ECHR: FROM GUARANTOR OF JUSTICE

TO INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL
PRESSURE

2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
CHAPTER 1. ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN JUSTICE: BIRTH DEFECTS. . . 4
ECHR AS A CONDUIT OF ULTRALIBERAL WESTERN VALUES AND INTERESTS . . . . . . . . . . . 4
RELIGIOUS, FAMILY AND CIVIL LAW IN LIGHT OF NATIONAL TRADITIONS AND IN ECHR
DECISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

CHAPTER 2. CONFLICT BETWEEN PACE AND RUSSIA:

ECHR’S ACTIVITIES ON THE RUSSIAN TRACK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ECHR DECISIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF EU AND PACE RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW. . . . . . . . . 7
INJUSTICE IN STRASBOURG: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN STATISTICAL TERMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
CASE EXAMPLE: ARMED CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CASE EXAMPLE: DIMA YAKOVLEV LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

CHAPTER 3. ECHR AND RUSSIAN RADICAL OPPOSITION . . . . . . . . 13

STRASBOURG AND PRO-WESTERN OPPOSITION IN RUSSIA: UNITY AGAINST MOSCOW. . . . 13
UNREQUITED HATE: RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE ARTICLE 292 AND ECHR DECISIONS. . . . . . 14

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

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INTRODUCTION
Perestroika undertaken in the USSR in the late 1980’s and the collapse of the eastern
bloc and the Soviet Union that followed, were accompanied by hopes for Moscow’s
quick integration into the Western political and economic community. In transition
from the postwar Yalta system to a unipolar world order, Russia began actively
taking part in the work of such structures as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), World Bank, International Criminal Court and others. Biased approach
of Western institutions towards Russia, and at times intentional actions, directed
against Russian interests, were frequently ignored for the sake of adhering to the
politics of Westernization.

The obvious unwillingness of the United States and its European allies to see Russia
as a full-fledged member of the Western community and the continuation of the
course to “contain” and destabilize Russia, brought about a fundamental reappraisal
of Moscow’s foreign policy course and the workings of its national security system.

The growing tensions in the relationship between Russia and the West in light
of the coup d’etat in Kiev, inspired by the Obama administration and Brussels, the
initiation of the civil war in Eastern Ukraine by pro-Western authorities in Kiev and
the introduction of sectoral sanctions against Moscow led to folding of the activities
of a number of American and European political and economic institutions on
Russian territory and curtailment of Moscow’s role in a number of international
organizations, serving the interests of the West.

As part of its response to aggressive actions by the West, Russia blocked further
activities on its soil of the International Republican Institute (IRI), National
Democratic Institute (NDI), National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and other
organizations, which acted to the detriment of Russian national interests. In
2016, Russia left the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). At
the same time, Russia led and joined a number of international organizations, whose
members treat Moscow as an equal and respected partner – Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, BRICS economic bloc, Eurasian Economic Union and others. Moscow
continues to remain within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights,
which is located in Strasbourg and reports to the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe.

How politicized are the decisions by ECHR against Russia? How does the position of
PACE affect the behavior of the ECHR? Why do the Court’s activities concerning Russia
create a stir in Western media outlets and who benefits from it? What are the pluses
and minuses of continued cooperation between Moscow and the ECHR?

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CHAPTER 1. ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN JUSTICE: BIRTH DEFECTS
ECHR AS A CONDUIT OF ULTRALIBERAL WESTERN VALUES AND INTERESTS
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was established by the Council of Europe
in 1959 to ensure the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights by
member states. At the time of signing of the Convention and the creation of the ECHR,
there were ten Western European countries in the Council of Europe: Great Britain,
France, Ireland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, The Netherlands, Luxembourg
and Belgium. The ideology and the direction of ECHR’s activities reflected the values
prevalent in the founding states.

A significant expansion of the structure of the Council of Europe following the

collapse of the USSR and the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe resulted in dozens
of new countries coming under the jurisdiction of the ECHR. In 1998, Russia
came under the jurisdiction of the Court.

