1

DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY

SABBAVARAM, VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

NAME OF THE TOPIC:

CONTRADICTORY STATEMENT AND LIABILITY OF WITNESSES-

APPLICABLE LAW IN INDIA

NAME OF THE SUBJECT:

LAW OF EVIDENCE

NAME OF THE FACULTY:

Prof. Dr. NANDINI C.P Ma’am

Name of the Candidate: Sk. Roshan

Roll No : 2018LLB083
Semester : 5th Semester
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Acknowledgement:

I would sincerely forward my heartfelt appreciation to our respected Law of Evidence

professor, Prof. Dr. Nandini C.P Ma’am for giving me a golden opportunity to take up this
project regarding “Contradictory Statement and liability of Witnesses- Applicable Law in
India”. I have tried my best to collect information about the project in various possible ways
to depict clear picture about the given project topic.
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CONTRADICTORY STATEMENT AND LIABILITY OF WITNESSES-

APPLICABLE LAW IN INDIA

INTRODUCTION:

Extracting the part which amounts to a contradiction is an art of the cross-examiner and the
method to prove it is a science. Any contradiction if proved in accordance with the provisions
of the Evidence Act, 1872 can impeach the credibility of the witness and can help in rejecting
the evidence of the prosecution in criminal trials and of the other side in civil trials.
Contradictions have to be proved in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section-
155(3) of Evidence Act, 1872 otherwise it would have no evidentiary value and would not be
admissible. A witness can be contradicted with its previous statements either made by him in
writing or reduced into writing by someone under section-145 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Credibility of witnesses and evaluation of their testimony will always present critical
problems difficult to solve in the trial court. Improved rules of evidence will give greater
freedom to counsel in their attack upon the problem, but they cannot eliminate the difficulties
of proof, for these difficulties vary with each factual situation and with each witness. If a
perfect substantive law could be assumed and a perfected system of trials established, it
might appear that these difficulties would be solved. Unfortunately, such would not be the
case. As long as human beings are subject to error in perception and communication, failure
of memory, and the willingness on the part of some to falsify whenever there is sufficient
motivation, trials will require skills and techniques in the use of the law of evidence for
solution of disputed questions of fact.

The present trend toward letting in more evidence and enlarging the competency of witnesses
has the advantage of giving the triers all of the evidence which will be helpful to a solution,
but it does not answer the question of whether a witness is mistaken or intentionally
falsifying. Under modern statutes, every person is qualified as a witness if he is capable of
expressing himself concerning a matter so as to be understood and has the capacity to
understand the duty to tell the truth.

SCOPE:

The scope of the study is confined to the applicability of the Contradiction and liability of the
Witnesses in India with compared to other countries.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY-

The nature of the study is doctrinal in nature and is a combination of descriptive, explanatory
and analytical study.

LITERATURE REVIEW:

1. A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS by Kane & Mathew C.1

The author specifically mentioned about how the contradictory Statement can be
explained by showing the circumstances or the paper which was signed, written and
executed by the witnesses can be shown. It can be explained with the physical or the
mental condition of the witnesses and also the motive of the witnesses as how he
understood the statement that the prior statement was due to mistake on the part of the
witness and that he had reason to believe it to be true when he made it that the
statement was not made with reference to the transaction then being investigated, but
was made with reference to another transaction as the witness did not know the
meaning of a technical term used by him.

2. THE PREVIOUS INCONSISTENT STATEMENT OF OPPONENT’S WITNESS 2

Upon any trial a witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by

him in writing, or reduced to writing, relative to the subject-matter of the case,
without such writing being shown to him; but, if it is intended to contradict the
witness by the writing, his attention must, before such contradictory proof can be
given, be called to those parts of the writing that are to be used for the purpose of so
contradicting him; the judge, at any time during the trial, may require the production
of the writing for his inspection, and thereupon make such use of it for the purposes of
the trial as he thinks fit.

3. IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES by William Tricket3

The author specifically explained how the good reputation of a witness is always
presumed, the party who denies it initiates the investigation, by giving evidence of the
bad character (or reputation) of the witness for truth (and veracity). A party's
admission of the bad reputation of a witness, would, doubtless, dispense with proof of
1
Kane & Mathew C, A Contradiction in terms, 10 Eyes on the ICC 1, 5 (2013).
2
Stanley Schiff, The Previous Inconsistent Statement of Opponent’s Witness, 36 U. Toronto L.J. 440 (1986).
3
William Trickett, Impeachment of Witnesses, 8 F, FORUM 245 (1903-1904).
 5

it by the opposite party , but the knowledge by the jury of the subjective character of
the witness, or of his objective reputation, as respects veracity, cannot dispense with
proof. Hence, there being no evidence submitted concerning the character of
witnesses, it would be error for the court to tell the jury that they must consider the
witnesses, who they are, what their character is in the community, whether their
character for veracity has been as - sailed, since to do so would give to the jury the
power of testing evidence by that which could be found only outside of the trial itself,
perhaps in the personal knowledge of some of the jurors.

4. CHARACTER EVIDENCE AS AFFECTING THE CREDIBILITY OF

WITNESS by J.A. Osoinach4
The author mentioned about the character affecting the credibility of witness.If there is any
doubt as to the truthfulness of the witnesses, it is then incumbent upon the advocate to resort
to a right, which, as Wigmore has pointed out, should always for reasons of public policy be
sparingly and judiciously used. That is, the right to probe into the witness'character for the
purpose of testing his credibility.

5. SEQUESTRATION OF WITNESSES by John H. Wigmore5

The rules relative to impeaching and sustaining witnesses are equally applicable to
civil and criminal matters. A witness called by the opposing party can be impeached
by proving that on a former occasion he made a statement inconsistent with his
statement made on trial, provided such statement is material to the issue but where a
witness has testified as to incriminating facts, he can’t be asked whether or not he had
previously stated that the defendant was not guilty for the purpose of impeachment as
a witness can’t be impeached on an immaterial matter. The statement upon which it
is intended to contradict must involve facts in evidence and the varying statements
sought to be shown must be relevant to the issues.

