Legal Appti

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VISHRUT JAIN, AUTHOR, CLAT 2.0
CLAT SURE
LEGAL REASONING SECTIONAL TEST 1
Passage 1
Law of Contempt: Its role in the context of the Prashant Bhushan case and ahead; Justice SC
Dharmadhikari (Bar & Bench Article) -
Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution confer the status of a “court of record” on the
Supreme Court and the High Courts, empowering them to punish for contempt of
themselves.
It is futile to label our law as archaic, colonial, old fashioned and to be done away with. It is
for Parliament and various state legislatures to decide if the Constitution is to be amended or
if the Act, a post-independence law, is to be repealed. Courts cannot refuse to implement
valid law.
This is an Act to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempt and to
regulate procedure therefore. It is erroneous therefore to suggest that the Act does not
guide the exercise of power to punish for contempt of court. While Articles 129 and 215 may
be the source of the power, it does not mean that the Act can be ignored or brushed aside.
This aspect is clear from a reading of Section 9 of the Act. Sections 3 to 8 and Section 13
(recently amended) explicitly provide that subject to conditions, mere criticism of the
working and functioning of the court or a judge or his judgment will not amount to contempt.
Further, the word “contempt” is not defined in the Act but the phrase “contempt of court” is,
and that enables us to appreciate that the right to free speech and expression and the
freedom in that behalf is neither taken away, curtailed or interfered with by the Act.
The law is designed to uphold the majesty of law and dignity of the courts to secure a feeling
of confidence of the people in general and for due and proper administration of justice in the
country. The Act does not suppress truth. Section 13(b) provides for justification in public
interest and a bona fide request for invoking truth as a defence. In my humble view, the
request for doing away with the Act is not justified at all. Such a law can exist along with the
Constitution of India, particularly when the substantive power to punish for contempt is
derived from the Constitution itself.
1. Which of these arguments is not made by the Author in this article?
(a) The Law of Contempt protects the individual reputation of Judges
(b) The Law of Contempt upholds the majesty of law.
(c) The Law of Contempt ensures that the feeling of confidence of the people in the
Courts is secured
(d) The Law of Contempt secures and upholds the proper and due administration of
Justice in India.
2. As per Indian law, which among these are considered as ‘Courts of Record’
(a) Supreme Court
(b) High Court
(c) Both (a) and (b)
(d) None of the above
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3. Is ‘truth’ a defense against Contempt of Court proceedings?
(a) Truth is an absolute defense against Contempt proceedings
(b) Truth can be a defense if it is in public interest
(c) Truth can bea defense if it is in public interest and invoked through a bona fide
request.
(d) Truth is not a defense against Contempt proceedings
4. Which of these statements is made by the author in this piece?
(a) The Courts can strike down the Contempt of Courts Act on constitutional
grounds.
(b) It is for the Legislature to decide whether or not to repeal the Contempt of
Courts Act.
(c) The Courts can refuse to implement a valid law on constitutional grounds.
(d) None of the Above
5. What is the central argument in this excerpt?
(a) The law of Contempt is unconsitutional and the Courts should strike it down.
(b) The law of Contempt is unconstitutional but the Courts should let the Legislature
decide whether or not to repeal it
(c) The law of Contempt is constitutional as the it is provided by the Constitution
itself
Passage 2
The Supreme Court’s Eviction Order Ignores the Rights of Jnuggi Dwellers; Rishika Sahgal
(Indian Constitutional Law & Philosophy) -
In 1985, a 5-judge bench of the Supreme Court established in Olga Tellis, that the right to life
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution includes the right to livelihood and housing. It
recognized 2 sets of entitlements as part of the right to housing — a right to notice and
hearing prior to evictions, and access to rehabilitation under existing schemes for the same.
(...)
These entitlements continue to be the law of the land. As is well established, decisions of a
higher bench strength of the Supreme Court, are binding on benches with the same or lower
bench strength. A 3-judge bench of the Supreme Court is bound by Olga Tellis, and any failure
to abide by that decision is contrary to the law. The Supreme Court’s recent order makes no
mention of the right to livelihood and housing of those it ordered to be removed. It makes no
mention of the need to provide notice and hearing, as well as rehabilitation in accordance
with existing schemes, to those ordered to be removed. It makes no note of Olga Tellis at all.
To that extent, the order is contrary to law. (...}
This order was passed in a PIL originally filed in 1984-85 by environmentalist MC Mehta, in
what is popularly known as the Delhi Vehicular Pollution Case. It isn’t clear why the Supreme
Court has continued to keep the case alive while moving beyond the original subject of the
petition. The ‘multiple lives’ of this PIL, have certainly been devastating for Delhi’s jhuggi
jhopdi dwellers.
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The Supreme Court has previously held that persons who are vitally affected by any decision
of courts in exercise of their writ jurisdiction must be heard by the court. Moreover, Article
226(3) of the Indian Constitution is explicit about the need for parties to be heard before an
interim order is made against them by High Courts. It is unclear why this basic principle of
natural justice has been abandoned by the Supreme Court in PIL cases such as this one.
6. The Supreme Court, in Olga Tellis, held which of the following rights to be part of Article
21 of the Indian Constitution?
(i) Right to Livelihood
ii) Right to Housing
iii) Right to Privacy
a) Only (i)
(b (i) & (ii)
(c) (i) & (iii)
(d) (ii) & (iii)
7. The Right to Housing involves the following entitlements as per Olga Tellis
(i) Right to Notice & Hearing
(ii) Right to Cities
(iii) Right to Rehabilitation
(a) Only (i)
(b) (i) & (ii)
(c) (ii) & (iii)
(d) (i) & (iii)
8. Inthe case of Keshavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, a 13 Judge bench of the Supreme
Court held that the Parliament can only amend the Indian Constitution subject to the
Basic Structure. Now, in 2020, the Supreme Court, in a 5-Judge bench decision in Harry
Potter v. Jon Snow, held that the Parliament has the unlimited power to amend the
Indian Constitution. Will the decision of the Supreme Court be valid?
(a) Yes; As a later bench can overrule the decision of an older bench
(b) No; As a later bench cannot overrule the decision of an older bench
(c) No; As a 5-Judge bench cannot overrule the decision of a 13-Judge bench
(d) Yes; As the Basic Structure is not mentioned in the Indian Constitution and
therefore, is not recognized by Indian laws
9. Mr. SK Guha owns a leather factory in Agra. The residents of Agra has filed a writ before
the Allahabad High Court to close down the Factory as it infringes their right to a clean
environment. Without hearing the contentions of Mr. Guha, the High Court has ordered
the Govt to shut down the factory. Based on the above excerpt, which argument do you
think will be sound in a challenge against this decision?
(a) The High Court’s decision is wrong as Writ Petitions cannot be filed against private
citizens.
(b) The High Court’s decision is wrong as Mr. Guha was not allowed an opportunity to
be heard.
(c) The High Court’s decision is wrong as Right to a clean environment is not recognized
by the Indian Constitution
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10. In this excerpt, the term PIL is used to denote
(a) Public Interest Litigation
(b) Private International Law
(c) Public International Law
(d) Publicity Interest Litigation
Passage 3
Legislative Coups and the Tenth Schedule; Mahalakshmi Pavani (The Leaflet) -
The Rajiv Gandhi led-government was successful in passing the Constitutional (Fifty-Second
Amendment) Act, 1985 in Parliament that saw the addition of the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution, commonly referred to as the Anti-Defection Law. This legislation was seen as an
instrument to control and curb the evil practice of defection and uphold the sanctity of the
Legislature.
The Tenth Schedule applies to both Houses of the Parliament as well as the State Legislature.
Tenth Schedule prescribes two conditions that would attract disqualification for a Member:
(a) if a member voluntarily gives up membership of the political party from which such
member has been elected or; (b) ifa member votes or abstains from voting in a manner that
contradicts the direction issued by the political party to which he belongs.

However, paragraph 4 of Tenth Schedule states that a member shall not be disqualified if he
belongs to a faction that comprises at least two-thirds of the members of the original
legislative party. This faction may have either merged with another political party, formed a
new political party or opted to function as a separate group.
The Speaker or the Chairman of the House is the sole adjudicating authority with respect to
matters under the Tenth Schedule and whose decision shall be final. Although paragraph 7
imposes a bar on the jurisdiction of courts, in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors the Supreme
Court held that the office of the Speaker is a quasi-judicial authority, whose decisions are
amenable to judicial review. Thus the Tenth Schedule does not oust the jurisdiction of the
courts under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It is also incumbent upon the
Speaker of the House to follow the principles of natural justice whilst adjudicating
proceedings under the Tenth Schedule.
Earlier this year, another 3-Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Keisham
Meghachandra Singh v. Hon’ble Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly & Ors called upon
Parliament to consider establishing an independent tribunal to impartially adjudicate upon
disputes under the Tenth Schedule. The tribunal must be headed either a retired judge of the
Supreme Court or retired Chief Justice of a High Court. The court observed the possibility of
natural perceived bias by the Speaker given the fact that the Speaker would typically be
chosen from the ruling party. This view was similarly echoed by Justice J.S. Verma in his
minority opinion in Kihoto Hollohan.
11. Which Amendment brought in the 10" Schedule into the Constitution?
(a) Soh
(b) 54s
(c) 52nd
(d) 53K
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12. Mr. Potter, is a member of the ruling party Griffindor in the State of Hogwarts, a newly
formed state in India. The Government has decided to bring significant amendments to
the Reasonable Restriction of Underage Sorcery Act through a bill. Since Gryffindor was
confident about the passage of the bill, and since the Chief Minister Ms. Granger was
best friends with Mr. Potter, the party did not issue a direction to its members on how to
vote for the Bill. The Bill was passed with an astounding majority. After the vote, the
party was shocked to find that Mr. Potter had voted against the Bill and has decided to
approach the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule to disqualify him as a Member of the
Assembly. As the Speaker, what will be your decision?
(a) Mr. Potter will not be disqualified as the Party has not given a direction to him on
how to vote.
(b) Mr. Potter will be disqualified as he had a moral obligation to support his Party’s
initiatives.
(c) Mr. Potter will not be disqualified as the Bill had passed even without his vote and
therefore, no harm was done.
(d) Mr. Potter will be disqualified as he had misused his friendship with Ms. Granger to
become a Member of the Assembly.

13. The Tenth Schedule applies to:
i) Lok Sabha
ii
i)
iii) State Legislatures
) Only (i) & (ii)
a(
b Only (ii) & (iii)
c) Only (i) & (iii)
d) (i), (li) & (iii)
14. The Tenth Schedule protects a member from disqualification if they belong to a faction
that comprises at least_———saof the members of the original legislative party.
(a) 1/2
(b) 2/3
(c) 3/4
(d) 4/5
15. Can the decision of the Speaker to disqualify a member be challenged in the Courts?
(a) No; Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule bars the jurisdiction of Courts in respect of
any matter connected with the disqualification of a member.

(b) Yes; The office of the Speaker is a quasi-judicial authority, whose decisions are
amenable to judicial review.
(c) No; Only the Governor or the President as the case may be has the authority to
reverse the decision of the Speaker
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Passage 4
An Executive Emergency, India’s Response to COVID-19; Gautam Bhatia (Verfassungsblog) -
Part XVIII of the Indian Constitution specifically authorizes the President (acting upon the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers) to declare an Emergency. An Emergency must
ordinarily be ratified by the Parliament within a month. During the period of Emergency,
fundamental rights (apart from inter alia the right to life and personal liberty) may be
suspended. Nonetheless, the preconditions for an Emergency proclamation are strict: there
must exist a state of war, external aggression, or an armed rebellion.
The Indian Constitution has no provision for environmental or public health Emergencies.
And indeed, prior bitter experience — with politically motivated Emergencies — has left
successive governments wary about formally invoking Emergency powers. Unsurprisingly,
therefore, the central government has not chosen to go down the Emergency Powers road in
order to tackle Covid-19.
The full extent of the restrictions imposed by India’s lockdown, therefore, becomes clear only
by weaving through a complex three-level web: the central government’s guidelines under
the National Disaster Management Act, the several state governments’ regulations under the
EDA, and local officers’ orders under the Criminal Procedure Code. As pointed out above with
respect to the central government, at each level, what is common is that the existence of
broadly worded, umbrella legislation is taken as cover for what is essentially rule by executive
decree.
The logical consequence of this interlocking web of executive decrees (many of which are
vaguely worded) is that while the lockdown is stringent and severe, its enforcement is also
arbitrary (and sometimes violent). Movement is difficult without a special government-issued
“passes”; there is no specific restriction on any individual going out (whether to exercise or to
buy essential commodities), but nonetheless, there are reports of the police “banning”
morning walks, as well as extra-legal sanctions that do follow even upon such imagined
breaches of the “lockdown”.
The vague and open-ended character of the statutes have also led to a number of measures
that infringe civil rights, with dubious legal basis. The absence of firm statutory basis for such
moves is compounded by the fact that many years after a landmark constitutional case on
the right to privacy, India still does not have a data protection law. Consequently, there is no
statutory standard that governs data collection, processing, and use by the state
governments, or by the centre. There does exist a constitutional standard of proportionality —
a standard familiar to students of global constitutionalism — that requires State action to
meet the tests of legality, rationality, necessity, and strict proportionality.
16. From your understanding of the above excerpt, which of the following statements is true
about the provisions of Emergency in the Indian Constitution?
(i) State of Emergency can be declared by either the President or the Governor of a
State.
(ii) An Emergency must be ordinarily ratified by the Parliament within two
months.
(iii) The President can solely decide on whether or not to declare Emergency
(a) Only (i)
(b) Only (i) & (ii)
(c) (i), (ii) & (iii)
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17. Which of these 4 grounds is not a ground to declare Emergency?
(a) War
(b) Internal Disturbance
(c) Armed Rebellion
(d) External Aggression
18. The Author points that regulations by the State Government during the pandemic is
given under the EDA. What does EDA stand for?
(a) Emergency Declaration Act
(b) Emergency Diseases Act
(c) Epidemic Diseases Act
(d) Epidemic Declaration Act
19. Which of these arguments is made by the author in this excerpt?
(a) The President has not declared an Emergency in light of the Pandemic since there
are no provisions for environmental or public health Emergencies.
(b) The Pandemic is an Act of God and therefore, the President should ignore the
established law to declare Emergency.

