Astrid B. Boening (Auth.) - The Arab Spring - Re-Balancing The Greater Euro-Mediterranean - Springer International Publishing (2014)

The Arab Spring
Astrid B. Boening
The Arab Spring

Re-Balancing the Greater
Euro-Mediterranean?
1 3
Astrid B. Boening
Miami
Florida
USA
ISBN 978-3-319-04605-1 ISBN 978-3-319-04606-8 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-04606-8
Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London
Library of Congress Control Number: 2014931503
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

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This book is dedicated to David Saleem with
deepest respect and profound trust, who,
cheerfully at that, saved my life literally not
just once but twice at 40,000 feet during the
writing of this book. Without his unequalled
professional and personal skills it obviously
would not have been completed.
Preface
This book builds on earlier work delineating a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Se-

curity (Super) Complex (EMRSSC) (Boening 2009) as a modification of Buzan’s
et al. (1998) concept of a Middle East Regional Security Complex by expanding
this theoretical model to integrate some ramifications of the Arab (and Ottoman)
Spring, especially in terms of (select) intra- and inter-regional actors, and the power
shifts this represents. As such, this work is not intended to be a finite analysis of
the Arab Spring, as this is continuing to evolve—likely for many decades to come.
Rather, this work represents a special perspective of the evolving geostrategic de-
velopments in the greater Euro-Mediterranean region with particular consideration
of the implications the Arab Spring has on it by utilizing Buzan’s et al. (1998) con-
cept of select (to remain within the limits of this work) security sectors and levels.
This book does not seek, as no book on this region ever could, to be all in-
clusive of every aspect—historical, political, social or otherwise, pertaining to the
problematiques addressed (nor are the countries involved in the Arab Spring re-
viewed equally, but rather areas of emphasis were chosen to illustrate a certain
point)—hence the widely varying depth and length of analysis on different aspects
and topics. As this book focuses on state/intergovernmental actors, the often sub-
stantial work of NGOs involved in the EMRSSC exceeds the scope of this work and
was hence not included. Instead this book intends to show the interconnections of
the Euro-Mediterranean region as an intricately interconnected Regional Security
Super Complex—like it or not, as Deutsch and others have repeatedly pointed out:
We experience the most security issues with those with whom we are most closely
related. And I would say, also the greatest opportunities—for all society groups,
rather than just a few—in the socio-economic and political areas, if we manage to
sort them out in a positive sum manner. This “if” perhaps the greatest threat to the
EMRSSC….
Ontologically, the analyses in several sections are divided into “soft” and “hard”
power and incorporate the Euro-Med Partnership’s (EMP) historic concept of the “3
baskets” (political, economic, and sociocultural) to facilitate comparisons, though it
is not intended to result in a “line-by-line” comparison.
To counter comments of West-centrism, if not neocolonialism, I sought to in-
clude a broad range of other authors’ analyses as an (indirect) process-tracing as
vii
viii Preface
well as discourse analysis methodology to augment—and contrast—my own analy-

sis and broaden its conclusions. The special details included in certain portions are
intended to outline some of the intricacies of the multitude of actors involved with
often contradictory domestic, ideological and security agendas.
I would like to extend my particular gratitude to Jon Gurstelle, my editor from
Springer Publishers in New York, who was beyond patient in awaiting the original
proposal for this book since our initial contact several years ago, through the in-
tervening publication of another volume with Springer Verlag: His flexibility, un-
derstanding, support, and professionalism are superb—and matched by Springer’s
New York team involved with this project, especially Brian Halm’s experience and
wisdom, and Kevin Halligan’s patience in coordinating this project. Most impor-
tantly, Lorraine Klimowich for her wisdom and understanding of the entire project’s
complexity, and led to my decision to publish with Springer rather than another
publisher. I hope their patience was justified with this volume! Last, but not least,
this book became a reality as a result of Alvaro de Varconelo’s encouragement—I
am deeply indebted for it!
Contents
1 Introduction: A Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex? �� 1

Soft Power and Intra-Regionalism �� 6
Hard Power and Inter-Regionalism �� 8
Greater Inter-Regional EuroMed Security �� 9
Concluding Remarks �� 10
2 Sectors of Security �� 11

Ideology and Sectarian Conflicts in the EuroMed �� 11
Theoretical Context of Sectarianism �� 13
Political Security �� 15
Coup and Post-Coup �� 15
States: Failed vs. Successful �� 15
Institutional Capacity �� 16
Democracy �� 17
Legitimacy: Ruling in Accordance with the Mandate/
Political Promise �� 17
Civil Society �� 18
Economic Threats �� 19
Social Justice: Material and Political Inequalities—
Privatization and Extreme Income Divergence �� 19
Human Security �� 20
Migration �� 20
Food Security �� 21
Human Security and the Syrian Civil War �� 22
Proliferation of WMDs �� 24
3 Levels of Security—Intra-Regional Level�� 27

Arab Spring �� 27
“Smart Mobs” and “Black Swans” �� 28
Asymmetrical Threats and International Regional Actors
Parallel to the Arab Spring �� 29
ix
x Contents
Southern Mediterranean �� 30

Turkey �� 31
Turkey, the Regional Kingpin�� 32
Turkey’s Strategic Cooperation�� 32
Turkey as a Bridge Between East and West�� 35
Israel �� 35
Israel–Palestine�� 35
Israel—Intra-Regionally�� 37
Lebanon �� 38
Tunisia �� 39
Egypt �� 40
Egyptian Post-Authoritarian Transitions�� 41
The Inter-Regional Context of Egypt’s Current Post-Transition�� 43
Libya �� 44
R2P Involvement and Internal Economic, Political, and
Social-Cultural Transition�� 44
The Internal Security Environment in the Greater
International Context�� 46
Syria �� 48
From the Damascus Spring to the Arab Spring�� 48
Sectarianism and the Syrian Civil War�� 49
Syrian Revolts in the Strategic Crossroads Theatre�� 50
The Syrian Civil War and the EMRSSC�� 51
The Syrian Civil War as an Inter-Regional Conflict
Resolution Effort: Infinite Insecurity of Soft and Hard
Power Sectors and Levels?�� 52
Jordan �� 54
Northern Mediterranean: The European Union �� 54
European External Action Service �� 55
Hard Power �� 59
European Union Neighborhood Policy �� 60
Soft Power �� 60
4 Levels of Security—Inter-Regional Level:

Part A Select State Actors �� 65
The Trans-Atlantic Link: Nationalism, Realism, and Shared
Interests: Convergence in “Globalized” Regional Security �� 65
Soft Power �� 66
The U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative�� 66
The Third Basket: Social Cultural�� 68
The Second Basket: Economic�� 69
The First Basket: Political�� 71
Hard Power �� 72
The Trans-Atlantic Link: The U.S., NATO, and the
Arab Spring�� 74
The U.S. and the Arab Spring: Forward �� 75
Contents xi
Iraq �� 76

Iran �� 78
Iran and the Arab Spring�� 78
Iran and Nuclear Enrichment�� 79
Iran and Political Change�� 80
Russia �� 81
Political–Bilateral/Multi-Lateral�� 81
Economic�� 84
Hard Power�� 84
Concluding Remarks�� 85
China �� 85
China’s Complex Interests in the EuroMed: Expanding Soft
Power and Hard Power�� 85
5 Levels of Security—Inter-Regional Level:

Part B Non-State Actors—Inter-governmental
Organizations: Global Governance—Leading from
Behind or Through Consensus? �� 91
NATO �� 91
Gulf Region/Gulf Cooperation Council �� 94
Sectarianism and the Arab Spring in the Gulf �� 94
Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf �� 96
GCC Inter-Regional Relationships �� 98
Arab League �� 99
United Nations �� 100
Inter-Regional Responses to the Arab Spring: Deauville
Partnership With Arab Countries in Transition �� 102
6 Conclusions: Addressing Regional Security

Threats—“Locally,” “Regionally,” and “Globally” �� 107
Inter-Regional Responses to the Arab Spring �� 107
Meso-Theoretical Perspectives of the EMRSSC �� 108
Institutional Frameworks and the EMRSSC �� 111
Final Words �� 117
A Short Guide to the Middle East �� 118
References�� 119
List of Acronyms
ABC Atomic, Biological and Chemical

AMU Arab Maghreb Union
ANIMA Euro-Mediterranean Network of Investment Promotion Agencies
AP Action Plan
BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty
BMENA Broader Middle East and North Africa (U.S. Department of State/G8
Initiative)
BSR Business Social Responsibility
CBM Confidence Building Measure
CEER Council of European Energy Regulators
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DIA U.S. Directorate of Intelligence
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Dialogue (NATO’s) Mediterranean Dialogue
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC European Communities
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
ECSEE Energy Community South East Europe Treaty
(E)EAS (European) External Action Service
EIB European Investment Bank
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EMAA Europe-Mediterrannean Association Agreement
EMP EuroMed Partnership (Barcelona Process)
EMPA Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly
EMRSC Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex
EMRSSC Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex
ENP European Neighborhood Policy
ENPI European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
EPC European Political Cooperation
xiii
xiv List of Acronyms
EPUF EuroMed Permanent University Forum

ESDP European Security and Defense Policy
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
EUBAM European Union Border Assistance Mission (of the External
Action Service’s Common Security and Defense Policy) (CSDP)
Euro-Med Euro-Mediterranean Region
EuroMeSCo Euro-Mediterranean Scientific and Cultural Organization
EUSPMME European Union’s Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean
and the Middle East
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FEMIP Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
FEMISE Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Institutes
FJP Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt)
FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of Operational Coopera-
tion at the External Borders of the Member States of the European
Union
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GAERC (EU) General Affairs and External Relations Council
GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GNSS Global Network Satellite System
GSP Generalized System of Preferences
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICI Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
IMF International Monetary Fund
IR International relations (theory)
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (the Levant)
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government
MD Mediterranean Dialogue
MEDA Middle East Development Assistance
Medring Euro-Mediterranean Electricity Ring Project
MEFTA Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative
MENA Middle East and North Africa (Region)
MEPI U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative
MEPP Middle East Peace Process
MNMC Mediterranean Non-EU (EMP) Member Country
MPC Mediterranean Partner Country
MS Member State
MU Mediterranean Union
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon State
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRA National Regulatory Agency
List of Acronyms xv
NTC Libyan National Transitional Council

OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPT Occupied Palestinian Territory
OSCE Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
OMC Open Method of Coordination
PA Palestinian Authority
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PBM Partnership Building Measure
PfP Partnership for Peace
R2P Responsibility to Protect
NRSCT New Regional Security Complex Theory
RSCT Regional Security Complex Theory
RSP Regional Strategy Paper
SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement
SCAF Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SNC Syrian National Council
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
S&P Standard & Poor Rating
TACIS Micro-Financial Assistance and Humanitarian Aid
Program
TCM Third World Countries of the Mediterranean
Three-basket structure The Political, Economic, and Social aspects of the EMP
(= 3 chapters of EMP)
TIFA Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TTIP Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“Trans-
Atlantic Free Trade Zone”)
TREC Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Cooperation
UAE United Arab Emirates
UfM Union for the Mediterranean
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNESCWA United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia
UNICEF United National Infant and Children’s Educational Fund
UNSC UN Security Council
U.S. MEFTA U.S. Middle East Free Trade Area
USTR United States Trade Representative
WEU Western European Union
WHO World Health Organization
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction
WOT War On Terrorism
WTO World Trade Organization
WWII World War II
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Northern and Southern Mediterranean/Euro-Mediterranean

Region�� 3
Fig. 1.2 EuroMed Partnership Member States �� 4
Fig. 1.3 The Euro-Mediterranean regional (super) complex �� 4
Fig. 4.1 Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea Oil and Gas Corridors�� 84
xvii
Chapter 1
Introduction: A Euro-Mediterranean Regional
Security Complex?
We are currently experiencing one of the largest shifts in global power structures of
the past century, partially due to the increased social, economic/financial and politi-
cal “speeds” nationally as well as internationally as a result of globalization and
resulting flows of power, including the ideational and its translation into political
power.1 This book examines some of these shifts during the recent past in the Euro-
Mediterranean region—a region which through the millennia was stage to immense
human conflicts and endless power struggles, both in naval battles, their incursions
to land, as well as between the inhabitants on land, emanating inter alia east-west,
such as the Muslim conquest along the North African coast into Sicily and Spain,
and later into the Balkans centuries, and subsequently reciprocally during the Cru-
sades to establish Western dominance of the Levant (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013).
This left the populations often the victim, “the most notable instance of impov-
erishment of the Mediterranean area… [having taken place] when the Silk Road
was severed in 1453 after the Ottomans took control of one among its key points,
Istanbul, and imposed unbearable transit tolls” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 1).
Beyond ancient ideological conflicts, the Mediterranean continues to be an eco-
nomic crossroad (Braudel 1982), to the extent of a “widened Mediterranean” (Brau-
del 1995, p. 168, quoted in Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 3),
including not only the Near East—the old Levant—but also the Red Sea, down to the Straits
of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Horn of Africa. Not by chance, until the XIX century Egypt has
always been keen to keep the Red Sea littorals under his government’s control, and more
recently tried in vain to dominate Yemen, the gate to this sea (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013,
p. 3).
The Mediterranean as an enclosed sea, has two “choke points” for commercial
(and military) vessels, the “narrows of Gibraltar and Suez/Bab-el-Mandeb…[, c]
1
Hudson (1968, p. 25), quoted in Abdo (2013, p. 3), and applied to the current Arab uprisings,
writes that “the reason that communal identities remain so strong, reinforced rather than obliter-
ated by the communication explosion, is the result of historic doctrinal differences and memories
of oppression, both antique and recent.”
A. B. Boening, The Arab Spring, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-04606-8_1, 1
2 1 Introduction: A Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex?
ontrolling points of the basin’s life (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 4), with the
one in control determining a tremendous strategic advantage.2
While it is understandable that a Euro-Mediterranean identity, in its classical form, can be
expressed through religion, cultures, languages, landscapes, folklore, traditions, physical
features and civil societies, a Euro-Mediterranean identity of the twenty-first century may
have to be further articulated to include the context of communication, cooperation and
confidence-building (Calleja 2008, p. 141).
From an International Relations (IR) theoretical perspective, in a Euro-Mediterra-

nean Regional Security Super Complex, neoliberalism does not contradict “the ba-
sic tenets of neo-realism and in particular the canons of rationality, sovereignty, and
anarchy” (Gariup 2008, p. 72, referring to Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1977).
However, the neoliberal and neorealist models are limited not just for their focus
on sovereign states within an existing international structure, as is social-construc-
tivism for its assumption that these were brokered by hegemonic actors dominating
“definition, distribution and institutionalization of these collective understandings”
(Gariup 2008, p. 73), sharing “a common objectivist epistemology and a predomi-
nant focus on the international rather than domestic determinants of preferences…
maintain[ing] that power—either material or immaterial—plays a fundamental role
in inducing cooperation” (Gariup 2008, p. 73).
The goal of competition and cooperation beyond individuals, whether between
states or organizations, is ultimately survival, with the security of an actor directly re-
lated to the systemic interdependence of all its components (Gariup 2008, p. 73, refer-
ring to Buzan 1991). In terms of the level of analysis of this work, a security complex
is defined whereby “a set of units whose processes of securitization, de-securitization,
or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed
or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 221, quoted in Gariup
2008, p. 73), whereby the regional, sub- and supra-regional levels are “central in the
mediation between the state and system levels, whereby security interactions among
neighbors are prioritized due to the shorter distance of the potential threats” (Gariup
2008, pp. 73–74, referring to Buzan et al. 1998, pp. 18–19), with geography and prox-
imity mediating “the effects of anarchy and can become an incentive for the creation
of security regimes or even the evolution towards veritable pluralistic security com-
munities” (Gariup 2008, p. 74, referring to Deutsch et al. 1957).
In this work, the “Euro-Mediterranean Region” (EuroMed) is defined as coun-
tries (or political (foreign policy) blocs such as the European Union (EU)) bor-
dering the Mediterranean Sea, i.e., besides the EU and its member states (MSs)
to the north, and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya (= the Maghreb: “where and
when the sun sets”), Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey to the south and east
2
Recent examples of efforts to keep these points open for commercial traffic are Operation Endur-
ing Freedom, whereby its Western coalition deployed fast patrol boats to control Bab-el-Mandeb,
while NATO escorted vessels through the Straits of Gibraltar, and during the spike in sea piracy in
the area, Western navies established patrol routes in the Gulf of Aden, as the main approach to the
Red Sea (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 4).
Introduction: A Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex? 3
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Fig. 1.1 Northern and Southern Mediterranean/Euro-Mediterranean Region. (Source: EU-Com-

mission website)
(compare Fig. 1.1). These countries also happen to be members of the Union for the
Mediterranean (Uf M).
While this work does not seek to focus on the Uf M or its predecessor, the
EuroMed Partnership (EMP) (compare Fig. 1.2), the latter does represent the EU’s
European Neighborhood Policy’s (ENP) dominant process for its southern neigh-
borhood. What is significant about the EU’s Southern Mediterranean policies is that
since the EMP, they continue to revolve around the conceptual triumvirate of the
“3 Baskets”: a focus of all programs on economic, political, and social coopera-
tion. This book will inter alia integrate the significance of this approach in dealing
with the security challenges of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security (Super-)
Complex in the context of the Arab Spring. While this book cannot be inclusive of
all its aspects, it seeks to provide an overview of the significance of this approach
with respect to the events currently unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA).
From a security perspective, Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) (Buzan
and Waever 1998) posits levels as well as sectors. I propose here that the Euro-Med-
iterranean region per se can be viewed as a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security
Complex (EMRSC), and, with its trans-Atlantic “umbilical cord,” a Euro-Mediter-
ranean Regional Security super complex (EMRSSC) (compare Fig. 1.3). As a sec-
ondary theory, macrosecuritization (Buzan and Waever 2009) is utilized in examin-
ing collectively some of the political units in the security constellations (linking the
Fig. 1.2 EuroMed Partnership member states 2008 (Boening 2009, p. 2). Blue EU member coun-
tries, turquoise EU candidate countries, green Mediterranean nonmember countries (MNMCs),
yellow observer country. (Source: Author)
Fig. 1.3 The Euro-Medi-

terranean Regional (Super)
Complex (Boening 2008a)
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Introduction: A Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex? 5
levels and sectors in which securitizations3 (Buzan and Waever 2009, p. 256)) of
the EMRSSC occur. In this case, regional security is not structured by one single
overarching conflict, but multiple complex inter- and intra-regional securitizations,
including, but not limited to, ideological4 and power struggles, inter alia dating to
(post-)colonial struggles (including the Israeli–Palestinian conflict), regional Cold
War manifestations, proliferation of regional nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), and implications of the U.S.’ War on Terrorism (WOT). These
act as securitizing actors, reinforcing—and at times seeking to destroy—each other.
Ideology in this region represents, from a social constructivist perspective, an “ac-
tor” which reciprocally informs state and nonstate actors (which will be discussed
in the following chapters in terms of security sectors and levels). In terms of RSCT,
securitizations in the EMRSSC can be positive (sharing “a definition of threat and
referent object” (Buzan and Waever 2009, p. 256)) or negative (“where actors, or
groups of actors, construct each other as threats”) (Buzan and Waever 2009).
A securitization analysis includes the identity and political constitution of the
particular referent object for an act of securitization. But since identity politics and
security practices take place within a relationship, deep understandings of the pro-
cesses of securitization demand a concept for the larger social formation (Buzan
and Waever 2009, p. 257). This is inter alia reflected in statements made by French
president Sarkozy (compare Thornhill 2008) that
Europe must progressively affirm itself as a first-rank player for peace and security in
the world, in cooperation with the United Nations, the Atlantic Alliance and the African
Union, … [and that] Europe had to develop a common vision of the main challenges that
confronted it and how best to respond to them.
The effect of the trans-Atlantic relationship, whether between the U.S. and the EU,
or with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the hard security com-
mon platform, is complex, rich, and far from a fait accompli. As global threats
evolve and emerge, this strategic alliance continues robust in their light—keeping in
mind that “security attracts attention only once the lack of it has become apparent”
(Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013); the Arab Spring is a prime example for a more de-
tailed analysis in terms of reflecting on the complexities of the macrosecuritizations
in the EMRSSC. These
3
“Macrosecuritisations are defined by the same rules that apply to other securitisations: “identi-
fication of an existential threat to a valued referent object and the call for exceptional measures”
(Buzan and Waever 2009, p. 257), but are “on [a] larger scale than the mainstream collectivities at
the middle level (states, nations) and seek to package together securitisations from that level in a
‘higher’ and larger order” (Buzan and Waever 2009, p. 257) and hence, have “a more complicated
structure” (Buzan and Waever 2009), embodying “permanent tensions across the levels, and are
vulnerable to breakdowns not just by desecuritisation of the macro-level threat (or referent ob-
ject)” (Buzan and Waever 2009, p. 257).
4
In terms of a Regional Security Complex always being “embedded in, and thus dependent on, the
constant reproduction of social identities at lower levels, and often also bound up with regional-
global and occasionally inter-regional relations” (Buzan and Waever 2009, p. 257).
are defined by the same rules that apply to other securitisations: identification of an existen-
tial threat to a valued referent object and the call for exceptional measure. The key differ-
ence is that they are on a larger scale than the mainstream collectivities at the middle level
(states, nations) and seek to package together securitisations from that level in a ‘higher’
and larger order (Buzan and Waever 2009, p. 257).
While no absolute analysis is attempted in terms of absolute power gains (“zero

sum outcomes”), some of the relative shifts will be examined in this work in the
intra- and inter-regional dynamics of the (greater) EMRSC, along with whether
this continues to be a useful or relevant analytical framework to the Northern and
Southern Mediterranean region today.
In the following chapters, soft and hard power within the paradigm of the
intra- vs. inter-regionalism of the EMRSSC is contrasted, in addition to other sec-
tors, and within a variety of security levels. While this is a somewhat arbitrary
decision (as the paradigm could be reversed or both perspectives could be inclusive
of hard as well as soft power), I chose these aspects to illustrate certain power as-
pects (with the reader welcome to extrapolate and/or contrast).
Soft Power and Intra-Regionalism
Security is not a zero-sum game, especially regionally (e.g., Deutsch 1981). Hence,
a security community, especially in view of the last decades’ proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destructions (WMDs) and accelerated threats post-Cold War, such as
illegal drug, arms, and human trafficking, and the myriad of other man-made and
natural threats to humans, must be viewed ever more urgently beyond national
borders also region-wide. Specifically, previous research (e.g., Boening 2008a, b;
2009), particularly when viewed from within the structures of the EMP, confirms
Attina’s (2004) suggestion that the Mediterranean region has been progressing from
a security partnership to potentially a security community.
While the concept of a security partnership developed in Europe following
the Helsinki Process, it is structured as an approach to international security in-
volving the majority of states in the region as well as extraregional powers in a
single arrangement (Attina 2004, p. 5). It is often constituted by countries which
are “characterized by conflict divisions, irregular flows of transactions and com-
munication, and a small sharing of values and institutions” (Attina 2004, p. 5). A
security community, by contrast, originates from the consensus of a region’s states
to cooperate from the recognition of “war as an obsolete instrument of conflict
resolution” (Deutsch et al. 1957, quoted in Attina 2004, p. 4). The Uf M could then
be considered as evolving in the direction of a loosely coupled pluralistic security
community (compare Adler and Barnett 1998). The EU would internally represent
a more tightly coupled portion of the EMP as an evolving security community, as
divergent approaches to national security converge institutionally and procedurally,
especially from the socio-economic angle as was anticipated in Uf M MSs in the
future, and currently proceeding primarily through the ENP.
Soft Power and Intra-Regionalism 7
Aliboni et al. (2007, p. 7) suggest that the multilateralism of the broad security
relationship among actors in the Mediterranean can be viewed as potentially shift-
ing to a “more pragmatic set of ‘hub and spokes’ type of relations, which the (ENP)
has been establishing in the region,”
keeping in mind that the joint ownership, on which the Uf M was based, is reflected in the
ENP. The objective of the ENP’s action plans, despite their individual variances in weight
and detail, are stability and security through shared values and security policy cooperation
(shared security objectives), plus the reduction of the North-South prosperity gap through
development (Senyucel et al. 2006, p. 13).
Buzan et al. (1998, p. 29) define security as a negative, i.e., “as a failure to deal
with issues as normal politics.” Attina (2001, p. 42) posits this in the EMP in that
“[p]revention and avoidance of military conflict among dyads of countries is the
prime goal of a security dialogue in the Mediterranean,” suggesting the utility of
confidence-building measures as outlined in the action plans and association agree-
ments of the EMP. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 29) write further that “desecuritization
is the optimal long-range option.” Attina (2001, p. 42) relates this process to the
EuroMed in that
the exchange of views on security and military organisations has the merit of making public
the aims of national armament policies and the conditions and processes of national security
policy-making. This objective is important in order to put under scrutiny national military
policies, and avoid misunderstanding the purpose of the military policy of the single state.
Noting that Buzan et al. are diverging from the traditional military definition of
security by adding “soft” areas, such as economic, environmental, societal, and in-
dividual security, we turn to Joffé (2001, p. 55), who refers to the EMP as
a perfect example of political symbiosis that may have interesting social and cultural con-
sequences and should be the real paradigm for the future … [where] soft power projection
becomes interdependence as the ‘forgotten frontier’ … [of a] common arena
—the stated objective of the Barcelona Process, if not its underlying purpose.
Indeed, in Buzan and Waever’s (2003, p. 57) words: “the most relevant form of
security community contains active and regional securitization, only it is not actor-
to-actor (one state fearing the other, and therefore, counter-threatening it), but a col-
lective securitization of the overall development of the region.” In fact, Buzan and
Waever (2003, p. 67) also view Europe as likely to move towards a structured secu-
rity region “because its internal interaction capacity is much too high to permit” an
unstructured security region. With respect to including the Southern Mediterranean
in this context, Chourou (2001, p. 61) recognizes this concern when he writes that
“the competence of the EuroMed Partnership (EMP) in the area of security has been
eroding through re-conceptualization [and] attrition.” Rather, this book explores
the essence of regional security as not about charters, but the processes of a shared
commitment to security region-wide.5 These include initiatives beyond the EU’s
5
Compare the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950: “world peace cannot be safeguarded without
the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.”
soft power ones (whether EMP, ENP, Uf M, or their numerous think tanks, such as
EuroMeSCo) also other initiatives as will be delineated in the following chapters.
Hard Power and Inter-Regionalism
Attempts to build regional security through partnership and confidence-building

measures are not primarily aimed at changing the motivations of political leaders to
develop weapons systems, but rather e.g. by introducing arms control and—limita-
tion in the region.
Hence, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 29) define security as a negative, i.e., “as a failure
to deal with issues as normal politics.” Attina (2001, p. 42) posits this in the EMP
in that “[p]revention and avoidance of military conflict among dyads of countries is
the prime goal of a security dialogue in the Mediterranean,” suggesting the utility
of confidence-building measures as outlined in action plans and association agree-
ments of the EMP. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 29) write further that “desecuritization
is the optimal long-range option.” Attina (2001, p. 42) relates this process to the
EuroMed in that
the exchange of views on security and military organisations has the merit of making public
the aims of national armament policies and the conditions and processes of national security
policy-making. This objective is important in order to put under scrutiny national military
policies and avoid misunderstanding the purpose of the military policy of the single state.
Multilateral strategic inter-regionalism, such as the “northeastern inter-region-

alism,” e.g., “Mediterranean—Black Sea,” have strategically and economically
played a significant role over centuries (compare Sanfelice di Monteforte 2009,
p. 2), whether for the Ottomans vis-à-vis the Silk Road, or for the recent growth in
Russian trade in coal, oil, or manganese—or illegal trafficking—making the Black
Sea the Asia-connection to the Balkans and the Mediterranean as an international
sea trade route (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2009).
While this idealistic discourse was perfectly “real” post-Cold War but pre-9/11,
changes in security perceptions post-9/11 are reflected in foreign policy afterwards,
tending towards a more “robust” explanation for foreign policy changes since then.
Comparisons of perception within a single geographical region can reveal differ-
ences in perception by actors, especially with respect to foreseeable “post-Iraq” sce-
narios (Bicchi 2001, p. 17). In light of this observation, the “soft” power ideas and
programs of the EMP to co-constitute structures for peace will have to be balanced
with NATO’s Article 5 mission: “Security is indivisible within the Euro-Atlantic
region”6 as a pact against war (Yost 1998, p. 6) vs. the now-favored “non-Article
5 missions” of collective security of an alliance to “deter, and if necessary defend,
against one or more identifiable external threats” (Yost 1998). This goes back to the
Wilsonian conviction that collective security is an international morality superior
6
Comparable to the theme of the League of Nations that “peace is indivisible.”
Greater Inter-Regional EuroMed Security 9
to that on which the realist balance of power system is based (Yost 1998, p. 8). It
has always been understood that NATO would not undertake a mission without
UN Security Council approval (especially after the U.S. overcame this restraint on
national action with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 with limited success at the time of
this writing, partially due to this unilateralism).
As “outsiders” (to the Mediterranean), such as Chinese businesses (e.g. their
oil companies, seeking ever larger foreign deals), proliferate in the trans-regional
areas of the Euro-Mediterranean, state interests continue to extend to the inter-
regional dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean (such as into Iran and Kazakhstan
(Hoyos 2009)) as well as to the Middle East (including the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil (GCC)), and Africa (including the African Union (AU)) as inter-governmental
organizations (IGOs) as some of the most prolific traders, investors, immigrants,
their oil shipments from the Middle East protected to a large extent by NATO naval
operations in the Persian Gulf.
Greater Inter-Regional EuroMed Security
The December 1994 Essen European Council summit declared the Mediterranean
region an area of strategic importance for the EU (Schumacher 2009, p. 183), where
geography still matters in an era of globalization (Biscop 2009, p. 5): While there
was agreement about the reciprocal economic, political, and social significance be-
tween the countries bordering the Mediterranean, there was no EU membership
perspective for the Southern Mediterranean countries. The EU has been developing
a regional strategy involving the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries
as well as the South–South Mediterranean linkages, inter alia through the EMP
and now the Uf M, overlapping with NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative: At present, with the end of the U.S.’ combat mission in Iraq
(and the strength this provides Iran with the new role and influence of Iraqi Shi-
ites), Turkey’s foreign policy and trade reorientation, Syria’s possible external re-
alliances (such as with Al Qaeda branches), Russia’s role in the Near-East’s balance
of power, and, last but not least, the reopening of direct talks between the Mideast
Quartet and Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Hence, both the EU’s and the U.S.’
interests towards the Mediterranean are, beyond economic, from a security perspec-
tive, i.e., to main regional stability utilizing hard and soft power.7
In terms of the trans-Atlantic link of a Regional Security Super Complex, inter
alia with the U.S. (and its historical focus on the Middle East as well as through
7
An example of this is the principle of “freedom of navigation,” which was so generally
accepted—and naively applied—until the 1990s “that nobody challenged the assumption that ves-
sels were” only in the pursuit of legal activities, rather than smuggling, the commission of crimes,
even terrorism or aggression. Only during Operation Desert Storm did NATO conduct surveillance
(under operation “Active Endeavor”) of same Iraqi vessels “to prevent a possible initiative against
the main ‘line of communication’ of the expeditionary forces” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 5)
of possible Al Qaeda navy activity and other opaque maritime criminal activities.
NATO, whether via Europe or through its programs in the MENA, such as the
Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Cooperative), there is addi-
tionally a southern Atlantic nexus with the greater regional relations of the EMRSC
and Hezbollah in South America—and, of course, more obviously the historically
strong ties between the Northern Mediterranean, inter alia Europe, and North (and
South) America, recently being enhanced by the “trans-Atlantic free trade zone,”
i.e., the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).8
Concluding Remarks
Some authors have viewed the Middle East as “a region without regionalism”
(Aarts 1999, p. 11, cited in Balamir Coskun 2008, p. 89), a region left out from the
regionalization taking place in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, divided instead by
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict into Arab and non-Arabic parts. This book disputes
this simplistic view of the MENA, but seeks to differentiate some more complex
inter-linkages of (at least some of) the security levels and sectors present. In fact,
this book suggests to confirm the slight modification of the Middle East Regional
Security Complex9 suggested by Buzan and Waever (2003) into a Euro-Mediterra-
nean Regional Security Super Complex instead (Boening 2009), as cooperation and
inclusion do exist, and exclusion is not simply on the basis of being Arab or non-
Arab. As such, it is a meso-theory, and does not seek to delineate the microprocesses
involved, e.g., of the EMP, which, for instance Schumacher (2002, compare inter
alia p. 218) has developed.
8
This after the temporarily less-than-smooth relations between certain EU member states and the
U.S. during the G.W. Bush presidency and the early years of President Obama’s first term. Once
Europe grasped the U.S.’ pivot west towards the Pacific, they became much more anxious about
its impact on NATO—and their immediate hard security…
While some researchers have bemoaned that President Obama, early during his first term, did
not emphasize “the symbolic aspects of the trans-Atlantic relationship” (Heisbourg, quoted in
Greenway 2010, p. 6), perhaps Europe needs to recognize—as Obama probably has—that during
the power shifts taking place after the Cold War, it may not continue to play the pivotal role on the
world stage it did during the last 200 years.
9
A pattern of security interdependence covering “the geographical area stretching from Morocco
to Iran and including the Arab states, Israel and Iran” (Balamir Coskun 2008, p. 91, referring to
Buzan and Waever 2003, p. 187), but not implying cooperation due to alleged zones of inclusion
and exclusion.
Chapter 2
Sectors of Security
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is subject to extensive endogenous
shocks, such as the social shocks leading up to and during the revolutions (and some
of the underlying tensions leading up to these), as well as exogenous shocks (e.g.,
fiscal shocks as a result of the political and physical instability in a country proper,
and those spilling over from neighboring countries in unrest), which lead to low
macroeconomic stability—and reciprocally reinforce the endogenous shocks. As a
result, this chapter will address some of these sectors of security related to, or aris-
ing out of the Arab Spring, albeit briefly, to show these interlinkages with further
discussion of broader contexts in the following chapters.
Ideology and Sectarian Conflicts in the EuroMed
The ideological conflicts playing out in the greater Euro–Mediterranean today, and
partially reflected in the struggles as part of the Arab Spring, are the continuum of
historical events, inter alia the division of the Ottoman Empire following World War I
which
in the eyes of the Entente partners was two-fold: each among the new nations would have
… a size insufficient to annihilate her neighbors, thus being compelled to look for support
to Europe. Also, as all among them would have had a multi-ethnic population, they would
be inherently unstable and weak (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 7).
While this plan, even if later modified in the peace treaty, was enacted over “the
rage of the Arabs, who under prince Feisal ‘dreamt of a great Arabia’, stretching
from Alexandria to Aden, from Jerusalem to Baghdad, as it had been during the
Middle Age” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013), Feisal was banned from both Syria
and the region of Heggiaz as a result. This territory, “including the governance of
the two sacred towns of Islam, Mecca and Medina, was given to the chief of the
most extremist among Sunni sects, the Wahabists, Ibn el Saud, which became pres-
ent day Saudi Arabia” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013).