SECTION-145:

A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or

reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to
him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must,

4
J. A. Osoinach, Character Evidence as Affecting the Credibility of Witnesses, 2 TENN. L. REV. 165 (1924).
5
John H. Wigmore, Sequestration of Witnesses, 14 HARV. L. REV. 475 (1900-1901).
 6

before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the
purpose of contradicting him.6

SECTION-155(3):

The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following way by the adverse party, or with
consent of the party who calls him:-

(3) By proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to
be contradicted.

(4) When a man prosecuted for rape or an attempt to ravish, it may be shown that the
prosecutrix was of general immoral character. (This clause was deleted by Act 4/2003.)

So far as clause (4) of Sec. 155 is concerned, in the 172 Report, the Law Commission
recommended its deletion. This has been done now by Parliament by Indian Evidence
(Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 4 of 2003).

The credit of a witness can be impeached by following one or other of four methods;

a) by cross-examination (that is, by eliciting, from the witness himself facts disparaging
him);
b) by calling other witnesses to disprove his testimony on material points (the credit of a
witness is indirectly impeached by evidence disproving the facts which he has
asserted);
c) by contradiction on matters affecting credit, through other witness;
d) by independent proof given by other witnesses as to character.

RECOMMENDATION OF LAW COMMISSION TO SECTION-155:

 Clause (1) of Sec-155: In the 69 Report7, it was suggested (in 87.11 and 87.24) that
clause (1) of Sec. 155 should be amended, as a matter of clarification, by using the
words, "impeach his credibility, accuracy or veracity" instead of "believe him to be
unworthy of credit".
 Clause (2) of Sec-155: In para 87.12 of the 69 Law Commission Report, it was
stated that no amendment is necessary in regard to this clause.

6
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
7
69th Law Commission Report
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 Clause (3) of Sec. 155: So far as this clause is concerned, two recommendations were
made in the 69 Law Commission Report:
a. One was that, for procedural purposes, it must be made clear that as per the
decision of the Privy Council in Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit 8, the
previous contradictory statement must be put to him. In other words, it must be
made clear that clause (3) of Sec. 155 is subject to Sec. 145.
b. The second recommendation concerns the words 'his evidence which is liable to
be contradicted. These words have been interpreted differently in different cases.
 Clause (4) of Section-155 has been carried out by Indian Evidence (Amendment) Act,
2002.

So far as Sec. 155 is concerned, two situations arise. If an accused volunteers to give
evidence under Sec. 315 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 he can be cross-examined like
any other witness and cannot claim the protection against self -incrimination as under cl. (b)
of Art-20 of the Constitution. But, he still requires some protection, when his credit is
impeached as in the case of other witnesses.

CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE STTAEMENT OF WITNESSES:

Contradiction by previous inconsistent statement must, however, be confined to matters

relevant to the issue, as no contradiction is allowed on irrelevant matters, except in the two
cases mentioned in Sec. 1539. That the previous inconsistent statement must relate to matters
relevant to the issue is borne out by the expression "inconsistent with any part of the evidence
which is liable to be contradicted. As pointed by Wilson J, an irrelevant matter requires no
contradiction, as it is not admissible in evidence under Sec. 5. The expression 'which is liable
to be contradicted' in clause (3) of Sec. 155 is equivalent to "which is relevant to the issue". .
The Supreme Court however, has said that this proposition is too broad and the various
clauses in Sec. 155 do not warrant such an interpretation. The third sub-clause refers to a
former statement which is inconsistent with the statement made by the witness in evidence in
the case and it is permissible that the witness be contradicted about that statement

In Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat 10 it was held that the stages
mentioned in Sec. 137 as chief examination, cross and re-examination are not relevant here

8
179 AIR 1915 PC 7
9
Sarkar, Sarkar’s Law of Evidence in India 2267 (Sudipto Sarkar, 15th ed. 1999).
10
AIR 1964 SC 1503
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and that under Sec. 154 of the Act, a discretionary power is vested in Court to permit a person
who calls a witness, to put any question to him which might be put in cross-examination by
the adverse party. Sec. 154 does not in terms or by necessary implication confine the exercise
of the power by the Court before the examination in chief is concluded or to any particular
stage of the examination of the witness. It is wide in scope and the discretion is entirely left to
the Court to exercise the power when the circumstances demand. To confine this power to the
stage of examination-in-chief is to make it ineffective in practice. But then an opportunity
must be given to the accused to cross-examine the witness on the answers which do not find
place in the examination in chief.

In Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn11., it was held that the entire evidence of the hostile witness need
not be discarded and reliance on any part of the statement of such a witness by both parties is
permissible. It was farther observed that the Indian position is different from that under the
English law. The decision to the contrary in Jagir Singh v. State of Delhi12 was overruled.

In Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana 13, the Court reiterated the view in Sat Paul. In that
case, the complainant, the principal witness for the prosecution was examined under Sec. 154
since he specifically did not refer to the co-accused in his examination in chief. Since the
entire case rested on his evidence, the accused objected to the conviction based on his
testimony after the witness was declared hostile. This plea was rejected and it was held that
the evidence remains admissible at the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction upon
his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence. On facts, it was held that this test
was satisfied.

The contradictory Statement can be explained by showing the circumstances or the paper
which was signed, written and executed by the witnesses can be shown. It can be explained
with the physical or the mental condition of the witnesses and also the motive of the
witnesses as how he understood the statement that the prior statement was due to mistake on
the part of the witness and that he had reason to believe it to be true when he made it that the
statement was not made with reference to the transaction then being investigated, but was
made with reference to another transaction as the witness did not know the meaning of a
technical term used by him and also because of the difficulty in understanding the questions
asked at the trial in which the inconsistent testimony was given and also the portions of

11
1976 (1) SCC 727
12
1975 (3) SCC 562
13
1976 (1) SCC 389
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witness answers in a deposition introduced to impeach him, were left out by the notary taking
the same or that merely the substance of his statements at a coroner's inquest, alleged to be
inconsistent with his testimony, was taken down in writing by the coroner. Where an affidavit
made by a party's attorney is admitted to impeach the party, it may be shown in rebuttal that
the party did not know what was in the affidavit, and that it was made in the party's absence.14

The author specially mentioned that the evidence need not be confined to what occurred
when the statement was made, but may properly extend to events preceding that time and the
fact that the explanation involves an attack or reflection upon the character of the defendant
and the statements which are contradictory to his testimony should be considered upon the
credibility.15 The contradictory statements are considered only for the impeachment but it
cannot be used as substantive evidence and it is the duty of the court to consider the
statements.

