What is a Person?

Rāmānuja’s Vedāntic Anthropology

Jon Paul Sydnor

This is the fundamental relationship between the Supreme and the universe of individual
selves and physical entities. It is the relationship of soul and body, the inseparable relation-
ship of the supporter and the supported, that of the controller and the controlled, and that
of the principal entity and the subsidiary entity. That which takes possession of another
entity entirely as the latter’s support, controller and principal, is called the soul of that
latter entity. That which, in its entirety, depends upon, is controlled by and subserves
another and is therefore its inseparable mode, is called the body of the latter. Such is the
relation between the individual self and its body. Such being the relationship, the supreme
Self, having all as its body, is denoted by all terms.1

The Vedāntic Challenge to Rāmānuja

R āmānuja was an 11th-century Tamil theologian. Born a Brahmin, he was

thoroughly trained in the Sanskrit scriptures by Yādava Prakāśa. In pro-
nounced violation of teacher-student norms of that period, Rāmānuja
strongly disagreed with Yādava’s interpretation of those scriptures, which prob-
ably accorded with the Advaitin (nondual) school of Vedānta. Rāmānuja’s inter-
pretations leaned more toward theism, a consequence of his devotional religious
disposition. Over time, his own devotion came to focus on Viṣṇu and his consort
Śrī, and he eventually associated himself with the eponymous Śrīvaiṣṇava com-
munity.2

85
86 Journal of Vaishnava Studies

Śrīvaiṣṇavas at the time were under tremendous intellectual pressure. The

Advaita Vedānta school, founded by Śaṅkara in the eighth century, was arguing
that meditative, nontheistic religion was more sophisticated than devotional,
theistic religion. They were using the most authoritative, pan-Indian, San-
skritic scriptures to make this argument. Rāmānuja and his (probably adoptive)
Śrīvaiṣṇavas faced an intellectual atmosphere that disparaged worship of Viṣṇu,
teaching instead the identity of Ātman and Brahman, the individual self and the
impersonal infinite absolute within and beyond the universe. By the time of
Rāmānuja, the Advaitins were having a great deal of success within the upper
echelons of society, as evidenced by Rāmānuja’s own childhood education.
Tamil Śrīvaiṣṇavas were blessed with popular enthusiasm, but their theism
was inadequately articulated within the intellectually dominant tradition of
Vedānta. This inadequacy deprived them of respectability outside South India,
limiting their religious credibility and influence. Rāmānuja’s life project was to
correct this perceived weakness and reconcile Tamil devotionalism with Vedāntic
intellectualism through rigorous interpretation of the Vedic scriptures.3
Against Śaṅkara’s Vedic, Sanskritic, Advaitin critiques of theism, Rāmānuja
and his community wielded their own theological treasure—the Tamil Veda.
The Tamil Veda consists of Śrīvaiṣṇavism’s long record of devotion to Viṣṇu, best
known by the proper name Nārāyaṇa. Consolidated by Nāthamuni more than a
century before the birth of Rāmānuja, the anthology organizes and preserves the
devotional songs of the twelve Alvars, the revered poet-saints of Śrīvaiṣṇavism.
Eventually the entire collection of hymns, the Prabandham, would be given the
religiously assertive designation “Tamil Veda,” correlating it with the Sanskrit
Veda. Rāmānuja, having apparently received no training in the Tamil scriptures
under Yādava, played catch up under his Śrīvaiṣṇava tutors yet astounded them
with his quick mastery of the Tamil corpus.
Once Rāmānuja completed his Śrīvaiṣṇava training, he set out to grant scrip-
tural and theological respectability to Śrīvaiṣṇavism through a rigorous re-inter-
pretation of Sanskritic scripture in light of Tamil scripture. His method was some-
what covert, since his scriptural references are almost exclusively to the Sanskrit
texts. But if he could link the authority of Sanskritic scripture to the practice of
Tamil worship, then he could establish the legitimacy of his community’s practice
within the pan-Indian theological arena.
The endeavor would not be easy since a paradox lies at the heart of Sanskritic
scripture, especially the Upaniṣads. Rāmānuja’s fundamental challenge was to
reconcile texts that describe the identity of Brahman, humans, and the universe
with those that assert the difference of Brahman, humans, and the universe. Three
 Rāmānuja’s Vedāntic Anthropology 87