(c) Since the Pandemic may lead to an Armed Rebellion in the future, the President
should declare Emergency to prevent it.
20. In light of the Aggression from China, the Government of India has decided to declare
Emergency over the entire Nation. Thereafter, the Government has decided to pass the
Anti-National Extermination Act where the Military is empowered to execute any Indian
resident ona prima facie suspicion of engaging in anti-national activities. The suspect will
not even be allowed to approach the Courts for protection as per the new law. Asa
socially aware citizen, you have decided to challenge the constitutionality of the new law
under your Fundamental Right to Life under Article 21. The Government has opposed
the petition saying that Fundamental Rights can be suspended during an Emergency. Will
the counter argument of the Government succeed?
(a) No; The Right to Life cannot be suspended even during an emergency.
(b) Yes; All Fundamental Rights can be suspended during an emergency
(c) Yes; While some Rights cannot be suspended, the Right to Life can be suspended
during Emergency
(d)No; No Fundamental Rights can be suspended during Emergency

Passage 5
Arbitrariness as a Test of Article 14 violation -
It is both logical and intuitive to start with the text of Article 14.
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the
laws within the territory of India.
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The earliest decisions of the Court had a fairly consistent view of Article 14. The first part of
the article which speaks of equality is commonly accepted to be a guarantee that no person
is above the law. This guarantee is made effective by its corollary in the second part which
offers to persons the equal protection of the laws. How are these interconnected guarantees
made effective? To quote from the minority opinion of Shastri J from State of West Bengal v.
Anwar Ali Sarkar:
“The second part which is a corollary of the first and is based on the last clause of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution, enjoins that equal
protection shall be secured to all such persons in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties
without discrimination or favouritism, or as an American Judge put it ‘it is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws’ (Yick Wo v. Hopkins [ 118 US 356, 369]}, that is, laws that operate
alike on all persons under like circumstances. And as the prohibition under the article is
directed against the State, which is defined in Article12 as including not only the legislatures
but also the Governments in the country, Article 14 secures all persons within the territories
of India against arbitrary laws as well as arbitrary application of laws. This is further made
clear by defining “law” in Article 13 (which renders void any law which takes away or abridges
the rights conferred by Part III) as including, among other things, any “order” or
“notification”, so that even executive orders or notifications must not infringe Article 14. This
trilogy of articles thus ensures non-discrimination in State action both in the legislative and
the administrative spheres in the democratic republic of India.”

Contrary to the belief that arbitrariness was discovered in the seventies, it is clear from the
above paragraph from 1952 that Article 14 has, from the very outset, been interpreted as a
guarantee against arbitrary action.
{Extracted from Rethinking Non-Arbitrariness by Shankar Narayanan, published in the NLUD
Student Law Journal]
21. Based on the passage above, when can a law justifiably be excluded from following the
principle of equality in Article 14?
(a) When it treats differently like people in like circumstances
(b) When it treats similarly like people in unlike circumstances
(c) When it treats similarly unlike people in like circumstances
(d) When it treats differently unlike people in unlike circumstances
22. The test of arbitrariness applies on
(a) Legislative action
(b) Executive action
(c) Both (a) and (b)
(d) Neither (a) nor (b)
23. If the Parliament were to enact a law fixing the age of consent for sex to be 15 years,
such a law would be

(a) Equal and arbitrary
(b) Unequal and non-arbitrary
(c) Equal and non-arbitrary
(d) Unequal and arbitrary
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24. Naveen is employed in a government company. The company, through an office order,
announced that every employee who has more than two children will not be eligible for
certain allowances. However, employees who already had two or more children were
exempt from this rule. Naveen challenged this order in court claiming it is arbitrary and
unreasonable, and thus violates Article 14. Can Naveen claim Article 14 violation against
his employer?
(a) Yes, because Article 13 protects all fundamental rights.
(b) No, because relief for fundamental rights violation is available only for government’s
legislative and executive functions.
(c) Yes, because a government company is considered State as per Article 12.
(d) No, because Article 13 only protects fundamental rights from violation by the
government.
25. Will Naveen succeed in his claim?
(a) Yes, because the order is arbitrary and unreasonable.
(b) No, because the order is arbitrary and reasonable.
(c) Yes, because the order is non-arbitrary and unreasonable.

(d) No, because the order is non-arbitrary and reasonable.
Passage 6
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act -
The [Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act] UAPA is primarily an anti-terror law — aimed at
“more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations and
for dealing with terrorist activities”. It was first promulgated in 1967 to target secessionist
organisations, and is considered to be the predecessor of laws such as the (now repealed)
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) and Prevention of Terrorism Act
(POTA).
Amendments from time to time have made the UAPA more stringent. Following the last
amendment in 2019, an individual can be designated a terrorist; only organisations could be
designated earlier. UAPA cases are tried by special courts.
The Act defines unlawful activity as any action — spoken or written words, signs, or visible
representation — which is intended or supports any claim to bring about secession of any
part of India or which incites anyone towards secession; disclaims, questions, disrupts or
intends to disrupt the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India; and “which causes or is
intended to cause disaffection against India”. The word “disaffection” has not been defined in
the law, and finds mention only once.
Section 13 (“Punishment for unlawful activities”), which has been invoked against Khalid and
others, provides for up to seven years in prison for anyone who “advocates, abets, advises or
incites the commission of any unlawful activity”.
Section 16 (“Punishment for terrorist act”) specifies punishment with death or imprisonment
for life in case a death has occurred as a result of the act. The law defines a terrorist act as
one that is intended to threaten or is likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, or
sovereignty of India, and causes or is likely to cause death or injuries, and property damage.
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Section 17 provides for punishment for raising funds for terrorist acts, and Section 18 deals
with conspiracy behind the terrorist act or “any act preparatory to the commission of a
terrorist act”.
The law has been used in cases other than those of conventional ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist
acts’. It has of late been invoked against activists, student leaders, and journalists. UAPA
cases have been filed against activists in the Bhima-Koregaon case; at least two journalists in
Kashmir; Devangana Kalita and Natasha Narwal, members of the women students and alumni
collective Pinjra Tod; former Congress municipal councillor Ishrat Jahan; Khalid Saifi of the
organisation United Against Hate; Jamia Millia Islamia student Safoora Zargar; and now, Umar
Khalid.
[Extracted from Umar Khalid arrested under UAPA in Delhi riots case: What is this tough anti-
terror law?, published in the Indian Express]
26. Who can be designated a terrorist under UAPA?
(a) individuals
(b) organisations
(c) either (a) or (b)

(d) both (a) and (b)
27. The passage is of the view that
(a) UAPA has helped curb the menace of terrorism
(b) UAPA has failed to curb the menace of terrorism
(c) UAPA has been used in conventional terrorism cases
(d) UAPA has not been used in conventional terrorism cases
28. Which of these laws can be used to charge an individual for terrorist activities?
1. UAPA
2. TADA
3. POTA
(a) Only (a)
(b) (a) and (b)
(c) (a) and (c)

(d) (a), (b) and (c)
29. Batuk Nath Ganguly is a columnist in a Bengali daily newspaper and a die-hard East
Bengal fan. Mohun Bagan recently left the i-League and joined the Indian Super League,
while their arch-rivals East Bengal stayed in i-League. Upset by the fact that he will never
watch the famous Kolkata derby football match again, Mr. Ganguly wrote a column titled
“One Nation, Two Leagues” in which he urged readers to boycott the Indian Super
League for damaging what he felt was the essence of Indian football culture. Fired up by
his columns, a mass gathered outside Mohun Bagan’s office to protest against the club’s
decision to switch leagues. One protestor ran forward shouting “two Leagues can’t be in
one India. India must be divided into two to have two football leagues” and threw a
molotov cocktail (a homemade explosive) into an office window which resulted in the
death of a Mohun Bagan employee. Mr. Ganguly was arrested and charged under
section 13 of UAPA and the protestor who threw the molotov cocktail was charged
under section 16 of UAPA
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Is Mr. Ganguly liable under section 13?
(a) Yes, because he advocated the commission of unlawful activity
(b) No, because he neither advocated nor incited commission of unlawful activity
(c) Yes, because he incited the commission of unlawful activity.
(d) both (a) and (c)
30. Is the protestor who threw the molotov cocktail liable under section 16?
(a) Yes, because he committed a terrorist act that resulted in a death.
(b) No, because his act resulted in a death but was not a terrorist act.
(c) No, because his act neither resulted in a death nor was a terrorist act.
(d) No, because his act was a terrorist act, but did not result in a death.
Passage 7
The Soleimani Strike Defied the U.S. Constitution -
(Source: Oona A. Hathaway, The Atlantic, available at
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/soleimani-strike-law/604417/)
The drone strike that killed Major General Qassem Soleimani, leader of the Quds Force of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, raises many legal issues, but one of the most significant—
at least to the American constitutional order—is that President Donald Trump ordered the
strike without so much as informing Democratic leadership in Congress, disregarding
Congress’s essential role in initiating war. If Congress fails to respond effectively, the
constitutional order will be broken beyond repair, and the president will be left with the
unmitigated power to take the country to war on his own —anywhere, anytime, for any
reason.
Soleimani, as the primary architect of Iran’s strategy to gain strategic power by fuelling
conflict, was responsible for the deaths of thousands, including hundreds of Americans.
Presidents before Trump, however, held back from taking action against Soleimani,
concluding that doing so would spark war with Iran and unleash its proxy forces against the
U.S. and its allies.
Any significant military action requires legal authority under both domestic and international
law. Normally, domestic law would require the president to seek the approval of Congress,
usually through a law authorizing the use of military force (after all, the Constitution gives
Congress, not the president, the power to “declare war”). International law would also
require him to seek the approval of the United Nations Security Council before resorting to
force, unless the host state consents (which it did not) or the action qualifies for the express,
but narrow, self-defense exception. Trump did not seek approval in either forum.
Though presidents have pushed the boundaries of their unilateral authority before, this
action by President Trump is arguably unprecedented. When President Barack Obama
participated in the NATO strikes in Libya, at least the operation was undertaken with allies
and approved by the United Nations Security Council. When President George W. Bush
invaded Iraq in 2003, his international support was tenuous, but he had clear congressional
authorization. In fact, the closest recent precedent for the current operation is President
Trump’s own earlier decisions to strike Syrian-government targets in April 2017 and again in
April 2018—without either congressional or international support. But those strikes were
relatively minor in comparison and did not risk setting off a new regional war.
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Congress must act not only to reject the illegal use of force represented by the decision to kill
Soleimani, but also to reassert its constitutional role in the decision-making process that
takes the nation to war. If Congress fails to effectively press back against this unconstitutional
assertion of unilateral authority, it will set a precedent that will put the greatest destructive
power the world has ever known in the hands of a single man.
31. The Statement “President Obama ensured compliance of the United States as to legal
obligations before initiating military action against Libya” is
(a) True
(b) False
(c) Insufficient information
32. In the passage, NATO refers to
(a) North American Treaty Organization
(b) North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(c) North American Territorial Organization
(d) North Atlantic Territorial Organization
33. The central argument of the author is that
(a) Congress must denounce the illegal use of military action by President Trump.
(b) President Trump must not act unilaterally and must comply with domestic and
international obligations before launching military action or deploying force.
(c) President Trump must be prevented from taking unilateral decisions in international
relations.
(d) Congress must intervene to assert its Constitutional authority to set the right
precedent.
34. The author states that the action of President Trump is unprecedented because
a) He had no authorisation from Congress and no international support.
(b) He had no international backing.
(c) There were more dangerous geopolitical implications.
(d) All of the above.
35. For military action to be legitimate as per international law, a State must
(a) Seek the approval of the Security Council of the United Nations.
(b) Seek the approval of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
(c) Comply with all its Constitutional obligations.
(d) Comply with all the conditions that may be set by the host State.
Passage 8
Domestic Violence in Russia: The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic -
(Source: Ekateyrina Aleynikova, Chantham House,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/domestic-violence-russia-impact-covid-19-
pandemic#)
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Russia is one of the few countries in the region to have no legal definition of domestic
violence and, as a result, there are no protective measures specific to domestic violence such
as restraining orders or compulsory anger management training for abusers. In fact, the
government has taken steps in recent years to remove any legal distinction between assault
happening in one’s home, and elsewhere, with battery among family or household members
for first-time offences decriminalized in 2017.
The Russian Ministry of Justice explicitly defended this position in its response to an enquiry
into Russian domestic violence cases by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in
November 2019. The ministry claimed existing legislation adequately protects citizens from
domestic violence, ‘even though it has never been considered a separate offence’, reiterating
that there is ‘no need’ for adopting specific legislation.
However, the four cases that led to the ECtHR’s enquiry demonstrate that current legislation
is not sufficient. The most prominent case is that of Margarita Gracheva whose ex-husband
severed her hands in 2017 despite her having made multiple complaints to the police ahead
of the act being committed. If Russian legislation had mechanisms in place to isolate victims
from their abusers, then Gracheva could have been protected by the law.
Instead, systemic impunity for abusers is supported by statements from people in power
excusing domestic violence. When meeting with the family of a young woman allegedly
murdered by her husband, Chechnya’s leader said, husbands beating their wives ‘happens’
and that the young woman should have tried harder to hold on to her marriage. These
statements send clear signals to abusers that their actions are justified, and to the victims,
that they won't be protected if they were to come forward.
On a systemic level, many of the provisions intended to protect victims of violence, which
were already ineffective in Russia, have been worsened during the lockdown. Where police
may not have rapidly responded to reports of domestic violence previously, under lockdown,
they have become focused on other priorities and, where shelters and support networks for
the victims may have been scarce in the past, they have been further constrained.
The pandemic has also been used as an excuse to postpone discussion of a federal law on
domestic violence, drafted by civil society, that was submitted for review by the Duma last
year. This bill would have introduced different types of domestic violence such as
psychological and economic violence and transferred domestic violence offences from
private to public prosecutions to make it easier for victims to seek justice.
The government’s disregard for domestic violence reflects, in part, the patriarchal mindsets
of those in power but perhaps, more significantly, the Kremlin’s belief that conservative
social groups constitute its main support base. This has been made evident by the
politicization of Russia’s ‘traditional’ values in recent years which was vigorously deployed
throughout the constitutional amendments campaign.
36. The author explicitly argues that the lack of action on part of Russia to tackle domestic
violence is motivated:
(i) Electorally.
(ii) Systemically.
(iii) Economically.
(iv) Internationally.
(a) (i) and (ii).
(b) (i) and (iv).
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(c) (i), (ii) and (iii).
(d) (ii) and (iii).
37. Which of the following would be considered as exacerbating domestic violence?
i) Decriminalisation of battery among household members.
ii) Statements condoning instances of domestic violence.
iii) Inquiry by the European Court of Human Rights.
(iv) Acceptance of complicity on part of the people in power.
(a) (i) and (iii).
(b) (ii) and (iii).
(c) (i) and (ii).
(d) (ii) and (iv).
38. In the passage, Duma is a reference to
(a) Parliament of Russia.
(b) Lower House of Parliament of Russia.
(c) Upper House of Parliament of Russia.
(d) None of the above.

39. Which of the following have provided less protection to victims due to imposition of
lockdowns?
(a) Elected officials.
(b) Police.
(c) Armed forces.
(d) Human rights groups.
40. In light of the passage, Kremlin is a metonymic reference to the of Russia.
(a) Legislature
(b) Executive
(c) Judiciary
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ANSWERS & EXPLANATIONS
Passage 1
1. (a); It is clear from the excerpt that the author does not claim the law of contempt
protects the individual reputation of judges. The law upholds the dignity of the Court as
an institution.
2. (c); Article 129 and 215 of the Constitution confer the status of a “court of record” on
the Supreme Court and the High Courts, empowering them to punish for contempt of
themselves.
3. (c); As per the latest amendment, section 13(b) provides for truth in public interest and
a bona fide request for invoking truth as a defence.
4. (b); While it is true that Courts have the power to strike down an unconstitutional law,
the author does not make that argument himself. The author clearly states that it is for
Parliament and various state legislatures to decide if the law is to be repealed.
5. (c); The author argues against the repealing of the law of Contempt and argues that
such a law can exist along with the Constitution of India.

Passage 2.
6. (b); As per the article, the Supreme Court established in Olga Tellis, that the right to life
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution includes the right to livelihood and housing.
Right to Privacy is not mentioned in the article at all.
7. (d}; The Supreme Court, in Olga Tellis, recognized 2 sets of entitlements as part of the
right to housing — a right to notice and hearing prior to evictions, and access to
rehabilitation under existing schemes for the same.
8. (c); Decisions of a higher bench strength of the Supreme Court, are binding on benches
with the same or lower bench strength. Even if one argues that (d) might be sound in
law, the case has to be referred to a larger bench so as to overrule the 13-Judge bench
decision. Until then, the decision of the larger bench shall be the law of the land.
9. (b); Principles of Natural Justice, along with established case laws mandate that persons
who are vitally affected by any decision of courts in exercise of their writ jurisdiction
must be heard by the court. The excerpt does not say anything to justify (a) & (c)
10. (a); Private International Law is a branch of Jurisprudence arising from the diverse laws
of various nations that applies when private citizens of different countries interact or
transact business with one another. Public International Law generally determines the
rights and duties between nations. Neither of these branches of law are relevant in this
excerpt.
Publicity Interest Litigation is not an actual branch of Jurisprudence recognized by law,
although the term is used in courtrooms often. Public Interest Litigation refers to
litigations filed by socially aware citizens to raise issues before the court that are of
general public concern, such as the Delhi Vehicular Pollution Case that is the subject of
this excerpt.
Passage 3
11 (c); The 10° Schedule was added to the Constitution in 1985 by the 52nd Constitutional
Amendment Act.
12. (a); The Tenth Schedule is clear that a member will be disqualified only when they votes
or abstain from voting in a manner that contradicts the direction issued by the political
party to which he belongs. No direction has been issued by the Party and Mr. Potter is
therefore free to vote on the Bill as per his moral conscience. Whether or not the Vote
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caused significant damage to a Party’s aspirations is not relevant to decide on the
member’s disqualification. Misusing of Friendship is not a ground to disqualify a member
as per Tenth Schedule.
13. (d); The Tenth Schedule applies to both Houses of the Parliament as well as the State
Legislature.
14. (b); The Tenth Schedule states that a member shall not be disqualified if he belongs toa
faction that comprises at least two-thirds of the members of the original legislative party.
15. (b); Although the reasoning in (a) is correct, the Supreme Court, in Kihoto Hollohan v.
Zachillhu & Ors held that the office of the Speaker is a quasi-judicial authority, whose
decisions are amenable to judicial review. So, the bar in Paragraph 7 is not absolute.pt.
Passage 4
16. (d); Only the President is empowered to declare a State of Emergency. The President has
to act upon the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and therefore, cannot solely
proclaim a State of Emergency. Also, the Parliament ordinarily has to ratify an Emergency
within one month.

17. (b); Emergency can be declared only on the grounds of a state of war, external
aggression, or an armed rebellion. Internal Disturbance as a ground was removed by the
44th Amendment.
18. (c); The Epidemic Diseases Act empowers the State Governments to pass any regulations
that they might deem “necessary to prevent the outbreak or spread” of an epidemic
disease. The other 3 options are fictitious.
19. (a); The author argues that the Government has not declared Emergency as the Indian
Constitution has no provision for environmental or public health Emergencies. The other
two arguments are not made by the author in this excerpt.
20. (a); While some Fundamental Rights can be suspended during an Emergency, the Rights
to Life and Personal Liberty cannot be suspended.
Passage 5
21. (d); Reason: Laws in accordance with Article 14 operate alike on all people in like
circumstances. Therefore, a law treating differently unlike people in unlike circumstances
would not violate Article 14.
22. (c); Reason: And as the prohibition under the article is directed against the State, which
is defined in Article12 as including not only the legislatures but also the Governments in
the country, Article 14 secures all persons within the territories of India against arbitrary
laws as well as arbitrary application of laws. This is further made clear by defining “law”
in Article 13 (which renders void any law which takes away or abridges the rights
conferred by Part Ill) as including, among other things, any “order” or “notification”, so
that even executive orders or notifications must not infringe Article 14. This trilogy of
articles thus ensures non-discrimination in State action both in the legislative and the
administrative spheres in the democratic republic of India.
23. (a); Reason: Such a law is arbitrary because fixing any age of consent for sex without
considering emotional and sexual maturity of every individual teenager would be
arbitrary. However, it applies universally to all people below and over the age of 15, and
is therefore equal.
24. (c); Reason: Government company is considered State under Article 12 and Article 13
protects fundamental rights from violation by legislative and executive State action.
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25. (a); Reason: The order arbitrarily fixes at two the number of children one can have, and
applies differently to employees that have children and those that do not. Therefore, it is
both arbitrary and unreasonable.
Passage 6
26. (c); Reason: Following the 2019 amendment, both individuals and organisations can be
designated terrorists under UAPA.
27. (d); Reason: The passage says “[t]he law has been used in cases other than those of
conventional ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist acts’. It has of late been invoked against activists,
student leaders, and journalists.” There is no mention of the law’s effectiveness in
conventional terrorism cases
28. (a); Reason: TADA and POTA have been repealed and are therefore no longer in
application.
29. (b); Reason: Mr. Ganguly only asked his readers to boycott the Indian Super League. He
did not urge them to go about throwing molotov cocktails in protest. Thus, he is not
liable under section 13 of UAPA

30. (a); Reason: UAPA defines a “terrorist act” as any act intended to threaten or is likely to
threaten the unity, integrity, security, or sovereignty of India, and causes or is likely to
cause death or injuries, and property damage. The protestor shouted a slogan calling to
divide India into two and threw an explosive into an office building.
Passage 7
31. (c); Firstly, the question is not clear whether legal obligations cover domestic legal
obligations. Secondly, even if it is assumed that domestic legal obligations are covered,
there is nothing in the passage to indicate that the Congress authorised the military
action.
32. (b); NATO stands for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
33. (d); The author makes the argument that the Congress has a role to play in matters
concerning use of military action and that by letting President Trump circumvent it,
unprecedented power is in the control of the President.
34. (d); The author mentions that the previous precedent of unilateral military action was in
2017 and 2018 when there was no Congressional support or international backing.
However, the author distinguishes the issue discussed in the passage by emphasising on
the danger of the start of a war.
35. (a); The State must get the approval of the United Nations Security Council in order to
initiate force against another State. Option (d) is inapplicable for two reasons. Firstly, it is
widely worded to mean more than just consent to military action. Secondly, even if it is
construed as consent to military action, it is a justification when approval is not granted
or taken, and as such, is outside the strict scope of the question.
Passage 8
36. (a); The passage makes no explicit mention of economic reasons for the inaction on part
of Russia. The last paragraph mentions electoral reasons whereas systemic reasons are
mentioned multiple times.
37. (c); Since the question is what would domestic violence worse, inquiry and acceptance of
complicity do not qualify. On the other hand, decriminalisation of a crime which is set in
the domestic context would directly exacerbate domestic violence. The condonation of
violence by people in power would also systemically encourage domestic violence.
38. (b); Duma is often misconstrued as the Parliament of Russia whereas it is the lower
house of the Parliament.
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39. (b); The passage clearly mentions that the police have newer priorities during
lockdowns.
AO. (b); Kremlin is widely used to refer to the Executive office of Russia.
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LEGAL REASONING SECTION TEST 2
Passage 1
Explained: What is abetment of suicide, and how does the court determine if it took place?;
Apurva Viswanath (Excerpt from Indian Express) -
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 makes abetment of suicide a punishable offence. Section 306 of
the IPC prescribes either a jail term of up to ten years or a fine or both.
“if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide shall be
punished with imprisonment of either imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years,
and shall also be liable to fine.”
Abetment of suicide is a serious offence that is tried in a Sessions court and is cognizable, non-
bailable and non-compoundable.
A cognizable offence is one in which a police officer can make an arrest without a warrant from
a court. A non-bailable offence means bail is granted to the accused at the discretion of the
court, and not as a matter of right.

A non-compoundable offence is one in which the case cannot be withdrawn by the
complainant even when the complainant and the accused have reached a compromise. The
court cannot allow withdrawal of a case involving a non-compoundable offence, and every
such complaint is necessarily followed by a trial where evidence is held against the accused.
There are two primary ingredients of the crime of abetment of suicide. First is a suicidal death.
The second ingredient is the intention of the accused to abet such suicide.
Legally, whether a death is a suicide or not is a determination of a fact, which means evidence
has to be evaluated to pronounce that death is a suicide. In common parlance, the word suicide
is liberally attributed to every case of self-destruction, but suicide is never presumed. A
determination of suicide is made when the deceased person is understood to have known the
probable consequence of what the self-harm is about to do to the person and yet, does so
intentionally.
Once such a determination is made, then the intention of the person accused of abetment of
suicide is looked into.
The intention is discerned from acts of the accused in proving any crime. Multiple rulings of
the Supreme Court, including a 2002 ruling in the case of ‘Sanjay Singh v State of Madhya
Pradesh’, have held that a comment or a statement uttered in haste, anger would not amount
to abetment of suicide.
Additionally, if the deceased person is found to be very sensitive compared to a reasonable
person, the court has said that the charge of abetment to suicide would weaken.
1. Ms. Jan Levinsson, resident of Kochi, is charged & arrested for the offence of Sedition,
which is a non-bailable offence under Indian Law. She has applied for bail for the same.
Can the Court grant bail to her?
(a) No. Since Sedition is a non-bailable offence, the Court cannot grant bail to the accused.
(b) No. Since Sedition is such a serious offence against the interests of the Nation, the
Court cannot grant bail to such an accused.
(c) Yes. Granting of bail is upon the discretion of the court, but not guaranteed as a right
to the accused.
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2. Sona and Aby have been best friends since childhood. They go to the same school, come
back home together, play together and have been inseparable since a very young age.
However, one day, they had a huge fight and in the spur of the moment, Sona said that
she hates Aby and hoped that he would kill himself. Aoby was heartbroken at this and killed
himself in grief. Will Sona be held liable for abetment to suicide?
(a) Yes. Since Sona’s words had a direct effect on Aby’s decision to commit suicide, she
will be held liable.
(b) No. Since Sona said the words in haste, it cannot be said that Sona had the intention
to cause Aby’s suicide.
(c) Yes. Sona was Aby’s best friend since childhood and should have known better about
the effects her words might have on Aby
3. Inthe above scenario, let us suppose that a case has been filed against Sona based on the
Complaint made by Aby’s parents. However, they later decide to forgive Sona considering
the friendship between Sona and their son. They therefore want to withdraw the case.
Will it be possible for the parents to do the same?

(a) Yes. Since the complaint was made by them, they have all the right to withdraw them
at a later stage.
(b) Yes. Considering the special circumstances regarding Aby and Sona’s friendship, the
Court will allow the parents to withdraw the complaint.
(c) No. The law does not allow withdrawing such complaints regarding abetment to
suicide.
(d) Both (a) & (b)
4. Inthe above case, it was found that Aby was generally of a sensitive nature and would get
hurt even in the most trivial matters. Would this new fact result in Sona’s acquittal?
(a) Yes. If the deceased person is found to be very sensitive compared to a reasonable
person, the Court will never hold a person guilty for abetment to suicide.
(b) No. The sensitivity of the deceased is a factor that can help Sona’s case but it is not a
guarantee for her acquittal.
(c) No. Sona ought to have been more careful considering Aby’s sensitive nature.

5. As per the Article, which of these Courts is empowered to try a case of Abetment to
Suicide?
(a) Judicial First Class Magistrate
(b) Judicial Second Class Magistrate
(c) Chief Judicial Magistrate
(d)Sessions Judge
Passage 2
The Theatrical Method in Putin’s Vote Madness -
(Source: Andrew Higgins, The New York Times, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/world/europe/putin-referendum-vote-russia. html)
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Russia’s seven-day national plebiscite, intended to keep President Vladimir V. Putin in power
until at least 2036, delivered the expected verdict on Wednesday: Early results showed that
three-quarters of voters had given their endorsement. “From a juridical point of view, this
whole exercise is insane,” said Greg B. Yudin, a sociologist and political theorist at the Moscow
School of Social and Economic Sciences. But, he added, “it is not at all a meaningless
procedure,” because Russia’s system under Mr. Putin depends on the appearance of popular
support to confer legitimacy on decisions he has already made.
Voters, in theory, could have rejected the amendments, and Mr. Putin pledged to honor their
decision. But the chances of that happening always seemed minuscule, not least because of
what Golos, an independent election monitoring organization, described on Tuesday as an
electoral process rigged from the start.
Golos said the vote, unfairly skewed by a noisy one-sided propaganda campaign by state-
controlled media and blatant pressure from a sprawling galaxy of state-funded companies and
organizations, did “not allow us to talk seriously about the possibility of the will of the people
being expressed.” For weeks, a long parade of prominent Russians who depend on the state
for their positions and income — from actors and musicians to the head of the Hermitage
Museum in St. Petersburg and the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church — have paraded
across state television urging people to vote.

Curiously, none of them mentioned the core of the exercise: an amendment to allow Mr. Putin
to crash through constitutional term limits in place since 1993 and stay in power virtually for
life, rather than step down at the end of his current term in 2024. They instead focused on
other changes, like enshrining the protection of pensions, family values, animals, the Russian
language and the memory of Russians killed in World War ll.
The foregone nature of the outcome, in Mr. Yudin’s view, reflects Russia’s “plebiscitary
democracy,” a system that revolves around a single, unchallenged leader but still requires
regular cries of “public acclamation to give it legitimacy.”
The Kremlin’s primary objective, he said, was less to get public approval for amendments that
had already been ratified than to give Mr. Putin a fresh jolt of legitimacy at a time when, with
Russia’s economy severely damaged by the coronavirus pandemic, his approval rating has
slumped to its lowest level since he came to power 20 years ago.
There were scattered reports of outright fraud, but more significant was the forced
mobilization of the large number of voters whose livelihood depends, one way or another, on
staying on the Kremlin’s good side.
6. The author contends that the election outcome was expected and that it could have legally
invalidated by the amendments.
(a) True
(b) False
(c) Data insufficient

7. The author’s central argument is that
a) The election process was legally unnecessary.
b)The election process involved a violation of the rights of people.
c) The election process served as a legitimacy-enhancing purpose.
d)The election process deployed state machinery in order to aid the government.
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8. The author implies that the purpose of the referendum is
(a) To circumvent Constitutional conventions.
(b)To bring forth a new Constitution.
(c) To distil state propaganda.
(d)To enshrine protection of Russian cultural symbolism in the Constitution.
9. The author, by referring to the wide displays of support for the Constitutional
amendments, is not referring to:
(a) The coercive nature of the government.
(b) The self-preserving nature of its supporters.
(c) The theatre that is required to gain public legitimacy.
(d) The violations of rights of workers in being forced to vote.
10. By referring to the symbolism to be codified in the Constitution, the author indicates
i) Deception to the people.
ii The creation of a false binary.

iii) Weaponised cultural pride.
(iv) Legitimising the beliefs of Orthodox Church.
(a) (i), (ii), and (iv)
(b) (ii) and (iv)
(c) (i), (ii), and (iii)
(d) (i) and (iv)
Passage 3
Performance Bank Guarantees: The Linchpin of Commercial Transactions -
§126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines a guarantee as a contract whereby the ‘surety’
(in this case, a bank) undertakes to discharge the liability of the ‘principal debtor’ against the
‘creditor’ in case of default by such 'principal debtor’. Since consideration is essential to ensure
the validity of contracts (§10, Indian Contract Act, 1872), §127 further clarifies that mere
benefit to the principal debtor acts as sufficient consideration. The contract of guarantee
presupposes the existence of separate liability of the principal debtor and the surety’s liability
thus becomes secondary.
Halsbury's Laws of England defines a guarantee as an accessory contract by which the promisor
undertakes to be answerable to the promisee for the debt, default or miscarriage of another
person, whose primary liability to the promisee must exist or be contemplated (5"" Ed., 1013).
Unless otherwise provided in the contract, the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that
of the principal debtor, implying that the creditor need not exhaust his remedies against the
principal debtor to make the surety liable (§128, Indian Contract Act, 1872).
Variance of terms of contract without surety's consent, creditor compromising time, creditor's
conduct impairing the surety's remedy etc lead to a discharge of the surety's liability (§§133-
137 and §139, Indian Contract Act, 1872). Furthermore, the surety has rights in equity such as
that of payment on performance which has been codified in §140 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872.
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Bank guarantees can be tailored to suit different needs and come in various forms covering a
number of contingencies such as limited, continuing, payable on demand etc.
§124 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines a contract of indemnity as a contract by which
one party promises to save the other from loss caused to him by the conduct of the promissory
himself, or by the conduct of any other person. The trigger event giving rise to liability of
indemnifier is the loss caused, whereas the trigger event giving rise to liability of guarantor is
mere default. Indemnity is thus given to protect the debtor, whereas the purpose of a
guarantee is to protect the creditor. The guarantor assumes the secondary liability since his
liability is triggered only in cases of default.
A guarantor has the right of subrogation, i.e. ability to recover from the debtor any amount
paid to the creditor (§140, Indian Contract Act, 1872), but the indemnifier has no such right. A
guarantee is a tripartite contract and consists of three contracts — the first, between the
creditor and the debtor, the second, between the surety and the creditor and a third contract
by which the principal debtor expressly or impliedly requests the surety to act as surety. If the
third contract is missing, it becomes a contract of indemnity. This was clarified in the Kerala
High Court in the case of Bank of India v. G. Govinda Prabhu (1964).
{Extracted from Perfomance Bank Guarantees: The Linchpin of Commercial Transactions [Part-
1], published on Live Law]

11. What is the difference between a guarantee and a contract of indemnity?
(a) Both consist of three contracts
(b) Both consist of two contracts.
(c) Guarantee consists of two contracts and indemnity consists of three.
(d) Guarantee consists of three contracts and indemnity consists of two.
12. Neeraj Moody, an Indian businessman who had won the right to build a road in the Indian
city of Andher Nagari, entered into a contract with Full Power Builders, a Chinese
construction company which would carry out the actual construction work as a contractor
for Mr. Moody. To show that he had the financial capacity to perform the task, the
company furnished a bank guarantee from Lena Bank. Full Power Builders ended its India
operations before it could fulfil the contract with Mr. Moody. Mr. Moody, therefore, called
on the bank as surety to pay the amount of money due to him as per the terms of the
contract. The bank paid the amount to Mr. Moody and then filed a case against Full Power
Builders, seeking to recover the amount. Will Lena Bank succeed in its case?
(a) No, because indemnifier has the right of subrogation but guarantor does not.
(b) Yes, because both indemnifier and guarantor have the right of subrogation.
(c) No, because neither guarantor nor indemnifier has the right of subrogation.
(d) Yes, because indemnifier has no right of subrogation but guarantor does.
13. For a contract to be valid
(a) Consideration could be present

(b) Consideration must be present
(c) Consideration is not needed
(d) Consideration is irrelevant
14. In a contract of guarantee,
(a) Principal debtor has primary liability and surety has secondary liability
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(b) Creditor has primary liability and principal debtor has secondary surety and debtor are
liable
(c) Only debtor is liable
(d) Only creditor is liable
15. Which of the following statements is not correct?
(a) Indemnity protects creditor, guarantee protects debtor
(b) In a contract of guarantee, surety’s liability is coextensive to that of the principal
debtor
(c) Trigger event for indemnity is loss caused and trigger event for indemnity is default
(d) If the principal debtor fails to impliedly or expressly request surety to act as surety,
the contractual relation formed is that of indemnity.
Passage 4
Reading SC’s verdict on Hindu women’s inheritance rights; Apurva Viswanath (Indian Express)-
A three-judge Bench headed by Justice Arun Mishra ruled that a Hindu woman’s right to be a
joint heir to the ancestral property is by birth and does not depend on whether her father was
alive or not when the law was enacted in 2005. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005
gave Hindu women the right to be coparceners or joint legal heirs in the same way a male heir
does. “Since the coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that the father coparcener should
be living as on 9.9.2005,” the ruling said.
The Mitakshara school of Hindu law codified as the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 governed
succession and inheritance of property but only recognised males as legal heirs. The law
applied to everyone who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion. Buddhists, Sikhs,
Jains and followers of Arya Samaj, Brahmo Samaj are also considered Hindus for the purposes
of this law.
In a Hindu Undivided Family, several legal heirs through generations can exist jointly.
Traditionally, only male descendants of a common ancestor along with their mothers, wives
and unmarried daughters are considered a joint Hindu family. The legal heirs hold the family
property jointly.
Women were recognised as coparceners or joint legal heirs for partition arising from 2005.
Section 6 of the Act was amended that year to make a daughter of a coparcener also a
coparcener by birth “in her own right in the same manner as the son”.
The law applies to ancestral property and to intestate succession in personal property — where
succession happens as per law and not through a will.
In Prakash v Phulwati (2015), a two-judge Bench headed by Justice A K Goel held that the
benefit of the 2005 amendment could be granted only to “living daughters of living
coparceners” as on September 9, 2005 (the date when the amendment came into force).
In February 2018, contrary to the 2015 ruling, a two-judge Bench headed by Justice A K Sikri
held that the share of a father who died in 2001 will also pass to his daughters as coparceners
during the partition of the property as per the 2005 law.
These conflicting views by Benches of equal strength led to a reference to a three-judge Bench
in the current case. The ruling now overrules the verdicts from 2015. It settles the law and
expands on the intention of the 2005 legislation “to remove the discrimination as contained in
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section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by giving equal rights to daughters in the Hindu
Mitakshara coparcenary property as the sons have”.
16. Raja Rathnam Pillai, a rich merchant from Madurai, has 2 sons, Raja Selvam and Raja
Manikyam, and a daughter, Rani Rathnam. Upon his demise, the contents of his will were
read out. The will distributed his properties equally between the two sons, while Rani
Rathnam was left with nothing. She decides to challenge the will under the Hindu
Succession Act, read with the latest Amendment in 2005. Will her challenge succeed?
(a) Yes; After the 2005 Amendment, the Hindu Succession Act says that daughters and
sons are equally entitled to the property of the father.
(b) Yes; Raja Rathnam Pillai loved his daughter the most and therefore, she is entitled to
a fair portion of her father’s property
(c) No; The Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to succession in terms of a will
17. In the above case, it was found that Pillai’s will was indeed a forgery and that he had left
no will. Given that he died on September 7, 2005, can Rani Rathnam assert her rights over
her deceased father’s property?
(a) Yes; The Hindu Succession Amendment Act of 2005 gives Rani Rathnam equal rights
over her father’s property. This Amendment will be applicable regardless of the date
of Pillai’s death.
(b) No; The Hindu Succession Amendment Act of 2005 will only be applicable in cases
where the father has died after September 9, 2005. Since Pillai decided before the
cut-off date, the Amendment will have no application.
(c) Yes; Despite the fact that the Hindu Succession Amendment Act of 2005 is not
applicable in this case, Rani Rathnam will get equal rights over her father’s property
as per Article 14 of the Indian Constitution
18. The Hindu Succession Act codifies which school of Hindu Law?
i) Mitakshara School
ii) Dayabhaga School
a) Only (i)
b) Only (ii)
c) Both (i) & (ii)
d) Neither (i) & (ii)
ee
19. Gopi, who was born a Hindu, has decided to convert to Dinkoism, a religion which worships
Dinkan, a comic character from a Children’s magazine. After his conversion, will Gopi still
be governed by the Hindu Succession Act?
(a) No; The Hindu Succession Act is only applicable to Hindus
(b) No; The Hindus Succession Act is only applicable to Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists,
followers of Arya Samaj and Brahmo Samaj
(c) Yes; The Hindu Succession Act is applicable to anyone who is not a Muslim, Christian,
Parsi, or Jew by religion
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20. What is the final position of law regarding applicability of the 2005 Amendment, as per
the 3-Judge bench decision of the Supreme Court?
(a) The 2005 Amendment will be only applicable to daughters born after the amendment.
(b) The 2005 Amendment will be applicable only if the father was alive at the time of
passing the Amendment
(c) The 2005 Amendment will be applicable regardless of the father being alive at the
time of enacting the amendment.
Passage 5
Russia-Ukraine Case and Article 73 of WTO TRIPS Agreement —
The language of Article 73(b)1 of WTO TRIPS Agreement is mirrored by Article XXI of the WTO
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO Panel which examined Russia's
invocation of Article XXI to deny the right to transit of goods from Ukraine upheld Russia's
action. However, the Panel also held that though a WTO Member has the freedom to
determine what constitutes an essential security interest, the Panel has the jurisdiction to
examine whether the Member's determination is in good faith, and on the objectivity of the
measures concerned.
Another debatable section is the meaning of the term "other emergency in international
relations” in Article 73(b)(iii). This raises the question whether a health emergency like a
pandemic falls within the scope of the term "other emergency in international relations”. In
the present situation, many WTO Members have declared health emergency and in the
absence of a definition or explanation of the said term, a member has the freedom to
determine what constitutes "other emergency in international relations". The WTO Member
has the flexibility to define the term and to include not only military emergencies but also other
emergencies including health emergencies.
India incorporated Article 73 in its IP legislations except the Copyright Act. The provisions of
"government use” and "compulsory licence” in the Patents Act have their own limitations such
as the usage is somewhat restricted only to authorised entities, cooling period of three years,
time consuming process of granting and excess discretionary powers to the Controller of the
Patent office, making the whole process a tedious exercise which is not considered to be
relevant in an emergency situation like the current pandemic. Hence, the blanket provision to
all IPs such as the security exception would be more effective. The security exception in Article
73 of TRIPS has been incorporated in Section 157A2 of the Indian Patent Act.
Section 157A allows the Central Government to not disclose any information relating to any
patentable invention which is detrimental to the interest of security of India. The government
can also revoke any patent which it considers necessary in the interests of security of India, by
issuing a notification in the Official Gazette. The provision explains that "security of India”
includes any action necessary for the security of India which relates to (i) fissionable materials
or (ii) to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and other goods and materials
related directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment. The
explanation explains invoking the section for the security of India in the time of war. But on a
closer look at clause (b)(iii), we can see that besides war it indicates 'other emergency in
international relations' which has not been defined specifically. It is clear that 157A of the Act
empowers the central government to suspend or even revoke patents in the security interest
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of India, which includes the "other emergencies in international relation”. It is further arguable
that the scope of Section 157A does not cover situations like health emergencies and covers
only the traditional notion of security i.e. in the military context. However, as explained above,
it is clear that the concept of security has expanded over a period of time and includes issues
which pose threat to life and properties of people in a country, which do not necessarily
emanate from military or war.
[Extracted from Section 157A in Context of Covid-19 by Tushar Kohli, published on Mondaq]
21. What kind of situation is covered by the phase “other emergency in international
relations” in Article 73(b)(ii) of TRIPS?
(a) Global pandemic
(b) Military emergency
(c) (a), but not (b)
(d) (a) and (b)
22. India has incorporated Article 73 in which of the following legislations?
(p) Trade Marks Act
(q) Copyright Act

(r) Patents Act
(s) Designs Act
(t) Geographical Indications of Goods Act
(u} Plant Varities and Farmers’ Rights Act
(a) (q) and (u)
(b)(p), (q), (r), (s)
(c) (p), (s), and (t)
(d)(p), (q), and (s)
23. Mr. Paidal Kaan worked as a nuclear scientist at a government factility. He recently
discovered a new and more efficient method of performing nuclear fission reactions. He
then resigned from his job and joined Kooreshi Atomic Reaserch Pvt Ltd. Mr. Kaan filed a
court petition asking the court to order his previous employer to allow him to access and
use the new formula he discovered. He argues that the new method was a result of his
intellectual labour and thus he should have the right to utilise it. Can his previous employer
be forced to share the formula with him?

(a) Yes
(b) No
(c) Depends on Mr. Kaan
(d) Depends on the government
24. The author argues that section 157A of the Patents Act protects which of the following
situations?
(X) war
Y) global pandemic
) (X) only
)(Y) only
(X) and (Y)
d)} (Neither (X} nor (Y)
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25. Which of the following statements is incorrect?
(a) The language of Article 73(b)1 of WTO TRIPS Agreement is mirrored by Article XXII of
the WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
(b) The WTO Panel which examined Russia's invocation of Article XXI to deny the right to
transit of goods from Ukraine upheld Russia's action.
(c) The security exception in Article 73 of TRIPS has been incorporated in Section 157A2
of the Indian Patent Act.
(d) The blanket provision to all |Ps such as the security exception would be more effective,
instead of the current legal situation in India.
Passage 6
Legality of National Law Admission Test (NLAT) —
It must be remembered that the primary objective of the NLUs initially coming together
through their Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2008, further amended in 2014, was
to conduct a common entrance test as per the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Varun Bhagat v. Union of India and in furtherance of the deliberations made by the University
Grants Commission, Ministry of Human Resource and Development, Government of Indian and
the then existing NLUs. This has also been recorded by the Consortium in its own MOA. Rather,
while the Consortium of NLUs was constituted in November 2014, one of the primary reasons
for it to have registered itself in its present form as a society seems to have been to “further
streamline conduct of Common Law Admission Test”.
Therefore, we look at these documents to analyse the legality of a Consortium Member
admitting students in its law programme through a separate examination.
Bye-Law 15.3 of the MoA, which regulates the Requirement of Membership specifies in sub-
clause 15.3.3
In order that appropriate intellectual rigor may be maintained, a Member institution shall
ensure that admission to every academic course or programme of study in each Member
institution shall be based on merit assessed through a transparent and reasonable evaluation
namely CLAT operated by the Society, prior to admitting any student.
Further, the MoA notes under Clause 3(A)(v) that one of the main aims and objectives of the
society Is:
To administer, control and monitor the conducting of all India common entrance examination
for law ie. CLAT, for and on behalf of all the participating NLUs, and facilitate admission of
students into various NLUS in the country.
In furtherance of the MoA, the Bye-Laws also note that the Society (Consortium) has the
power:
3.3.3, to provide for matters connected with the admissions to the Member institutions;
3.3.6, to provide platform for admission to all National Law Universities in India through CLAT
for UG & PG Law Courses if such National Law Universities become the Members of the Society;
Rather, “CLAT” has itself been defined in the Bye-Laws under Clause 1.1.3 as the
“all India Common Law Admission Test conducted for students seeking admission to the
undergraduate or postgraduate degree programme offered by various Member institutions”.
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Therefore, it seems that the Consortium MoA does seem to imply that all admissions must be
only through CLAT as that is also a specific membership requirement. On the other hand it’s
also true that NLSIU has been given special membership status in a manner. While no
institution, including NLSIU, is a permanent member as per the Bye-Laws, the Vice-Chancellor
of NLSIU serves as the ex-officio Secretary-Treasury of the Society.
However, if attention is paid to Clause 15.7 which deals with “Voluntary withdrawal of Member
institution”, the sub-clause 15.7.3 under it does envisage not mere withdrawal but also the
possibility of a Member institution that “becomes ineligible for membership.” Even though,
the Bye-laws fail to lay out the procedure to hold a Member institution ineligible in detail, one
of the powers of the Executive Committee as per Clause 7.3.8 includes the power to “impose
or recommend sanctions upon any Member institution.”
Therefore, Clause 7.3.8 read with Clause 15.7.3 of the Bye-Laws opens the possibility of the
Executive Committee holding NLSIU to be ineligible for membership of the Consortium in light
of it having failed to meet the membership requirement under Clause 15.3.3. The lack of clarity
however seems to have also been the reason that in its Press Release, the Consortium decided
to hold a meeting to consider the necessary amendments in the Bye-Laws and MoU yesterday,
however we are still to hear any updates on the meeting’s proceedings.
[Extracted from Part |- NLAT: Can a Consortium Member have an independent test, by Bhavisha
Sharma and Dayaar Singla published in Law and Other Things]
26. How can a member bypass the consortium’s Memorandum of Association?
a) By an exemption within the Consortium
b) By withdrawing from the consortium
c) Both (a) and (b)
d)(a) only.
~~
27. What grounds do the Consortium have to hold NLSIU to be ineligible for membership?
a) Clause 15.7.3 read with Clause 15.3.3
b) Clause 15.7.3 read with Clause 7.3.8
c) Clause 15.3.3 read with Clause 7.3.8
d)Clause 7.3.8 read with Clause 15.7.3 and Clause 15.3.3
ae
28. Where does the Consortium draw its power to expel a member institution from?
a) Clause 7.3.8
b) Clause 15.7.3
c) Clause 15.3.3
d) Clause 15.7.3 read with Clause 7.3.8
—_
29. What is the primary objective of the consortium?
(a) To administer and monitor CLAT and facilitate admission of students into various
NLUS in the country.
(b) To administer, control and monitor CLAT and facilitate admission of students into
various NLUS in the country.
(c) To control and monitor CLAT and facilitate admission of students into various NLUS in
the country.
(d) To regulate, control and monitor CLAT and facilitate admission of students into
various NLUS in the country.
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30. The Consortium has power to: X — to provide for matters connected with the admissions
to the Member institutions; Y — to provide platform for admission to all National Law
Universities through CLAT.
(a) (b) only
(b) (a) only
(c) (b) and (a)
d)None of the above
Passage 7
Police vs judicial custody in the context of Rhea Chakraborty case; Sushant Kulkarni (Indian
Expresss) -
In the drugs case linked to Sushant Singh Rajput’s death, actor Rhea Chakraborty was on
Tuesday arrested by the Narcotics Control Bureau, which is the apex drugs law enforcement
agency in the country. After being produced before court she was remanded to the Judicial
Custody.
In India, the various procedures of the administration of the criminal law are governed by the
legislation called the Code of Criminal Procedure or Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). Chapter
5 of the CrPC starting from section 41 lists the legal provisions about the arrest. Arrest primarily
means putting restrictions on the movement of a person. It can be done by a police officer or
officer of investigating agency if the officer is satisfied that the arrest is necessary: to prevent
the person from committing the offence further, to prevent tampering if evidence, for proper
investigation, to prevent the person from dissuading those acquainted with facts and more.
As per the provisions, an arrested person has the right to be informed about grounds of arrest
and there is obligation on the person making the arrest, to inform about the arrest, to a
nominated person. Arrested person also has the right to meet an advocate of choice during
interrogation. The law also makes an examination by a medical practitioner mandatory after
the arrest.
The arresting authority can not detain a person in custody for more than 24 hours without
producing him or her before a magistrate as per section 57 of CrPC. The Article 22 of the
Constitution of India also has provisions for protection of a person during arrest of detention.
Whenever a person is arrested by police or investigating agency and detained in custody and
if the investigation can not be completed in 24 hours, the person is mandated to be produced
before a magistrate court.
The magistrate may further remand the person to custody of police for a period not more than
15 days as a whole. The police custody means that the person is confined at a lock up or
remains in the custody of the officer.

After lapse of 15 days or the police custody period granted by the magistrate, the person may
be further remanded to judicial custody. Judicial custody means that the person is detained
under the purview of the judicial magistrate is lodged in central or state prison.
The judicial custody can extend up to 60 or 90 days as a whole, depending upon the maximum
punishment prescribed for the offence. An undertrial person can not remain in judicial custody
beyond half the time period of prescribed maximum punishment.
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31. From your understanding of the above article, which of these statements about Judicial
Custody is false? i) Judicial Custody means that the person is held under the custody of the
Investigating Officer ii) The duration of Judicial Custody cannot exceed 15 days in total
(a) Only (i)
(b) Only (ii)
(c) Both (i) & (ii)
(d) Neither (i) & (ii)
32. Thomas is charged with slapping Peter, a crime which has a maximum punishment of 60
days. Thomas has been arrested for the same and is awaiting trial. He can be held in
Judicial Custody for up to how many days?
(a) 90 Days
(b)60 Days
(c) 30 Days
(d)15 Days
33. In the above case, suppose that the maximum punishment for Thomas’s alleged crime is
20 days. In that case, how many days can Thomas be held in Police Custody at max?
(a) 20 Days
(b) 15 Days
(c) 10 Days
(d)5 Days
34. Jake was arrested on the suspicion of stealing Rosa’s diamond necklace on Saturday
Morning. Hitchcock, the investigating officer, produced Jake before the Magistrate on
Tuesday, since Monday was a National Holiday. Is the action of Hitchcock legally justified?
(a) Yes; Since Sunday was already not a working day, and Monday was a National Holiday,
Hitchcock only need to produce Jake before the Magistrate on the next working day,
which is Tuesday
(b) No; Jake had to be produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours, ie within Sunday
(c) No; Jake had to be produced before the Magistrate within 48 hours; ie within Monday
35. Which of these rights is not available to a person who has been arrested as part of an
investigation?
(a) Right to get bail in all cases
(b) Right to meet a lawyer of their choice during interrogation
(c) Right to be examined by a Medical Practitioner
(d) Right to be Informed about the grounds of their arrest
Passage 8
California considers strict ‘George Floyd’ law to punish police who fail to intervene -
[Source (edited): Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-
29/california-considers-strict-law-for-officers-who-fail-in-duty-to-intervene]
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Outraged that Minneapolis officers stood by while their colleague killed George Floyd,
California lawmakers are considering a tough law to punish police who fail to intervene when
witnessing potential excessive force — including possible criminal charges and being banned
from law enforcement.
But the bill, authored by Assemblyman Chris Holden (D-Pasadena}, has set off a fight with law
enforcement agencies around the state who contend the rule is largely redundant but places
a criminal penalty on officers during situations that often involve split-second decisions.
Holden’s bill would make bystander officers an accessory to any crime committed by the officer
using undue force if they failed to take action. Holden said that despite current mandates and
policies that give officers a duty to intervene, his measure is needed to clarify what that action
means and how officers should be trained. It would also provide whistleblower protections to
officers who report excessive force, and prohibit a person from remaining an officer if they
were found to have used excessive force unnecessarily that resulted to great bodily injury or
death, or failed to intervene in that situation.
“There needs to be physical intervention,” he said. “There also needs to be making sure that
the body camera is on, that there is an effort to deescalate the situation.”
But law enforcement officials said the bill is unfair to officers because it doesn’t take into
account that the Floyd case, in which officers had time to react, is an anomaly. They said that
most use-of-force happens quickly, and often in chaotic situations, and that holding officers to
an inflexible duty to intervene is not practical or fair. “It’s a slippery slope because what are
you going to say, that you’ve got 30 officers in a skirmish line and one deploys a projectile and
it hits someone in the head. What are the other officers supposed to do?”, it was argued.
In the face of opposition from law enforcement, Gov. Gavin Newsom engineered a last-minute
compromise between law enforcement and reform advocates that convinced police to end the
opposition to the measure, but softened some of its language. That deal largely centered on
the definition, or lack of it, of a single word: necessary.
Police reform advocates got a clear definition that deadly force could only be used when other
options had been exhausted.
36. The Holden Bill, in its target situation, would impose criminal sanction, on
(a) Police officers who used excessive force.
(b) Police officers who did not take action when another officer used excessive
force.
(c) Both of the above.
37. Kumar Malid, a national of China, visited New York City. Under watch for suspicious
movement, the police officers approached him to make an arrest. When asked to submit,
Kumar put his dominant hand inside his coat pocket. The police officers sensing that it was
a gun that would be discharged, warned him to drop to the ground. When Kumar charged,
the officers aimed shot his leg. In this case,
(a) The action was justified as per the exhaustion of alternatives argument.
(b) The action was not justified as per the exhaustion of alternatives argument.
(c) The action was not justified as the officers should have conveyed a final
warning.
(d) The action was justified as the officers gave Kumar an extra chance.
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38. After the shot was made, Kumar was decapitated and was unable to move. One officer, X,
arrested him. Another officer, C, took him to the police van to take him to the hospital.
Outside the view of X, C shot Kumar in his shoulder and abdomen to prevent any trouble
from Kumar during the journey. Kumar passed away before the hospital was reached. In
this case,
(a) Cis liable.
(b) X is liable.
(c) Neither C nor X is liable.
(d) Both C and X are liable.
39. If officer X had shot Kumar at the first instance his movement was considered suspicious,
and after signalling to the other officer, C, that he was going to make the shot, the
sanction, as per the passage, would be on
(a)X
(b) Cc
(c) Both X and C
(d) Neither X nor C
AO. If X had seen that C did this, and later reported him, under the Bill, X would be
(a) Protected as a whistle-blower.
(b) Facing social consequences in the form of a social boycott.
(c) Suspended for reporting his fellow officer.
(d) Placed under the protection of the police.
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Passage 1
1. (c); A non-bailable offence means bail is granted to the accused at the discretion of the
court, and not as a matter of right. Therefore, there is no absolute bar from obtaining a
bail even in Non-Bailable cases.
2. (b); One of the essential ingredients to prove a charge of abetment to suicide is the
intention of the accused to abet the suicide. Multiple rulings of the Supreme Court,
including a 2002 ruling in the case of ‘Sanjay Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh’, have held
that a comment or a statement uttered in haste, anger would not amount to abetment of
suicide. The excerpt does not speak of any requirement of special knowledge so as to make
option (c) correct.
3. (c); Abetment to Suicide is non-compoundable in nature. Anon-compoundable offence is
one in which the case cannot be withdrawn by the complainant even when the
complainant and the accused have reached a compromise. The court cannot allow
withdrawal of a case involving a non-compoundable offence, and every such complaint is
necessarily followed by a trial where evidence is held against the accused.

4. (b); The author argues that if the deceased person is found to be very sensitive compared
to a reasonable person, the court has said that the charge of abetment to suicide would
weaken. However, this does not mean that the accused will automatically be acquitted in
every case where the deceased has a sensitive nature. The author does not say anything
about special knowledge of the accused about the deceased person’s sensitivity. So, the
answer cannot be (c) too.
5. (d); Abetment of suicide is a serious offence that is tried in a Sessions court.
Passage 2
6. (b); The author mentions Yudin’s statement to argue that the point of the election was a
farce because the referendum had no legal power.
7. (c); The author mentions options (a), (b), and (d) only to further the point that there was
a legitimate non-legal purpose behind the process, and that it was critical for the
legitimacy of the decisions already taken.
8. (a); The author mentions that the referendum would “gate-crash” Presidential term limits
set since 1993. This implies that the referendum would replace a Constitutional
convention with a new rule.
9. (d); Options (a), (b), and (c) are what the author indicates, where option (d) is what the
author does not refer to, in light of the support for the amendment.
10. (c); The author refers to the use of cultural symbolism to indicate the deception of the
people through the binary of having to choose whether to codify Russian sacrifices into
the Constitution or not. This indicates the use of culture as a weapon for the agenda of
the government.
Passage 3
11. (d); Reason: A guarantee is a tripartite contract and consists of three contracts — the first,
between the creditor and the debtor, the second, between the surety and the creditor
and a third contract by which the principal debtor expressly or impliedly requests the
surety to act as surety. If the third contract is missing, it becomes a contract of indemnity.
This was clarified in the Kerala High Court in the case of Bank of India v. G. Govinda Prabhu
(1964).
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12. (d); Reason: A guarantor has the right of subrogation, i.e. ability to recover from the debtor
any amount paid to the creditor (§140, Indian Contract Act, 1872), but the indemnifier has
no such right.
13. (b); Reason: Consideration is essential for a valid contract.
14. (a); Reason: The contract of guarantee presupposes the existence of separate liability of
the principal debtor and the surety’s liability thus becomes secondary
15. (a); Reason: Trigger event for indemnity is loss caused and trigger event for indemnity is
default. Therefore indemnity protects debtor and guarantee protects creditor.
Passage 4
16. (c); The Hindu Succession Act applies to ancestral property and to intestate succession in
personal property — where succession happens as per law and not through a will.
17. (a); As per the 3-Judge bench decision of the SC, “since the coparcenary is by birth, it is
not necessary that the father coparcener should be living as on 9.9.2005.” Therefore, the
conclusion in (b) and the reasoning in (c) are faulty.

18. (a); The Hindu Succession Act of 1956 codifies the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law
19. (c); The Hindu Succession Act is applicable to anyone who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi,
or Jew by religion. Although the article says that Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains and followers of
Arya Samaj, Brahmo Samaj are also considered Hindus for the purposes of the Act, this list
is notin the form of an exhaustive list.
20. (c); As per the ruling of the SC, a Hindu woman’s right to be a joint heir to the ancestral
property is by birth and does not depend on whether her father was alive or not when the
law was enacted in 2005. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 gave Hindu
women the right to be coparceners or joint legal heirs in the same way a male heir does.
“Since the coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that the father coparcener should be
living as on 9.9.2005”.
Passage 5
21. (d); Reason: The WTO Member has the flexibility to define the term and to include not
only military emergencies but also other emergencies including health emergencies.
22. (c); Reason: India incorporated Article 73 in its IP legislations except the Copyright Act.
23. (d); Reason: Section 157A of the Patents Act allows the Central Government to not disclose
any information relating to any patentable invention which is detrimental to the interest
of security of India.
24. (c); Reason: But on a closer look at clause (b)(iii), we can see that besides war it indicates
‘other emergency in international relations' which has not been defined specifically ... the
concept of security has expanded over a period of time and includes issues which pose
threat to life and properties of people in a country, which do not necessarily emanate from
military or war.
25. (a); Reason: Article XXI, not Article XXII.
Passage 6
26. (c); Reason: The only option for a member institution to bypass the same seems to be
either an exemption within the Consortium or to withdraw from Consortium’s
membership.
27. (b); Reason: Clause 7.3.8 read with Clause 15.7.3 of the Bye-Laws opens the possibility of
the Executive Committee holding NLSIU to be ineligible for membership of the Consortium
in light of it having failed to meet the membership requirement under Clause 15.3.3.
28. (a); Reason: Even though, the Bye-laws fail to lay out the procedure to hold a Member
institution ineligible in detail, one of the powers of the Executive Committee as per Clause
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7.3.8 includes the power to “impose or recommend sanctions upon any Member
institution.
29. (b); Reason: the MoA notes under Clause 3(A)(v) that one of the main aims and objectives
of the society is: To administer, control and monitor the conducting of all India common
entrance examination for law ie. CLAT, for and on behalf of all the participating NLUs, and
facilitate admission of students into various NLUS in the country.
30. (c); Reason: In furtherance of the MoA, the Bye-Laws also note that the Society
(Consortium) has the power: 3.3.3. to provide for matters connected with the admissions
to the Member institutions; 3.3.6. to provide platform for admission to all National Law
Universities in India through CLAT for UG & PG Law Courses if such National Law
Universities become the Members of the Society;
Passage 7
31. (c); Judicial custody means that the person is detained under the purview of the judicial
magistrate, not the Investigation Officer. The judicial custody can extend up to 60 or 90
days as a whole, depending upon the maximum punishment prescribed for the offence.
32. (c); An undertrial person can not remain in judicial custody beyond half the time period of
prescribed maximum punishment.
33. (b); The magistrate can only remand the person to custody of police for a period not more
than 15 days as a whole. No qualifications similar to that of Judicial Custody is mentioned
in this Article in case of Police Custody
34. (b); Whenever a person is arrested by police or investigating agency and detained in
custody and if the investigation can not be completed in 24 hours, the person is mandated
to be produced before a magistrate court.
35. (a); As per the provisions of CrPC, an arrested person has the right to be informed about
grounds of arrest and there is obligation on the person making the arrest, to inform about
the arrest, toa nominated person. Arrested person also has the right to meet an advocate
of choice during interrogation. The law also makes an examination by a medical
practitioner mandatory after the arrest. The Right to Bail exists only in case of bailable
offences. In cases of non-bailable offences, bail is upon the discretion of the Court.
Passage 8
36. (c); The passage mentions that the Bill would seek to sanction officers who used excessive
force and officers who stood by as excessive force was being used.
37. (a); As per the exhaustion of alternatives argument, force could be used only when no
other alternatives existed. In this case, the alternative was exhausted when Kumar was
directed to drop to the ground. In the scenario when Kumar charged at them, force to
prevent the charge from continuing was not excessive. Option (d) is inapplicable because
it is not grounded in a principle, unlike option (a).
38. (a); C used excessive force when none was necessary. As per the passage, it would
attract
39. (c); As per the Bill, excessive force by an officer would attract sanction, and lack of action
to prevent excessive force would also attract sanction. In this case, force was excessive in
the face of lack of danger or warning. As C did not stop X after X mentioned that he would
shoot Kumar, C is also liable to be sanctioned.
40. (a); The Bill would protect officers who would report excessive force. Hence, X would be
protected under the Bill as a whistleblower.
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Passage1
SC verdict on adultery welcomed by lawyers, activists (Economic Times) -
The Supreme Court verdict declaring that adultery is not a crime received was widely
welcomed with several lawyers and activists saying it was an antiquated colonial era law that
treated women as properties of their husbands.
A five-judge Constitution bench headed by Chief Justice Dipak Misra was unanimous in striking
down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code dealing with the offence of adultery, holding it
manifestly arbitrary, archaic and violative of the rights to equality and equal opportunity to
women.
Senior Supreme Court lawyer Prashant Bhushan termed the verdict a fine judgement that did
away with an "antiquated" law.
"Another fine judgement by the SC striking down the antiquated law in Sec 497 of Penal code,
which treats women as property of husbands & criminalises adultery (only of man who sleeps
with someone's wife). Adultery can be ground for divorce but not criminal," Bhushan said on
Twitter.
Congress MP and president of women's wing of the party Sushmita Dev agreed with him.
"Excellent decision to de-criminalise adultery. Also a law that does not give women the right to
sue her adulterer husband & can't be herself sued if she is in adultery is unequal treatment &
militates against her status as an individual separate entity,” she tweeted.
The National Commission of Women chief Rekha Sharma, too, welcomed the judgement and
said it should have been removed long time ago.
"This is a law from the British era, although British had done away with it long back, we were
still stuck with it,” she said.
According to social activist Ranjana Kumari, "patriarchal control" over women was
unacceptable.
"We welcome the judgement by the SC striking down the 158yr old law based on Victorian
values, in Sec 497 of Penal code, which treats women as property of husbands & criminalises
adultery. Patriarchal control over women's body unacceptable,” she tweeted.
While adultery should not be a criminal offence, the bench held that adultery should continue
to be treated as civil wrong, and can be grounds for dissolution of marriage or divorce. There
can't be any social licence which destroys a home, Justice Misra said.
Section 497 of the 158-year-old IPC says: "Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who
is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the
consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of
rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery."
The offence of adultery entailed a maximum punishment of five years, or with fine, or both.
1. Jim and Pam have been married for 5 years. One day, Jim was shocked to find Pam having
sexual intercourse with his best friend Dwight. In light of the recent Supreme Court
decision on Adultery, what possible legal remedies do you think Jim would have?
(a) File a Criminal Case against Pam and Dwight for the criminal offense of Adultery
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(b) File for Divorce under the grounds of Adultery
(c) File a Criminal Case against Pam for the criminal offense of cheating
2. If we suppose that the Supreme Court had not given its decision on Adultery Laws, Jim
would be able to file a criminal case against
(a) Only Dwight
(b) Only Pam
(c) Both Dwight and Pam
(d) Neither Dwight and Pam
3. In the above case, Pam was shocked to find that Jim was also cheating on her by having
sexual intercourse with a woman named Erin. If we suppose that the Supreme Court had
not given its decision on Adultery Laws, can Jim be held liable for Adultery?
(a) Yes; Him had sexual intercourse with a woman who was not his wife and that amounts
to Adultery as per section 497 of IPC
(b) No; Jim was distraught about his failing marriage and therefore, did not have the
intention to commit adultery

(c) Yes; However, Pam should forgive Jim considering the circumstances
4. Which of the following reasons were used by the Supreme Court while striking down
section 497, as per the above passage?
(i) Section 497 violates an individual’s Right to Privacy
(ii) Section 497 is Manifestly Arbitrary
(iii) Section 497 violates the Rights to Equality
(a) Only (i) & (ii)
(b) Only (ii) & (iii)
(c) Only (i) & (iii)
(c)AIl (i), (ii), & (iii)
5. Ted is married to Tracy and Marshall is married to Lily. If Ted engages in an act of sexual
intercourse with Lily, who would have the right to sue Ted for the crime of Adultery, given
that the Supreme Court has not decriminalized section 497 of IPC?
(a) Only Tracy
(b) Only Marshall
(c) Both Tracy & Marshall
(d) Neither Tracy nor Marshall

Passage 2
How Patanjali’s Magic Didn’t Work on COVID -.
(Source: Livemint, https://Awww.livemint.com/news/india/how-patanjali-s-magic-didn-t-work-
on-covid-11593527233719.html)
23 June, witnessed a big, chest-thumping event at Patanjali Yogpeeth in Haridwar, one of
India’s largest yoga institutes. Baba Ramdev, the founder of Patanjali, chanted mantras as he
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launched Coronil and Swasari Vati as a “cure” for coronavirus. “| am proud to announce that
corona’s first Ayurvedic clinically-controlled trial based, evidence-based, research-based
medicine is ready," he said animatedly to applause. “Our Ayurvedic treatment is not only (for)
control, it is cure. We are proud to say that there is a 100% recovery rate in seven days and 0%
death."
Besides exaggerated claims, Patanjali’s conduct could have fallen short of both legal and ethical
boundaries. The company picked speed over scientific rigour, fueling doubts on the quality of
its clinical trials. In its application of clinical trial with the Clinical Trials Registry of India (CTRI),
the company declared that its first patient was enrolled on 29 May. The estimated duration of
trial mentioned two months but by 23 June, Patanjali was ready with the medicine, its
packaging and marketing plans.
“Purely from a process point of view, it (the Patanjali claim) makes a mockery of drug regulation
in India. | don’t understand what is the point of having the Drugs and Magic Remedies
(Objectionable Advertisements) Act, which provides for criminal prosecution,” Dinesh S.
Thakur, a public health activist and an expert in drug regulation, said. “In this case, there is a
clear violation of the law because the company went on television and said they have a 100%
cure for covid-19. Ramdev didn’t say he had promising early stage results,” he added.
Perhaps Ramdev wanted to be first off, the block in a race that would have meant significant
windfall for Patanjali—the earliest results from other Ayurveda trials are not expected before
mid-July. Patanjali is struggling with market share losses in many FMCG product categories and
a magic COVID drug was just the panacea the company’s business needed.
Patanjali chose to partner the National Institute of Medical Sciences and Research (NIMS),
which is part of the university, for its clinical trial. NIMS is an allopathic institute and the
principal and co-investigators are both allopathic doctors without expertise in Ayurveda
medicine. Here, since it’s a Ayurvedic study being conducted by an allopathic institution, one
or more of the investigators themselves should have been Ayurveda experts.
Guidelines for clinical trials by Indian Council of Medical Research and Ministry of Ayush make
it mandatory for an ethics committee to probe possible conflicts of interest when academic
institutions conduct research along with companies. It was not clear whether the review was
conducted or what were the findings. Patanjali never shared the protocol of the trial nor did it
share its findings through a peer-reviewed journal article.
The controversy has brought to the fore yet again the tensions between evidence-based
medicine and other forms of treatment, be it Ayurveda, Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha or
Homoeopathy. Public health experts, therefore, are asking that India’s ministry of Ayush create
a regulatory pathway to evaluate and approve traditional Indian therapeutics because clinical
trials aren’t designed to understand or prove conclusively how traditional drugs work.
6. After seeing the public response for Coronil, Mr Talkrishna of Tabur Ayurveda launched a
medicine claiming it to be a COVID vaccine. His claim was not based on any scientific or
clinical trial. Under which of the following legislations can he be held liable according to
the passage?
(a) Disaster Management Act
(b) Clinical Trials Registry of India Act, 1972
(c) Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act
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7. “The controversy has brought to the fore yet again the tensions between evidence-based
medicine and other forms of treatment”. What does this statement in the passage signify?
(a) There is no regulation whatsoever on the trial and research of medicines other than
allopathy.
(b) The scepticism regarding traditional Indian methods of therapy is an ongoing debate
and has been brought to light once again after the Patanjali fiasco.
(c) BothA&B
8. Which of the following actions of Patanjali, according to the passage, raise suspicion over
the clinical trials of Coronil and Swasari Vati?
(a) Both the investigators are allopathic experts without any expertise in Ayurveda.
(b) No information regarding the trial and method of such trial is available in public
domain, as per the protocol.
(c) Patanjali did not adhere to the estimated duration of trials.
(d)All of the above