12 2 Sectors of Security
With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Islamic galaxy was deprived “of a sin-
gle ecumenical religious leader, able to reconcile the different facets of” (Sanfelice
di Monteforte 2013, p. 11) this complex greater Euro–Mediterranean region: while
the Sultan was, in fact, “also the ‘Great Caliph of the whole Islam’” (Sanfelice di
Monteforte 2013), holding the plethora of confessions and sects for the sake of
Muslim unity together (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013) until 1921, when he was
exiled—without clear successor. The result was a growing split between the two
major forms of Islamic identity (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013)—a tension be-
tween the Sunnis and the Shia that today is impossible to control (Sanfelice di
Monteforte 2013)—and the start of political perceptions based on ideology to sig-
nificantly influence the foreign (in terms of e.g., giving to and receiving support
from governmental leaders with similar ideological orientations) and domestic
(economic, social, and core institutional) policies, such as decisions pertaining to
the establishment of theocratic vs. secular institutions (Haass 2013, p. 154), and
the degree of commitment for equal civil rights and democratic participation for
all population groups in the MENA. This tension evolved inter alia between the
“expansionist policy of Iran, whose religious leaders were keen to strengthen the
ties between all Shiites, settled in what is now called the ‘Shiite Crescent’, from
Pakistan to Bahrain, [and] from Iraq to southern Lebanon” (Sanfelice di Monte-
forte, p. 12)—and the Sunnis, intent on controlling, if not subjugating, the Shiite
minorities living in their respective regions. Yet, the image of extremist Islam is
not applicable for the majority of Muslims, as the muted response in the Arab
world to Osama bin Laden’s death showed: “Al Qaeda, through its violent opera-
tions in the Arab states and all over the world, has lost all sympathy” (Amr al-
Shubaki, quoted in Deeb 2013, p. 67), in that violence “associated with the Islamic
paradigm was detrimental to Arabs and Muslims themselves” (Deeb 2013) in fa-
vor of the paradigm of a new generation of a secular, democratic, nonviolent, and
nonideological society, whose citizens are nationalist but maintain their Arab and
Muslim identities, according to one author (Deeb 2013, p. 68). In late May 2013,
one of the most influential Sunni theologians, the Egyptian Yusuf al-Qaradawi,
called on all Sunni Muslims globally to fight the regime of Bashar Al-Assad as
well as against Hezbollah (Hegghammer and Zelin 2013). Yet, internal violence
associated with the domestic democratization and liberalization processes of the
Arab Spring was only partially affected by these sentiments: Haass and Lesch
(2013, p. 5) write that “perhaps the most interesting issue for post-authoritarian
societies in the Middle East and North Africa concerns the relationship between
Islam and democracy.” This is not a black and white issue, but one of many shades
of gray: the debate ranges from “Islamic democracy” to the establishment of lib-
eral democracies in the post-revolution societies of the MENA, to Islamist par-
ties with various degrees of authoritarian tendencies at times (e.g. post-democratic
election under Morsi’s Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood) giving sway to some degree
of Shari’a law/theocracy as a national, political, and constitutional roadmap—and
with it its nondemocratic tendencies, such as an unequal role for women in busi-
ness, government, and society.
Ideology and Sectarian Conflicts in the EuroMed 13
Theoretical Context of Sectarianism1
This book places an emphasis on delineating the sectarian complexities in the

greater (inter-) regional EuroMed to highlight their socio-political and economic
consequences on multiple security levels, including hard security, discussed in sub-
sequent chapters.
“Traditionally, sectarianism can be understood as an institutional set of arrange-
ments determining familial, local, regional, and even broader kinds of loyalty and
affiliation” (Anonymous interview 3 January 2013 in Washington, D.C., quoted
in Abdo 2013, p. 5). Within the Arab Spring uprisings, sectarian conflicts in the
MENA have increased, following the downfall of the authoritarian regimes sup-
pressing them previously, to gain economic and political power, and the struggle
over which interpretation of Islam will dominate society and the new political
leadership (Abdo 2013). In fact, “democracy” is being used effectively by sup-
pressed Shia majorities (or at least substantial proportions of the populations) in
Bahrain and Lebanon—with the result that some Sunni view it as a subversive Shia
agenda… (Abdo 2013, p. 5).
We need to consider, however, that according to some scholars
Traditional shari’a law is a kind of divine civil law, not a political [emphasis added] law as
the one presented by the Islamists. Currently, shari’a has become an ideological weapon of
political Islam directed against all open-minded Muslims, who wish to see Islamic civiliza-
tion in a proper place in this ever-changing modern world (Tibi 2005, p. 166).
This makes the discussion of “sectarianism” in the EuroMed more relative—if not
less salient in the political discourse of the region.
However, sectarianism in the MENA is not confined to the struggle between
the Sunnis and Shia and their respective subsects, but includes something beyond
the struggles for political representation of Judeo–Christian populations in the
MENA within the Arab Spring as well, of course. Hence, political and sectarian
fights cannot be easily separated regionally, or be viewed only as purely sectarian
struggles.
There is a growing rise in sectarianism in the Southern Mediterranean, which
not only destabilizes this region internally, but also complicates its foreign relations
with the Northern Mediterranean as well as the trans-Atlantic relationship within
the Euro–Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex (EMRSSC). These reli-
gious differences in the Southern Mediterranean and neighboring countries are seri-
ous on their own account “and not simply an epiphenomenon stemming from social,
economic, or political contestation” (Abdo 2013, p. 2). Furthermore, Shia-Sunni
1
The Sunni–Shia conflict represents unresolved differences dating back more than 1,400 years to
the death of the Prophet Mohammad and the debate over his rightful succession as to whether to
arise from among his closest companions or strictly from his direct bloodline.
hostilities should not be over-generalized as they show local differentiations2,

e.g., while the Tunisian and Egyptian conflicts have strong Sunni support—and
have added fuel to the sectarian tension in the MENA—the outcome of the current
Syrian civil war (and the possible demise of Hezbollah—and simultaneous rise of
Al Qaeda—in Syria and Lebanon) will strongly determine this sectarian power bal-
ance not only intra-regionally, but also inter-regionally, such as pertaining to Iraq.
In other words, outside intervention in the MENA has created a proxy war with Iran,
Syria, and Hezbollah on one side, and Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and Turkey on the
other (Abdo 2013, p. 4). A practical example of this represents the Al Qaeda-linked
break-in of the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad to free a (significant) number of
suspected or convicted jihadists who subsequently have made it to Syria. They view
the current Syrian war as much more than a struggle against a brutal dictator, but
as a war against nonbelievers. Their ultimate aim is the establishment of an Islamic
government, both in Iraq and in Syria in this case, over the current nonbelievers that
transcend the borders of the modern Middle East (Doornbos and Moussa 2013): As
the government of Al-Assad is weakening, they see the opportune moment for their
goals approaching.
This intensification of sectarian tensions in MENA followed the uprisings and
their undermining of the authoritarian regimes which kept them in check: “People
return to their primary identities. And the more religiosity in a society, the more the
state is weak” (Fahs 2012, quoted in Abdo 2013, p. 4).
Minorities, whether religious (e.g., Sunni vs. Shiite and their more extrem-
ist branches, or Copts, as one of the non-Muslim constituencies) or ethnic (e.g.,
Kurds), as the “other,” represent the most important internal dimension, in addition
to socio-economic factors as discussed further in the section below, and the protest
of the suffering the respective minorities experienced during the past decades under
oppressive regimes in leading to the tectonic shifts we are currently observing in the
Southern Mediterranean. Especially when the party/group in power is not only as-
sociated with, but held in power through an outside “force,” such as through foreign
(and significantly, military) aid, e.g. to Mubarak in Egypt.
Ironically of course, the uprisings of the Arab Spring resulted in an opposite
swing of the political pendulum, e.g., in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood,
marginally elected to power in 2012, was opposed to allowing women and Copts
to hold the presidency (Rutherford 2013, p. 47/8). A further irony is the fact that
Mubarak’s successor after the revolution of 2011 also welcomed Western (e.g., EU
and U.S. financial assistance). While this was important to both the EU and the U.S.
not only to lessen humanitarian tragedies as a result of the severely compromised
economy following the Tahir Square popular revolt, but also to maintain political
and economic ties with Egypt and its people, the pragmatism (rather than uncom-
promised idealism) of the Muslim Brotherhood is noted.
2
The Shia question involves inter alia the degree to which Persian Shia can have an Arab Shia
identity as the Islamist Republic envisions it—or to what extent this political agenda is affected by
external actors and factors (compare Abdo 2013, p. 3).
Political Security 15
Political Security3
Coup and Post-Coup
Encarnacion (2013) developed the model of a civil society coup in 2002, and the
ouster of several dictators in the MENA can be analyzed through this paradigm:
Endemic to new democracies, civil society coups entail the removal from power of an
elected leader through sustained protest, usually with the aid of the military. Indeed, it is
the partnership between civil society and the military—not usually known for acting in
concert—that distinguishes a civil society coup from an ordinary one. More often than
not, those behind the coup justify it by claiming that they intend to rescue democracy,
which is paradoxical since they are, in fact, uprooting it. This is Tocqueville’s civil society
gone rogue; rather than working patiently and discreetly toward improving the quality of
democracy, it turns angry and restless and plots for sudden and radical political change
(Encarnacion 2013, p. 14).
In this sense, Taleb and Blyth (2011, p. 36) suggested that the international treaties
which many authoritarian rulers, deposed during the Arab Spring, made for the
convenience between them and their patron countries, were without consideration
of the populace—and as a result tended not to be supported by the latter. Rather
than suppressing political fluctuations, these authors (Taleb and Blyth 2011) quote
Rousseau: “A little bit of agitation gives motivation to the soul, and what really
makes the species prosper is not peace so much as freedom” and with it “some
unpredictable fluctuation…—[:] no stability without volatility” (Taleb and Blyth
2011, p. 36). In other words, the suppression of political expression may create the
appearance of stability on the surface, but this suppression will, in the end, result
in even greater upheaval or a coup, rather than just letting political thought be ex-
pressed peu à peu as it arises.
International assistance overall in post-revolution states in the MENA depends
on the circumstances of course. Interestingly, the EU, who has the most immedi-
ate interest in a re-stabilization of its southern neighborhood, does not necessarily
have the financial means: “while European armed forces can do crisis response
operations well, they are running out of money to put that wisdom into practice”
(Mattelaer 2013, p. 1). Hence, the countries in post-revolution upheaval have to find
additional regional assistance (e.g., from the GCC states) or the U.S. to assist them
in smoothing the human suffering as a result of the political “restructuring.”
States: Failed vs. Successful
The Western perception of a “successful” state is as one that inter alia is conducive
to economic growth (rather than stagnation or decline), ideally without extreme
3
The author wishes to thank Inger Andersen of the World Bank and Ralph Chami of the IMF for
their invaluable comments at the Harvard Arab Weekend November 7–10, 2013 pertaining to the
following sections.
income disparities, to provide constructive (positive sum) international relations, as

well as to provide basic public services and jobs to all its citizens (i.e., inter alia to
all appropriate age and sectarian groups) within the clear, and evenly applied rule of
law (including civil freedoms in terms of religion, gender, and ethnic origin), and to
allow for a vibrant civil society to support and define the state in this. Yet, these are
not universal norms in all countries and societies. Often, the lack of these criteria
leads to failed states, and become a challenge for “free and democratic” states to
engage in with these for positive sum outcomes on the social, economic, and politi-
cal levels.
One example of intra-regional cooperation on this level is the EU’s “civilian”
border mission in Libya. It is training paramilitary forces in a wider European and
U.S. effort to prevent Libya from becoming a “failed state” (Rettmann 2013c) by
stopping local militias from interfering with the state’s (legitimate) control of the
nation’s security, and thereby assist the Libyan state to “reconstitute” itself into a
stable and successful (and democratic…) state—rather than potentially the scene
for further trans-trafficking of weapons, drugs, and humans from western Africa
into Europe (and the vicious circle this would represent for impeded Libyan politi-
cal—and social—stability and growth).
Institutional Capacity
While many of the now defunct authoritarian regimes in North Africa and the Mid-
dle East inhibited independent or divergent political opinion, often stymieing striv-
ing civil society through their (often brutal) secret services, this lack of a broad civil
society now represents a difficult handicap post-authoritarianism in developing ef-
fective participatory democratic institutions to serve all segments of their society.
Some well-organized groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood are, nevertheless,
not in a position to take over the functions of the state, as exemplified by the ab-
sence of basic public services, e.g., the lack of public security, in Egypt, as was ap-
parent under Morsi’s rule. Additionally, the “oil and gas shortages, and a weakening
level of a regime resulted in mounting ungovernability” (EuroMeSCo 2013, p. 7)
as Morsi’s reign showed as well. Though post-Morsi the state has made a strong
comeback in Egypt, it embodies “a lack of [a] consensual culture of nation build-
ing” (EuroMeSCo 2013) at the time of writing.
There are parallels with Tunisia, such as the deep political divisions between
“the Troika-structured coalition government and the Tunisian Salvation Front since
the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi, a member of the Tunisian Constituent As-
sembly” (EuroMeSCo 2013), resulting in “an obsession with the state” (EuroMeS-
Co 2013), which prevented “the country from adopting durable solutions and a new
paradigm for the long term” (EuroMeSCo 2013).
In this context, the role of the militaries in the MENA during the Arab Spring
continues to be significant. It suffices to say that the military has been supportive
of (or at least not interfering with) the popular revolts in some countries, such as
in Egypt during the Tahir Square protests, and of the regime (such as in Syria).
Political Security 17
By contrast, in Turkey, the military was for many decades the guardian of its de-
mocracy, just as the military, from its perspective, was in ousting Morsi in Egypt.
This was ostensibly because the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was not conduct-
ing an inclusive government once they had been democratically elected—and the
military’s actions could, in this sense, be interpreted as supportive of democracy as
well. The civilian–military balance to assist in internal stabilization (as militaries
tend to resist chaos) will need to coalesce in the MENA as the new democracies are
consolidated, with strong institutions as checks and balances to avoid either military
dictatorships—a line which Turkey toed often—or sectarian autocracies. Israel is
unique in that its military acts as the great equalizer of a very culturally (though
not religiously) diverse immigrant population with its universal conscription (while
many countries rely on volunteer armies today).
Democracy
The dictator we know vs. the future we don’t know

(anonymous)
The revolutions of the Arab Spring brought a great sense of optimism and hope
for social and democratic reform in the MENA region—masking the differences
in underlying causes for the uprisings in each country, many related to the degree
of authoritarianism in each country. However, as the dynamics shifted into a tenu-
ous relationship between Arab transnational Islamist movements, now often having
evolved into political Islamism on the one hand and nation-states plus their soci-
eties on the other, becoming an often existentialist debate, which was previously
repressed by authoritarian regimes, there are more questions than answers for guar-
anteeing the security of the state and its society with such multiple relationships on
all levels.
Regardless of the specific state-forms countries take after the upheaval of the
Arab Spring, reforms are the “A and O” in the post-revolutionary phases, often
similar between countries, some differing: political transparency and inclusiveness
of the entire electorate, regardless of gender or religious orientation, are urgent on
the political level, however.
Legitimacy: Ruling in Accordance with the Mandate/Political

Promise
For post-revolution countries to become successful, institutional deficits in public

governance (e.g., legal frameworks, constitutional modalities) need to be remedied
to meet the aspirations of the people. In the absence of these, the consequences
will translate into stunted economic growth, affecting (inclusive) growth to meet
the immediate social and economic challenges internally, with this “disintegration”
further spilling over into neighboring countries, as Syria exemplifies.
Scattered populist actions (e.g., subsidies for petroleum and bread) do not build
up social fairness in the longterm, but may result in macroeconomic challenges
without reforms. The threat to stable governance after revolutions is that on occa-
sion the transition governments perceive not having adequate time to finalize the
myriad of reforms necessary until a firm legitimate government is in place, but that
these populist actions may buy temporary stability, if only for a short time. Balanc-
ing immediate material needs with longterm inclusive growth will buy trust and
increase equality. A population can accept the necessary sacrifice to rebuild a holis-
tic society easier if the longterm payback of prosperity and stability is explained to
them. To fail to do this could mean frustration and dissatisfaction with the transition
process, which would make a reversion to dictatorial times more likely.
Civil Society
There are indications among several countries (e.g., Morocco and Tunisia) involved
in Arab Spring rebellions that civil society has become more de-politicized since
the revolution, as they cannot tackle major political issues (and to the contrary, their
space in society is shrinking during the political restructuring) (EuroMeSCo 2013,
p. 11). Especially the young have not had a chance during this reshuffling to obtain
actual political office (which generally stayed in the hands of very senior politicians),
and often have to resort to make themselves heard for the very causes which they
fought for by using civil societal outlets, such as a myriad of art forms (whether art/
graffiti, poems, songs, or online blogs) to voice their continued political frustrations
for which many of their peers had already perished during the revolution.
Similarly, the implementation of EU assistance frequently did not fail during the
post-revolution phases for lack of theoretical planning, but in their implementation
phase by not being able to adequately engage with the local population and their
political liaisons. In this phase, concrete assistance for socio-economic reform, con-
stitution-building, and the establishment of law and order are perceived as primary
needs before the “luxury” of devoting themselves to freedom of media and speech
(EuroMeSCo 2013, p. 12).4
4
On a more positive note, compare a travel report about the EU’s Head of Delegation to Morocco,
Ambassador Rupert Joy’s, survey trip in that country: “in Chefchaouen, the ambassador was struck
by the commitment and dynamism of local actors.” “The elected officials, the people in charge
of national education, water and forests, the civil society in the fields of education, sustainable
development, environment and preservation of architectural and cultural heritage show a strong
will to improve the daily lives of the population, by setting up innovative and concrete actions in
the field,” he reported after his visit.
He reminded that rural development and the sustainable management of natural resources are
among the priorities of EU budget support to Morocco, with a funding program of 400 million dir-
hams, signed last May.
The visit to the Rif enabled the ambassador to see first-hand how the EU is helping the region
to catch up with more developed parts of the country. “I travelled along the road connecting
Chefchaouen to the coast at Oued Laou, and the spectacular 100-kilometre section of the Rocade
Economic Threats 19
In terms of the EMRSSC, military cooperation (ranging from officer training

to military hardware sales as well as shared security operations, such as with the
U.S.’ Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and cooperation in the War on Terror (WOT), such as
with Morocco) has traditionally equaled economic cooperation trans-Atlantically
between the U.S. and the MENA, even when politically there are disagreements at
times.
Economic Threats
Social Justice: Material and Political Inequalities—

Privatization and Extreme Income Divergence
After the initial euphoria in the MENA, the complexities of constructing new
systems to address old grievances are rearing their head: There is a widening fis-
cal imbalance of the oil-importing countries (e.g., Egypt and Jordan) post-Arab
Spring, which is a fuse waiting to be ignited—together with continuing triggers,
such as high youth unemployment, especially of females (and the waste in talent
this represents to a country’s utilization of its human resources, e.g., to start a busi-
ness). When the Arab Spring began, the Eurozone crisis had just occurred, and the
EU could not step in with significant assistance.5 Inter-regional efforts, such as by
Turkey, Saudi Arabia/the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the U.S. filled this
void in part. Yet, a reliance on financial aid is not sustainable, and more complex
measures need to be undertaken to avoid economic collapse, and exacerbate fur-
ther political instability of most post-Arab Spring nations. This instability reduces
private sector confidence and makes a country unattractive to foreign direct in-
vestments (FDIs).
Reforms beyond those in governance need to involve improved service delivery,
checks that resources (such as those via World Bank assistance to make the transi-
tions holistic) are being used efficiently in re-building post-conflict countries in
the MENA and break out of this cycle. The recommendations by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank address in particular reforms, such as the
end to subsidies of essentials, as they help the top earners the most—not through an
instantaneous halt, but a gradual phasing-out, as e.g., Indonesia successfully accom-
plished some years ago. Without structural reforms leading to inclusive growth (e.g.,
access to finance, and a social safety net to support those groups of the population
Mediterranéenne between Jibha and Ajdir. These roads, financed by the EU at a cost of € 145 mil-
lion, are crucial enablers of socio-economic development in this remote mountain region.”
The EU funded the construction of a 103 km stretch of the Tanger-Saadia highway, connecting
El Jebha and Al Hoceima. This € 145 million funding represents the most important infrastructure
funding by the EU in North Africa” (EU Neighborhood Info Center 2013).
5
Of significant help would be for the EU to open its internal market to (especially agricultural)
products from the MENA. However, progress on this goal continues to be elusive.
which are hit the hardest by the phasing-out of subsidies) and increased gover-
nance, even a relatively wealthy country, such as Libya, will start to sustain deficits.
Hence, formulating a social justice vision in post-revolution countries is absolutely
essential. It should not become a victim of irrational reflexes, but needs to be part of
their new governance to yield optimal solutions to their longterm socio-political and
economic outlook—together with strengthened public institutions.
National internal differences add a further layer to necessary socio-economic
reforms, e.g., Tunisia’s “other,” especially during the recent uprisings, was not so
much an ethnic or religious minority, but rather the tremendous historical urban
“coast” population vs. the impoverished populations inland. Post-Arab Spring, the
economic bases in many countries in the MENA are severely weakened as a result
of actual physical destruction of modes of production, infrastructure, and loss of hu-
man capital due to hundreds of thousands having fled or having perished or become
disabled. While many countries in the MENA have overall well-educated youths,
their skill set, like that of students in many countries in the West, needs to match
the present economic opportunities to empower especially this population group to
prevent them from becoming a “lost generation.”
Human Security
The shifting identities of religious, gender, and national tribal affiliations post-
conflict need to rise above an endless circle of instability and violence into anarchy.
The power vacuum due to polarizations of some parties compared to the lack of
organization of new parties, such as Islamists, allowed the latter to win some elec-
tions after the uprisings compared to liberals and elites, but led to more instability
on many occasions.
The indirect social threats, many triggered by the uprisings in the first place,
such as high unemployment, the erosion of the social welfare net, and rising prices
of gasoline and food not only make structural economic reforms difficult but run
the danger of repeating the dangers of the past by becoming a mutually reinforcing
vicious circle, often leading to emigration and the loss of human capital this repre-
sents to a country.
Migration
From the perspective of the Northern Mediterranean, the political instability on its
southern borders has led to increased migration across the Mediterranean into the
EU. Controlling illegal migration continues to be a challenge to EU security, as it
seeks to secure its southern borders. Despite the application of advanced technol-
ogy, such as that beyond national coast guard controls, e.g., Spain has installed a
network of thermal infrared cameras along most of its coast line to detect at least
the larger vessels (leading to a reduction of illegal immigration via this route by
Human Security 21
nearly 90 % in 2012 over 2006 (Minder and Yardley 20136))—only to lead ille-
gal immigrants to resort to the use of rubber dinghies at a substantially increased
risk to their survival of the crossing from (mostly) North Africa (in terms of the
south–north migration). The human tragedies occurring during illegal crossings
were highlighted again in early October 2013, when two boats capsized by being
overloaded with desperate migrants off the coast of Lampeda, killing several hun-
dred people, after one caught fire when the migrants lit flares to signal other ships
off the coast for assistance.
Europe is losing its credibility in the immigration question: Are only the rich
welcome?7 According to the UN Refugee Agency, over 2,000 poor refugees have
perished in the Mediterranean since the beginning of 2011, as Fortress Europe is
vigoplusly defending itself against poverty-stricken refugees by all means (Hecking
2013).
Other neighboring regions of countries in upheavals have seen their resources
stressed from immense streams of migrants across their borders, like the migration
of almost 2 million Syrian refugees to Turkey. This prompted the latter to build a
two meter-high wall along those parts of its border with Syria, which are particu-
larly susceptible to fighting and the resulting refugee stream, “bypassing its check-
points and [to] prevent smuggling” (Pamuk and Coskun 2013, p. 1), such as in the
border district close to the Syrian town of Qamishli, where Kurds, rebel units and
Arab tribes regularly clash (Pamuk and Coskun 2013), although Turkey vows to
continue be open to Syrian refugees per se.
Food Security
There are many sectors of security according to Buzan et al. (1998), depending
on the securitization of the sector at a given moment and location. Food security
was one of the significant triggers during some revolutions of the Arab Spring,
such as in Egypt (compare further details in the country-specific section on Egypt).
What the “bread wars” there have shown is that the international community should
encourage domestic food production, i.e., their agricultural sectors, rather than,
6
With drones and satellites planned to detect illegal migrants
7
In Spain, a new law came into force in early October 2013 providing a residence permit to for-
eign investors who invest at least € 500,000 in property (Hecking 2013), benefitting the real estate
sector—infamous for parking moneys to be laundered. Since summer 2013, Greece has been giv-
ing 5-year permits to anyone investing € 250,000 in property. Technically, the permits only allow
non-EU citizens to spend 90 out of every 180 days in other Schengen states, but virtually no one
checks this in practice. Since October 2012, Portugal has offered a “golden visa” in exchange for at
least two years residency in exchange for a real estate investment of at least € 500,000. Hungary’s
right-wing nationalist government, normally eager to keep foreigners from precious Hungarian
soil, also created a “Residence Permit Bond” in July 2013, whereby foreigners need to invest at
least € 250,000 in the country in addition to “administrative fees” of about € 40,000 payable to
dubious partner companies of the Hungarian government (based in offshore tax havens like the
Cayman Islands or Cyprus) (Hecking 2013).
e.g., send surplus food from the U.S., as the growth of local industries not only
lifts people out of poverty more effectively than any other sector but also literally
feeds them instead of increasing their dependency on the often exorbitant prices of
imported food (Ciezadlo 2011, p. 5).8
Tetreault et al. (2012) propose redefining food security in terms of securing vul-
nerable populations from the structural violence of hunger. This framing offers both
conceptual and practical value for efforts in confronting the problem of increasing
and widespread hunger. In the MENA, different countries face different degrees of
threat to their food security (depending on climate and soil, as well as wealth, as
money can buy imported foods), and hence, the degree in which hunger contributed
to the anxiety and restlessness of a population as triggers leading up to revolts dur-
ing the Arab Spring vary.
There are many unfinished revolutions within each country in the EMRSSC—
each country experiencing it directly, or at least having shifted indirectly; revo-
lutions which take time, but which need solutions to some immediate priorities.
Beyond the elimination of hunger by 2030 as a UN goal, especially following the
uprisings, prosperity needs to be boosted in particular for the bottom 40 % of the
populations in the region.
Human Security and the Syrian Civil War
The issue of human security specifically—and the legal bases to ensure it operation-
ally during one of the most glaring examples during the Arab Spring, Syria—will
be detailed in this section. By autumn 2013, there were at least 2 million Syrians
who have fled their country as a result of the civil war, and live in refugee camps in
Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, while around 5 million Syrians are refugees in their
own country, either because their homes and businesses (including agriculture) were
destroyed during the civil war, or they are trapped in their own neighborhoods, cut
off through military blockades from the fighting government and opposition forc-
es. They have exhausted food (as agriculture is severely disturbed) and medicines
(leading, among many other untreated illnesses, to a shortage of vaccines, with the
consequence that, inter alia by early autumn 2013, there were at least ten confirmed
polio cases among children in Syrian refugee camps), and are isolated from aid
shipments as winter 2013/14 approached. As this crisis is becoming longterm, it is
exhausting the $ 1.5 billion international aid effort (on top of efforts by the World
Food Program, UNICEF, the WHO, and others) (Barnard 2013), laying bare the
complex security relationships of this unsolved conflict, partially due to internation-
al actors having made Syria the theater of their own political and sectarian agendas
whose human consequences they now cannot assuage. Valuable time was lost in
making international assistance available, partially due to the fragmentation within
8
President Obama has taken steps by summer 2013 toward specifically ending this practice from
the side of the U.S.
Human Security 23
opposition forces and the polarization of the country overall. This interferes with
the efficient delivery of aid and emphasizes the worsening humanitarian crisis—and
the necessity for a decisive, pragmatic, and agreeable solution to deal with Syria’s
likely very difficult post-civil war future.
The current civil war became more acute on international foreign policies agen-
das in August 2013, when the use of chemical weapons by the Al-Assad regime
towards its civilian population (leading to more than 1,500 deaths of not only sus-
pected opponents to the regime, but also women and children), was determined
with great likelihood by UN inspectors, following an alleged small-scale use of
chemical weapons in the spring of 2013. While Russia and China were uncertain
to approve (GlobalSecurity.org 2013, p. 3; DiploNews 2013) a military interven-
tion under Articles 399 and 4210 of the UN Charter in response in Syria (though
both “resolutely oppose” chemical weapons use as signatories of the Chemical
Weapons Convention), the Obama administration studied the legal precedent for
Responsibility to Protect (R2P)-action (set by the intervention to the genocides in
Kosovo by the Slobodan Milosevic regime against the Serbians in 1999) under
the Chemical Weapons Convention,11 and the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC)-mandate under Resolution 197312 for military intervention in Libya in
2012, for a limited intervention in Syria without escalating this incident into a
wider regional conflict.
What happened to the victims, including many children, is not only a violation
of international law—it is also a danger, beyond the regional and inter-regional, to
global security. The following section will address in somewhat greater detail the
threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the EMRSSC,
especially in the context of the Arab Spring.
9
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be tak-
en in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
10
“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be in-
adequate, or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, or other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations.”
11
The international ban on chemical weapons following the experience during World War I was
later codified by the 1925 Geneva Convention (which also included a ban on the use of biological
weapons—though it did not ban or limit the production and stockpiling of WMDs—a shortcoming
rectified in the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention) (Kasapoğlu et al. 2013, p. 2).
12
The operational paragraph is “…authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-
General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in coop-
eration with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of
resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi….”
Proliferation of WMDs
While Syria (together with Egypt and Israel and four other countries) is not party
to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, it is bound by the Geneva Convention,
banning the use of chemical weapons. These are some of the rationales for a coali-
tion intervention to punish the Al-Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons
leading to these deaths in August 2013, and preventing it from resorting to their use
in the future. This would likely lead to a change in the balance of power domesti-
cally, and give opposition parties a democratic—or even more extremist (such as
ISIS, which continues to operate there and increase their military gains)—opportu-
nity in Syria.
President Obama (2013a) stated the considerations of an international response
in the following speech to this threat to not just regional, but international peace—
well within the parameters of the Powell Doctrine—in that
if we fail to act, the Assad regime will see no reason to stop using chemical weapons. As
the ban against these deadly weapons erodes, other tyrants and authoritarian regimes will
have no reason to think twice about acquiring poison gases and using them. Over time, our
troops could face the prospect of chemical warfare on the battlefield. It could be easier for
terrorist organizations to obtain these weapons and use them to attack civilians. If fighting
spills beyond Syria’s borders, these weapons could threaten our allies in the region.
So after careful deliberation, I determined that it is in the national security interests of the
United States to respond to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons through a targeted
military strike. The purpose of this strike would be to deter Assad from using chemical
weapons, to degrade his regime’s ability to use them, and make clear to the world that we
will not tolerate their use.
Though I possess the authority to order these strikes, in the absence of a direct threat to
our security I believe that Congress should consider my decision to act. Our democracy is
stronger when the President acts with the support of Congress—and when Americans stand
together as one people.
Over the last few days, as this debate unfolds, we’ve already begun to see signs that the
credible threat of U.S. military action may produce a diplomatic breakthrough (emphasis
added). The Russian government has indicated a willingness to join with the international
community in pushing Assad to give up his chemical weapons and the Assad regime has
now admitted that it has these weapons, and even said they’d join the Chemical Weapons
Convention, which prohibits their use.
It’s too early to tell whether this offer will succeed, and any agreement must verify that the
Assad regime keeps its commitments. But this initiative has the potential to remove the
threat of chemical weapons without the use of force.
Meanwhile, I’ve ordered our military to maintain their current posture to keep the pressure
on Assad, and to be in a position to respond if diplomacy fails.
This speech gives a brief overview over the extraordinary difficulty in curbing
the use of chemical weapons in this case, even with two superpowers, the U.S.
and Russia, giving this problem priority attention. The U.S. and Russia reached
an agreement on September 14, 2013 in Geneva, under which Syria will declare
its chemical weapon stocks to be destroyed by mid-2014, after it submitted the
paperwork to join the Chemical Weapons Convention in advance. Although this
resolution did not a contain a UN Chapter VII mandate, and the Convention was de-
signed for a country to join voluntarily rather than being coerced into it to renounce
Human Security 25
its chemical weapons, the French, UK, and U.S. foreign ministers jointly declared
in Paris “that they would seek a ‘strong’ resolution with ‘serious consequences’ if
Syria fails to turn over its chemical weapons” (FP Morning Brief 2013). This would
allow the use of military force if Syria does not comply with its provisions, and
dispelled suspicions, both in the Arab world and in Europe, Asia, and Russia about
a possible U.S. lack of interest or resolve in easing human suffering as a result of the
Arab Spring, or lack of ability by the Obama administration (in this case especially
Secretary of State John Kerry) to accomplish this.
Obama rightly took credit for responding to the threats by exhausting non-
military political and economic approaches, which in turn successfully led to the
Russian proposal, and corresponding UN Resolution 2118 (2013) of September 27
for Syria to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile and related manufacturing fa-
cilities. Initial progress by UN chemical weapons inspectors of “site inspections
and the disabling of equipment at production sites” (FP Mideast Daily 2013b) was
encouraging.
The extraordinary challenges presented to the international community to reign
in the use of chemical weapons was preceded by the efforts of the Arab League,
which is seeking to implement a completely WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Of
the region’s violent history, the most troublesome violations of the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT) have occurred in Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Iran’s nuclear ambi-
tions remain an urgent concern, although Iran has expressed its interest in a WMD-
free zone in the region. Scholars have been frustrated over decades to achieve a
WMD-free zone in the Middle East to open doors for cooperation and a security
dialogue among the states of the region, by inducing an atmosphere of trust in work-
ing towards lasting peace here. Criticism is directed at the failure in fulfilling the
obligations states accepted in negotiations at the 2010 NPT Review, partially due to
the lack of political will, and an alleged cavalier attitude by the U.S. in the past in
not facilitating the achievement of a WMD-free zone in the MENA. However, the
latest negotiations between Iran, Russia, and the U.S. (“Geneva II”) have brought
the greatest advance in this respect in several decades, even though the latest round
of talks in the middle of November 2014 was not yet successful.
Chapter 3
Levels of Security
Intra-Regional Level
Arab Spring
The Maghreb countries achieved independence from colonialism in the 1950s and
1960s, choosing “different economic strategies and political systems. … [though]
all ended up with authoritarian regimes that relied on repression and paternalistic
rule” (Layachi 2011, p. 1). Over the years, the fight against Islamist extremism be-
came the justification for the hardening of their rule. Especially Morocco became
a significant ally to the U.S. in its War on Terror (WOT) through a quid pro quo of
Morocco receiving terror suspects for further “questioning” (and the accompanying
human and political rights abuses) in exchange for U.S. military hardware and train-
ing for its security forces (Layachi 2011).
Understanding the much-debated appropriateness of the term “Arab Spring,”
it is used in this volume for ontological purposes only, without implying a value
judgment, or political or historical implications.
A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values
and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and govern-
ment activities and policies (Huntington 1968, p. 264 quoted in Deeb 2013, p. 74),
with new groups entering the political arena, and a generational leap, whereby the
younger generation overcomes the fears of their elders to “defy those who wanted
to keep them under the political yolk of a defunct ideology” (Deep 2013, p. 75).
Early vestiges of the political changes of the Arab Spring a few years later be-
came noticeable in early 2005 with the open elections in Iraq, the Syrian withdrawal
from Lebanon following immense protests in Beirut, and municipal elections in
Saudi Arabia (Cook 2009). The chaos in Egypt and the “Jasmine Revolution,” dur-
ing which the Tunisian people ousted President Ben Ali, meant a new lease on life
for the domino theory, very much in vogue recently throughout the Arab world. In
Europe and the United States, everyone is wondering what the consequences of the
events, still running their course, will be. Wishful thinking as well as trusting in
destiny to prevent the current political crisis from jeopardizing the balance of the
whole region would be a mistake (Razoux 2011, p. 1).

28 3 Levels of Security
“Smart Mobs” and “Black Swans”
A significant change in the modus operandi of the popular revolts of the Arab Spring
compared to other, earlier ones in all parts of the world is the role of the internet
(Doran in Pollack et al. 2011) in creating cyber activism, not only in sharing, pre-
Arab Spring, details of political oppression (such as torture and death), so the popu-
lation had no choice but to acknowledge abuse by their regimes—and stir popular
anger. But mass mobilization was also achieved as the internet made it possible to
easily follow the unfolding events and the calls for unified action in building soli-
darity and overcome fear of government disapproval. These user-generated mass
communication technologies then not only “enabled leaderless groups to organize
collective action” (Doran in Pollack et al. 2011, p. 42), but resulted in international
saturation media coverage, which garnered wide international sympathies, scrutiny,
and support1—with little the authoritarian rulers could do to effectively stop this.
Yet, the limits of the influence of these Smart Mobs become apparent while “pro-
testers are drawn from diverse backgrounds … [with] radically different visions of
the Arab future—visions that, ultimately, are totally incompatible. As a result, once
the dictator is ousted, the coalition disintegrates” (Doran in Pollack et al. 2011,
p. 45)—and the challenge of building a new democratic society truly becomes ap-
parent in all countries having faced popular revolts during the Arab Spring.
Some of the universal characteristics (albeit with national nuances and foci) in
countries with rebellions during the Arab Spring-era are oppressive political elites,
often combined with political corruption, so that wealth, attained equally by the
populations, cannot be shared, but is disproportionately concentrated at the top
through the restrictive political arrangement (compare Deeb 2013, p. 69). These
mechanisms became much more transparent with the communication revolution,
which also made the oppressive measures used to maintain the status quo much
more visible nationally and globally—and gave the tech-savvy youth in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa (MENA) additional means to address these (Deeb 2013,
p. 71). While the public wrath turned at last against their corrupt totalitarian re-
gimes, the path taken by individual countries was dependent on their individual
histories, cultures and social conditions (Deeb 2013) in proceeding to the unique
outcome of “their” Arab Spring.
Taleb and Blyth (2011) suggest a theoretical interpretation—and explanation,
missing from most commenters and analysts—of the Arab Spring. They view the
countries part of these processes as highly constrained systems which became very
fragile, without exhibiting any visible risk (as silent risks accumulated beneath the
surface), when their artificially suppressed volatility exploded: Despite the stated
intent of some
political leaders and economic policymakers … to stabilize the system by inhibiting fluc-
tuations (emphasis added), the result tends to be the opposite. These artificially constrained
systems become prone to ‘Black Swans’—that is, they become extremely vulnerable to
1
For example, the American military played a significant role in strongly encouraging the Egyp-
tian military to hold its fire during the Tahir Square protests.
Arab Spring 29
large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a
given set of observers (Taleb and Blyth 2011, p. 33/4).
These authors indicate that to make systems robust, whether political or (global)
financial systems, grounded in the rise of complexity, interdependence and un-
predictability (Taleb and Blyth 2011, p. 34/5) “all risks must be visible and out
in the open—fluctuat nec mergitur (it fluctuates but does not sink)” (Taleb and
Blyth 2011, p. 34). Once such a complex system of interdependence and contagion
reaches the tipping point, no one can predict which straw is going to be the one to
break the camel’s back. This is the characteristic of the system, not the components
(Taleb and Blyth 2011, p. 36)—and simply attributing the surprise experience by
many observers about the sudden onset of the Arab Spring to faulty intelligence to
predict these events would mean “confusing catalysts for causes (emphasis added)
and assuming that one can know which catalyst will produce which effect.” Despite
human adverseness to unpredictability, “[one] should not fear fluctuations per se,
since allowing them to be in the open … creates the stability of small jumps” (Taleb
and Blyth 2011, p. 36).
Western response, much aligned with the U.S.’ specifically, was to encourage
self-determination of the populations, “regardless of local peculiarities and interne-
cine tensions, due to their multi-ethnic composition,” (Ibid.) with only the Libyan
crisis having resulted in direct Western intervention so far: Some Western countries
were motivated by re-gaining lost petroleum extraction privileges, while others
sought to reduce instability in their own countries from the uncontrollable influx
of refugees, terrorism and organized crime (Taleb and Blyth 2011)—especially the
southern European countries, such as Italy and Spain.
Asymmetrical Threats and International Regional Actors Parallel

to the Arab Spring
The uprisings of the Arab Spring represent a challenge to the status quo powers in-
ternally as well as regionally; those which seek to suppress the political upheavals as
well as those which claim to champion them (Marashi and Parsi 2013, p. 135), with
some countries identifying this paradox as a new fault line in the region (Marashi
and Parsi 2013). This deteriorating status quo playing out into a political vacuum,
or the political rivalries in hard as well as in soft power may exacerbate the fragile
(greater) regional security environment (Marashi and Parsi 2013).
In terms of terrorism, while there was sympathy towards Muslims before 9/11,
this changed as the asymmetrical wave of terrorism since then to undermine West-
ern economies beyond the Mediterranean, and additionally rising maritime piracy,
in particular radiating out from the “greater Mediterranean” to the Gulf of Aden
and the Indian Ocean, sponsored by powerful backers out to harass the enemy (i.e.,
Western) commerce as a vital source of their wealth, and hereby weaken them in
this weakest spot of the basis (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 9). The UN only
authorized anti-piracy operations after piracy had already peaked, and carried out
successfully “by NATO, the EU, a U.S.-led coalition and by warships of the
emerging powers, India, China and Russia” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 9).
This delay, however, led private commerce to relocate to a far more expensive pas-
sage where possible, around the Cape of Good Hope. This led to a significant rise
in the price of commodities, especially food prices, and a parallel decline of traf-
fic through the Suez Canal, and the resultant financial strain, especially to Egypt,
and all maritime economies of the basin (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013): “as dur-
ing the Ottoman Empire, the Mediterranean region had become poorer again”
(Ibid., p. 10)—providing “the spark, which lit the fire of the Arab Spring” (Ibid.),
though with additional causes much deeper—and worsened by the global financial
crisis: not only were states unable to make up the price increases with additional
subsidies, but donor nations also had less aid available—and in contrast to the role
of the international community pre-Arab Spring, which was to suppress the ideo-
logical extremes of Islamic fundamentalism by supporting rulers who were at their
bidding—forcing Islamic fundamentalism underground, which had only made it
stronger now (Taleb and Blyth 2011, p. 39).
In terms of a “regional perspective” of the Arab Spring beyond aspects discussed
below on a country-by-country perspective (though not on an inclusive or complete
sample basis), some authors view the MENA in terms of World Society theory,
where
All territorial borders and, consequently, all territories in world society must necessarily be
understood as being the result of global (communicative) dynamics. Accordingly, the very
notion of the ‘region-ness’ of both the Middle East and territories within the region must
be shifted from a positivist, spatial and cultural understanding to a concept of territory as a
world societal and communicatively generated phenomenon (Stetter 2008, p. 41),
in order to overcome the view by other scholars of the MENA witnessing “the un-
controlled collision between the tectonic plates of global, and Western-dominated
practices, and an entrenched local/regional culture. … conceptualized as the si-
multaneous confrontation between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ on Middle Eastern
territory” (Stetter 2008, p. 35). The World Society-perspective certainly plays a sig-
nificant role in analyzing the MENA on a continuum. However, this book seeks to
address the interconnections beyond the IR theoretical, via actual security dynamics
of the Arab Spring within an EMRSSC.2
Southern Mediterranean
The levels of the Euro-Mediterranean in terms of Euro-Mediterranean Regional