hundred years before Rāmānuja, his rival Śaṅkara had emphasized the identity,
interpreting the Veda (the Hindu sacred scriptures, broadly conceived) as non-
dual thereby founding the interpretative school of Advaita (Nondual) Vedānta.
Two hundred years after Rāmānuja, Madhva would emphasize the ontological
difference among Brahman, humans, and the universe, interpreting the Vedas as
dual and founding the interpretative school of Dvaita (Dual) Vedānta. Situated
between them theologically and historically, Rāmānuja would articulate a divine-
human relationship characterized by both identity and difference.4
Rāmānuja’s embrace of identity and difference among Nārāyaṇa, humans, and
the universe is not a rejection of reason; Rāmānuja insists that both our study of
the world and of the scriptures should be rational, even as reason relies on revela-
tion for its own fulfillment. Instead, Rāmānuja’s solution is metaphysical. In order
to merge identity and difference, Rāmānuja proposes a metaphysic in which we
and the universe can be of Nārāyaṇa and yet not Nārāyaṇa, at the same time.
Now, let us consider Rāmānuja’s rationalist, exegetical resolution of this
seemingly intractable tension between identity and difference. For practical
purposes, we will focus on Rāmānuja’s anthropology (doctrine of human being),
only addressing his theology (doctrine of Nārāyaṇa) and cosmology (doctrine of
prakṛti) as they relate to his anthropology. This focus will keep our investigation to
a manageable length. It will also allow us to address such contemporary and cru-
cial questions as: What is a person? And what are persons for?
Humankind has offered innumerable answers to these questions. We have
reduced humans to objects and perpetrated slavery. We have declared ourselves
essentially material and dependent on our bodies. We have declared ourselves
essentially spiritual and trapped within our bodies. Rāmānuja provides his own
answer to these questions, a particularly powerful answer worthy of consider-
ation today.
(A brief note on nomenclature: Rāmānuja is an exegetical theologian propos-
ing an interpretation of the Vedas, Upaniṣads, Bhagavad Gītā, Brāhma Sūtras, and
other Sanskritic scriptures—collectively referred to as the Veda. These texts, and
Rāmānuja’s resulting theology,5 refer to “God” by a multitude of terms and names
including Brahman, Īśvara, Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa, et al. For the sake of consistency,
I will most frequently refer to Rāmānuja’s “God” as Nārāyaṇa. When discussing
other writers, I will utilize the more universal term “Brahman.” Utilizing both
terms risks some confusion but reminds readers that, for Rāmānuja, Brahman is
a truly personal God, identified generally with Viṣṇu, but most powerfully known
by the proper name Nārāyaṇa. The scriptural passages that I cite will refer to God
in several different ways, but in my analysis of those passages I will usually refer
88 Journal of Vaishnava Studies

to Rāmānuja’s God as Nārāyaṇa, and other theorists’ God as Brahman.)

The Vedāntic Anthropology of Rāmānuja

Therefore, the only alternative left is that the soul is a part of Brahman, in which
case alone both these sets of texts can be taken in their primary sense. By part,
however, is meant that which constitutes one aspect (deśa) of a substance. Hence
a distinguishing quality of a substance is a part of that substance. The luster of
gems, the generic character of a cow in cows, or the body of an embodied being,
is a part of the gem, the cow, or the embodied being respectively. In this sense,
the soul which is the body of Brahman, as declared by the scriptural texts, is a
part of It. These qualities which distinguish the substance are experienced as dif-
ferent from the substance; hence the texts which declare the difference. On the
other hand, inasmuch as these qualities cannot exist without the substance, they
are non-different from it; hence the texts which declare non-difference.6