The expansion of the Council of Europe and other European structures came in several
stages, the most important of which involved the admission of several former Soviet
republics and a number of states that were formerly a part of the socialist bloc. This,
in turn, resulted in a significant growth in the geography of countries that fell within
the jurisdiction of the ECHR. Some of the countries that signed treaties of cooperation
with the ECHR were admitted only in some of the institutions of the new European
integration project (PACE, CE), but were not provided an opportunity to attain full-
fledged membership in the European Union and take part in the workings of key
decision-making organizations (Russia, Turkey and others). As a result, an entire
category of states appeared, that were, on the one side, obliged to submit to
the decisions handed down by the ECHR, and, on the other side, did not share
in the value system of its founding members, and did not have an opportunity to
effectively influence the Court’s functioning.

An entire category of states appeared, that were, on the one side,

obliged to submit to the decisions handed down by the ECHR, and,
on the other side, did not share in the value system of its founding
members, and did not have an opportunity to effectively influence
the Court’s functioning

The swift spread of liberal ideological tendencies among Western European elites and
the EU bureaucracy turned the ECHR not only into an instrument of political and
ideological pressure of a united West against its neighbors in Eastern Europe, but also
into a platform for the liberal transformation of traditional Western societies by non-
democratic judicial methods. The latter served as additional fodder for Eurosceptics
in the United Kingdom and other countries in their struggle for a fundamental
restructuring of the European political system.

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RELIGIOUS, FAMILY AND CIVIL LAW IN LIGHT OF NATIONAL TRADITIONS AND IN ECHR
DECISIONS
Judicial activism and the wide room for interpretation of the European Convention on
Human Rights granted to the ECHR regularly result in decisions, which touch on the
relationship between individual and states, which contradict the accepted practice
and traditions of countries within the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg-based court.

Thus, the ECHR ruled in favor of British murderers Jeremy Bamber, Peter Moore
and Douglas Winter, who are serving a life sentence in British prisons. The court
concluded that punishment in the form of a life sentence violates Article 3 of the
European Convention, prohibiting the use of torture against prison inmates.

Jeremy Bamber Peter Moore Douglas Winter

Thus, loosely interpreting the the tenets of the European Convention, the ECHR
attempted to change the accepted norms of sentencing law in Great Britain. ECHR’s
decision brought on harsh criticism from the upper echelons of London’s political
leadership.

Loosely interpreting the the tenets of the European Convention, the

ECHR attempted to change the accepted norms of sentencing law in
Great Britain
In 2005, the ECHR decided that the forfeiting of the right to vote in elections by prison
inmates violates the European Convention on Human Rights.
 
However, it is the decision by ECHR that in fact directly violates reigning
constitutional law in Russia and a number of Western nations, which limit
certain categories of prisoners from exercising their right to vote.

Formally adhering to the tenets of the European Convention, dealing with the freedom
of religion, the ECHR actively works to promote the liberal mindset, by supporting
and defending the interests of sexual minorities at the expense of those who espouse
traditional religious beliefs.

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The legalization of same-sex marriages (ECHR also played an active role in this process)
caused a number of European officials and other workers, who did not want to take
part in registering same-sex marriages on the basis of their Christian beliefs, to
submit complaints to the ECHR, demanding protection from discrimination based on
religious affiliation resulting in being laid off work.

The ECHR reviewed a complaint by Lillian Ladele, an employee of one of the borough
authorities in London, responsible for the registration of marriages, who was fired
for her refusal to register a same-sex marriage, and by British family psychologist
Gary MacFarlane, who lost his job after refusing to provide his services to a same-sex
couple. In 2013, the ECHR rejected Ladele’s and MacFarlane’s complaints, stating that
the actions that led to their dismissal were discriminatory towards representatives of
sexual minorities. At the same time, the Court ignored the rights of Ladele and
MacFarlane as Christian believers, clearly illustrating the ideological bias in its
approach.

The ECHR regularly hands down decisions with the goal of changing the traditional
concept of family and family relations in states that fall under the jurisdiction of the
Court, and to influence family law in member countries to promote the liberal agenda
of the Court and the organizations that oversee its activities (PACE, CE).