Security Super Complex (EMRSSC) analysis involve the local (e.g., as the poi-
gnant influence of local tribes pre- and post-Gaddafi shows in Libya), the national
2
Compare Buzan (2004, p. 217): “Where community and society occupy the same space, as in
a classical nation-state, the element of identity (e.g., nationalism) may well play a crucial role in
balancing some of the divisive effects of society and politics … [b]ut where identity and society
are not (emphasis added) in the same space, as in the contemporary problematique of globalization
[- or (inter-)regional securitization], they might well be antagonistic forces”.
Southern Mediterranean 31
(e.g., the complex domestic post-authoritarian political and ideological struggles

in Egypt on its stability and return to normalcy), the (intra-)regional (such as the
united uprisings of the Arab world in the MENA), and the inter-regional (e.g., the
influence trans-Atlantically on security of the Mediterranean (both north and south-
(eastern)).
The following sections will use select examples of some specific modi operandi
of the EMRSSC security levels in the context of the Arab Spring and their politi-
cal, economic, and social-cultural implications on its security: Two countries in the
southern Mediterranean, Turkey and Egypt, have been grouped as CIVETS (Colom-
bia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey (Ward 2009)), the next (second) tier of large
emerging markets (after BRICS3), which are expected to offer attractive returns
to investors. Hence the southern part of the Mediterranean is of interest not only
geostrategically from its an immediate economic perspective, but also politically
(as reciprocally this economic growth affects political influence).
Turkey
Sanfelice di Monteforte describes Turkey’s historic international strategic influence

in the greater Mediterranean region in terms of
the bitter ongoing struggle, involving the Ottoman Empire, whose government was known
as the Sublime Porte,4 helped by its occasional Western allies, and the so-called ‘Chris-
tian Powers’. This precarious balance between these two blocks was upset, after several
centuries, only by the emergence of Russia, as the arch-enemy of the Ottomans; as a con-
sequence, the Porte became unable to cope with too many foes at the same time, and her
decline became irreversible (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 6).
In the twenty-first century, this led to drastically cascading regional and inter-
regional shifts, which are significant to this day, such as the expansion of Western
powers, the liberation of Greece from Turkish rule, the conquest of Algeria, the
reduction of Tunisia and Egypt to protectorates, Crete’s annexation by Greece, Cy-
prus becoming a British colony, the (partial or total) loss of independence of Libya
and Morocco (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013), and the collapse of the Ottoman Em-
pire in 1918.
France and Great Britain, who had been able to exploit its [Turkey’s] lack of internal cohe-
sion, took stock of the agreement reached ten years earlier by king Edward VII and tsar
Nicholas II; both rulers, wary of five hundred years of ‘Holy War’, had in fact concluded in
1908 that the ‘Great Sick Person of Europe’ was in any case a looming danger, and had to
be eliminated for good. This decision was put in practical terms some years later in 1916 …
[in an agreement] of splitting the failing empire into several nations of a similar dimension
(Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 7).
3
In 2001, Jim O’Neill, Goldman Sachs Chief economist, coined the term “BRICS”, with Robert
Ward devising CIVETS in The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009).
4
Also known as the “Ottoman Porte” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 6).
Turkey, the Regional Kingpin
Turkey today is a very important, and the only, member of NATO and the Council
of Europe—and the only Muslim candidate for EU membership. As such, Turkey
has a unique advantage due to its “bridge” position as a secular Muslim and demo-
cratic country.
Turkey’s “immediate neighborhood” challenge involves, inter alia, beyond the
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle also Israel, not only in terms of the Greek and Cy-
priot EU memberships vis-à-vis Turkey’s EU applicant status (as one of the require-
ments for EU accession is to have friendly relationships with other EU MSs), but
in terms of the energy finds—and their implication on energy- (as well as eco-
nomic) self-sufficiency as well: once Israel discovered huge natural gas deposits
off its shores in late 2010, neighboring countries Greece,5 Turkey, Cyprus and Syria
also searched—and found—that the entire eastern Mediterranean is submerged by
huge untapped oil and gas reserves. This has enormous geopolitical as well as eco-
nomic—and likely military—consequences as well. Turkey has previously stated
it would consider it an act of war if Greece drilled further into the Aegean (Blake
2011).6 Now Israel is planning to build an underwater gas pipeline from the Israeli
Levantine fields across Cypriot waters onto the Greek mainland (no doubt its deci-
sion to circumvent its longtime ally Turkey based significantly on the Mavi Marma-
ra incident), where it would be sold on the EU market. To aggravate Turkey further,
the Cypriot and Israeli governments have mutually agreed on delimitation of their
respective economic zones, to the exclusion of Turkey. Turkey openly threatened
Cyprus for signing the agreement with (Houston-based—and institutionally-held)
Noble Energy—a trans-Atlantic link, technically unattached to the EU or other ma-
jor powers with interest in the Mediterranean. This led to a Russian statement that
it would not tolerate Turkish threats against Cyprus, further complicating Turk-
ish–Russian relations (Engdahl 2012), despite its foreign policy in the past few
years, enhancing diplomatic and trade relationships between the two countries—
and refreshing everyone’s awareness of Russia’s desire to be an active player in the
Mediterranean.
Turkey’s Strategic Cooperation
Turkey was compelled to join NATO in view of the Soviet threat against the
Straits during the Cold War, and the economic and political support this member-
ship brought with it. Despite periods of mutual caution between Turkey and some
5
Amid its disastrous financial crisis, the Greek government began serious exploration for oil and
gas. Since then, the country has been in a curious kind of dance with the IMF and EU governments,
a kind of “energy Sirtaki” over who will control and ultimately benefit from the huge resource dis-
coveries there, as Greece could potentially solve its entire public debt crisis through development
of its new-found gas and oil ….
6
This did not seem to have serious economic consequences, until these oil or gas reserves became
known.
countries in the West, partially kindled by the election successes of the AKP party,
Turkey manages a foreign policy today with its bordering regions with great bal-
ance: Having voted positively on its new constitution in September 2010, Turkey’s
role to modernize itself, inter alia in preparation for its EU-accession,7 this led
simultaneously to the broadening of its foreign policy presence towards its south-
ern and eastern neighbors during the past few years. However, the great influx of
migrants from Syria during the past couple of years, including fighting between Al
Qaeda affiliates (e.g. the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/ISIS) and the Free Syrian
Army’s Northern Strom brigade continued near the Turkish border led the Turkish
Parliament to extended its mandate for a year to deploy troops into Syria if neces-
sary (Engdahl 2012).
Its relationship with the U.S. has been traditionally very constructive,8 especially
as a NATO member. NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which
extends to Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE … [and] engages its partners on a 26 + 1
basis, and equips the [Mediterranean Dialogue] MD with both a multilateral and a bilateral
dimension … [to promote] regional security and stability, better mutual understanding, and
the dispelling of misperceptions among NATO and partner countries (Schumacher 2010,
p. 6).
The ICI indicates the inter-regional security relevance of the EMRSSC. While the
success of this trans-Atlantic link is difficult to quantify, the demand for—and suc-
cess of—NATO’s non-Article 5 missions in the greater Mediterranean inter-regional
dynamics is unquestioned: even if NATO cannot guarantee each aligned country’s
every security need, especially in light of some reduction of U.S. forces in the re-
gion, it increases the need—or opportunity—for other actors to step in, be it Turkey,
the EU, or extra-regional actors as discussed in the following sections.
Turkey’s relationship with the EU has been hindered by political, and some claim
religious, insecurity on the part of the EU, despite Turkey’s official EU candidacy
status. This reflects the significant interlinkages of soft and hard power, and the
political with the socio-cultural and economic security sectors in the EMRSSC—
and the implications this has inter-regionally: Turkey’s insouciance towards the
EU today is a reflection of its new confidence as an open society with a Muslim
7
EU membership talks with Turkey, stalled for three years since its accession negotiations started
in 2005 (with its candidate status dating back to 1999) due to lack of agreement among EU MSs,
are set to re-launch after member states agreed that accession negotiations would recommence on 5
November 2013 (though they had been scheduled for June 2013, but the violent police crackdown
on antigovernment protests (with 3,000 arrested, six fatalities, including one police officer, and
thousands injured in Istanbul’s Gezi Park during the summer of 2013, before rapidly spreading to
other cities) delayed these talks).
There are thirty-five individual chapters (“Kopenhagen Criteria”) covering different policy
aspects, which must be finalized before Turkey’s accession talks can successfully lead to full EU-
membership. So far, thirteen have been opened, but progress has been slowed by member state
objections, largely due to Turkey’s frozen conflict with EU member state Cyprus, with only one
chapter, on science and research, provisionally closed (Nielsen 2013).
8
Despite its reservations about the U.S.’ use of its airspace during the former’s military action in
Iraq.
identity—not automatically as a model or inspiration for MENA post-conflict, but

to be attractive to Arab countries as a political and economic partner. Additionally,
Turkey has confidently positioned itself as a very effective economic partner to,
and skilled political mediator with its neighbors around the Black Sea, as well as
with Iran, Syria, and Greece (Allessandri 2010, p. 6), while upholding its values,
e.g., vis-à-vis its old ally Israel, i.e., not succumbing to security blackmail by the
latter (e.g., during the first “Gaza flotilla” (Mavi Marmara-incident) in the spring
of 2010), but instead supporting the Palestine–Israeli peace process. At the same
time, Turkey is asserting its foreign policy autonomy much more forcefully than in
the past, such as was demonstrated during its deal with Brazil a couple of years ago
in submitting a joint proposal to control Iran’s nuclear enrichment (even if this did
not proceed past the proposal-stage due to Western political “(re-)considerations”).
Most recently in particular, Turkey has been playing a pivotal role in seeking
to consolidate the Syrian opposition forces,9 headquartered in Turkey proper, to
prepare for the challenges in governing a fractured post-Al-Assad Syria (Saban
2012, p. 4) beyond preparing legal documents for a new secular and democratic
Syria,10 including the common objectives of the Syrian people to also work towards
unification and consensus of the opposition itself (Saban 2012). Turkey’s political
evolution provides parallels with some of those evolving during the Arab Spring:
Egypt’s inter-regional position was affected domestically by the regional events
unfolding during the Arab Spring with the removal from office of Egyptian presi-
dent Morsi: the Islamist-based party predecessor of Turkish president Erdogan was
edged out of office by the generals in 1997, setting a trend of military dominance
in Turkish politics at that time in this resolutely secular republic—a nondemocratic
regional trend difficult also for Egypt to overcome post-Morsi, and exposing the
West’s double standard in its response to Turkey at the time vs. Egypt in July 2013
(Dombey 2013).
While the Turkish public strongly seeks to stay out of the Syrian conflict, the
conflict represents a source of regional instability beyond the hundreds of thousands
9
… against the backdrop of the Syrian and Turkish militaries having shot down each other’s air-
craft—short of becoming a bilateral military confrontation, with Turkey seeking NATO support:
The latter’s lukewarm response was an indication of the West’s lack of resolve (and capacity?) to
be involved in new regional military actions—a lesson Turkey retained when it signed a missile
defense system with China in October 2013.
10
“The study concludes that ‘[t]he more Turkey is operationally involved the higher the risk of a
retaliatory strike from Syria. Ankara will therefore need to ensure that the first wave of Allied at-
tacks includes strategic targets in Syria with a view to greatly diminish the Syrian regime’s ability
to strike back. But for the longer term, Ankara’s security will be affected by the conditions prevail-
ing in the aftermath of an international intervention—or the lack thereof. If the military engage-
ment is able to substantially weaken the regime both diplomatically and militarily, Turkey will
have fulfilled a goal that proved to be elusive until now, which explains Turkish Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutglu’s statement that Ankara is willing to take part in a coalition-response (against the
Al-Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in August 2013—however, equally likely is the pos-
sibility that a limited strike would further fuel the willingness of the Al-Assad regime to cement
regional instability backed by a pro-Al-Assad regional alliance intent on challenging the West and
its allies" (Kasapoğlu et al. 2013).
Syrian refugees to Turkey (and other neighboring countries)—though without

intent to militarily “liberate” it (Fahim and Yeginsu 2013) in the absence of an in-
ternational coalition to do so.
Turkey as a Bridge Between East and West
Turkey as a skilled regional and inter-regional foreign policy (and military) ac-
tor, who has overall consistently continued to support the security dilemmas of the
West, needs to continue to be part of its hard and soft institutional dynamics to
ensure its future role within them. While the Cyprus “dilemma” continues to be
resolved, albeit in baby steps and mostly behind-the-scenes, irrational religious
phobias used by politicians in the West for often political gains should not hinder
overall Mediterranean stability11 and development—or Turkey’s pivotal role in en-
hancing Europe’s energy security/reducing European energy over-reliance on less
reliable suppliers. The alternative might otherwise be a marginalization of Turkey
to Europe’s periphery politically and strategically, an option which the West may
not be able to afford longterm militarily or strategically in addressing the security of
the (greater) Mediterranean regional dynamics—and their consequences on greater
European and trans-Atlantic stability as well. Rather, Turkey as an anchor in the
greater inter-regional Mediterranean economic and political complexities cannot be
overestimated—last but not least for the EU and its part not to lose its own influence
in its southern neighborhood (Kirisci et al. 2010, p. 26).
Israel
Israel–Palestine
The perspectives of the Palestinian–Israeli relationship within the security dynam-

ics of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex are becoming ever more
multifaceted during the Arab Spring: While the only Palestinian demonstrations
during the Arab Spring were in Ramallah, seeking intra-Palestinian reconciliation
amid the regional realignment, the intensifications of the Shia-Sunni sectarian con-
flict during the current Arab uprisings have made fighting Israel a lower priority
for the Arab world, especially in light of their myriad of domestic, political and
economic problems (compare Abdo 2013, p. 2).
The fallout from the Arab Spring for Israel cannot be denied despite Israel’s
stated desire to remain neutral in the Syrian civil war as well as in respect to
many of the peripheral threats12 of the Arab Spring to it. As such Iran’s insinuated
11
Such as the Greek-Cypriot veto of Turkey’s participation in the European Defense Agency
(Alessandri 2010, p. 11). Compare Fig. 1.2.
12
An example is Israel keeping a close eye on its border with Syria to monitor any spillover from
the latter’s civil war into the Golan Heights—a region with significant historical meaning: “It was
“guiding hand,” especially in the Syrian government’s handling of its civil war in-
ternally as well as through its proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its impli-
cation for Israel’s security, is undeniable. This will draw Israel into its neighbor’s
conflicts again and again as an ally of the West and its actions, such as R2P initia-
tives as of August 2013 forward to destroy Syrian chemical arms.
Israel for its part also has parallel internal challenges, which are partially similar
to those of its Arab neighbors. Israel has been on a number of unsustainable long-
run domestic trajectories for the past three decades: Its rate of academic emigration
is unprecedented, its education system failing to adequately support its students,
and rapidly growing population groups are disengaging themselves from Israeli so-
ciety, largely due to low employment rates that are unparalleled among developed
countries. On the other hand, while many developed countries are aging rapidly,
Israel is young and, as the home to an immense cutting-edge knowledge base, has
great potential.
From the Palestinian perspective, as disappointment with the peace process in-
creased after the U.S. vetoed a UN resolution to condemn Israeli continuous illegal
settlements in the West Bank, the Arab Spring is tearing down the old Arab order,
which they viewed as also having held them down: The Palestinian assertion of
statehood at the UN-level is a strong example—yet lack of U.S. support for it cer-
tainly does not soften claims of U.S. hypocrisy in its policies in the region.
The Arab–Israeli conflict, however, was addressed anew in the current round
of peace negotiations at the initiative of the U.S. with the continued support of the
other partners of the Mideast Quartet as well, as especially Egypt and Jordan—
an ever-active dynamic of the EMRSSC. Without renewed—and it is hoped from
the Palestinian side, for a just, equitable, and rapid solution with U.S. active and
sustained influence—the security concerns inherent in the conflict (territory, ref-
ugees, etc.) might hamper the efforts to give the current initiative the necessary
momentum. And unfortunately, Israeli plans for yet new settlements in the West
Bank again left a bitter taste with its negotiating partners13 and questioned the
on the River Yarmouk, a major tributary to the Jordan River, south of the Golan Heights, where,
in August 636 [AD], the Arab forces of the Rashdun Caliphate defeated the Christian forces of
the Byzantine Empire, opening the way to a series of Muslim victories over Christianity” (Dromi
2013, p. 1).
Yet one of today’s Syrian rebel groups, the Martyrs of the Yarmouk Brigades, is without inter-
national aspirations (or intentions vis-à-vis Israel), but has only “domestic” demands of Al-Assad
(Dromi 2013). The settlement of Palestinian refugees in Yarmouk, and the permanent borders of a
Palestinian State, will have to be part of a permanent peace in the post-Arab Spring MENA: Pal-
estinian President Mahmud Abbas stated on Israeli TV Channel Two that “Palestine now for me
is the ’67 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital. This is now and forever … This is Palestine
for me. I am [a] refugee, but I am living in Ramallah. I believe that [the] West Bank and Gaza is
Palestine and the other parts [are] Israel” (Abbas quoted in Dromi 2013).
13
Leading inter alia “the EU [to] publish guidelines prohibiting Israeli entities beyond the pre-
1967 borders from receiving funds, grants and scholarships” (Reed 2013). An MP from Israel’s
second largest party warned that settlement-building risks cutting off Israel from the West: “The
price of occupation that … used to be some abstract, philosophical notion, nowadays is concrete,
obvious—and unbearable … settlement-building will make us the pariahs of the world … The
credibility of the West Bank leadership. Technically Israel did not violate the agree-
ment for the resumption of talks in late summer 2013 (U.S. Secretary of State
Kerry14 had spent months persuading the Palestinians to the talks without a settle-
ment freeze—or even a promise of negotiations based on the 1967 boundaries (Ker-
shner 2013), even though the U.S. never endorsed the illegal settlements), after
direct talks between the West Bank and Israel broke off in 2010 when Netanyahu
refused to renew a partial ten-month moratorium on building in Jewish West Bank
settlements (Levinson 2013).
Israel—Intra-Regionally
Alternately, relations with Egypt, a source of stability for Israel before the Arab
Spring, have warmed significantly again since the summer of 2013 following the
ouster of President Morsi (his ouster, which Israeli officials rather welcomed, as his
Muslim Brotherhood movement has long-standing ties to Hamas). Israeli–Egyptian
high-level cooperation between their military and intelligence chiefs in quelling
Islamist militants has been historically—and currently—close, such as concerning
Israel’s drone strike in the Sinai in early August 2013—though denied by Egyptian
officials (and neither confirmed nor denied by Israel (Entous and Levinson 2013)).
The EU’s consistent efforts, both within the EMP and now the greater UfM/ENP
initiatives, have been to consistently support security as well as economic and social
empowerment programs for all parties, solidifying the foundation for the actual UN
peace talks, now on a basis which is fair to all parties. This means compliance with
international law, such as “bringing Israel’s Bomb out of the Basement.” As such,
evolving nuclear strategies by its neighbors can be addressed rationally, rather than
based on speculation by Israel’s neighbors, which only contributes to the antici-
pated regional nuclear arms race, and perpetuates the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.
The Middle East cannot be an exception to the Global Zero campaign:
Israel remains the only state in the Middle East that has not yet become a party to the NPT,
and the only state in the region with a nuclear-weapon capability. And therefore Israel’s
accession to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state remains central to achieving the goal
of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. The example of South Africa uni-
laterally renouncing its nuclear weapons and acceding to the NPT and the Pelindaba Treaty
as a non-nuclear-weapon State (NNWS) beckons Israel (Saghafi-Ameri 2013, p. 24).
This needs to be viewed in a regional cultural context, whereby Israel for its part
is justifiably concerned about the ingrained institutional culture of deceit, i.e., a
“disturbing tendency to violate commitments to WMD nonproliferation and/or dis-
armament” (Landau and Stein 2013, p. 23–24), that has been revealed in a number
Western world that is our frame of reference, the world with whom our relations nourish our
technological and economic power, says to us in word and deed that we will no longer be able to
belong to it while continuing our control over another people” (anonymous).
14
The U.S. being bound under the 1978 Camp David Accords to protect the peaceful existence
of Palestine.
of Middle East states over the past twenty-five years (as was evident in Iraq under
Saddam Hussein, in addition to other states, who proceeded to work on enrichment
after their signature of the NPT).
Furthermore, Israel and Egypt have presented diametrically opposed approaches
towards arms control “ideology,” which accompanied the regional discourse on
this issue since the Arms Control and Regional Security talks of the early 1990s
as part of the multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process (Landau and Stein
2013): While Israel strongly advocates an incremental approach to arms control
as a long process of confidence building and gradual political transformation15 to
lead eventually to successful negotiations and the establishment of a WMD-free
zone, Egypt’s position is that Israel’s signature to the NPT itself represents the first
confidence-building measure (Landau and Stein 2013, p. 23–24).
The lack of trust, painfully necessary for nonproliferation, is similarly evident
with respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons
Convention, which are not universally accepted in the Middle East—as the repeated
use of chemical weapons by the Bashar Al-Assad regime shows, with the current
Geneva II convention, scheduled to start in mid-November 2013 to settle the Syrian
civil war—and the delimitations of its regime’s use of chemical weapons.
Overall, Israel and its neighbors will need sub-regional consolidation by balanc-
ing adherence to international law (e.g., UN resolutions pertaining to Israeli borders
and international accords pertaining to this conflict), while at the same time con-
tributing to Israel’s security not only through U.S. financial aid, but also by actively
promoting stable democratic neighbors for Israel as policy priority. Likewise, the
security impact on Israel of greater regional nonproliferation, such as the initiation
of U.S.–Iranian nuclear containment talks as of September 27, 2013, are essential
for Israel’s security.16
Lebanon
Lebanon’s difficult history with Syria continues to complicate its current poli-
tics. Especially the aggravated sectarian war in Syria leads the Sunni in Leba-
non to continue confronting Hezbollah17 in Lebanon as well as in Syria (who are
15
Some authors have argued that this is understandable in that Israel was not a signatory to the
defining resolutions that were adopted under the NPT, nor present at its discussions leading up to
it, or the issues framed by successive NPT review conferences, Israel does not have the space to lay
out its critical security concerns now. This would make it impossible to reach future understand-
ings and agreements by consensus (Landau and Stein 2013, 23–24), to the extent of preventing
opt-outs, such as Israel chose in respect to the NPT so far, as it demonstrates the significance of
path-dependency on the success of mutual agreements on regional peace.
16
Israel needs to understand that the Iranian nuclear program (as is the foreign policy of most
countries) is the result “of four distinct fears: existential threats and strategic risks, socio-economic
erosion, and a challenge to founding principles” (Eiran and Malin 2013, p. 1)—and its own role in
contributing to assuaging—or enhancing—these fears.
17
The Sunni Al Qaeda, however, are likewise targeting Hezbollah: the implications for Lebanon
of being caught in the cross-fire between two terrorist organizations are evident in the renewed
violence this country has been experiencing during the past couple years.
slaughtering the Sunni in Syria under Bashar Al-Assad’s Alawite presidency). The
Sunni Al Qaeda, however, are likewise targeting Hezbollah: the implications for
Lebanon being caught in the cross-fire between two terrorist organizations are evi-
dent in the renewed violence this country has been experiencing during the past
couple of years.
Furthermore, the current intra-regional uprisings have led to such an intensifica-
tion in sectarianism that Sunni clerics now warn of the “Shiitization” of the Middle
East (Abdo 2013, p. 2)—and call for a Sunni backlash. Parallel to the intensifying
civil war within Syria, its ally, Hezbollah in Lebanon, has been firing provocatively
into Israel—and was retaliated by missiles from Israel. This increasing destabiliza-
tion of Lebanon can be viewed as a “divide-and-conquer” approach by Syria to-
wards neighbors it perceives as unfriendly in order to distract their focus from Syria
proper.
The inter-regional significance of intertwining domestic and international hard
and soft security concerns was exemplified inter alia when Arab states—including
Saudi Arabia and the UAE—urged their citizens to leave Lebanon in August 2012,
after a mass kidnapping in retaliation for events in Syria raised fears that violence
could be spilling across the region.
Tunisia
Since Tunisia’s independence from France in 1956, its first president, Bourghiba,
established a secular, single-party authoritarian regime. His successor, Ben Ali’s
rhetoric promoted political pluralism (in theory) however. Yet in practice he cracked
down on free speech and political dissent with torture, citing the dangers of Is-
lamists (and the danger that they would not respect democracy and freedoms, such
as women had achieved after independence) (Penner Angrist 2011). Zine el-Abidine
Ben Ali was ousted in January 2011, not so much because of despair18 with the
economy (high—especially youth-, unemployment, inflation, and related high cost
of living, against which Tunisians revolted also in the early 1980s without seeking
a change of leadership then), but also the abuses of Ben Ali’s dictatorship and the
wealth his family flaunted—and the monopolies in private industries, such as tele-
communications they held hereby, excluding participation by ordinary Tunisians
unless they opted-in based on cronyism.
In terms of Tunisia’s subsequent external relations, in the weeks preceding the
ouster of Egyptian president Morsi in July 2013, the leader of Tunisia’s dominant
Islamic party Ennahda, Rached Ghannouchi, attempted a last-ditch mediation
in Egypt between Morsi and his opponents, based on his experience in Tunisia fol-
lowing the post-Ben Ali revolutionary period, when there were calls to oust the
Islamic government: These had not succeeded, as Tunisia developed a coalition
18
Brought to the global attention when vegetable seller Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in
Sidi Bouzid in protest against the Ben Ali regime, starting a domestic chain reaction of demonstra-
tions which sent Ben Ali into exile to Saudi Arabia—and spilled-over into many other states in
the region.
government with secular parties (Gall 2013) and avoided “mention of Shari’a law
or an Islamic state in the constitution … [in favor of] a lighter wording that Islam
is the religion of the nation” (Gall 2013, p. 2). While it is too early to tell whether
this is in fact a sustainable internal constellation in Tunisia, Ghannouchi’s lack of
success was evident in the violent clashes between pro- and anti-Morsi groups in
Egypt, which threaten the stability of the entire region (Gall 2013).
Egypt
Egypt’s history has known many false starts and faded dawns. … from the time Napoleon
Bonaparte’s armada turned up off the coast of Alexandria in the summer of 1798, Egypt’s
history has … been a quest for modernity and national power (Ajami 1995, p. 13/4).
Many authors paint the events leading to the Arab Spring too monotone and abstract,
often deducing its causes as “the youth bulge” and ”poverty.” While it exceeds the
parameters of this volume to detail all nuances, varying by country, Egypt’s history
is one example of the complex national and geo-spatial position in world history
during the past nearly 200 (if not 2,000+), years which culminated in the most re-
cent uprisings in Egypt, i.e., its unique path during the Arab Spring.
Egyptian dependence19 on the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Arab oil states, inter
alia as a result of global Cold War politics, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, regional
sectarian struggles, and lastly, its attempts to comply with IMF and World Bank
stipulations (without regard for their broader consequences in terms of drastically
increased social inequality and economic desperation by ever greater population
numbers, and the resulting political restlessness) for economic liberalization left the
country less competitive than many equivalent Asian countries by the early 2000s. The
revolutions of the Arab Spring are about more than bread, but also about human rights,
dignity, and a chance of a decent future with “good jobs at livable wages” (Ciezadlo
2011, p. 2). As one of the results of the patronage system, which involved inter alia
bread subsidies through foreign donations (e.g., USAID loans and grants amounted to
$ 4.6 billion between 1979 and 1997) (Ciezadlo 2011), and encouraged by the IMF and
the World Bank to lift tariffs and import bans, Egypt became a net importer of cheap
grains, and hereby neglected its once thriving agricultural sector. These bread subsi-
dies20 did not lift Egyptians out of poverty, but instead living standards for all income
19
Moyo (2009) extensively explores the double-sided sword-like effect of foreign aid (e.g., hu-
manitarian/emergency aid, charity-based aid, and systematic aid, paid directly to governments on
a bilateral or multilateral government-to-government basis): she shows, e.g., that “the prospects of
repayment may induce governments to use funds wisely and to mobilize taxes and maintain cur-
rent levels of revenue collection“ (Moyo 2009, p. 8/9), inter alia effective tax collection.
Dating back to the nineteenth century as a means for political control by the colonial powers
over their overseas territories (Moyo 2009, p. 10), this fiscal discipline can position these countries
within the Bretton Woods framework of a global system of financial and monetary management
(Moyo 2009, p. 10), and to later fund social sector activities, including those that buttress democ-
racy and governance (Moyo 2009).
20
(Predominantly by the inefficient and corruption-prone system of the Egyptian government sell-
ing flour to local bakeries).
groups declined, except for those at the top 20 % who had benefitted from an increase in
their business as a result of the import liberalization (Ciezadlo 2011, p. 4)—hence mak-
ing everyone more dependent on subsidized bread. When the price of bread rose from
2007 forward,21 the Egyptian youth took to the street (Ciezadlo 2011). After Mubarak
broke his promise to limit his presidency to two terms, “autocracy prevailed, … [and]
the regime’s legitimacy seemed to vanish overnight” (Ajami 1995, p. 17)—providing
the background against which the Tahir Square revolts were able to ignite.
Egyptian Post-Authoritarian Transitions
About two and a half years after Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow, Egypt’s democratic
transition is becoming ever more challenged with increasing polarization—and
bloodshed—between supporters and opponents of Mubarak’s successor, the now
(as of July 3, 2013) ousted President Mohamed Morsi (CrisisGroup 2013, p. 1), who
was popularly “viewed as incompetent, arrogant, domineering and increasingly out
of touch” (CrisisGroup 2013, p. 1). By gaining “constitutional legitimacy” in the
election, the Brotherhood subsequently lost legitimacy (Pace 2013, p. 2; Reitman
2013) in not fulfilling their mandate to enable “real freedom of speech, justice,
economic and social dignity, an end to police brutality and the state of emergency
laws” (Pace 2013, p. 2). Initially, though, the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP) started with an impressive free market-oriented economic program, ad-
vocating cutting the deficit, adjusting subsidies and facilitating an investor-friendly
business environment, and moderation of its position on women in public office—
though that right of non-Muslims was questioned (Hamid in Pollack et al. 2011,
p. 34).
Other authors attribute the downward spiral in his administration to Morsi’s
Muslim Brotherhood having ceded “its role as the vanguard of Islamist politics to
the ultraconservative Salafist Nour party in Egypt, adherents of a Sunni revival-
ist movement” (McCants 2013, p. 15). Supported by a far-right constituency, it
was successful in curtailing individual rights and freedoms, congruent with their
ultraconservative vision of Islamic Law during Morsi’s reign. Yet immediately pre-
ceding Morsi’s ouster, realizing their fragile position, the Nour party as well as
the Salafi Dawa movement called on him to seek early presidential elections and
establish a technocratic government (Kenner 2013)—but too late. President Morsi
was ousted by the Egyptian military on July 3, 2013 after his last-minute offer for a
compromise, “including the formation of a national government and constitutional
change was ultimately rejected by the army” (Pace 2013, p. 3), for the latter “to
build a more just political order” (Cook 2013). The U.S. and EU carefully avoid
referring to this move as a “coup” to avoid being forced to cancel aid to Egypt at
a time when the country’s socio-political structures and economy are exceedingly
The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization declared by early 2011 that food prices had
21
reached an all-time high. World Bank President “Zoellick released data that 44 million people had
been pushed into extreme poverty since June 2010”, and he warned that global food prices had
reached ‘dangerous levels’ (quoted in Ciezadlo 2011).
frail. By mid-August 2013, being affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood was
considered by the military really in charge behind the government appointed after
Morsi’s ouster “all but an act of terrorism” (Youssef 2013): this significant public
policy shift, reflecting majority public sentiment pertaining to national ideology,
subsequently determined the political leadership succession in Egypt—and with it
Egypt’s foreign policy.
While the military (supported by an eclectic mix of “liberals, leftists, business-
men, Mubarak-era conservatives and members of the establishment” (Youssef
2013)) sees its mandate to suppress the street protests, the Muslim Brotherhood,
“aggrieved by what it sees as the unlawful overturn of its democratic mandate,
seems persuaded it can recover by holding firm” (Youssef 2013). Crisis Group
(2013b) suggests lowering the flames literally and figuratively by releasing political
prisoners, foremost Morsi, respecting speech and assembly rights, independently
investigating killings, and for all sides to avoid violence and provocation to pave the
way for the negotiation of basic rules, and an inclusive reconciliation process for all
citizens to see their concerns and needs addressed.
The “presidential transition” to Mansour and the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces (SCAF) (with General Abdel Fatah el-Sisi as defense minister) involved
constitutional revisions in advance of parliamentary presidential elections, which
sought to “avoid the destabilizing politics that occurred during the transition from
Mubarak to Morsi” (Crisis Group 2013b), such as politicians seeking “to maximize
their powers and, in turn, enshrine their prerogative in a new constitution” (Crisis
Group 2013b).
In all, this crisis can be viewed as “the product of a fundamentally flawed political
transition (International Crisis Group 2013a, p. 1), without political actors having
reached basic agreements on the desired political system (International Crisis Group
2013a): The Muslim Brotherhood proceeded with a winner-takes-all,22 polarizing
attitude to shape the nascent polity, rather than submitting to the power-sharing and
centripetal processes of consensus-building among all parties (International Crisis
Group 2013a), but instead sidelining or dismissing them—and thus forcing them
into extra-institutional means to call for judicial23 or military intervention (Interna-
tional Crisis Group 2013a, p. 2). Without a second democratic (inclusive) transition
for a civilian, secular- and independently led government in Egypt—and lessons
learned for national dialogue and consensus-building by both sides—Islamists will
lose hope for peaceful, democratic change and take away the lesson that mass pro-
tests trump the ballot box. This does not have to be so: Rutherford (2008) points out
22
In a democratic setting such as Egypt post-Mubarak, the Islamists did not continue to follow
their moderate approach of self-limiting with respect to the number of parliamentary seats they
would hold (“participating without seeking a majority”) as they had previously done in autocratic
settings (such as in Yemen, Kuwait, and Jordan) to avoid regime repression, which they would face
with an image of power-obsession (Hamid in Pollack et al. 2011, p. 36)—even if democratically
elected in post-Mubarak Egypt: indeed this heavy-handed style of ruling by the Morsi government
did lead to their loss of power.
23
The interim president to succeed Morsi, Adly Mansour, comes from the Constitutional Court
(Hendawi 2013).
that the Muslim Brotherhood can work in parallel (if not together) with the Egyptian
judiciary and the business sector to shape Egypt’s post-Mubarak transition with a
combination of ideological self-interest and political constraints on a path to mod-
eration, inclusive of, and compatible with modernity (Cook 2009).
The worst-case scenario question in the post-authoritarian (Mubarak) govern-
ment is whether the protest by Morsi’s supporters from August 2013 on will have
been worth the destruction of the country for the sake of salvaging Morsi’s presi-
dency (through his reinstatement). While principle certainly asks to prevail, prag-
matism may instead end the disruption of daily life, and Egypt sliding into anarchy
and civil war—a situation compounded by the regional geostrategic challenge of
Egypt’s neighborhood, as el-Sisi is having a potentially explosive impact on Gaza:
This Palestinian enclave exemplifies the interconnectedness of historical legacy
with soft and hard security to overcome it in the EMRSC: sealed off by Israel, Gaza
depends on smugglers in the Sinai to bring in basic goods from Egypt via tunnels
between the two areas. While the former (Muslim Brotherhood) government, to-
gether with EU diplomats and Egyptian intelligence officers talked with Bedouin
groups in the Sinai to reduce arms supplies to Gaza (to the point of considering
paying the smugglers to reduce weapons traffic), el-Sisi’s forces are taking a tough
stand and destroying most of the tunnels, and are waging war on Sinai militants
instead: Together with Israel bombing the Sinai tunnels to stop the Muslim Brother-
hood, it also destroyed access to food and fuel for the population in Sinai. “But now
Hezbollah has taken the lead on the most incendiary issue for Jihadis of all stripes:
the fight against Israel, and many Sunnis are therefore rallying to Hezbollah’s side,
including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan” (Haykel 2013, p. 1)—a
regional strategic turn from the early days of the Arab Spring.
While Jordan called for the rule of law to be reestablished in Sinai, other coun-
tries such as Turkey attempted to abstain from involvement, calling instead for UN
intervention. The UN response, however, was weak with merely a declaration for
peace by mid-August 2013: The revolution overthrew the brutal but stable Mubarak
government, and Sinai became a virtually lawless zone: Tourists stayed away, and
smugglers, human and drug traffickers, and jihadists took over. Since late sum-
mer 2013, and the removal of President Morsi from power, the army, the police,
as well as Special Forces have been trying to regain control over the peninsula
(Hoppe et al. 2013): The question is whether Egypt can preserve its mosaic cul-
tural (including r eligious) identity by establishing a government of inclusion in the
months to come… By late November 2013, the state of emergency declared at the
time of Morsi’s removal from office was at least lifted.
The Inter-Regional Context of Egypt’s Current Post-Transition
The relevance of global governance intra- and inter-regionally within the EMRSSC
has been of limited success, as evidenced not only with respect to the Mid-East
Peace Process, plus the UN’s input on separate occasions, but also with respect to
Egypt’s (post-)Arab Spring democratization, and the (lack of) resolution at the time
of writing for international mediation efforts (involving, beyond the U.S. and the
EU, and also Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) to defuse Egypt’s political crisis,
including the violent dissolution of the Islamist protest camps following Morsi’s
ouster.
Post-Arab Spring efforts could have been supported by Egypt’s projected growth
rates of 4–5 % p.a. for the next several years pre-Arab Spring—not only the highest
in the greater eastern Mediterranean region, but based on a longterm socially and en-
vironmentally sustainable basis to become a regional superpower by 2023. However,
according to the World Bank’s most recent data, Egypt’s GDP nosedived since the
2011 revolutions, with low growth rates at present adding to mounting social ten-
sions now that job and economic opportunity growth will not be forthcoming soon.
With a reestablishment of democracy in Egypt questionable in the near future,
the U.S. continues to resist being drawn into the conflicts of the Arab Spring further.
Despite the U.S. military Central Command’s dependence on Egypt for air and sea
access to support missions in Afghanistan and throughout the Middle East, Obama
stood on principle in defending the democratically elected Morsi and his govern-
ment: When Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s sympathizers overturned the former’s gov-
ernment on July 3, 2013, Obama cancelled the Bright Star training exercise with
Egypt’s new military rulers as well as delayed the delivery of four F-16 fighter
jets—though stopping short of cutting off U.S. civilian aid.
Libya
R2P Involvement and Internal Economic, Political,

