Rethinking Moral Economy

Author(s): Thomas Clay Arnold

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 85-95
Published by: American Political Science Association
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AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 1 March2001

Moral
Rethinking Economy
THOMAS CLAY ARNOLD Emporia State University
establishthree closely relatedclaims. The first two are interpretive,
the third theoretical.(1) The
prevailingconceptionof moral economyin political science,presupposedby opponentsas well as
advocates,reststoo heavilyon the distinctionbetweennonmarketand market-based societies.(2) The
prevailingconceptionof moraleconomyreducesto the undulynarrowclaim thateconomicincorporation
of a nonmarketpeople is the basisfor the moral indignationthat leads to resistanceand rebellion.(3)
Reconceptualizingmoral economy in terms of social goods revealsadditionalgroundsfor politically
significantmoralindignationand permitsmoral-economic politicalanalysisof a largerset of cases and
phenomena.Waterpolitics in thearidAmericanWestillustratethepowerof a conceptionof moraleconomy
basedon socialgoods.

olitical scientistsdebate as intenselyas ever the economy draws little attention or controversy.Yet,
idea of a moral economy, which contains both moral-economicpoliticalscience is only as effectiveas
descriptiveand prescriptiveelements. The de- the conceptof moraleconomyon whichit rests.Silence
scriptiveelement reflects the contributionsof, among on this central issue begs two questions.What is the
others, anthropologistsand refers to the various, es- underlyingconceptionof moraleconomypresupposed
sentially noneconomic norms and obligations (e.g., by the parties to the dispute? More important,is it
reciprocity)that mediate the central social, political, adequate?The next two sections reconstructand cri-
and/or economic relations of a given (almost always tique the prevailingbut largelyunquestionedconcep-
pre- or nonmarket)people. The prescriptiveelement tion of moraleconomyin politicalscience.Reconstruc-
refers to moral economy's status and value as an tion and critiqueestablishtwo points:The traditional
instrumentfor social and political analysis.Whether conceptionof moral economy in political science (1)
used to evaluate the distinctive social and political rests too heavilyon the distinctionbetweennonmarket
featuresof varioussystemsof exchange(Booth 1993a; and market-basedsocieties and (2) reduces to the
Dalton 1961; Polanyi 1957) or to explain insurgency undulynarrowclaimthat economicincorporationof a
and rebellion (Gosner 1992; Scott 1976; Thompson nonmarketpeople is the basis for the moral indigna-
1971),the idea of a moraleconomyis a claimaboutthe tion that leads to resistanceand rebellion.The remain-
conductof inquiry,of whatto studyand how.For many ing two sections develop a more effectiveconception.
political scientists committed to alternativeforms of Combining overlooked aspects of early moral-eco-
inquiry,moral economy easily means above all else nomic analysiswith insightsdrawnfrom recent studies
spiriteddiscussionabout"themost crucialquestionsof of communityand collective action, I recast the con-
method and interpretation"(Booth 1993b,953). cept in light of the constitutive,communal,and, espe-
Parties to this debate in political science differ cially,nested propertiesof social goods.
sharplyover the value of whatFrerejohn(1991,301, n. A conception of moral economy based on social
1) has fruitfully described as "theethnographicstarting goods capturesthe groundsfor politicallysignificant
point," the assertion,embracedby moral economists, moral indignationmore precisely than does the pre-
that "the proper place to begin social analysisis with vailing view. It demonstrates that the grounds for
the meanings embedded in the social practices in politicallysignificantmoralindignationdo not lie only
question,"that social practices"formthe basis for the or even predominantlyat the level of clashingecono-
identificationof actors and choices."Describedmore mies or cultures.Theylie insteadat the level of specific
fully below, the debate over moral-economicpolitical social goods, at the intersection of nested sets of
science reflectsin partmoraleconomists'oppositionto meaning and value called into question by equally
the assumptions and approaches of rational-choice specificchangesin circumstance.
forms of inquiry,that is to say, economic assumptions My revision also refines analysis.Given the nested
about human behavior applied in settings in which, properties of social goods, instancesof resistanceto
moral economists argue, narrowlyself-interestedcal- what traditionalmoral economists often describe as
culationsof gain or efficiencyare absentor secondary. commodificationneed not be viewedas resistanceto all
Curiously,the spiriteddebatein politicalsciencehas forms or degrees of commodityexchange,even of the
not featuredthe concept itself. In starkcontrastwith good in question. Moreover,by focusing on specific
the disputesover the value of moral-economicpolitical social goods, rather than on overarchingeconomic
science, the question of what constitutes a moral systems,I accountfor politicallysignificant(although
not necessarily rebellious) moral economies where
traditionalmoraleconomistswouldleast expectto find
Thomas Clay Arnold is Associate Professorof Political Science, them: within modem, market-structured communities
EmporiaState University,Emporia,KS 66801-5087. and societies.Waterpoliticsin the aridAmericanWest
The authoris deeplyindebtedto Kim Arnold,MichaelHandley,
Phil Kelly, Chris Phillips, Greg Schneider,and the anonymous illustratethe powersof a conceptionof moraleconomy
reviewersfor their manyhelpfulcomments. based on social goods.

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RethinkingMoralEconomy March2001

RECONSTRUCTION terms,emphasizingthe predatorynatureand culturally

effects of "NorthAtlantic Capitalism."
The traditionalnotion of moral economy in political disruptive
This pattern of behavior has even been used to
science reflects the seminal works of Karl Polanyi
reinterpretaspectsof U.S. social and politicalhistory,
(1957) and E. P. Thompson (1971). It features the in particularthe actionsof nineteenth-century premar-
extraordinaryphenomenonof a poor, premarketpeo- ket farmersin largeportionsof Georgia,Missouri,and
ple contesting the dictates of a much more modern Texas. Convincedthat their communitiesand atten-
economic order.' Polanyi contributesthe important dant "habitsof
distinctionbetween embeddedand autonomousecon- mutuality"were threatenedby a grow-
ing and impersonalmarket,yeoman farmersresorted
omies. Embedded,typicallyancientor primitiveecon- to,
omies submergeproductionand exchangeto the pur- among other things, populist revolt and social
banditry (Hahn 1983, 53; see also McMath 1985;
poses and practices of far more significant social, Thelen 1986). Resistance to economic incorporation
political,or religiousinstitutions.Autonomousecono- also emergesin Strickland's(1985)studyof newlyfreed
mies functiondifferently.Productionand exchangeare blacksin the rice-plantingsections of the South Caro-
much more significant,increasinglyserve economic lina LowCountry.In this instance,Low Countryblacks
ends, and operate according to the constraints of jealouslyretainedthe independenceand unsupervised
pervasive, impersonal markets. Autonomous econo- time long affordedslavesby the traditionalmannerof
mies define the modernera. rice cultivation(taskworklargely"out of the master's
Thompsoncontributesseveralthings.Beyondpopu- eye") despite postwareffortsby enterprisingwhites to
larizingthe term moraleconomy,he explainshow and regulatelabor rationallyon the basis of time, supervi-
why the transitionfrom an embeddedeconomyto an sion, and wages.2Blacks resisted the emergingorder
autonomousmarketgeneratedsocial and politicalun- simply by refusing to participate.Their subsistence
rest,even sustainedorganizedviolence.Drawingon his skillsand,unlikeothersectionsof the South,the refuge
studyof eighteenth-century Englishfood riots,Thomp- of their well-established,extended families sustained
son (1971, 78, 79) finds the "delicatetissue"of tradi- the resistance.Judgingfrom the literature,resistance
tional social normsand reciprocitiesunableto accom- to economicincorporationis indeedthe preferred,and
modate the "cash-nexus"of the emerging market typicallythe only, recognizedpattern.