• In 1981 the ECHR decided to decriminalize

homosexuality in Northern Ireland

• In January 2016 the ECHR came down with a

verdict against Bulgaria, demanding that its
police command provide security for the
“Gay pride” parade (Kostadinov vs. Bulgaria)

• In November 2016, the ECHR reached a

decision against the government of Turkey,
which confiscated a magazine with LGBT
propaganda (Kaos GL vs. Turkey)

The visible focus of the ECHR on complaints that relate to ensuring the rights and
freedoms of persons of non-traditional sexual orientation, puts it on collision course
with Russia, which wishes to protect itself from the pushy propaganda of the LGBT
community and to defend the values of traditional family and society.

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CHAPTER 2. CONFLICT BETWEEN PACE AND RUSSIA:
ECHR’S ACTIVITIES ON THE RUSSIAN TRACK
ECHR DECISIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF EU AND PACE RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW
The politicization of ECHR’s work on the Russian track becomes apparent when
analyzing the Court’s decisions in regards to complaints against Russia and their
dependence on the current state of relations between Russia and the West as a whole
and Russia and PACE in particular.

Thus, in 2006, when relations between Moscow and Brussels went through
a period of relative calm and stability, Moscow paid out 1.3 million euro in
compensation in cases reviewed by ECHR. Next year, in 2007, when tension began
to build in the relationship between Russia and the West, and President Vladimir
Putin delivered his Munich address, in which he provided a critical assessment of the
existing system of international relations, which did not take Russia’s interests into
consideration, the amount Moscow had to pay in compensation according to ECHR
decisions grew to 4.3 million euro. Just a year later, when relations between Russia
and EU structures grew even more tense following the war in South Ossetia initiated by
the Saakashvili regime, Russia’s expenses in connection with compensation provided
via ECHR decisions jumped two-fold.

When relations between Russia and EU structures grew even more

tense following the war in South Ossetia initiated by the Saakashvili
regime, Russia’s expenses in connection with compensation provided
via ECHR decisions jumped two-fold

In the period from January 2008 to March 2009, when harsh criticism of Moscow and
the adoption of anti-Russian resolutions became common practice during the plenary
sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Russia’s
spending on compensatory payments in accordance with ECHR decisions rose
to 9.3 million euro. After the hot phase of the conflict in Transcaucasia, the annual
sum of compensatory payments, paid off by Russia stabilized around 4-7 million euro.
However, the chain of events that led to a sharp deterioration of relations between
Russia and the West – unconstitutional coup in Ukraine, conducted with support from
Washington and Brussels, Crimea’s reunification with Russia, the introduction of US
and EU sectoral sanctions against Moscow – was immediately reflected in the sum of
compensatory payments Russia had to pay in accordance with ECHR decisions. It was
then that PACE made a decision to deprive the Russian delegation of its voting rights
and to exclude Russian representatives from PACE committee leadership positions
and international monitoring missions. If in 2013, Russia paid out 4.1 million euro,
then in 2014, a critical year for international relations, Moscow had to pay 9.7

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million euro. ECHR decisions concerning complaints against Russia correlate
with the general political climate to such an extent, that the annual sum of
compensation Moscow has to pay out could be used as a barometer of relations
between Russia and Western capitals.

ECHR decisions concerning complaints against Russia correlate

with the general political climate to such an extent, that the annual
sum of compensation Moscow has to pay out could be used as a
barometer of relations between Russia and Western capitals.

Annual Russian budget expenditures on ECHR compensatory payments

Year Compensatory The sum of compensation does
payment totals not include spending related to
(million euro) sending Russian attorneys to
work at the ECHR and on
2006 1,3
Russia’s participation in PACE
2007 4,3
(32 million euro/2.5 billion
January, 2008–march, 9,3 rubles). The largest portion of
2009 this sum was spent on
2010 7,4 supporting ECHR’s activities. In
2011 8,7 2017, Russia’s budget already
2012 7,15 has 600 million rubles set away
2013 4,1 for compensatory ECHR
payments.
2014 9,7
2015 7,4
2016 7,7

INJUSTICE IN STRASBOURG: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN STATISTICAL TERMS

The biased approach of the European Court of Human Rights is richly illustrated
by the geography of the Court’s decisions against countries, that fall within its
jurisdiction. In 2015, the decisions reached against the Russian Federation,
Turkey and Romania comprised almost a third of all the decisions related to
complaints filed at the ECHR. In other words, the Court is predisposed towards
making an disproportional number of decisions against countries that are not part of
the founding Western European nucleus, which gave birth to the Court in late 1950’s.