and Social-Cultural Transition
Libya, at the time of writing, has been the only country which received direct mili-
tary outside help (after all preceding intermediary steps were unsuccessful) through
NATO’s Operation Desert Dawn24, 25 in the overthrow of its dictator, Muammar
24
Under UNSC Resolution 1973 of March 17, 2011, agreed to jointly by the EU, the Arab League,
the G-8 and the UNSC under the 2005 UN World Summit’s “Responsibility to Protect-” (R2P)
mandate to “help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity” as “threats to peace” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—although the UNSC
has wide discretion in the interpretation of (triggers to) “threat”.
25
Operation Desert Dawn is a clear example of having followed the Powell Doctrine (based on
Clausewitz (1873, reprinted and translated 1942), developed by Colin Powell, then Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the during the U.S. response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
It involved, broadly speaking: (1) A threat to a vital national (U.S.) security interest, (2) A clearly
defined/obtainable military objective—supported by the American people and the international
community, utilizing all available resources to achieve decisive force against the enemy and mini-
mize U.S. casualties to end the conflict quickly, (3) Clearly defined risks, costs, and consequences
of military action, (4) Exhaustion of all other nonviolent political, economic, and diplomatic alter-
natives, and (5) A clearly defined exit strategy.
al Gaddafi, in 2011 under the UN’s R2P-norm26 whereby “state sovereignty is not a
license for a dictator to murder his citizens” (Patrick 2011, p. 1):
certainly not when Gaddafi’s security forces had imported mercenaries from Mali, Niger,
Chad and other sub-Saharan countries to use indiscriminate force against his own civilians,
massacring hundreds, if not thousands (Patrick 2011, p. 2).
The post-Gaddafi democratic transition epitomizes (though not being identical to)
the challenges which several other countries face following their own Arab Spring
revolution in terms of not only establishing culturally (in the case of Libya, e.g.,
the linguistic and ethnic subgroups and tribes) and ideologically (in MENA often
referring to the wide variety of religions and sects) inclusive politics and platforms,
which are sufficiently centripetal to be integrated—and be viable and stable in their
post-revolutionary states.
By autumn 2013, stability was not a constant phenomenon in Libya, and in-
cluded protests and strikes by the same fighters, which overthrew Col. Al Gaddafi,
at several large oil export terminals and oil fields, throttling Libyan oil production
to 10 % of its capacity. As the oil and gas sector represents a crucial part of the coun-
try’s revenue, post-Gaddafi protests and strikes led to plant closures, exacerbated
by “tensions between tribal militias and the government over the out-sourcing of oil
field protection to local tribes” (Muhlberger 2013, p. 2), and escalating into shoot-
outs against the Ministry of Defense (Muhlberger 2013). While Prime Minister Ali
Zeidan assured that his government will not be held hostage by these groups, it il-
lustrates the challenge in establishing democracies post-Arab Spring, in which all
groups of a society feel included and partaking in their country’s fate and fortune. It
also epitomizes the difficulty in
repairing a society long traumatized by the Middle East’s most Orwellian regime. Libya
lacks both legitimate formal institutions and a functioning civil society. The new, post-
Gaddafi era, therefore, is likely to be marked by the emergence of long-suppressed domes-
tic groups jostling for supremacy in what is sure to be a chaotic political scene (Wehrey
2011, p. 1).
Against Gaddafi holdouts are those from the Libyan military and officer corps who
had joined the opposition—to the extent that “institutional revenge” has resulted in
several officials (such as Mohamed Megarief, who had joined the opposition and
held significant posts in the General National Congress (GNC)), to be forced to
resign subsequently.
This fragmented military, together with tribal groups and their warlords, which
had defected from the ancient regime (e.g., the al-Margariha and the al-Warfalla
(Wehry 2011)), together with local Islamists and non-Salafi networks (e.g., Sufi
orders, such as the Sanussiyas, and the Muslim Brotherhood—which were, interest-
ingly supported by Gaddafi at the time as a bulwark against radical Salafism), cou-
pled with the prospect of abundant oil revenue from the Cyrenaica region (and their
26
R2P had been “unanimously endorsed by the heads of state at the [UN] 2005 World Summit”
(Patrick 2011, p. 1) as the biggest challenge to state sovereignty in over three hundred years (Pat-
rick 2011), stating that a state’s presumed right of nonintervention is “contingent on its ability and
willingness to protect its citizens, and…[risks] ‘collective, timely and decisive action’ if it does
not” (Patrick 2011, p. 1–2).
renewed self-confidence to reassert their influence based on this natural resource),

together with non-Arab ethnic groups, such as the Berbers (Amazigh), Tuareg and
Toubou, are seeking redress for their oppression under Gaddafi: The development
of their new identities of respect will be interesting, especially the type of reconcili-
ation Libya will undergo. Otherwise, these militias, reluctant “to disarm and reinte-
grate into civilian life pose an existential threat to the elected bodies” (Muhlberger
2013, p. 2) as sole legitimate providers of security (Muhlberger 2013, p. 2–3), as
well as public safety.
However, diluted tribal and internal geographic affiliations in post-Gaddafi Lib-
ya (Wehry 2011) are already addressed in the Libyan Interim Constitutional Decla-
ration. The country needs them all for their economic, administrative/technocratic,
and sub-national expertise to consolidate the country’s regions, and to rebuild its
domestic security structures, subordinated to civil authority (Wehry 2011): starting
initially with the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) in February 2011,
(which also represented the country at the UN) until it transferred its power to the
General National Congress in August 2012—the first peaceful transfer of power in
Libyan modern history according to BBC (2012). Establishing national reconcili-
ation to “forge a national identity and create a general atmosphere of stability…
is closely intertwined with broader regional stability” (Muhlberger 2013, p. 1),
and requires also inter alia controlling the “proliferation of weapons, limiting bor-
der porosity27 and unlawful migration, pre-empting the creation of a terrorist hub
in southern and north-eastern Libya, and supporting the state in de-fragmenting
the security sector” (Muhlberger 2013). “Forging a monopoly on the part of the
state over the use of force” (Muhlberger 2013, p. 2) has to succeed to minimize
the extra-judicial pressure exerted by the militias (despite their significant role in
toppling Gaddafi) in the new Libyan state today in “incapacitating nascent state
structures” (Muhl-erger 2013)—beyond hard security, also economic ones (e.g., by
drug- and arms trafficking).
The Internal Security Environment in the Greater

International Context
While some authors (e.g., Layne 2010, p. 1) predicted the end to the pax Americana
in general globally, i.e., the end to U.S. foreign policy primacy in favor of a more
multipolar world, European reliance on NATO’s security umbrella for Europe can
certainly no longer be taken for granted,28 as U.S. security priorities pivot west. Yet,
27
The EU’s Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM Libya) e.g., cannot operate in an institutional
vacuum, but needs functional counterparts in Libya to be effective.
28
Compare, e.g., that “the prospect of sharp reductions in U.S. conventional forces in Europe
could have a significant impact on the debate on the future of U.S nuclear weapons on the conti-
nent. The United States has made clear that it wishes Europe would become more of a ‘provider’
of security than a ‘consumer,’ and that the role for residual Europe-based U.S. conventional forces
is not just for NATO’s defense but, perhaps more importantly, to deploy for operations in neighbor-
ing regions (such as the Middle East)” (Perkovich et al. 2012, p. 8).
the U.S.’ role in the Mediterranean as a security actor remains significant. Operation
Desert Dawn in the spring of 2011 demonstrated clearly that “European NATO”
(i.e., specifically England and France) were not able to conduct even a simple oper-
ation such as this autonomously:29 Basic coordination between those two countries
was a failure, leading President Obama to request the Canadians to take its lead to
avoid the U.S. being involved a third time within a decade in an “Arabic” military
intervention. Instead, he chose for the U.S. to “lead from behind,” such as supplying
nearly 90 % of the missiles launched against Gaddafi’s installations, as well as bear-
ing the majority of the actual cost of this endeavor—either because the European
NATO partners were unwilling to contribute their part, preferring lip-service against
Gaddafi’s atrocities to putting their money where their words were, or they were
simply unable to materially supply them. This lack of hard power “consolidation”
in the EU is reflected in the PESCO/French–British military cooperation agree-
ment—more “parallel to” than “within” the EU.30 Either way, talk is cheap—and
quite visible to everyone evaluating the EU for their own national security strategies
in the EMRSSC, even if the EU itself perhaps finds this strategy economically and
politically “clever.”31
As MENA uprisings continue, such as at the time of writing in Syria, with other
countries in the region post-uprising not yet having consolidated their democracies,
a free market economy, or stabilized internal socio32-economic challenges, U.S.
foreign policy is shifting from the “Nixon Doctrine”33 to the “Obama doctrine”34—
and the implications this has for the ready use of force vs. soft power, as will be
discussed in the following section on Syria.
29
This despite their military cooperation agreement in November 2010 and indications that EU
member state cooperation in defense matters is insufficient (Piris 2012, p. 42).
30
Compare Military Permanent Structured Cooperation under the aegis of the European Union,
which has stalled. Instead, a “two-speed Europe is going to be institutionalised in the field of
military affairs, where the British–French ‘Euro-core’ will take the lead, and others will join only
if London and Paris want it” (Nemeth 2012, p. 1).
31
Although youthful exuberance has visions of “a British-French geostrategic axis spanning the
southern maritime fringe of Western Eurasia and running from the Gulf of Guinea in the west,
through the Mediterranean basin, to Somalia and the Arabian Sea in the east… [a]s key to a bal-
ance of power favorable to European and Western interests in North Africa, West Africa, the Le-
vant and the broader Middle East” (Simon 2012, p. 1)….
32
inter alia youth unemployment and regional sectarian struggles.
33
The “use of military and economic assistance to help U.S. partners and allies resist Soviet-
sponsored insurgencies without using U.S. troops in the kind of military interventions that had
proved too costly and controversial in Korea and Vietnam” (Gates 2010, p. 1).
34
Whereby a superpower considers both national interests and humanitarian factors before inter-
vening overseas (McGregor 2011, p. 1).
Syria
From the Damascus Spring to the Arab Spring
After 1946, when the French mandate expired and French troops withdrew, Syria,
with the greatest number of ethnicities in the region (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013,
p. 12), experienced thirteen government-changing coups until the Al-Assad family
of the Alawite Shia-sect was accepted to rule this country—a clan considered to be
honest, not greedy, and a more reliable solution to rule the country than building
a coalition government representing all ethnicities (and the continuous dissent this
had entailed in the past) (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 12). However, after thirty
years of rule, this family began to lose their appeal, inter alia having dissatisfied
the Sunni majority of the Syrian population during the 1990–91 Kuwaiti and the
2003 Iraqi crises: A revolt with (majority) Sunni financial and political support was
predictable against the Iranian backed (minority) Shia Al-Assad family and their
loyalists (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013).
Bashar Al-Assad had promised reforms for a more democratic model in Syria,
economic reforms, and technological modernization at the beginning of the Damas-
cus Spring, when he assumed power in July 2000 following his father Hafiz’ death.
Yet it became clear that peaceful change was impossible for Bashar Al-Assad due
to the Syrian acien regime’s lack of cooperation. The protests of the current civil
war in Syria began “as appeals for social, economic, and political reforms” (Saban
2012, p. 4). When the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts erupted in early 2011, Syria re-
mained quiet on the surface, although a steady stream of information on the internet,
Twitter, and Facebook below the surface provided details of the Arab Spring to the
MENA (and global) “neighborhood”—and later served to activate and organize the
rebellion, partially by using the “Tor”-network to remain undetected on the internet
by Syrian Alawite security services.
Yet the perfect storm of the effects of increased commodity prices on the broad
population, the global financial crisis of 2008+, and 60 % of the population below
the age of 25 (with an unemployment rate estimated at 20–25 % in this group (Lesch
2013, p. 81)), and the resulting un- and underemployment (and resulting poverty)
in the face of an enormously unequal distribution of wealth between the elites (plus
massive corruption making this partially possible) and the marginalized majority,
(Broning 2011) erupted despite the government’s tight control of the population
in general: the spark lighting the flames of revolt in Syria began in the city of Da-
raa, an up to that point regime-friendly, though Sunni region, following the arrests
on March 6, 2011 of at least fifteen children for painting anti-government graffiti
on the walls of a school.35 The community’s blunt outrage over the children’s ar-
rests and mistreatment, the government’s humiliating and violent reactions to their
concerns, and the people’s refusal to be cowed by security forces emboldened the
The graffiti read “’down with the system [nizam]’ instead of ‘government’ [hukuma]” (Lesch
35
2013, p. 86), an indication that social justice rather than corruption—or even a call for democ-
racy—was a greater priority to the protestors (Lesch 2013) at that point.
protestors, and helped expand the Syrian opposition. Soon these peaceful protests
escalated into armed resistance when the Syrian military brutally attempted to sup-
press these (Broning 2011).
Sectarianism and the Syrian Civil War
The interwoven complexity of regional ideology on war and peace in the MENA
is exemplified in Syria’s sectarian pluralism, with 75 % Sunni Muslims (including
Sufis), approximately 10 % Shia Muslims, mostly of the Alawite sect, 10 % Chris-
tians, 3 % Druze, some Jews, plus some minor Islamic sects (Lesch 2013, p. 83).
The Al-Assad regimes have successfully played the minority card, warning of the
threat of majority rule and the price of instability which the minorities must bear
(Lesch 2013). Additionally, the Al-Assads co-opted the (majority) Sunnis through
“rewards” (such as through corrupt practices and cronyism)—and the remainder
through coercion by the security services of playing family and tribal alliances
(Lesch 2013, p. 84) “to attain a critical mass into regime maintenance” (Lesch 2013,
p. 83). This is reinforced by the official discourse of justifying these practices by
pointing to the comparison with Lebanon and Iraq, where sectarianism stunts these
countries (Broning 2011).
When the opposition revolts against the Bashar Al-Assad regime began in March
2011, these artificially and forcefully suppressed sectarian tensions played out in
greater extreme in Syria than in most other countries undergoing an “Arab Spring.”
The 1982 government killings (by Hafiz Al-Assad’s forces) in Hama, when the con-
servative Sunni Muslim Brotherhood moved against the government, resonate to
this day—both for a resentful populace and for a government that fears revenge for
its past actions: A minority regime, such as the Al-Assad’s, may have galvanized it-
self against defection and splitting, but when it does, the revenge, in this case by the
Sunni majority, will be especially bloody and drawn out. While the protests in Syria
were initially not sectarian, but demands for better governance and living standards,
the underlying sectarian divisions became undeniable as significant causes for the
economic and political status quo—with the demonstrators starting to chant: “No
to Iran, to Hezbollah. We want a leader who fears God”—a direct reference to the
Alawite faith of the leadership and Iran’s support of their cruel regime (Marashi and
Parsi 2013, p. 135). But Syria state television acted as if the violence and protests
had simply not occurred: it broadcasted images of pro-government demonstrations
in every Syrian city, with crowds shouting “God, Syria and Bashar only.” Yet the
Syrian government had initially insisted that the protests and deaths were the work
of criminals, infiltrated from across the border from Jordan.
The official discourse was outlined by vice president36 and former foreign min-
ister, Farouk al-Sharaa, who is from the Dara’a region, in terms of the regime not
36
Who would succeed Bashar, were he to resign—though he is also representative of the behind-
the-scenes jockeying occurring among the Syrian leadership: amidst talk of his defection, he con-
tinued to straddle an appearance of regime loyalty.
being opposed to the Islamic currents that are rational and broad-minded (which is
understood to be their true roots), “but as for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, which take
their instructions from America and pretend that they are against it, they are con-
demnable” (Middle East Research Institute 2011). And yet, even government sup-
porters appeared taken aback by the decision to use lethal force. “The government
believes we have to give people more freedom” according to Muhammad Habash,
a moderate Islamist cleric and Member of Parliament. But he added that there was
a very clear decision by the government to use guns. Yet, he is aware of the di-
lemma for (at least) some in the administration: “We are against using guns against
people, there is no justification for using violence” (Middle East Research Institute
2011)—indicating the internal divisions, if not polarizations within the Assad gov-
ernment, mixed with some faulty foreign policy analysis (such as their assumption
of Al Qaeda as being U.S.-supported) in formulating their domestic security strate-
gies. In the meantime, one of the opposition groups, ISIS, which emerged from the
ultra-conservative al-Nusra party, and set up by al-Zawahri,37 is tyrannizing Syrians
moving back and forth between the regime’s security forces and the Free Syria
Army, arresting people on charges of secularism.
Over the past two years, what began as a series of peaceful protests against the
repressive regime of Bashar Al-Assad has turned into a brutal civil war in Syria.
Over 100,000 people have been killed at the time of writing. It is everyone’s guess
at the moment to what extent this may backfire in the longterm and increase the re-
gional strategic rivalry and flux (Marashi and Parsi 2013, p. 135): The end result in
the case of Syria may not be ultimately national reconciliation, but a legally divided
country (or at least an autonomous region as in Afghanistan) for the Kurdish popu-
lation. Beyond the Shia-Sunni divide, the Kurdish areas in Syria are ruled by the
Kurdish Democratic Union Country. It not only has formed an interim autonomous
government in its territory, but seeks to attend the 2013/2014 Geneva peace talks as
a separate delegation from the Syrian National Coalition (CFR Brief 2013).
Syrian Revolts in the Strategic Crossroads Theatre
Geostrategically, Syria as the gateway to the Middle East since the crusades in terms
of power and trade, as well as the turnstile between Anatolia and Egypt, is also a
crucial strategic crossroad, in which “all powers, including Russia and China, are
interested in exerting their influence in the regions” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013,
p. 11) by preserving its status quo (such as through Russian weapons shipments in
exchange for access to the port of Tartus as a naval base, although the Russian naval
fleet was moved to Beirut as the Syrian crisis worsened), while Western powers
pursue the doctrine of Syrian popular self-determination.
Syria’s “strategic crossroads theatre” was expanded during the uprisings since
2011. Broadly speaking, beyond the involvement of the Druses, additionally outside
Ayman al-Zawari’s leutenant was killed by a U.S. drone strike in July 2013—an example of the
37
U.S. leading from behind to end the Syrian civil war by eliminating many of the tyrannical causes.
Islamic volunteer warriors, stealthened by their experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia,

and Chechnya, came to the assistance of the insurgents during the Syrian civil war
to balance Iranian, Russian, and Lebanese Hezbollah assistance to the Al-Assad
government (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 12)—a scenario which some authors
Ibid.) warn of potentially leading to a Third World War, and the greatest danger to
Mediterranean (inter-)regional security. This crisis, especially considerable concern
about the significant population of Kurds38 in Syria, Iran, and Iraq (in addition to
eastern Anatolia) reciprocally provides Turkey for its part with an opportunity to
regain its past influence in the region by actively involving itself with the Syrian
opposition to broker an armistice (Ibid.).
The Syrian Civil War and the EMRSSC
After the Syrian military shot down a Turkish air force jet in the summer of 2012,
there was no NATO response to this violation of a member state. In the autumn of
2012, France, the UK, and the U.S. at last stated that Bashar Al-Assad no longer
represented the Syrian people—but continued to stay on the sidelines during the
Syrian civil war, and not taking any further action towards regime change until
early 2013. At that time Assad appeared to be winning, and the U.S., the UK, and
France lifted the arms embargo to opposition forces, while simultaneously limiting
the flow of arms to the rebels to prevent them from reaching Al Qaeda—with Qatar
and Saudi Arabia providing small arms (and possibly heavier materials) to the op-
position (Korteweg 2013, p. 2).
The impact of Al Qaeda and its representation in Syria via the al Nusra party
is subject to discussion as the civil war continues in Syria through the summer of
2013: By some accounts Al Qaeda has hijacked the Syrian revolution—and any
(western) support for the opposition forces is almost impossible without also giving
support to Al Qaeda. This partially explains the hesitancy by the West to intervene39
even after undeniable use of chemical weapons by Bashar Al-Assad’s forces. This
38
The Kurds were the backbone of the Sultan’s army during the Ottoman Empire and the Porte to
the point of accepting to commit the second Armenian genocide during WWI at the behest of the
Ottoman government, with the result that the winning powers at the subsequent Paris peace talks
would not receive Kurds—leading to their vain attempt for independence (Sanfelice di Monteforte
2013, p. 12).
39
U.S. Gen. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated on August 21, 2013 that the
U.S. must choose that side to support in the Syrian civil war which also promotes U.S. interests—
in line with the foreign policy of most nations—and the ethical and moral side of international
law, one hopes, when the balance shifts in their favor. At that time, the Syrian opposition was not
willing to make that commitment—likely because its Al Qaeda-affiliated portion has diverging
goals. The systematic killing of several hundred civilians, an act referred to as war crimes and/or
crimes against humanity, was ascribed to “the extremist- and Al Qaeda-linked factions”—namely
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and “two other Islamist
factions were the main entities charged with perpetrating the atrocities”. The report reinforces the
West’s concern that Syria’s rebel forces are composed heavily of extremist elements and jihadist
fighters, often from abroad. While some groups were affiliated with the Free Syrian Army, none
reason is then, ironically or understandably, interpreted by others of the Syrian op-

position (and other Arabs) that the U.S. is an unreliable ally. And it shows again the
dilemma of the U.S.’ role in the MENA: from an imperialist country of the hated
West to be needed as the indispensable ally to the Arab Spring … The U.S. would
get involved in Syria on its own terms to stay involved in the region overall, e.g.
being moved by the use of chemical weapons there as a national security imperative
to destroy WMDs: Al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013, having
crossed the “red line,” did move President Obama to definitively evaluate the use
of military force, submitting it to nonbinding U.S. congressional votes, as did PM
Cameron, unsuccessfully, to the House of Commons.
The EU’s High Representative Catherine Ashton was also unable to forge a unit-
ed front among EU MSs vis-à-vis a response to Al-Assad’s use of chemical weap-
ons, and deferred to the UN instead for a response: This strategic division of the
West, besides damaging the trans-Atlantic relationship further,40 offered President
Putin the opportunity as the “deus ex machina” (Korteweg 2013, p. 1) to press for
a UN-backed diplomatic intervention over a possible U.S.–French military strike,
which could likely politically incapacitate his client, Al-Assad, and instead allow
Russia to continue, if not step up, arms shipments to Syria—while at the same time
resolving President Obama’s dilemma between military intervention in the Syrian
war in the summer of 2013 at least, or have to back away from his stated “red line-
intervention” due to lack of EU and U.S. congressional support. At the time of
writing, Syria was complying with the timetable for disabling chemical weapons
production, and UN teams are working on dismantling the existing stockpiles: di-
plomacy appears to trump hard power for the moment against the Syrian regime—
or vice versa, the credible threat of U.S. hard power may have motivated Putin to
seriously move for a diplomatic solution.
The Syrian Civil War as an Inter-Regional Conflict Resolution Effort:

Infinite Insecurity of Soft and Hard Power Sectors and Levels?
Syria, while still playing to Russia, also aimed to establish “best relations” with Iraq
(ISRAI 2010b), simultaneously not only being wooed its neighbor, Saudi Arabia,41
but also by the West just a few years ago, when Europeans and the U.S. decided to
end Syria’s international isolation, and facilitate its relationship with Iraq and Leba-
non. This affected Syria’s potential strength also in international organizations, in-
cluding at the founding of the UfM, and, it was hoped, would have led to a reduction
belonged to the Western-backed Supreme Military Council led by General Salim Idris (Human
Rights Watch 2013, p. 1).
40
Never mind damaging the credibility of NATO, as President Obama did not call on it to avoid
pointing out the impotence of its European members overall and the lack of decisiveness in the
North Atlantic Council, as the Europeans continue to pass the buck to the U.S. to sort out security
in Europe’s neighborhood with Russia (compare Korteweg 2013, p. 3).
41
After the Shiite-“empowerment” in Iraq, this also left Saudi Arabia little choice but to reach out
to Al-Assad regime opposition Sunnis in Syria (Schumacher 2010, p. 18).
of its support of Hezbollah (traditionally aligned with Iran). As this shifting tactical
alliance certainly does not signal Syria’s break with Iran today, its success remains
to be confirmed in the inter-regional Mediterranean security constellation (Khalaf
2010; ISIRA 2010b), as Syria continues to remain one of its current foreign policy
challenges, given the relative influence—and necessity for international interven-
tion it requires—it continues to exert in the Middle East and its regional balance
of power. While Bashar Al-Assad pursued a single-minded hard-power solution
to preserve his position during the civil war, “he lost his legitimacy and mandate
to rule” (Lesch 2013, p. 95), at least without a more inclusive political coalition,
should he be able to cling to some power as the civil war runs its course.
Arab and Western officials have been holding meetings in Istanbul (under the
auspices of the Turkish government, supporting the “Syrian people’s right to self-
defense”) with Syrian opposition representatives42 in efforts to encourage a “united
position” and convince the opposition to participate in the Geneva II talks. The
U.S. State Department stated that the emergence of Al Qaeda-links of the insurgent
group, the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) is jeopardizing efforts for a ne-
gotiated resolution to the Syrian conflict—with British Foreign Secretary William
Hague stating that “the longer this conflict goes on, the more sectarian it becomes”
(Foreign Policy Mideast Daily 2013). Additionally, he stressed the importance of a
moderate opposition, “because if they don’t have a role, then all the Syrian people
have got left is a choice between Assad and extremists” (Foreign Policy Mideast
Daily 2013). In light of this, the international community has been encouraging,
and helped organize, the moderate opposition, “Friends of Syria Group,” who meet
periodically outside the UN Security Council43 in response to the Russian and
Chinese veto on a Security Council resolution condemning Syria. The Al-Assad
government denounces the meetings abroad by opposition groups as “a series of
related circles of conspiracy against Syria” (Syrian News Agency 2013). At this
point, Al-Assad indicated that he would not run for a third presidential term if the
Syrian people indicated that they are opposed to it—but his current term seems
surprisingly assured, partially perhaps because resistance to “outside” interference
unites many Syrians, especially in light of the “dialogue,” which Assad promised to
open up for society.
Syria’s longterm opportunities remain extremely uncertain—and a challenge
to any multilateral strategies to address the current crisis, though its outcome has
broad implications for the Middle East (Saban Center 2012, p. 4). The scheduled in-
ternational meetings in early 2014 for a final solution to Syria’s civil war are highly
anticipated—though not initially promising.
42
Notably the Syrian National Council—whose pedigree in terms of being representative of mod-
erate oppositionists has become questionable.
43
The first meeting was in February 2012 in Tunisia, the next one a couple of months later in April
2012 in Istanbul, the third one in early July 2012 in Paris, and the most recent one in Marrakesh.
Jordan
Jordan, like the monarchies of the Gulf region, may be an example of offering an al-
ternative to toppling the existing regime in favor of providing a less violent political
space for alternative voices, beliefs, and ideologies—as western kingdoms show, a
monarchy per se does not preclude democracy. Jordan faces both economic and eth-
nic and political tensions: the former due to the privatization processes, which left a
dwindling middle class in favor of greater divergences in wealth—which cut across
ethnic lines (Ryan 2013, p. 121). The country’s ethnic tensions increased with the
influx of Palestinians and a massive inflow of Iraqi refugees after 2003, as well as
currently hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees.
Jordan represents one of the exceptions to the falling dominos in the Arab Spring:
Demonstrators in Amman “did not call for King Abdullah’s removal, but for better
governance, economic reform, and the removal of Prime Minister Samir Rifai, who
is blamed for rising commodity prices and political stagnation” (Danin 2011, p. 1),
i.e., policy changes rather than a regime change. This is typical of many monarchies
in MENA (e.g., Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar), which were better able to ab-
sorb the unrest of the uprisings (Danin 2011, p. 2)—possibly because monarchies,
while holding absolute control, have power more diffused, “allowing for a buffering
of rage and resentment, and greater potential for real politics” (Danin 2011), while
rentier monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, were able to calm unrest with increased
social spending not only in their country, but also in neighboring countries such as
Bahrain. In the case of Jordan, this may lead to more fundamental governance- and
economic reforms under the monarch (Danin 2011) to avoid his legitimacy being
questioned or even be removed ultimately.
While King Abdullah welcomes the Arab Spring as a wake-up call for change
in his country, rather than a threat, he sought a stronger alliance with the GCC for
support in recognizing that there was a danger of the spark of social and politi-
cal grievances to develop into a more volatile situation. Yet, Jordanians, similar to
Moroccans—and perhaps Saudis—prefer reform over regime change (Ryan 2013,
p. 125). A possible greater “regionalization” through the GCC might even sup-
port this—ideologically as well as financially. This might indeed be beneficial to
counteract Jordan’s vulnerability to regional pressures and violence (compare Ryan
2013, p. 127).
Northern Mediterranean: The European Union44
World War II (WWII) affected the relationship between the northern Mediterra-
nean, North Africa, and the Levant significantly in delineating patterns of amity
and enmity between their populations. The Allied landing in Morocco and Alge-
ria, and their progress towards Tunisia—and the suffering of these populations as
44
Parts of the following section were published in Boening 2009.
Northern Mediterranean: The European Union 55
combatants and victims of the struggle (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 7) during
the war and postcolonial rule led to their negative affinity towards Europe. Many of
the post-WWII anticolonial/independence-agenda political movements in MENA
had originated already between the world wars, however. More recent authors view
the Euro-Mediterranean geostrategic axis in terms of a British–French axis, “span-
ning the southern maritime fringe of Western Eurasia and running from the Gulf of
Guinea in the west, through the Mediterranean basis, to Somalia and the Arabian
Sea” (Simon 2012, p. 1). However, this approach overall is too vague, especially
since it appears to build on the du jour news “item” of the PESCO/French–British
military cooperation agreement.
Parallel to the superpower competition in the MENA during the Cold War, Eu-
ropean countries sought to improve their relationship with this region through a
number of initiatives—if half-heartedly at first (as they were intensely focused on
expanding the intra-European market), and hence with minimal success—such as
the Davignon Procedure in 1970, and two years later with the Global Mediterranean
Policy, followed by the Euro-Arab Dialogue of 1974, and in 1985 and 1995 the
two Barcelona Processes (“the first quickly ending in a stalemate, while the second
gave some hope of positive results” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 8)), and, most
recently the Union for the Mediterranean. Programs peripheral to some of these
efforts such as the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) FEMIP programs, however,
have been extraordinarily pragmatic and successful in expanding economic and
governance capacity and structures to increase resistance of new democracies both
institutionally and economically.
Simultaneously, European countries, in the absence of an effective and cohesive
European External Action Service, continue to foster bilateral relationships with
the countries of the south and southeastern Mediterranean. Philippart (2001, p. 124,
quoted in Schumacher 2005, p. 374) states that:
The [EU] Mediterranean policy as a whole has been impaired by a guerilla war among the
EU institutions over the allocation of competencies, with the Council jealous of its preroga-
tives and the Commission and the European Parliament … keen to assert themselves.
One recent example in connection with the Arab Spring is France, which sought to
increase ties with Bashar Al-Assad still until very recently, such as through an in-
vitation to the Elysee Palace on the occasion of the Bastille Day celebrations 2013,
to forge increased business deals—not only to maintain an active diplomatic rela-
tionship with an eye on France’s interest in Lebanon (and what the spill-over from
Syria’s civil war means to it), but also to have a communication link to attempt and
dissuade Al-Assad from further use of chemical weapons.
European External Action Service
As the EU’s External Action Service (EEAS) addresses both diplomatic and hard se-
curity concerns, the EU’s security modus operandi post-Lisbon Treaty continues to
be soft power, in accordance generally with UN security mandates, with c ontinuing
“back-up” through its cooperation with NATO under the Berlin Plus-Treaty (mostly
for crisis management during natural and man-made disasters, including cyber se-
curity, human security such as trafficking, piracy (e.g., Operation Atalanta), and
other sectors affecting security, such as food and water security, and illegal immi-
gration), and most recently of course Operation Odyssey Dawn).
The EU’s role towards its southern neighbors was during the past couple de-
cades expressed mainly through soft power, such as in the harmonization of many
EU policies vis-à-vis its southern neighborhood, e.g., in terms of environmental
regulation pertaining to the clean-up of the Mediterranean, economic assistance as
discussed in terms of formerly the EMP’s, and now the EU’s/UfM’s Association
Agreement process with southern MSs, and the social-cultural rapprochement, such
as through the efforts of the Anna Lindh Foundation, or benchmarking standards
attached to these projects in terms of civil liberty expansion in the southern partner
countries, civil society capacity expansion, and education (besides, e.g., enhanced
gender equality, inter alia through internet access, and the increase in freedom of
speech this entails).
The EU had been critiqued for not addressing the human rights “compromises”
and the democratic deficit in many countries in its southern neighborhood. Yet, I
would argue that the benchmarking and conditionality of programs availed to these
countries under the ENP/EMP/UfM did increase e.g. civil society capacity,45 by
contributing relatively quietly in the background to inter alia developing civil so-
ciety, democratic values, journalistic freedom (important not only on principle, but
also to open the “public sphere” to democratic debates), as well as the development
of human capital, which contributed to the consciousness and determination dem-
onstrated in many of the democratic transitions witnessed currently in the MENA,
especially in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Yemen.
During these ongoing democratic transitions in MENA, a unified EU-level response
had initially been halting, as the EU “consolidated” a supranational response beyond
the initial response at the EU MS-level, such as by France and Italy, who had moved
quickly to ensure their privileged relationship with affected former colonies. However,
very soon the EU on both the intergovernmental levels (the Council and the Parlia-
ment), as well as on the supranational level via the EEAS responded definitively in
supporting Tunisia and Egypt in calling for a nonviolent response by the existing re-
gime, freezing the assets once the latter was deposed of, such as Ben-Ali’s in Tunisia,
Mubarak’s in Egypt and Gaddafi’s in Libya. Hence, the EU, in the most challenging
test for its EAS since its inception through the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009 has
shown that its soft power has been quite proactive once the situation in its southern
neighborhood became critical (even if the Union for the Mediterranean’s potential in
45
For example, the 3-year 2004 Egypt—EU Association Agreement and Action Plan entailed
€ 558 million via the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for Egypt to sup-
port its reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights, and justice (Abdel-latif 2010, p. 1), and to
fight religious extremism and illegal immigration, while € 120 million/year in “MEDA funding is
directed towards economic, trade and educational reform” (Abdel-latif 2010, p. 3).
proactively easing a potential democratic transition since its inception 2008 was not
capitalized on up to that point)—if not stunningly effective.
The EU’s hard power (i.e., via the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP))
has also supranational and intergovernmental aspects: while EU defense falls tech-
nically (post-Lisbon) under the EEAS, national interests such as the French–UK
defense treaty of 2010, reflect the sui generis character of the EU overall, i.e., a
mixture of the supranational, intergovernmental, and, in the case of the Euro-Med-
iterranean region, aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex
characteristics (e.g., Boening 2008; 2009) in terms of EU-NATO defense coop-
eration within the 2002 Berlin Plus-agreements involved. The ESDP represents a
relatively new structure for cooperation among EU MSs, still “a project in progress”
(in terms of being as inclusive of all MSs as possible, to expand trust among all to
contribute equally), and has been successfully deployed in approximately twenty-
seven civilian (peace-keeping, peace-making, and policing) missions, such as ini-
tially in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is in this sense that the EU has been
acting consistently with the 2004 Consilium’s Strategic Partnership Policy with the
Mediterranean and the Middle East, combining soft power both within the Three
Baskets of the EMP (and now the UfM), and the ENP’s explicit agenda to promote
“democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy prin-
ciples and sustainable development.”
However, following the escalating popular revolts in the greater MENA region,
and the instability this represents for the EU’s southern border, the EU, both on the
supranational level through the Commission, and on the intergovernmental level
through the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, began
hastily investigating approaches for greater security cooperation (i.e., on a larger
number of security sectors and levels between the Northern and the Southern Medi-
terranean), as well as increasing and accelerating funding for many projects on a
larger scale, and accelerating those, which had been stalled for years, such as the
import of MENA agricultural products, and more flexible business visa regimes for
its citizens.46
One asks, had these steps been taken at the latest upon the founding of the UfM
within its mutually reinforcing three-basket structure, could some of the unrest in
the MENA have been pro-actively and more peacefully been avoided? And will
now another new Mediterranean modus operandi by the EU start from “square one”
in its security strategy towards its southern borders, one which expands High Poli-
tics diplomacy of a Grand Strategy, rather than bureaucratic piecemeal approaches
perhaps, or will it satisfy itself with the Commission’s “Partnership for Democracy
and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” of 8 March 2011, which
represents simply “new wine in old bottles” (i.e., a new wording of previous EU/
ENP approaches towards its southern border), rather than utilizing those detailed
strategies, which were well-thought-out (e.g., such as building on the Marseille
46
Such as, e.g., the 10 May 2012 MEP decision to promote trade and stability in MENA by boost-
ing mutually-beneficial trade relations, focusing on small businesses as main drivers of job cre-
ation and wealth (EU Neighborhood Info Center 2012).
Declaration of November 2008, which is much more sophisticated from an Interna-

tional Relations theory-perspective)?
Beyond the EU’s involvement in its southern neighborhood via the ENP’s ex-
tended programs and the UfM, the EU’s political and socio-economic engagement
takes place predominantly nowadays through the European External Action Ser-
vice (EEAS). Since it is relatively newly established, the supranational external
engagement of the EU is still a work in progress in terms of achieving maximum
efficacy—while the historical bilateral engagement of the EU member states with,
in this case, the southern Mediterranean countries, continues—and at times collides
(as indicated previously) with the EU-level engagement in the region.
Pre-EEAS, EU foreign policy was conducted under its Third Pillar on an
intergovernmental basis, headed by the High Representative for the Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP) (as simultaneously also the Secretary General of
the Council of the European Union), later the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. In
terms of the physical maritime space of the Mediterranean, the Integrated Maritime
Policy addressed the preceding lack of securing the Mediterranean as an “integrated
space,” requiring a comprehensive approach at sea, just as the EU had undertaken
to assure a “maximum possible degree of security through military and constabu-
lary actions on land” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 5). Largely due to its long
historical connection with the (greater) MENA, the EU has been actively and con-
secutively involved in a number of peacemaking47 and nonproliferation initiatives48
in the region, in addition to humanitarian efforts to ease the suffering following
political crises there.
Inter-regional cooperation in respect to the EMRSSC, such as the latest round of
joint ministerial meetings between the Council of the EU and the GCC in June 2013
reflects the changing dynamics within each bloc as well as their inter-regionally
changing dynamics—and the resulting policy implications. While the continuing
debt crisis and sluggish EU MS economies have sapped the EU’s capacity (in all its
dimensions) for maneuvering “the long-running negotiations with the Gulf States
and in terms of their engagement with the transition countries of North Africa”
(Coates Ulrichsen 2013, p. 1), GCC states appear “more robust in mid-2013 than
at any point since the start of the Arab uprisings in January 2011” (Ibid.). This re-
sulted, inter alia in EU policies to have become more introspective and uncertain
(Coates Ulrichsen 2013). Specifically the “Mediterranean crisis” has affected be-
yond North Africa and the Levant not only the southern, but also the northern EU in
terms of all sectors of security (e.g., economic, political, and consequently, human).
47
For example, Javier Solana’s secret negotiations with Hamas.
48
Such the EU’s “EU-3 plus 3” (France, Germany, the U.K., plus Russia, China—minus the U.S.
(aka “P5”, i.e. the UNSC 5 permanent members “ +1”, i.e., Germany) efforts to halt further instal-
lation of centrifuges by Iran (Riedel and Samore 2008, p. 98).
Hard Power
According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute (quoted in Humpert and