order. The clash was often traumatic.Those most at The prevailingconceptionof moraleconomyis also
the mercyof the emergingorder regardedthe transi- a response to a prominent issue in contemporary
tion as unjust. Moral outrage and direct action fol- politicalthought,"the controversyover 'the economic
lowed. Thompson'smost significantcontributionis his approachto humanbehavior,'overrationalchoice and
understatedconcept of a moraleconomy,whichpolit- relatedtheories,and especiallyovertheunderstanding of
ical scientistsdo not incorporateas fullyas theyshould. nonmarket societies" (Booth 1994, 653, emphasis
Generalizingfrom the particularsof the food riots, added). This disputedominatesthe literature,render-
Thompson conceives moral economy as a popular ing moraleconomymore a label for the debate than a
consensus about what distinguisheslegitimate from categoryfor organizingexperience.Althoughthe argu-
illegitimatepractices,a consensus rooted in the past ments for and especiallyagainstmoral-economiclines
and capable of inspiringaction (pp. 78-9, 108, 112, of inquirydo not debate the concept per se, they are
131-6). revealing.Summarizedbelow, they confirm the nar-
Reflecting the discipline's longstanding desire to rowness of the prevailing view and point, if only
account for peasant and Third World insurrections indirectly,to a compellingalternative.
(Bates and Curry1992;Lichbach1994), the prevailing Traditionalmoral economistsmaintainthat, insofar
concept in political science emphasizes conflict and as the economicapproachprivilegesthe self-interested
resistance.This emphasisspeaksfar more to a pattern individual,who narrowlybut rationallycalculateson
of behavior rather than, as Thompson instructs,the the basis of unforgivingcompetitionand the principle
natureof and sourcesfor communalnotions of legiti- of utilitymaximization,it cannot fruitfullyengage the
many instancesin which economicbehavioris embed-
macy. Illustrationsabound. Consider Scott's (1976) ded in noneconomic institutions and values. Tradi-
analysisof peasant rebellions in early-twentieth-cen-
tury Burma and Vietnam. Peasants rebelled, he con- tional moraleconomistsarguethat scholarsgain little,
cludes, out of their desire to resist intensifyingEuro- if anything,by analyzingbehaviorin termsof what the
actors themselveswould recognize as strange or im-
pean colonialismand to restore ancientpeasantways if even comprehensible.Scott (1976, 166) con-
and rights.Eric Wolf (1969,276) explainspeasantwars moral,
in Cuba,Russia,China,Mexico,andAlgeriain similar cludes that a strictlyeconomicapproachoverlooksthe
more telling socioculturalcomponentsof behavior;it

1 This notion is found throughout the literature, among early advo-
cates as well as recent critics. Scott (1976) is the leading example of
early moral-economic analysis in political science. More recent
studies include Posusney 1993 and Heilke 1997. Among contempo-
rary critics are Bates and Curry (1992) and Booth (1994), whose
works are second-order analyses of the topic, although both rely in
part on the authors' earlier studies of premarket societies, African
and ancient Greek in particular.
2 "The real social and cultural significance of the task system lay in
the fact that a slave could finish the day's work at his or her own
chosen rate. ... Slaves who worked quickly often assisted others who
were slower, thereby making task labor a collective experi-
ence.... Task work thus helped to fashion a moral economy that
prized the virtues of independence, self-determination, and personal
achievement, while encouraging collective responsibility for the
completion of assignments" (Strickland 1985, 145).

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AmericanPoliticalScience Review
misses "the centralfact that the peasantis born into a
society and culture that providehim a fund of moral
values, a set of concretesocial relationships,a pattern
of expectationsabout the behavior of others, and a
sense of how those in his culture have proceeded to
similargoals in the past."
In the traditionalview,the moreappropriateempha-
sis is on culturalformsandvalues,on whatHahn (1983,
6, 85) describesas the "web of social life," meaning
"ideas about justice, independence, obligation, and
other aspects of social and political life, rooted in
specific relationshipsand refractedthroughhistorical
experiences."Scott (1976, 167) agrees: "Woveninto
the tissueof peasantbehavior,then,whetherin normal
local routinesor in the violence of an uprising,is the
structureof a sharedmoraluniverse,a commonnotion
of what is just. It is this moralheritagethat, in peasant
revolts,selects certaintargetsratherthan others, cer-
tain forms rather than others, and that makes possi-
ble.. . action born of moral outrage."The abstract,
atomistic,and narrowlyutilitarianassumptionsof eco-
nomic analysis simply will not do. Instead, analysis
mustbe phenomenological,capableof comprehending
the cultural self-understandingsof the actors them-
selves, that is, their sense of propriety,justice, obliga-
tion, and the like (Scott 1976, 3, 4).3
Responsesto these argumentsvarybut fall into one
of three categories.The most commonis the claimthat
the norms and reciprocitiesof any given moral econ-
omy are reducibleto and best explainedin terms of
self-interested,political economy. Popkin (1979, 18),
for instance, in a study of Vietnamese peasants that
overlaps Scott's, argues that "by applyingtheories of
individualdecision-makingto villages,we can begin to
develop a deductiveunderstandingof peasant institu-
tions and move the analysisback one step to the level
of the individual.By using the concepts of individual
choice and decision-making,we can discuss how and
why groupsof individualsdecide to adopt some sets of
norms while rejecting others." Peering beneath the
veneer of collective behavior and a shared moral
universe,Popkinfinds a familiar"unifyinginvestment
logic" (p. 244) to Vietnamesepeasantlife, a logic less
materialisticor income-orientedthan that in the West,
but rationaland maximizingnonetheless.
3 Compare this kind of criticism of rational-choice modes of analysis
with those of Sen (1977) and Monroe (1996), two scholars who work
outside the tradition of moral economy. Sen recognizes that calcu-
lations of (even personal) welfare are much more complex than the
undiluted model of self-interest indicates. They involve multiple
rankings of different kinds of preferences, some of which are based
on a sense of duty, as affected by morals and culture and as mediated
by "commitment" to religion, class, group, or community (1977,
326-9).
Based upon her study of altruism, Monroe (1996) rejects individ-
ualistic self-interest as "an all-embracing theory of human behavior"
because it "distorts and limits our understanding of what it means to
be a human being" (p. 236). Altruists in particular act well outside
the context of calculated costs and benefits; their often personally
risky acts of selflessness are instead spontaneous and rooted in their
deeply felt connection to all other human beings. Monroe prefers an
approach she describes as "perspectival" (p. 15), in which nonutili-
tarian world views, core values, and a sense of self figure at least as
prominently as self-interest.
