ACADEMIA Letters

Using mental bias to construct a model of cognition

Lorin Friesen, mentalsymmetry.com, Abbotsford, BC, Canada

Immanuel Kant suggested back in 1781 that the structure of the mind causes people to interpret
reality in certain ways (Smith, 2011). For instance, people believe that reality is composed of
space and time because the mind thinks in terms of space and time. Kant’s statements have
been interpreted in many different ways (Stang, 2016), but the basic principle is that the mind is
imposing its structure upon observations of physical reality. This mental imposition suggests
a possible method for studying the mind. Stated briefly, a cognitive mechanism can be defined
as a form of thinking that results from the structure of the mind; thinking is being pushed in
directions that are cognitively natural. Cognitive mechanisms can be uncovered by looking
for common thinking patterns in different fields, a methodology that could be described as
semi-rigorous analogical reasoning.
Research normally attempts to eliminate mental bias in order to gain a clearer understand-
ing of what is being studied (Sackett, 1979). A search for cognitive mechanisms does the
opposite, eliminating data in order to gain a clearer understanding of mental bias. Data can
be eliminated most effectively by comparing the thinking of unrelated fields. If two fields
are totally different, then any commonality between them presumably comes from the minds
of those studying these fields. Thus, an empirical field might be compared with a psycho-
logical field, observation with introspection, art with mathematics, or objective science with
subjective religion. The goal in each case is to look for common ways of thinking that are
presumably being caused by cognitive mechanisms.
This kind of methodology is, by definition, highly interdisciplinary. And the best results
will be achieved by including a wide spectrum of fields. A field that is being analyzed for cog-
nitive mechanisms does not have to be regarded as scientifically valid. Instead, what matters
is finding authors who are carefully describing what it means to think about some subject—
whatever that subject may be. This definitely includes Thomas Kuhn’s book on paradigms

Academia Letters, July 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Lorin Friesen, lorinfriesen@gmail.com

Citation: Friesen, L. (2021). Using mental bias to construct a model of cognition. Academia Letters, Article
1681. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1681.

1
(Kuhn, 1970) but also includes an analysis of Zen Buddhism (Humphreys, 1976). Obviously,
a methodology that minimizes data, compares fields, and looks for common patterns is quite
different than the normal scientific method of building carefully upon empirical data within
some field. In addition, searching for cognitive mechanisms requires competence in a number
of unrelated fields, which is difficult to achieve in today’s world of technical specializations.
A similar methodology is used to improve the resolution of visual images, known as image
stacking (Park, 2008). Suppose that one has many blurry, noisy pictures of some object or
scene. It is possible to construct a composite picture that has greater resolution and less noise
by mathematically stacking these blurry images on top of one another. Park mentions that
image stacking will only work if each image views the same scene from a different perspective,
and images have to be rotated and shifted in order to line up with one another, typically done
by aligning each new image with some reference image.
Applying this to a search for cognitive mechanisms, examining a single system or field
will only provide a blurry and noisy ‘image’ of how the mind functions. However, a clearer
and less noisy ‘picture’ of the mind will emerge if many images from different perspectives
are laid on top of one another. But what is needed to start this process of cognitive ‘image
stacking’ is some reference image to which succeeding pictures can be aligned.
This methodology has been used successfully to construct a reasonably detailed cognitive
model, known as the theory of mental symmetry. The original ‘blurry image’ emerged from
a system of cognitive styles encountered in the 1980s (Harvey, 1976). This system was ex-
panded through an analysis of 200 biographies (Friesen, 1986), leading to the theory of mental
symmetry. This theory describes the mind as seven interacting cognitive modules, with each
cognitive module being emphasized by one of seven cognitive styles. It was discovered back
in the 1980s that the function of each cognitive module corresponds to the function of some
brain region, providing empirical evidence that this ‘blurry image’ really was a ‘picture’ of
the mind.
A more extensive form of ‘image stacking’ has been used recently to compare various
fields and systems for common cognitive mechanisms. This process involves two primary
steps. First, each field is ‘lined up’ with the reference image provided by mental symmetry.
This means identifying which cognitive modules are being used and how they are interacting.
For instance, one cognitive module (known as Perceiver thought) deals with facts, which it de-
termines by looking for repeated connections between experiences. Another cognitive module
(known as Server thought) deals with actions and sequences. Thus, whenever some system
talks about facts, this is interpreted as referring to Perceiver thought. Similarly, any mention
of sequences or actions is interpreted as a reference to Server thought. For instance, Kant’s
reference to space and time would be interpreted as saying that the mind contains a cognitive