Rāmānuja utilizes three terms in his anthropology: jīva, jīvātman, and ātman.
Generally, in the Vedārthasaṅgraha (Rāmānuja’s most systematic work and the
focus of our investigation), the ātman is the self as unembodied, while the jīvātman
refers to the ātman as embodied. However, when commenting on a specific scrip-
tural passage, Rāmānuja will frequently use “ātman” interchangeably with “jīva,”
depending on the scripture under discussion. In Rāmānuja’s Gītā Bhāṣya (his com-
mentary on the Bhagavad Gītā) for example, the term ātman is favored in accord
with the predominant terminology of that text. In our analysis we will favor the
term jīva, in accord with the predominant terminology of the Vedārthasaṅgraha.
Each jīva is a mode (prakāra) of Nārāyaṇa. Prakāra is one of the most important
terms in Rāmānuja’s ontology because it bears the linguistic weight of differ-
ence. In addition to accounting for Upaniṣadic texts that assert the homogene-
ity of reality, Rāmānuja must also account for Upaniṣadic texts that assert the
heterogeneity of reality: “He [Brahman] then thought, ‘Let me be many.’”7 How
can real difference exist if Brahman/Nārāyaṇa is the underlying ground of all
existence and all existents? Rāmānuja argues for the reality of difference through
the existence of three different modes (prakāra) of divine being: Nārāyaṇa, cit
(sentient beings, souls, jīvas) and acit (nonsentient beings, matter). These three
modes share one material cause, hence one substance—Nārāyaṇa. Neverthe-
less, although cit and acit exist as modes of Nārāyaṇa, Nārāyaṇa remains wholly
distinct (sarvavilakṣaṇa) from cit and acit by nature of Nārāyaṇa’s self-sustenance.
That is, while Nārāyaṇa sustains his own being, cit and acit do not sustain their
own being. Instead, they are entirely and always dependent upon Nārāyaṇa for
their existence. This ontological dependence distinguishes them from Nārāyaṇa.8
 Rāmānuja’s Vedāntic Anthropology 89

Nārāyaṇa grants cit and acit a distinct state of being by assigning them a dis-
tinct name and form (nāmarūpa), and a new purpose consequent upon that name
and form.9 The distinct name, form, and purpose prevent any identification with
Nārāyaṇa on the part of the new modalities. At the same time, these distinc-
tions—including the primary distinction of self-sustenance as opposed to other-
sustenance—insulate Nārāyaṇa from any charge of mutability based on the suffer-
ing of jīvas or the mutations of prakṛti.10 The purpose of the jīva (individual soul) is
to worship Nārāyaṇa eternally unencumbered by deleterious attachments, while
the purpose of prakṛti (acit) is to execute karma for those jīvas who have not yet
achieved release, relentlessly impelling them toward a desire for liberation. As
modes, jīvas (individual souls) can neither separate from Nārāyaṇa, which would
bring about annihilation, nor can they identify with Nārāyaṇa, from whom they
are distinct due to Nārāyaṇa’s self-sustenance. Instead, jīvas are by nature eternal-
ly and inextricably related to Nārāyaṇa, whose worship and service is their highest
calling and their greatest blessing.11
We can best understand the relationship of mode and mode-possessor (prakāra
and prakārin) through the analogy of attribute and substance.12 Modes are in
the same dependent status with regard to their possessor as an attribute is to its
substance. Similarly, a mode can be perceived or understood correctly only with
reference to its possessor, just as an attribute can be perceived or understood cor-
rectly only with reference to its substance. Rāmānuja provides the example of a
gem and its luster.13 The luster cannot exist independently of the gem, nor can it
be perceived or understood accurately without reference to the gem. In order to
further clarify the analogy, Rāmānuja states that not only can a quality exist as an
attribute of a substance, but a substance can exist as an attribute of a substance,
with all the dependence that any attribute would have upon its substrate.14 In
other words, the substance of Nārāyaṇa in its modes of cit and acit is absolutely
dependent upon the substance of Nārāyaṇa as Nārāyaṇa. Therefore, puruṣa and
prakṛti, cit and acit are as dependent upon Nārāyaṇa as the luster is upon the
gem.15
In the end, these modal distinctions are perhaps best understood as a pro-
foundly relational unity. In the case of an individual, the two substances of jīva
(the individual soul) and prakṛti (nature) are united through the indissoluble onto-
logical dependence of the body upon the soul. More comprehensively, the three
modes of Nārāyaṇa, jīva, and prakṛti are united through the indissoluble ontologi-
cal dependence of the jīva and prakṛti upon Nārāyaṇa. An accurate perception of
a human being, therefore, cannot be materialist (we are dependent upon our
bodies) or even dualist (we are embodied souls or ensouled bodies). Instead, an
90 Journal of Vaishnava Studies