PREVIOUS INCONSISTENT STATEMENT OF OPPONENT’S WITNESS:

A witness called by opponent gives testimony which, counsel can attempt to show, is
inconsistent with something the witness said or wrote at some earlier time when not on the
stand. For example, in a trial involving the collision of two automobiles at an intersection, a
witness called by plaintiff testifies during examination-in-chief that defendant's automobile
entered the intersection after the facing light turned red. Defendant's counsel has evidence
that before the trial the witness had said that the light was then green. If counsel introduces
evidence of the earlier statement and the trier of fact believes that the witness so spoke, the
obvious self-contradiction grounds the trier's inference that the witness possesses 'some
undefined capacity to err; it may be a moral disposition to lie, it may be partisan bias, it may
be faulty observation, it may be defective recollection, or any other quality.

Counsel may have learned of the statement in various ways. During counsel's inquiries before
trial, some third person may have told about a conversation in which the witness uttered the
crucial words. Or counsel may have come into possession of a letter or other document the
witness wrote to the same effect. Very often counsel or an associate has interviewed the
witness as part of ordinary preparation for trial and has obtained a signed statement setting
out the witness' version of the relevant events. Failing a written record, counsel's associate

14
Kane & Mathew C, A Contradiction in terms, 10 Eyes on the ICC 1, 5 (2013).
15
William, Editor Mack. Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (1901-1912).
 10

(or, if need be, counsel personally) can tell what the witness said. 16 And, of course, if the
witness is the opposing party in a civil trial, counsel has available a transcript of the
examination for discovery. Indeed, in a civil trial held in provinces where a non-party witness
is also subject to pre-trial oral examination, counsel may have a similar transcript for him.

At common law the use of a previous inconsistent statement to impeach witness credibility
both upon cross-examination and by independent evidence was well established. Statutory
provisions across Canada now substantially govern the procedure. One family group is aimed
at statements whether oral or written.

Counter-arguments defend characterization as hearsay and application of the hearsay rule.

While preparing for possible future litigation, private investigators, insurance adjusters, and
policemen often obtain inaccurate written statements from unknowing and indifferent
witnesses. The trier of fact cannot assess the witness credibility at the very moment he was
making the statement. In comparison with the power of cross-examination immediately after
a witness in court has testified in chief to a matter, cross-examination on a previous statement
cannot effectively attack his testimonial factors at the earlier time or effectively cause him to
withdraw the statement. Since evidence of the inconsistent statement is introduced by the
opponent during the witness' cross-examination, the party who called the witness cannot
under ordinary circumstances use techniques of cross-examination to challenge the statement
during re-examination. At all events, cross-examination is inevitably frustrated if, upon the
witness denying that he made the inconsistent statement or claiming that he cannot remember
making it or remember the event it describes, evidence of the statement is introduced through
some other witness. On balance, the counter-arguments appear more persuasive. Only if the
witness uttered the statement while under oath and subject to cross-examination would the
balance be tipped the other way. Indeed, these are the conditions to admissibility proposed in
the Uniform Evidence Acts and implemented in the Federal Rules of Evidence.

IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES:

The impeaching witness must before testify respecting the character of the primary witness,
satisfies the court "that he has adequate means of knowledge of the character of the latter.
Prior to an inquiry concerning reputation it is necessary to lay grounds by asking whether the

16
Stanley Schiff, The Previous Inconsistent Statement of Opponent’s Witness, 36 U. Toronto L.J. 440 (1986).
 11

witness is acquainted with the witness intended to be impeached and with his general
reputation for truth and veracity in the neighbourhood in which he resides. Q It is not
necessary that the secondary witness should personally know the primary witness. He is not
to express his own judgment of the trustworthiness of the latter, as a result of his
acquaintance with the latter.17 Witness B cannot, e. g., says that witness A worked for me
three days, and from his conduct during that time, I had reason to believe him not to be an
honest man. A witness called on to impeach the credit of another, is never permitted to speak
of his knowledge of particular facts from which he draws an opinion of the witness
examined." When A says that he has no knowledge of B's general character but by report, he
shows that he is exactly qualified to be heard, since common report is character, and to know
the report is to know the character. The witness must show that he lives or has lived in the
neighbourhood in which the witness to be attacked lives or has lived, or that he is in such
contact with this neighbourhood that he would be able to learn the opinions entertained by its
members concerning the witness.

WEAKENING IMPEACHING TESTIMONY:

The testimony of the impeaching witness may be weakened by his cross-examination. He

may be required to name the persons from whom he has heard expressions of adverse
opinion, and may be unable to name any, or any considerable number. Some latitude must be
allowed to the cross-examination of impeaching witnesses, excluding however such details as
would create collateral issues. They may, e. g., be questioned as to their business and social
relations with the impeached witness. Those named may be called afterwards, and may deny
that they have expressed the adverse opinion attributed to them by the attacking witness.
They may also say that they would believe the impeached witness under oath. If they are not
present at the trial, a rule for a new trial may be made absolute if, being eight in number, six
of them depose that they have not made the statements attributed to them. Other witnesses
may be called to contradict the impeaching witness, by saying that the general character for
veracity of the assailed witness is good.

CHARACTER EVIDENCE:

Impeachment by evidence of bad general reputation is, of course, admissible, but the
impression it creates upon the jury is often vague and unsatisfactory. Evidence of particular
acts of misconduct is always more pointed and more effective. The rule in Tennessee is rather
17
William Trickett, Impeachment of Witnesses, 8 F, FORUM 245 (1903-1904).
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liberal as to what may be inquired about, for the purpose of informing the jury as to the
credibility of the witness. It is the general rule, and likewise the rule in Tennessee, that
particular acts of misconduct may not be proven by extrinsic testimony. A witness may be
fully interrogated upon cross-examination as to allege particular acts of misconduct, subject,
however, to certain important conditions and restrictions 18. Perhaps the most important
condition is that the answer of the witness is binding upon the cross-examiner. This does not
mean, as some of the cases say, that the answer is conclusive upon the other party. As
Wigmore points out, the jury has the right for itself to gauge the truthfulness of the testimony.
It merely means that the advocate cannot put on other witnesses to contradict a witness who
has denied some alleged prior misconduct unless such misconduct is relevant to some matter
in issue. Such denial must stand upon the record un-contradicted, and the jury may -accept it
for whatever they think it is worth. If the questions involve a witness in possible criminal
liability, he may claim his privilege against self-incrimination. Another qualification is that
the acts inquired about must not be too remote in time.