The Court is predisposed towards making an disproportional number

of decisions against countries that are not part of the founding
Western European nucleus, which gave birth to the Court in late
1950’s

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In 2015, almost a third of all decisions reached by the ECHR were related to
complaints against Russia (15.7%), Turkey (11.4%) and Romania (10.4%). In 2016,
more than a quarter (26%) of all decisions by the ECHR were taken against Russia
(222 out of 829). Notwithstanding the fact that there were significantly more
complaints registered by the Court against Ukraine (8658) than against Russia
(5591), the ECHR reached three times as many decisions against Moscow (222)
than against Kiev (70).

In 2016, more than a quarter (26%) of all decisions by the ECHR

were taken against Russia (222 out of 829). Notwithstanding the
fact that there were significantly more complaints registered by the
Court against Ukraine (8658) than against Russia (5591), the ECHR
reached three times as many decisions against Moscow (222) than
against Kiev (70)

2016 ECHR statistics

Country Complaints filed Judgements Rulings against

and registered by contracting
ECHR state
Russian Federation 5591 228 222
Ukraine 8658 73 70
Turkey 8308 88 77
All Council of
Europe (CE) 53493 997 829
members

Judgements against Russia in 2015-16 (proportionally)

2015 2016
Russian Federation Other countries Russian Federation Other countries

16%
27%

84% 73%

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CASE EXAMPLE: ARMED CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE
In February 2014, following prolonged confrontation between the government and
opposition in Kiev, a coup d’etat took place in Kiev, as a result of which members of
oligarchic clans and radical nationalist parties and movements took power by force,
with the support of American and European political leadership. Radical nationalist
and hate-filled russophobic statements of the new government elicited a strong
disapproval and resistance in regions of the country with a majority Russian and
Russian-speaking population.

Residents of Crimea, which was

historically a part of Russia, voted for
the Crimean Peninsula to rejoin the
Russian Federation. Residents of
Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the
Donbass area also attempted to take
control of the situation and stop the new
government in Kiev from spreading neo-
Nazi ideology and limiting the rights of
the Russian and Russian-speaking
population in the region. Assured of support from the West, the new government
in Kiev decided to use the Ukrainian armed forces and hastily formed volunteer
battalions (“Azov”, “Aidar”, “Tornado”) and other units to quell the rebellious
eastern regions by force. Soon, the civilian population of Donetsk and Lugansk
People’s Republics became the object of aerial bombardments and rocket fire from the
Ukrainian armed forces. Punitive actions were taken against the residents of Donbass,
eerily reminiscent of the tactics employed by German occupiers during World War II:
extrajudicial killings, torture, violence and rape of women and children, kidnappings
and unlawful confinement.

According to UN statistics, more than 30,000

people lost their lives in the conflict, about
1.5 million residents of Ukraine were forced
to leave the territory of theuir country as
refugees (most left for Russia). In the three
years of civil strife in Donbass (2014-2016) the
residents of Donetsk and Lugansk People’s
Republics sent 840 complaints to the ECHR.
The Court officially registered 560 of them,
and did not reach a single decision.

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Complaints from residents of DPR and LPR and judgements against Ukraine in 2014-2016
Complaints filed Registered complaints Judgements
DPR 840 560 0

From August, 2014 to December, 2016, 840 complaints from DPR and LPR residents were filed in ECHR
against Ukraine. The court officially registered 560 of them. So far, not a single ruling has been made on the
complaints. (Source: member of DPR Civic commission Yulia Nikitina)

The policy of double standards in the workings of the ECHR becomes even more obvious
when the amount of complaints and decisions against Russia in a state of peace is
compared to the amount of complaints and decisions reached against Ukraine, which
remains in a state of civil war. Thus, in the first year of conflict (2014), there was a
significantly higher number of complaints lodged against Ukraine (14181) than against
Russia (8913). However, there were three times as many decisions reached against
Russia (122) than against Ukraine (40).