Rospotnik 2012, p. 2), Russia overtook the United Kingdom as the world’s third
largest military spender—with China’s twice that of Russia. Daniel Keohane (e.g.,
in Humpert and Rospotnik 2012) surmises that if Europe really aimed for a military
option to respond to international crises in the future, a shared strategic vision and
cooperation between France, Germany, and the U.S. under the plethora of mecha-
nisms, such as inter alia the European Security Strategy, the Common Security and
Defense Policy, and the British–French defense alliance, need to be re-committed
to. The lack of having such a shared strategic vision has been demonstrated most
recently in the lack for a cooperative response to Bashar Al-Assad’s use of chemical
weapons, most prominantly in August 2013:
EU member states have proven incapable of clarity in their strategic planning, with the
result that their key strategic documents are almost inevitably vague and ambiguous. This is
extremely unfortunate because without a clear catalogue of interests and an understanding
of their location around the world it is impossible to identify the appropriate force structure,
let alone conduct a coherent and effective foreign and defence policy. This lack of rigor in
strategic planning is hurting European defence integration, as member states are unable to
have transparent and constructive debates about the interests they share. It would be wise
to incorporate into the strategic planning process a model that allows for the capturing and
quantifying of states’ interests. Such a process might lead to the realization that EU member
states share more strategic interests than is at first apparent (Muniz 2013).
While the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy is hamstrung by intra-MS wran-
gling (perhaps more for “appearance,” hoping for the U.S. to get tired of their project-
ed incompetence49 and ante-up the funds for continued NATO operations), or indeed
out of true national selfishness to protect national militaries, their supplier industries,
as well as staff positions, the PESCO/French–British military cooperation agreement
proceeds separately from the EU, in line with the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties to
create a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force by 2016, including an air component
(with a Future Combat Air System by 2030 (EUObserver 2013))—underscoring the
EU’s lack of cohesion, and reliance on it for its hard power.
The Middle East is the most militarized region in the world today, largely due
to the many conflicts that have raged and still rage in the area. While soldiers,
tanks, and planes have been growing in number in the area, the Iraq–Iran War from
1980–1988, and the second Gulf War of 1990/1991 increased the danger of WMD
proliferation—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the region, as well as ballistic
missiles capable of carrying them (the most recent intensification of the accelera-
tion in the Syrian civil war being an example). One of the concrete examples of the
EU engaging in post-Arab Spring conflict areas is EUBAM Libya (headquartered
in Tripoli with an initial mandate of two years), a civilian Mission under the Com-
mon Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), working at the invitation of the Libyan
government following the approval on 22 May 2013 by the Council of the European
49
The EU Rapid Reaction Force has never seen action.
Union to support Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of

the country’s borders. This represents part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to
support Libyan postconflict reconstruction (EEAS 2013)—and to enhance the EU’s
southern Mediterranean cordon sanitaire to fortify it against (illegal migration/refu-
gee-) threats from its neighborhood. Likewise, Libya has also requested NATO for
post-conflict support to rebuild its military units from scratch—an internationally
more complex request to fulfill.
European Union Neighborhood Policy
In this analysis of the ENP and UfM in terms of regionalism and regional integra-
tion, I adopt inter alia Pace’s (2003) concept that the Mediterranean is a social con-
struction, based on the concerned actors’ acceptance of significance and meaning
of this term: Geopolitical and socio-economic imaginings of their socio-political
processes sustain this concept of a Mediterranean “region,” i.e., what and how this
region is defined as such—and consequently institutionalized—by the principal ac-
tors’ reciprocal co-constitution of this entity’s structures in Wendt’s (e.g., 1987;
1992; 1999) terminology, in order to understand its challenges and opportunities.
This transformational approach to accommodate competing interests can be vi-
sualized, for example, through the work of Buzan and González-Peláez (2005) who
find that an analysis of Middle Eastern society through the English School lens is
helpful in understanding the traditional nonliberal mix of inter-human, transnational
and interstate social structures of the classical Islamic world in a “layered interna-
tional social structure in which some norms and institutions are shared and some
not” (Buzan and González-Peláez 2005, p. 11). The EMP, as the ENP’s “southern
neighborhood-” policy can be understood as functioning within this interplay of
inter-regional and global socio-political and economic structures.50 Indeed, it is a
project of mutual learning on both shores of the Mediterranean, the traditional Ju-
deo–Christian club of the EU (in tandem with Turkey’s current EU accession pro-
ceedings) opening itself socio-culturally to the Muslim world and actively engaging
itself politically and socio-economically, with the reciprocal true for the MENA
states.
Soft Power
The EMP should be understood not as an attempt by the EU to invent a region that
did not yet exist, and but to create a regional identity based neither on blood nor
religion, but on civil society, economic interdependence, voluntary networks, and
civic beliefs, i.e., to construct in the Mediterranean region a pluralistic security
50
Such as democracy, free markets, equal education access for youth or gender equality, the mul-
tilateralism of the EU, traditional religious values (both Christian, Muslim and Jewish), or institu-
tionalized business social responsibility (BSR).
community whose practices are synonymous of peace and stability. The EMP can-
not be adequately analyzed solely in the neoliberal theory of international coop-
eration (e.g., Keohane 1984), whose elements are the importance of international
anarchy in shaping state behavior, with the state as the most important actor in
world politics, and the assumption of states as essentially self-interested when there
is low interdependence between states. Rather, the establishment of new norms and
institutions (i.e., explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations
of the EMP (Keohane 1984, p. 85–109)) in EU relationships reduces international
anarchy among its members (to varying degrees, depending on whether the topic
is intra-EU or an EU-external relationship), thus inducing them to incur reciprocal
obligations as cooperation demands. Could it not be possible that peace and pros-
perity, as foreign policy aims, be approached in terms of democracy, human rights,
a market economy, and the rule of law in a region (compare EuroBarometer: The
European Union and its Neighbours 2006), rather than through massive military
attacks which have shown in “the recent experience of the United States and Israel
in the Middle East … [that they are] not only morally reprehensible, but useless
in achieving the stated aims [i.e. democratization]—of those who carry them out”
(Zinn 2006). The details of the EMP above have shown that the EU’s economic,
political, and socio-cultural initiatives are for the purpose of extending the Euro-
pean area of stability south and to create a pluralistic security community whose
practices are synonymous with peace and stability (Adler and Crawford 2004). The
EMP was additionally “designed as the EU’s preferred tool for engaging Islam in a
‘dialogue of civilizations’, and its central foreign economic policy in the region as
a whole” (Crawford 2005, p. 1).
This is, in my analysis, significant in the wider globalization setting, such as an
analysis of the dynamics within the EMP (or its successor program, the UfM), as
well as to capture not simply power gains and expansion spheres of political inter-
est considerations, but to address the socio-cultural aspects of economic integration
and eliminate dependencies in terms of the English School writers, such as Hedley
Bull might, and hereby achieve the political harmonization within the area of the
EMP which the European Coal and Steel Community achieved after World War II
between France and Germany. However:
The myth of the dumb and dangerous Other across the ocean served a transparent purpose
in the elite European project of building a common, supranational identity. Alas, no myth
can displace political and economic realities for long. Today’s reality is that the finan-
cial crash, whatever its origins, is stirring a potentially far-reaching crisis of legitimacy in
Europe’s political system (Barber 2012, p. 2).
Contrary to declarations of the demise of postmodern security, the current time

represents just the very beginning of it pertaining to the greater Euro-Mediter-
ranean region. That means that not just national governments have a voice, but
socio-economic interests need to be recognized, not only of the haves, but also of
those whose voice needs to be heard—the sociological aspect involving a signifi-
cant ideological component: The current Syrian war amplifying traditional sectarian
conflicts and elevating them to an inter-regional level (compare Abdo 2013, p. 2).
This may mean access of southern Mediterranean farmers to northern Mediter-

ranean markets, and some type of positive inclusion of Islamists51 (Kausch and
Youngs 2009, p. 74) and power sharing between political actors, rather than margin-
alization or political strongmen to broker lasting peace and stability.
Concluding Remarks
For the sake of its own credibility, the European Union reviewed its policies for
the MENA region within the framework of its Neighborhood Policy. While some
aspects of its new approach could be seen in a positive light, most experts do not
hesitate to underline its shortfalls, talking about missed opportunities. What is more,
the Union for the Mediterranean, together with its protracted difficulties in becom-
ing operational, appears now to be anachronistic since it was originally designed
as an apolitical union. Efforts of the president of the European Parliament in April
2013, Martin Schulz, to re-think it in a way where parliaments may be able to play
a more prominent role have so far come to no avail.
The EU’s political and diplomatic negotiating power, represented by its High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ash-
ton, alluded to the challenges of the Arab Spring in a New York Times editorial52
51
Political Islam became a significant international factor with the 1979 Iranian Revolution
(Lewis 2005).
52
“History is littered with examples of wars won, only for the subsequent peace to be lost. In
Europe, terrible mistakes made after the First World War paved the way for the Second World War.
We were more successful after 1945, despite the Cold War, because we understood that we needed
to do more than defeat Hitler. We had to rebuild a shattered continent.
With Libya, success means not just protecting civilians in the days ahead, or even securing the
end of Colonel Muammar el-Gaddafi’s regime. Success requires a strategy for what we do after-
wards [of the battles of the Arab Spring in each affected country]. I intend to focus my discussions
on how we rise to that challenge.
We know in principle what needs to be done to lay the foundations of deep democracy—the
kind that lasts and does not get blown away. We need the rule of law, administered by honest
police forces and independent judges. We need national and local government to be efficient and
transparent. We need enforceable property rights, freedom of speech, and free trade unions. Above
all, we need prosperity to spread fast enough and wide enough for the whole society to feel it has
a stake in democratic reform.
These are not simply Western liberal ideas. In recent weeks, I have personally found that they
inspire reformers in Tunis and Cairo, and my staff has found a great appetite for them on the streets
of Benghazi and even Tripoli.
I shall set out what the European Union can do, and how we want to work with the rest of the
Western world—and, vitally, the Arab League—to achieve just that. Some people have called for
a new Marshall Plan. The sentiment is surely right. However, 21st century North Africa is not the
same as 1940s Europe. We need to fashion a new and targeted strategy for the task at hand. This
is precisely what we have been working on in the EU. At its heart are three M’s—money, market
access and mobility.
Regarding money, resources are needed in the medium and short term when transitions are
more challenging and instability risks are higher. I want Europe to contribute billions of euros
Concluding Remarks 63
(3/18/11) by asking “now what?” (in terms of now that we hope to have won the
war (i.e., defeated authoritarianism, at least in Libya for the moment), how do we
not lose the peace (i.e., the countries’ success in their post-authoritarian starting-
phase in rebuilding their country and governments))? Her editorial is included in
the preceding footnote in its entirety, as it reflects the discourse of the EEAS with
respect to Arab Spring events and the EU’s necessary, though perhaps not possible,
responses to it.
The “3 Ms”—money, market (-access to the EU), and (legal) mobility between
the northern and southern Mediterranean are the Achilles’ heel of the northern Med-
iterranean. Beyond charity handouts and lip service, mostly to aggrandize European
elites (with token academics from the southern Mediterranean to confirm their own
legitimacy), actual engagement in terms of a genuine effort to open European mar-
kets to MENA agricultural products, and genuinely engage with MENA transitions
(rather than wait for the U.S. to do the “heavy (and expensive) lifting” to lead to
to develop the economies of Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. Part of this will come from the EU’s own
funds; I hope EU member states and parliamentarians will join with me in seeking the rest from the
European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Earlier this week I met Egypt’s planning minister, Fayza Aboulnaga. She told me that her most
urgent need was to build one million more houses. I want Europe, working with others, to help her
do so—and to help fund infrastructure projects across in Tunisia, and in post-Gaddafi Libya, too.
We also have the resources, expertise, and determination to help build the institutions of a healthy
civil society, and have already started discussing specific projects with the new governments in
Tunis and Cairo. And we can help to arrange and oversee free elections.
However, we know that in the end aid can play only a limited role. Countries must work and
trade their way to prosperity. This is why market access matters so much: the ability to sell goods
to better-off countries.
As North Africa’s nearest wealthy neighbor, Europe has a crucial role. In formal terms, there
are already few trade barriers. But there are other obstacles. We rightly insist that imports, ranging
from food to manufactured products, meet the highest standards. So we need both to remove the
remaining tariff barriers over time, and also work with North Africa’s new democracies to help
them in practice to sell goods and services into Europe.
Market access: the need for Europe to open its (mainly agricultural) market to its southern
neighbors in a more consistent way and in accordance with these countries’ needs and readiness.
One specific measure I am asking EU member states to adopt is a program to support rural de-
velopment in North Africa, so that Egypt, Tunisia and, in due course, Libya will be able to grow
food to the quality that European consumers demand. All these measures should help to attract the
private investment that will be vital to achieve prosperity.
Greater mobility also needs a range of measures. The EU already has a number of scholarship
programs such as Erasmus Mundus, EuroMed Youth and Tempus. These can be enhanced to bring
more students to Europe and so help to enhance the skills base of the new democracies. We should
also review our visa arrangements, so that business men and women, and those with professional
skills, are able to travel between Europe and North Africa more easily.
I readily concede that this agenda lacks glamour. But it does not lack ambition. In recent weeks,
many have said that the events of North Africa pose a special challenge to which the EU must rise.
I agree. It is important for the world that Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and other countries in the region
become stable democracies. It is especially important to Europe, for these countries are our neigh-
bors. Failure would be bad for our citizens, not just horrific for theirs.
The test for us is not just what happens in the days ahead, but what happens in the months and
years after peace returns and the media’s attention has switched to crises elsewhere. Saturday’s
meeting in Paris gives us the chance, which we must seize, to plan for peace” (Ashton 2011).
viable and postrevolutionary countries, which can support their own populations
(rather than bleed them externally), the northern Mediterranean is maintaining a
non-sustainable vicious circle of insecurity vis-à-vis its southern neighborhood—
while emerging powers supersede cowards, ostriches hiding their heads in the sand,
and bottom feeders, seeking to coat-tail as they have done for decades, albeit suc-
cessfully until recently.
The EU, however, will maintain its relevance for its part in terms of an ever more
rapidly changing world, although many of its member states, “geographically small,
economically, fragile, and demographically in a declining and ageing trend” (Piris
2012, p. 146) have to face accelerating globalization. This anxiety was most recent-
ly very visibly exemplified during the 2013 French presidential election “against
such a background of foreboding and anxiety … [that] the EU economic crisis is
threatening to bring the good times to an end” (Rachman 2012). Furthermore, the
extent of the global competition between Chinese industrial champions and Ger-
man technology became undeniable (Bryant 2012), such as during April 2012 at the
world’s largest industrial fair, the Hannover Messe...
Chapter 4
Levels of Security—Inter-Regional Level:
Part A Select State Actors
The Trans-Atlantic Link: Nationalism, Realism,

and Shared Interests: Convergence in “Globalized”
Regional Security
Since World War II, the trans-Atlantic relationship has involved extensive politi-
cal, economic, and social–cultural cooperation. Security challenges in a globalized
world require increasingly not national solutions alone, but multilateral approaches.
Neither the European nor U.S. security dilemmas are solved through a simple bina-
ry choice between coercion and engagement, but are increasingly embedded in the
formulation of new global orders—which some view as nonpolar, while this book
explores potential emerging (multi-) polarities, including non-state actors, such as
24/7 news and media, drug cartels, and significant foundations (such as the Anna
Lindh Foundation), which can affect foreign policy as well as the global security
environment.
The U.S.’ links to the (greater inter-regional) Mediterranean region, besides
economic (such as through its free trade agreement with Morocco) and political,
involve both hard and soft security through NATO and its regional dialogues (i.e.
the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), and their re-
ciprocal institutional linkages. As the U.S. has concluded its combat mission in Iraq,
not only opening economic opportunities for the EU in Iraq’s reconstruction, this
has also affected the greater regional power balance, especially involving emerging
regional hegemons in the greater Middle East and Mediterranean.
Excerpts from this section were presented at the “Europe and the Arab Region Post-January
2011” workshop by the Kellog Forschergruppe/The Transformative Power of Europe, Freie
Universitaet Berlin, on June 8–9, 2012.
66 4 Levels of Security—Inter-Regional Level: Part A Select State Actors
Soft Power
The U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative
To draw the initial parallels between the EuroMed trans-Atlantically, soft power is
broken down under the “original” headings of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(EMP) “baskets” in this book as appropriate, since this continues to be a shared
understanding in the region. Hence, this section will take a look at (predominantly)
the U.S., in terms of the multilateral aspect of the trans-Atlantic “connection” with
the Euro-Med (understanding Canada’s significant role as a NATO member, the lat-
ter addressed in the following chapter in greater detail).
One of the U.S. State Department’s special initiatives for the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) dates back to 2002: The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initia-
tive (MEPI) was launched to support organizations and individuals in their efforts to
promote political, economic, and social reform in MENA by providing direct sup-
port to MENA-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), educational institu-
tions, local governments, and private businesses to implement projects designed
to directly engage and invest in the people of the MENA region. Through these
partnerships, MEPI helps build the capacity of those that serve as the region’s most
successful agents of change—local civil society and business leaders, activists,
scholars, students, and lawmakers. The MEPI’s original mandate was to address
four deficits in the Arab world identified by the 2002 Arab Human Development
Report: political freedom, economic freedom, knowledge, and women’s rights. In
that UN report, Arab scholars wrote that a choice had to be made between “inertia…
[and] an Arab renaissance that will build a prosperous future for all Arabs.”
Today, MEPI’s programs contribute to capacity growth of civil society orga-
nizations in the region to advance political participation, foster economic reform,
support quality education, and empower women and youth in MENA1—areas iden-
tified as critical by President Barack Obama in his June 4, 2009 speech at Cairo
University. This U.S. regional foreign policy encourages economic growth, thereby
contributing towards the development of democratic institutions and countering ex-
tremism. These reforms were accelerated by the Obama administration after the
Arab Spring/Arab Awakening following the 2011 revolutions.
The U.S.’ assistance in the first phase of the Arab Spring, i.e., late spring 2011,
included encouragement of Tunisia and Egypt to develop a joint action plan with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the multilateral banks in preparation for the
G8 summit 2011, with the U.S. inter alia forgiving US$ 1 billion in debt, encouraging
1
MEPI-supported projects (with an initial annual budget of US$ 29 million, and by 2009
US$ 530 million), addressed 600 projects in 17 countries by 2009, including the Palestinian ter-
ritories, covering broad security sectors, from voter education programs in Egypt, judicial reform
seminars in the Persian Gulf, women’s literacy campaigns in Yemen, and a region-wide partner-
ship program between U.S. and Middle Eastern universities (including its annual Student Leaders
program that brings students from all over the region to participate in a summer-long seminar, and
its Middle East Entrepreneur Training program, which assists aspiring young business and civil
society leaders).
The Trans-Atlantic Link: Nationalism, Realism, and Shared Interests 67
the Tunisian and Egyptian diasporas2 in the U.S. to become involved in the recon-
struction of their countries of origin, with the Overseas Private Investment Corpo-
ration to provide up to US$ 2 billion financial support throughout the MENA to
strengthen democratic consolidation in the region3 (White House Factsheet 2011).
As the MENA uprisings continue, such as at the time of writing in Syria, with
other countries in the region post-uprising not yet having consolidated their democ-
racies, a free market economy, or stabilized internal socio4-economic challenges,
U.S. foreign policy is shifting from the “Nixon Doctrine”5 to the “Obama doctrine.”6
While some authors (e.g., Ellis 2009, p. 361) advocate a U.S. grand strategy now,
based not on formal international organizations “because of a significant divergence
of security interests and capabilities with its European allies” (Ellis 2009), I would
take exception to that. Rather, U.S. trans-Atlantic grand strategy following the G.W.
Bush presidency will not only reduce the focus on the War on Terror in favor of
broader security paradigms, but will give way to a greatly evolving (broadening)
strategic environment, involving more flexible coalitions to accommodate domestic
and international policy restraints, with an emphasis on operating stronger within
international law (some authors viewing this as based on “Western liberal interna-
tional law” (Ellis 2009, p. 361)) to enable more nuanced responses to proliferat-
ing threat types and the actors promulgating them. Let us remember that President
Obama, in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech stated that all nations
“must adhere to standards that govern the use of force” (cited in Savage 2013,
p. A9), yet also arguing “that humanitarian grounds justified military force” (Ibid.)
citing the Balkans, “leaving ambiguous whether he meant Bosnia, which had some
Security Council approval; [or] Kosovo, which did not; or both” (Savage 2013).
The current civil war in Syria has shown, however, that the EU is at best a “re-
luctant” partner to the U.S. in a role in MENA. While President Obama could have
used his power as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. military and under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter to forcefully remove Syria’s chemical weapons after their
repeated use on civilians, especially in 2013, he sought—and was rebuffed—Euro-
pean support for such a mission (as he had received for NATO’s mission in Libya
to oust General Gaddafi): not only is the U.S. public but also the European public
war-weary after two long military actions in the (greater) region, but the EU tends to
always prefer the role of socio-economic benefactor and peacekeeper at best, rather
2
Compare “Expats trickle back to Libya but business remains slow” (Daragahi 2012, p. 2).
3
Compare Kuru’s (2012) findings, contrasting with those of other scholars, such as Huntington’s,
that democratization follows a regional phenomenon/critical juncture of democratization, rather
than being a function of (an absence of) rentierism, level of education, history of patriarchy, or
level of income equality.
4
inter alia youth unemployment and regional sectarian struggles.
5
The “use of military and economic assistance to help U.S. partners and allies resist Soviet-
sponsored insurgencies without using U.S. troops in the kind of military interventions that had
proved too costly and controversial in Korea and Vietnam” (Gates 2010, p. 1).
6
Whereby a superpower considers both humanitarian and national interests before intervening
overseas (McGregor 2011, p. 1).
than having blood on its hands, “standing up and be counted” for the principles it
supposedly avows—a capitulation showing the sunset of the continent?
The emerging new global world order, and the trans-Atlantic relationship in par-
ticular, cannot limit itself to bilateral agreements, but will need to incorporate a
more “democratic” representation of state and nonstate actors in achieving these
goals. While this may appear ideological and rhetorical, the reality at the time of
writing is one of state budgetary austerity. For the U.S., the significance of not
only the intra- but also inter-regional security dynamics continue to be of upmost
geostrategic interest—hence Washington’s balancing act between pragmatism and
idealism in its foreign policy (Cooley and Nexon 2011, p. 1). Sectarian conflicts
translate deeply into economic and political interests, and become more challenging
to the U.S. as the uprisings of the Arab Spring spread intra- and inter-regionally,
such as the assistance the U.S. provides the (oppressive) Sunni governments (like in
Saudi Arabia): This radicalizes the Shia-dominated opposition7 and results in their
turning to Iran for assistance instead. In particular, the Syrian crisis, as a proxy con-
flict between President Al-Assad’s regime (with a military whose leaders are only
sporadically defecting) and the heavily fractured opposition (including some radi-
calized Salafis), as well as the middle and large governmental actors, and religious
powers (i.e., Hezbollah) in the region, is, beyond the threat of a spill-over more
broadly into the region, a microcosm of the Gordian knot of the regional political
constellations—and the future power shift options this represents for most global
players in the future.
The Third Basket: Social Cultural
The renewed interest in the third basket is, however, also a response to a changing security
environment. In the aftermath of September 11 and the US administration’s war on ter-
ror, the EU has been looking for alternative ways to approach radical extremism and ever
increasing mutual mistrust; ways which do not rest on scenarios of inevitable clashes of
civilizations… In fact, this new initiative for a Dialogue between Cultures to a great extent
was inspired by Habermasian ideals of dialogue, but that these ideals are difficult—if not
impossible—to apply in practice given that this Dialogue has become framed within the
context of security (Helmvig 2007, p. 71/2).
While the attainment of security in the Euro–Mediterranean Regional Security

Super Complex (EMRSSC), indeed, is not easy, this approach is in line with the
eclectic theoretical approach taken in this book, as it expands from basic Inter-
national Relations approaches, beyond (neo-)liberalism and (neo-)realism, and the
various schools of social Constructivism which were alluded to in the introduction
of this book and are treated in further detail in the final two chapters of this work.
Security exists not only in terms of the military, but also in civilian sectors.
7
Some authors have suggested that “If the Syrian government collapses and a Sunni-dominated
regime replaces it, Hezbollah’s position in Syria will inevitably decline; its connection to Iran
through Syria will be severed, and its ability to replenish its military arsenal will diminish, leaving
the group [perceived as] vulnerable to an attack from Israel” (Saban 2012, p. 5).
The Second Basket: Economic
U.S. involvement in MENA continues, as indicated earlier in this chapter, for inter
alia national energy security reasons, i.e., threats emanating from there and threaten-
ing the U.S. homeland, as well as the free flow of commerce (Saban 2012, p. 14).
Reciprocally aided, e.g., by the increase in Saudi oil output (Naimi 2012) to assist
inter alia the U.S.’ economic recovery and political stability within the tremendous
security dilemma the U.S. faces in the region—caught between assisting democra-
tization, civil society, and accountable institutions in MENA—yet often supporting
authoritarian rulers in the greater region in defense-cooperation to further immediate
U.S. security goals, including regional integration (such as with the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (GCC)), nonproliferation, and a counter-terrorism strategy, which ne-
cessitates continued U.S. operational presence there (Saban 2012, p. 11) vis-à-vis a
noncritical stance towards Israel’s domestic and foreign policies. Since this takes
place at times in clear defiance of UN resolutions, the U.S. is challenged to project
its regional foreign policy credibly in a new regional equilibrium, negotiated and
inclusive, rather than imposed.
In this vacuum of words (and continued missing coordination Europe-wide as
the eurozone threatens to dissolve and potentially lead to the ultimate disintegration
of the EU), and the severe human crises concomitant to the Arab Spring, President
Obama’s speech on May 19, 2011 outlined the U.S.’ focal point to address the lack
of opportunities in MENA8 as based on four pillars: (a) Support for better economic
management (b) support for economic stability (c) support for economic modern-
ization and reform and (d) a framework for trade integration and investment. Notice
that ideological and/or political aspects are absent in this strategy, although in previ-
ous communications during the Arab Spring, “the White House has warned Hezbol-
lah against coercion and intimidation” (Landler 2011, p. 1). Nevertheless, President
Obama walked a tight rope vis-à-vis the Israel lobby when he declined to take sides
in the recent Egyptian elections 2013, which had a politically mosaic result.9
In terms of the U.S.’ hegemonic role, domestic problems (e.g., its national debt
burden and excessively polarized bipartisan politics) represent a systemic security
threat in terms of its downgrade by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) from AAA to AA+
in 2012, inter alia for the shift this might represent for its defense priorities inter-
nally and externally in terms of its implication for military spending and economic
growth (as economic restraints have a positive correlation with defense spending/a
shift in defense priorities).
As many seek stabilization in this fragmenting regional polarization, the U.S. con-
tinues to be a stakeholder in the greater Euro–Mediterranean region.10 While the age
8
This is in addition to a relatively high birthrate without accompanying job market expansion, a
history of political rights restrictions, as well as economic corruption as major sources for the Arab
Spring uprisings.
9
Leading to some concern internationally whether the trend in Egypt post-Arab Spring is away
from pluralism towards more polarized politics in favor of “more true Islam” (Kirkpatrick 2012).
10
Compare NATO 2010 summit: the U.S. continues to bear the greatest responsibilities in the al-
liance as it faces the contemporary asymmetrical threats not so much in the trans-Atlantic sphere
of American exceptionalism11 yields to an era of greater multilateralism (especially

evident in the greater Euro-Med), its leadership continues to be to a considerable
extent the U.S. (together with the EU), but likely with a strong influence from emerg-
ing powers. It involves nonstate actors and transnational actors such as multinational
companies (MNCs) as well as their investments in products and services, competition,
and promotion of transparency of public procurement markets, as well as trade facili-
tation and liberalization, and solidarity by the EU not automatic (and the effect this has
on business and social interaction and complexities), but requiring a constant effort
to ensure its input is not only focused on soft power, but punching its weight with the
difficult regional security challenges, such as the tightened sanctions towards Iran.
In May 2003, the U.S. proposed the Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative
(MEFTA) initiative, a plan of graduated steps for Middle Eastern nations to in-
crease trade with and investment in the U.S. and with others in the world econo-
my, with the eventual goal of a regional free trade agreement tentatively by 2013.
Some countries in MENA already have bilateral free trade agreements with the U.S.
The largest hurdles to the MEFTA is the participation of Israel vis-à-vis Palestine’s
democratically elected government of Hamas in Gaza; plus the issue of agricul-
tural products there, which can be produced less expensively in the U.S., and could
hence threaten the livelihood of farmers in the MENA, and could potentially lead
to protests there.
MEFTA’s purpose is, however, about more than quotas: the U.S.’ initial goal to
work with “peaceful nations” (a term carefully selected to address certain coun-
tries—and perhaps give Israel a “solution” for working with MEFTA after all), who
desire to become members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) by working
with these countries12 to implement domestic reform agendas, institute the rule of
law, and protect property rights (including intellectual property) to facilitate the
trade relationship, including deepening the mutual economic ties with MEFTA
(potential) members in the trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs),
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs),
and related measures as appropriate. Bilateral FTAs with Israel, Jordan, Morocco,
Bahrain, and Oman have already entered into effect. These initiatives are significant
for their augmentation of economic growth, and their expected expansion of the job
market—one of the top causes of popular discontent during the Arab Spring.
per se, but on its periphery, based on realistic strategic concepts, not lost in words or determined
by political calendars or convenience—and its leadership ready to sustain this with rhetoric and
substance, especially in an age of Western austerity, rather than being just reactive to threats.
11
its legitimacy tested, moreover, by its refusal to follow its obligations under international law
selectively, particularly in past administrations.
12
The U.S. continues to actively support the WTO accession efforts of Lebanon, Algeria, and
Yemen, and has also taken steps to reinvigorate dialogues with other key trading partners in the
region, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. “USTR has continued to work with trading partners in
the region to implement the MEFTA initiative. The United States and the United Arab Emirates
decided early in 2007 that the timing was not conducive to concluding bilateral FTA negotiations
and have since sought to pursue trade and investment enhancement through a “TIFA-Plus” pro-
cess; the first meeting of this new format was held in June 2007” (Office of the United States Trade
Representative 2013).
The First Basket: Political
In terms of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, President Obama utilized the early phase
of the Arab Spring, when Tunisian and Egyptian euphorias were overshadowed by
the violent crackdowns in Bahrain and Syria, a raging civil war in Libya, and a
political stalemate in Yemen, to call a “moment of opportunity” to articulate a cohe-
sive U.S. policy, including a deal based the on 1967 lines with a demilitarized Pales-
tine (Lander and Myers 2011, p. 1), formalized in a “final status” agreement within
the next nine months, to lead to an independent Palestinian state (FP Mideast Daily
2013b). While we know that at the time of writing, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
has not been settled, Libya and Yemen have made political “transitions” (if not
consolidations of democracy). This lack of success, despite President Obama’s ear-
lier efforts to address the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, such as designating a special
envoy, George J. Mitchell, is an example of what U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner referred to as “America’s dark side” (Luce 2012): the considerable biparti-
san deadlock during the Obama administration. It is a socio-political phenomenon,
extraordinarily destructive to socio-economic progress domestically, as well as op-
timal political progress in U.S. foreign policy: and this, one should remember, is
part of the goal of actors whose foreign policy goals have opposing aims to the U.S.,
i.e., in this case favorable to Israel. Of course, this translates into less than 20 % “fa-
vorable” ratings of the U.S. in Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories,
substantially down from 2009 (Dombey 2011).
This tightrope became more challenging from the spring of 2012 onward, as Is-
rael was increasingly eager to take the Iranian nuclear program out, while President
Obama continued to seek a diplomatic settlement through increased sanctions on
Iran (with the Russians and Chinese attempting to water them down), and Tehran
unhappy that some of the negotiations were taking place in Ankara13 instead of a
more “neutral” country like Iraq or China. However, at the time the research for
this book was concluding, President Obama succeeded as the first U.S. president
to have a conversation with an Iranian leader “since 1979 when President Jimmy
Carter spoke to Mohammed Reza Pahlavi shortly before the shah left the country”
(Baker 2013, p. 1). As the sanctions against Iran had become too onerous, it became
more open to negotiate its nuclear capabilities. While the future will tell the trajec-
tory of further cooperation between these two countries in the future, it is a signifi-
cant development in terms of the Euro–Mediterranean Regional Super Complex,
inter alia due to Iran’s nexus to Syria—and its significant influence on its regime
during the current civil war, and reversely Iran’s nexus to Russia, and its significance
in the U.S.–Russia relationship (as a thawing Iran–U.S. relationship and nuclear
arms control discussions lessen the leverage Russia has vis-à-vis the U.S. through
its influence over Iran) as well as reciprocally in the Russia–Syria relationship
This represents one aspect in the Israeli–Turkish balance of power evolving in the Mediterra-
13
nean, which President Obama is juggling, as elaborated on in the preceding and following sections
briefly.
and the reduced leverage Russia has on Syria dancing, if not all by itself, with a less
firm ally in Iran potentially.
These moves played out against what was perceived by many as “pivots” in
President Obama’s strategy towards Syria. Baker (2013b) interprets this as:
Mr. Obama’s willingness to hit the pause button twice on his decision to launch airstrikes
to punish Syria for using chemical weapons on its own people reflects a refreshing open-
mindedness and a reluctance to use force that they considered all too missing under his
predecessor with the Texas swagger. In this view, Mr. Obama is a nimble leader more
concerned with getting the answer right than with satisfying a political class all too eager
to second-guess every move.
‘All the critics would like this to be easily choreographed, a straight line and end the way
they’d all individually like it to end,’ said David Plouffe, the president’s former senior
adviser. ‘That’s not the way the world works for sure, especially in a situation like this.
I think it speaks to his strength, which is that he’s willing to take in new information.’…
I do not want to see military action, but understand that after years of failed diplomacy, it
may be the only option left:
The Obama Doctrine by the time of the president’s second term can hence be re-
fined as a shift from military might to diplomatic solutions. Signaling the success
of the considerably increased sanctions President Obama imposed on Iran during
his first term, we witness the successful nuclear deal with Iran on November 24,
2013 after more than three decades of hostility, in addition to the announcement
that in January 2014 a conference will convene to broker an end to the Syrian civil
war (Landler 2013, p. 1). Fulfilling his campaign promise to wind down two wars,
President Obama can be credited with a nimble inter- and intra-regional MENA
strategy that avoided a third war in the greater region.
Hard Power
The following section will focus primarily on the U.S.–MENA relationship in light
of the Arab Spring with the U.S. a special member of NATO and hereby concretizing
the “trans-Atlantic link” of the Euro–Mediterranean Regional Security Super Com-
plex. The U.S.’ role in the Arab Spring is posited against its immediate past there:
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has been the dominant
power in the Middle East. But much has been done to diminish its influence there, rang-
ing from the failure to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict at
the end of the Clinton administration to the Bush administration’s costly war in Iraq, its
unsuccessful attempt to impose democracy on Arab authoritarian regimes, and its willful
disregard of the Palestinian issue for most of its two terms (Haass and Indyk 2008, p. 4).
President Obama’s legacy of the political fallout from the ill-advised Iraq war was
again demonstrated in August 2013, when the West sought to counter the Bashar
Al-Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against some of its civilian popula-
tions with retaliatory strikes, but was met with tremendous skepticism on the
“Arab street,”14 despite calls by the Arab League for an international response to
14
Polls indicate that the vast majority of Arabs in the region view any U.S. action as self-interested
or in Israel’s interest, regardless of the context—possibly as a result not only of the recent experi-
ence with Iraq but also due to the region’s long colonial history (Kirkpatrick et al. 2013).
the “heinous crime” (Dagher et al. 2013), with neither Saudi Arabia nor any of the
Sunni-dominated Gulf States publicly endorsing a western military response except
for Egypt (with the largest Arab population) disagreeing (Kirkpatrick et al. 2013).
President Obama has been criticized on the other hand during his second term
for not taking the same definite stand towards Syria’s President Al-Assad’s civilian
atrocities initially, as he had supported intervention against Moammar Gaddafi in
Libya during his first term. However, the Pentagon’s presentation to U.S. Con-
gress in mid-July 2013, laying out military options to stem the bloody Syrian civil
war, made the extent of such an undertaking clear in terms of costs in the billions
of dollars—and the chance of backblow for the U.S., similar to its experience in
Iraq. While the White House had authorized supplying the rebels with small arms,
more decisive options, ranging from training opposition troops to airstrikes and
the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Syria would require “hundreds of aircraft,
ships, submarines and other enablers, and cost in the billions” according to General
Dempsey (Landler and Shanker 2013), with the likelihood that Bashar Al-Assad
would still be in power a year later (though not necessarily ruling all of Syria
again). While the U.S. military is in a position to carry out efforts beyond training
the opposition (approximately US$ 500 million/year) (Landler and Shanker 2013),
such as limited missile strikes (requiring hundreds of aircraft and warships at a
cost of billions of dollars during the project) (Landler and Shanker 2013), setting
up a no-fly zone (requiring also hundreds of aircraft to shoot down government
air force planes, and destroying their logistics support at a cost of US$ 1 billion/
month) (Landler and Shanker 2013), and establishing buffer zones (e.g., across the
borders with Turkey and Jordan, which would need to build on a limited no-fly
zone and deploying U.S. ground forces in the thousands). Beyond the thousands
of special operatives needed to assault and secure critical sites, which would cost
well over an additional US$ 1 billion/month (Landler and Shanker 2013) to take
control of Al-Assad’s chemical weapons stockpile, deeper U.S. involvement would
be likely (and not necessarily supported by the U.S. public at the moment15,16)—
with a chance of inadvertently empowering extremists or unleashing those chemi-
cal weapons to be controlled (Landler and Shanker 2013).
After the Arab Spring has transformed the past “landscape of the Middle East
into a new and uncharted territory for the United States,…[h]ow should the U.S.
navigate in the post-Arab Spring” (ia-forum 2012:1)? In terms of Syria, the re-
linquishment of chemical weapons by Bashar Al-Assad’s regime at the behest of
Russia in the autumn of 2013 does not preclude a Western-led military intervention
should Syria default on its promise. Though there are limits of what force can ac-
complish (as the U.S. learned painfully with the limited longterm success of Presi-
dent Obama’s military “push” in Afghanistan), it remains an option if the diplomatic
route fails in the end to accomplish its goal—even though a United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) agreement was reached as a non-Chapter VII solution, i.e., without
Compare NYTimes.com 9/10/13.

