HDMF vs Sagun July 31, 2018

Facts:

n 2008, Globe Asiatique, through its president Delfin Lee, entered into a Window I-Contract to Sell (CTS)
Real Estate Mortgage (REM) with Buy-back Guaranty take out mechanism with the HDMF, also known as
the Pag-Ibig Fund, for its Xevera Bacolor Project in Pampanga. Globe Asiatique and HDMF also executed
various Funding Commitment Agreements (FCAs) and Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs). 

Under the FCAs, Delfin Lee warranted that the loan applicants that Globe Asiatique would allow to pre-
process, and whose housing loans it would approve, were existing buyers of its real estate and qualified
to avail themselves of loans from HDMF under the Pag-Ibig Fund; that all documents submitted to the
HDMF in behalf of the applicants, inclusive of the individual titles and the corresponding Deeds of
Assignment, were valid, binding and enforceable; that any person or agent employed by Globe Asiatique
or allowed to transact or do business in its behalf had not committed any act of misrepresentation; and
that in the event of a default of the three-month payment on the amortizations by said members or any
breach of warranties, Globe Asiatique would buy back the CTS/REM accounts during the first two years
of the loan. 

The parties further agreed that Globe Asiatique would collect the monthly amortizations on the loans
obtained by its buyers in the first two years of the loan agreements and remit the amounts collected to
HDMF through a Collection Servicing Agreement (CSA). In this regard, Delfin Lee undertook to maintain
at least 90% Performing Accounts Ratio (PAR) under the CSA.

On June 10, 2008, Delfin Lee proposed the piloting of a Special Other Working Group (OWG)
Membership Program for its Xevera Bacolor Project while the FCA was in effect. The OWG Membership
Program would comprise of HDMF members who were not formally employed but derived income from
non-formal sources (e.g., practicing professionals, selfemployed members, Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs), and entrepreneurs). Delfin Lee offered to extend the buy-back guarantee from two to five years
to bolster his position that the project was viable. HDMF eventually entered into another agreement for
this purpose

Issue:  WON Pampanga RTC's judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest against the respondents is valid

Ruling:

The statement made by public respondent that there is probable cause because "xxx a huge amount of
money was transferred from the coffers of respondent HDMF and released to GA through a complex
scheme xxx that could only have been accomplished by and through the sustained supervision and
action in concert of a group of persons for the attainment of the same criminal objective," to be in the
nature of a speculation only and carries no weight in the determination of probable cause.
Jurisprudence dictates that in the determination of probable cause, the same should be based on hard
facts and solid evidence and not dwell on possibilities, suspicion and speculation. From the aforequoted
paragraph alone, petitioner's (Delfin Lee) participation, if there was any, in the offense for which he was
indicted, was not established or ascertained. Worse, petitioner was not even named. Neither were his
cohorts in the alleged defrauding of respondent HDMF.

Petitioner Lee and his co-accused were charged with syndicated estafa. For estafa to have been
committed by a syndicate, the act must be committed by five or more persons. A considered scrutiny of
the assailed Resolution by public respondent which found probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest
against petitioner Lee and his co-accused, shows that there was no mention that the acts constituting
estafa were done by five or more persons. The resolution merely mentioned "could only have been
accomplished by and through the sustained supervision and action in concert of a group of persons for
the attaim1ient of the same criminal objective." Moreover, the amount of damage incurred by
respondent HDMF was not ascertained. It goes without saying that public respondent did not take it
upon herself to determine, based on the evidence submitted, the exact amount of damage incurred by
respondent HDMF. Public respondent merely made a sweeping statement that a huge amount of money
was transferred from the coffers of the PAG-IBIG Fund to GA.

Tujan-Millante versus Nustad June 19, 2017

Facts: 

On June 2, 2011, Respondent Ana Kari Carmencita Nustad represented by Atty. Lucila filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City and prayed that Ma. Hazdina A. Tujan-Militante
be ordered to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Lucena City the owner’s duplicate copy of the
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T- 387158 and T-387159, which ‘were all issued in
Nustad’s name. She averred that Tujan-Militante has been withholding the said titles.

Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Annul Proceeding
dated September 2, 2011. She averred that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she
was not able to receive summons. Moreover, she argued that the Order appeared to be a decision on
the merits, as it already ruled with certainty that she is in possession of the subject titles.