In the first year of conflict (2014), there was a significantly higher

number of complaints lodged against Ukraine (14181) than against
Russia (8913). However, there were three times as many decisions
reached against Russia (122) than against Ukraine (40)

Complaints and rulings against Russia and Ukraine in 2014-2015

Country Complaints filed and Rulings against contracting state
registered by ECHR
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
Russian 8913 6009 8450 122 109 222
Federation
Ukraine 14181 6010 19900 40 50 70

CASE EXAMPLE: DIMA YAKOVLEV LAW

The Dima Yakovlev law, forbidding the adoption of Russian
children by U.S. citizens was adopted and came into force in
2013.

It was adopted following numerous and egregious incidents

of violence left and criminal negligence towards adopted
children from Russia that went without punishment for their
American parents. Dima Yakovlev’s case, which involved a 1.5
year old boy left to die in a locked car for 9 hours in simmering
summer heat by his adoptive father in the U.S., shook up
public opinion in Russia.

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The American court’s decision to completely acquit the adoptive father of the
Russian boy was especially egregious.

Additionally, handwriting analysis showed that the rejection letter written by the
boy’s grandmother was forged. The boys’ relatives were not given a chance to adopt
him, and preference in the adoption process was given to foreign citizens.

Unjustifiably lenient sentences given by American courts in cases involving

violence towards adopted children from Russia and the U.S. government’s refusal
to set up a monitoring system for adopted children from Russia led to the ban on
adoption of Russian children by Americans.

ECHR’s decision against Russia in the case involving Americans whose adoption
requests were cancelled by the Dima Yakovlev law (17.01.2017), who accused Russia
of discriminating against them on the basis of their citizenship status is yet another
example of the Strasbourg court’s bias towards Russia, since it does not take into
account the right of Russian children to have their security protected by Russia, whose
citizenship they retain. The ECHR also ignores the legal history of limiting adoption
options in accordance with the children’s heritage in Western countries.

For example, in 1978, the United States Congress adopted the Indian Child Welfare Act,
which guaranteed the right to adopt Native American children by Native American
families and limited the rights of other families in the adoption process.

ECHR’s decision against Russia in the case involving Americans

whose adoption requests were cancelled by the Dima Yakovlev law,
who accused Russia of discriminating against them on the basis
of their citizenship status is yet another example of the Strasbourg
court’s bias towards Russia

Considering the adherence of the United States to laws limiting adoption of

children based on their ethnic origin, the decision by ECHR judges in favor of
American citizens in considering their complaint against the Dima Yakovlev
Law looks like another instance of the use of double standards.

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CHAPTER 3. ECHR AND RUSSIAN RADICAL OPPOSITION
STRASBOURG AND PRO-WESTERN OPPOSITION IN RUSSIA: UNITY AGAINST MOSCOW
The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, relating to the activities of
pro-Western opposition movements and activists in Russia, are consistent with the
general bias, double standards and politicization of the judicial body. In reviewing
cases involving complaints by representatives of the radical opposition in Russia, the
ECHR is pursuing several goals at the same time:

• Protecting pro-Western activists, who violated Russian law

• Forcing the Russia to pay out monetary compensation to opposition members,

thereby creating a legal path to funnel financial resources and finance their
activities from the Russian taxpayer’s money

• Creating an unfavorable news background around Russia to be used in the

U.S. and EU propaganda war against Moscow

An example of this approach to reaching decisions in cases against Russia can be found
in the so-called “Bolotnaya Square case”, in which the ECHR set a precedent by ruling
that Russia violated the right to freedom of assembly and just hearing in court. Thus,
after reviewing the convicted national-democratic opposition activist Yaroslav
Belousov’s complaint, the ECHR ruled that the case be reviewed by the Russian
Supreme Court and awarded the activist compensation in the amount of 12,500
euro.

During the disturbances on Bolotnaya Square, Belousov resorted to violence

towards law enforcement employees and threw a billiard ball at a member of a
special police unit. However, this fact played no role in the ECHR decision.