15
Hence Obama’s choice to put the decision of whether or not to use military force aganst Al-
16
Assad to relinquish Syria’s chemical weapons to U.S. Congress in August 2013 (Lubold 2013)—
before a definitive vote came forth from both houses, as the UNSC met on September 26/2013 to
reach a resolution by all fifteen member states.
automatic military action preordained should Al-Assad renege on his obligation to

surrender Syria’s chemical weapons.17
The Trans-Atlantic Link: The U.S., NATO, and the Arab Spring
As indicated above, the U.S. will also continue to work with old allies, such as Tur-
key18 (having received a new NATO missile defense base), as a secular democracy19
in the region, which is often held up as an example for states in the MENA democ-
ratizing after the Arab Spring. As indicated previously, the regional sectarian divide
has strengthened the political alignments, with the U.S. supporting the Sunni bid for
power at times (except in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein’s defeat at the hands of the
U.S. brought the Shia to power), as well as the Muslim Brotherhood’s (democratic)
victory in Egypt in 2012. The ultimate outcome of the current Syrian civil war will
represent a significant weighting of this balance of power, and is hence so gingerly
approached by the U.S. in light of the Russia–Iran–Syria axis.
While Ankara continues to pursue a “zero problems with neighbors” -policy
since 2009,20 the unfortunate war in Iraq has made relations with this former Sunni
country with a now strongly strengthened Shia population,21 as well as with Tehran,
more difficult (which might explain why Turkey did not avail air or ground transit
space to the U.S. during the Iraq war22). Hence, Turkey’s cooperation with the U.S.
and NATO23 is mutually essential24 also in terms of the Tehran–Russia axis and
17
Compare Lubold (2013): “The Mil Don’t Do Pinpricks”.
18
Barak Obama last year cited “Tayyip Erdogan as one of the five world leaders with whom he
works most closely” (Dombey 2012, p. 7).
19
The democratization process strengthened here through its EU candidacy, even though some
trends into the opposite direction are noticed, such as the incarceration of over hundred journalists,
which Turkey claims are terrorist-related (Turkey’s struggle against Kurdish separatists continues).
20
Leading inter alia to Turkey’s vote at the UN Security Council on June 9, 2010 (together with
Brazil) against the U.S.-backed sanctions on Iran (compare Ustun 2010).
21
Note the anti-Sunni sectarianism by Iraqi prime minister al-Maliki.
22
However, Turkey is paying the price for this lack of cooperation with the U.S. now, as it is left
dancing with itself in asserting any rights to the new Cypriotic–Israeli gas finds in the Mediter-
ranean… (compare Ogurlu 2012). Of course, one might surmise that Israel pointedly sought to
provoke the “flotilla incident” to prove this point to Turkey.
23
This is to be read literally: Turkey chose NATO, not automatically the West—hence the EU’s
“resignation” about a genuine accession process for Turkey in light of the former’s abysmal demo-
graphics and markets—and Turkey's “solution” for this with a young population and a substantial
market (as China will not need EU products too much longer, having copied most everything:
Europe will need China much more for cheap products than China needs Europe) may be inter-
preted as an opportunity the EU should not have missed and a necessary expense despite economic
conditions.
24
Note also that the EU’s requirement for a change from a military government in Turkey to a ci-
vilian one to comply with the acquis communautaire as part of Turkey’s EU-accession process left
the Turkish military weakened and more dependent on NATO. While Turkey invests substantially
in its strategic sector, few can match the continuing exponential growth of the U.S. in this area.
vis-à-vis Syria. Indeed, Turkey might become the “order maker”—and soft power/
bridge to the West (including Europe) with MENA in the future.25 This would posi-
tion it well with the policy of “asymmetrical deterrence” Iran practices in the re-
gion. Turkey balances its nuclear deterrence capabilities with soft power towards its
neighbors (even if its accommodation of the GCC is deteriorating). While humani-
tarian and small and medium enterprise (SME) business motivations might explain
the smuggling of everyday goods from Turkey into Iran, more formal solutions
to end inter-regional security dilemmas would be desirable for their transparency,
predictability, and longterm stability within global systemic threats in all sectors
and levels facing all players—as the inter-regional security of the Mediterranean
would remain susceptible to internal and inter-regional threats without them. Tur-
key’s value as an ally to both the EU and the U.S. continues to rise as “it can help
steer transition in Europe’s Middle Eastern backyard” (Gardner 2012, p. 1).
While the U.S.’ lead role in the Euro–Mediterranean may appear minor in the
absence of another foreign policy actor on the world stage who can accept—and
is accepted by the majority of other actors for this role—it will continue to play a
respectable part in Euro–Mediterranean security, last but not least for its continuing
impetus to the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. As U.S. military power is viewed
to be often more “persuasive” with its partners especially in the Mediterranean and
the Middle East, than European soft power initiatives, the former backed by U.S.
willingness for trade agreements for its close partners, such as Morocco (in contrast
to the perceived “foot dragging” by the EU toward, e.g., free trade agreements,
such as with the UAE). NATO’s attractiveness in the Euro–Mediterranean and its
inter-regional “dynamics,” such as the waterways bordering the Arabian Peninsula,
remains strong. NATO’s relationship as an intergovernmental organization (IGO)
in Euro–Mediterranean events surrounding the Arab Spring is elaborated in its re-
spective section below, including Canada (though the relationship of other trans-
Atlantic actors would exceed the dimensions of the present work).
The U.S. and the Arab Spring: Forward
After the Arab Spring has transformed the past “landscape of the Middle East into
a new and uncharted territory for the United States,…[ h]ow should the U.S. navi-
gate in the post-Arab Spring” (international affairs-forum 2012, p. 1)? As indicated
earlier in this chapter, when “decision time” arrives in MENA, one can expect the
U.S. to make the decisive moves—although President Obama treads more subtly
than many of his predecessors.
The trans-Atlantic relationship cannot be taken for granted, but should be opti-
mized by rational calculation and effort, rather than just be tolerated as inevitable,
as a manner of strategic concept to express a grand strategy, rather than a strategy
25
Considering that the Arab Spring has understandably not yet resulted in consolidated democra-
cies in the region.
of limited aim (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2009). U.S. credibility was shaken in this
context, when many bemoaned the initial lack of apparent support gestures by the
U.S. for the Syrian opposition to prevent mass atrocities there, perhaps making
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) “to be seen as just another type of weapon”
(Haass 2013). Yet, beyond the behind-the-scenes diplomatic—and hard power (such
as drone strikes against Al Qaeda operatives involved in Syria)—initiatives, the
subdued open support by the U.S. can be understood by the diversity and complex-
ity of the Syrian opposition (e.g., some pro- and other anti-U.S. in simplest terms).
If the trans-Atlantic relationship failed, how would the economies and political
influence of many emerging countries benefit? Although the U.S. has managed to
“reconstitute” itself from its 2008–2009 financial near-meltdown, the percentages
are shifting at the “global prosperity table,” and neither Germany nor the U.S. can
expect to sit comfortably, as they need to stay on their toes while others are jockey-
ing for a seat at the table. The U.S.’ popularity in MENA (except for Saudi Arabia)
has been dropping since 2010, inter alia as being viewed by some as an impedi-
ment to peace and stability in the Arab world, its failure to resolve the Palestinian
issue, and a perceived lack of commitment to democracy in the region. The U.S.’
Pacific shift, e.g., through the launch of the Trans-Pacific Partnership26 to economi-
cally (and always politically) balance China in the Pacific (as well as its growing
influence in Latin America), and to reassure the U.S.’ Asian allies (Kaufman Purcel
2011) should give the MENA pause to think.
Iraq
Some authors have suggested that the democratization in Iraq post-2003 could be a
model for the post-Arab Spring political transitions. However, overall, each coun-
try, regardless of which “wave” of democratization it is a part of, follows a unique
path, dependent inter alia on its political, (post-)colonial history, unique economy,
sectarian and tribal balance, and other sociological circumstances.
Iraq’s inter-regional significance in terms of the EuroMed and the trans-Atlantic
tangent is, beyond the Iraq war, oil. After overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s authori-
tarian government to bring a more democratic government to the country, the sus-
picion has been that the U.S. sought control of the country’s petroleum resources.
This perhaps simplistic plan by G.W. Bush was not to be such:
US oil groups were all but shut out of Iraq as the country completed the biggest oil field
auction in history at the weekend. European groups, including Royal Dutch Shell, Lukoil,
Gazprom , and Asian groups, such as China’s CNPC and Malaysia’s Petronas were the main
winners at Iraq’s second oil auction, which completed the sale of its large fields in April
2012” (Hoyos 2012).
Likewise, beyond the economic sectors, the inter-regional political shifts became
more dynamic as the GCC, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt started to reassert their respective
26
Included as of July 2013: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zea-
land, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, U.S., and Vietnam.
Iraq 77
leading roles as they had during the Saddam Hussein era (Ragab 2013, p. 1). This
regional activism involved, e.g., payment of reparations to Kuwait for the Iraqi oc-
cupation there. Furthermore, Iraq’s foreign relations post-U.S. occupation present
novel political and security balances, such as the increased Iranian influence in Iraqi
politics (some authors (e.g., Ragab 2013, p. 2) go so far as to speak of a subordi-
nation of Iraqi foreign policy to Iran’s—a fragile domestic Iraqi security environ-
ment potentially exacerbated if certain parts of the Syrian opposition gain traction,
economy, and security, inter alia through the Shia ascent in Iraq after the demise of
Saddam Hussein, as shown in the 2006 Iraqi election results (Ragab 2013, p. 1)).
This has a spill-over empowerment effect of the Shia in the greater inter-regional
dynamics of the EMRSSC, such as the Shia (many of whom have roots in Iraq) in
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia—to the chagrin of the ruling class in both countries as
well as future revanchist strategies of the Iraqi Sunnis.
The demise of the nuclear threat from Iraq began with an Israeli raid on the
French-supplied, ostensibly civilian nuclear reactor in 1981, with the Iraqi enrich-
ment program largely completely destroyed by U.S. bombs during the 1991 Gulf
War, and completely dismantled by UN inspectors and sanctions following that war
(Riedel and Samore 2008, p. 95). The 2003 invasion of Iraq has extinguished its
“ability to revive its nuclear program for the foreseeable future” (Riedel and Samore
2008). The political evolution of Iraq will certainly have a significant impact on
the regional balance of power—with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki already deftly
exploiting the ambiguities of the new Iraqi constitution and applying nepotism to
consolidate his power (and marginalize opponents), rather than obtaining parlia-
mentary approval for senior military and security appointments (Saban 2012, p. 9),
hereby weakening Iraq’s very fragile new democracy.
Beyond this threat to the country, the actual physical security threats have been
increasing again since the U.S. troop draw-down by December 2011—partially be-
cause of the increasing influence of external actors there, such as Al Qaeda affiliates
(AQI) (compare the prison break-in/out by Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Levant)
(ISIS)27 in July 2013, leading to the escape of hundreds of prisoners, including many
Al Qaeda members for which this group takes responsibility). In addition to non-
governmental actors affecting the stability of Iraq post-Saddam Hussein, countries
such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar are seeking to undermine Iraq’s Shia-dominated
government (Saban 2012, p. 10) and Turkey’s alliance with the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) (vs. Prime Minster Erdogan’s public frustration with Prime
Minister M aliki) (Saban 2012) represent destabilizing forces for Iraq, underlining
the previous discussion on the significance of sectarianism in the greater Euro–
Mediterranean.
A close associate of its leader, Zawahiri, Saleh al Nahri, killed by a U.S. drone strike a couple
27
weeks later in East Yemen.

Iran
Iran and the Arab Spring
Iran, beyond the possibility of it becoming part of the “European neighborhood”

should Turkey’s EU membership bid be successful, exercises its influence in the
Mediterranean inter alia through proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, as Ahma-
dinejad’s 2010 visit to Lebanon asserted Iran’s strategic competition in the south-
eastern Mediterranean. Beyond this political influence, Iran’s potential economic
strength could evolve in terms of energy shipments to the Mediterranean via Syria
and Turkey, which would compete with its shipments via the eastward route to
China.
Iran is a pivotal player in the Middle East:
Overall, Iran’s geopolitical strategy aims to consolidate the Islamic Republic as a regional
power. The cornerstones of its strategy are (1) managing and balancing its ties with immedi-
ate neighbors and key Islamic countries—relations with Turkey and Saudi Arabia are key
factors in Iran’s regional positioning for influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and else-
where; (2) consolidating Iranian regional preeminence with indigenous technical capabili-
ties—the country’s nuclear program, missile tests, weapons purchases, and satellite launch
are all facets of this strategic track; (3) standing up to the West (Marashi and Parsi 2013,
p. 134).
When the Arab uprisings began in the winter of 2011, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei was quick to express his glee: one of the long-awaited objectives of the
1979 Islamic revolution would now be realized. Khamenei praised what he called
the “Islamic awakening” in the Arab world and claimed vindication for Iran’s long-
running efforts to overcome the West’s regional hegemony. The realization of a pan-
Islamic Middle East was on the horizon… (Ayatollah Khamenei’s Nowruz Message
2011).
Iran’s tendency to view the recent Arab uprisings with a strategic spin of their
own political (soft power) strategy (rooted in a combination of a rejection of the
status supported by the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia (Marashi and Parsi 2013,
p. 135) in combination with the ideology of political Islam and investments sup-
porting this (Marashi and Parsi 2013)) may be an overestimation of their own in-
fluence in Arabic countries—or the latter’s reliance on Iran for leadership (Abdo
2013, p. 1), as the Shia–Sunni Syrian War of the past couple of years indicates:
Persian Islam represents a shadow for Arabs, which is capitalized on in Sunni
discourse. Furthermore, the new sense of Arab self-determination, while not di-
rectly challenging to Iranian leadership, will likely influence challenges “from
the street” to Sharia-based politics in Iran—as the election of the new president,
Hassan Rouhani, in June 2013 already made apparent. His choice of cabinet and
the reopening of previously banned reformist magazines give hope to reform—
even if he will not be able to perform miracles in repairing what “eight years of
the chaotic and catastrophic presidency of Mahmud Ahmadinejad created” (Esh-
raghi 2013, p. 1).
Iran 79
Iran and Nuclear Enrichment
On a fundamental level, acquiring WMDs implies security contradictions for Iran:

Despite a concern of losing conventional superiority (such as conventional arms, an
educated, sizable population, vast surface area, and geopolitical situation), WMD
acquisition by Iran would likely be followed by WMD proliferation in the region,
especially among its neighbors—in turn weakening its conventional superiority,
as well as possibly encouraging terrorist groups to gain access to such weapons
and use them against Iran. Vice versa, Iran’s path to nuclear weapons has pushed
many countries in the region closer to Iran’s enemy, the U.S. (strengthening and
stabilizing the U.S.’ presence in the region) (Hadian and Hormoz 2013, p. 15–16)—
per the status quo pre-November 2013.
A perception of Iranian (nuclear) offensiveness in turn could provoke its neigh-
bors to boost their military capacity, further destabilizing the security environment
of the Middle East, while Iran has to face the cost of producing and maintaining
WMDs—a cost that would reduce its capacity for domestic civilian expenditures.
Another Iranian “tangent” to the inter-regional aspects of the EMRSSC is the
Russian “component” in this very multilevel dynamic, and its broad security im-
plications (e.g., bringing Russia potentially into NATO and the trans-Atlantic “dia-
logue” anew in terms of the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe—vis-
à-vis potential threats, such as from Iran, which Russia supplies at the same time
with nuclear fuel). A number of authors (compare, e.g., Saban 2012, p. 6) have
repeatedly admonished that Iran’s perspective on the foreign policy of much of the
West involves a “double standard,” which is threatened by regional actors who are
not questioned about their enrichment, and the extensive sanctions applied to Iran,
which are perceived not just to control its nuclear enrichment, but to damage its
economy in order to weaken the state per se.
While some countries do not appear to be threatened by Iranian nuclear enrich-
ment (whether due to geographic distance or a friendly relationship with it), such
as Brazil and Turkey respectively, who together brokered an agreement with Iran
in the spring of 2012 to hold about half of Iran’s enriched uranium (permitting it to
keep enough to continue to enrich the remainder), after last year’s U.S.–EU–Rus-
sia agreement with Tehran was reneged on by the latter. While this “showcases”
an example of the nascent regional security dynamics of intra- and extra-regional
emerging hegemons in the greater Mediterranean, existing actors in the effort to
control Iran’s enrichment efforts were (a) not pleased and (b) perhaps admonished
to strengthen the priority allocated to their cooperation, acting under UN Security
Council decisions, as well as beyond them, if they are to be effective in addressing
the arms race anticipated by Iran’s neighbors, who “are wary of falling behind on
nuclear technology” (England 2010).
The nuclear accord of 24 November 2013 also has the potential of minimizing
Saudi Arabia’s preeminent role in the MENA in favor of a geostrategically more
substantial role of Iran there in the future were Iran’s reconciliation with the U.S.
to result in “a new chapter of convergence” (Worth 2013, p. 4) between these two
countries. Saudi Arabia’s bitterness towards perceived U.S. abandonment is en-

hanced by Iran’s “costly effort to support the government of the Syrian president…,
including arms, training and some of its most valuable Revolutionary Guard com-
mandos” (Worth 2013, p. 2), leading to important victories for Al-Assad. These bat-
tlefield gains could potentially “translate into expanded Iranian hegemony across
the region. Already, the Saudis have watched with alarm as Turkey—their ally in
supporting the Syrian rebels—has begun making conciliatory gestures toward Iran”
(Worth 2013).
Iran and Political Change
The (inter-)regional role of Iran goes beyond the complications of its current nucle-
ar enrichment. Iran has an educated (and possibly more liberal) middle class today,
which is socially disillusioned by the international political isolation and a seriously
troubled economy, partially as a result of the state’s mismanagement in addition to
debilitating international sanctions.
This new middle class, with its own youth culture, is no longer content with
the hollowed revolutionary slogans of the past. Political demands for a fair elec-
tion were abundantly clear in the widespread protest movement against ballot box
rigging in June 2009, which kept Ahmadinejad in office. The 2013 election results
confirmed public repulsion by rampant corruption and mismanagement, favoritism,
and skulduggery under Ahmadinejad. If any further catalyst was needed, it came
with West-imposed sanctions that crippled the Iranian economy and disrupted the
lives of ordinary people. Soaring prices combined with banking restrictions, vola-
tile rates of exchange, and shipping insurance bans reduced Iran’s oil exports well
below 50 % compared to 2010 figures: In effect, the sanctions deprived this rentier
state of its addictive oil revenue. For decades, the free flow of oil had allowed the
clerical elite to project an image of power toward its own citizens and gestures of
defiance, often futile, toward the outside world (Annat 2013).
The agreement by President Obama with newly elected Iranian president Rou-
hani during the UN 2013 opening events to address nuclear limitations showed the
recognition by the U.S. administration that Rouhani, though a regime insider, nev-
ertheless must contend with Iranian hard-liners seeking his downfall, and is hence
dependent on some Western political reciprocity to enable him to navigate his do-
mestic currents (FP Mideast Daily 2013b, p. 2). In consistency with the hyper-mul-
tidimensional dynamics of EMRSSC security-political dynamics, this recognition
was not shared in Israeli president Netanyahu’s United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) comments at that time, which appeared to be intended for his domestic
constituency….
Instead, an expression of this more open stance towards the West can be seen in
the most recent Iranian presidential elections of a seemingly more reform-oriented,
politically and economically liberal president, Hassan Rouhani in June 2013, with
apparent foreign policy goals which seek negotiations with the West (Erdbrink
2013, p. 1). These materialized during the UNGA meetings in September 2013
Russia 81
(Takeyh 2013), when Rouhani not only acknowledged the Holocaust, but subse-
quently the U.S. and Iranian foreign ministers met in September 2013, followed by
a direct telephone conversation with President Obama a few days later. The nego-
tiations over Iran’s nuclear program were scheduled to start in mid-October 2013
in Geneva between the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, Catherin Ashton, representatives of the P5 + 1 group (the U.S., Britain, Chi-
na, France, and Russia plus Germany).
The topic also involves the Iran–GCC inter-regional axis referred to in the next
chapter: while some authors (e.g., Colombo 2012) have referred to the West’s
engagement with the GCC as promulgating double standards (e.g., in respect to the
monarchy and the uneven treatment of Sunnis vs. Shia there), one needs to keep
in mind that there are different routes to modernity, and increased engagement be-
tween the GCC and the West (such as Qatar’s support in the “liberation” of Libya)
amidst the very volatile current climate at the moment in MENA could be viewed
positively despite the “imperfections.”
Strengthened by the weakening of their old adversaries, the now subdued Sunnis
in Iraq (following the U.S. military action of the past years over the newly empow-
ered Shia there), as well as the approaching of weapons-grade uranium production
in Iran, plus its strong mutual trading relationship with China, Iran is also adopting a
new approach in its ties to Africa (Isria 2010a). Geostrategically, this could be inter-
preted as inter alia supportive of the extensive Chinese economic presence there—
perhaps lending teeth to an ally who claims to seek its economic rise “peacefully.”
In terms of potentially increased Iranian engagement in Africa, the significance to
the Euro–Mediterranean is additionally in terms of its effect on illegal immigration
into the (southern) EU, as the Maghreb is frequently used as a transit point for im-
migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.
Russia28
Political–Bilateral/Multi-Lateral
Part of Russia’s political interest in Mediterranean inter-regionalism is the new sov-

ereignty of former Yugoslav Republics, such as Kosovo, and the international legal
precedent it sets for former Soviet republics, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
and Russia is hence lobbying intensely against it at the UN and with the EU.
Russia is guided by the Putin Doctrine, which seeks the recovery of economic, geostrategic,
and political assets lost by the Soviet state in the revolution of 1987–1991. The doctrine
also promotes an assertive affirmation of three essential national goals, inherited from the
Soviet Union and likely to be upheld by any Russian regime: the maintenance of Russia’s
roles as a nuclear superpower; as the military, economic, and cultural hegemon in former
Soviet territories (with the exception of the three Baltic states); and as a great world power
(Aron 2013a).
28
Excerpts from this section were presented at the MESA conference on November 18–20, 2010.
The conflicting power interests between the Soviet Union and the U.S. and its
western allies post-WWII led to the Cold War, which was also reflected signifi-
cantly in the MENA, whether in terms of the complex relationship with Egypt
(especially due to its strategic access to the Suez Canal), or in polarizing the
populations in the MENA vis-à-vis the Non-Aligned Movement by the early
1960s in respect to NATO’s influence in the Mediterranean. Following the Six
Day War “between Israel and the Arab coalition, the Mediterranean saw a strong
presence of the Soviet power, materialized by its Fifth Squadron … as part of
the ‘Peripheral Strategy’ … to further weaken Western economies” (Sanfelice di
Monteforte 2013, p. 8), by supporting all liberation movements as well as sup-
porting Egypt in its struggle against Israel (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013). Most
Soviet initiatives in the region were not successful longterm, and with the recipi-
ent countries growing weary of Moscow, many “played” the Super Power com-
petition for influence in the region to their advantage (e.g., in terms of loans,
project financing, and supporting claims in international forums) in securing a
better quality of life for their populations—and increased stability as a result
(Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013).
The end of the Cold War, and in particular the collapse of the Soviet Union,
gave room to lay bare hidden tensions and the resultant spread of instability, not
only in Eastern Europe but also in the power equilibrium of the Southern Medi-
terranean. Hence Medvedev’s initial response to events of the Arab Spring were
rather alarmist: “We must face the truth. In the past, such a scenario [i.e. a con-
spiracy theory, such as Facebook being exploited to incite unrest] was imagined
about the U.S. [i.e. Western secret services staging experiments for their con-
trolled chaos, ‘which Russians believe the West intends to employ against them’
(Baev 2001)], and now attempts to implement it are even more likely. In any
case, this plot will not work” (Medvedev 2011). The fact that educated, urban
Arabs were deeply dissatisfied with corrupt despots was edited out of the official
Russian rhetoric (Baev 2011) as this is one of the concerns that hits too close to
home of their own “self-service” bureaucracy (in addition to the Russian fear of
Muslim insurgencies, should they catch on in the Russian neighborhood). Rus-
sia’s strategy for the preservation of its own regime, as that of many autocratic
regimes in MENA, is to deny the opposition legitimate political space, and push
it underground—creating a hidden explosive potential,29 with a difficult to con-
trol “ignition” (Baev 2011).
Today, Russia continues to assert its strategic interests in MENA either directly,
e.g., with defense shipments and stationing in Syria, or via Iran, or with renewed
defense cooperation as well as broadened economic relations, such as between Rus-
sia and Egypt, as was initiated in late summer 2013 (New America Foundation et al.
2013). It will most likely involve an arms deal, possibly to compensate for the U.S.
suspension of a large portion of its $ 1.3 billion military assistance to Egypt (Baev
2011)—an example par excellence for the broad reciprocal inter-regional security
(re-)balancing dynamics as part of the Arab Spring.
29
Compare the “Black Swan” phenomenon, discussed in Chapter 3.
Russia 83
Russia’s role in the greater Mediterranean inter-regionalism continues as a para-

dox between old Cold War patterns of supporting allies directly and indirectly (e.g.,
shipment of nuclear rods and other supplies for related facilities to Iran, hereby en-
hancing its negotiating power with its proxies, such as Syria—as well as indirectly
also, e.g., Hezbollah).
At the same time, Russia seeks to continue its involvement in solving Middle
East conflicts, such as those bordering the Mediterranean through its involvement in
the Middle East Quartet30 (Russia was inter alia the “godmother” for the founding
of the EMP following the 1983 Madrid Peace Conference), as well as selective sup-
port of UN’s sanctions against Iran, and a strategic “polarizing” position pertaining
to oil shipments to Europe, in this case to those pertaining via Turkey—and those
seeking to circumvent Turkey!
In terms of addressing the Syrian chemical weapons removal without military
intervention by the U.S., Russia realized that President Obama was certainly seri-
ous in effecting this option, and persuaded Bashar Al-Assad to voluntarily give
up his chemical stockpile by autumn 2013. Though Putin has received the cred-
it for this (“punished the West”), it would not have happened without credible
“pressure” from the White House under Chapter VII of the UN Charter along
President Obama’s subdued leadership style (“leading from behind”) of “make
them think it was their idea”.31 In this case, it manifested as effective discussions
with Syria and at the UN in September 2013 at last for the removal of its chemi-
cal weapons stockpile for now (with the possibility of Russia having to answer
for its support of Syrian chemical weapons to the Court of International Justice).
As President Obama was able to achieve Russia’s agreement in the UNSC on
September 26, 2013 for the removal of Syrian chemical weapons, without an
automatic UN Chapter VII mandate (Gordon 2013), some writers (Trenin 2013)
suggest that this demonstrates Russia’s lacking commitment to an international
security system grounded in international institutions, in particular the UNSC
(as Russia is assured that no issue it disapproves of will ever get passed at this
forum, as two of the five permanent members, i.e., China and itself are always
likely to cancel any vote by the other three members, France, the UK, and the
U.S.), but prefers to focus on scoring points in international prestige (which it
initially lost, together with actual economic and military capacity, after the disso-
lution of the USSR) over President Obama by preventing him from striking Syria
in late summer 2013 at least.
30
Consisting of the EU, the UN, the U.S. and Russia.
31
While some scholars gleefully stated that “Putin Scores on Syria” (Hill 2013), I would argue that
with a gun to his (actually his protege, Bashar Al-Assad’s) (figurative) head, Putin came around
at last to finally (give the appearance at least to) seriously negotiate the first (diplomatic) steps for
Al-Assad to relinquish chemical arms.
CZECH REPUBLIC
SLOVAKIA Existing gas network
MOLDOVA
Priority project (pipeline)
Baumgarten ROMANIA
Major pipeline with links to a priority project
AUSTRIA HUNGARY
SLOVENIA REP. OF CROATIA

GEORGIA
BOSNIA & Tbilisi
HERZEGOVINA
BULGARIA Baku
FED. REP. YUGOSLAVIA AZERBAIJAN
ITALY Istanbul
Erzurum ARMENIA SHAH DENIZ FIELD
FYR OF Komotini
MACEDONIA Karacabey Ankara
Ipsana
TURKEY
Loutsa
GREECE
CYPRUS SYRIA
IRAN
IRAQ
LEBANON
Fig. 4.1 Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea Oil and Gas Corridors (Graph courtesy of Francesc
Serra, Universidad Autonoma Barcelona).
Economic
Russia’s role in the EMRSSC (in all directions: north, south, east, and west in the
greater EuroMed) is economic as well as political—the two often intertwined to
serve each other. The economic aspect is expanding, and more visible, since the
Cold War. An interesting example of this occurred in the context of the 2008 euro
financial crisis and the Cyprian bailout. While many Europeans were pleased to
see the bubble created by substantial cash deposits from wealthy Russians—and
the liability it meant for the EU in the context of the Cyprian financial crisis after-
wards—dissolved, it led in the end to control of a systemic institution of the EU:
the bail-out plan, seeking to absolve European taxpayers at least partially from the
expense of paying for banks’ mistakes, created unintended consequences. Instead
of banishing
dirty Russian money from Cyprus’ bloated banks [,…] it has pulled Russia even deeper into
Europe’s financial system by giving its plutocrats majority ownership, at least on paper, of
the Bank of Cyprus, the country’s oldest, biggest and most important financial institution.
‘Whoever controls the Bank of Cyprus controls the island’ (Higgins 2013).
Russia’s new role in the Mediterranean is emerging, as compared to that during the
Soviet era, using energy as an instrument of state policy—and if not going westward
to the EU (Russia positioning itself in competition with North African producers),
the Caspian and Central Asia energy flow is increasingly toward China (compare
Fig. 4.1).
Hard Power
Some authors have since suggested that the major powers in the Mediterranean will
have to shift their understanding of operations to take into consideration the leverage
China 85
of emerging regional hegemons, such as Turkey in this case, to find solutions to

joint political and economic challenges. While the Russian fleet “trawls” the Medi-
terranean among the local fleets (many being members of NATO), the significance
of Mediterranean maritime security per se is exemplified by Russia.
The first step might be the increased integration of Russia into NATO beyond
the Partnership for Peace to anchor Russia’s multiple current and potential near
and far security dilemmas in a more transparent multilateralism—cemented in the
reinforcement which neoliberalism can provide, such as the Russian joint venture,
TNK-BP, vis-à-vis a potential neo-imperial Russian state policy.
Concluding Remarks
While Russia may dream of being a significant actor in a “tripolar” Mediterra-

nean, together with the EU and Turkey (Krastev and Leonard 2010), it may want
to hone its foreign policy based on multilateral trust based on cooperation instead,
as there are a multitude of potentially emerging actors beyond these, such as the
countries of the Southern Mediterranean, some briefly detailed in this book. The
conflict in Syria could ignite Islamic unrest around the region, even as far as Rus-
sia’s own restive Muslim regions, and, if it were mismanaged, represents one of
the security dilemmas Russia continues to face today in the EuroMed—and shows
that Russia is capable of contributing to that region’s stability in certain parts, such
as a military strike would have risked, spreading the conflict far beyond Syria’s
borders….
China
China’s Complex Interests in the EuroMed: Expanding Soft