accurate perception of a human being must reflect the monosubstantial, trimodal

unity of that human being: the material body dependent upon the individual soul,
both of which are dependent upon Nārāyaṇa for their existence.16
As noted above, the jīva is, like prakṛti, monosubstantial (of one substance) with
Nārāyaṇa of whom it is a mode. And like prakṛti, the jīva functions as the body of
Nārāyaṇa meaning that it is controlled by and instrumental to Nārāyaṇa.17 How-
ever, unlike prakṛti the jīva shares a form analogous to that of Nārāyaṇa, since
both possess a proper form (here, svabhāva) of pure, unlimited knowledge and
bliss (amalaparicchinnajñānānanda).18 Like Nārāyaṇa, this proper form of knowledge
and bliss is characterized by the corresponding attributes of knowledge and bliss.19
Human being is derivative of Nārāyaṇa’s being. Nārāyaṇa is not anthropomor-
phic; humankind is theomorphic.
All jīvas are essentially alike in this form and attribution. That is, there is no
essential distinction between jīvas, all of which are identical. Distinguishing char-
acteristics belong to the realm of prakṛti, and those who posit ultimate distinctions
based on these characteristics simply manifest their captivation by prakṛti. At the
same time, however, penultimate distinctions of caste and gender are allowed in
order to preserve an ordered universe that permits release. But in the end all jīvas
are equal (samam: alike, same).20 To recognize this equality is, fundamentally, to
recognize one’s dependence on Nārāyaṇa.21
Jīvas—like Nārāyaṇa, prakṛti, karma, avidya (nescience), the Veda, and saṃsāra—
are eternal. They are beginningless and endless; they always have been and
always will be. Rāmānuja gives three reasons as to why the jīva must be eternal.
First, because it is simple rather than complex, it cannot disintegrate as does, for
example, a human body. Second, rather than being known, just as a jug is known,
the jīva knows. The Bhagavad Gīta assures the eternality of that which knows
(13.1). Third, the jīva pervades the body, while the body is pervaded by the jīva.
Because that which pervades is subtle and that which is pervaded is gross, the jīva
is inferred to perdure through time while the body is consumed by time.22
Other qualities characterize the jīva. In addition to being eternal, the jīva is also
self-luminous, a subject that knows both objects and other subjects, including
itself. As a knower that can know itself, the jīva is conscious. This consciousness of
oneself is, according to Rāmānuja, the act of self-illumination. It is not a degraded
consciousness in need of sublimation, but a pure consciousness in itself. In mak-
ing this point Rāmānuja implicitly critiques those Advaitins who insist that the
individual consciousness needs purification through assimilation into the greater
consciousness of the impersonal Brahman. Instead, insists Rāmānuja, the jīva’s
consciousness is valuable in itself. It needs actualization through devotion, not
 Rāmānuja’s Vedāntic Anthropology 91

assimilation into a vast, pure consciousness.23

In his doctrine of prakṛti, Rāmānuja has to explain how mutable prakṛti can be
a mode of Nārāyaṇa without compromising Nārāyaṇa’s immutability. Similarly,
in his doctrine of the jīva, Rāmānuja must explain how suffering jīvas can be a
mode of Nārāyaṇa without compromising Nārāyaṇa’s absolute bliss. As was noted
above, jīvas suffer due to their identification with a body. The body in itself is
insentient and does not suffer. But jīvas suffer pleasure and pain as they assume
that the body is their source of existence. More specifically, jīvas’ karma deter-
mines their experience of material objects as pleasurable or painful. The objects
themselves have no inherent agreeable or disagreeable quality. Instead, the expe-
riencer’s karma assigns their quality to them.
Since karma changes, the experiential quality of objects changes. The same
object can provoke satisfaction one day and grief the next (like a lost valuable), or
pleasure one moment and pain the next (like an excessive meal). Therefore, the
pursuit of happiness through the experience of pleasing objects is an inevitably
frustrating endeavor, since the pleasing or displeasing quality of objects is con-
stantly shifting. For that reason, the material world can offer no substantive or
abiding pleasure. So long as jīvas identify with their bodies and seek satisfaction
through their physical surroundings, they will suffer. The only “object” that is
inherently pleasing to contemplate is Nārāyaṇa.24
But how does Nārāyaṇa possess a suffering body of jīvas without himself suf-
fering? One analogy that Rāmānuja provides is that of the Sun reflected off a
putrid pond. While the reflection may appear dimmed, the reality of the Sun will
remain dazzlingly brilliant. Rāmānuja provides another analogy: the jīvas, claims
Rāmānuja, are like the luster of a gem or the light of a candle. The luster and the
light are inseparable from their sources, but they are not their sources. The luster
is inseparable but distinguishable from the gem, and the light is inseparable but
distinguishable from the candle. By way of analogy, the jīva is a part (aṃśa) of
Nārāyaṇa, united with Nārāyaṇa but distinct from Nārāyaṇa. Rāmānuja defines
“part” to mean “that which constitutes one aspect (deśa) of a substance.” So, all
distinguishing qualities of a substance are to be considered parts of that sub-
stance. The luster is a part of the gem, the light is a part of the candle, and the jīva
is a part of Nārāyaṇa. As distinguishable they are different, so all Vedic texts that
proclaim ontological plurality are true. But as inseparable they are united, so all
Vedic texts that proclaim ontological unity are true as well.25
Another explanation for Nārāyaṇa’s transcendence despite the jīvas’ suffering
is the analogy of king and subject. Although the king and his subjects both have
bodies, only the subjects, not the king, suffer punishment for transgression of the
92 Journal of Vaishnava Studies

