international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197–216

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijcip

Using interconnected risk maps to assess the threats

faced by electricity infrastructures

Gabriel J. Correa-Henaoa, Jose M. Yustab,n, Roberto Lacal-Aránteguic

a
Faculty of Engineering, Fundación Universitaria Luis Amigó, C/51A # 67B90, Medellín, Colombia
b
Department of Electrical Engineering, Universidad de Zaragoza, C/María de Luna 3, Zaragoza 50018, Spain
c
JRC-Institute for Energy, European Commission, P.O. Box 2, 1755 ZG Petten, the Netherlands

art i cle i nfo ab st rac t

Article history:
Received 13 December 2011
Received in revised form
6 September 2013
Accepted 6 October 2013
Available online 9 October 2013
This paper describes a methodology for risk identification and risk assessment in
electricity infrastructures. The approach leverages risk maps and can be applied to general
infrastructure networks. A semi-quantitative assessment strategy that incorporates the
creation of risk charts within a risk management framework is also presented. This
strategy engages an intuitive graphical representation to identify the most significant
threats affecting infrastructure networks. As a result, it is possible to conduct risk analyses

Keywords: of energy supply (and other) infrastructures within a region or country by engaging

Electricity infrastructure interconnected risk maps. The application of the methodology is demonstrated using a

Risk assessment case study of a Colombian electricity infrastructure, which includes an estimation of the

Interconnected risk maps risk components.

& 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
An integrated risk management cycle must adhere to the
infrastructure protection guidelines specified in the United
States National Infrastructure Protection Plan [1] or the
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection [2].
The frameworks established by these protection plans can be
summarized in terms of a risk management plan that involves
six steps: (i) establishment of safety goals; (ii) identification of
resources and risks; (iii) assessment of risks; (iv) prioritization
of actions; (v) implementation of protection programs; and
(vi) measurement of effectiveness [3]. This paper proposes a
conceptual framework for risk management in electricity
infrastructures, which specifically addresses the various risks
that affect electricity infrastructures, especially those related
to electricity transmission and distribution. The methodology
focuses on risk identification as well as risk evaluation, and
also incorporates semi-quantitative assessments.
This paper is divided into two parts. The first part reviews
risk identification as it relates to the electricity sector. It
includes a brief description of state-of-the-art risk assess-
ment strategies for electricity infrastructure owners and
operators, with an emphasis on electricity transmission and
distribution. Key concepts such as infrastructure protection
plans, enterprise resources, risk maps and risk matrices are
also described.
The second part of the paper describes the application of
interconnected risk maps as the first step to implementing a
risk management framework. A case study involving a
Colombian electricity infrastructure is used to demonstrate
the identification and assessment steps via the construction
and validation of an interconnected risk map. A semi-
quantitative technique involving risk charts is presented as
a rapid and highly effective risk evaluation strategy that can
be used within a risk management framework. The evalua-
tion methodology is broad enough to cover short-term,

n
Corresponding author. Tel.: þ34 976 761 922; fax: þ34 976 762 226.
E-mail address: jmyusta@unizar.es (J.M. Yusta).

1874-5482/$ - see front matter & 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2013.10.002
198 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216
medium-term and long-term threats and risks in the techni-
cal and non-technical categories. This facilitates the analysis
of structural vulnerabilities in electricity infrastructures and
the identification of situations that impact infrastructure
protection more accurately than existing methods.
The paper also provides an inventory of risk components
related to the electricity infrastructure. The inventory covers
the nature of the risks and their components, origins, classi-
fication and assessment. The inventory is useful for validat-
ing the methodology presented in this paper and serves as a
good reference source for critical infrastructure protection
planning.
2. Risk management framework for electricity
infrastructures
The critical infrastructure comprises the assets that are
required for the functioning of a society and its economy,
i.e., assets whose sudden non-availability could result in the
loss of life or seriously impact health, economic systems or
public security. This definition also applies to energy infra-
structures, including those related to electricity generation,
transmission and distribution.
2.1. Infrastructure protection plans
In 2005, a “green paper” entitled “European Programme for
Critical Infrastructure Protection” was released by the
European Commission [4]. In 2008, the European Council
adopted Directive 2008/114/EC [2], which created the European
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). In 2009,
the United States National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) [1] was launched, following the release of several frame-
works established by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
[5–7]. Both EPCIP and NIPP clearly define the critical areas in
which efforts must be focused in order to develop plans for
threat prevention and infrastructure protection. Meanwhile, the
governments of several countries have launched similar initia-
tives for critical infrastructure protection [3].
The frameworks established by Directive 2008/114/EC and
NIPP can be summarized in terms of a risk management plan
that involves six steps: (i) establishment of safety goals;
(ii) identification of resources and risks; (iii) assessment of
risks; (iv) prioritization of actions; (v) implementation of
protection programs; and (vi) measurement of effectiveness.
Feedback and continuous improvement are also part of the
frameworks. Fig. 1 presents a risk management plan for
critical infrastructure protection that conforms to the
frameworks.
Infrastructure protection plans promote the use of risk
management models that incorporate strategies for reducing
uncertainty by exhaustively compiling and taking into
account infrastructure asset data and infrastructure interre-
lationships. Infrastructure protection plans also suggest
approaches for reaching the various stakeholders in the
critical infrastructure value chain.
 Identification of risks and resources: This step involves the
creation of an inventory of resources, assets, systems and
Goal Security
Definitions
Monitoring Risk
Effectiveness Identification
Program Risk
Implementation Assessment
Prioritization of
Actions
Fig. 1 – Risk management plan for critical infrastructure
protection.
networks in the infrastructure value chain. The step also
involves the identification of risks affecting system resi-
lience, which requires the development and maintenance
of an inventory of physical infrastructure assets that
includes property, information systems and considers
technical and non-technical threats.
 Risk assessment: The most widely used and accepted
technique involves qualitative risk assessment using risk
assessment matrices that take into account the likelihood
and the consequences of each risk [8–10]. The risk
matrices are created with input from domain experts
(through interviews and Delphi techniques). Quantitative
risk assessment is performed using data and variables
that allow statistical modeling. Quantitative risk assess-
ment is typically focused on specific risks, especially the
risks that could produce serious consequences.
 Prioritization of actions and program implementation:
This step involves the comparison of the relative levels
of risk, along with options to achieve the safety goals.
Protection measures are applied where possible to reduce
security risks in a cost-effective manner.
 Monitoring effectiveness: This step incorporates monitoring
activities as a means to achieve regular supervision, e.g., by
creating performance indicators. Many opportunities for
change and improvement can be recognized during this step.
2.2. Electricity infrastructure value chain
The risks to the population and to the environment from
energy systems arise from energy production as well as from
the components in the value chain. In the case of electricity
infrastructures, this includes power generation, high and
medium voltage transmission, medium and low voltage
distribution, power marketing and the provision of services
to energy consumers (Fig. 2).
Specifying the value chain in electricity infrastructures is
the first step to defining the objectives and policies for secure
energy supply. The majority of critical infrastructure assets in
 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216 199

OECD countries are privately owned. In fact, as much as 80%

of the critical infrastructure may be owned or operated by
private sector entities [11]. In addition to the large-scale
networks, the hundreds of thousands of small nodes and
private networks also require attention. The protection tasks
should be performed to the extent that they are economically
and technically feasible [12]. Some infrastructure assets,
especially those at military installations and other mission-
critical facilities, usually incorporate alternative and autono-
mous power facilities that guarantee backup supply in the
event of power failures. Although this paper explores most of
the stages within the value chain, more emphasis is placed
on electricity transmission and distribution.

2.3. Enterprise resources

The definition of the set of resources possessed by electricity
infrastructure asset owners and operators is required before
risk identification and risk assessment can be performed [13,14].
The resources include the assets and expertise that are essen-
tial to satisfactory operations. In general, these include mate-
rial, human, technical and economic resources [15–17].
 Material resources: Material resources include assets such
as installations (e.g., buildings, machinery, transmission
lines, control centers, dispatch centers and generation
plants) and materials (e.g., primary fuels, nuclear, hybrid,
solar and wind resources).
 Human resources: Human resources are essential to any
organization. The resources include the entire labor force –
employees, contractors and third-party workers – involved
in the operation and maintenance of the electricity infra-
structure. Human resources may be established in hier-
archical levels within an organization.
 Technical resources: Technical resources relate to the set
of auxiliary instruments and tools that are essential to the
construction, operation, maintenance of the infrastructure
value chain (e.g., information systems, design plans,
project management know-how and procedures).
 Economic resources: Economic resources include equity (e.g.,
cash and shares) and debt (e.g., loans, credit and bonds).
2.4. Threat identification using risk maps
The threat identification step focuses on discovering the
major types of risk that exist within an infrastructure
[18,19]. It provides qualitative descriptions of all the risks
and their components applicable to the value chain and the
life-cycle of the infrastructure [8].
Risk categorization can be performed in several ways. One
approach is to categorize and analyze the technical and non-
technical threats [20]. Threats arising from malicious indivi-
duals (involving inherent risks to the operation of the value
chain) are different from the threats posed by natural
phenomena.
 Technical threats: These threats induce financial and
operational risks. Other technical threats are caused by
Fig. 2 – Electricity infrastructure value chain.
people, systems and procedures that negatively impact
the infrastructure.
 Non-technical threats: These threats induce environmen-
tal risks, strategic risks and resource allocation risks.
Other non-technical threats are posed by external factors
such as natural disasters, socio-political situations, third-
party actions, and policies and regulations.
A risk map simplifies the identification of the risk compo-
nents by grouping them into categories (e.g., technical and
non-technical). The methodology, which allows for a better
representation of the interrelationships among the various
risks, is widely used for threat identification in the electric
power sector. Some of the popular risk map approaches are:
 COSO audit maps: These risk maps [13,14] facilitate the
monitoring and auditing of risks.
 Holistic schemes: These schemes are specifically adapted
to project management [9]; however, they do not
categorize risks.
 Radar maps: These risk maps are widely used in the
financial sector [21–23]. They are constructed based on
interviews conducted with strategic business managers.
 Enterprise risk maps: These risk maps facilitate the
categorization of enterprise risk into the defined risk types
[15,16,18,19].
2.4.1. Risk categorization
In general, the risks facing an electric power company may be
divided into the following categories [24]:
 Compliance: This category includes the risks related to
policies, laws, regulations and their economic and social
impact to the region in which the infrastructure asset
operates.
 Assets and finance: This category includes risks arising
from market volatility and the economy that impact the
200 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216
Fig. 3 – Risk component breakdown structure.
operation and expansion of electricity infrastructures.
This category also includes risks associated with debt
collection and the acquisition of funds to cover upgrades
and expansion of the electricity infrastructure.
 Environmental: This category includes risks related to
regulatory issues and political, social, natural phenomena
that impact electricity infrastructure operations.
 Operational: This category includes the risks that affect
the activities, systems, people and value chain within an
electricity infrastructure. They reveal failures in the
execution of activities, lack or absence of procedures,
insufficient human capital, lack of technological and
administrative management, etc.
Finally, documenting the origins of technical and
non-technical risks can help determine how they are to be
treated [20].
2.4.2. Establishing risk components
The risk identification phase of a risk management frame-
work seeks to determine (to the extent possible) all the events
that affect the resources required to achieve the infrastruc-
ture operation objectives. A detailed investigation of each risk
must be conducted to identify its components.
Risk component definition ensures a uniform level of
detail, and contributes to the effectiveness and quality of
risk identification. A risk component breakdown structure
(Fig. 3), in which risk scenarios facilitate the definition of risk
components, may be used to assist this activity. In particular,
it supports the logical and systematic identification of risks
and their impact on the value chain of an electricity
infrastructure.
The risk map and the risk components become part of the
corporate knowledge base of critical infrastructure asset
owners and operators. Some risks may affect the value chain
as well as infrastructure assets and sub-systems. The
abstraction of a risk map varies from the strategic level to
the operational level depending on the specific situation
being considered.
2.5. Risk assessment matrices
In the risk assessment phase, each risk is evaluated by
measuring it against the probability of occurrence and the
severity of the consequences according to a predefined
scale [19]. An effective risk assessment should include the
vulnerabilities of the system, the magnitudes and types of
threats, and estimates of the consequences. The following
sections discuss two broad risk assessment strategies.
2.5.1. Qualitative and semi-quantitative assessment
strategies
Risk classification may be followed by a qualitative strategy
that incorporates the probability of occurrence (likelihood)
and the impact (severity) of each risk according to a descrip-
tive scale [8]. This process takes into account risk indicators
such as the lack of energy supply, equipment failures in the
network infrastructure and interdependence with other sec-
tors. The “qualitative variables” cannot be measured numeri-
cally; instead, they are assigned “linguistic” values (e.g.,
probability is high, medium or low) [8].
In general, risk may be computed as
Risk ¼ likelihood  severity ð1Þ
The likelihood (L) is allocated by experts who determine the
most likely outcome of each of the identified risks. It also
includes the possibility of occurrence of a vulnerability in the
system. The severity (S) can be minor when an incident
breach results in a small financial loss. In other cases, the
severity can be significant, resulting in a long-term service
outage or perhaps even loss of life.
Risk matrix elements are organized according to the like-
lihood and severity assigned to each risk. The assessments of
likelihood and severity are assigned from five-level scales
that range from 1 to 9 as suggested in [25]. The range assigned
to a scale depends on the infrastructure circumstances,
country situation, company policies and company strategies
among other criteria.
 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216 201

Table 1 – Likelihood (L) scales for semi-quantitative risk assessment.

Likelihood (L) Remote Unlikely Credible Probable True

Scale 1 3 5 7 9
Frequency One event every One event every One event every One event every One or more events every 1 year
10 years or more 7–10 years 3–7 years 1–3 years

Table 2 – Severity (S) scales for semi-quantitative risk assessment.

Severity Low Moderate Medium High Critical

(S)

Scale 1 3 5 7 9
Economic Losses less than Losses between 1M € Losses between 3M € and Losses between 10M € Losses more than
resources 1M € and 3M € 10M € and 20M € 20M €

Technical No services are No services are No services are affected. Some services are Some services are
resources affected. affected. Enterprise Enterprise information is affected. Enterprise affected. Enterprise
Enterprise information may be lost but can be recovered information is also information is lost
information is somewhat compromised and cannot be
not compromised recovered
compromised

Human No effects on Integrity of Integrity of employees or Integrity of employees Loss of human life
resources employees or employees or stakeholders may be or stakeholders may
stakeholders stakeholders may be temporarily affected, but be permanently
temporarily affected, intervention is required affected. Intervention
but no intervention is for recovery without is strongly required
required for recovery consequences for recovery

Material No effect on Effect on service Effect on service Service operations Service operations
resources service operations is evident. operations is evident. have collapsed. have crashed.
operations. Relationships with Relationships with energy Relationships with Relationships with
Relationships energy consumers consumers are somewhat energy consumers energy consumers
with energy are not affected affected have deteriorated and market
consumers are regulators are
not affected shattered

The scales presented in Tables 1 and 2 take into account
common concepts established by electric utilities in Colombia
[15–17]. The risk likelihood (L) can be determined based on the
number of events that trigger the occurrence of a particular
risk using the scale presented in Table 1. Table 2 shows the
scale used for severity (S) assessments, which are required to
produce valuations of the relative importance of the four
enterprise resources described in Section 2.3.
A risk matrix facilitates the understanding of threat
valuation because it contains values computed using Eq. (1).
As shown in Fig. 3, It is possible to rank the risks according to
the following judgment-based categories:
 Critical risks: These risks require high priority attention to
reduce their scores. The prioritization of actions must be
considered and implemented urgently in order to elim-
inate the threats in the short term (valuation rank: 50–81).
 Important risks: These risks require the implementation of
short-term priority actions due to their high impact on
infrastructure operations, despite the fact that their imple-
mentation may not require as many resources as those
required to attend to critical risks (valuation rank: 28–49).
 Tolerable risks: These risks require actions to be designed
for purposes of risk management. However, they may
have lower priority and can be executed in the medium
term (valuation rank: 10–27).
 Acceptable risks: These risks are not particularly significant
and do not require additional actions to be executed in
addition to those that are already implemented (valuation
rank: 1–9).
Considerable expert knowledge underlies the risk matrices
that are used to create critical infrastructure protection plans.
Although, it is difficult to rank terms such as “terrorism” and
“corruption” when performing quantitative risk assessments,
they can, nevertheless, be evaluated in a convenient manner
using Eq. (1).
2.5.2. Quantitative assessment techniques
The use of quantitative techniques requires deeper mathe-
matical and/or statistical understanding of the various vari-
ables involved in risk analysis. In addition to traditional risk
maps and risk matrices, several quantitative approaches
have been developed to perform threat evaluations for
202 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216
electricity infrastructures. Well-known approaches include
Monte Carlo simulation [26], agent-based simulation and
system dynamics [3,27], as well as statistical analysis [28],
graph theoretical modeling [29–31] and geographic informa-
tion systems [32]. Several tools and techniques have been
applied to electricity infrastructures to determine their sus-
ceptibility to risks and threats; these include Athena [33],
CASCADE [34], CEEESA [35], CIMS [36], COMM-ASPEN [37],
DEW [38], EMCAS [39], FAIT [40], Fort Future [41], GoRAF [42],
MIA [43], modular dynamic modeling [44] and HAZOP meth-
odologies [46]. Although risk matrices are widely accepted,
the particular application of graph theory has become a
useful methodology for performing quantitative assessments
of electric network vulnerabilities and the interdependencies
between the electricity infrastructure and other critical infra-
structures [29,31,45].
The approaches listed above are used for a variety of
purposes. Key applications include:
 Evaluation of the interdependencies between infrastruc-
ture assets (e.g., electricity infrastructure and banking
systems).
 Evaluation of the indicators defined for emergency
response (e.g., regions impacted by natural phenomena,
disconnected users, contingency time response, and
restoration and evacuation strategies).
 Evaluation of the impact of policies and regulations on
infrastructure performance.
 Measurement of compliance with infrastructure perfor-
mance indicators.
 Estimation of asset failure probabilities.
 Assessment of the impact of fuel supply on electricity
generation.
 Evaluation of electric power grid stability indicators.
Generally, the evaluation guidelines suggested by generic
proposals such as HAZOP [46], NIPP [1] and Directive 2008/
114/EC [2] provide an objective basis for risk management and
subsequent security decisions. They require qualitative and
quantitative interpretations of concepts provided by domain
experts. Despite their strictness, implementations of the
guidelines are often limited by the need to perform a deep
and comprehensive study of all the nodes, circuits and
electrical network assets, along with market indicators.
3. Risk identification and assessment in
electricity infrastructures
Although risk identification processes seek a comprehensive
list of risks and their components, it is not possible to identify
all the risks; in fact, even if this were possible, it would be of
little help [24]. After the risks in a critical infrastructure have
been identified, it is necessary to conduct a detailed assess-
ment in order to prioritize actions for decision making. The
decisions can be broadly categorized as:
 Risk acceptance, which means that no measures are taken
to mitigate the risk.
 Risk disposal, which involves the termination of the
activity that generates the risk or changing the resource
allocation procedure, among other options.
 Risk management, which involves the implementation of
preventive measures that decrease the risk likelihood and/
or protection measures that reduce disturbances to
mission-critical systems.
3.1. Interconnected risk maps
An interconnected risk map is a useful construct for decision
making because it simplifies the perception of risk in an
integrated manner. The approach assists in the discovery and
analysis of the various threats to infrastructures, including
the threats that are the most critical.
Fig. 4 shows an interconnected risk map created for the
electricity infrastructure value chain. The risk map is also
applicable to electricity transmission networks. The risk map
takes into account the requirements discussed in Section 2.3. It
describes the technical and non-technical threats to the infra-
structure of interest. The construction of the risk map requires
the use of descriptive and analytical instruments to collect data
from primary and secondary sources at electricity infrastructure
asset owners and operators (transmission and distribution). The
Delphi method may be used to obtain information from domain
experts via open questions and interviews, supplemented with
reviews of proprietary information.
The risk map incorporates 21 risks that are classified into
four categories. The risks constitute the basis for the further
identification of the risk components in the value chain. Risk
maps can be also applied to entities that are vertically
integrated (i.e., the same entity is involved the generation,
transmission, distribution and marketing of electricity).
The information provided by the interconnected risk map
in Fig. 4 considers the likelihood of occurrence (L) and the
severity of consequences (S) for each risk, including the
economic and social aspects. The results are graphically
represented using the node diameter to express severity
and the line thickness to express the likelihood. The thick-
ness of the link between two nodes indicates the extent of the
interconnected risk between the nodes.
3.2. Risk components
In practical terms, organizations that own or operate electricity
infrastructures characterize each risk in terms of components
[19,26]. The 21 major risks presented in the interconnected risk
map in Section 3.1 produce more than 142 risk components
classified into four categories (see Appendix A).
Determining the risk components required analytical–
descriptive research. Data was collected from experts at
electricity infrastructure owners and operators (transmission
and distribution) using open questions and interviews, sup-
plemented with reviews of proprietary data and technical
documentation [15–17,24,47–53].
Fig. 5 shows the number of risk components associated
with each of the 21 risks along with a summary of the risk
categorization. Note the existence of technical and non-
technical threats. However, some risks arise from both types
 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216
Fig. 4 – Interconnected risk map for a Colombian electricity infrastructure.
of threats (e.g., risks related to vulnerabilities in the supply
chain and those related to non-compliance of electricity
supply indicators).
In order to validate that the risk components are deter-
mined accurately, it is necessary to examine how they affect
the electricity infrastructure value chain, as shown in Fig. 6.
Note that a risk component can affect all the stages in the
value chain (i.e., technical perturbations in the system).
Most risk components that affect the value chain belong to
the category of environmental and operational risks. Electricity
generation, transmission and distribution sub-systems have
greater exposure to risk components because they have large
numbers of assets, greater geographical coverage and more
interrelationships with other social and economic systems.
3.3. Semi-quantitative risk assessment
Identifying threats using interconnected risk maps is applic-
able to the entire electricity infrastructure value chain,
primarily due to their simplicity and their adaptability to
different processes. The assessment may be performed using
risk matrices, which is a commonly-used technique because
it allows for the use of expert knowledge and judgment.
Furthermore, the technique can be used to quickly perform
semi-quantitative assessments and it is easily combined with
other methodologies.
203
The case study involving a Colombian electricity infra-
structure is used to demonstrate the prioritization of actions
in order to mitigate risks. This step requires clear and
consistent information about the nature of the threats and
the strategies for mitigating the threats.
3.3.1. Risk component assessment
An evaluation of the interconnected risk map must consider
all four enterprise resources (material, human, technical and
economic). When processing the data for each enterprise
resource, a particular risk i with n risk components is
evaluated using the equation:
!
1
ðRiskÞi ¼ ∑ ðLikelihood  SeverityÞn ð2Þ
n nAi
i
The average evaluation of each risk component after using
expert knowledge and judgment is presented in Appendix A.
A risk matrix is then constructed for each resource (as shown
in Fig. 4) by plotting the likelihood of each risk valuation on the
horizontal axis and its severity on the vertical axis. The scales
provided in Tables 1 and 2 are used for the risk matrix axes.
We illustrate the risk assessment calculations using Table 3,
in which the analysis of Risk 1 (non-payable billing extension –
overdue) uses expert judgment for each enterprise resource.
Table 3 shows that Risk 1 has an average score of 7.1 and is,
therefore, categorized as an “acceptable risk.” Similar
204 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216

Fig. 5 – Risk components in an electricity infrastructure.

Fig. 6 – Risk components affecting the electricity infrastructure value chain.

calculations are performed for the other identified risks in the
interconnected risk map shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 7 shows the score ranges of the risks identified in
Section 3.1 according to the rating scales. In case of Risk 1
(analyzed in Table 3), it is possible to estimate the location of
each enterprise resource in the risk matrix: acceptable range
(green) for material, human and technical resources, and
tolerable range (yellow) for economic resources.
Fig. 7 helps discern the risks that may demand short-term
prioritization of actions; these risks are rated as important
 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216 205

Table 3 – Semi-quantitative assessments for the components of Risk 1.

Risk components Material Human Technical Economic Risk

resources resources resources resources average

Non-payment and non-performing loan recovery from agents who L¼ 1; L¼1; L ¼1; L¼ 5; 9.5
use the transmission grid network S¼ 1; S¼ 1; S ¼1; S¼ 7;
Risk ¼1 Risk¼ 1 Risk¼ 1 Risk ¼35

Non-payment and non-performing loan recovery for service L¼ 1; L¼1; L ¼1; L¼ 5; 9.5
connections to the electricity infrastructure (transmission) S¼ 1; S¼ 1; S ¼1; S¼ 7;
Risk ¼1 Risk¼ 1 Risk¼ 1 Risk ¼35

Non-payment and non-performing loan recovery for associated L¼ 1; L¼1; L ¼1; L¼ 5; 9.5
services and for non-operational services and facilities S¼ 1; S¼ 1; S ¼1; S¼ 7;
Risk ¼1 Risk¼ 1 Risk¼ 1 Risk ¼35

Credit risk: lack of compliance by third parties with financial L¼ 1; L¼1; L ¼1; L¼ 3; 3.5
obligations S¼ 3; S¼ 1; S ¼1; S¼ 3;
Risk ¼3 Risk¼ 1 Risk¼ 1 Risk ¼9

High prices in regulated tariffs (transmission, distribution) or L¼ 1; L¼1; L ¼1; L¼ 3; 3.5

marketing S¼ 3; S¼ 1; S ¼1; S¼ 3;
Risk ¼3 Risk¼ 1 Risk¼ 1 Risk ¼9

Fig. 7 – Semi-quantitative risk maps for enterprise resources. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

(orange) or critical (red). Special attention should focus on using Eq. (2) with the associated values, acceptable, tolerable,
Risk 8 (Terrorism and vandalism), which is rated as important important and critical.
with respect to material, technical and economic resources 3.3.2. Risk matrix calculation
and critical with respect to human resources. A semi-quantitative assessment of each risk i is obtained by
Appendix A contains the results of averaging the expert averaging the judgments for each enterprise resource over all
judgments for the entire set of risk components obtained n risk components:
206 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216

Table 4 – Semi-quantitative assessments of the risks in the interconnected risk map.

No Description of risk Risk Judgment

1 Non-payable billing extension (overdue) 7.1 Acceptable

2 Insufficient financing 4.4 Acceptable
3 Regulatory changes, political and legal processes 4.8 Acceptable
4 Changes in national public policy 12.0 Tolerable
5 Adverse weather conditions 19.1 Tolerable
6 Adverse natural phenomena 36.0 Important
7 Misunderstanding and opposition of the population 18.1 Tolerable
8 Terrorism and vandalism 50.0 Critical
9 Volatility of macroeconomic variables 18.3 Tolerable
10 Corruption, fraud, mismanagement 34.4 Important
11 Gaps in information and knowledge management 24.3 Tolerable
12 Growth challenges of the infrastructure system 6.0 Acceptable
13 Human or procedural failures 35.9 Important
14 Failures of equipment, materials and hardware 20.1 Tolerable
15 Inadequate manpower education and training 27.2 Tolerable
16 Technical disturbances in power grid and generation plants 34.6 Important
17 Vulnerability of ICT systems 33.9 Important
18 Non-compliance or low quality of electricity supply indicators 33.5 Important
19 Reputation and public image 8.3 Acceptable
20 Deficiencies of suppliers and subcontractors 29.4 Important
21 Vulnerability of the supply chain 33.5 Important

 
1 Risk 10 (Corruption, fraud and mismanagement) also
ðRiskÞi ¼ ∑ ðL S Þ
4 Resources i i n emerges as an important risk, especially due to the financial
where Li is the likelihood of occurrence of risk i, Si is the
severity of consequences, and Resources include the material,
human, technical and economic resources. Table 4 shows the
assessments of the risks identified in the interconnected risk
map of Fig. 4.
3.3.3. Risk chart representation
A better understanding of risk assessment can be provided by
introducing a representation of risk matrices that includes
semi-quantitative results. A practical method is to associate
the judgment of each risk as a distinct color in a radar chart
[54], which we call a “risk chart.” Fig. 8 shows how the risk
assessments of the items identified in the interconnected risk
map may be visualized. The values in Table 4 are indicated in
the scale of the risk chart. The risks that are scored as
important or critical are placed in the orange or red regions,
respectively, while tolerable and acceptable risks are located in
yellow or green regions, respectively. As noted in Section 1,
semi-quantitative assessments of risk are of great importance
to electricity distribution and transmission infrastructures.
Fig. 8 indicates that the most important item relates to
Risk 8 (Terrorism and vandalism). This means that electricity
networks have become targets because successful attacks can
compromise the security of the energy supply, which impacts
homeland security, the national economy and the daily lives
of citizens. Risk 6 (Adverse natural phenomena) is also a
concern, requiring preparation against the possible destruc-
tion of infrastructures (or assets) by floods, earthquakes,
avalanches, all of which would impact energy supply. These
risks and others have such a significant impact on national
security and society that they have contributed to the devel-
opment and implementation of national infrastructure
protection plans.
ð3Þ
impact on electricity infrastructure asset owners and opera-
tors. This is because resources are drawn away from infra-
structure assets, which ultimately impacts infrastructure
performance. Special attention should also be given to Risk
13 (Human or procedural failures), which is a big concern to
electricity infrastructure asset owners and operators.
Risk 17 (Vulnerability of ICT systems) is related to manage-
ment technologies, supervisory control systems and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems, power transmission and dis-
tribution control systems, programmable logic controllers
(PLCs), etc., which are interconnected through networks and
accessible remotely and are, therefore, exposed to viruses,
malware and computer attacks.
Given the amount of organizational resources devoted to
planning, execution and maintenance of the components and
physical assets, technical risks such as Risk 16 (Technical
disturbances in power grid and generation plants) and Risk 14
(Failures of equipment, materials and hardware) should have
high scores because they are associated with unexpected
blackouts. However, Risk 14 is rated as “tolerable” because
some electrical system components have very low failure
rates; this is common for assets that have no moving parts
such as lightning arresters, instrument transformers, reactors
and capacitors. On the other hand, Risk 18 (Non-compliance
or low quality of electricity supply indicators) is important
because it could lead to political and social consequences in a
region or country.
Risk 21 (Vulnerability of the supply chain) focuses on
energy supply to electricity generation plants (e.g., natural
gas, fuel and coal, as well as industrial operations related to
nuclear plants). Governments and energy companies attempt
to manage this risk by designating uninterrupted energy
supply as an important policy goal. Interested readers are
referred to Appendix A for additional information about the
 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216 207

1 Non-payable billing …
21 Vulnerability of the… 2 Insufficient financing
20 Deficiencies of…

19 Reputation and… 4 Changes in national…

18 Non-compliance or … 5 Adverse weather…

17 Vulnerability of ICT… 6 Adverse natural…

0

16 Technical… 7 Misunderstanding…

8 Terrorism and…

14 Failures of… 9 Volatility of…

10 Corruption, fraud,…
12 Growth challenges…

Fig. 8 – Visualization of the 21 risks. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)

1
139141 3 5 7
135137 9
133 60 11
131 13
129 15
127 17
125 19
123 21
40
121 23
119 25
117 27
115 20
29
113 31
111 33
109 35
107 0 37
105 39
103 41
101 43
99 45
97 47
95 49
93 51
91 53
89 55
87 57
85 59
83 61
81 79 63
77 75 73 71 69 67 65
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE OF INDICATORS ASSETS & FINANCING

Fig. 9 – Radar chart created for the critical and important risk components. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
figure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

risk components related to the generation phase in the
electricity infrastructure value chain.
The risks rated as tolerable or acceptable are usually less
noticeable and may overcome difficulties arising from social
opposition, which can significantly impact the execution of
planned infrastructure projects. They are associated with
national policy and regulations (Risks 3 and 4), infrastructure
growth challenges (Risk 12), loss of reputation and public image
(Risk 19) and misunderstanding and opposition of the popula-
tion (Risk 7). A properly implemented risk management frame-
work should be able to control and manage these threats.
3.3.4. Risk component chart
The identification of vulnerabilities in an electricity (or other)
infrastructure is carried out through a detailed analysis of the
risk components shown in Appendix A. Fig. 9 presents the
208 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216

Table A1

Notation
NT Non-technical risk type
T Technical risk type
AF Assets and financing risk category
EN Environmental risk category
OP Operational risk category
CI Compliance of indicators risk category
++ Critical risk
+ Important risk
− Tolerable risk
−− Acceptable risk

No. Type Category Risk Risk Component Score Range

Non-payment and non-performing loan recovery
1 NT AF
1 - Non-payable billing
extension (overdue)
from agents who use the transmission grid 9.5 --
network
Non-payment and non-performing loan recovery
2 NT AF
1 - Non-payable billing
extension (overdue)
for service connections to the electricity 9.5 --
infrastructure (transmission)
Non-payment and non-performing loan recovery
3 NT AF
1 - Non-payable billing
extension (overdue)
for associated services and for non-operational 9.5 --
services and facilities
4 NT AF
1 - Non-payable billing
extend (overdue)
Credit risk: Lack of compliance by third parties
to financial obligations
3.5 --
5 NT AF
1 - Non-payable billing
extension (overdue)
High prices in regulated tariffs (transmission,
distribution) or marketing
3.5 --
6 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing
Rising expected conditions to achieve financial
resources
9.5 --
7 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing
Impossibility of achieving timely financial
resources
6.0 --
8 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing
Contractual commitments that limit or hinder the
achievement of new debt
6.0 --
Complexity, delay and heterogeneity of business
9 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing processes (internal or external) for approving and 6.0 --
obtaining financial resources
10 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing
Market risk associated with arrangements in the
energy pool market
3.0 --
11 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing
Market risks associated with variations in
currency conversion rates
3.0 --
12 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing
Market risks associated with variations in interest
rates and debt renewal
3.0 --
13 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing Untimely payment of taxes and contributions 3.0 --
14 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing
Less market share (transactions and contracts) in
the energy pool market
3.0 --
15 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing
Inadequate budget projections and cash flows in
the short, medium and long terms
1.5 --
Increased competition and market strategies
16 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing among agents in the chain value (generation, 4.5 --
transmission, distribution, marketing)
17 NT AF 2 - Insufficient financing
Expected return is less than the cost of capital
employed
4.5 --
Changes or gaps in regulation policies that
3 - Regulatory changes,
18 NT EN political and legal
increase the requirements regarding quality,
safety and reliability levels in the provision of
4.5 --
processes
energy transport services
 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216 209

Table A1 – (continued)

No. Type Category Risk Risk Component Score Range

3 - Regulatory changes,
19 NT EN political and legal Changes in rules and case law (legal uncertainty) 4.5 --
processes
3 - Regulatory changes,
20 NT EN political and legal
Differences of opinion and interpretation of rules
between administrative and judicial authorities
4.5 --
processes
3 - Regulatory changes, Changes or gaps in regulations that affect
21 NT EN political and legal revenue or expenses associated with energy 4.5 --
processes transport businesses
3 - Regulatory changes, Improper application of rules or improper
22 NT EN political and legal evaluation of evidence by administrative or 4.5 --
processes judicial authorities
3 - Regulatory changes,
23 NT EN political and legal process
Reduction or loss of compensation tariffs for
reliability and subsidies
3.0 --
in infrastructure systems
3 - Regulatory changes, Regulations are inconsistent with the
24 NT EN political and legal technological realities in generation plants 5.0 --
processes (thermal, hydroelectric, wind, nuclear, solar, etc.)
3 - Regulatory changes,
25 NT EN political and legal
Partial or total failure and/or increased
environmental regulation requirements
7.5 --
processes
26 NT EN
4 - Changes in national
public policy
Expropriation, confiscation or nationalization of
company assets
13.3 --
27 NT EN
4 - Changes in national
public policy
Restrictions on currency conversion and transfer 13.3 --
28 NT EN
4 - Changes in national
public policy
Restrictions on foreign investment in a particular
country
13.3 --
Failure of the governments of the contractually
29 NT EN
4 - Changes in national
public policy
agreed obligations with electricity infrastructure 8.3 --
owners and operators
30 NT EN
5 - Adverse weather
conditions
Ice storms and/or snow 6.0 --
31 NT EN
5 - Adverse weather
conditions
Wind gusts 25.0 -
32 NT EN
5 - Adverse weather
conditions
Environmental pollution 11.0 -
33 NT EN
5 - Adverse weather
conditions
Excess salinity 11.5 -
34 NT EN
5 - Adverse weather
conditions
Cold waves 1.5 --
35 NT EN
5 - Adverse weather
conditions
Heat waves 18.8 -
36 NT EN
5 - Adverse weather
conditions
Solar radiation 18.8 -
37 NT EN
5 - Adverse weather
conditions
Strong storms 35.0 +
38 NT EN
5 - Adverse weather
conditions
Lightning 44.0 +
39 NT EN
6 - Adverse natural
phenomena
Earthquakes 31.3 +
40 NT EN
6 - Adverse natural
phenomena
Landslides 49.0 +
41 NT EN
6 - Adverse natural
phenomena
Avalanches or sudden rises of river levels 64.8 ++
42 NT EN
6 - Adverse natural
phenomena
Flood or flooding 64.8 ++
43 NT EN
6 - Adverse natural
phenomena
Volcanic eruptions 14.3 -
44 NT EN
6 - Adverse natural
phenomena
Forest fires 37.0 +
45 NT EN
6 - Adverse natural
phenomena
Solar magnetic disturbances 2.0 --
46 NT EN
6 - Adverse natural
phenomena
Vegetation protruding into easement area of the
electricity infrastructure
25.0 +
210 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216

Table A1 – (continued)

No. Type Category Risk Risk Component Score Range

7 - Misunderstanding and
47 NT EN opposition of the
Peaceful demonstrations, marches or work
stoppages
7.5 --
population
7 - Misunderstanding and
48 NT EN opposition of the Riots 25.0 +
population
7 - Misunderstanding and
49 NT EN opposition of the Lockdowns or peaceful occupation of facilities 31.3 +
population
7 - Misunderstanding and
50 NT EN opposition of the
Theft, damage or sabotage of property or
equipment
27.5 +
population
7 - Misunderstanding and
51 NT EN opposition of the Invasion of easements for socioeconomic reasons 27.5 +
population
7 - Misunderstanding and
52 NT EN opposition of the Conflict with landowners in easement areas 4.5 --
population
7 - Misunderstanding and Rejection by the community of normal
53 NT EN opposition of the development of activities related to infrastructure 17.5 -
population operation
7 - Misunderstanding and
54 NT EN opposition of the
Deinstitutionalization of the local state
authorities
15.0 -
population
7 - Misunderstanding and
55 NT EN opposition of the
Transmission line rights of way shared with other
key infrastructures
27.5 +
population
7 - Misunderstanding and
56 NT EN opposition of the
Opposition to the development of electricity
infrastructure networks
9.5 -
population
57 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Armed attacks or seizure of facilities, including
generation plants
6.0 --
58 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Attacks on the electricity transmission
infrastructure
60.0 ++
59 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Kidnapping of employees and collaborators 62.5 ++
60 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Minefields 55.0 ++
61 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Extortion 62.5 ++
62 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Lockdowns or armed strikes 55.0 ++
63 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Crossfire 34.5 +
64 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Armed attacks on transmission towers,
substations and generation facilities
55.0 ++
65 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Easements or land invasion of forced
displacement
29.0 +
66 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Assault 62.5 ++
67 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Illicit crops that constrain access to infrastructure
assets
17.5 -
Actions by contractors outside the law or
68 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
contrary to the interests of the infrastructure 40.0 +
owner or operator
69 NT EN
8 - Terrorism and
vandalism
Armed attacks (including thrown explosives) 40.0 +
Adverse movements in price indices that affect
70 T/ NT EN
9 - Volatility of
macroeconomic variables
the revenue or the costs of infrastructure
operation, currency conversions that affect
18.3 --
income statements and cash flow
71 T/ NT EN
9 - Volatility of
macroeconomic variables
Adverse movements in interest rates that affect
local and international debt costs
18.3 --
72 T/ NT EN
9 - Volatility of
macroeconomic variables
Volatility of commodity prices that affect the
profitability of projects or operating costs
18.3 --
 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216 211

Table A1 – (continued)

No. Type Category Risk Risk Component Score Range

73 NT OP
10 - Corruption, fraud,
mismanagement
Forgery or manipulation of information 37.8 +
Deviation of resources, includes misuse of
company property, misappropriation of funds,
74 NT OP
10 - Corruption, fraud,
mismanagement
payments to suppliers, phantom double 32.8 +
payments, handling of cash surpluses,
misappropriation of company funds, etc.
Corruption, in the form of bribes, gratuities,
extortion and collusion for purposes such as
access to confidential information, procurement,
75 NT OP
10 - Corruption, fraud,
mismanagement
testing or fault handling, legal and administrative 32.5 +
processes; includes clear conflicts of interest
involving employees or managers, and money
laundering
Theft or damage to tangible assets (equipment,
76 NT OP
10 - Corruption, fraud,
mismanagement
cash, inventory, etc.) or intangible (intellectual
property, know-how, best practices, information,
38.8 +
etc.)
Crimes involving information systems such as
inappropriate use of computer tools to cause loss
77 NT OP
10 - Corruption, fraud,
mismanagement
or destruction of data, affecting the integrity, 15.0 -
availability and confidentiality of information
(viruses, hacking, phishing, etc.)
Incorrect or unfavorable contract management
78 NT OP
10 - Corruption, fraud,
mismanagement
decisions that lead to economic losses, image, 49.8 +
penalties or local control requirements
11 - Gaps in information
79 NT OP and knowledge
Inadequate identification and classification of
information
15.0 -
management
11 - Gaps in information
80 NT OP and knowledge
Gaps in knowledge management at the
organizational level
31.0 +
management
11 - Gaps in information Inadequate definition and implementation of
81 NT OP and knowledge security authorizations for the use of information 23.5 -
management and organizational knowledge
11 - Gaps in information
82 NT OP and knowledge
Ignorance or lack of mechanisms for the proper
handling of information
18.5 -
management
11 - Gaps in information Impairment or obsolescence of components,
83 NT OP and knowledge services and security infrastructure associated 10.0 --
management with the information life-cycle
11 - Gaps in information
84 NT OP and knowledge
Misuse of privileged information and knowledge
of the organization
29.3 +
management
No information is available for studies and
11 - Gaps in information
85 NT OP and knowledge
analysis with the requisite accuracy; can lead to
under or overvaluation of technical
26.0 -
management
specifications, errors in design, etc.
11 - Gaps in information
86 NT OP and knowledge
High administrative costs due to the absence of
comprehensive risk management
41.3 +
management
12 - Growth challenges Inability of the operational, financial or
87 T AF of the infrastructure administrative authority to deal with or support 6.0 --
system growth
12 - Growth challenges Growth without value or not aligned with a
88 T AF of the infrastructure strategy that commits resources and limits 6.0 --
system participation in other important activities
Decisions or actions of third parties (partners,
12 - Growth challenges
89 T AF of the infrastructure
bankers or other advisors) that hinder the
implementation of the strategy or adversely
6.0 --
system
affect the execution of business plans
90 T OP
13 - Human or procedural
failures
Lack or failures in the definitions of procedures 55.0 ++
Errors and omissions, including non-compliance
91 T OP
13 - Human or procedural
failures
with the requirements for quality assurance 37.5 +
procedures and processes
212 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216

Table A1 – (continued)

No. Type Category Risk Risk Component Score Range

92 T OP
13 - Human or procedural
failures
Poor design of operating procedures,
maintenance or assembly
42.8 +
93 T OP
13 - Human or procedural
failures
Accidents during maintenance or project
implementation
15.8 -
94 T OP
13 - Human or procedural
failures
Poor operational management 38.8 +
14 - Failures of
95 T OP equipment, materials and
Inadequate management of accounting standards,
taxation, customs, currency and financial
25.8 -
hardware
14 - Failures of
96 T OP equipment, materials and
Sudden or unexpected accidental damage,
including damage to IT hardware
18.5 -
hardware
Obsolescence, loss of the operating
14 - Failures of characteristics of equipment, systems or
97 T OP equipment, materials and materials that make them unsuitable for the tasks 6.0 --
hardware at hand (including inadequate or inappropriate
technological solutions)
14 - Failures of
98 T OP equipment, materials and No hidden defects notified by the manufacturer 19.0 -
hardware
14 - Failures of
99 T OP equipment, materials and Fire 37.0 +
hardware
14 - Failures of
100 T OP equipment, materials and
Machinery breakdown and poor endurance of
civil construction
42.5 +
hardware
14 - Failures of
101 T OP equipment, materials and Design errors 9.0 --
hardware
14 - Failures of
102 T OP equipment, materials and
Location of primary energy equipment and
backup equipment reliability and electrical safety
9.0 --
hardware
Poor management in developing human
15 - Inadequate
103 T OP manpower education and
resources, includes improper employee retention
practices, performance management, planning
32.0 +
training
and training
15 - Inadequate Missing, inappropriate or inadequate decision-
104 T OP manpower education and making related to human resources; tasks 37.5 +
training executed by untrained people
15 - Inadequate
105 T OP manpower education and Loss of manpower or retirement of key personnel 30.0 +
training
15 - Inadequate
106 T OP manpower education and
Inadequate management of skills, experience and
knowledge of workers
37.5 +
training
15 - Inadequate
107 T OP manpower education and Legal restrictions on disengagement processes 1.8 --
training
15 - Inadequate
108 T OP manpower education and
Demoralized staff, poor teamwork and corporate
commitment
24.3 -
training
16 - Technical
109 T OP disturbances in power Impaired infrastructure (e.g., shaft vibration) 22.5 -
grid and generation plants
16 - Technical
110 T OP disturbances in power
Failure to provide ancillary services in a plant or
facility
62.8 ++
grid and generation plants
16 - Technical
111 T OP disturbances in power
Interruption in the supply of energy and primary
fuels
62.8 ++
grid and generation plants
Hazards to operating personnel; during critical
16 - Technical
112 T OP disturbances in power
conditions, the amount of work to be done is
much more than can be performed by the
24.0 -
grid and generation plants
available employees
 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216 213

Table A1 – (continued)

No. Type Category Risk Risk Component Score Range

16 - Technical
113 T OP disturbances in power Control personnel are not be available 24.0 -
grid and generation plants
16 - Technical
114 T OP disturbances in power
Inadequate incorporation of new generation
plants and new production facilities
18.0 -
grid and generation plants
16 - Technical
115 T OP disturbances in power Obsolete technology in power plants 28.5 +
grid and generation plants
16 - Technical
116 T OP disturbances in power Computer attacks on the control center 38.8 +
grid and generation plants
117 T OP
17 - Vulnerability of ICT
systems
Loss of computer system data 38.8 +
118 T OP
17 - Vulnerability of ICT
systems
Confidentiality and integrity of information are
compromised
38.8 +
Non-availability of ICT systems
119 T OP
17 - Vulnerability of ICT
systems
(telecommunications, Internet, intranets, SCADA 26.5 -
systems, etc.)
Deficiency in the telecommunications
120 T OP
17 - Vulnerability of ICT
systems
infrastructure (border routers, intranets, Internet, 26.5 -
extranets, SCADA systems, etc.)
18 - Non-compliance or Balance between generation and demand, which
121 T/ NT CI low quality of electricity can lead to imbalances in other parts of the 32.5 +
supply indicators system causing cascading phenomena
18 - Non-compliance or
122 T/ NT CI low quality of electricity
Difficulties in controlling the release of
renewable electricity
20.5 -
supply indicators
18 - Non-compliance or Risk of failure in power plants; the loss of one or
123 T/ NT CI low quality of electricity more generators results in a greater or lesser 34.0 +
supply indicators impact throughout the network
18 - Non-compliance or
124 T/ NT CI low quality of electricity Operating conditions or faults within a plant 40.3 +
supply indicators
Operational failures in the power grid due to
18 - Non-compliance or
125 T/ NT CI low quality of electricity
primary regulation, secondary regulation,
tertiary regulation, or voltage control at the
40.3 +
supply indicators
power grid
126 T/ NT CI
19 - Reputation and
public image
Improper conduct or omissions by internal staff
or external agents
8.3 --
127 T/ NT CI
19 - Reputation and
public image
Leadership owns and operates the infrastructure
asset
8.3 --
Performance outside the corporate governance
128 T/ NT CI
19 - Reputation and
public image
model; non-implementation of directives,
guidelines and practices defined in business
8.3 --
models and government requirements
Deficiencies in the procurement process,
including gaps in information requirements,
20 - Deficiencies of
129 T/ NT EN suppliers and
inaccuracies in defining the scope of contracts,
delays in the internal process of recruitment, lack
42.5 +
subcontractors
of clarity of the grounds for termination, failure
or deficiency in monitoring supplier performance
20 - Deficiencies of
130 T/ NT EN suppliers and
Untimely payment of contractual obligations
with suppliers and subcontractors
32.5 +
subcontractors
20 - Deficiencies of
131 T/ NT EN suppliers and
Breach of agreements (e.g., delays in delivering
documentation to start a project)
13.3 --
subcontractors
Failures in the supply chain (e.g., technical
132 NT EN
21 - Vulnerability of the
supply chain
inability, financial or administrative action of a
provider that impede or impact the operation of
59.5 ++
the infrastructure system)
133 NT EN
21 - Vulnerability of the
supply chain
Deficiencies in the supply of natural gas to
operate power plants
31.5 +
214 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216

Table A1 – (continued)

No. Type Category Risk Risk Component Score Range

134 NT EN
21 - Vulnerability of the
supply chain
Deficiencies in the supply of coal to operate
power plants
31.5 +
135 NT EN
21 - Vulnerability of the
supply chain
Deficiencies in the supply of petroleum and
petroleum products to power generation plants
31.5 +
136 NT EN
21 - Vulnerability of the
supply chain
Deficiencies in the treatment and rework required
in nuclear power plants
12.0 -
137 NT EN
21 - Vulnerability of the
supply chain
Divergent trends in oil prices (including fuel oil
and diesel)
22.3 -
138 NT EN
21 - Vulnerability of the
supply chain
Divergent trends in natural gas prices 22.3 -
139 NT EN
21 - Vulnerability of the
supply chain
Lack of infrastructure, dual fuels in power plants 52.8 +
140 NT EN
21 - Vulnerability of the
supply chain
Reduction of generation capacity due to a fuel
supply failure
35.3 +
141 NT EN
21 - Vulnerability of the
supply chain
Reduction of generation capacity due to the
inability to operate hydroelectric plants
35.3 +
142 NT EN
21 - Vulnerability of the
supply chain
Reduction of generation capacity due to adverse
conditions with regard to renewable resources
35.3 +

assessment results using a radar chart, in which critical and
important risk components are placed in red and orange
colored bands, respectively.
Fig. 9 shows the average rating of the risk components
according to their categories. The ratings are provided for a
total of 142 risk components obtained from the 21 risks
identified in an electricity infrastructure (see Appendix A).
Thirteen risks components are classified as critical (three
operational risks and ten environmental risks). A total of 49
risks are rated as important (21 operational, 24 environmen-
tal and four related to compliance of indicators). Thirty risk
components are assessed as tolerable and 50 risk compo-
nents as acceptable. Note that the environmental and opera-
tional risk categories have major effects on infrastructure
throughput (rated as critical and important), whereas the risk
components in the assets and financing category have the
least effect on throughput (rated as acceptable risks).
The risk component chart shown in Fig. 9 allows deeper
study of the nature of the risk components. Since the
valuation was performed by Colombian companies, some of
them with recorded attacks to their infrastructures, many
risk components rated as critical understandably relate to
terrorism and vandalism (Risk Components 58, 59, 60, 61, 62,
64, 68). Natural phenomena are also of great concern (Risk
Components 40, 41, 42) due to the potential destruction and
non-availability of key assets.
Operational risks related to operations, procedures, main-
tenance, quality indicators (including secondary and tertiary
regulation procedures) as well as asset management in the
electricity infrastructure are (predictably) rated as the most
important risks (Risk Components 94, 100, 111, 112).
It is important to note the potential impact of some
administrative risks, such as corruption and interference
from third parties, on organizational performance (Risk Com-
ponents 78, 86, 129). This type of risk is a concern to
managers because of the impact that the risk components
may have on project realization; these manifest themselves
in terms of lower (corporate) financial performance, and
inadequate infrastructure operations and maintenance.
Conducting a risk map based assessment enhances the
detection of vulnerabilities in organizations and infrastruc-
ture systems, and facilitates the planning and implementa-
tion of risk mitigation activities. While the approach has been
presented in the context of an electricity infrastructure, it is,
of course, very useful for assessing and managing risks across
the various critical infrastructure sectors.
4. Conclusions
The proposed methodology for risk identification and risk
assessment in the electricity infrastructure value chain greatly
enhances risk management efforts and electricity infrastructure
protection plans. The methodology is generic enough to be used
by a wide variety of critical infrastructure assets.
Interconnected risk maps are an effective tool for risk
management efforts. The focus has been on the identification
and assessment of risks arising from technical and non-
technical threats against electricity infrastructures; the
accompanying risk classification strategy involves the break-
down of risks into risk components. The case study involving
a Colombian electricity infrastructure has identified 21 inter-
dependent risks and 142 risk components. The classification
considers the nature and the effects of risks, categorizing
them as operational risks, environmental risks, assets and
financing risks, and quality compliance risks.
Having identified the risks and their components, semi-
quantitative ratings of the risks and risk components can be made
by relying on subjective assessments, analyst opinions, and the
specific circumstances of the electricity infrastructure, as demon-
strated by the Colombian case study. The assessment results are
useful for prioritizing actions in order to contain the threats and to
monitor the effectiveness of countermeasures (especially for the
risks that are classified as critical and important).
An interesting observation regarding the semi-quantitative
risk assessment results is that a large number of risk compo-
nents are rated as acceptable; their effects on the electricity
infrastructure value chain are less significant than the relatively
 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 6 (2013) 197 –216
few risks that are rated as critical. For example, although there
are many risk components in the risk category of assets and
financing, their impact is much less than that of the risks
categorized as operational. Indeed, the risk assessment reveals
that the operational and environmental risks, although rela-
tively few in number, have a greater impact on the electricity
infrastructure value chain.
The risk assessment also shows that the most susceptible
electrical sub-systems are generation, transmission and dis-
tribution, which are also the most important systems and
have extensive geographic coverage.
In summary, the primary contribution of the paper in a
powerful and intuitively appealing methodology for risk identi-
fication and risk identification that leverages interconnected
risk maps. While the methodology has been presented in the
context of an electricity infrastructure, it is, of course, very
useful for assessing and managing risks across the various
critical infrastructure sectors. Moreover, the paper itself serves
as a useful reference for security planners and policy makers.
Appendix A. Risk components in electricity
infrastructures
See Table A1.
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