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Vol. 95, No. 1
A second and relatedresponseis that moral econo-
mistshave a "too-pinchedconceptionof the economic"
(Booth 1994, 659). In short,they fail to appreciateits
influence in social formationsother than that of the
market. Studies of the firm, family, and government
demonstrate,critics argue, how obviouslynonmarket
features and institutions are clearly the product of
primaryeconomic forces and calculations.Summariz-
ing the conclusionsof Douglass North, Robert Bates,
Michael Hechter, EdwardLeClair,and Neil Smelser,
Booth writes that nonmarketeconomies are best "un-
derstoodin the lightof the transactioncosts associated
with markets"(p. 658, emphasisadded). The logic of
this response is clear-converting nonmarketinstitu-
tions into full-blownmarket ones simply incurs too
many information, measurement, and enforcement
costs. Retaining nonmarketfeatures is in these in-
stances cost efficient.The point, however,is that non-
market does not necessarilymean noneconomic.For
Booth, peasant moral economies in particular"lend
themselvesto retranslationinto the vocabularyof the
economicapproach,"whereupon"itbecomesapparent
thatmanyof theirbehaviorsand institutionalformsare
economizingresponsesto a situationof severe risk in
regard to subsistencegoods" (p. 659). The work on
transactioncosts by North and others questions the
assumptionof manytraditionalmoral economiststhat
modernityis distinguishedby the role and place of
economiccalculation.
The third and even more substantiveresponse ad-
dressesdirectlythe "masterassumption"(Booth 1994,
653) of moral economists,the concept of embedded-
ness. Accordingto Granovetter(1985), embeddedness
is in the end a matterof the degree to whicheconomic
behavioris affectedby or submergedin socialrelations.
Traditionalmoral economists err in two ways. First,
moraleconomistsso deeply embed economicbehavior
in what they thinkare social relationsthat "economic"
behavioris not literallyeconomic (oversocialization).
Second, what moral economistspresent as economic
behavior is actually an attribute of a "generalized
morality,"which Granovetter defines as a widely
shared set of "implicitagreementsto certainkinds of
regard for others" (p. 489, citing Arrow 1974, 26).
Generalizedmoralities,however,lead to other difficul-
ties.
Accordingto Granovetter(1985), generalizedmo-
ralities,whatevertheircontent,are not socialrelations.
Truly social relations involve relatively continuous,
concrete, and specific interpersonalties; actors, fully
awareof these ties and circumstances,respondaccord-
ingly.Trulysocial relationsare ongoing,"continuously
constructedand reconstructedduringinteraction"(p.
486). In contrast,generalizedmoralitiesare external,
fairly fixed systems of norms and values internalized
through socialization.Because they are internalized,
their behavior-inducingclout is "contained,"so to
speak, "inside an individual'shead" (p. 486). There-
fore, behavioris "automatic,"even "mechanical,"and
ongoing social relations are "irrelevant"(p. 486).
Moraleconomistswho embed behaviorin generalized
moralitiesparadoxicallyretain that to which they ob-
87
RethinkingMoralEconomy
ject in the strictlyeconomic approach:"atomizedde-
cision makingeven when decisionsare seen to involve
more than one individual"(pp. 486-7).
Booth adds to the critique of embeddedness.He
rejectsthe use of the concept by moral economiststo
distinguishsharplythe characterand mannerof sub-
merged,premoderneconomiesfrom modern,autono-
mous ones, a distinction that many of them take
somewhatfor granted.Contraryto the claimsof Pola-
nyi in particular,he believes close study of ancient
Greeceprovesthat narrowlyrational,economicbehav-
ior is never so embedded that it is "theoretically
indistinct,"not to mention"invisible"(Booth 1993a,6;
1994,654, 655). Furthermore,studyof modernmarket
societyprovesthat narrowlyrational,economicbehav-
ior is never so autonomousthat the very concept of
economy must be regardedas "a productof modern
society"and not truly applicable"to the theoretical/
moraluniverseof non- or precapitalistworlds"(Booth
1993a, 6). In the end, the notion of embeddedness
blinds moral economiststo the analyticallyimportant
fact that all economies (ancient and modern) are
simultaneouslyeconomizingand normativein nature,
althoughin varyingdegrees.4
CRITIQUE
Accordingto its severestcritics,moral-economicpolit-
ical analysisis flawed.It misreadsthe natureof human
behaviorand,therefore,the politicsthatflowfromit. It
may stimulatereflectionbut is not a particularlypow-
erful or credibleline of inquiry.Rejection,however,is
premature. Rejection presumes that the traditional
notion of moral economy is conclusive. It is not.
Interestingly,Booth's studyof ancient Greece is itself
cause for rethinkingthe concept,althoughfor reasons
other than those Booth emphasizes.5
According to Booth, the moral architectureand
economyof ancientGreecereflectedfundamentalends
4 According to Booth, market society is itself normatively embedded.
In particular, labor and exchange now reflect the freedom, equality,
and moral pluralism of modernity rather than, as in the past, the
hierarchy and domination of the preliberal household. The transition
to market society was not, as Polanyi claims, a fateful disembedding
of economy and society but an historic "moral redrawing of the
community and of the place of the economy within it" (Booth 1994,
661). This perspective distinguishes Booth as a critic of moral-
economic political science. Although sharply critical of one (from his
point of view, fundamental) feature of it (analysis predicated in part
on the embeddedness distinction), Booth supports another by ana-
lytically linking the economy of a given time and society to the
normative context within which that economy is situated. In Booth's
case, however, the linkage is general rather than specific, at the level
of economic systems writ large. As such, his quasimoral-economic
argument cannot address the issue at the center of my social goods
version: how and why moral economies (some even contrary to the
spirit of the modern market society) emerge within commercialized
market societies.
5 Booth's effective critique of a sharp, Polanyian distinction between
submerged and autonomous economies does not directly question
traditional moral economists' related claim that economic incorpo-
ration of a pre- or nonmarket people often leads to collective action
rooted in moral outrage. What needs reappraisal is whether resis-
tance to economic incorporation is today the only or even most
important foundation for a moral economy.
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March2001
and values of the household, the primaryeconomic
unit. As epitomized by Ischomachosin Xenophon's
Oeconomicus,the household rested on careful, even
rationalcalculationsof utility.More precisely,its econ-
omy turned on "the managerialrole of the wife [in
relation to servants and children] ... the need for
overseers [in relation to slaves], and.., .the issue of
how to motivate the wife and overseer to do the
master'sworkefficiently"(Booth 1994,659). The value
of efficiency,however,lay not in maximizingthe mas-
ter'swealthbut his leisure,a prerequisitefor meaning-
ful participationin politicalaffairsand for livinga good
and beautifullife.
The example of ancient Greece, used by Booth to
refute the "radical exceptionalism"(1994, 662) of
market society, yields other insights. In short, that
society does not conformto what contemporarypolit-
ical science would have us believe constitutesa moral
economy.It was unquestionablya normativelyembed-
ded economy and society, which Booth describesas
anticommercial,as dedicatedto a life of "detachment
from provisioningactivity"(p. 660), but it was not a
marginalsociety of subsistence-orientedpeasants re-
bellingagainstthe callousforces of economicincorpo-
ration. The Greek example challenges political sci-
ence's preference for conceiving moral economy in
termsof premarketcommunitiesand culturesclashing
with far more commercialones. Equallytelling chal-
lenges are not limitedto cases drawnfromthe precapi-
talist world,as two recent studies demonstrate.