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 It is telling that incidents of violence
by civilians against police employees in
Western countries are frequently
followed up by much harsher
punishment, then in Russia.
Opposition activist Pyotr Pavlensky
freely left Russia for France just months
after he staged an arson attempt at the
Federal Security Service headquarters in Moscow and was charged with a number of
other crimes. Similar actions by Western opposition activists would inevitably
lead to prolonged prison sentences for them.

Another showcase example of the

ECHR’s activity on the Russian track is
the Kirovles case, which involved
Russian opposition leader Aleksei
Navalny. In 2016, the ECHR handed
down a decision in favor of Navalny
and his partner Pyotr Ofitserov, also
convicted in the same case.

The speed with which the complaint was reviewed and the
compensatory amount (63600 euro) to be paid out by Russia speak of
the intentional and egregious politicization of the process

The formal reason for the decision against Russia that the ECHR provided was that
Navalny and Ofitserov were tried separately from former head of Kirovles company
Viacheslav Opalev, who was able to make a deal with the prosecution before other
defendants in the case. The ECHR awarded compensation in the amount of 48,000
euro to Aleksei Navalny and 23,000 euro to Ofitserov. On February 2, 2017, the ECHR
ruled against Russia on another Navalny complaint concerning seven instances of
detention at unlawful mass gatherings in Moscow in 2012-2014. The speed with
which the complaint was reviewed and the compensatory amount (63600 euro)
to be paid out by Russia speak of the intentional and egregious politicization of
the process. As a rule, monetary compensations of this magnitude are awarded in
cases where serious damage to the person’s health or death is involved. In standard
court practice, compensatory payments for detention do not exceed 5,000 euro.

UNREQUITED HATE: RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE ARTICLE 292 AND ECHR DECISIONS
The openly biased approach of the ECHR in ruling on complaints against Russia
inspires movements and activists, who espouse radical nationalist ideology of hate to
take action.

The rulings of the Strasbourg-based court give them hope that if they lodge a complaint

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against Russia, the court will rule in their favor, which induces growth in their
destructive activities.

Hate speech by well-known opposition blogger Anton Nosik, who called for the
physical extermination of the Syrian people and openly insulted the Syrian people,
was recognized by a Russian court in violation of Article 282 of the Criminal Code,
which deals with incidents of extremism in society.

Russian law dealing with confronting extremism is much softer than similar laws
in a number of European countries, where a prison sentence can be assigned even for
denying the validity of historic events. In 2006, an Austrian court sentenced British
historian David Irving to three years in prison for denying the genocide of the Jews
during World War II. In France and Switzerland, there are laws that criminalize the
denial of the Armenian genocide during World War I.

In most European nations, there are tough laws, which prohibit hate speech and
acts towards persons or groups based on their religious, ethnic, and racial origin.
The famous French actress Brigitte Bardot was prosecuted on numerous occasions for
her public anti-Islamic statements that were deemed hate speech.

Encouraged by the victory over Russia at the ECHR and fully aware
of the high level of politicization of Court actions towards Moscow,
Aleksei Navalny has already promised to defend Anton Nosik’s
rights in Strasbourg. Knowingly taking on an unwinnable case,
Navalny hopes to score yet another point against Moscow, taking
into account the anti-Russian attitudes of ECHR judges

Encouraged by the victory over Russia at the ECHR and fully aware of the high level of
politicization of Court actions towards Moscow, Aleksei Navalny has already promised
to defend Anton Nosik’s rights in Strasbourg. Knowingly taking on an unwinnable
case, Navalny hopes to score yet another point against Moscow, taking into

actualpolitics.ru 15
account the anti-Russian attitudes of ECHR judges. The next few months will
show if Aleksei Navalny and his client were correct in his assessment of the ECHR and
its attitude towards Russia.

actualpolitics.ru 16
CONCLUSION
When entering into an agreement with the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) in 1998, Russia assumed the necessity and inevitability of deeper and wider
integration into Western political, economic and social structures. Such integration,
its ideologues presumed, would in time bring Russia completely into the Western
world, as one of its respected and inalienable parts.