Baker v. Bates19

It is sometimes said that a witness cannot be contradicted on facts affecting his character
because they are collateral. This is merely a confusion of the present rule with the rule
forbidding a contradiction on collateral matters. This fact, to be sure, happens to be a
collateral one, and therefore a contradiction on this point would not be allowable by that rule;
but it simply confuses separate principles, having a separate purpose and history, to invoke
that rule in the present case. That it has no essential bearing can easily be demonstrated.
Suppose that rule (forbidding contradiction on collateral matters) were abolished; it would
still be unlawful to impeach a witness' character by extrinsic testimony of particular
misconduct, for the reasons already explained which would still be in force.

Again, suppose that the witness is not asked beforehand whether he did this act, so that proof
of it by extrinsic testimony does not involve a contradiction of him and is therefore not
obnoxious to that rule; nevertheless, the testimony would be excluded, because it is extrinsic
testimony of particular misconduct impeaching character. Historically, the rule forbidding
impeachment of character by extrinsic testimony of particular misconduct existed a century
before the rule forbidding contradiction on collateral matters was settled; so that, in tradition

18
J. A. Osoinach, Character Evidence as Affecting the Credibility of Witnesses, 2 TENN. L. REV. 165 (1924).
19
76 Ill. App. 2d 30, 221 N.E.2d 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966)
 13

as well as in principle, they are entirely independent. It is thus clear that the invocation of the
latter rule in the present connection is not only unsound but useless. Moreover, it is mis-
leading.

RULES FOR IMPEACHING WITNESS:

The rules relative to impeaching and sustaining witnesses are equally applicable to civil and
criminal matters. A witness called by the opposing party can be impeached by proving that on
a former occasion he made a statement inconsistent with his statement made on trial,
provided such statement is material to the issue but where a witness has testified as to
incriminating facts, he can’t be asked whether or not he had previously stated that the
defendant was not guilty for the purpose of impeachment as a witness can’t be impeached on
an immaterial matter.20 The statement upon which it is intended to contradict must involve
facts in evidence and the varying statements sought to be shown must be relevant to the
issues.

The right of impeachment is not limited to matters arising in chief but extends to those
originating in cross-examination and such matters are material, impeachment is permissible.
A witness may also be contradicted by proof of prior contradictory statements before the
court. Thus where a witness testifies to facts his acts, showing his belief in a different state of
facts, may be shown and he will be cross-examined to those acts and where he does not admit
the facts, they may be proved to contradict him21.

 Evidence that the defendant has a criminal record may be admissible solely to
impeach
 A statement obtained in violation may nevertheless be used as prior inconsistent
statements to impeach.
 A hearsay statement that a witness disliked the defendant may be admitted to show
the witness's bias.
 Evidence that the defendant is covered by liability insurance is admissible to show
the bias of a witness who works for that insurance company.

LIABILITY OF WITNESSES:

20
John H. Wigmore, Sequestration of Witnesses, 14 HARV. L. REV. 475 (1900-1901).
21
Francis Wharton. Treatise on the Law of Evidence in Criminal Issues (8).
 14

The Evidence Act blesses sworn testimony given in Court on the suspicion that in the
security and straightforwardness of the Court air, a witness under vow would be free, as well
as be willing to talk reality, every bit of relevant information and only reality. If the Court
thought that there was tendering of false evidence, it could punish the witnesses concerned or
prosecute them for the offence of giving false evidence under Sec. 193 of the IPC. Whatever
that be, the earlier version recorded before the Magistrate should not be relied on as that was
not legal evidence subjected to cross-examination. The argument was legally correct and the
Court was helpless in the situation though morally and subjectively convinced of the truth
behind the prosecution case. The case ended in acquittal and the acquittal was confirmed by
all higher Courts. But for the fact that statements during investigation had been got recorded
by the Magistrate, in that case, even a prosecution for giving false evidence (as resorted
therein) could not have been initiated against the hostile witnesses. Perhaps it is this position
of law and the fact that the maximum punishment prescribed for the offence is only
imprisonment for 3 years and fine that emboldens witnesses.

What is the remedy then?

It depends on the cause. If serious threat from any quarter is the cause for the vacillation,
providing effective police protection to the witness until the correct deposition is recorded by
the trial court, or even for further periods, may help. Appropriate changes to Sec. 191 to 193
of the IPC making the law relating to false evidence more stringent, and making the
procedure for prosecution simpler, may be helpful. Abettors of the crime may also be
prosecuted and that offence may be made non-bailable. Statements of witnesses, wherever
possible, may be got recorded by the Magistrate under Sec. 164 of the Code. In fact, in its
178th Report the Law Commission suggested enactment of such a clause and that led to
inclusion of such a provision in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2003. It may also be
considered whether at least in important cases, insurance at State cost to cover case-specific
risk to the witnesses and to their near ones could be provided.

CASE ANALYSIS-01

Case Name: Tahsildar Singh v State of U.P

Citation: 1959 AIR 1012

 15

Topic: Contradictory Statement and Liability of witnesses under Indian Law. In this case,
they discussed Sec-145 which explains about the concept of cross-examination as to previous
statements in writing and Sec-155(3) i.e., to impeach the credit of witness.

Scope/ Chapter (of Indian Evidence Act,1872)

The Scope of this study is limited to the Chapter-X of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 i.e.,
Examination of Witnesses.

