Topic/s: Post-Judgment Remedies

EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR vs JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SIXTY-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS RECKONED FROM NOTICE OF DENIAL OF THE FIRST
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER EVEN THOUGH A SECOND
AND THIRD MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (WHICH ARE NOT PROHIBITED MOTIONS) OF THE
SAME INTERLOCUTORY ORDER HAD BEEN FILED AND WERE LATER DENIED.

Ruling:
The petition for certiorari filed by petitioner in the appellate court was time-barred. The proscription
against a pro forma motion applies only to a final resolution or order and not to an interlocutory one. The
60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioner's receipt on June 11, 2004 of the denial of
his May 7, 2004 second motion for reconsideration. The 60-day period shall be reckoned from the
trial court's denial of his first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will ensue.

There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court for the nullification of a judgment, resolution or order: (1) the date when notice of the
judgment, resolution or order was received; (2) when a motion for a new trial or reconsideration of the
judgment, order or resolution was submitted; and (3) when notice of the denial thereof was received by
petitioner.

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is for the purpose of determining its timeliness, considering that a petition is required to be filed not
later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be nullified.

In the case of University of Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, the
December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court denying the motion of petitioner to consider insufficient or
inadequate respondent's compliance with its November 22, 2002 Order is interlocutory. The order does
not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the task of the court of adjudicating the parties'
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other but obviously indicates that
other things remain to be done. Such order may not be questioned except only as part of an appeal that
may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. It bears stressing however that
while the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner assailing the December 2, 2003 Order of the trial
court based on the same grounds as those alleged in his first motion is not pro forma, such second
motion for reconsideration can nevertheless be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere
reiteration of grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court. Such a motion
cannot be rejected on the ground that a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is
forbidden by law or by the Rules of Court