Somerset County,Maryland
Community,culture, and economic developmentare
the subjectsof MeredithRamsay's(1996) researchon
PrincessAnne and Crisfield,Maryland,two Somerset
County communities recently gripped by economic
crisis. Both were in trouble because longstanding
modes of production (agriculturein Princess Anne,
commercialfishing and seafood packingin Crisfield)
sharply and irrevocablydeclined between 1986 and
1991, makingMaryland'spoorest countyonly poorer.
Calls for economic revitalizationwere frequent and
popular,but residents routinelyrejected commercial
real estate projects.In fact, elite-sponsoredreal estate
initiativesin PrincessAnne spawnedan unprecedented
electoraluprising.Voters sweptout of officea number
of progrowthestablishmentofficialsand even elected
their first black representative. Ramsay attributes these
and other outcomes to "a nearly universal commitment
to a shared way of life" (1996, 8), despite racial, class,
and other divisions, a way of life in which "community
mattered" (p. 9).
Two aspects of Ramsay's study stand out. First, her
study is firmly grounded in the moral-economic axiom
that "all economies are enmeshed in the political,
social, and moral life of particular places" (1996, 9).6
Echoing Hahn, Ramsay emphasizes "way-of-life vari-
6
Ramsay (1996, 135, n. 18) acknowledges Scott's influence, charac-
terizing her own work on Maryland as an "independent collabora-
tion."
AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 1

ables" (p. 107). A more finely tuned grasp of local at least up to the moment of rebellion, was one of
policyis achieved,she writes,by paying"carefulatten- persistentdifficulty,sacrifice,and isolation. Hardship
tion to the ... social structuresand culturalvaluesthat was the unrelentingorder of the day, and collective
give security,predictability,character,and meaningto endeavor-in the form of an elaborate,if not always
the life of a given community"(p. 22). In Somerset tolerant, string of voluntaryorganizations(civil soci-
Countysocial structuresand relationswere such that ety)-was the only abundant social resource. These
residentswere reluctantto abandonor degradethem frontier people were willing to endure hardshipand
in the name of economic development. sacrificein the hope that prosperitywould somedaybe
Second, Ramsay'sstudyis not of a pre- or nonmar- theirs, as their pioneeringheritagetold them it would.
ket people. Local agricultureand fishingconformedto This valley of expectantcapitalistssaw the opportuni-
and operatedwithinthe largermarketeconomy.Given ties and marketsassociatedwith mines, railroads,and
modernmodes of production,the politicallysignificant reclamationas their commercialsalvation.Unlike the
moraleconomies of PrincessAnne and Crisfielddiffer communitiesin Burmaand Vietnam studiedby Scott,
in origin,form,and to some degreecontentfromthose security lay in perfecting,not rejecting,the spirit of
associatedwith the Asian, African,or SouthAmerican enterprise.
corporatevillages emphasizedin the literature.7 Accordingto Walton (pp. 90-103), the moral econ-
omy of OwensValleyreflectedits uniquesituationand
Owens Valley, California history. It combined a vibrantbut as yet unrealized
commitmentto commercialenterprisewith a propen-
John Walton's (1992) study of the Owens Valley in sity for civicorganizationand collectiveendeavor.The
CaliforniacomplimentsRamsay'sexaminationof the combinationprovedexplosivewhen hopes for prosper-
social roots of local action, although in his research ity were repeatedlyraisedand dashed.Miningcompa-
rebellion returns as the critical event. The tale is nies and railroadsflirted with the valley but never
remarkable.At the turnof the centurythis ruralvalley establishedongoing economic ventures, leaving it as
just east of the Sierra Nevada range confrontedthe destitute as ever. Reclamationwas the last and best
City of Los Angeles over access to valley water. In hope and provedthe greatestdisappointment.Chosen
1924, at least twentyyears into the confrontation,the by the newlyformed ReclamationService as an ideal
dispute turned violent when residents seized and site for fulfillingthe promiseof the 1902 Reclamation
bombedthe city'swater-relatedholdingsandstructures Act, which was designed to promote western settle-
within the valley. Led by two bankers,the bombings ment, small-scale family farming, and democracy
were numerous,strategic,and popular.Local support through irrigationof arid lands (no more than 320
frustrated efforts by Los Angeles to prosecute the acres of irrigatedland per couple), the valley finally
perpetrators.One investigatorfor the city was con- seemed poisedfor transformation. Abundantirrigation
vinced "no local grandjurywould indict,and no court water, residentsnoted, would lead to an agricultural
convict"the forty to sixtypeople he believed directly bonanza, population growth, a cash economy, and
involved(Walton1992,169).Los Angelesgot the water economic security.
it wanted, but dynamiting,arson, and other acts of Moral outragewas swift and pronouncedwhen the
rebellioncontinuedperiodicallyinto the 1970s,ending residentslearnedthat Los Angeles had cheated them
only when new environmentallaws allowed valley (throughfraudin some cases, intimidationin others)
residentsto wage their resistancethroughthe courts. by obtainingtitle to keyparcelsandall-importantwater
Walton'sexplanationof this extraordinaryaffaircom- rights (pp. 154-6). Even worse, the city had used its
bines elements from a numberof schools of thought.. influence with state and federal officialsto convince
At the center of his explanation,however, lies an PresidentTheodore Roosevelt, ironicallya prominent
accountof moraleconomydifferentfrom and superior advocate for the ReclamationAct and its ideals, to
to that usuallyfound in the discipline. supporta change in the project:Rather than use the
Waltontakes to heartThompson'sstatementsabout waterfor farmingin the OwensValley,exportit to Los
a popularconsensusrooted in the past and capableof Angeles to subsidize the city's already phenomenal
inspiring action. He agrees with Scott, Hahn, and growth. Certain they were the victims of a massive
others that operativeconceptionsof justice and injus- injustice(the "Rape of the Owens Valley"),residents
tice emerge from local history, from the concrete drew on their civic traditionsand rebelled (pp. xviii,
meanings,traditions,and mechanismsof dailylife. The 168-82, 292, 312).
historyof Owens Valley, from initialwhite settlement The studies by Ramsay and Walton support the
argument that the prevailing conception of moral
7 The power of the prevailingconception of moral economy in
politicalscience is in part terminological,as is evidentin Ramsay's
economyin politicalscienceis undulynarrow.Givenits
study.Drawingon Scott's(1976)language,Ramsayrefersto Princess emphasis on the distinctionbetween premarketand
Anne and Crisfieldas subsistencecommunities,an awkwardchoice market societies, the prevailingconception of moral
at best. Scott'scommunitiesare precapitalistand peasant;Ramsay's economy in political science cannot explain the non-
are not, even thoughthey have a risk-minimizing, communalethic rebelliousmoraleconomiesof market-structured com-
thatis "basedupontrust... andmutualobligation"andis dedicated
to preserving"a particularmoralorder"(Ramsey1996, 120).Moral munities in Maryland, which had achieved a degree of
economy must be conceived in such a way as to account more economic development but were reluctant to develop
accuratelyfor the broadly similar norms and reciprocitiesthat further,even in the face of economicdecline. Givenits
emanatefrom sharplydifferentsocial and economiccircumstances. emphasis on resistanceto commercialincorporation,

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RethinkingMoralEconomy March2001

the prevailingconception of moral economy cannot The conceptof socialgoods developedbelow clearly
explainthe moral indignationand rebellionof a non- falls into the latter category and draws cruciallyon
marketvalley in Californiadesperatefor commercial Walzer (1983, 6-10). The followingversion,however,
incorporation.These and related cases require an differsin certainrespects.WhereasWalzeruses social
altogetherdifferentapproachto the issue of a moral goods as his foundation for developing a theory of
economy.Thompson'snotion of communallegitimacy justice that championspluralismand complexequality,
offers a promisingalternative. my concept addressesthe narrowerissue of collective
As employedby Thompson,legitimacyis recognition action that emanates from communalperceptionsof
by a communitythat a givenstate of affairsconformsto legitimacy.This reorientationbringsinto even sharper
knownand acceptedrules and principles.Well-known relief the centralrole of social goods on the identities,
and long acceptedrules and principlesare the ground, obligations,and relationshipsof both persons and a
Thompsonargues,for consensusand collectiveaction. people. In other words,a collectiveaction orientation
Moraleconomistsloosely sharethis view but too often featuresthe goods-basedsenses of self and community
couch legitimacy in the diffuse language of shared Walzer'sgeneral theoryof justice clearlyincorporates
universesor traditionalnorms and obligations,restat- but need not alwaysemphasizein the same way (see
ing in effectMaxWeber'sfamousbut genericreference below). By analyzingsocial goods as groundsfor col-
to the legitimacyof the "eternalyesterday"(Gerthand lective action I extend Walzer'sconcept, revealingin
Mills 1958, 78). What is even more problematic,legit- turn both the nested nature of social goods and the
imacy is complex;no one set of legitimizingrules or basis for my theoryof moral economy.