Provisions/ Laws applied in the Case:

1. Section- 145 and Sec-155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

2. Section- 161 and 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Cases Referred:

1. Ram lal v. State of U.P22

2. Naresh Agarsinh Chhara @Nariyo v. State of Gujarat23
3. Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar
4. Ravi Kumar @ Sonu v. State24
5. K.S. Ramaswamy and M.R. Dass v. Union of India25

Facts:

On June 16,1954, one Ram Sanehi Mallah of Nayapura gave a dinner at his home and a large
number of his friends attended it. After the dinner, at about 9 p. m., a music performance was
given in front of the house of Ram Sanehi's neighbour, Ram Sarup. About 35 or 40 guests
assembled in front of Ram Sarup's platform to hear the music. Asa Ram was still taking his
dinner inside the house. At about 9 p. m., the accused along with 15 or 20 persons arrived
from an eastern lane, stood behind the well, shouted that no one should run away and
advanced northward from the well firing shots.

Natthi and Saktu were hit and both of them died on the spot. Bharat Singh, who was also hit,
ran northward and was pursued by some of the culprits and was shot dead in front of
22
1979 AIR 1498
23
R/CR.A/1713/2012

24
124 (2005) DLT 1,
25
(1977) ILLJ 211 Mad
 16

Bankey's house shown in the plan. Bankey, who was also shot at and injured, took up Asa
Ram's gun and went up to the roof of Ram Sarup's house wherefrom he fired shots at the
dacoits, who were retreating. Asa Ram, who was luckily inside the house taking his dinner,
ran up to the roof of Ram Sarup's house and saw the occurrence from over the parapet. The
culprits turned over the dead- bodies of Saktu, Natthi and Bharat Singh and, on seeing Bharat
Singh's face, they exclaimed that Asa Ram was killed. Thereafter, they proceeded northward,
passed through the corner of Ram Sarup's house and disappeared in the direction of the
Chambal. They also carried away Bankey's gun which was on the cot.

Issues Raised:

1. “Did you state to the investigating officer that the gang rolled the dead bodies of
Natthi, Saktu and Bharat Singh, and scrutinized them and did you tell him that the
face of Asa Ram resembled that of the deceased Bharat Sing?”
2. “Did you state to the investigating officer about the presence of the gas lantern?”

Judgement:

The learned Judges of the High Court ruled out from their consideration that these two
circumstances made it possible for the witnesses to recognise the accused, but hold that there
was ample opportunity even otherwise for the witnesses to do so. The High Court was
justified in so doing, and there being ample evidence on which they could come to the
conclusion that the witnesses had, in fact, recognised the accused, it must inevitably be
regarded as one of fact in regard to which this Court does not interfere. Since no other point
was argued, the appeal must fail, and we agree that it be dismissed. Here the Appeal got
dismissed.

Grounds for Appeal:

1. Appeal to High Court:

The learned Sessions Judge on a consideration of the voluminous evidence in the case
held that the guilt was brought home to the said two accused and convicted them as
aforesaid. Tahsildar Singh and Shyama Mallah preferred two separate appeals to the
High Court against their convictions and sentences. The two appeals were heard along
 17

with the reference made by the learned Sessions Judge under s. 374 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure for the confirmation of the sentence of death awarded to the
appellants. 

2. Appeal to Supreme Court:

But the question raised in the petition was considered by the earned Judges of the High
Court in their judgment. The judgment discloses that the learned Counsel appearing for
the appellants argued before the High Court that the learned Sessions Judge wrongly
disallowed the aforesaid two questions, and the learned Judges, conceding that those two
questions should have been allowed, held that the accused were not prejudiced by the said
fact. 

Judgement and Order;

The learned Judges of the High Court ruled out from their consideration that these two
circumstances made it possible for the witnesses to recognise the accused, but hold that there
was ample opportunity even otherwise for the witnesses to do so. The High Court was
justified in so doing, and there being ample evidence on which they could come to the
conclusion that the witnesses had, in fact, recognised the accused, it must inevitably be
regarded as one of fact in regard to which this Court does not interfere. Since no other point
was argued, the appeal must fail, and we agree that it be dismissed. Here the Appeal got
dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dicta:

These questions were defective, to start with. They did riot set up a contradiction but
attempted to obtain from the witness a version of what he stated to the police, which is then
contradicted. The cross-examination cannot even indirectly sub serve any other purpose. The
witness was not asked what he stated to the police, but was told what he had stated to the
police and asked to explain the omission. It is to be borne in mind that the statement made to
the police is duly proved either earlier or even later to establish what the witness had then
stated.

 In our opinion, the legislature did and for the very obvious reason that it gave the prosecution
also a chance to re-examine the witness, to explain I any matter referred to in the cross-
 18

examination of the witness. We respectfully do not agree that the section should be construed
in the way our learned brother has construed it. Though we agree as to the result, our opinion
cannot be left unexpressed. If the section is construed too narrowly, the right it confers will
cease to be of any real protection to the accused, and the danger of its becoming an
impediment to effective cross-examination on behalf of the accused is apparent. This brings
us to the consideration of the questions, which were asked and disallowed.

Comment or Observations or Critical Analysis:

A statement which was given to the Police under section-162 of the Crpc only for the purpose
of contradicting a statement under section-1 second part of the Evidence Act but it cannot be
used for the purpose of cross-examination under section-145(1). If the statement made to the
police was not reduced to writing then it could not be used for the purpose of contradiction.

CASE ANALYSIS - 02

Case Title: State and Ors v. Babu and Ors

Citation:  1993(2)KLJ587

Topic: Contradictory Statement and Liability of witnesses under Indian Law. In this case,
they discussed Sec-145 which explains about the concept of cross-examination as to previous
statements in writing and Sec-155(3) i.e., to impeach the credit of witness.

Scope/ Chapter (Indian Evidence Act):

The Scope of this study is limited to the Chapter-X of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 i.e.,
Examination of Witnesses.

Provisions/ Laws applied:

1. Section-145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 152, 155(3) of Indian Evidence Act
2. Section-161, 162, 482 of Crpc

Cases Referred:

1. Gajendra Singh v. State of U.P

2. Tahsildar Singh and Anr.v. State of U.P26
26
1959 AIR 1012
 19

3. Khatri v. State of Bihar27

Facts:

Police registered a case in respect of death of one Muraleedharan and after completion of
investigation laid charge sheet against four persons as accused for the offence of murder.
Government appointed a Special Public Prosecutor to conduct prosecution in the case. In the
Sessions Court some witnesses were examined for the prosecution. Defence counsel, at a
particular stage of the trial, brought to the notice of the learned Sessions Judge that the same
police had registered another case in respect of another incident which happened later on the
same night and investigation has been conducted by the police into that later incident. At the
request of the defence counsel, the file relating to the latter case was brought down to the
Sessions Court. Defence counsel then moved an application for permitting him to further
cross - examine one of the witnesses who was already examined) with reference to the
statement recorded by the investigating officer in connection with the second incident.
Special Public Prosecutor opposed it, but learned Sessions Judge overruled the objections and
granted permission to further cross - examine the witness with reference to the said statement.