Academia Letters, July 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Lorin Friesen, lorinfriesen@gmail.com

Citation: Friesen, L. (2021). Using mental bias to construct a model of cognition. Academia Letters, Article
1681. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1681.

2
module (Perceiver thought) that looks for spatial connections between physical experiences,
and a cognitive module (Server thought) that looks for temporal connections between physical
experiences.
The second step increases the ‘resolution’ of the cognitive image by comparing the de-
tails of the new field being analyzed with the details of the current composite image of the
mind. For instance, Kant only gave a limited picture of the functioning of Perceiver thought
and Server thought. Other systems that talk about facts or sequences provide a different per-
spective that emphasizes other aspects of these cognitive modules. ‘Stacking’ these various
perspectives on top of one another makes it possible to construct a composite ‘image’ of
each cognitive module that is more detailed and less noisy than the description provided by
any single system or field. And it can be concluded that the resulting composite picture accu-
rately describes the functioning of the mind because it maps in detail onto the latest neurology
(Friesen, 2019). I am not aware of any other cognitive model that maps onto neurology with
this level of completeness and detail. (And if there is a detailed mapping between mind and
brain, then meaningful research can be done without having to determine what is mind and
what is brain.)
A number of unrelated fields have been analyzed using this methodology. The earliest
analyses tend to be somewhat ‘blurry and noisy’ and lacking in rigor. However, papers have
been presented at several academic conferences, and some of the more recent analyses have
been written in the form of academic papers and books. These include the cultural and lin-
guistic aspects involved in teaching English as a second language (Friesen, 2013), a book
on natural cognitive theology (Friesen, 2015), a cognitive analysis of science and theology
(Friesen, 2020), and a cognitive analysis of economics (Friesen, 2021). This has turned men-
tal symmetry into a meta-theory of cognition that provides a framework within which to place
more specific theories.
Publishing this research has proved to be a challenge, because academic journals focus
upon sharing incremental discoveries with academic peers who follow the same paradigm,
as described by Thomas Kuhn (1970, pp. 19 – 20). A search for cognitive mechanisms, in
contrast, acquires its rigor by ‘image stacking’, which means comparing different paradigms
in a detailed manner, resulting in papers that are too long and too interdisciplinary to publish.
This challenge can itself be analyzed from a cognitive perspective. It appears that the
seven cognitive modules can interact in three primary ways, which mental symmetry refers to
as technical thought, normal thought, and mental networks. Technical thought corresponds to
the ‘normal science’ of Thomas Kuhn, and could be summarized as solving technical problems
within the ‘playing field’ of some game guided by the rules of that game (Kuhn, 1970). Normal
thought is a less rigorous form of thinking based upon analogies and metaphors, which is

Academia Letters, July 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Lorin Friesen, lorinfriesen@gmail.com

Citation: Friesen, L. (2021). Using mental bias to construct a model of cognition. Academia Letters, Article
1681. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1681.