law. Similarly, Nārāyaṇa remains blissful while jīvas—to whom Nārāyaṇa assigns
name and form (nāmarūpa) in accord with their karma—suffer pleasure and pain
due to their good and bad deeds. In order to understand this analogy we must
recall that Nārāyaṇa’s own bodies—jīvas and prakṛti—are freely chosen rather than
karmically imposed.26 As freely chosen they cannot cause the suffering that kar-
mically imposed bodies cause. Indeed, Nārāyaṇa’s power to assign name and form
constitutes a defining difference between jīvas and Nārāyaṇa.27
We may note several other differences between Nārāyaṇa and jīvas. Although
Nārāyaṇa and jīvas share a proper form (svarūpa: essential nature) of knowledge
and bliss, they remain distinct in that proper form since Nārāyaṇa’s knowledge
and bliss are infinite while those of jīvas are finite.28 Additionally, Nārāyaṇa’s
knowledge cannot diminish whereas jīvas’ knowledge is capable of contraction
and expansion in accord with their karma. Indeed, a jīva’s knowledge can become
so contracted that it forgets the sovereignty of Nārāyaṇa, enmeshing itself in the
vicissitudes of saṃsāra.29 Nārāyaṇa is inherently devoid of imperfections whereas
the jīva only becomes devoid of imperfections through Nārāyaṇa’s act of release.
And Nārāyaṇa’s inherent perfection is expressed as an ocean of auspicious quali-
ties, whereas the released jīva bears but two qualities, those of knowledge and
bliss.30
Finally, Nārāyaṇa is vibhū (pervasive) while the jīva is aṇu (atomic). That is,
Nārāyaṇa is everywhere (sarvagata) while the jīva is always somewhere, occupy-
ing a “smallest place.” We know this both through scripture and through reason.
Scripturally, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad 4.4.2 states, “Then the top of his heart lights
up, and with that light the self exits through the eye or the head or some other
part of the body. As he is departing, his lifebreath (prāṇa) departs with him. And
as his lifebreath departs, all his vital functions (prāṇa) depart with it.”31 Since the
self (here, ātman) departs the body, it must have been within the body, hence aṇu
(atomic). Were the jīva all-pervasive then no such motion would be possible.32
Additionally, Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 5.9 declares the jīva to be the size of a tip of
hair split into a hundred parts, and one of those parts split into a hundred further
parts. Although minute and dwelling in the heart, the jīva then pervades the body
as consciousness, in the same way that a drop of sandalwood ointment pervades
a room.33 But the pervasion stops there. Were the jīva to stretch farther, then it
would be related to all prakṛti rather than its own individual body. The jīva must
only experience its own karma by means of its own body.34
As noted above, Rāmānuja states that the essential nature of the self is devoid
of all the distinctions that characterize the body with which it is temporarily asso-
ciated. Instead, all individual selves have knowledge and bliss as their essential
 Rāmānuja’s Vedāntic Anthropology 93