The experience of relations between Russia and PACE has shown that the political elites
of key Western actors do not regard Russia as a full-fledged candidate for membership
in the Western community and have no intention of contributing to Moscow’s further
integration. To the contrary, the leadership of Western countries continues to view
Russia as a geopolitical competitor and a potential adversary. Judging by the openly
biased approach of the ECHR, such opinion of Russia is shared by many judges in
Strasbourg. Essentially, the ECHR is used not for the administration of justice,
but to send political signals to Russia.

Careful examination of ECHR activities shows that the decisions against Russia
made by the Court correlate directly with the state of relations between Russia
and key actors in the European Union.

Russia’s spending to pay off compensation awarded by the Court grew significantly
when Moscow’s relationship with the EU and PACE soured and went down during
periods of stable relations.

• In 2006, during a period of relative calm in relations between Russia and the
West, the Russian Federation’s compensation payments awarded in ECHR cases
amounted 1.3 million euro.

• In 2007, with the rise in tensions and President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the
Munich Security Conference, Russia’s spending to pay out compensatory amounts
awarded by ECHR immediately jumped to 4.3 million euro

• In 2008, the aggression of the Saakashvili regime against South Ossetia and the
Russian operation to pacify Georgia that followed, as well as harsh criticism
leveled at Moscow by PACE and other European structures immediately brought
about a new twofold increase in Russian expenditures on compensatory payments
brought about by ECHR rulings

• In 2009-2013 temporary stabilization in relations between Moscow and Brussels

was reflected in the drop of compensatory payments awarded in ECHR rulings
against Russia to the level of 4-7 million euro per year

• In 2014, a coup in Kiev, supported by the Obama administration and Brussels, and
the ensuing civil war in eastern Ukraine exacerbated tensions between Russia and
the EU. Wishing to pressure Russia, PACE deprived the Russian delegation of its
right to vote, while ECHR, which is under its supervision, raised the amount of
compensation Russia had to pay out that year to 9.7 million euro

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Political bias of the ECHR towards Russia is clearly seen in the speed with which
complaints of different nature and categories are reviewed by the court. Thus, ECHR
reviewed a number of complaints against Russia lodged by representatives of radical
pro-Western opposition (from “Bolotnaya Square case” activists to Alexei Navalny) and
ruled against Russia. At the same time, 840 complaints were lodged at the ECHR
by residents of Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics starting in 2014 and not
one of them has been taken on by the court.

In addition, ECHR statistics show that, despite the fact that a lot more complaints
were lodged against Ukraine (14181) than against Russia (8913) in 2014, the court in
Strasbourg ruled three times as often against Russia (122), which is in a state of
peace, than against Ukraine (40), which is in a state of civil war.

ECHR’s bias can also be discerned in its treatment of other countries, which were not
part of the founding nucleus of Western European states that originally gave birth to
the court. For example, in 2015, almost a third of all ECHR rulings were against
Russia (14.09%), Turkey (10.57%) and Romania (10.21%). In 2016 more than a quarter
(26%) of all ECHR rulings were against Russia (222 out of 829).

Annually, Russia suffers significant material and reputational losses from cooperation
with ECHR and the propaganda campaign organized around the court’s anti-Russian
activities. Western journalists and publicists constantly portray Russia as a
malicious violator of human rights, referring to numerous ECHR rulings against
Moscow.

Additionally, ECHR creates risks for Russia’s constitutional order by loosely

interpreting the constitution and attempting to view it through the prism of
Western law, interests and values

• After the Russian delegation was deprived of its right to vote at PACE sessions – the
main body overseeing ECHR activities – it is necessary to note further limitations
on Russia’s ability to influence the work of the court, whose decisions Moscow
is supposed to respect and follow. In the arising circumstances, it is necessary
to demand that ECHR and its overseeing body, PACE, cease and desist from
using the judicial bodies in Strasbourg as an instrument of political pressure
against Russia.

• The growing internal crisis in the EU, related to the coming Brexit, the growth
of popularity of Eurosceptic movements in key Western European countries, and
the general demoralization of the European bureaucracy make the legitimacy of
the ECHR questionable in the wider European context. In the future, the need for
institutions ensuring the implementation of fundamental norms of international
law may be satisfied by the creation of new international judicial structures,
built on the principles of mutual respect of member countries and devoid of
clearly visible political ambition.

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