Power and Hard Power
China’s role in the EuroMed and its inter-regional relations are by far more evolved
than is appreciated generally in the West. For example, while the official Chinese
discourse—and modus operandi—was that China supports Palestinian rights within
the international consensus, hereby seeking overall a political balance in the region
(Zhiyue 2012), i.e. at the moment through
an unobtrusive and avoidance-based … plan … to keep [China] out of disputes and foster
a balanced approach to strategic affairs in the Middle East. Because China’s policy in the
region is motivated more by economic interests, this foreign policy tactic serves an impor-
tant goal. Essentially, China wants to do business with everyone in the region, regardless of
individual countries’ relations with each other (Zhiyue 2012, p. 1).
On the contrary, the strategic importance of this “peaceful trading relation-

ship with everyone” is exemplified when one compares U.S. and Japanese
vulnerability to high oil prices in the spring of 201232 following uncertainty

about future political developments—and stability—in Middle Eastern oil pro-
ducing countries, compared to China’s lack of vulnerability, largely because “it
has become the primary beneficiary of OPEC’s rising trade expenditure… [in
terms of] [t]he recycling of large sums of petrodollars through rising imports of
goods by oil producers” (Blas 2012). This has been viewed as “the largest trans-
fer of wealth in the history of the economy…from consuming to producing coun-
tries” (Birol, quoted in Blas 2012).
While Chinese foreign policy in the greater EuroMed was in the (recent) past
predominantly through trade, human assistance (such as building hospitals and
sports areas in developing countries), and low-level diplomacy (preferring to re-
main noncommittal in regional political issues), regional strategic collaboration
between China and, e.g., Turkey, the UAE, the Arab League, and of course, Iran
are more substantial than is commonly known, as is Chinese military presence in
terms of its navy for example. While public opinion globally ranked China a couple
years ago higher than the U.S. (Burson-Marsteller 2010; Pew 2010; BBC 2010),
both Europe and the U.S. cannot underestimate China’s foreign policy of acquir-
ing equity stakes in strategic assets, including energy exploration and production
projects (Chen 2011). However, in 2011, despite the continuing significance of the
Arab–Chinese relationship, Arab perceptions of China have deteriorated, inter alia
due to China’s veto (together with Russia’s) of the UN Security Council’s resolu-
tion that called for Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad to step down, and China’s lack
of action in the context of the economic sanctions on Iran. This perspective was
reinforced when China “highlighted its desire for access to arms technology and
less criticism on human rights” (Rettmann 2012, p. 1) as conditions to deepen the
relationship between the EU and China in the future.
China’s expansion into the Euro–Mediterranean is projected with an appearance
of peaceful economic engagement, supportive of UN resolutions pertaining to the
Middle East process, and in particular, engaging Syria beyond the economic, into
the cultural sphere (ISRIA 2010c). However, the anti-Chinese sentiment in many
markets has become caustic, such as the political disagreements over m anipulated
Chinese exchange rates, which affect European exports as much as other non-Chi-
nese exports, negatively. Additionally, on the African continent, some countries
appreciate Chinese investments in infrastructure and natural resource exploration
for their speed and price advantage over European investors, although others com-
plain that no African who has worked for a Chinese company saw his life improve.
Chinese traders have stifled local traders in some (North) African countries to such
an extent that locals resorted to kidnapping Chinese traders en masse to force their
retreat in some areas. The impact for the Mediterranean is inter alia its effect on
sub-Saharan socio-economic stability on illegal migration into the northern Mediter-
ranean via Saharan (Southern Mediterranean) countries.
These observations also hold true inter-regionally, e.g., in respect to Chinese
business in Iran and the competition the former have given the latter beyond the
32
Of course, by autumn 2013, the U.S. approached energy self-sufficiency.
China 87
poor quality of Chinese products. This popular Iranian resentment to Chinese trade
is matched by popular Iranian resentment of Chinese politics, which have supported
international sanctions in mid-2010 (Maloney 2011, p. 4). Nevertheless, Iranian–Chi-
nese petroleum business continues to grow, with Iranian oil exported to meet Chinese
ever-expanding industries, and, after being refined in China, some of it being reim-
ported to Iran: Local MENA economic sentiment about Chinese business practices
in the region playing a subordinated role to the grand foreign policy strategies of the
inter-regionally evolving hegemons’ role there…
China actively seeks trade and economic cooperation with the Arab World (note
the China-Arab International Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum in September
2011 in Yinchuan). However, in the Northern Mediterranean, reports accumulate that
Chinese investments appear to be less for economic exchanges, but have increasingly
strategic and political ends.33 State-sponsored industrial espionage, representing a
tremendous transfer of wealth—to benefit ultimately Chinese state power is just one
example of this.
Hence China’s assertive and “trigger-happy” foreign policy, and its economic and
political destabilizing influence abroad, is treated by many other foreign policy actors
as a threat. As a result, China’s practices and presence in the Euro–Mediterranean is
observed with great reservation from the Northern Mediterranean more recently as
well. Different from the generosity of the Kennedys, China does not seek to share its
wealth with humanity, but to expand at the expense of the West, to strengthen their
nation at the expense of any other. While it is claimed not to be militarily aggressive
(which can be debated in terms of their extensive naval and their facility expansion
throughout Asia—and Europe, including the infrastructure expansion, which could
be argued to serve potentially future military strategy in the region),34 it bears the
marks of suffocating the economic bases for other countries’ political and social, and
in the end, potentially geographic survival—and leave the remainders to China in
“fire sales” in the end?
The U.S. National Security Strategy directive towards China overall is to
“pursue a ‘positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship’ and ‘prepare
accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies … are not negatively affect-
ed’” (The White House 2010, quoted in Chen 2011, p. 7). However, in the pro-
cess of close contact, the collision of interests between the U.S. and China could
increase.35
Whether currency wars as a result of politically staged global trade imbalances
have been averted only temporarily for now, or longterm, will depend to a large
33
Beyond forced (or face market exclusion) transfer of Western know-how in return for European
market access to China, Chinese investments in Europe involve inter alia transport route construc-
tion (e.g., a highway in Poland and a bridge in Serbia), having the character of seeking to gain
political influence (and geostrategic access?) over sovereigns as a result of huge state subsidies in
the form of very low rates for longterm loans from the EXIM Bank, including the refinancing of
Kazakhstan’s banks (Wiesmann and Schaefer 2010).
34
Compare the arrival of the Chinese icebreaker through the northern route in Iceland in 2013.
35
Compare the contested “Chinese strategic airspace”, an accelerating conflict by November
2013.
extent on the balance between multilateralism and aggression in Chinese foreign

policy. China certainly was quick (and effective) in capitalizing on the U.S. govern-
ment shutdown on 1 October 2013, when President Obama completely cancelled
his attendance at all events of his planned Asia trip,36 leaving many to doubt the
U.S.’ ability to stand up to China’s international expansionist policy, whether in
respect to offer Japan and other allies backing over their dispute with China over
islands in the East China Sea—or in respect to NATO partners.
Turkey’s decision to purchase a Chinese missile defense system in October 2013
was not only based on the more economical price of the system and the accompany-
ing largesse of promised Chinese investments in Istanbul to build an industrial park
near its airport, but is also strategic, as the Chinese system is not interoperable with
NATO’s early warning radar system provided to Turkey (Stein et al. 2013). Beyond
economic involvement in the EuroMed, China is now concretely and effectively in-
tegrating itself militarily in this region with the definitive intent to exclude the West.
Depending on future Russian–Chinese alignments, this could mean a more (or less)
significant strategic shift of the EMRSSC.
From a U.S. perspective, the preceding belies strategic interests, as China’s role
in the greater MENA will have to be managed very cautiously to reduce zero sum
dynamics, such as for energy resources (China and the U.S. are the largest energy
customers globally),37 and strategic access to the area. So far China has, to a large
extent, been a free rider of the U.S.’ efforts to bolster reliability of energy explora-
tion and production in the global market, and especially in MENA, including the
longterm, although the U.S. has worked since 2009 at a tactical level with China to
counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden—while China simultaneously sabotaged global
security, e.g., through its veto of UNSC sanctions (with the result e.g., of helping
to militarize North Korea (Hoyos 2012, p. 2), and hence threaten global security in
favor of Chinese national (power) interests.
In terms of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis China, President Obama “has begun to
pursue the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would ultimately link the Pacific
coast countries of the Western Hemisphere with those of the Asia-Pacific in order
to increase Pacific Basin trade and security and help offset China’s influence in
Latin America” (Kaufman Purcell 2011), indicating a significant geopolitical shift,
as Latin America, especially Venezuelan President Chavez decried the U.S. as a
declining power in the Western Hemisphere and China as a rising one (the latter
hungering for Latin America’s resources...).
36
Xi Jinping “became the first foreigner [in October 2013] to address the Indonesian Parliament,
offering billions of dollars in trade to the country that was Obama’s childhood home” (Perlez
2013), before moving on to Malaysia and the APEC and ASEAN summits.
37
This is about to change, as indicated earlier, in that the U.S. approaches energy-independence
-and potentially becoming a significant energy exporter itself: “Once considered a source of vul-
nerability to America’s superpower status, oil and gas production has now become the very foun-
dation of the country’s economic strength” (Perry 2013, p. 1).
China 89
These dynamics reinforce the overarching theme that the EuroMed is itself
the strategic theater not only as it pertains to its immediate neighborhood but also
globally, strategically,38 involving Asia to the East, and Latin America trans-Atlan-
tically—and reciprocally, which is the essence of the EMRSSC.
38
And in terms of immediate trans-Atlantic terrorism with Hezbollah training camps in Latin Amer-
ica active not only militarily but also supported economically (banking, air transport, etc.) by all
levels of society in several Latin American countries. Hezbollah, as the nonstate armed branch of
radical Shia Islamists, has a direct relationship to state sponsors (Farah 2012, p. 5). “As the [U.S.’
Directorate of Intelligence] DIA noted in 2010: ‘the Qods Force38 stations operatives in foreign
embassies, charities, and religious/cultural institutions to foster relationships with people, often
building on existing socio-economic institutions to foster relationships with people, often building
on existing socio-economic ties with the well-established Shia diaspora’ (Farah 2012, p. 5)—and
operational capabilities around the world. It is well established in the Middle East and North Africa,
and recent years have witnessed an increased presence in Latin America, particularly in Venezu-
ela…. The profits of global TOC activities, even before factoring in the growing efficiencies derived
for state sponsorship and protection, are enormous. The sheer scale of the enterprise, and the impact
it has on legal economies, argues for sustained national and international attention and resources as
a tier-one security threat… The Bolivarian and Iranian Revolutions: Ties that Bind: Iran, identified
by successive U.S. administration as a state sponsor of terrorism, has expanded its political allianc-
es, diplomatic presence, trade initiatives and military and intelligence programs in the Bolivarian
axis. This press for expanded ties comes despite the almost complete lack of cultural or religious ties
to the region, linguistic affinity, or traditional economic logic and rationale in the relationships. The
relationship, in fact, is built on a common perception of history and grievances against the United
States38 that lead directly to the doctrine of asymmetrical warfare and the embrace of the concept of
justified use of WMDs against its enemies” (Farah 2012, p. 6–7).
Chapter 5
Levels of Security—Inter-Regional Level:
Part B Non-State Actors
Inter-governmental Organizations:
Global Governance—Leading from Behind
or Through Consensus?
NATO
Countries aligned with NATO enjoyed post-WWII a period of “significant eco-

nomic development—fostered by the generous financial support” (Sanfelice di
Monteforte 2013, p. 7) of the U.S., enabling their rapid recovery from the ruins of
war—while they were politically and militarily severely weakened during the post-
Colonial period and unable to resist the independence processes—often under laical
leadership—of the southern Mediterranean.
One of NATO’s advantages was the control of all key points of the Mediterranean
basin (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 7), both through soft-power (e.g., the
Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), and through hard
power (i.e., military bases in both the northern and southern Mediterranean (and
beyond, e.g., in the GCC), thus making the Mediterranean “a Western Lake” (Sanfelice
di Monteforte 2013, p. 7). It was not peaceful, however, with the populations in
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) often engaged in guerilla movements,
military revolutions, and civil wars during their struggle for independence—setting
“the stage for long-lasting hatreds” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 7).
NATO represents the multilateral trans-Atlantic link for security involvement in
the Euro-Mediterranean region. This “enhanced cooperation” has new relevance for
the EMRSSC in light of the influence of emerging hegemons (such as extra-regionally,
e.g., the Chinese and Russian economic and political influence discussed in the pre-
ceding chapter), and intra-regionally, such as through Turkey’s NATO membership,
as discussed previously as well. While the trans-Atlantic influence in the greater
Mediterranean had mixed results in the past, during the Arab Spring, there have been
repeated calls for NATO assistance.
In the southern Mediterranean, NATO’s projected role for the future1 as a bridge
between the European and the North American member states continues to be
1
in terms of: Home Missions (Deterrence and Defense →lead role. Trans-Atlantic Resilience and
Europe Whole, Free and at Peace →support/selective role); and Away Missions (Crisis Prevention
→lead/selective support role. Stability Operations →support/selective lead role. Working Effec-
tively with Partners →Support/Ensemble Player) (Hamilton et al. 2009, p. 23).

92 5 Levels of Security—Inter-Regional Level: Part B Non-State Actors
strong, if more subtle within non-Article 5 missions as compared to only Article 5

missions. It is well positioned vis-à-vis the European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP) and EU soft power initiatives for crisis management, much more able to
integrate Madeline Albright’s “3 Ds-directive” (of “no duplication of efforts, no dis-
crimination towards any member countries, and no decoupling of member states”)
between it and the ESDP. NATO members joined hands in funding common secu-
rity to be able to reduce state military spending by avoiding duplication between
national and NATO resources—a process of international integration proceeding
slowly as individual states are holding back to protect domestic defense industries
and staffing. The November 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon showcased the new
NATO 2020 Strategic Concept to address new dangers under the complex demands
of many-sided operations in an era of response capability needs, which are versa-
tile, yet under tight resources, in order to support its principle of democracy against
totalitarian ideologies.
Modern state security requires hardware as well as pro-active skills to face mod-
ern threats, such as in cyber security, missile defense, and sea- and airlift capacity.
Some of NATO’s work for the coming decades is within a newly formalized (as of
September 2008) relationship with UN positions within “a framework for expanded
consultation and cooperation” (Hamilton et al. 2009, p. 39), then for example, “to
safeguard Kosovo’s fragile stability… (or for the protection) of UN food aid ship-
ments to Somalia against the threat of pirate attacks” (Hamilton et al. 2009, p. 39).
During the Arab Spring, the involvement of the international community, especially
in terms of NATO, in the period leading up to the overthrow of Gaddafi was
mainly based on NATO’s support of the civilians in the Libyan civil war of 2011, and the
role UNSMIL (the UN Support Mission in Libya) as the central coordinator of foreign
activities in the post-conflict setting, and, more general, on the response of both the West
and the neighboring countries to the overall security implications of the Arab Spring
(Muhlberger 2013, p. 2).
The synergy of international organizations, beyond states and (inter-)regional

organizations, plays a significant role in the post-Arab Spring EMRSSC, including
trans-Atlantic (core) interests and responsibility. Both the EU and the U.S. have
made compromises with cooperative leaders in the southern Mediterranean, even
if they do not conform to the Western ideal of democracy, respect for international
law and universally agreed-on human rights in order to maintain the dialogue with
“incentive conditionality.” However, this often leads to superficial results with-
out deeper reforms taking place. Beyond the moral and soft power aspect, this
organization also protects especially hard security sectors, such as stopping ille-
gal immigration towards the northern Mediterranean countries (especially their
potential for “infiltration by terrorist cells”) (Muhlberger 2013, p. 3) and human-,
weapons- and narco-trafficking.
Whether, in fact, the “pooling and sharing” of NATO member assets is occurring
at a significant level is up for debate at the time of writing: it appears to be just one
example of missing political will on the part of the European NATO members to ac-
complish this policy objective, preferring too often “muddle-through compromises”
NATO 93
(crisis- rather than strategy-driven)—calling into question whether the necessary

expertise for this defense is being kept alive and up-to-date among European NATO.
Of course the question arises of who will fill this capacity- and human capital
void in the future (with the Chinese icebreaker Xuelong successfully navigating
the Arctic Ocean to Iceland (where the Chinese government2 has been extremely
interested in purchasing very large tracts of land since 2012) in August 2013, it
now has the strategic capability to reach Europe “directly” with potentially signifi-
cant amounts of security-relevant hardware—and power interests beyond those of a
peaceful mercantilist foreign policy). The recalibrating of U.S. vs. European contri-
butions and commitment to NATO is being observed very carefully by external ac-
tors: for the moment Europe represents the support mission to NATO (non-) Article
5 projects. The Mediterranean, however, remains pivotal to the U.S.’ re-balancing
towards Asia—in the meantime China is asserting its (military?) presence into the
EMRSSC into MENA in addition to the north of the EU (i.e., the “northern Mediter-
ranean” politically).
In a trans-Atlantic environment of new approaches to the rapid shifts in the
MENA, inter alia in the security and foreign policy areas (such as an anticipated
soft-balancing of power), notably Operation Desert Dawn, the control of chemical
weapons in Syria and a renewed direct NPT dialogue with Iran, it is essential that
this opportunity for the EU–U.S. security dialogue3 is maximized, not squandered to
achieve improved continued prosperity and stability within it (an area encompass-
ing approximately 505 million EU citizens,4 313 million U.S. and almost 34 mil-
lion Canadian citizens), but also in the greater trans-Atlantic neighborhood. While
many expected to enjoy the peace dividend after the end of the Cold War, stability
and prosperity continue not to be guaranteed in this greater trans-Atlantic security
complex (compare Boening 2008b). In fact, many threats can only be solved jointly,
such as energy security (both sourcing and shipments), management of Iranian and
North Korean nuclear proliferation (in light of the dynamics with “extra-regional”
players of influence in the Euro-Mediterranean, briefly discussed in previous chap-
ters), environmental degradation, or food and water security for millions, especially
2
“The feat underscores Beijing’s desire to extend its reach into the oil- and gas-rich area: The
Arctic holds an estimated 22–25 % of the world’s undiscovered petroleum resources.
In addition, as the thaw slowly opens up the region due to climate change, the change in the
polar environment of the Arctic is set to unveil new trade routes for several countries, which also
sparked China’s interest, and led to its application to become an observer at the Arctic Council,
made up of the U.S., Russia, Canada, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark and Iceland” (Martins
2013).
3
Incorporating inter alia multilateral security aspects, such as a follow-up on the Pittsburgh Sum-
mit commitment to implement the G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth.
4
With several candidate countries on track to join, this could potentially enlarge the EU’s area and
population substantially. This enlargement process per se encompasses a dynamic which in itself,
if not carried out effectively, could destabilize the EU and cause it to lose its leverage, as might
become the case with Turkey’s EU candidacy: Turkey might turn east to build its influence in the
Middle East, if its candidacy continues to be sabotaged by some EU members.
when other potential multilateral partners’ security dilemmas do not enable their
cooperation (compare Blitz and Bozorgmehr 2009).
Previous findings (e.g., Boening 2008a) indicate the greater Mediterranean region
resembling a Regional Security Complex, taking into account security levels and sec-
tors as well as other criteria from Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan and
Waever 2003). Hence all soft and hard power aspects of political, economic, and
socio-cultural “co-existence” in the greater Euro-Mediterranean region, in addition to
classical military security, continue to be at play and will likely need to be strengthened
in light of the assertion of emerging potential regional hegemons to the east and south.
Gulf Region/Gulf Cooperation Council5
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981 as a security coop-
eration and regional integration initiative amid security concerns following the Iran-
Iraq war—though regional integration was uneven: The GCC customs union was
only established in 2005, and Bahrain and Oman signed bilateral (not GCC-wide)
free trade agreements (FTAs) with the U.S. in 2004 and 2006, respectively. After
numerous postponements, talks on the creation of a common currency have been
frozen after Oman and the United Arab Emirates decided to opt out. Nevertheless,
the process of regional integration advanced, and in 2008 GCC MSs established a
common market with the creation of the Gulf Customs Union.
GCC member states have a high portion of state-ownership in enterprises, inter
alia in their hydrocarbon resources and the banking sector. This complicates re-
gional integration and privatization efforts (although the state generally facilitates
the private sector in member states) (Ayadi and Gadi 2013).
Sectarianism and the Arab Spring in the Gulf
The Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria inspired other countries and reli-
gious groups in the MENA, including the Shia (often migrant workers from Paki-
stan, etc.) in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to protest their minority status
(and inferior living conditions and lack of political power) there—giving Iran a
potentially stronger foothold in the Gulf as well. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Ara-
bia have maintained strong ties with the U.S.—especially Saudi Arabia was very
supportive of regime change in Libya, and is sympathetic to the Syrian opposi-
tion’s attempts to overthrow the Al-Assad regime. While affluent rentier states,
such as Saudi Arabia were able to quell domestic unrest6 by exponentiating their
5
Member states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
6
A number of scholars have pointed to the negative correlation between oil and democratization
(compare Karl 1997; Tsui 2010; Yetiv 2013).
Gulf Region/Gulf Cooperation Council 95
social payments, Saudi Arabia additionally has undertaken a number of “National

Dialogues” since 2003 (predating the Arab Spring) to identify and address popu-
lar discontent when other countries chose to ignore or downplay it (or were unable
to find a reform modus operandi with the old guard) to foster increased tolerance,
and accommodate more diverse political actors by granting more rights such as
“for ethnic and religious minorities; widespread educational reform; enhanced
rights for women in a number of areas; and an antiterrorism campaign aimed at
delegitimizing violence” (Yetiv 2013, p. 106).
Politically, the GCC has been acutely involved inter-regionally, if behind the
scenes, in affecting outcomes in countries undergoing Arab Spring revolts7: from
the U.S. perspective (e.g., the National Council on U.S.–Arab Relations), decisions
made pertaining to MENA continue to be relevant beyond the region, but also glob-
ally. These decisions need to be a shared responsibility inter-regionally due to the
stakes8 of the diverse actors involved there, and the shared pursuit of increased
stability, sovereignty, and greater prosperity amid the current volatile, if not cha-
otic, dynamic nature of the region (DiploNews 2013a): The Arab Spring in Tunisia,
Egypt, and Syria inspired other countries in the MENA, including the Shia (often
migrant workers from Pakistan etc.) in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to protest
their minority status (and inferior living conditions and lack of political power)
there—giving Iran a potential stronger foothold there as well—with all three latter
actors maintaining strong ties with the U.S. Saudi Arabia in particular was very
supportive of regime change in Libya, and is sympathetic to the Syrian opposition’s
attempts to overthrow Al-Assad’s regime.
Prince Banda bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s intelligence chief, scaled back its co-
operation with the U.S., however, enhancing his country’s cooperation with the
Syrian rebels instead after the U.S. backed off from the military intervention in
Syria after their regime’s use of chemical weapons in August 2013. Saudi Arabia’s
frustration went so far that it even spurned a non-permanent seat in the UNSC in
the autumn of 2013 (Mohammed and Westall 2013) in protest over U.S. policies
towards Syria, Iran, Egypt and the Palestine-Israeli conflict—although U.S. Secre-
tary of State, John Kerry, confirms that the U.S. and Saudi continue to share core
values: As sectarian tensions pre-date the Arab Spring, the Gulf region, supported
by the West, continues to be obsessed with Iran’s potential influence9 post-Arab
Spring—especially in light of a potentially waning U.S. influence (and legitimacy)
7
Ostensibly “repaid” by the attempted assassination in Washington, D.C. of a Saudi envoy to
the U.S., ascribed to the Quds force—just one more example of Iran’s asymmetrical warfare, in
addition to its strategies of being a volatile destabilizing threat to the EMRSSC region, whether
through illicit operations (“charitable donations-” based global money transfers), illicit trademark
“acquisitions,” economic coercion, or eroding fragile structures, all representing a military and a
nonmilitary threat.
8
Such as “the free flow of resources through key shipping lanes, the defense of the U.S. homeland
against the threat of terrorism and extremism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion” (DiploNews 2013a).
9
The Bahraini government accused Iran in 1996 of funding the Bahraini Hisballah, which alleg-
edly carried out some violent attacks inside the kingdom (Abdo 2013, p. 11).
in the region. Saudi Arabia supported the ousting of the Shiite Yemeni president
Saleh in February 2012, and was quick to invade Bahrain when their Shiite majority
rose against the (Sunni) al Khalifa ruling family in 2011 (Sanfelice di Monteforte
2013, p. 12) to prevent contagion to Saudi Arabia (Yetiv 2013, p. 103). The greater
regional security (EMRRSSC) mutual interests and support of some of the GCC’s
foreign policy objectives was exemplified by the non-intervention of the U.S. fol-
lowing the dispatch of about 1,000 Saudi troops, 500 security personnel and more
than 100 armored vehicles to Bahrain in February 2011 to quell the uprisings in
Manama’s Pearl Roundabout in exchange for Saudi support for the non-fly zone in
Libya leading up to Operation Desert Dawn.
Some authors (e.g., Cooley and Nexon 2011), however, have strongly advocated
a zero-sum tradeoff by the U.S. between pragmatism and idealism—arguing that
this would not automatically strengthen Iranian influence in the Gulf, as the Shia
should be better integrated into Bahraini political processes (as they do not automat-
ically seek to align themselves with Tehran). Other writers (compare Smith Diwan
2011) have also suggested that allowing broader rights to their Shia minorities and
a fuller political participation in the GCC region would lessen Iranian influence, as
these groups would gain domestic political expression—and (at least partial) own-
ership of the political process—rather than having to take their dissatisfaction to the
street and openly polarize these countries further.
Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf
The GCC, until the fall of Saddam Hussein, had a relationship of mistrust and ani-
mosity with Iraq (Ragab 2013, p. 2), and has “not yet developed a cohesive strategy
for collective or bilateral engagement with” (Ragab 2013, p. 2) it. Unfortunately, the
sectarian shift in Iraq post-Hussein intensified the threat perception of Iraq by the
GCC, as they recognize that they can no longer effectively control the effect of Iraqi
Shiites on their own political systems (Ragab 2013, p. 3). The result is a recognition
of the need to pro-actively take a stronger role in shaping the security environment
of the Gulf inter-regionally.10
The Sunni11-led Gulf States (GCC), alarmed by the rise of Iran, continue to rely
on NATO to protect their oil shipments and proximate security. Even though the
10
It has been suggested that this can take place via enhanced economic engagement with the
Sunni and Kurdish regions in Iraq, be it microeconomic projects, infrastructure development, or
educational projects (similarities with the pre-EU accession strategies between western and central
Europe come to mind, such as the Central European Initiative), political strategic dialogues, such
as cooperation in regional issues involving nonproliferation, state- and nation-building efforts in
Syria, and counter-terrorism (Ragab 2013, p. 3)—this small example of the GCC in the inter-
regional dynamics of the EMRSSC alone shows the saliency—and far- and deep-reaching com-
plexities of this Regional Security Super Complex.
11
With a special branch, Wahhabism, (or its less derogatory term, Salafism) being the domi-
nant sect in Saudi Arabia. Ironically, while Sunni Islam represents a progressive form of Islam,
Gulf Region/Gulf Cooperation Council 97
Saudis were furious when Washington did not support Mubarak—and Washington
reciprocally frustrated with the Al Saud family over their interference in Bahrain—
at a time when non-U.S. NATO members plan drastic defense cuts,12 it leaves the
U.S. to compensate for these to maintain inter alia the Gulf’s security and oil ship-
ments to the West (as well as its energy security) and to Asia—possibly to the detri-
ment of the U.S.’ fleet strength in the Mediterranean proper.
When the nuclear accord was signed between Iran and the U.S., France, Ger-
many, Great Britain, Russia, and China on November 24, 2013 after marathon, tor-
tuous, and politically charged negotiations, Tehran’s possible routes to a nuclear
bomb were cut off in exchange for initial sanctions relief. This signaled “the start
of a game-changing rapprochement that could ease the risk of a wider Middle
East war, …[and] won the critical endorsement of Iranian clerical Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei” (Business Standard 2013). This deal, however, collid-
ed with Saudi Arabia’s continued interest to reign-in Iran, preferably militarily
by a U.S. strike on its nuclear facilities. The recent Iranian accord confirms that
the U.S. refuses to get involved in Saudi Arabia’s sectarian agenda, a country
which perceives itself as successively weakened by the recent drop in oil prices
following this accord (due to Iranian oil reaching world markets again), plus the
loss of its ally, Hosni Mubarak, and the U.S.’ minimal reliance on oil imports
by late 2013—and the consequences Saudis fear it could have on their overall
hard security-backing from the U.S.13 This also exacerbates Saudi Arabia’s con-
tinuing concern about the rising Iranian influence in the Middle East after Iran’s
recently renewed legitimacy following the nuclear accord. This explains Saudi
support of the Syrian opposition, such as their pledge of (military) support for
a U.S.-led forceful removal of Syrian chemical weapons in late summer 2013
(but not of the Egyptian protesters (Yetiv 2013, p. 110) to remove Mubarak). The
subsequent removal of the democratically elected government succeeding him in
Egypt, of course, removed an ideological threat from the GCC (with the exception
of Qatar) (Coates Ulrichsen 2013, p. 1)—though it remains to be argued whether
this actually implies a return to the pre-Arab Spring status quo in Egypt, or demo-
cratic consolidation in MENA.
Wahhabism/Salafism is rather puritanical and intolerant (Saudi Osama bin Laden hence was very
welcome with his fundamentalist form of Islam with the Taliban in Afghanistan).
12
The UK is proposing 10–20 % in defense cuts, and Germany aims to reduce its army by 30 %
(Domby and Luce 2010).
13
Thomas Lippman of the MEI refutes this by pointing out that “we’re [the U.S.] training their
[Saudi Arabia’s] National Guard, we’re doing security plans and training for oil terminals and
other facilities, and we’re implementing one of the biggest arms deals in history” (Worth 2013).
GCC Inter-Regional Relationships
The GCC reflects the overlapping regional and trans-Atlantic actors and strategies
in the inter-regional Mediterranean dynamics between relying on the soft power of
the EU in terms of their economic cooperation agreements (even if these often lag
in ratification and implementation) (Schumacher 2010, p. 11), and relies on—and
cooperates with14—the hard security, which is supported to a large extent by the
U.S.15 The GCC’s challenge is to take a pro-active role in shaping the collective,
or at least trans-Atlantically coordinated, regional security strategy in dealing with
their (perceived—to view it from a social-constructivist perspective) inter-regional
challenges.
The GCC is aware of its finite hydrocarbon resources—and seeks to expand into
other economic sectors to foster a more future-oriented and multifaceted relation-
ship inter-regionally within the EMRSSC for its post-hydrocarbon era: In October
2013, the GCC and South Korea signed a comprehensive Partnership Agreement,
reflecting the increasingly stronger and broader Middle East–Asia cooperation, not
just any longer out of choice, but out of necessity to foster mutually enhancing
economic relations, and to mutually contribute to increased political and cultural
communications.
The EU-GCC free trade agreement, for its part, continues to inch towards com-
pletion as well—while inter-regional actors speed by….
Concluding Remarks
The unrest and mass demonstrations in Bahrain in 2011, in Kuwait in the autumn
of 2012, in Saudi Arabia’s eastern province, and to a lesser extent in other parts of
the Gulf, have been contained (often through the government’s largesse available
as a result of high oil prices), although they are not comprehensively politically
resolved: While Saudi Arabia claims to have broken up
cells linked to the Muslim Brotherhood that were ostensibly targeting national security…the
Sultan of Oman remains firmly in power. Meanwhile, in Qatar, the decision by Emir Sheikh
Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani to hand power to his son won widespread praise for the con-
sensual transfer of responsibility to a new ruling generation (Coates Ulrichsen 2013, p. 2).
Overall, the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, have been playing a
considerable role in reshaping the contours of this region in flux: Initially in Libya,
and subsequently in Syria, GCC states have backed opposition groups materially
and militarily (Coates Ulrichsen 2013, p. 2).
14
As exemplified by the attendance of all GCC states (with the exception of Kuwait) at the 2007
Annapolis conference, together with Israel (Schumacher 2010, p. 15), and the Saudi-Qatari Peace
Initiative, presented at the Arab League’s 2002 meeting in Beirut, and re-endorsed in 2007 by
Jordanian King Abdullah (Ibid., p. 16).
15
Compare October 2010: US$ 60 billion weapons sale to Saudi Arabia.
Arab League 99
The multisectoral and level dynamics of the EMRSSC are endlessly complex—
with multilateralism—and further democracy?—as the GCC’s kingmaker.
Arab League
Inter-regional cooperation between IGOs in the Mediterranean involved addition-

ally also the G8 nations, who agreed in their June 9, 2004 summit at Sea Island, “to
start a cooperation with the Arab League, plus Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey”
(Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 8), the “G8-MENA”. It includes the Partnership
for Progress and a Common Future with programs such as the Democracy Assis-
tance Dialogue, the Fund for the Future, and a Regional Center for Entrepreneurial
Excellence, in addition to funding a number of research centers and academic insti-
tutions devoted to regional development (Boffo and Quadarella 2007).
The Arab League has been involved as a collective regional voice, balancing
outside, especially Western opinions on policy recommendations pertaining to
events in MENA. Some examples are NATO’s operation against the Gaddafi re-
gime, starting on March 19, 2011: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were the
only two members of the Arab League which participated in the operation with lo-
gistical support. Post-Gaddafi, the Arab League is struggling to compensate for the
loss of the substantial financing it received from Libya until 2011, and has played a
more subdued role there.
In 2011, when the current Syrian civil war began, the international community
hoped not to have to take similarly invasive action against the Syrian regime as
it had in Libya. Despite the West’s outrage over Bashar Al-Assad’s repeated, and
ever wider use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilian populations in 2013,
the Arab League concurred with this response—but insisted on an international
response by the United Nations Security Council to take deterrent action against
Syria, rather than the West to constrain Al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons (Da-
gher et al. 2013).
This politically-split response reflects inter alia how two closely allied Arab
heavy-weights, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, may be split over which enemy poses the
greater immediate threat to their regional interests: the Sunni Islamists dominating
the Syrian rebels, or the Shiite Iranian backers of President Al-Assad (Kirkpatrick
and Sandler 2013). But as the conflict escalated, the UN and the Arab League,
leading the international community at that time, sought diplomatic negotiations
to resolve it (Lesch 2013, p. 88)—albeit to have its plan for a “government of na-
tional unity dismissed,… scorn[ing] Gulf nations for walking out of the League’s
peace mission in protest at the behavior of President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime”
(Peel and Fielding-Smith 2013). These discussions are to be continued formally
on a multilateral basis at a peace conference in the autumn of 2013, which U.S.
Secretary of State Kerry called for at an October 14, 2013 meeting with the UN
and Arab League special envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi in London over details
for a transitional Syrian government to replace the regime of President Bashar
Al-Assad (Radio Free Europe 2013), which has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of
the international community.
Furthermore, the Arab League is involved in U.S. Secretary of State Kerry’s
new Middle East peace bid to restart talks between Israelis and Palestinians with
a nine-month timeline for a “final status agreement” to end the decades old con-
flict, reiterating “its commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative, first proposed by
Saudi Arabia in 2002” (FP Morning Brief 2013). These initiatives occur against
continuous challenges by and to the protagonists, however: While Israel commit-
ted to limit West Bank construction and improve conditions in the West Bank and
Gaza at the end of July 2013, this did not stop it from starting new settlements a
couple of days later in August 2013. Palestinians in Gaza are likewise squeezed by
events of the Arab Spring evolving around them; for example, when the Egyptian
“interim” government following Morsi’s ouster cracked down16 on the smuggling
tunnels between Egypt and Gaza. Hamas’ reaction so far appears to be “wait and
see” towards Egypt’s political development now—and further illuminating the sub-
regional micro-“entanglements” of the Arab Spring regionally with not only the
Israeli–Palestinian peace process, but the role of nongovernmental agents (i.e.,
Hamas as a former terrorist organization—now turned legitimately elected politi-
cal party in Gaza). The inter-regional efforts by states and IGOs, such as the Arab
League to resolve these longstanding crises in the region are significant, inter alia
for the regional voice and influence they lend these efforts.
United Nations
The UN’s involvement in MENA has historically been consistently broad—even

if some results have been mixed (such as a resolution to the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict). Several examples in connection with Arab Spring “dynamics” highlight
its continued significance in “moderating” events on an EMRSSC-scale. In Libya,
the UN’s activities are divided between those of the UNSC to monitor the imple-
mentation of the sanctions against the Gaddafi regime (such as a travel ban, asset
freeze, and arms embargo), and those of UNSMIL, which are directed toward sup-
port for democratization, establishment of the rule of law, and disarmament, demo-
bilization, and reintegration (DDR) (Muhlberger 2013, p. 3) post-Gaddafi.
For a long time, the Security Council, constrained by vetoes, was powerless
in the face of the Syrian tragedy. Populations are massacred, and the worst sce-
16
Egyptian soldiers dug up hundreds of tunnels near Rafah, straddling both sides of the Egypt–
Gaza border, turning the “Egyptian side into something resembling a cratered moonscape”
(Bradley and El-Ghobashy 2013, p. 1), and devastated the local economy, as the tunnels served to
transport beyond arms into Gaza, also food, fuel, and other daily civilian supplies following the
Israeli blockage of Gaza since Hamas was elected there in 2007.
United Nations 101
nario unfolded as the regime implemented a large-scale use of chemical weapons

against children, women, and other civilians. For all those who expect the UN to
shoulder its responsibilities to protect populations, this situation is reprehensible.
The elimination of Syrian chemical weapons, especially due to the extremely
tight deadline of its resolution, requires the cooperation of all involved actors,
i.e., especially not only the Al-Assad government, but also the Syrian opposition,
as a number of chemical weapon sites are in Opposition-controlled areas. The
need to rebuild the world geopolitical order is questioned by few—yet few play-
ers have the capability, experience or trust of the others to lead singlehandedly.
In recent UNGA meetings, the Obama Doctrine became more nuanced when the
U.S. President elaborated on the chemical weapons attacks by the Syrian govern-
ment (and the apparent lack of support by U.S. Congress to support a unilateral
military intervention to stop these): “The bigger risk for the world in coming years
is not that the United States will try to build empires abroad, … but that there will
be a price to be paid in chaos and disorder if Americans elect to stay home” (Sanger
2013, p. 1). After approximately 400 drone strikes against Al Qaeda affiliates and
Iran’s nuclear program, President Obama also committed to increased diplomacy
in MENA, especially aimed for the resolution of the nuclear standoff with Iran
and the stalled Israeli–Palestinian peace process, as the recent initiatives with both
show—though oscillating between further UN resolutions pertaining to Israel and
UN recognition of Palestinian statehood.…
An expansion of a trans-Atlantic “regionalism”—and convergence of practices
and complementary interests (rather than some of the hostile suspicions of previous
administrations) might serve these old friends well in the future in light of those
further away, who have arrived in the Mediterranean, and the regions it connects to,
and with whom the relationship is less tested or tried by heritage and tradition. Nev-
ertheless, global power is always being re-balanced, whether in favor of nationalism
or in shifting alliances of multilateralism: while global systems of rules aided not
only traditional stakeholders, but also rising powers, a withdrawal of the West from
international ambitions into isolation might leave the role of “indispensable power”
open to guesses about its intentions and capacities.
This change to the understanding of sovereignty towards interdependence among
postindustrial societies involves a corresponding agreement to the understanding
of aggression in the context of the UN and the International Criminal Court. The
complementarity of the international role in sovereignty is evident in the EU, and
takes the analysis in the Euro-Mediterranean beyond traditional (military) security
from a state-centric perspective in terms of protecting its borders, territory, and
citizens, to include, for example, the UN definition of human security, which also
identifies economic security (i.e., ensuring an adequate individual income), food
security (i.e., guaranteeing access to food), environmental security (i.e., the protec-
tion from long- and short-term natural and man-made disasters), personal security
(i.e., protection from any perpetration of violence or arbitrary arrest), community
security (i.e., the protection from the loss of traditions and values, or from secular
and ethnic violence, or epidemics or ABC warfare), political security (i.e., ensuring
individual basic human rights) (compare e.g., U.S. National Security Policy 2007),
and cyber security, encompassing indirectly all the preceding: as “many genies are
out of the bottle” today, from global finance and its risks in distorting the world
economy, as patient diplomacy alone is not sufficient in addressing these threats in
the economic area, to nuclear proliferation and its lack of deterrence in international
foreign policy.
Inter-Regional Responses to the Arab Spring: Deauville

Partnership With Arab Countries in Transition
The following discussion of the Deauville Partnership is intended to serve as a re-

evaluation of public opinion in the MENA in the past three years of the U.S. as not
supportive of democratization17 in that region. The Deauville Partnership’s overall
goal towards free, democratic, and tolerant societies was envisioned to assist the
post-Arab Spring transitions’ long and difficult road ahead, with extensive exter-
nal economic and political support for institution building and domestic security
needed (and offered as outlined below) to help the newly pluralistic countries meet
citizens’ basic needs, and to evolve into cohesive new political units after the initial
splintering in many post-revolution societies.
The Deauville Partnership18 with Arab Countries in Transition is an international
effort in uniting besides state actors also most IGOs discussed previously in this
chapter. It was launched by the G-8 at the Leaders Meeting in Deauville, France,
on May 2012, following the recognition by G-8 leaders at the Camp David Summit
immediately beforehand, that, while important progress that has been achieved in
17
Huntington (1991) had classically identified three prior global waves of democratization: (1)
From the Expansion of Universal Suffrage in the U.S. in the 1820s until the rise of Fascism about
100 years later; (2) The European decolonialization following WWII until the early 1960s; and
(3) The Third Wave from 1974 in the Iberian peninsula, followed by Latin America, then East
Asia, until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent revolutions in all of Central and Eastern
Europe—but none touching the Arab world.
18
The Partnership includes Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Egypt,
Jordan, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab
Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States, international financial institutions and
organizations committed to supporting reform: The African Development Bank is the rotating
chairman of the IFI platform, which includes the African Development Bank, the Arab Fund for
Economic and Social Development, the Arab Monetary Fund, the European Investment Bank, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, the
International Monetary Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, the OPEC Fund for International
Development, and the World Bank. There are several other organizations that have been supportive
of the Deauville Partnership, including the Arab League, the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, and the United Nations organizations.
Inter-Regional Responses to the Arab Spring: Deauville Partnership … 103
a number of countries undergoing transition and committed to maintaining their

support for these transitions in four key priority areas: stabilization,19 job creation,20
“Stabilization”
19
In response to transition countries’ request for support in promoting economic stabilization

necessary to pursue reform, G-8 members will take the following actions:
• Assist transition countries in the region to stabilize their economies and pursue country-
owned plans, by supporting external financing through the International Monetary Fund
and bilateral assistance, as appropriate, to promote an economic environment conducive
to strong, sound, and sustainable economic growth.
• Encourage direct assistance through the World Bank, African Development Bank, Euro-
pean Investment Bank, and other international financial institutions, and provide bilat-
eral assistance, for country-owned reform plans that promote growth and opportunity
through a combination of loans, grants, budget support, and technical assistance.
• Launch a new Capital Markets Access Initiative to provide credit enhancements, bilater-
ally where such instruments exist, and in conjunction with multilateral institutions, to
help transition countries regain access to international capital markets to spur growth and
jobs (The White House 2012).
20
“Job Creation”
In response to transition countries’ request for support in promoting job creation and allowing
their economies to benefit all citizens, G-8 members endorse the following actions:
• Lead the effort to complete the change of the charter of the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD) to activate the “special fund” for investment in this
region. This will enable the EBRD to invest up to $ 1.3 billion this year, and, with full
ratification of the charter amendment, up to $ 4 billion over the next 3 years. This invest-
ment will bring the EBRD’s expertise in transition economies to the countries committed
to economic transformation, supporting broad-based private sector development, includ-
ing the financing of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the creation of
much-needed jobs.
• Create a new Transition Fund to complement other bilateral and multilateral initiatives in
providing grants, technical assistance, and exchanging best practices that help countries
strengthen institutions critical to economic development and implement country-owned
reforms. Contributing G-8 members will work with regional partners, the World Bank,
and regional institutions such as the Islamic Development Bank to set up the fund with
an initial capitalization of $ 250 million.
• Provide a new generation of young, hard-working and determined men and women with
the skills they need to get good jobs in a competitive economy by supporting increased
vocational education through new schools, exchanges, and training programs.
• Provide support to unlock the potential of a vibrant SME sector that employs millions of
people and capitalizes on the spirit of entrepreneurship in the region through bilateral and
multilateral assistance that strengthens the policy, legal, and regulatory environments,
improves access to finance and builds enterprise skills to allow SMEs to take advantage
of local and international market opportunities to hire more employees and become more
productive and competitive (The White House 2012).
participation/governance,21 and integration22 for “the aspirations of people of the

region for freedom, human rights, democracy, job opportunities, empowerment and
dignity” (The White House 2012).
“Participation/Governance”
21
In response to transition countries’ request for support with reforms that promote transparency,
accountability, and good governance, G-8 members will take the following actions:
• Facilitate the recovery of stolen assets through an Asset Recovery Action Plan, which
facilitates cooperation and capacity building measures to identify and recover the pro-
ceeds of corruption stowed abroad. G-8 and other members of the Partnership will con-
vene the Arab Forum on Asset Recovery in September 2012 in conjunction with the
Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative of the World Bank Group and United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime.
• Assist each transition country with progress toward membership in the Open Govern-
ment Partnership (OGP). Jordan joined the OGP in 2012 and will launch its national
action plan in 2013; Tunisia plans to join the OGP in 2012 and Libya, Morocco, and
Egypt plan to initiate steps toward eligibility this summer.
• Welcome Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia’s commitment to the UN Con-
vention Against Corruption including the participatory and transparent review of their
implementation. Support non-G-8 Partnership countries in their preparation to join
and participate in the Arab Anti-Corruption and Integrity Network and United Nations
Development Program’s Anti-Corruption Initiative for the Arab Countries.
• Create a Financial Sector Advisory Corps consisting of volunteer experts from the public
and private sectors to provide technical assistance to help transition countries develop
financial sectors that are strong, stable, transparent, and accessible. The G-8 will provide
training for public employees in transition through the implementation of training pro-
grams and technical assistance.
• Launch a Partnership exchange program to pair legislators, judges, regional, and munici-
pal leaders and labor unions with G-8 counterparts to build institutional capacity, pro-
mote knowledge sharing, and strengthen accountability and good-governance practices
in transition countries (The White House 2012).
22
“Integration”
In response to transition countries’ interest in opening up their economies to increased trade
and investment with the G-8 and each other, G-8 members will take the following actions:
• Launch bilateral and regional trade initiatives to expand market access, lower barriers
to trade, and promote increased trade between transition countries and the G-8. These
initiatives include the United States’ Middle East and North Africa Trade and Investment
Partnership (MENA TIP); the European Union’s ongoing trade and investment partner-
ship with the Southern Mediterranean, in particular the Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) to be launched, if feasible, later this year; Canada’s com-
pleted FTA with Jordan and ongoing FTA negotiations with Morocco; the Russia-Arab
Cooperation Forum and bilateral Intergovernmental Commissions; and Japan’s invest-
ment agreements with appropriate Partnership countries and the Japan-Arab Economic
Forum.
• Develop initiatives, with the international and regional financial institutions as appropri-
ate, to support trade facilitation.
• Endorse the launch of the Arab Financing Facility for Infrastructure including targeted
investments in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia, and also recognize the
importance of investment in information technology and both “hard” and “soft” infra-
structure to enhance connectivity in the region (The White House 2012).
Inter-Regional Responses to the Arab Spring: Deauville Partnership … 105
One also cannot help but wonder whether the Deauville Partnership was mod-
eled on the UfM’s Marseille Declaration of 2008—but “on steroids” in terms of
objectives and urgency, and hence less room for intra-organizational wrangling
and “standing on protocol,” or lack of hard achievements: specific responsibilities
are clearly spelled out—such as reporting on results, rather than the more vague
“dreams” of the UfM.
• Welcome the Statement on Open International Investment, endorsed by all members

of the Partnership and encourage further strengthening of investment frameworks and
agreement on a common set of investment principles, building on the efforts in MENA-
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Investment program.
• Encourage Jordan’s initiative to join the WTO Government Procurement Agreement,
which saves money and increases accountability through rules to enforce openness,
transparency and non-discrimination in public procurement.
.• Encourage efforts taken by Jordan and Tunisia to adhere to the OECD Declaration on
International Investment and Multilateral Enterprises, and support the adoption by other
Partnership countries.
• Facilitate closer commercial ties with critical sectors to transition countries. The G-8 will
co-sponsor investor conferences focused on information and communications technol-
ogy, renewable energy, agriculture and food, infrastructure, transportation and tourism in
the region with Partnership countries.
• Provide technical assistance to support structural reforms in the Partnership countries to
boost competition and strengthen investment regimes (The Whitehouse 2012).
Chapter 6
Conclusions: Addressing Regional Security
Threats
“Locally,” “Regionally,” and “Globally”
Inter-Regional Responses to the Arab Spring
The Euro-Mediterranean region as a Regional Security Complex continues to be influ-

enced by its intense historical struggles—and the resulting confidence gap (Sanfelice
di Monteforte 2013, p. 13)1. Although the civilian programs of, e.g., FEMIP, the “Five
plus Five” cooperation, and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue have made some prog-
ress in years past to overcome this bilaterally and multilaterally, the sample of security
sectors and levels discussed in the preceding chapters pertaining to the Mediterranean
as a sea as well as a region indicate that security continues to be a prospect rather than
a fait accompli. Insecurity in the Mediterranean as a common destiny needs to be ad-
dressed collectively with problem prevention to enable future generations to have a life
of dignity, freedom, and material necessities: Jeffrey Sachs (2013) pointed out that we
need to seek “a balance of trust rather than just a balance of terror.”
Many authors (compare Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 13) point out that West-
ern nations have exploited the endemic instability of the southern Mediterranean
when they had the power to do so. At a time of reduced northern Mediterranean
power and wealth, the Arab Spring is laying bare strategic fault lines within the
Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex: Europe is able to do little
except supply “bandaid-style” financial assistance and moral support after its latest
effort, the Union for the Mediterranean, failed miserably due to a lack of leadership
and resulting insurmountable dissent, and can now generally simply stand by help-
lessly while their southern border is spinning out of control.
What happened during the Cold War and the lack of success of … European initiatives have
both left, in our days, two major legacies: first of all the profound diffidence by Western
countries toward laic leaderships, especially in … Muslim countries [except Turkey]; this
lack of confidence has been reciprocated by the belief, … among the latter, that the West
was not amicable at all, but sought only to acquire a new form of ascendance over them
(Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 9).
1
Some authors would go so far as to be pessimistic about Europe, despite its continued relative
economic and political possibilities, fearing for its future global role due to Europe’s “helplessness
in the face of the approaching storms. After being the center of world politics for so long, the old
continent now runs the risk of becoming a pawn” (Laqueur 2013, p. 1).
108 6 Conclusions: Addressing Regional Security Threats
Perceived “inactivity” by the U.S. in Syria for example towards the beginning
of the civil war is viewed in the region as a sign of U.S. ambivalence and weak-
ness—regardless of the endless continuous diplomatic efforts behind the scene by
the Obama Administration I and II to bring stability to the region by attempting
to resolve the stalemates there. The U.S.’ successful efforts towards repairing the
Turkish–Israeli relationship in 2012, which had degenerated considerably as a re-
sult of “Israel’s incursion into Gaza in 2008 and its attack on the Turkish Flotilla of
Freedom in 2010” (Marashi and Parsi 2013, p. 136), is but one of the endless parts
of the tremendous mosaic of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex:
its geostrategic shifts exacerbated by the Arab Spring and “extrapolated violence,”
exemplified such as by the September 2011 attack on the Israeli embassy in Cairo
by Egyptian citizens, “and the Egyptian government’s April 2012 decision to scrap
a gas supply deal with Israel” (Marashi and Parsi 2013).
Meso-Theoretical Perspectives of the EMRSSC
An appropriate theoretical analysis of the EuroMed would involve an eclectic ap-

proach of realist, neoliberal, and social constructivist IR theories (which could cor-
relate with the “3 baskets” of the EMP: political, economic, and social—as well
as their mutual reconstruction). This corresponds to the eclectic theoretical levels
of analysis suggested by Brauch et al. in terms of a “Hobbesian/Neo-Malthusian,”
“Equity-Oriented/Grotian Pragmatist,” and “Kantian/Cornucopian Optimist” clas-
sification to assess future military, political, economic, societal, and environmental
security challenges in the Euro-Mediterranean (Brauch et al. 2003).
While many battles are literally fought currently within governments in the re-
gion, the struggle to regain economic stability and growth will involve pragmatic
neoliberal decisions, while the ideological struggles in the EMRSSC would be best
informed through Social-Constructivism to reciprocally inform the political and
economic “discourse.” This book’s analytical level was in terms of macrosecuriti-
zation within Regional Security Complex theory. While this work was strictly quali-
tative, it confirmed Buzan and Waever’s (2009, p. 259) postulation of a positive
correlation between the degree of comprehensiveness of securitization (from niche
securitization to inclusive security constellations beyond national security to inter-
regional security threats) and the level of aggregation (from individual to civiliza-
tional → system level → global).
This book addressed the Euro-Mediterranean region in terms of a regional se-
curity complex, using security sectors and levels as analytical tools within the
“3-basket” (political, economic, and ideological) framework of the EMP, as stated
above—and the challenge of countries not spreading further insecurity while at-
tempting to secure their own (compare Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013) in an en-
vironment of increasing ideological polarization. These parameters proved useful
to assess the EuroMed regionally and inter-regionally within the unfolding Arab
Spring events. While external actors played a certain role in the uprising of some
Meso-Theoretical Perspectives of the EMRSSC 109
countries, such as in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, local actors (even if inspired by pi-
ous political and religious external actors) instigated the uprisings—and will likely
do so in the future (Abdo 2013, p. 2). In fact, GCC and EU interests have converged
more since 2011 by an (uneasy?) consensus in favor of “stability” and security2 as
the processes of Arab Spring transitions continue to be “contested, longterm, and
by no means unidirectional as indicated by the return of Egypt’s military to power”
(Coates Ulrichsen 2013, p. 2).
While in fact the “Transitology School” views the political continuum linearly
from autocracy to democracy, there really is not a definite ending point in MENA,
however. Democracy should be inclusive (centripetal vs. centrifugal), regardless
of who wins an election, although the separation between religion and the state
may not be a universal characteristic3, but is a contested political discussion, as a
population chooses the right balance for them between state, religion, and civil soci-
ety—and then balance considerations of neoliberalism with social inclusion/justice
and political participation regardless of religious or gender preference. While the
supporters of some uprisings will push their anciens regimes “to fulfill their dream
of a more democratic, just, and accountable society” (Rutherford 2013, p. 59) as
in Egypt following Morsi’s overthrow, it demonstrates the significance of a (new)
government attaining legitimacy: ruling in accordance with the mandate/political
promise.
This book shows how in the EMRSSC all four types of security universalisms
are present:
(1) Inclusive universalisms: “ideological beliefs, whether secular or religious”
(Buzan and Waever 2009, p. 260), whether a particular religion or political orien-
tation, ostensibly applying to all of humankind to improve their condition (such
as militant Islamism); (2) Exclusive universalism: “ideological beliefs that claim
superior rights and status for one group over the rest of humankind” (Buzan and
Waever 2009, p. 260/1) (such as Israeli politics, e.g., under B. Netanyahu); (3) Ex-
isting order universalisms: “Political claims about threats to one or more of the
institutions of international society, which are universalist in the sense that they take
the global level international social structure as their referent object” (Buzan and
Waever 2009), either overlapping with (such as liberalism for the global economy),
or independent of (such as sovereignty being threatened by transnational actors) the
greater security complex (Buzan and Waever 2009), and finally, (4) Physical threat
universalisms: claims about dangers that threaten humankind on a planetary scale
(for example, nuclear weapons, global warming, and new diseases).
2
Including Iranian nuclear control, the containment of piracy in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of
Aden, countering radicalization, such as in Syria, as well as providing a better platform for eco-
nomic development through improved coordination of investment strategies region-wide (in the
southern as well as the northern Mediterranean), as well as locally, such as the Gulf States’ rapid
intervention in stabilizing Egypt’s public finances as well as compensating for its fuel shortages
(Coates Ulrichsen 2013, p. 2).
3
By comparison, although there is technically a division between state and church in most western
countries, politics in practice are often to the contrary, as the U.S. shows, and in Europe: several
parties actually have “Christian” explicitly in their name.
These are universalist because they take “the physical fate of humankind as their
referent object” (Buzan and Waever 2009)—and are at times contested by some of
the actors of the EMRSSC, either as opposition to macrosecuritization, such as the
proxy contestation by Russia through Iran and Syria, or by rivalries between oppos-
ing universalisms, such as the opposing ideologies whether Islamic sectarianisms
or the Judeo–Islamic conflict, which is at times exceptionally acute in the EMRSC,
and extending to the EMRSSC.
The macrosecuritization, historically created, continues to be reinforced through
a myriad of securitizing actors and their related speech acts to responsive audiences
(Buzan and Waever 2009, p. 265), whether the Cold War universalism with its com-
petition of political-economic ideologies, which had a regional theatre in MENA,
and by extension, e.g., NATO’s engagement with some regional actors, the physi-
cal threat universalism of nuclear and chemical weapons, the religious–political
exclusive universalism of Islamism (regardless of its sectarian predominance) over
secular forms of democratic government, as an existing order universalism—or ac-
tors such as the EU is attempting to redefine their evolving—or devolving?—role
in the peace and security of the EMRSSC.
Identity studies show that all humans have several “identities” which do not have
to exist to the exclusion of each other, but overlap to varying degrees. The strategic
and geopolitical reality of the Mediterranean with its current flashpoints among
political oppositions internally and intra-regionally might be well served by a stron-
ger institutional structure, which integrates Euro–Arab–Israeli (rather than e.g., a
Euro–Israeli plus Arab constellation) relations with the objective of relative gains
(if suboptimal, as there is no single “winner”) for each member state, rather than the
attainment of absolute gains, which had been the historic foreign policy perspective
in the Euro-Mediterranean for millennia. This shared Euro-Mediterranean identity
can be viewed as a unifying factor, stirring cooperation between diverse peoples.
This trilateral, basic soft power approach of the “3 baskets” (ignoring the hard pow-
er aspect through inter alia the trans-Atlantic relationship/NATO and other (inter-)
regional hard power constellations), includes both official governments and non-
governmental organizations, and is in a strong position to address the numerous
security challenges faced by its member states.
The theoretical shift proposed by Boening (2008) from the Middle Eastern Re-
gional Security Complex, which was delineated by Buzan and Waever (2003), into
an ontologically more appropriate Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex
is indicated in light of the preceding highlights of my research. This can be extrapo-
lated into a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Super Complex in view of the strong
historical security asociation trans-Atlantically, which continues, such as among
NATO members in addition to the U.S.’s engagement in the Israeli–Palestinian
peace processes for many decades, also later with the launch of NATO’s Mediter-
ranean Dialogue as well as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the latest projects
delineated in preceding chapters. While European preference for “cooperative and
comprehensive security has been tempered by the so-called new discourse of threat
and danger” (Attina 2005, p. 9) in light of the new worldwide conditions of in-
security (Attina 2005, p. 9, italics original) in order to cope with governments “per-
ceived as aggressive, irrational and unreceptive of cooperative mechanisms, and
the problem of dealing with the threats of terrorism, European governments have
been increasingly concerned with upgrading their military preparedness” (Attina
2005), including developing the ESDP for worldwide use, and the “enhancement
of the Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as condition for international stability
and peace” (Attina 2005) on the one hand, while potentially being hamstrung by the
“new austerity” of Western public finances on the other hand.
Institutional Frameworks and the EMRSSC
Despite perceived cultural differences, the trans-Atlantic EuroMed security envi-

ronment is viewed by scholars as linked intensely through political, financial, and
cultural institutional structures as part of the EMP/ENP, NATO, and the myriad
programs of IGOs and NGOs. To quote Otte:
The new US commitment is improving the odds on a genuinely sustained and comprehen-
sive conflict resolution effort that could change realities in the region. This new approach
should be parallel [to other initiatives, such as the UfM], rather than sequential, in order to
creating mutually reinforcing processes” (Otte 2009, p. 1–2)
to create regional stability—as the nature of “positive sum” would indicate that
a stable southern Mediterranean is more beneficial to just these interests than the
achievement of zero-sum goals. The continued commitment of the Middle East
Quartet (compare ENPI-Info 2013) since the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian talks
in July 2013 is certainly central to this process.
The Arab Spring undoubtedly brings a number of new or changing alliances
among the partners of the EMRSC, an example being a potentially closer coop-
eration between Greece and Israel after the Israeli–Turkish relationship froze for
a couple years following the Mavi Marmara incident in May 2010 (to be thawed
a couple of years later by an official Israeli apology to Turkey at the urging of
President Obama)—yet the oil finds in the Eastern Mediterranean threaten to make
acrimonious competitors out of these new friends…: The Arab Spring has shown
inter alia that development in the MENA occurs not necessarily as a traditional
mirror of western power structures, but that their political and ideological mobili-
zations are often local, serving internal elites—which does not necessarily lead to
greater stability, but increased contestations, as post-Gaddafi Libya shows, until the
competitive politics of democratic processes run their course toward consolidation
and address the social pressures which led to the protests beyond regime change.
Concluding Remarks
Lessons learnt during some of the processes observed during the Arab Spring are
that in the absence of inclusion, stability suffers—and elected officials, such as
Morsi, are not able to govern for the term they were elected to if they contributed
to this exclusion—and raise the ire of those excluded to the extent of calling for
the return of the military. In the absence of stability4, investment suffers, and in
return, the welfare of the population in simple terms. The EMRSSC needs to search
for alternative symbols and leaders incorporating the Islamist democracy Zeitgeist
which was not addressed/were missed in the 1950s/1960s Cold War ideologies of
Communism vs. Democracy. In terms of the EMRSSC, regions can be viewed as
social constructions
to explain the process through which regions are in the process of ‘becoming’ and are
constructed/reconstructed by reflective actors, whereas the conventional emphasis is on a
particular set of activities, and flows within a pre-given regional framework… resulting in
a more open-ended interpretation of inter-regionalism. It implies, for instance, that, even
if there is no formal regional organization or grouping to relate to, it can still be fruitful to
refer to a ‘region’ and, in consequence, one can also speak of inter-regionalism in this way
(Soderbaum and van Langenhove 2006, p. 11).
Nonstate actors from the private sector or civil society, sometimes referred to as a
“trans-regionalism,” can also considered as part of Inter-Regionalism (Soderbaum
and van Langenhove 2006, p. 10): beyond intentions, the EMRSSC has the multipo-
lar potential to accommodate actors of different ideologies: While the honeymoon
may be over for the Arab Spring, one can envision a successful relationship between
concerned actors.
Different national outcomes involve new coalescences sectorally and politically
inter- and intra-regionally: the most striking example perhaps Syria—will it remain
Iran’s staunchest ally, or will there be a westward shift? Will there be a continuation
of the Cold War being waged in this proxy war between Russia and the U.S., or
what national, possibly more multilateral, fate will it carve out for itself? While the
uprisings in the MENA were against authoritarian regimes, the parallel current up-
risings in Turkey and Brazil, both democracies, are detached from political dividing
lines (Stephens 28 June 2013)—though what “unites the protests … is the challenge
to political systems in the rising world… when confronted by economic and social
change. It has all happened too fast” (Stephens 28 June 2013) for local political
systems to adapt to the rapid global economic and social changes.
In fact, the “actorness” of the EMRSSC can be viewed in terms of the capacity
of its internal regions, (supra-)regional organizations and inter-regional actors “to
develop presence, to become identifiable, aggregate interests, formulate goals and
policies, make and implement decisions (Ruland 2002, p. 6, quoted in Soderbaum
and van Langenhove 2006, p. 11). An EMRSSC can be analyzed from comple-
mentary strands of liberal, realist, and constructivist perspectives, “encompassing
non-economic matters such as justice, security, the environment, culture and iden-
tity. In second-generation regionalism the number, scope and diversity of regional
projects have grown significantly” (Soderbaum and van Langenhove 2006, p. 7)—
possibly towards the emergence what Telo (2007) refers to as “post-hegemonic
4
Unless they choose to overcome it with brute force as Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan did during
the riots in several cities during the summer of 2013—which might be a political “kicking the can
down the road” instead addressing his population’s frustration with his increasing orthodoxy in
governing and legislation: certainly a more arduous and time-consuming task that may be impeded
by priorities of efficiency.
regionalism”: this could be the “positive force” in the region. Yet, the inter-region-
alism of the EMRSSC can also be viewed as competing policy-strategies—with the
conflicts arising there from the evolving to the chronic.
While many still rely on the determination of Western players in the region, a
policy recommendation would be for the involved actors (traditional as well as
emerging) to seek non-zero sum but positive-sum outcomes within an environment
of stable and predictable rule of law to stabilize the region and calm it for growth,
rather than to threaten its further destruction on its many fronts. From this per-
spective, the regionally integrative economic and governmental programs of the
ENP, the analyses and recommendations of its numerous think tanks, the European
Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to
name a few, continue to be relevant and significant, which refer to as the “3 Ds:”
diplomacy, development5 and defense. Without a political voice seeking to unite
rather than divide, and going beyond rebellion, the region could face mutually as-
sured destruction, potentially making space for a new, and perhaps non-benevolent,
hegemon.
Europe still is not standing on its own feet politically and militarily today
(Laqueur 2013, p. 1)—even if power politics are not important for the northern
Mediterranean in the immediate future, having found effective political and eco-
nomic structures (e.g., the EU institutions, the euro, etc.) to peacefully resolve
their conflicts internally, an apathetic—yet very self-satisfied—Europe in slow
but steady decline is not effective today in contributing to solutions to the fanati-
cally desperate civil wars being waged in Syria, Egypt, and other countries in
their immediate neighborhood or greater region. And it is questionable whether
post-heroic Europe even represents a model, as their “enlightened” postmodern
soft power admonitions, and civilizing and moral speeches carry little weight—if
not serve to irritate China and Russia outright: retreat offers no security against
the consequences” (Laqueur 2013, p. 1) of staying out of the fray of global poli-
cy6. While Europe will survive the current crises on its southern border, it may in
the future become just a quaint geographic term or museum of past civilizations,
when it ceases to become relevant in global politics and economics (Laqueur
2013, p. 4).
Especially the U.S.’ war in Iraq has intensified the sectarian tension inter-region-
ally in the southern Mediterranean and greater Middle East by relegating the Sunnis
to a severely weakened position in Iraq while empowering the Shias’ ascendency
in political and religious power inter-regionally (Laqueur 2013)—the Shia–Sunni
conflict potentially replacing the “clash of civilizations” between the Middle East
and the West (Laqueur 2013). This shift has significant implications for the foreign
policy of the other actors in the EMRSSC: besides Russia’s interest in MENA,
5
This includes governmental, industrial, and transportational skill sets, institutional capacity, and
other infrastructural designs.
6
French psychologists coined the term “abulia” in the late 19th century to describe an otherwise
inexplicable lack of will—which some now interpret as a symptom of aging in prosperity (or deca-
dence), and apply to Europe’s international inefficacy (Laqueur 2013, p. 2).
reciprocally it also continues to guard against the northern Mediterranean, that is,
Europe, in not reducing its nuclear stockpiles and hereby global proliferation.7
Contrasting the trans-Atlantic influence in the Mediterranean with that of some
other “extra-territorial players of influence” in the Mediterranean, Pilling (2010)
writes in terms of China’s new role in the global order vs. the U.S. that
[t]he US has the advantage of being an attractive democracy with a dream to sell. That has
been enough to win acceptance, if not always joyful embrace, of its extra-territorial activi-
ties… There have been many question marks against US power, but it is the power we’re
used to… it is precisely the sense that Asia may be in transition towards a new power-shar-
ing arrangement that is causing angst. … no one really knows how Beijing would behave if
it gained anything like the power Washington has so long enjoyed.
While the U.S. has been critiqued for a number of foreign policy decisions, the
alternatives are either the limited efficacy of the EU’s soft power for the moment,
or the even less subtle, but much more muscular foreign policy of emerging (re-
gional) hegemons—something interpreted by some as a sign of weakness by the
latter, but effective in leading to distrust by other nations—and potentially leading
to shifts in the balance of power, which could lead to greater global rivalry instead.
One might consider the potential bandwagoning between China and Russia “via”
the new EPSO pipeline from Skvordino to Dqing—two countries in philosophical
agreement over state sovereignty superseding other considerations in international
relations, such as supranational limitations, e.g., by the UN against human rights
abuses or atrocities committed by a state8. Flawed foundations for security on many
levels and sectors in the Euro-Mediterranean continue to be addressed in practice by
the evolving programs under the ENP and partially by the continued trans-Atlantic
influence9. As the global response to the Syrian use of chemical weapons in 2013
has shown, global governance, e.g., via the UN, is weak and slow. This does not
invalidate it, but attests to its limitations.
This book examined a specific form of security cooperation in international
relations, that of a regional security partnership in the Euro-Mediterranean. It is
7
In recent months, the Kremlin has doubled down on the Putin Doctrine, as evidenced by growing
authoritarianism at home and recalcitrance in foreign policy, in particular global security issues.
Russia has continued to zealously guard its nuclear superpower status against the perceived threat
of a European missile defense system, despite a stream of high-level U.S. emissaries, from Vice
President Joe Biden to top national security officials, seeking to assuage Moscow’s concerns.
As a result, there has been no progress in the further reduction of strategic nuclear arms, one of
Obama’s presidential goals and the key priority of his entire Russia policy, epitomized by the 2010
New START Treaty. That agreement reduced the number of America’s deployed strategic nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles to Russian levels, yet has failed to move Moscow any closer to ac-
cepting a missile defense system over Europe (Aron 2013b).
8
As was most recently demonstrated with respect to Syria—and hence the convoluted diplomacy
in late summer 2013 at the UNSC to “arrange” Syria’s “cease and desist” in the production and
application of chemical weapons.
9
Compare Ban 2010: only full international cooperation can counter global security threats, “be-
cause these threats are both interconnected and trans-national, countries are not equipped to deal
with them on their own…. They must be addressed comprehensively and in coordination. Interna-
tional cooperation—bilateral, regional, trans-national—is the only effective approach”.
consistent with the characteristics of the current state of global power competition
without polarized competition involving American hegemony. This is expressed by
Attina in terms of “the predominant security culture of the current international
system, that is the emergence of cooperative and comprehensive security principles
together with the traditional principles of national military doctrines based on the
so-called security dilemma” (Attina 2005, p. 2). Attina (2001, p. 41) furthermore
suggests viewing security in the EuroMed in a wider context of (a) the systemic
properties of security in the contemporary world as well as to (b) consider it in
“the new dimensions of security and security community building” (Attina 2001)
(emphasis added), and (c) from European as well as Arabic security cultures. An
analysis of the inner context, in addition, focuses on the processes aimed at building
security (Attina 2001) as this work has shown.
Zbigniew Brzezinkski (2012) warned that the forces of upheaval rumbling
through the developing world and the weaknesses of the West could undermine
the global clout of the triumph of liberal democracy following the end of the Cold
War. His policy recommendations included, inter alia the need for structural,
not cyclical adjustments, and the need for a commitment to a common vision
for the EuroMed rather than a trend towards national hoarding of hard and soft
power resources (compare Taylor 2012, p. 3) in that “(m)odest examples of pro-
tectionism are proliferating” following Europe’s “Sputnik-moment” of the euro
crisis threatening EU dissolution. While all theories have “perspective” (“are by
someone for someone”), one can hope that the EMRSSC will evolve from a post-
modernist/constructivist perspective with a “holistic,” not just a realist perspec-
tive of “the other,” seeking more “unity in diversity” (i.e., a peaceful coexistence)
rather than seeking to leverage (international) political relationships with greed
as the ultimate motive.
The shift in the balance of power, whether Turkey’s “pivot to the east” away
from its automatic NATO—interoperability, or China’s “rot at the top” (clearly ex-
posed in the spring of 2012, not only exceeding previous sources of nondemocratic
legitimacy in China, but showcasing its current political meritocracy—and pos-
sibly questioning its future “performance legitimacy” and China’s future fragility
(Bell 2012) internationally) will determine the future power of many actors in the
EMRSSC, e.g., changing from insulator powers to middle powers.
The shift in sectorial hierarchies in the greater region is also shifting nation-
ally as well as intra- and inter-regionally. Hence, the world is not automatically
going to be a G-2 or a G-zero world (with the power vacuum filled by a changing
“cast” of governmental and non-governmental powers and movements, should no
global cataclysm occur), or an age of non-polarity—a world post-Cold War which
“could prove to be mostly negative, making it more difficult to generate collective
responses to pressing regional and global challenges” (Haass, quoted in Bremmer
2012). Nye (2011) views this diffusion of power in international politics as leading
to a more complex world (“similar to a three-dimensional chess game”).
Hence one might envision a U.S. foreign policy globally, such as practiced by
President Obama, which is not a zero-sum game (whether on China’s periphery
or elsewhere)—and as the trans-Atlantic relationship can hardly afford a “tale of
paralysis” (Stephens 2012)—and political gridlock, largely due to the widening

expectations gap between what governments can do and what their voters expect
(Stephens 2012). Maybe we need to revisit Dean Acheson’s vision after World War II
of the U.S.’ global role, when it struck a deal with the world whereby “it would pro-
vide secure trade routes, stability, and the opportunity for other countries to become
prosperous” (Bremmer 2012), that is, providing the public goods; and other coun-
tries would accept American preeminence and would play by American-designed
rules (Bremmer 2012). Only today, amid a “world of regions” (“to each his own”)
(Bremmer 2012), a world with strong states but “without global leadership, one
in which many of the rest will rise, but only to tackle local and regional issues”
(Bremmer 2012) may not be able to face the challenges locally, regionally, and
inter-regionally.
Fareed Zakaria (cited in Bremmer 2012; compare Mahbubani 2013) viewed the
global power shifts in terms of the spread of wealth in the post-American world,
while others mentioned the emergence of multiple modernities. Kanat points out
that while
the US still had a global edge in many significant areas, including military strength, demo-
graphic vitality, and research and development potential… [a] nation’s identity and stand-
ing are sometimes more significantly shaped and constructed by the perception [italics
added] of other countries and the international public. …In that sense, the decline of the US
may be more about the perception of the US than its actual capabilities (Kanat 2013, p. 2).
While the U.S.’ image suffered repeatedly because of its “unilateral actions and its
disregard for other international actors” (Kanat 2013), such as the U.S.–Iraq war and
the financial crisis, effectively every country not only is expected to serve its own
interests first,10 but it is universally almost entirely ignored in the latter example that
the financial interests leading to the global crisis (and its security-implications on
every level and every sector) were global, rather solely U.S.-based.11
More importantly, perception, as Social-Constructivist Theory holds, informs
structures and power: While U.S. unilateralism, including damaging the trust of
its allies, was criticized by some (Kanat 2013, p. 2), the same authors (e.g., Kanat
2013) condemn the U.S. for shirking “its (global) responsibilities,” yet simulta-
neously clamoring for U.S. involvement and help in the southern Mediterranean
during different stages of the Arab Spring, such as for the eliminations of Col.
Gaddafi and Bashar Al-Assad, and for assistance to the hundreds of thousands of
Syrian refugees.
10
Even in a supranational institution such as the EU, national MS interests are vehemently asserted
through its intergovernmental arms, such as the European Parliament and the European Council.
11
On the other hand, the U.S. budget “impasse”, leading to the U.S. government shutdown on
October 1, 2013 was not only self-inflicted, but led to a global financial (e.g. in terms of strong,
and difficult to predict, exchange rate fluctuations)—and subsequent political-destabilization, and
reduced economic and social growth rates as a direct result hereof. Some of this may or may not
be compensated for later. This domestic Congressional dysfunctionality ignores the dependence of
not only U.S. citizens but also its international allies’ dependence on the performance of govern-
ment, such as a stable currency, meeting its (international) debt obligations, and confidence in its
economy and its political system (Stewart 2013).
Final Words 117
The U.S. Congressional bipartisan conflicts, leading to the shutdown of the U.S.
federal government on October 1, 2013, have weakened not only the trans-Atlantic
aspect of the EMRSSC, but also trans-Pacifically the credibility of U.S. foreign
policy12—and the implication of this weakness as a result of this domestic division,
as a possible symbol of waning U.S. power, and its implications of lack of reliability
(in terms of its commitment to the “Asia pivot”) and resources to its partners—
means to the strategic calculations of rising powers such as China as it pushes its
dominance of the South China Sea (or to the East? The North?) in particular.
This enigma explains the EuroMed region’s general confusion about the role of
“the West”—the southern Mediterranean countries’ ambivalence towards former
(northern European) colonial powers and the U.S.—or the EU’s ambivalence about
the U.S. as a military protector and most important trade partner, vs. the U.S. as a
country to be mocked in order to improve its own image globally: regardless of the
perceptions, the facts, whether socio-culturally, economically, or politically, are that
the greater Euro-Mediterranean represents a Regional Security Super Complex—
for the foreseeable future joined in all three aspects stronger than extra-regional
actors, such as Russia or China, despite their sometimes significant influences, are.
The EuroMed does not exist in a vacuum, but in the greater global security and
economic sphere.
Final Words
The Arab Spring has been compared to previous waves of democratization in other
parts of the world. The MENA’s unique history makes its present likewise unique
and has invited many comparative studies (compare e.g., Paczynska 2013). The
complexity and breadth of the MENA in terms of its positioning in a Regional
Security Super Complex, coupled with the reverberations of accelerating global-
ization playing out there does not allow simple formulaic generalizations about
it. Rather, this book attempted to show some of the nuances—among many more
not addressed—necessary to understand the processes of the Arab Spring. At the
moment, Attina’s (2004) suggestion that the Mediterranean region has been pro-
gressing from a security partnership to potentially a security community, however,
cannot be confirmed.
If all this sounds confusing, I would like to quote K. N. Al-Sabeh with the
tongue-in-cheek “blip” version:
12
Such as the cancellation of President Obama’s planned trip to Southeast Asia to attend the East
Asia Summit, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations leaders’ summit, the Asia Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation leaders’ summit and a global entrepreneurs’ summit in Malaysia, inter alia to
finalize trade talks for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and, perhaps most importantly, to
bolster strategic and defense ties with Southeast Asian nations, such as the Philippines, Vietnam,
and Indonesia (Kurlantzick 2013, p. 1).
A Short Guide to the Middle East
… Iran is backing Assad. Gulf States are against Assad!

Assad is against Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood and Obama are against Gen-
eral Sisi.
But Gulf States are pro-Sisi! Which means they are against Muslim Brotherhood!
Iran is pro-Hamas, but Hamas is backing Muslim Brotherhood!
Obama is backing Muslim Brotherhood, yet Hamas is against the U.S.!
Gulf States are pro-U.S. But Turkey is with Gulf States against Assad; yet Turkey is pro-
Muslim Brotherhood against General Sisi. And General Sisi is being backed by the Gulf
States!
Welcome to the Middle East and have a nice day (Al-Sabeh 2013).
I hope that this book explained some of the background dynamics at least.
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This book builds on earlier work delineating a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Se-

well as discourse analysis methodology to augment—and contrast—my own analy-

1 Introduction: A Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex? ���� 1

2 Sectors of Security ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11

3 Levels of Security—Intra-Regional Level����������������������������������������������� 27

Southern Mediterranean ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 30

4 Levels of Security—Inter-Regional Level:

5 Levels of Security—Inter-Regional Level:

6 Conclusions: Addressing Regional Security

ABC Atomic, Biological and Chemical

EPUF EuroMed Permanent University Forum

NTC Libyan National Transitional Council

Fig. 1.1 Northern and Southern Mediterranean/Euro-Mediterranean

From an International Relations (IR) theoretical perspective, in a Euro-Mediterra-

   .P

Fig. 1.1 Northern and Southern Mediterranean/Euro-Mediterranean Region. (Source: EU-Com-

Fig. 1.3 The Euro-Medi-

While no absolute analysis is attempted in terms of absolute power gains (“zero

Soft Power and Intra-Regionalism

Hard Power and Inter-Regionalism

Attempts to build regional security through partnership and confidence-building

Multilateral strategic inter-regionalism, such as the “northeastern inter-region-

Greater Inter-Regional EuroMed Security

Ideology and Sectarian Conflicts in the EuroMed

A. B. Boening, The Arab Spring, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-04606-8_2, 11

Theoretical Context of Sectarianism1

This book places an emphasis on delineating the sectarian complexities in the

hostilities should not be over-generalized as they show local differentiations2,

Coup and Post-Coup

States: Failed vs. Successful

income disparities, to provide constructive (positive sum) international relations, as

The dictator we know vs. the future we don’t know

Legitimacy: Ruling in Accordance with the Mandate/Political

For post-revolution countries to become successful, institutional deficits in public

In terms of the EMRSSC, military cooperation (ranging from officer training

Social Justice: Material and Political Inequalities—

Human Security and the Syrian Civil War

A. B. Boening, The Arab Spring, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-04606-8_3, 27

“Smart Mobs” and “Black Swans”

Asymmetrical Threats and International Regional Actors Parallel

The levels of the Euro-Mediterranean in terms of Euro-Mediterranean Regional

(e.g., the complex domestic post-authoritarian political and ideological struggles

Sanfelice di Monteforte describes Turkey’s historic international strategic influence

Turkey, the Regional Kingpin

Turkey’s Strategic Cooperation

identity—not automatically as a model or inspiration for MENA post-conflict, but

Syrian refugees to Turkey (and other neighboring countries)—though without

Turkey as a Bridge Between East and West

The perspectives of the Palestinian–Israeli relationship within the security dynam-

Egyptian Post-Authoritarian Transitions

The Inter-Regional Context of Egypt’s Current Post-Transition

R2P Involvement and Internal Economic, Political,

renewed self-confidence to reassert their influence based on this natural resource),

The Internal Security Environment in the Greater

From the Damascus Spring to the Arab Spring

Sectarianism and the Syrian Civil War

1 Introduction: A Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex? �� 1

2 Sectors of Security �� 11

3 Levels of Security—Intra-Regional Level�� 27

Southern Mediterranean �� 30

4 Levels of Security—Inter-Regional Level:

5 Levels of Security—Inter-Regional Level:

6 Conclusions: Addressing Regional Security

Fig. 1.1 Northern and Southern Mediterranean/Euro-Mediterranean

.P