9. According to the passage what is the reason behind such a fraudulent claim made by
Patanjali regarding the medicine of COVID?
(a) Patanjali wants to get the first mover benefit in the medicine of COVID.
(b) Ramdev claims that Ayurveda medicine can cure 100% people and he want to save
lives.
(c) Patanjali is struggling with market share losses in many FMCG product categories and
the COVID drug was an attempt to give a push to their business.
(d) All of the above
10. Mr Khambani, the richest businessman in country, owns a pharmaceutical company and
many academic institutes as well. For developing a COVID vaccine, he asked his academic
institutions to collaborate with the pharmaceutical company and conducted the research.
Very soon his company plans to release a vaccine which they claim to be 100% safe in
clinical trials. Is there any regulation that has been violated in the process?
(a) Yes, they have publicised the claim of releasing a vaccine beforehand which is
punishable under the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act
(b) Yes, the mandatory ethics committee probe to ensure there was no conflict of interest
was not complied with.
(c) No, the pandemic situation demands discovery of a vaccine at the earliest and hence
Mr Khambani is doing it in good faith.
(d)No conclusion can be reached
Passage 3
Explained: What labor law changes by states mean -.
(Source: The Indian Express, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/what-labour-law-
changes-mean-coronavirus-6403611/)
As the economy struggles with the lockdown, and thousands of firms and workers stare at an
uncertain future, some state governments last week decided to make significant changes in
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the application of labour laws. The most significant changes were announced by three BJP-
ruled states- UP, MP and Gujarat — but several other states, ruled by the Congress (Rajasthan
and Punjab) as well as BJD-ruled Odisha, too made some changes, although smaller in scope.
UP, the most populous state, has made the boldest changes as it summarily suspended the
application of almost all labour laws in the state for the next three years.
On the face of it, these changes are being brought about to incentivise economic activity in the
respective states. Keeping aside the questions of law — labour falls in the Concurrent List and
there are many laws enacted by the Centre that a state cannot just brush aside — the key
question is: Are these the long-pending reforms of the labour market that economists used to
talk about, or is the suspension of labour laws an ill-timed and retrograde step that critics have
made it out to be?
Estimates vary but there are over 200 state laws and close to 50 central laws. And yet there is
no set definition of “labour laws” in the country.
The main objectives of the Factories Act, for instance, are to ensure safety measures on factory
premises, and promote health and welfare of workers. The Shops and Commercial
Establishments Act, on the other hand, aims to regulate hours of work, payment, overtime,
weekly day off with pay, other holidays with pay, annual leave, employment of children and
young persons, and employment of women.

The Minimum Wages Act covers more workers than any other labour legislation. The most
contentious labour law, however, is the /ndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 as it relates to terms of
service such as layoff, retrenchment, and closure of industrial enterprises and strikes and
lockouts.
Theoretically, it is possible to generate more employment in a market with fewer labour
regulations. However, as the experience of states that have relaxed labour laws in the past
suggests, dismantling worker protection laws have failed to attract investments and increase
employment, while not causing any increase in worker exploitation or deterioration of working
conditions.
Ravi Srivastava, Director, Centre for Employment Studies at the Institute of Human
Development, said employment will not increase, because of several reasons.
First, there is already too much unused capacity. Firms are shaving off salaries up to 40% and
making job cuts. The overall demand has fallen. Which firm will hire more employees right
now, he asked.
Kaur said that if the intention was to ensure more people have jobs, then states should not
have increased the shift duration from 8 hours to 12 hours. They should have allowed two
shifts of 8-hours each instead, she said, so that more people can get a job.
Both Srivastava and Kapoor said this move and the resulting fall in wages will further depress
the overall demand in the economy, thus hurting the recovery process. “The timing is all
wrong,” said Kapoor. “We are moving in the exact opposite direction,” said Srivastava.
11. In the passage, the author states that there is no set definition of “labour laws” in the
country. What is the reason behind this according to the author?
(a) The government does not want to define labour laws as it will hamper developmental
works.
(b) Defining labour laws will grant more rights to the workers, thereby making it difficult
to make them work according to the needs of industries.
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(c) Since the labour laws fall under the concurrent list, there has been confusion between
central and state governments in defining the term.
12. Which of the following statement/s suggest that the amendments of labour laws will not
achieve the desired results?
(a) The experience of states that have relaxed labour laws in the past suggests,
dismantling worker protection laws have failed to attract investments and increase
employment.
(ob) There is already too much unused capacity. Firms are shaving off salaries up to 40%
and making job cuts. The overall demand has fallen.
(c) All of the above.
13. “Overtime” is covered under which of the following labour laws?
(a) Industrial Disputes Act.
(b) Factories Act.

(c) The Shops and Commercial Establishments Act.
(d)The Payment of Bonus Act.
14. Kaur states that the increase in timing would have led to increased employment if what
was done?
(a) The number of shifts were increased to two.
b) More people were given incentives to work from home.
(c) More people were administered disincentives of penalties in case of unemployment.
(d)States should have increased the number of workers per shift.
15. “UP, the most populous state, has made the boldest changes as it summarily suspended
the application of almost all labour laws in the state for the next three years.” What does
this line from the passage signify?
(a) Economy of UP has been worst affected in the lockdown and hence stringent
measures have been taken.
(b) UP government was looking for opportunity to alter the existing labour laws.
(c) Both (a) and (b).
Passage 4
Nomination of Former CJI Ranjan Gogoi to Rajya Sabha: A tale of Probity and Prejudice
(Source: Bar and Bench, https://www.barandbench.com/columns/nomination-of-former-cji-
rajan-gogoi-to-rajya-sabha-a-tale-of-probity-and-prejudice)
The nomination of the former Chief Justice of India, Mr. Ranjan Gogoi, as a member of Rajya
Sabha has led to a controversy mainly centring around two facets; namely (i) denigration of
the independence of judiciary and its reputation and (ii) compromising the principle of
separation of powers amongst the three organs of the State.
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That apart, nomination of Justice Gogoi is also questioned on personal grounds of favouritism
etc. This write up is intended to headlight on the two facets set out above from the legal and
constitutional perceptive and historical paradigm.
The role of the Rajya Sabha as a body was one of the points for discussion. In this respect, Shri
Gopalaswami Ayyangar observed:
“.. The most that we expect the Second Chamber to do is perhaps to hold dignified debates on
important issues and to delay legislation which might be the outcome of passions of the
moment until the passions have subsided and calm consideration could be bestowed on the
measures which will be before the Legislature... we also give an opportunity, perhaps to
seasoned people who may not be in the thickest of political fray, but who might be willing to
participate in the debate with an amount of learning and importance which we do not
ordinarily associate with a House of the People...”
It is in this background that Article 80 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (“the
Constitution”) postulates the nomination of 12 members by the President of India to the
Council of States (Rajya Sabha) and those persons under Article 80(3) of the Constitution are
to be persons having special knowledge or practical experience in respect of such matters as
the following, namely; literature, science, art and social service.

It cannot be disputed that a former Chief Justice of India who has been a judge for about 15
years fits the description eminently.
These are but some of the instances wherein former Chief Justices/Justices have accepted a
government post almost immediately after their retirement from the Bench.
In fact, several laws of the Country (India) provide for appointment to several positions, being
a judge or a chief justice of a Higher Court as one of qualifications. Therefore, to say that a
mere acceptance of a post retirement position by a former judge of a Superior Court is
denigration of independent judiciary, is against the mandate of the law and the Constitution.
The only prohibition postulated by the Constitution against retired judges are those contained
in Article 124 (7) vis-a-vis a judge of the Supreme Court and Article 220 vis-a-vis a permanent
judge of the High Court.
There have been no allegations with respect to these appointments, despite the fact that they
were also occupying the same position as Justice Gogoi, i.e., being a member of the Supreme
Court.
16. Which amongst the following is not one of fields considered for the nomination to Rajya
Sabha?
(a) Literature
(b)Art & Science
(c) Journalism
(d) Social Service

17. Mr Suresh Mishra was a District & Sessions Judge for 13 years and during his tenure he
was known for timely disposal of cases. After his retirement, the state government
appointed him to the State Human Rights Commission. Which of the following Articles of
the Indian Constitution prohibits the District & Sessions Judge to accept any post after
retirement?
(a) Article 124
(b) Article 220
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(c) Article 80
18. Which of the following statements is not true regarding post retirement appointments of
Judges of the Supreme court and High court in India
(a) There has not been any Chief Justice of India, before Ranjan Gogoi, who has accepted
any post retirement appointment.
(b) Any post retirement appointment is prohibited by the Constitution of India to secure
the independence and integrity of the judiciary.
19. Which amongst the following issues is at the core of the controversy surrounding Justice
Gogoi’s nomination to Rajya Sabha?
(a) Independence and reputation of judiciary
(b) Separation of powers among different organs of the state

(c) Insufficient information
(d) Both (a) and (b).
20. Which of the following is the main role of Rajya Sabha, according to Shri Ayyangar, as
mentioned in the passage?
(a) Provide opportunity to the marginalised section of the society in law making process.
(b) Hold dignified debates on important issues
(c) Provide assistance in drafting of major legislations which the Lok Sabha alone cannot
do
(d) Both (a) and (c).
Passage 5
International Law and the Rights of Palestinian People - .
(Source: Peace and Justice Center, https://www.pjcvt.org/international-law-and-the-rights-of-
palestinian-people/)
Despite the Geneva Conventions and UN Security Council Resolutions, the Israeli government
blatantly ignores international law in dealing with Palestinian people. Inthe prolonged military
occupation and colonization of Palestinian territories, Palestinian people have experienced
egregious assaults on their lives on a daily basis. Actions that that were outlawed after or
before WWII have become normal: civilians are subject to extra-judicial killings, collective
punishment (curfews and home and infrastructure demolitions), night-time home invasions,
arrests of children, torture and detention without trial. Travel restrictions and checkpoints cut
people off from their livelihoods, medical care, their friends and relatives. After withdrawing
its military and illegally settled civilians from Gaza, Israel (along with Egypt) instigated a land,
air and sea blockade. Civilians, including women and children along with medics and journalists
have been shot by Israeli snipers when they approached the border fence in an attempt to
exercise their legal right to return to their original homes.
The powerful Likud party in Israel upholds the right to Jewish settlement, ignoring the fact that
civilian settlement of occupied territory is specifically prohibited by the 4°° Geneva Convention.
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Likud rejects the idea of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River. What was Palestine has
become an Apartheid state because of expansive Zionism.
Rather than addressing these human rights abuses, international aid programs for Palestinians
frequently just serve to normalize and provide cover for them and to excuse Israel of its legal
obligations as an occupying power. The UN has made substantial efforts on behalf of
Palestinian people. Following the 1948 partitioning of Palestine, the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency was established by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 to carry
out direct relief and works programs for hundreds of thousands of Palestine refugees. UNWRA
has become the longest lasting relief agency because Israel refuses to allow Palestinian
refugees to return to land it controls. Israel refuses to accept UN Resolution 194 which insisted
that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should
be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid
for the property of those choosing not to return.
Unenforced resolutions highlight the powerlessness of the UN to resolve the fundamental
problems. Most notably, the legally binding UN Security Council Resolution 242 was
unanimously approved in November 1967 in an effort to deal with the humanitarian
consequences of the ‘six-day’ war in which Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan and
the Sinai Peninsula.

21. The central argument of the author in this passage is that
(a) International Law has failed to deal with the issue of Israel and Palestine by covering
and excusing Israel from its obligations.
(b) The resolutions of United Nations are not enforced against Israel because it is a super
power.
(c) The Likud Party of Israel does not accept the authority of International Law and only
respects Zionism.
22. “The powerful Likud party in Israel upholds the right to Jewish settlement”. What does this
line from the passage signify?
(a) The Likud party is engaged in xenophobia.
(b) The Likud party uses all its resources to supress any other settlement on the Israeli
land especially the Palestinian people.
(c) The Likud party endorses the settlement of Jewish people on the occupied land by
ignoring the UN conventions and rejecting the state of Palestine.