principlesprevailsin or acrossall cases. Dependingon In Walzer'sjustice-basedapplicationas well as my
circumstances,market rules and principlesmay well own, the notion of social goods is firstand foremosta
statement about the universal nature of all human
give way to political,religious,or still other principles.
Consequently,phrasessuchas "sharedmoraluniverse" goods. Even goods consideredpure commoditiesare
(Scott 1976, 167) and "sharedway of life" (Ramsay social,for they consistof sharedunderstandingsabout
1996, 8) too often suppress rather than reveal the the beneficialcharacteristicsattributedto a given ob-
various sources of communallegitimacyavailableat ject. Any identificationof an object as a good unavoid-
any one time; they inhibit a clearerunderstandingof ably draws on culturallyconstructed and culturally
why communitieschoose one set of legitimizingrules transmitted ideas about human needs, wants, and
and principlesover another.8 benefits. "Goods don't just appear in the hands of
Basing moral-economicpolitical analysison social distributiveagents who do with them as they like";
goods is a muchmore effectivealternative.Giventheir goods first "come into people's minds"(Walzer 1983,
nature and properties,describedbelow, social goods 6-7). Like the meaningof words,the value and mean-
harborthe principlescommunitiescanvasswhen judg- ingfulnessof goods are sociallydetermined.In Walz-
ing whetherspecificdevelopmentsare legitimate. er's theory of justice, the principlesof shared under-
standingsand socially determinedvalue are central:
"Alldistributionsarejust or unjustrelativeto the social
SOCIALGOODS
meaningsof the goods at stake"(p. 9). More precisely,
Goods are objects and qualitieswhose possession or when we understandthe social meaning of a given
consumptionconferssome kindof benefitand satisfies good, "we understandhow, by whom, and for what
humanneeds and wants.For many,goods are unques- reasons it ought to be distributed"(p. 9).9 Although
tionablymaterialand commercialin nature.Everyday central, these principlesdo not exhaustWalzer'sthe-
illustrationsincludeforeignand domesticgoods, dura- ory.Significantly,his accountalso includesconstitutive
ble and nondurablegoods, basic and luxury goods. and communalsenses of social goods, and when these
Contemporaryphilosophersagree that goods satisfy are analyzedexplicitlyfrom the perspectiveof collec-
human needs and wants but acknowledgeand often tive action, they speak directlyto the issue of sources
emphasize their less material and noncommercial for communalperceptionsof legitimacy.
forms. Examples from contemporarywork include Constitutivesocial goods establish and symbolize
primaryand secondarygoods (Rawls 1971), goods of important senses of self. They reflect a manner of
excellence and goods of effectiveness (MacIntyre individualand collective identificationthat is charac-
1988), additive and nonsubtractivegeneric goods teristicof humanbeings(Appadurai1986;Douglasand
(Gewirth 1978, 1982), and mutual and convergent Isherwood 1979). Humans acquire "concrete identi-
goods (Taylor1989). These deliberatelyabstractcate- ties" through the ways in which they "conceive and
gories feature such goods as opportunities,powers, create, and then possess and employ social goods"
rights, security, community,and well-being, that is,
goods "forwhich it is the task of a theoryof justice to 9 No one principle of distribution holds in all cases. Some goods are
providedistributiveprinciples"(Swift 1995, 224). justly distributed according to principles of merit, others according to
principles of exchange or need, and so on. As a general rule,
however, "no social good x should be distributedto men and women
8 Walton makes a similar point: "The fact that repertoires [of who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and
politically significant collective action] are associated with culture without regard to the meaning of x" (Walzer 1983, 20, emphasis in
does not tell us where standardsof justice come from, how they affect original). In effect, each social good is its own sphere of justice. My
the state and the economy, or whether culture is a causal force or concept of moral economy is consistent with and supportive of
simply a setting" (1992, 325, emphasis added). Walzer's general theory of justice.

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AmericanPoliticalScience Review
(Walzer 1983, 8). People inevitably take stock of
themselvesand interpretthe identitiesof otherslargely
in terms of social goods. Moreover, patterned use,
display,and exchangeof social goods place people in
specific social, economic, and even political relations.
Among the Nuer of Africa,for instance,cattle connect
people to one anotherin vital ways,not just as herds-
man, buyer, or seller. Cattle structurethe status, ca-
pacities, and obligations of individuals. Owned by
families,cattle reflect and reproducethe all-important
"networkof kinshipties" (Evans-Pritchard1940, 17).
Nuer allocate cattle accordingly,and their movement
from one kraalto another is "equivalentto lines in a
genealogicalchart"(p. 18). Couplesfinalizethe union
of marriagethroughritualisticslaughterof cattle, and
their legal statusas a marriedcouple is in part"defined
by cattle rightsand obligations"(p. 17). Cattleare not
simplybeastsof burdenor sourcesfor food, psycholog-
ically and sociologicallythey are an integral part of
what it means to be a Nuer. They are social goods in
wayscompatiblewithbut deeperthanthat conveyedby
the notion of shared understandingsalone; cattle are
the foundationfor importantprocesses, roles, identi-
ties, and relationshipswithoutwhich it would be very
difficultto speak of Nuer society and culture.
The value of these identity-orienting,role-shaping
goods extends beyond their purely material or com-
mercialproperties.Insofaras constitutivesocial goods
structurethe status and obligationsof persons, their
value includesthe meaningfulnessof the relationships
and the senses of self generated.Under certaincircum-
stances, this identity-relatedvalue overridestheir nar-
rowercommodityvalue.Choicesin these instancesmay
well reflectrationalesother than the strictlyeconomic.
Equally important,at least from the perspectiveof a
theoryof moraleconomy,deeplyvalued identitiesand
relationshipsare latent but easilytriggeredsourcesfor
assessingthe legitimacyof both proposedand emerg-
ing developments.
Considerrice in Japan.It is, of course,a food, yet it
is much more. According to Ohnuki-Tierney(1993,
102),rice is the criticalmetaphorby and throughwhich
Japanese"thinkabout themselvesin relationto other
peoples." These reflections are in turn an equally
criticalpart of their conceptof "the collectiveself"'(p.
102). It was in terms of short-grainrice (agri)culture
that the Japanese recognizedthemselvesas a people
significantlydifferentfrom the meat and wheat ori-
ented West and, more important,the long-grainrice
culturesof Asia, in particularChina.AlthoughJapanis
no longer predominantlyagricultural,a rice-based
sense of self persists.Rice and rice paddiesremainthe
definingsymbolsof Japanand its ancestralland. Com-
pared to bamboo, sashimi, or many other Japanese
foods and symbols, rice is sacred. Its harvest and
consumptionoften are a matterof ritualand collective
celebration,its whitenessis a symbolof Japanesepurity
and virtue. This significancereaches and affects the
conduct of everydaylife. Rice is the most common
offeringin the ancestralalcoves found in many Japa-
nese homes, a gesturethat preservesa sense of family
continuityas well as conveysrespect.The role of rice in
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Vol. 95, No. 1
reproducingand maintaininga sense of familyextends
to the meal itself:
Whereasdishesare servedon individual platesaheadof
time in urbanJapanesehouseholdstoday,rice alone
remainsthecommonfoodto be distributed bythewoman
of the house.Commensality withinthe householdis sym-
bolizedby the act of distributing rice from a single
container....The collectiveself of the family-themost
basicunit of Japanesesociety-is constructedthrough
sharingriceduringdailymeals(p. 95).
Rice is a trulysocial good, and its longstandingand
ongoingrole in establishinga Japanesesense of collec-
tive self is at times a prominentfactor in evaluating
emergingdevelopments.In the late 1980s,for example,
when officialsannounced plans to import California
rice (it was far more plentifuland muchless expensive
thanthe decliningsuppliesof Japaneserice), the social
value of rice prevailed over its value as a staple.10
Although the Japanese import and consume other
Americanfood products,they vigorouslyopposed and
ultimatelydefeatedthe proposalto importrice. Urban
Japanese,women in particular,made the difference.
Their oppositionwas broad and decisivebut contrary
to theirinterestsas consumers.Even thoughCalifornia
rice had been sown from short-grainstocks imported
fromJapan,the Japanesefound it impure,"foreign,"a
corruptionof the "lastsacredrealm,"and a threat to
Japanese identity and autonomy (Ohnuki-Tierney
1993, 111). In this instance, the seemingly irrational
oppositionto importationreflecteda commitmentto a
deeper, more importantvalue, unrelatedto price."1
In additionto their influenceon identityand status,
select social goods are intrinsicallycommunalin na-
ture. These goods produce(or at least reproduce)the
sensibilitiesand "specialcommitmentto one another"
(Walzer 1983, 62) that make associated people a
community. Although relative to each community,
intrinsicallycommunalsocial goods are the foundation
for trulycommonactions.Unlike other goods, they are
not simply"convergent"in nature,a matterfor me and
(then) for you. Intrinsicallycommunalsocial goods are
mutual and indivisible,a matter for us (Taylor 1989,
166-9). The goods of security,welfare, and member-
ship illustrate;in each case participationin a common
life is, as Walzer(1983,65) puts it, "simultaneously the
prerequisiteof provision and one of its products."
Because these goods are mutual and indivisible,they
linkpeople as citizens,and as citizenspeople recognize
joint responsibilitiesand pursuewhat are now unmis-
10 Walzer distinguishesbetween the not alwayscompatiblemoral
andphysical"necessities"of goods.Whichset of necessitiesprevails
dependson circumstances. Bread,Walzer(1983,8) notes, is not just
a food item;it is "thebodyof Christ,the symbolof the Sabbath,the
meansof hospitality,and so on." For the devoutwho view breadas
symbolicof importantreligiousvaluesand relationships,it maywell
be somethingthat,dependingon circumstances, people shouldbake
and destroyratherthan sell or eat.
11Reminiscent of Monroe, Ohnuki-Tierney(1993, 9) finds the
economic assumptionsof rational-choicetheory "inappropriate."
Rice, she concludes,"isnot simplyfood to fill the stomach.Japanese
attitudesand behaviorstowardrice are not governedby economic
rationale"(p. 29). Instead,theyreflectthe complexsocialpsychology
of rice as self.
91
RethinkingMoralEconomy
takablycollectiveaffairs.If, as Walzerargues,member-
ship in human community is "the most important
good" (p. 29) we distribute to one another, then
intrinsicallycommunalsocial goods are an additional
and perhapseven more potent basis on which people
judge legitimacy.
Social goods are not as singular or discrete as
analysismust sometimesportraythem. As with rice in
Japan,social goods can and do harbormore than one
kind of meaningand value, particularlyif the good in
questiontakes a commodityform.Likethe nested pots
in a backpacker'skit, multiple sets of meaning and
value serve different purposes but rest within the
confines of one another. Tobacco, for instance, has
long been grownfor its commercialvalue,and fortunes
have been made from its cultivation.In 1849,Missouri
plantersproducedmore than 17 million pounds of it,
surpassingeven North Carolina. Planters sold their
tobacco in the marketsof St. Louis and New Orleans,
but they did not regardit simplyas a cash crop. For
Missouriplanters,much like their Kentuckyand Vir-
ginia ancestors,tobaccowas a socialgood; the rhythms
and ritualsof its cultivationwere an importantsource
for "collectiveidentity"and "harmony"(Phillips2000,
123). More than even profit,verdantfields of tobacco
were a "sharedsign"of communityhealth and mem-
bership,as centralto the collectivesense of self (and
unrelated to market price) as rice paddies for the
Japanese.12Defying the logic of marketsand profits,
Missouriplantersincreasedproductiononly modestly
when tobaccopriceswere at all time highs(otherstates
tripledproduction)but doubledproductionwhen their
tobacco-centeredsenses of self and communitywere
assailed by a decade-long ruinous collapse in prices
(pp. 123, 124). Similarto the rice example, tobacco
illustratesimportantpoints for moral-economicpoliti-
cal analysis. Beyond the fact that many goods are
nested complexesof value that differin kind as well as
degree, the constitutiveand communalpropertiesof
socialgoods often set the boundarieswithinwhichtheir
other values operate. A social good's commoditysta-
tus, then (shouldit have one), need not clashautomat-
ically or completelywith that good's less commercial
roles.
A focus on social goods facilitates analysisin still
other ways. Multiplebut nested values and meanings
accountfor the diverse(but not alwaysperfectlycom-
patible) practices surroundinggiven goods. Nested
12 Tobaccoculturefostered
powerfuland often insularconceptions
of community.Accordingto Waldrep(1993,13-4), who didresearch
in western Kentuckyand Tennessee, "tobaccofarmersdeveloped
unusuallyclose ties with their neighbors.Even a small crop of
tobaccorequiredso mucheffortthat [they]swappedoff workingon
each other's farms.Women frequentlyjoined their husbandsand
fathers in the fields.... Neighborhoodwomen worked so closely
togetherto clothe their families,sharingpatternsand sewingtech-
niques, that communitiesdevelopeddistinctivestyles of dress and
residentscouldimmediatelyidentifyoutsidersby theirclothes.Only
rarelydid neighborhoodgirlsmarryoutsidethe community."Breen
(1984, 251, 261) speaks of an early Americantobacco culture in
whichcultivationwas simultaneouslythe basisfor "socialcohesion,"
a mechanismfor forginga "publicidentity,"and"emblematic" of the
largersocial order'spast and future.
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March2001
valuesand diversepracticesexplainin turnthe basisfor
conflict.Significantly,the conflictrelatedto such com-
plex social goods as rice and tobacco is not just about
more favorableallocationsor greatermaterialgain;it
involveswhatkindof value shouldprevailin particular,
often changingsituations.Nested sets of meaningand
value also explain how, given even only slightly
changed circumstances,previouslyaccepted practices
(such as commodity-likeexchange)may come to gen-
erate perceptionsof illegitimacy.In Japan, rice is in
many respects a commodity,appropriatelysubject to
the competitivepressuresof commercialexchange,but
only to a point.Beyondthatpoint,when rice-basedand
quintessentiallyJapanese identities and relationships
are compromised,rice'ssocialvalue prevails.Likewise
for tobacco in nineteenth-centuryMissouri(and else-
where);it was an economicallyvaluablecommoditybut
was even more valuable as a medium for stable and
fulfillingsocial relations.13
In some communitiessocial goods are clusteredas
well as nested. Clustered social goods intensify felt
impressions of belonging and membership, adding
texture and weight to the notion of culturallydistinct
but sharedways of life. Linkagesamong clusters are
such that, for those who enjoy them, affiliatedgoods
maywell standor fall together.Among yeomanfarm-
ers and artisans in nineteenth-centuryMissouri, for
instance,work, familylife, religion, and politics were
distinctbut deeply intertwinedsocial goods; each re-
flected and in turn sustained an economy in which
production,consumption,and pricingwere governed
by local, self-sufficientcommunitiesbased upon per-
sonalnetworksand face-to-facerelations.Farmersand
artisans understood all too well the implicationsof
expandingrailroads;impersonal,commercialsociety
would alter not just the local economybut life as they
knew it (Thelen 1986,9-25).
Given their natureand meaningfulness,constitutive
and intrinsicallycommunalsocialgoods are sourcesfor
shared notions of legitimacy. Roles, identities, and
communitiesgroundedin social goods containwithin
them the criteriafor evaluatingspecificdevelopments
as appropriateor inappropriate,at least for those who
recognizethe goods in questionas social goods. These
meaningsand relatedcriteriaare the foundationfor a
conceptionof moraleconomybased on socialgoods.A
preliminarysketch,demonstration,and justificationof
this conceptfollows.
MORAL ECONOMY REDEFINED
Conceptually,moral economyremainsa popularcon-
sensus rooted in the past and capable of inspiring
action. With Thompson,it reflects a claim about the
natureof and sourcesfor communalnotions of legiti-
macy.In this version of moral economy,however,the
13 Tobacco-basedsenses of self and communityfueled the Black
Patch War (1890-1915) in western Kentuckyand Tennessee, a
region famous for its dark tobacco and fierce hostilityto outside
interestsbenton undermininglocalcommunitycontrol.See Waldrep
1993.
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
popularconsensusaboutwhat distinguisheslegitimate
from illegitimatepracticesresidesin the nested mean-
ings of specific constitutiveand/or communal social
goods. These meaningsharborimplicitnotions about
legitimate practicesas well as legitimate relations in
and amongaffectedgroupsand individuals.14 A signif-
icantthreatto or a sustained,deliberatedeviationfrom
accepted practices and relations prompts organized
response,which can range from publiccriticism,legal
challenges, and policy initiativesto more unconven-
tional andviolent formsof protest,includingrebellion.
Waterin the aridAmericanWest is a particularlygood
illustrationfor two reasons.
First,water has long been associatedwith a number
of generallydesirablebut frequentlycompetingvalues.
It is valued not only as a sourceof sustenancebut also
as an instrument of agriculture,object of beauty,
industrialcommodity,means of transportation,com-
munity good, fuel for urban development,clean and
pure resource, and place for recreation and wildlife
habitat(Wilkenson1990).The West'spersistentaridity
(manyareasreceiveless than 12 inchesof precipitation
a year) complicatesdecisionmaking,becauseall water-
related values cannot be realized equally. Moreover,
realizationof any one value maywell precludethat of
one or more others. Consequently,the just allocation
of scarce water is a constant challenge, the fertile
setting for a moral economyof a complexgood.
Second,wateris a constitutiveand intrinsicallycom-
munalsocial good. Westernersidentifythemselvesand
relateto othersin termsof water,whichplaysmuchthe
same role as rice in Japan or tobacco in nineteenth-
centuryMissouri.The most importantforms of rela-
tion and identificationderive from the fact that long-
term communityand polityin the aridAmericanWest
are not possiblewithoutan ongoing abilityto procure
and allocatewater. Figurativelyif not literally"at the
center of humancommunities"(Bates et al. 1993, 14),
water is embedded in the very notion of collective
existence. It relates communityresidents as citizens,
impressing upon them in particular their "mutual
dependency,commonenterprise,andjoint responsibil-
ity" (Sax 1990, 17).15
Foundedin parton water,westerncommunitiesand
their residentsrecognize and frequentlyinteractwith
one another in terms of shared or contested rivers,
watersheds,and aquifers.Water rights and practices,
diversion structures,and a variety of water-oriented
districts,institutions,and organizationsidentifypeople
in even more particularways: water rights holder
versus nonholders,junior versus senior appropriator,
14 My idea is similarto Wuthnow's(1987)conceptof a moralorder:
a concept "essentiallyabout culture..,.an attributeof social rela-
tions"(p. 58). Moralorders"expressboundaries,"so that we may
know"theplaceof things,"andtheyinclude"implicitcategoriesthat
define properrelationsamongindividualsand groups"(p. 69).
15These intrinsicallycommunalpropertiesqualifywateras a sphere
of securityandwelfare,whichWalzer(1983,64) describesin partas
"politicalcommunityfor the sake of provision,provisionfor the sake
of community." The communalpropertiesandeffectsof waterin the
arid West can be comparedto those of education,sumptuarylaws,
relief,andransomof captivesin Walzer'sanalysisof medievalJewish
communities(pp. 71-4).
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Vol. 95, No. 1
up- versusdownstreamcommunity,lowerversusupper
basin state, and so on. The web of physical,legal, and
administrativestructures that capture and allocate
water constitutesin effect a social and politicalmatrix
that individuals,communities, and states invariably
take into account. In other words, water is a vital
mediumfor social and politicalrelations,a mediumat
the center of processes of community,even regional
self-identification(Brownand Ingram1987).
Water's status as a constitutive and intrinsically
communalsocial good accountsfor the fact that west-
erners conceive and cherish water in terms beyond
those of mere economicutility.It is not simplya liquid
with certain physicalproperties,a thing unto itself, a
commoditywhose value is realizedonly or essentially
in economic exchange. Water symbolizes inherently
desirable states of affairs achieved and experienced
only in concert with others, in particularthe mutual
advantagesof "schools,churches,and social life," of a
civic and moral as well as economic progress (Mead
1903, 382; see also Hundley1992;Pisani 1984;Sherow
1990).16Because of these deeplyvalued and clustered
senses of communityand self, waterissues turn on far
more than questionsof how to allocate efficientlyan
increasinglyscarce yet increasinglyvaluableresource.
Also involvedis the more difficultbut importantques-
tion of which water-relatedvalue should prevail and
why in given situations.As in the examplesof rice and
tobacco, water-relatedsenses of communityand self,
especiallywhen threatened,establish the context for
evaluationand action.
The deeply rooted and politicallysignificantmoral
economy of water springs from its constitutiveand
intrinsicallycommunalproperties.Long valued for its
role in creating and maintainingcivically rewarding
communities,water has a moral thrust that is funda-
mentallynegative;in effect,waterallocationsin the end
should not undermineachieved or expected commu-
nity.Simplyput, transfersand allocationsthat threaten
or underminethe integrityof communityare illegiti-
mate. Subordinatingthe disposition of water to the
integrityof communityis legitimatebecausethe auton-
omy,welfare,and identityof westerncommunitiesare
tied directlyto water.17
The embeddedand negativenatureof water'smoral
economy affectshow westernsinvoke it. Because em-
bedded, its longstandingmeaningsand understandings
at times are takenfor granted.Consequently,western-
ers invokeit sporadically,often in responseto specific
circumstancesand with the objective of more firmly
16
IngramandOggins(1990,5, 10) emphasizethe noneconomicview
of water.In a surveyof leadersin Arizona,New Mexico,andwestern
Texas whose communitiesstood to lose water throughintensified
water marketing(economicallydrivenrural-to-urban transfers),the
overwhelmingmajoritycharacterizedthe loss as damagingto rural
communitiesand not subjectto compensation.Accordingto one,
whena communityloses itswaterit "losesits present,its past,andits
future."
17Bateset al. (1993,182)referto thisas a principleof equity,rooted
"in the shared,publicnatureof water."Equitydictates,they con-
clude, that water-relateddecisionsinvolve and reflect "the whole
community,not just those parts that were there first or that have
moneyor power"(p. 178).
93
RethinkingMoralEconomy
securingthe integrityof specificcommunities(includ-
ing states).18These invocationspair actsof rediscovery
with calls for change. In each instance westerners
negotiatewater'smultipleuses andmeaningsin lightof
both new circumstances and water's fundamental
moral imperative.
Beyondpublicand often emotionallychargeddecla-
rationsof concernor injustice,19 westernersinvokethe
moral economy of water throughappeals for reform,
new legislation, reinterpretationof existing laws, or
more direct action, includingviolence (Babbitt 1988;
Dunbar 1983; Pisani 1984; Sherow 1990; Walton
1992).20Results have been broadly and consistently
regulatory.Many of these regulations,unlike those
associatedwith other naturalresources,shelter water
from fully self-interested,privatized,or market-driven
transactions,which qualifieswater as an example of
what Walzer calls a "blockedexchange."21 The limits
westernershave placed on the exchange,sale, appro-
priation,or transferof waterincludegrantingit public
ownershipor public resource status;nonexportlaws;
public trust, welfare, or interest review of proposed
transactions;beneficialuse requirements(officiallyin-
terpretedin some statesas a prohibitionon speculation
in waterfor profit);and, since the OwensValleyaffair,
area-of-originstatutes,whichincludevestingirrigation
and other water-relateddistrictsor associationswith a
veto over all out-of-watershedtransfers(DuMarsand
Minnis 1989; Hoffman-Dooley 1996; MacDonnell
1990; MacDonnell and Howe 1986; Sax 1989; Tre-
garthen1983).22Coupledwithlongstandingfearsabout
water monopolies (Alston 1978), these limitationsre-
flect deep concernsaboutwater-relatedmeasuresthat
would subjectstates or communitiesto external,arbi-
18 This sporadic aspect supports Walzer's argument that the distri-
butional autonomy of social goods is a critical principle, that the
demand for autonomy is "more likely to make for occasional
reformation and rebellion than for everyday enforcement" (Walzer
1983, 10).
19For example, residents across six counties in the San Luis Valley of
Colorado recently responded to plans to sell the valley's groundwater
to Denver and other large cities. They placed a notice in the Denver
Post: "We, the undersigned citizens, are committed to preserving the
water within Colorado's San Luis Valley for land and life. Private
marketers are drawing up plans to take water from the Valley and
sell to other parts of Colorado or other regions. We are opposed to
these plans. We are committed to fight efforts to take water from
....place, the San Luis Valley. Help us to protect land and
this beautiful
life" (Johnston et al. 1996, 5 B, emphasis in the original).
20
Secretary of the Interior Babbitt, a former governor of Arizona,
characterized unfettered, market-driven rural-to-urban transfers of
water as "economic Darwinism" and recommended protective regu-
lations and oversight. Otherwise, he predicted, "big cities will
inexorably squeeze the water and the life out of small communities"
(Babbitt 1988, 7).
21 "Blocked
exchanges set limits on the dominance of wealth"
(Walzer 1983, 99). Due to their shared understandings, some goods
(e.g., human beings, rights, criminal justice) properly fall outside the
sphere of money altogether. Other goods (medical care, education,
and, I argue, water in the arid American West) are partially blocked;
market-like exchanges are permitted but only to the extent that the
sphere of money does not jeopardize the core, noncommodity values
associated with those goods.
22 Area-of-origin statutes limit interbasin transfers to prevent envi-
ronmental, political, and/or economic losses to the areas from which
the water is transferred.
94
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March2001
trary control and, consequently, compromise their
identities as states and communities.23 Rooted in the
past and in water's status as a constitutiveand intrin-
sically communalsocial good, the moral economy of
water remainsthe basis for determiningthe legitimacy
of a numberof water-relatedactivities.
A moral-economicpoliticalanalysisbased on social
goods is justifiedfor at least three reasons.First, this
concept, unlike the prevailingview, is not limited by
time or culture.Socialgoods andtheirattendantmoral
economies are characteristicof modern as well as
premodern communities.Political science need not
restrictmoral-economicanalysisto the clashof embed-
ded versusautonomouseconomies,or, for that matter,
to the phenomenonof rebellion.Second, social goods
and moral economies are plural, not singular.Each
moral economy is a separate although often nested
sphere of action-inspiringlegitimacy.Unlike the over-
ridingeconomicutilityof rational-choicetheoryor the
undifferentiated webs-of-lifeof traditionalmoralecon-
omy, my revision honors the moral complexity of
humancommunities,and it capturesmuch more pre-
cisely the groundsfor politicallysignificantmoral in-
dignation.Third,the groundingin social goods mini-
mizes the risk of under-or oversocializedconceptions
of economicbehavior.Because of the mutual,consti-
tutive, and subjectivelymeaningfulpropertiesof spe-
cific social goods, moral economy is embedded in
concrete, ongoing social relations,not in generalized,
mechanicalmoralitiesor romanticizedpasts. In sum,
important kinds of political and economic activity
reflectthe inherentlyculturalpropertiesof meaningful
goods, and a moral-economicanalysisbased on social
goods is especiallywell suited to explainthem.
23Westerners' historical objections to water monopolies effectively
illustrate Walzer's theory of social goods, dominance, and monopoly.
Walzer (1983, 10-3) defines dominance and monopoly as the unjust
conversion of one social good into another. In the end, he concludes,
"dominance of goods makes for the domination of people" (p. 19),
which is precisely what westerners fear about water monopolies.
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