Issues raised:

1. Whether the statement u/s- 161 of Crpc in one particular crime could be used against
that witness in any other trail enquiry or proceedings by the accused.
2. Whether the learned Sessions Judge can call for the police diaries of a case which is
not under inquiry or trail before him and permit it to be used by the accused for
contradicting a witness examined in another case under trail before him
3. Whether section 162 permits the use of statement recorded sec-161 of Crpc in any
other proceeding other than the inquiry or trail in respect of the offence for which the
investigation was conducted.

Judgement:

From the sweep of Sec. 162 of Code legislature protected the right of a cross examiner to use
the statement for contradicting the witness who made such statement. Of course, the right of
the accused to use it for contradiction is unrestricted while prosecution can use it for
contradiction only if the court permits. Both the Criminal Miscellaneous Cases were
dismissed.
27
1981 SCC (1) 627
 20

Grounds for Appeal:

One of the brothers of the deceased (on whose request Government appointed the Special
Public Prosecutor in the trial court) has now moved this Court under Sec. 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code') challenging the said order. Shri. T. V. Prabhakaran,
learned counsel for the brother of the deceased, strenuously contended that the impugned
order is in violation of the tenor and spirit of Sec. 162 of the Code.

Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dicta:

The right to cross - examine a witness with reference to his previous statement can be traced
to Sec-145, 146 and 155 (3) of the Indian Evidence Act. Sec. 145 says that a witness may be
cross- examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced to writing. This
is the general right of a cross-examiner. The only restriction provided is that the previous
statement must be relevant to the matters in question. Sec. 146 empowers a cross-examiner to
put any question to test the veracity of the witness. Sec. 162 of the Code has been inserted for
protecting the interest of the accused (Tahsildar Singh v. State of U. P). Hence that which
was intended to provide as a protection to the accused cannot, by interpretation, be made a
handicap to the accused. Sec. 162 is never intended to curb the right of the accused to
contradict a witness with his previous statement,

In Khatri v. State of Bihar the Supreme Court pointed out that protection is afforded to the
accused against the user of statement of witnesses made before the police during
investigation. In that context, learned Judges observed thus: "But, this protection is
unnecessary in any proceeding other than an inquiry or trial in respect of the offence under
investigation and hence the bar created by the section is a limited bar". According to me, the
said decision makes the position clear that the limited bar is not to be stretched beyond its
contours. Learned Sessions Judge was, therefore, perfectly right in permitting the defence
counsel to use the statement recorded by the police in connection with another case for cross-
examining the prosecution witness concerned.

Observations:

Sections- 145, 146 and 155 (3) of the Evidence Act are complementary to each other. When
they are read together, a cross-examiner cannot be restricted from putting questions except to
the extent indicated in Sec. 148 to 152 of the Evidence Act. The general right of the cross-
examiner has to be borne in mind when deciding the present question. According to Section-
 21

145 of Indian Evidence Act, the witness may be cross examined as to the previous statements
made by him in writing or reduced in writing.

CASE ANALYSIS -03

Case Title: Majid and Ors v. State of Haryana

Citation:  AIR 2002 SC382

Topic: Contradictory Statement and Liability of witnesses under Indian Law. In this case,
they discussed Sec-145 which explains about the concept of cross-examination as to previous
statements in writing and Sec-155(3) i.e., to impeach the credit of witness.

Scope/ Chapter (Indian Evidence Act):

The Scope of this study is limited to the Chapter-X of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 i.e.,
Examination of Witnesses.

Provisions/ Laws applied:

Sections- 145, 155(3) of Indian Evidence Act

Section- 161 of Crpc

Section- 302, 34 of IPC

Cases Referred:

1. State and Ors v. Babu and Ors28

2. Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava29
3. Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P30

Facts:

On the intervening night of August 11/12, 1995 in the wee hors i.e. about 4 a.m. Smt.
Hamidi and her husband Abdul Rahim (PW-7) were subjected to murderous assault and at

28
1993(2)KLJ587
29
AIR 1957 All 1
30
1959 AIR 1012,
 22

that time their minor son Hasham (PW-6) aged about 11 years, was the only person p resent.
Both Smt. Hamidi and her husband Abdul Rahim became unconscious and fell down.
Hasham saw the assault, raised an alarm and persons from nearby houses came to the house
of Abdul Rahim. At about 5.50 a.m. Hasham (PW-6) was taken to the Police station by
Jamaluddin, Shaurab and Tahir where Hasham was purported to have made a statement on
the basis of which the First Information Report was recorded. In this statement, Hasham was
alleged to have made a statement that there was a quarrel between his parents followed by
assaults and as a result both of them were injured. Tahir was the nephew of the accused.
Hamidi who was taken to the hospital remained unconscious till her death on August 14, 195.
Abdul Rahim (PW-7) who became unconscious after the assault was also taken to the
hospital and he regained consciousness only after more than ten days. After Hamidi
succumbed to her injuries, on August, 15, a supplementary statement of Hasham (PW-6) was
recorded by a Police officer of the rank of the Dy. Superintendent and in this Hasham sated
that all the four accused assaulted his parents. After further investigation, police submitted
charge sheet against the four accused and they were convicted as stated earlier. According to
the prosecution four years prior to occurrence, all the four accused assaulted Abdul Rahim
(PW-7) as his eldest son Sher Mohammed was suspected of having illicit relationship with
Mehmooda, sister of the accused. Abdul Rahim and his deceased wife their two sons left the
village out of fear of the accused and on their return to the village after more than four years
the present occurrence took place.