natures. Once Nārāyaṇa frees the self from karma, hence from matter, all these
distinctions are destroyed, leaving only an individual self of the nature of con-
sciousness (jñānasvarūpam). This status applies to all individual selves.35
According to Rāmānuja, Nārāyaṇa creates and sustains jīvas to find fulfillment
in the love of Nārāyaṇa. Any other concept of human existence—as indepen-
dent of Nārāyaṇa, as dependent upon matter, as instrumental to itself—inher-
ently dooms the possessor of that concept to loss and attendant suffering. Alas,
so enchanting are the attractions of material existence that the human being
is unable to break the spell alone. Left to our own devices, we would remain
captivated by matter. There, we could at best celebrate occasional, anxious, and
transitory happiness. Even this anxious celebration would be accompanied by a
conscious or subconscious lament over our inescapable misery.36
Fortunately, captivation by matter is not the final word for human destiny,
since our existence is sustained by Nārāyaṇa and Nārāyaṇa wants to love us. This
love is the key to our liberation as through it we receive divine grace. Divine love
will of necessity harmonize with the joyful recognition that we are absolutely
dependent upon Nārāyaṇa—for our being, for our meaning, and for our purpose.
In other words, to be loved by the divine is to recognize our dependence upon
the divine and our sustenance by the divine. Such love-as-knowledge is the only
means to release. Ironically, through this release from matter’s captivity all real-
ity—including material reality—comes to mediate blessedness. A felt recognition of
the divine sustenance does not diminish us. It amplifies us and the world we live
in, unto perfection.

The Vedāntic Achievement of Rāmānuja

As noted at the beginning of this essay, Rāmānuja attempts to mediate between
the divine/human/world identity proposed by the Advaita (Nondual) Vedānta of
Śaṅkara and the divine/human/world difference later epitomized by the Dvaita
(Dual) Vedānta of Madhva. In so doing he provides the most articulate exposition
of Viśiṣṭādvaita (Qualified Nondual) Vedānta in the Hindu tradition, granting his
followers intellectual confidence, Vedāntic legitimacy, and access to the pan-
Indian theological conversation.
As a synthesist of identity and difference, we might expect Rāmānuja to iden-
tify with the Bhedābheda (Difference/Identity) school of Vedānta. Curiously, he
does not. In Rāmānuja’s opinion, both Advaita and Bhedābheda compromise the
perfection of Brahman/Nārāyaṇa by associating him with imperfection—an egre-
gious theological error for any Śrīvaiṣṇava. According to Rāmānuja, any unquali-
fied ascription of identity among Nārāyaṇa, humans, and the universe associates
94 Journal of Vaishnava Studies

Nārāyaṇa with imperfection, change, and limiting qualities, thus denying him
perfection.37 For instance, if the universe is ultimately identified with Nārāyaṇa,
then the ignorance in the universe must taint Nārāyaṇa—an impossibility. Or
if the suffering of human souls under the influence of karma is within Nārāyaṇa,
then Nārāyaṇa must suffer as well—another impossibility.38
Rāmānuja allows that human souls and the material universe are emanations
of Nārāyaṇa, of one substance with him. However, Rāmānuja is extremely cau-
tious to assert that the different modalities of Nārāyaṇa, souls, and the universe
prevent any communication of attributes among them, thereby preserving Nār-
āyaṇa’s perfection. Although all three are identical in substance, they are differ-
ent in mode. Thus, the ignorance within the universe does not taint Nārāyaṇa,
and the suffering of human souls does not harm Nārāyaṇa. Through this ontology
Rāmānuja rejects any association with either Advaita Vedānta or Bhedābheda
Vedānta.39
As we have seen, in order to safeguard Nārāyaṇa’s perfection Rāmānuja sug-
gests a number of terms for the relationship between Nārāyaṇa and existents,
all of which are ontological in nature. Rāmānuja emphasizes ontology because
he faced a situation in which the Tamil, Śrīvaiṣṇava feeling of devotion was inad-
equately accompanied by a metaphysic of devotion. Problematically, incongruity
between a religion’s experience and a culture’s worldview may result in abandon-
ment of the experience. And Śrīvaiṣṇavism was surrounded by highly developed,
intellectually articulate, metaphysically incongruous rivals. Be it the meditative
monism of Advaita Vedānta, the studious dualism of Saṅkhyā, the cosmic ritual-
ism of Mimāṃsā, or the theistic asceticism of Yoga—Śrīvaiṣṇavism competed in a
field crowded with established, respected rivals.40
Beginning his project, Rāmānuja inherits the Sanskrit Veda, which Śaṅkara had
provided an influential, nontheistic interpretation. Yet he also inherits the Tamil
Veda, which was passionately theistic in sensibility. In order to secure a position
amongst the āstikadarśanas (orthodox views) and prevent the loss of devotees,
Rāmānuja would have to connect Śrīvaiṣṇavism’s Sanskrit and Tamil heritages
through a new metaphysic. And in order for that metaphysic to secure cred-
ibility, it would have to be written in the most authoritative of Indian languages,
Sanskrit, and it would have to be founded upon the most authoritative of Indian
texts, the Vedas (broadly conceived). In other words, Tamil devotionalism in its
metaphysical form would have to be both Sanskritized and Vedānticized.41 Only in
this way would Rāmānuja secure a position for his beloved Śrīvaiṣṇavism within
Vedānta, the most authoritative tradition of scriptural interpretation in India. He
would have to offer an Ubhaya Vedānta, a “Both” Vedānta that would celebrate
 Rāmānuja’s Vedāntic Anthropology 95