3
guided by the facts of Perceiver thought and the sequences of Server thought. A seminal
volume here is Lakoff & Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff, 2008). Metaphors guide
the thinking and behavior of normal life, which is why this is referred to as normal thought.
When one field is being compared with another to look for cognitive mechanisms, then
normal thought is being used to search for analogies. (Analogy uses similarities to provide
a theoretical explanation, while metaphor uses similarities to connect experiences. One of
the seven cognitive modules generates theories, while another deals with experiences.) The
analogies of normal thought can be made semi-rigorous by adding details and by looking
for functional analogies. Semi-rigorous analogical thinking uses analogy in a manner that is
consistent with scientific thought (Gentner, 1993) and mental symmetry follows the principles
described by Gentner (Friesen, 2020).
Mental networks are collections of related emotional memories that function as a unit.
Mental networks are similar to psychological schemas (Brewer, 1984), but include an emo-
tional component. A mental network generates positive emotion when experiencing input that
is consistent with its structure and negative emotion when input is inconsistent. For instance,
mental networks provide the emotional drive for maintaining a culture, and culture shock is an
example of a mental network generating negative emotion. The distinction between mental
networks and technical thought can be seen in dual process theory, which divides thinking
into a fast, intuitive form known as Type 1 and a slower, more logical type of thought known
as Type 2 (Sloman, 1996).
Summarizing, a method for developing and clarifying a cognitive model has been de-
scribed, which compares thinking in different fields in order to uncover cognitive mechanisms.

Academia Letters, July 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Lorin Friesen, lorinfriesen@gmail.com

Citation: Friesen, L. (2021). Using mental bias to construct a model of cognition. Academia Letters, Article
1681. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1681.

4
References
Brewer, W. F., & Nakamura, G. V. (1984). The nature and functions of schemas. Center for
the Study of Reading Technical Report; no. 325.

Friesen, Lane (1986). Cognitive Styles in History: Contributor and Server. Victoria, BC:
Lane Friesen, Inc.

Friesen, Lane (1986). Cognitive Styles in History: Perceiver and Mercy. Victoria, BC: Lane
Friesen, Inc.

Friesen, L., & Van Dyke, A. (2013). A Cognitive Meta-Theory for TESOL. Retrieved from
researchgate.net. doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3552.2721

Friesen, Lorin (2015). Natural Cognitive Theology. Abbotsford, BC: Lorin Friesen.

Friesen, Lorin (2019). Mapping a cognitive theory onto neurology. Retrieved from research-
gate.net. doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28982.24641

Friesen, Lorin (2020). A cognitive model of science and theology. Retrieved from research-
gate.net. doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27653.17122/1

Friesen, Lorin (2021). A cognitive model of economics. Retrieved from researchgate. doi:
10.13140/RG.2.2.17044.83847

Gentner, D., & Jeziorski, M. 1993. The shift from metaphor to analogy in Western science.
In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and thought: 447–480. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.

Harvey, F. (1976). Motivational Gifts. Vision Magazine, 18(6). pp. 5-9.

Humphreys, C. (1976). Zen Buddhism. London: Butler & Tanner Ltd.

Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd Ed.). Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (2008). Metaphors we live by. University of Chicago press.

Park, S. C., Park, M. K., & Kang, M. G. (2003). Super-resolution image reconstruction: a
technical overview. IEEE signal processing magazine, 20(3), 21-36.

Sackett, D. L. (1979). Bias in analytic research. In The case-control study consensus and

Academia Letters, July 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Lorin Friesen, lorinfriesen@gmail.com

Citation: Friesen, L. (2021). Using mental bias to construct a model of cognition. Academia Letters, Article
1681. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1681.

5
 controversy (pp. 51-63). Pergamon.

Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological
bulletin, 119(1), 3.

Smith, N. K. (2011). Immanuel Kant’s critique of pure reason. Read Books Ltd.

Stang, N. F., Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. (Spring 2021), In The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved from https://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/.

Academia Letters, July 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Lorin Friesen, lorinfriesen@gmail.com

Citation: Friesen, L. (2021). Using mental bias to construct a model of cognition. Academia Letters, Article
1681. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1681.