Issues Raised:

1. Whether eyewitness Hasham (PW-6) minor son of the deceased made any statement

to the police on August 12,1995 or not and in the alternatively his alleged statement
was under the influence of Jamaluddin, Shaurab and Tahir..

Judgement:

Both the courts below have also recorded a clear finding that previous enmity between the
parties was duly proved which the motive of the crime was. We do not find any material to
disturb the concurrent findings recorded by the trial court as well as by the High Court that
the appellants were the perpetrators of the crime and accordingly they do not find any merit
in these appeals. Hence the appeals got dismissed.
 23

Grounds for the appeal:

The appellant has strenuously urged that the courts below ought not to have discarded the
evidence of defence witness- Jamaluddin D.W.1. Jamaluddin deposed before the court that on
hearing alarm coming form the house of Abdul Rahim, he went there and found Hasham
weeping and on being asked Hasham told him that his parents quarrelled over meals and
thereafter his father gave Kulhari blow on the head of his mother deceased Hamidi, who at
the same time gave Kulhari blow on the neck of his father.

Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dicta:

Here the statement allegedly made by PW-6 to DW-1 was not in writing nor was it reduced to
writing. Nonetheless if the object of examining DW-1 as a witness was to discredit PW-6 it is
only fair to insist that PW-6 himself should have been given an opportunity to explain it.
Without PW-6 being asked about that aspect it is unreasonable to expect PW-6 to explain
about it. Hence it is immaterial that the statement claimed by DW-1 as made to him by PW-6
was not reduced to writing. When PW-6 was cross-examined by the defence counsel he was
not asked anything about the alleged statement made by him to DW-1. In such a situation we
cannot give any credence to the evidence of DW-1. Because of this the appeal got dismissed.

Both the courts below have also recorded a clear finding that previous enmity between the
parties was duly proved which the motive of the crime was. We do not find any material to
disturb the concurrent findings recorded by the trial court as well as by the High Court that
the appellants were the perpetrators of the crime and accordingly we do not find any merit in
these appeals.

Observations:

From this case I came to understand that according to section-145, the testimony can be
discredited under section-155(3). In this particular case, the statement which was allegedly
made by PW-6 to DW-1 was not in writing and if the object of examining DW-1 as a witness
was to discredit PW-06, it is only fair to insist PW-6 to explain it.

CASE ANALYSIS -04

 24

Case Title: Horace Branch v. Cindy Sweeney, Associate Administrator, the Attorney
General of the State of New Jersey

Citation: 758 F.3d 226 

Topic: Contradiction between the Statement of the Witnesses and also the liability of the
witnesses.

Scope/ Chapter of Indian Evidence Act:

The Scope of this study is limited to the Chapter-X of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 i.e.,
Examination of Witnesses.

Provisions/ Laws applied:

1. 28 United States Code -§ 2254(d)(2), § 2254(d)(2), § 2241-2254,

2. Antiterrorism and Effective death Penalty Act of 1996.

Cases Referred:

1. Duncon v. Morton31
2. Outten v. Kearney32
3. Harrington v. Richter33
4. Breakiron v. Horn,
5. Panetti v. Quarterman34
6. Frantz v. Hazey35
7. Strickland v. Washington

Facts:

On November 4, 1993, Branch entered the apartment building at 260 Prince Street in
Newark, New Jersey a premises infested with a criminal element including drug dealers and
addicts. At Branch's criminal trial the parties sharply disputed the reason why Branch went to
the premises and what happened once he was inside. It is undisputed, however, that Branch

31
256 F.3d 189
32
Civil Action No. 98-785-SLR
33
562 U.S.86
34
551 U.S.930 (2007)
35
472 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2007
 25

had some role in the fatal shooting of Randolph Mosley in the building. It is also undisputed
that when the police arrested Branch on the day following the shooting he had possession of
the weapon that had been used to kill Mosley.

Branch testified at the criminal trial that he went to 260 Prince Street to retrieve $50 that he
had paid for "beat," or fake, cocaine at that premises. He said that he obtained the drugs from
Phillip Murphy, who was outside of the building serving as a lookout for drug dealers inside
the building. Murphy also procured drugs from a dealer inside when a purchaser arrived.
Branch determined that the dealer supplying his cocaine gave him a product that was partially
baking soda and he wanted a refund of the purchase price. Branch, though he claims to have
been unarmed, insisted that he and Murphy go inside the building to get his money back but
he soon found out that in the narcotics retail market all sales are final. Upon entering, Branch
saw eight to ten people, including Kenneth Dortch, Michael Davis, and Patricia Lee, standing
against the walls.

Issues Raised:

1. Whether the state courts that reviewed Branch's petition for post-conviction relief
(“PCR”) unreasonably applied federal law in holding that his trial counsel was not
constitutionally ineffective for failing to call two potentially exculpatory witnesses.
2. Whether the evidence supported the verdict to the extent that the jury found Branch
guilty.

Judgement:

If the state courts had concluded without an evidentiary hearing that Branch's trial counsel's
performance had been deficient but nevertheless had denied Branch PCR relief because he
did not satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, it is possible that we would have granted
Branch's petition without ordering that the District Court hold an evidentiary hearing.
According to Noble v. Kelly, holding a remand for an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary in
part because the record negated the possibility that counsel's omission was strategic); Fed.R.
Governing § 2254 Cases 8 advisory committee's note (commenting that in "unusual cases the
court may grant [a habeas petition] without a hearing"). As the case stands, however, there
are factual questions that must be resolved concerning the first Strickland prong before the
District Court may adjudicate the habeas corpus petition.
 26

Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dicta

As the State correctly points out, Robinson's testimony at least would have impeached
Murphy's testimony, which is significant as Murphy was a key witness for the prosecution.
We note also that when the trial court admitted Barnhill's testimony it overruled the
prosecution's hearsay objection and thus it allowed Barnhill to describe what Lee had told
him about the incident. We see no reason why trial counsel, after having cleared the hearsay
hurdle once, would have withheld Robinson's statement out of a concern that the court would
not have admitted it for the truth of its content.

We do not have the benefit of a diagram that Lee drew at trial that purported to demonstrate
the positions of all the individuals in the hallway. As the case stands, however, there are
factual questions that must be resolved concerning the first Strickland prong before the
District Court may adjudicate the habeas corpus petition.