Tamil, Śrīvaiṣṇava worship while giving it pan-Indian, Sanskritic respectability. In

the eyes of his contemporaries—and history—he succeeded.
Many religious persons sense that God is immanent in everything and
everyone. Yet, at the same time, these same persons sense that God is tran-
scendent of everything and everyone. As we strive to account for God’s
presence both within and beyond our surroundings, Rāmānuja can provide
invaluable assistance. For this reason he is still studied by those who wish
to understand how humanity and the universe can be both the same as and
different from God.
Endnotes
1. Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha, transl. by Raghavachar, §95, 76.
2. Carman, Theology of Rāmānuja, 27-29.
3. Dutta, From Hagiographies to Biographies, 61-66.
4. Betty Stafford. “Dvaita, Advaita, and Viśiṣṭādvaita: Contrasting Views of Mokṣa.” Asian
Philosophy vol. 20, no. 2 (July 2010). 215-224.
5. Clooney, “Restoring ‘Hindu Theology,’” 59-61.
6. Rāmānuja, Śrī-Bhāṣya,§2.3.42, 298.
7. Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 2.6.4.
8. Sydnor, “Seeing Nature, Sensing God,” 46-48.
9. Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha, transl. by Raghavachar, §39, 35.
10. The term “modality” is to be preferred over “modification,” which fails to capture
the absolutely distinct nature of the three modes from one another. See Helfer, “The Body
of Brahman According to Rāmānuja,” 45. See also Grimes, “prakāra.”
11. Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha, transl. by Raghavachar, §80, 64.
12. Veliath, The Mysticism of Rāmānuja, 76-77.
13. Rāmānuja, Śrī-Bhāṣya, §2.3.42, 298.
14. Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha, transl. by Raghavachar, §86, 70.
15. There is debate internal to the Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition regarding whether Viṣṇu alone
is ultimate, or Viṣṇu with his consort, Śrī. In the later Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition, Vedānta Deśika
(1268-1369) of the northern Vadagalai school asserted the co-operative identity of Viṣṇu and
Śrī. He argued that, were the divine mercy (Śrī) not co-equal with the divine righteousness
(Viṣṇu), then the divine grace would be restricted. Pillai Lokacarya (1264-1369) of the south-
ern Vadagalai school argued that Śrī must be subordinate to Viṣṇu, since two infinites could
not both be all-pervasive. See Śrīnivasachari, The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, 167-169.
16. Lott, God and the Universe, 55. See also Monier-Williams, “ātman.”
17. Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha, transl. by Raghavachar, §11, 14.
18. Ibid, §121, 93.
19. Ibid, §2, 4.
20. Raghavachar and Van Buitenen translate as “equal,” Brahmavadin translates as
“alike.”
96 Journal of Vaishnava Studies