RTC denied Tujan-Militante’ s Motion and ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case. Further the RTC
stated that it has not yet decided on the merits of the case when it ordered Tujan-Militante to surrender
TCT Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T- 387.158 and T-387159 because it merely set the petition for a hearing.

Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration and alleged that the Power of Attorney executed by
Nustad in favor of Atty. Lucila is void and non-existent. Tujan-Militante likewise averred that Atty. Lucila
is representing a Norwegian, who is not allowed to own lands in the Philippines. Aside from the
dismissal of the case, petitioner prayed that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Land Registration
Authority be impleaded. Moreover, Tujan-Militante prayed for moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

Issue: Whether or not the Special power of attorney notarized abroad is validly issued and can be used
in the Philippines by Atty. Lucila on behalf of Nustad under Rule 132 section 25.

Rulings: Yes. The requirements in Rule 132, Section 24 does not apply.

In the Heirs of Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro, this Court clarified that the ruling in the Lopez case is
inapplicable because the Rules of Evidence which were then effective were the old Rules, prior to their
amendment in 1989. When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, the introductory phrase “An
official record or an entry therein ” was substituted by the phrase “The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, as found in the present Rules. Also, Section 25 of the former
Rules became Section 24 of the present Rules.

On this note, the case of Heirs of Spouses Arcilla explained further:

It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service under
Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19 (a), to wit: written official acts or
records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of
the Philippines, or of a foreign country. TheCourt agrees with the CA that had the Court intended to
include notarial documents as one of the public documents contemplated by ·the provisions of Section
24, it should not have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19.

As the Rules explicitly provide that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service refers
only to written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines, or of a. foreign country, as found in Section 19(a), Rule
132, such enumeration does not include documents acknowledged before a notary public abroad.

With all these, We rule on the validity of the subject notarial document. What is important is that
Nustad certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer an oath that she is
authorizing Atty. Lucila to institute the petition before the court a quo on her behalf.

A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there
must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the
document should be upheld.

Lastly, Tujan-Militante’s contention that the TCTs under the name of N ustad are invalid because of her
citizenship constitutes a collateral attack on the titles. The CA correctly ruled that the issue as to
whether an alien is or is not qualified to acquire the lands covered by the subject titles can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.

Kumer vs People Sept 11, 2013

Facts:

On 19 June 1988, Jesus Mallo, Jr. accompanied by AmielMalana went to petitioner’s house. Mallo
knocked at the front doorwith a stone and identified himself by saying, “Auntie, ako si BoyMallo.” Leticia
opened the front door and, at this point, the son andco-accused Johan Kummer shot Mallo twice.
Malana immediately ranaway, followed by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he sawLeticia leveling
and firing her gun at Mallo, hitting the latter’s backand causing him to fall flat on the ground.Petitioner
went inside the house and came out with a flashlight tolook for Mallo’s body. When they found it,
Leticia uttered, “Johan,patay na” then they pulled him 3 or 4 meters away from the house.They returned
to the house and turned off all the lights after.An information for homicide was filed against petitioner
and Johan.Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Atone point after plea and
during trial, the information was amendedto change the date of the commission of the crime from 19
July 1988to 19 June 1988, and petitioner was convicted based on the amendedinformation.RTC found
Leticia and Johan guilty of homicide. CA affirmed thedecision.Petitioner now claims that she was not
arraigned on the amendedinformation.
Issue:

WON there is necessity for a new arraignment in this case because ofthe amendment of the
information?

Ruling:

No.There is no need for a new arraignment since the changeof date of commission of a crime is merely a
formal amendment.Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
states:Section14.Amendmentorsubstitution.Acomplaintorinformation may be amended, in form or in
substance, withoutleave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. Afterthe plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only bemade with leave of court and when it can be done
withoutcausing prejudice to the rights of the accused.However, any amendment before plea, which
downgrades thenature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from thecomplaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by theprosecutor, with notice to the offended party and
with leave ofcourt. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion andcopies of its order shall
be furnished all parties, especially theoffended party.If it appears at any time before judgment that a
mistake has beenmade in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss theoriginal complaint or
information upon the filing of a new onecharging the proper offense in accordance with section 19,
Rule119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy.