SRIJAN BASU MALLICK

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SESSIONAL: TERM PAPER

CONFLICT, DISPLACEMENT AND CITIZENSHIP: A CASE STUDY OF

THE CHAKMAS

SUPERVISED BY PROF. SATYABRAT SINHA

Before I begin addressing the specific topic in my term paper, I will be giving
an outline of the concepts of refugees and migrants in the context of South Asia.
Sanjoy Hazarika, in his book ‘Rights of Passage’ makes a distinction between
migrants and refugees. The primary difference, he highlights, is that the
‘refugee is also a migrant but the migrant is not necessarily a refugee.’
(Hazarika 2000: 76) He goes on to highlight the evolving nature of definitions
of the terms along with the international recognition of ‘environmental
refugees’ and the difference it has with ‘internally displaced persons.’ The
perspectives provided by the Norwegian social scientist, Ajay Sukhre, find
mention in his work where Sukhre has argued against the dangers of using these
words loosely. Opinions related to these, Sukhre argues, are broadly divided
among two schools of thought – Minimalists and Maximalists. The minimalists
argue that the factor of economic growth become the central theme in
determining the ways in which people engage in mobility within and outside the
country. Environmental factors, to them, do not occupy the central position.
Maximalists, on the other hand hold the position that the emergence of
environmental refugees comes from the fact that they have been displaced from
their homes due to calamities which can be natural or man-made and it can
compel theme to seek refuge in a neighbouring country. Hazarika criticises
those scholars who take a generalised position on this issue by stating that they
oversimplify environmental refugees by stating them as those people who are
fleeing environmental decline. He calls this definition as imprecise as there is
no clear cut distinction among internally displaced people and internationally
displaced people. He goes on to highlight the ideas that were formulated by the
scholar Myron Weiner. Weiner went on to separate the concepts of refugees and
migrants and classification of two categories of people moving across
international boundaries – Rejected peoples and Unwanted Migrants. Rejected
people, according to Weiner, are the following – ‘Governments or dominant
ethnic groups may expel from their country ethnic or religious minorities or in
other ways make life for minorities so intolerable that for their safety and well-
being they flee the country. In several instances rejected peoples are dumped
upon a neighbouring country in the expectation that they will be accepted
because they share the ethnicity of groups within the receiving country.’ Weiner
has highlighted six instances of rejected people in South Asia – ‘Indo-Pakistan
Refugee Flows 1947-48, Exodus of Burmese Indians, Exodus of Sri Lankan
Indians and Sri Lankan Tamils, Bangladesh and the Stranded Pakistanis, Flight
of Burmese Muslims to Bangladesh and Flight of Chakmas from Bangladesh to
India.’ (Weiner 1993: 1737-40) Unwanted Migrants, on the other hand,
‘embraces those groups which have crossed international and domestic
provincial boundaries in search of economic benefits or those who have moved
as a result of economic and environmental factors. They are unwanted because
they have been rejected by the host community. Host begin turning against
migrants when the feel politically and socially threatened. Or put more simply,
until the settlers begin to assume numbers which make the native community
feel that they are being undercut, both physically and culturally.’ (Hazarika
2000: 92-93) Examples of this category include - Bengalis in Assam, Nepalis in
India and the driving away of the Nepali speaking Lhotshampas from Bhutan.
Chakmas, I would say belong to the category of mixed migration as their
migration to India as refugees have taken part in two phases. The first one in
1964 was that of a ‘development induced displacement’ as a result of their lands
getting inundated due to the construction of the Kaptai Dam in CHT. The
second one during 1970s to 1990s was a result of ‘conflict induced
displacement’ as a result of the Bangladeshi state carrying the political
programme of settling Bengali Muslims in the CHT to bring about a shift in the
demography and militarising the CHT to achieve its motive.

The Chakmas in Arunachal have been victims of social and political exclusion
for a long time in South Asia and have been consistently denied to exercise one
of the most basic and universally recognised fundamental human rights – the
right to self-determination. It started in 1947 when the Chakmas had expressed
the desire to become Indian citizens but found themselves on the other side of
the border as Pakistani nationals. When Bangladesh emerged as an independent
sovereign state in 1971, it did renew their hopes of getting their aspirations of
being politically recognised being fulfilled but they got to realise that there was
no politico-cultural space for them in an overwhelmingly Bengali-Muslim
dominated society. It resulted in a protracted struggle for the right to self-
determination by the Chakmas under the banner of Parbattya Chattogram Jana
Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) and Shanti Bahini. The state of Bangladesh, in a
similar manner like that of the Pakistani state, engaged in the common approach
of suppressing and oppressing dissent in the quest of homogenisation of each
and every non-Bengali community within the larger Bengali speaking
nationalist frame. What is important to note here is the fact that while the
Bangladeshi state engaged in a brutal military campaign to persecute Chakmas
living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), it has never claimed responsibility
for the Chakmas who had taken refuge in India in 1964. They justified it by
stating that it had happened before Bangladesh came into existence. As a result
of the prevailing circumstances, the Chakmas faced a peculiar situation as the
source of their Pakistani citizenship (East Pakistan) had ceased to exist and the
new state of Bangladesh derecognised by going to the extent of not mentioning
them in the newly formed constitution. What has added to their worries is the
fact that the Indian state has failed to grant them citizenship after reassuring
them several times and as a result, they still remain outside the purview of the
protection of any national state. Another factor that has added to their
ambiguous status is the fact that they were resettled in Arunachal Pradesh which
was then known as North East Frontier Agency, a place which enjoys a unique
status under the Indian federal arrangement as a result of which Indians from
other states have to comply to certain restrictions while they are in Arunachal. If
we look back at the history of this problem, we will get to know that it was in
1964 when as a result of the Kaptai Dam being built over the Karnaphli River in
CHT, 54000 acres of prime cultivated land got inundated and as a result, almost
one-sixth of the Chakma population i.e. approximately 100000 people became
landless, homeless and as a result refugees displaced due to environmental
calamity caused by ‘development.’ Near about 40000 Chakmas migrated from
CHT to Indian Territory, seeking asylum. They were given asylum and were
settled in NEFA during the time period of 1964-69. The dynamics changed
when NEFA became a union territory in 1972 and was renamed Arunachal
Pradesh. It changed in a drastic manner when Arunachal attained statehood in
1987. The Chakma population in Arunachal, by then, had grown to 65000. The
antagonisms between the ‘insider’ Arunachalis and the ‘outsider’ Chakmas
became prominent during the 1990s. Having lived for several years in the places
that are settlements, the Chakmas have realised these spaces as their new
‘homes’ and have no intention of going back to the CHT and have demanded
citizenship and all other rights. It is this point from which Arunachalis fear that
they will go on to lose their lands, employment and political representation and
ultimately they will become a minority in their own land living under the
dominance of the Chakmas whom they clearly view as foreigners. So, the
statuses of Chakmas have evolved as ‘political refugees’ from Bangladesh to
‘unwanted migrants’ in India.

Anupama Roy in her book, ‘Citizenship in India,’ discusses in detail the various
premises of the presence of ambivalent or ‘doubtful’ citizens residing in Indian
land.
The modern nation state has citizenship as the most crucial facet of legal
membership and its association with the entity of an ‘outsider’ is an inalienable
part. The identification of the outsider becomes an essential part to determine
the insider (i.e. the legal citizen). Anupama Roy takes the help of postcolonial
theory to assert the fact that the entity of the ‘outsider’ does not share a
relationship of what she calls a ‘simple opposition’ (i.e. exclusion). She
highlights the usage of the term ‘forclusion’ by postcolonial theorists which
reflects a continuous comparison of the ‘other’ and the ‘self’ and it is this
‘other’ which formulates the ‘identity and the unity’ of the self. The citizen’s
‘virtual’ image gets linked with that of the ‘outsider’ and it gets attached to the
‘objective citizen but it is unable to reproduce itself as an objective citizen. It is
this relationship, Roy argues that gets reproduced and replicated in a continuous
manner through ‘legal and juridical pronouncement’ so that there is a
continuous cohabitation by the ‘other’ in a citizen’s space yet having an
incongruous relation. (Roy 2016: 115-16)

Roy goes on to describe how the idea of people belonging to ‘nowhere’ came
into existence after the inception of India as a republic. The very narrative of
citizenship in the Indian Republic was based upon the ‘drawing of national
borders’ and ‘the affirmation of state sovereignty over the territorial boundaries
of the nation state.’ However, both of the above was followed by the
requirement of a legal statement which would define membership of the nation
state. The legal-constitutional frameworks give recognition to those citizens
who have ‘resided within the national borders’ or ‘crossed them in ways that
could be considered legitimate by the state.’ In spite of this the citizenship law
did not capture each and every scenario in which migration across borders took
place, and only a few forms of migration was brought under its purview as
distinct contexts. One such mode of legitimate cross border movement was
‘displacement.’ The primary difference between an abducted person and a
displaced person is that the second one belongs to an administrative category
unlike the first one which belongs to a legal category. It is this introduction of
displaced persons that created the avenue for the state to categorise the
migration of specific groups of people coming across the border as
displacement and it opened up the initiation of bureaucratic actions vis a vis
displaced citizens. It was primarily the Hindu refugees coming across the border
who were considered as displaced persons and they were ‘legally absorbed’ as
Indian citizens with their names being included in the electoral rolls. However,
several decades even after the partition, an entanglement in terms of remaining
‘legally undetermined’ continues to exist. In the purview of two amendments in
laws pertaining to Indian citizenship in 1986 and 2003 respectively, the huge
numbers of people who had migrated into Indian territory from the then
Pakistan’s western and eastern borders have taken up the space of being ‘illegal
migrants’ and hence, ‘stateless nowhere people without legal claims to
citizenship.’ (Roy 2016: 116-21) It is them who can be categorised under the
domain of ambiguous citizens and the people of Chakma community,
specifically those people residing in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, fall under
this domain.

Chakmas have been living as ambivalent citizens across three states of northeast
India for several years now and their ambivalence has resulted in them living
under marginalised and subhuman conditions along with being at the received
end of hostilities by the local populace in Mizoram and even more in Arunachal.
Tripura has a different context to it because the hostility over there is aimed
towards the Bengali settlers collectively by the local populace and the Chakmas
living there. Although they have been referred to as ‘Palestinians of South Asia’
by Rabin Gupta, in his article, ‘Searching for a niche’ in 1995, the distinct
political demand that separates these two communities is that while the
Palestinians demand for sovereign nationhood, the Chakmas have no such
demand. They, in fact, do not want to go back to their own homeland of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts in fear of getting persecuted even further and most
importantly, they have nothing to go back to as their most important asset, their
lands have been taken over by Bengali settlers. It is because of this reasons that
they intend to stay back in those places in northeast India which is now ‘home’
to them and it is from this perspective that they assert their right to become
Indian citizens in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. However, their ‘statuses’ as
citizens of ambivalence have increased as days have passed by because of the
hostilities against them by the local populace and as a result, their vulnerability
to become victims of it. I have used the word ‘statuses’ instead of the word
status because of the different conditions Chakmas live under as ambivalent
citizens in these three states. The Chakmas who reside in Mizoram and Tripura
have went on to become naturalised citizens of the Indian Union in 1947 and
1949 and got the status of Scheduled Tribes too. However, the Chakmas who
arrived in India during 1964 as a result of displacement due to the Kaptai dam
project were given asylum in NEFA by the central government. However, they
have not been given citizenship and continue to remain stateless citizens.
However the one common element that unites the Chakmas of Mizoram,
Tripura and Arunachal is the fact that all of them are unwilling to return back to
Chittagong Hill Tracts and are determined to remain in India even at the cost of
remaining ambivalent citizens in the context of Arunachal. The lack of desire
among them to return to their homeland emanates from an acute awareness of
the ever-increasing deterioration of the Chakmas’ condition back home in the
CHT at the hands of the successive political regimes. Added to this is a strong
sense of attachment with the land of their present settlement which they have
made their homes.

Chakmas living in Arunachal Pradesh sought refuge in India in 1964 and have
been living there since then, as ambiguous citizens. It was during the 1990s that
the hostilities directed towards them by local organisations with the support of
political parties, became prominent in the national perspective and it paved the
way for the bone of contention which is the most prominent one in the context
of each and every state in Northeast India (Arunachal in this case): The ‘insider’
versus the ‘outsider.’

The perspectives regarding the arguments of the local Arunachal people

(insiders) and the Chakmas (outsiders) asserting their positions have been
highlighted by Deepak K. Singh in his book, ‘Stateless in South Asia, The
Chakmas between Bangladesh and India.’ He discusses the fundamental
arguments provided by both the sides.

One of the main arguments that have come up from the perspective of the
Chakmas is that of citizenship ad land rights where they have asserted that they
want to become citizens along with the right to own land in Arunachal. There
have been demands to give them the status of Scheduled Tribes in Arunachal
too. However, differing points of view of view exist among the Chakmas on this
issue. There is a section who has asserted that the political recognition of them
as citizens is the most important factor that lies in front of them and will elevate
them to have access to all the political rights and recognitions that an Indian
citizen has. There is another perspective that has been provided by a differing
set of opinions within the Chakmas. It asserts that there is no point giving them
citizenship if they are not given land rights along with it. This is because, they
have primarily been an agrarian community and giving them land rights along
with elevating them to the status of Scheduled Tribes will ensure that they are
protected by socio economic rights. The common element that can be found in
both the perspectives is that they want to elevate their status from being
outsiders to becoming insiders (becoming ‘Indians’) in terms of their identity.
(Singh 2010: 151-79)

Arunachalis, on the other hand formulate a set of arguments which assert that
making the Chakmas ‘insiders’ will endanger the rights that they enjoy and will
make them a minority in their own land. This fear arises primarily on the
question of land rights. They fear once the Chakmas are recognised as
Scheduled Tribes, they will gradually take over all the lands in Arunachal which
poses a serious threat to their identity and existence. Land, they argue, for them
is not just a physical entity. It occupies a high moral and spiritual position in
their lives and the attachment that they have developed towards their lands
makes them an inalienable part of those lands. On the question of ‘indigenous’
human rights, it is the factor of identity that promotes their position of having
the fear of getting isolated and marginalised; socially, economically and
politically if the Chakmas were to be recognised as full-fledged citizens. As a
result of the prevailing conditions, the rise of insecurity among the Arunachalis
have given space to violent sectarian politics that is anti-Chakma in its political
position and it has mobilised a huge number of Arunachali youths specifically,
who under the leadership of various organisations have demanded their ouster
from the state blaming them for crime, unemployment and other vices that have
taken shape in the state. It has also given way for an indigenous right to self-
assertion and determination by them where they have argued that they are the
‘sons of the soil’ and the protection of their identity is of fundamental
importance to them and for that it is necessary to recognise Chakmas as
‘outsiders’ in Arunachal and not give them rights and recognitions at par with
them. (Singh 2010: 180-220)

In the context of the volatile nature of citizenship in Arunachal and Northeast

and the dimensions surrounding it, Singh, has taken up an interrogation of
India’s refugee policy and has provided his own opinions as to devising
solutions in order to formulate coherent policies that will solve the complex set
of problems the Indian state is encountering with, in the context of refugees.

Chakmas were given settlements in NEFA (Northeast Frontier Agency), which

is known as Arunachal Pradesh today and it is a protected area. As a result of
being a protected area, a scenario of conflict has developed between the
Arunachalis and the Chakmas with the Arunachalis objecting to giving them
land rights in an area, constitutionally protected for them. When they were
settled, it was done without consulting them and giving them the space to
express their desires. As a result of it, as time passed by, complex problems
arose without any tangible solution in sight. The non-grant of citizenship to
Chakmas, Singh argues is not much of a legal deficiency or the absence of
constitutional provisions at the domestic level but a lack of political will. In the
backdrop of migration induced problems in Arunachal, it will be an
oversimplification to term the fear and the apprehensions expressed by the
Arunachalis of losing their land to the Chamkas and hence losing their identity
as chauvinistic and xenophobic. This has been the dominant ‘mainstream’
understanding of the problems faced by the people over there and has ultimately
led to apathy and disregard for the concerns of the people there. The Chakmas,
on the other hand have been living for a long time under marginalized
conditions deprived of social, cultural, economic and political rights. However,
the have a strong assertion for the places they live in as their ‘homes’ and it is
reflective of their willingness to stay back in Arunachal despite the uncertainties
faced by them. The question of land rights, rather than citizenship, has become
the focal theme of hostilities between the two communities and various
perspectives have come up in the competing claims over land.

If the question of land is viewed from the perspective of political and juridical
level, Singh states that “it might appear that the Chakmas do not have any
legitimate claim over land as they are clearly ‘foreigners’ in the absence of
citizenship rights. However, even if they were to be granted citizenship, it
would not simultaneously entitle them to any legitimate claim over land, if they
chose to stay on in Arunachal. Given the unique status that Arunachal enjoys
within the Indian federal arrangement where no non-ethnic Indian citizen can
own land or have any permanent stake in the resources of the region, grant of
citizenship to the Chakmas would at best only bring them at par with the other
outsider Indians living in the state. They may even run the risk of vacating the
land presently under their control, as the state government can legitimately ask
them to do so, since land is exclusively under the collective control of the
indigenous peoples.” (Singh 2010: 251) However, Singh also provides us with
a counter argument from the humanitarian point of view. He goes on to say that,
“it would be unfair and unjust to uproot them once again from the land where
they have lived all these years, particularly so when they have no other home to
call their own. A deep awareness of the specific land laws in the state and the
emerging apprehensions that settlement in Arunachal without land rights would
make them landless reinforces their determination to be treated at par with the
indigenous peoples. What is of even greater significance is the fact that an
overwhelming majority of the Chakmas who were born and brought up in
Arunachal not only define their political identity as ‘Indians’, but also know of
no other home they can identify themselves with.” (Singh 2010: 251-52)

It is the perception of the indigenous people in relation to their land rights that
becomes a determining point of the arguments they provide to assert their
identity. They look upon themselves as ‘first nations’ based upon their historical
association with their lands since ‘times immemorial,’ the most rudimentary
phrase used to define indigenous populaces highlighting their continued
occupancy of lands in their places of origination. Arunachalis have a perception
similar to the one above. It is important to note here that the Arunachalis do not
have objections to Chakmas claiming citizenship in India. They have a problem
with the Chakmas being accorded similar status like them in the question of
land rights and they assert that the refugee issue will not have a long term
solution until and unless the Chakmas are relocated outside the protected areas
of Arunachal. The fear becomes prominent from one of the statements Singh
had recorded while interviewing them – ‘We do not want Arunachal to become
another CHT.’

Singh has examined the failure of this issue from two perspectives. Firstly, he
highlights the discourse of national security which, he argues has failed to grasp
the real nature of the problem from both factors of refusal to acknowledge the
indigenous populace based concerns of the Arunachalis and the stateless refugee
based concerns of the refugees. Secondly, he has highlighted the absence of a
coherent refugee policy of the Indian state. The unwillingness of the Indian and
other South Asian governments, to acknowledge and categorise the presence of
indigenous communities has made the approach towards these issues more
problematic. Singh states, “the unwillingness on the part of the South Asian
governments to acknowledge the existence of indigenous peoples in their
countries can be largely explained as part of the deliberate process of
nullification of the political category of ‘indigenous’. This is so because these
governments do not wish to grant the rights that invariably flow from the
recognition of such a status. This can further be illustrated with the help of an
example in the Indian context. The indigenous right to self-determination,
which is considered to be one of the most fundamental rights of the indigenous
peoples the world over under several international conventions, is denied by the
Indian state on the ground that no such category of people exist within India. It
is precisely because of such unwillingness to acknowledge the presence of the
indigenous peoples within its territorial boundaries that the Indian state cannot
appreciate the significance of land in the indigenous worldview. Such people in
India are instead known by a curious and politically neutral term called
‘scheduled tribes’. Interestingly, even though the so-called tribal people in India
do enjoy certain special statutory privileges in terms of reservation schemes in
government jobs and educational institutions, the term ‘tribe’ is an artificial
construct which in no way reflects the reality of their lives. It reflects a
condescending derogatory overtone and more importantly, its general
dissociation from the processes of empowerment of such people on social–
cultural and political–economic terms, which the use and acceptance of the term
‘indigenous’ otherwise entails.” (Singh 2010: 255)

Singh goes on to develop his arguments based upon an interrogation of the

existing refugee policy of India. He highlights the fact that the modern state of
India has been generous enough to grant asylum to refugees coming from
various corners and belonging to different ethnicities and religions. This is
viewed by him as a policy arising out of a voluntary framework rather than a
more formal obligatory institutionalised structure as formulated by the
international refugee rights regime. In the course of such a record, there is no
need for India to commit itself to binding international rules and norms which
have a chance of limiting the freedom of action. However, what lacks in India’s
generosity towards refuges is that it is unwilling to provide long term solutions
to the refugee problems it faces because of the lack of will to formulate and
frame national level refugee specific legislations. Singh provides three grounds
to interrogate India’s refugee policy - i) Need for a Legal and Legislative
Framework ii) Need to ratify the 1951 Convention and iii) Need for a South
Asian Protocol. Out of these three, the second one, he argues, does not require a
critical review as he mentions that it is under doubtful considerations as to
whether India should ratify it when the international refugee rights regime is
itself in a state of flux.

Firstly, the need for a domestic legal and legislative framework is of paramount
importance to act as a guide in order to have a uniform response to different
refugees based upon the contexts. It is the absence of such a framework that,
critics argue, has led to ‘political ad-hocism’ resulting in different refugees
being treated differently. This lack of uniformity has resulted in refugee issues
being handled at the ‘political-administrative’ level and the refugees, upon
entering become forgotten people and hence, not looked after. This is because
of a couple of reasons. Firstly, there has been no practical refugee legislation
that has been enacted in Indian and there is no mention of the word refugee in
the Indian Constitution. Secondly, what enhances the problem is the fact that
most of the existing laws in India are archaic when it comes to dealing with
refugees. If the example of Foreigners Act 1946, the principal law in India for
dealing with foreigners, is considered, it can be observed that as a result of
emergence during the colonial period, the law is backdated as they are not
connected to the specificities of refugee issues of contemporary times. It
essentially, fails to distinguish between an illegal foreigner and a refugee.
Courts in India have played an active role in intervening in a humanitarian
manner to uphold the dignity and rights of the refugees often citing the
fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution as a safeguard to protect them.
However, doubts have been raised as to how fare ‘judicial creativity’ can be a
substitute for a ‘legislative framework.’ It has been argued that the judiciary can
only fill the void for a temporary period of time. Legislative frameworks will
provide permanent solutions to the issues refugees encounter. The need for
adopting a ‘South Asian Protocol and Covenant’ is another important factor that
needs to be taken up. There is a need to address refugee related issues at
multilateral forums rather than at the bilateral levels. South Asia plays host to
the fourth largest refugee population in the world and along with it, internally
displaced persons and environmental refugees are there too and it is due to these
factors that the need for a multilateral framework becomes all the more
necessary. There is a need to shift from the bilateral role and replace it by a dual
role of a national and a regional one. India’s undertaking of bold initiatives at
the regional level would result in South Asian countries taking up an active role
too in resolving the issue of trans-border migration. Adoption of a regional
framework by India would also pressurise the refugee producing states in the
region to protect its communities who are vulnerable. However, it needs to be
ensured that the formulation of uniform frameworks to deal with refugees does
not endanger laws protecting the rights of marginalised indigenous communities
in the countries. Singh concludes by saying that, ‘a look at the Chakma issue
through the prism of self-perception of the communities does reveal that both
the stateless Chakmas and the indigenous Arunachalis have equally competing
claims against the Indian state.’ (Singh 2010: 256-66)

From the existing literature that I have looked up in this theme, I have been able
to formulate primarily two perspectives vis a vis the scenario of the Chakmas in
Arunachal Pradesh. Firstly, the Chakmas who were resettled in NEFA in 1964
were settled over there on the grounds that they were predominantly Buddhists
and the local Arunachali populace over there too were mainly followers of
Buddhism. However, the resulting antagonisms between the two communities
give light to a facet that becomes integral in understating the idea of India. The
perception that the Chakmas are Buddhists and giving them settlements in
places where Buddhists are in a majority (Arunachal in this case), does not
imply that there will be automatic bonhomie amongst the two communities. If
that was the case, then almost the entire of Europe and America could have
been brought in and given settlements in Christian majority states in India. So, it
is clear that religion cannot be the basis for citizenship in an ethnically diverse
country like India because religious similarity does not imply that there are no
complexities. This argument becomes relevant in the context of Citizenship
Amendment Act 2019. The idea that persecuted non-Muslim minorities from
Afghanistan, Pakistan and specially Bangladesh will be given political
citizenship upon entering India by December 2014 does not imply that there
will be social and economic integration of the communities with the local
populations specifically in Northeast India. The antagonisms emerge out of
ethnic assertions rather that religious assertions and even if the migrant is a non-
Muslim, he/she remains ‘an unwanted foreigner’ to the locals of the Northeast
and it is because of this reason violent sectarian agitations of an ethnic nature
have shaped up across various states in Northeast in the past and if walked
along the same line, fears are there it might be the same again. The most recent
agitations in Assam and Tripura are reflective of that fact. Coming to the case of
Chakmas in Arunachal, the Union Government has exempted Arunachal from
the act and hence, the conditions of Chakmas over there will remain the same.
Arguments can be given of resettling them in other states but, the same doubt
remains as to how far they will be integrated into the social and economic
spaces of the territories they will be given settlements in. Mizoram is a living
example of that where the Chakmas despite being given citizenship remain
victims of hostilities directed against by the local Mizos. The second dimension
is directly linked with the first dimension and it is with this question that I
intend to conclude my term paper with. There needs to be a formal recognition
of Arunachalis as an indigenous community by the Indian Union and once that
is done, the protections given to them in terms of their sole ownership over the
means of production will be reinforced in a much stronger manner. The
Chakmas should be accorded with political citizenship and the Arunachalis have
no reservations with it. However the integration into the social and economic
space does not happen until and unless the Chakmas are accorded with the
status of scheduled tribe and land rights in the state. This however revives the
prevailing hostilities that the Arunachalis have against them and hence, the two
dimensions share an antagonistic relationship with each other. From this
perspective I pose the following question – How far are political rights viable in
the absence of social and economic rights? To this question, there is no
homogenous universal answer.

REFERENCES:

 Singh, Deepak K.: Stateless in South Asia - The Chakmas between

Bangladesh and India; 2010
 Roy, Anupama: Oxford India Short Introductions - Citizenship in India;
2016; pp. 114-154
 Hazarika, Sanjoy: Rites of Passage – Border Crossings, Imagined
Homelands, India’s East and Bangladesh; 2000; pp. 75-99
 Weiner, Myron: Rejected Peoples and Unwanted Migrants in South Asia;
Economic and Political Weekly; Vol. 28, No. 34 (Aug. 21, 1993); pp.
1737-1746
 Prasad, Chunnu: MIGRATION AND THE QUESTION OF
CITIZENSHIP: PEOPLE OF CHITTAGONG HILL TRACT IN
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