21. Rāmānuja, Gīta Bhāṣya, §5.19, 204.

22. Ibid, §2.18, 73. See also §2.17, 71.
23. Rāmānuja, Vedānta-Sūtras, §1.1.1, 58-61. See also Lipner, The Face of Truth, 55.
24. Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha, transl. by Raghavachar, §248, 180.
25. Rāmānuja, Śrī-Bhāṣya,§2.3.42, 296-298.
26. Sydnor, “From Brahman to Nārāyaṇa,” 13.
27. Ibid, §3.2.14, 340.
28. Ibid, §2.3.45, 299.
29. Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha, transl. by Raghavachar, §209, 165-166.
30. Rāmānuja, Śrī-Bhāṣya,§2.1.14, 221-222.
31. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, transl. by Olivelle, §4.4.2.
32. Rāmānuja, Vedanta-Sūtras, §2.3.20.
33. Ibid, §2.3.24-26.
34. Lipner, The Face of Truth, 63-66.
35. Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha, transl. by Raghavachar, §2, 4.
36. Sydnor, Rāmānuja and Schleiermacher, 34-35.
37. Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha, transl. by van Buitenen, §7-9.
38. Lott, God and Universe in Rāmānuja, 89.Zz
39. Carman, Theology of Rāmānuja, 108-111.
40. Sydnor, “Jaimini, Sankara, and the Alvars,” 10-11.
41. This term borrowed from Bartley, The Theology of Rāmānuja, 2.

Bibliography

Bartley, C. J. The Theology of Ramanuja: Realism and Religion. New York: Routledge-
Curzon, 2002.
Carman, John Braisted. The Theology of Ramanuja. An Essay in Interreligious Under-
standing. Bombay: Ananthacharya Indological Research Institute, 1981.
Clooney, Francis X. “Restoring ‘Hindu Theology’ as a Category in Indian Intellec-
tual Discourse.” In The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism, edited by Gavin
Flood, 447-477. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
Dutta, Ranjeeta. From Hagiographies to Biographies: Rāmānuja in Tradition and History.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Grimes, John. A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in Eng-
lish. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996.
Helfer, James S. “The Body of Brahman According to Ramanuja.” Journal of Bible
and Religion. 32.1 (January 1964). 43-46.
Lipner, Julius. The Face of Truth: A Study of Meaning and Metaphysics in the Vedantic
Theology of Ramanuja. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.
Lott, Eric J. God and the Universe in the Vedantic Theology of Ramanuja: A Study in his
 Rāmānuja’s Vedāntic Anthropology 97

Use of the Self-Body Analogy. Madras: Ramanuja Research Society, 1976.

Monier-Williams, Sir Monier. A Sanskrit-English Dictionary: Etymologically and Philo-
logically Arranged with special reference to Cognate Indo-European Languages.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2002.
Raghavachar, S. S. Introduction to the Vedarthasamgraha of Sree Ramanujacharya.
Mangalore: The Mangalore Trading Assn. (Private) Ltd., 1957.
Rāmānuja. Brāhma Sūtras: Śrī Bhāṣya. Translated by Swami Vireswarananda and
Swami Adidevananda. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1995.
—————. Gita-Bhāṣya: With Test in Devanagari & English Rendering, and Index of First
Lines of Verses. Translated by Swami Adidevananda. Madras: Sri Ramak-
rishna Math (no year).
—————. The Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary by Ramanuja. Translated by
George Thibaut 1904. Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, n/d.
—————. Vedarthasamgraha. Translated by S.S. Raghavachar. Mysore: Sri Ramak-
rishna Ashrama, 1956.
Srinivasachari, P. N. The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Madras: The Adyar Library
and Research Centre, 1978.
Stafford, Betty. “Dvaita, Advaita, and Viśiṣṭādvaita: Contrasting Views of Mokṣa.”
Asian Philosophy vol. 20 no. 2 (July 2010).
Sydnor, Jon Paul. “Jaimini, Shankara, and the Alvars: Ramanuja’s Enduring Syn-
thesis.” Journal of Vaishnava Studies vol. 22. no. 2 (Spring 2014). 5-22.
—————. “Ramanuja’s Philosophy of Divinity: From Brahman to Nārāyaṇa.” Jour-
nal of Vaishnava Studies vol. 16 no. 2 (Spring 2008). 3-26.
—————. Ramanuja and Schleiermacher: Toward a Constructive Comparative Theology.
Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2011.
—————. “Seeing Nature, Sensing God.” Journal of Vaishnava Studies vol. 24 no. 1
(Fall 2015). 39-62.
Upaniṣads. Translated by Patrick Olivelle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Van Buitenen, J.A.B. Rāmānuja’s Vedarthasamgraha: Introduction, Critical Edition and
Annotated Translation. Pune, Deccan College Postgraduate and Research
Institute, 1992.
Veliath, Cyril S.J. The Mysticism of Rāmānuja. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal
Publishers, 1993.