Observation:

The weaknesses in the prosecution's case and our conclusion based on their statements that
Samee and Robinson would have materially aided Branch's case, we find that fair-minded
jurists would not disagree that there was a reasonable probability that Samee's and Robinson's
testimony at trial would have changed the jury's verdict. Accordingly, in the absence of an
explanation from Branch's trial counsel as to why he did not call Samee and Robinson as
witnesses, we find the state courts' application of Strickland's second prong to have been
unreasonable. As a result, the District Court should have made a de novo review of Branch's
ineffective assistance claim.

CASE ANALYSIS-05

Case Title: United States of America v. Rainwater

Citation:  283 F.2d 386

Topic: Contradiction between the Statement of the Witnesses and also the liability of the
witnesses.

Scope/ Chapter of Indian Evidence Act:

 27

The Scope of this study is limited to the Chapter-X of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 i.e.,
Examination of Witnesses.

Provisions/ Laws applied:

1. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1301 ( Agriculture Act of 1948)

2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 714,(Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act)
3. Rule 503(b) of its Model Code of Evidence

Cases Referred:

1. Southern Railway Company v. Gray36

2. Hickory v. United States37
3. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. et al38
4. Ellis v. United States, 8 Cir.39
5. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Woelfle, 8 Cir.40

Facts:

These actions were instituted by the United States of America under the False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C.A. §§ 231-233, against R.S. Rainwater, Sr., Sloan Rainwater and William Rainwater
(doing business as a partnership under the name of R.S. Rainwater & Sons), and the Citizens
National Bank of Walnut Ridge, Arkansas, and were consolidated for purposes of trial. Two
of the defendants in the Rainwater case (No. 16,472) were, at the times here involved,
officers of the Citizens National Bank of Walnut Ridge, Arkansas. In the complaints it is
alleged that the defendants in connection with their participation in a cotton loan program
conducted by the Commodity Credit Corporation (herein referred to as Commodity) under
Section 1 of the Agricultural Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1248, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1301 et seq., and the
Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 714, had in the year 1949
presented or caused to be presented to Commodity claims which they knew to be false.

At the trial the United States (plaintiff and appellant) introduced evidence to the effect that
the defendants in both cases had entered into Lending Agency Agreements with Commodity
36
241 U.S 333 (1916).
37
151 U.S. 303, 14 S. Ct. 334, 38 L. Ed. 170 (1894)
38
105 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1939)
39
356 U.S. 674 (1958) 
40
83 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1936)
 28

and thus became authorized lending agencies under the 1949 Cotton Loan program and
subject to the regulations of the program as set out in the 1949 Cotton Bulletin 1.

Issues raised:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in excluding witness Blalock's prior
wrote inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, and in directing a verdict in
favour of the defendants.

Judgement:

The trial court was correct in refusing to admit plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 8 and 10 as
substantive evidence. As the record discloses that exhibits constitute the only substantial
evidence offered by plaintiff which supports a verdict, the trial court properly directed a
verdict in favour of the defendants.

Affirmed.

Ratio Decidenci and Obiter Dicta:

In United States v. Graham, the Court stated: "Ordinarily, the impeachment of one's own
witness goes only to his credibility. Evidence so elicited is not to be treated as affirmative
proof of fact for any other purpose. And the jury should be so instructed. But this evidence
became more than impeaching evidence when the issue of subornation of perjury was
developed." For our purpose there is no necessity of giving concern to the stated distinction.
It is important, on the question now before this Court, only that the Court speaking in Graham
expressly recognized and adhered to the general rule.

58 American Jurisprudence: Page-421

The rule is almost universally recognized that evidence of extrajudicial statements made by a
witness who is not a party and whose declarations are not binding as admissions is admissible
only to impeach or discredit the witness and is not competent as substantive evidence of the
facts to which such statements relate, and this rule is equally applicable where a party
impeaches his own witness by inconsistent statements. Since the inconsistent statements of a
witness are not substantive evidence in the case, they should not be offered as such."

Observations:
 29

The theory of the Hearsay rule is that an extrajudicial statement is rejected because it was
made out of Court by an absent person not subject to cross-examination (post, Sec. 1362).
Here, however, by hypothesis the witness is present and subject to cross-examination. There
is ample opportunity to test him as to the basis for his former statement. The whole purpose
of the Hearsay rule has been already satisfied. Hence there is nothing to prevent the tribunal
from giving such testimonial credit to the extrajudicial statement as it may seem to deserve.

CONCLUSION:

Whether the laws related to the contradictory statement and impeaching the credibility
of witness are working effectively or not?

The statements recorded under Section 161(3) of the Code are not substantive piece of
evidence and the Court cannot suo -motu make use of such statements in case if the testimony
of the witness made during the trial is not consistent with the statement made before the
police during the course of investigation. The object of Section 162 of the Code is to protect
the accused against overzealous police officers and untruthful witness.  In almost every other
trial the witnesses are either turning hostile or are giving exaggerated testimonies. Sometimes
clever witness in their examination-in-chief conforms to what they have stated earlier to the
police, but in the cross-examination introduces statements in a subtle way contradicting in
effect what they stated in the examination-in-chief. If the witness turns hostile and resiles
from his earlier statement made before the police, then it becomes important for the Public
Prosecutor to bring that part of the earlier statement on record of the trial and the manner is
provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872 read with the proviso to Section 162
of the Code.

It is only after such contradictions are brought on record and thereafter proved the question
would come of evaluating the testimony. Therefore, it becomes very important for both the
prosecution as well as the defence to first bring the contradiction on the record and thereafter
to prove it in accordance with the manner prescribed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Books:

1. CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE- William Mack

 30

2. TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUES- Francis

Wharton.

Articles:

1. A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS- Kane and Mathew C.

2. THE PREVIOUS INCONSISTENT STATEMENT OF OPPONENT’S WITNESS-
Stanley Schiff.
3. IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES- William Tricket.
4. CHARACTER EVIDENCE ON AFFECTING THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS-
J.A. Osoinach.
5. SEQUESTRATION OF WITNESS- John H.Wigmore.

Reports:

1. 69th Law Commission Report

2. 172nd Law Commission Report

Statutes:

1. INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

31
32