23. Which of the following UN Resolutions grant the right to refugees to return to their
homes?
(a) Resolution 302.
(b) Resolution 194.
(c) Resolution 242.
(d) Resolution 171.
24. What does UNRWA in the passage refer to, and which resolution created it?
(a) United Nations Relief and Works Agency, Resolution 302.
(b) United Nations Refugee Welfare Association, Resolution 194.
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(c) United Nations Refugee Welfare Agency, Resolution 194.
(d) United Nations Relief Work Association, Resolution 302.
25. Which of the following areas was not occupied by Israel after the “six-day” war according
to the passage?
(a) West Bank
(b) Gaza
(c) Golan & Sinai
(d) Western Jerusalem
Passage 6
Universal Health Coverage in India: Progress achieved & the way forward -.
(Source: The National Center for Biotechnology Information,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6057252/)
The theme of this year's World Health Day is ‘Universal Health Coverage (UHC): everyone,
everywhere’. The ultimate goal of UHC is to ensure that everyone, everywhere, should have
access to essential healthcare services without facing financial hardship. Progressive realization
of UHC is also one of the key features of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.
India's commitment towards achieving UHC is clearly reflected in policies and institutional
mechanism, which are directed towards increasing coverage and access to health services.
India has launched Ayushman Bharat - one of the most ambitious health missions ever to
achieve UHC. Ayushman Bharat encompasses two complementary schemes, Health and
Wellness Centres and National Health Protection Scheme. Health and Wellness Centres are
envisioned as a foundation of the health system to provide comprehensive primary care, free
essential drugs and diagnostic services, whereas National Health Protection Scheme is
envisaged to provide financial risk protection to poor and vulnerable families arising out of
secondary and tertiary care hospitalization to the tune of five lakh rupees per family per year.
Indeed, the dream of achieving UHC or health for all has been a long-standing one for India.
India has supported the idea of health for all since independence, and the Bhore committee
report had recommended a publicly financed national health services and system for
comprehensive preventive and curative care for all, way back in 1946.
The World Health Organization (WHO) has identified four key financing strategies to achieve
UHC - increasing taxation efficiency, increasing government budgets for health, innovation in
financing for health and increasing development assistance for health. Unfortunately, all of
these measures fall beyond the control of Ministries of Health (MOH) and less likely to be
influenced by their efforts alone. The MOH need to be more assertive in their demands for
health budget and should use evidence-driven investment case scenarios to justify higher
budgetary allocations. Evidence suggests that tax revenue is a key determinant in progress
towards UHC in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). To generate an additional $9.86
public health spending per capita, the tax revenue needs to increase by $100 per-capita. Not
only financing and institutionalization are critical for achieving UHC, but also measuring
progress towards UHC is equally important. The three core dimensions of UHC proposed by
the WHO are “the proportion of a population covered by existing healthcare systems, the range
of healthcare services available to a population, and the extent of financial risk protection
available to local populations”. An analysis of South Asian countries reported that access to
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basic care varied substantially within and across each country. In India, financial risk protection
was only 17.9 per cent and prevention and treatment coverage for selected health conditions
was 83.5 per cent. The study also raised equity concerns, highlighting that access to care for
maternal and child health services was higher among rich as compared to poor mothers.
26. Which of the following statements according to the passage is not true regarding the
Universal Health Coverage?
(a) UHC is one of the components of the United Nations sustainable development
program.
(b) Indian approach in achieving UHC has not been up to the mark lately.
(c) Bhore committee recommendations regarding public financing of National Health
facilities has already been implemented in India.
(d)(b) and (c).
27. Which of the following schemes is not encompassed under the Ayushman Bharat
scheme?
(a) To provide comprehensive primary care, free essential drugs and diagnostic services.
(b) Providing free vaccination to children up to the age of 6 years from deadly diseases.
(c) To provide financial risk protection to poor and vulnerable families arising out of
hospitalization to the extent of five lakh rupees per family per year.
(d) Both (a) and (c).
28. Which of the following does not fall under three core dimensions of UHC proposed by the
WHO?
(a) Proportion of a population covered by existing healthcare systems.
(b) Innovation in financing for health and increasing development assistance for health.
(c) Range of healthcare services available to a population.
29. Which of the following issues were identified in India under the report of varying access
to basic care in different countries?
(a) Lower financial risk protection.
(b) Lack of parity in access to care for maternal and child health services among rich and
poor.
30. Tubanda, a recently recognised state has shown its commitment towards achieving UHC.
Which of the following according to the passage are critical components that the Tubanda
administration must keep in mind for achieving UHC?

(a) Financing & Institutionalisation.
(b) Measuring progress.
(c) Neither (a) nor (b).
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Passage 7
What are the key changes in the Environment Impact Assessment Notification 2020? -
[Source: The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/the-hindu-
explains-what-are-the-key-changes-in-the-environment-impact-assessment-notification-
2020/article32249807.ece]
The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change has published the draft Environment
Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification 2020, with the intention of replacing the existing EIA
Notification, 2006 under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. The government wants to
incorporate modifications made to the regulations through amendments in the interim period.
An EIA makes a scientific estimate of the likely impacts of a project, such as a mine, irrigation
dam, industrial unit or waste treatment plant. There is also a provision for public consultation
in the rules, including a public hearing at which the local community and interested persons
can give opinions and raise objections, based on the draft EIA report prepared by experts for
the project.
A list of projects has been included under Category B2, expressly exempted from the
requirement of an EIA. The projects under this category include offshore and onshore oil, gas
and shale exploration, hydroelectric projects up to 25 MW, irrigation projects between 2,000
and 10,000 hectares of command area, small and medium mineral beneficiation units, small
foundries involving furnace units, some categories of re-rolling mills, small and medium
cement plants, small clinker grinding units, acids other than phosphoric or ammonia, sulphuric
acid, micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in dye and dye intermediates, bulk drugs,
synthetic rubbers, medium-sized paint units, all inland waterway projects, expansion or
widening of highways between 25 km and 100 km with defined parameters, aerial ropeways
in ecologically sensitive areas, and specified building construction and area development
projects.
The projects in this list were identified on the basis of screening by Expert Appraisal
Committees, rather than being exempted through listing in the Schedule. Also, coal and non-
coal mineral prospecting and solar photovoltaic projects do not need prior environmental
clearance or permission in the new scheme.
The EIA Notification 2020 excludes reporting by the public of violations and non-compliance.
Instead, the government will take cognisance of reports only from the violator-promoter,
government authority, Appraisal Committee or Regulatory Authority. Such projects can then
be approved with conditions, including remediation of ecological damage, which, again, will be
assessed and reported by the violator (and not an unconnected agency), although Central
Pollution Control Board guidelines must be used.
EIA rules must meet the requirements of the precautionary principle of avoiding harm, and
intergenerational equity. The European Union, as an evolving example, has modified its
processes in accordance with the Aarhus Convention, 1998, which stipulates that
environmental rights and human rights are linked, the present generation owes an obligation
to future generations, sustainable development can be achieved only through the involvement
of all stakeholders, government accountability and environmental protection are connected,
and interactions between the public and public authorities must take place in a democratic
context.
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31. Raj is an entrepreneur who wants to set up a clinker grinder unit (small). His legal advisor
mentions that he should seek an EIA to get the regulatory permission. Based on the
passage, this advice will be
(a) Correct
(b) Incorrect
(c) Partially correct
32. Karishma wanted to set up a recreation company which would operate in Krishnapur. A
recreational activity that she ideated needed aerial ropeways to be made. She spent
money out of her own pocket, and built aerial ropeways. However, she came to know later
that Krishnapur was an ecologically sensitive area since 2018. Her legal advisor mentioned
that she should report the violation as she did not have the EIA done and pay the fine. The
legal advice is
(a) Correct
(b) Incorrect
(c) Environmentally conscious
(d) Does not acknowledge business considerations.
33. Before EIA Notification 2020, would she have been required to have an assessment of the
project done to determine whether an EIA was necessary?

(a) No
(b) Yes
34. Urmila started a hydroelectric project of 35 MW, and operated for years, without having
conducted an EIA. Nischay, a public-spirited individual, is a stakeholder as he lives very
close to the project. He alleged that the project could not operate without an EIA. He
approached the appropriate forum to complain. The forum admitted his complaint. Urmila
said that Nischay had no standing to file the complaint. This assertion is
(a) Justified
(b) Unjustified
(c) Partially unjustified
35. If the author argues that EIA rules must comply with the Aarhus Convention, 1998, then,
with respect to the previous question, and as per the passage, does the EIA Notification
2020 satisfy its principles?
(a) Yes
(b) Only partly respected
(c) No
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Passage 8
Why are the Agriculture Bills being opposed (The Hindu) -
Three Bills on agriculture reforms — The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion
and Facilitation) Bill, 2020; The Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement of Price
Assurance and Farm Services Bill, 2020 and The Essential Commodities (Amendment) Bill, 2020
— were introduced in the Parliament on September 14 to replace the ordinances issued during
the lockdown.
Farmers and farmer associations across the country have protested against the ordinances.
The tractor protest by farmers of Punjab and Haryana in July was in opposition to these. The
Punjab Assembly on August 28 passed a resolution rejecting the Centre’s ordinances.
Since agriculture and markets are State subjects — entry 14 and 28 respectively in List Il — the
ordinances are being seen as a direct encroachment upon the functions of the States and
against the spirit of cooperative federalism enshrined in the Constitution. The Centre,
however, argued that trade and commerce in food items is part of the concurrent list, thus
giving it constitutional propriety.
The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Ordinance aims at
opening up agricultural sale and marketing outside the notified Agricultural Produce Market
Committee (APMC) mandis for farmers, removes barriers to inter-State trade and provides a
framework for electronic trading of agricultural produce. It prohibits State governments from
collecting market fee, cess or levy for trade outside the APMC markets.
The Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement of Price Assurance and Farm Services
Ordinance relates to contract farming, providing a framework on trade agreements for the sale
and purchase of farm produce. The mutually agreed remunerative price framework envisaged
in the legislation is touted as one that would protect and empower farmers.
The written farming agreement, entered into prior to the production or rearing of any farm
produce, lists the terms and conditions for supply, quality, grade, standards and price of farm
produce and services.
The Price Assurance Bill, while offering protection to farmers against price exploitation, does
not prescribe the mechanism for price fixation. There is apprehension that the free hand given
to private corporate houses could lead to farmer exploitation.
The Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance removes cereals, pulses, oilseeds, edible
oils, onion and potatoes from the list of essential commodities. The amendment will deregulate
the production, storage, movement and distribution of these food commodities. The central
government is allowed regulation of supply during war, famine, extraordinary price rise and
natural calamity, while providing exemptions for exporters and processors at such times as
well.
36. Which of these bills is not being tabled by the Government in the current Parliamentary
Session on September 14?
(a) The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Bill, 2020
(b) Protection of Farmers (From Unfair Trade Practices) Bill, 2020
(c) The Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement of Price Assurance and Farm
Services Bill, 2020
(d) The Essential Commodities (Amendment) Bill, 2020
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37. Among the following arguments, which one has not been made against the proposed
laws?
(a) The Proposed laws violate a citizen’s Article 19 Freedom of Trade
(b) The Proposed laws violate the principles of Cooperative Federalism envisaged in the
Constitution
(c) Agriculture and Markets are part of the State List and therefore, the Centre cannot
legislate upon that subject
38. Which, among the following, will be excluded from the Essential Commodities Act as per
the new proposed law?
(i) Cereals
(ii) Milk
(iii) Onion
(iv) Tomatoes
(a) (i) & (ii)

(b) (i) & (iii)
(c) (ii) & (iii)
(d) (ii) & (iv)
39. Which among the following provisions is provided for in The Farmers’ Produce Trade and
Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Ordinance?
(a) Framework for electronic trading of agricultural produce
(b) Protection to farmers against price exploitation
(c) Framework on trade agreements for the sale and purchase of farm produce
40. The Central Govt has decided to pass the Agricultural Regulation Act, a comprehensive
legislation which will rule over every dispute regarding Agriculture in the country. Based
on your understanding of the above passage, will this legislation be valid?
(a) Yes; Since Agriculture is in the Concurrent List, the Central Government will have the
power to pass the law.
(b) No; Since Agriculture is in the State List, only the State Governments can pass a law
on the subject
(c) Yes; Since the Central Government has the duty to protect the farmers of the nation.
(d) No; Since Food Security and agriculture are linked together, and Food Security is in
the State List, only the State Government can pass a law on the subject.
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Passage 1
1. (b); Adultery has been decriminalised by the Supreme Court recently. However, Adultery
continues to be treated as civil wrong, and can be grounds for dissolution of marriage or
divorce. The Article does not say whether or not such act would qualify for cheating so
there is not enough material to substantiate option (c)
2. (a); Section 497 of IPC says "Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and
whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the
consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence
of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery." From the words, it is clear that only the Man
who has sexual intercourse with another man’s wife will be prosecuted for Adultery, while
the wife herself cannot be sued for the same offence.
3. (d); As per the words of section 497, whether Jim’s action amounts to adultery or not will
depend on two questions, i) Whether Erin was married or not, and ii) Whether Erin’s
husband had consented or connived to the act. Since these two options are not mentioned
in options (a) to (c), none of them can be the correct answer.

4. (b); A five-judge Constitution bench headed by Chief Justice Dipak Misra was unanimous
in striking down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code dealing with the offence of adultery,
holding it manifestly arbitrary, archaic and violative of the rights to equality and equal
opportunity to women. The passage does not speak about the Right to Privacy
5. (b); From the words of Congress MP Sushmita Dev quoted in the passage above, it is
indicated that the law does not give the woman the right to sue her adulterer husband.
Only Marshall will have the right, as Lily’s husband, to file criminal charges against the
person who had sexual intercourse with Marshall’s wife without his consent or
connivance.
Passage 2
6. (c); According to the passage, mockery of drug regulation in India. Attracts the Drugs and
Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, which provides for criminal
prosecution.
7. (bj); The last paragraph of the passage states that, clinical trials aren’t designed to
understand or prove conclusively how traditional drugs work hence tensions arise
between evidence-based medicine and other forms of treatment. This evidently shows
that this is an ongoing debate, triggered again by the Patanjali incident.
8. (d); All of the mentioned reasons have been highlighted in the passage which raise
suspicion over the trial and claim made by Patanjali over Coronil. Neither the investigators
had any expertise in Ayurveda, nor were the findings of the trial available to the public by
way of an article in a peer-reviewed journal. Furthermore, the estimated trial duration of
2 months was also not adhered.
9. (c); It has been mentioned in the passage that earliest result of trails could not be expected
before July, but since the company was suffering losses a magic drug was just the panacea
the company’s business needed.
10. (b); According to the passage, Guidelines for clinical trials by Indian Council of Medical
Research and Ministry of Ayush make it mandatory for an ethics committee to probe
possible conflicts of interest when academic institutions conduct research along with
companies. In the present case, the owner of both the pharmaceutical company as well
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as the institution is the same person giving rise to conflict but no such probe was
conducted.
Passage 3
11. (d); Though the author highlights the non-defining of labour laws, he does not discuss
anything about the reasons for it. All the other options are probable causes but cannot be
established with certainty.
12. (c); Both the options suggest that the amendments will not serve the desired purpose as
similar moves in past have not worked and moreover the market right now is not capable
of utilising all the labour force as it already has too much unused capacity.
13. (c); The issues related to “overtime” is dealt under The Shops and Commercial
Establishments Act. This has been provided in the passage itself, immediately below the
portion dealing with Factories Act.
14. (a); Kaur said that if the intention was to ensure more people have jobs, then states should
not have increased the shift duration from 8 hours to 12 hours. They should have allowed
two shifts of 8-hours each instead, she said, so that more people can get a job.
15. (d); The passage only states that Indian economy is struggling after the lockdown and does
not mention anything about the individual economy or intention of any state. Therefore
any conclusion cannot be reached based on the given information.
Passage 4
16. (c); The different fields provided under Article 80 (3) of the constitution are literature,
science, art and social service. Journalism is not expressly mentioned in the article.
17. (d); The passage only provides for prohibition postulated by the Constitution against
retired judges of the Supreme Court contained in Article 124 (7) and a permanent judge
of the High Court under Article 220. There is no discussion in the passage regarding the
prohibition on the District & Sessions Judge to accept any post after retirement.
18. (c); Both the statements A & B are wrong as the passage mentions that there have been
many instances where former CJ|’s have accepted post retirement appointments, further
the constitution does not prohibit all post retirement appointments; in fact, certain laws
prescribe such appointments.
19. (d); In the very first paragraph of the passage, the author has mentioned that the
controversy is mainly centring around two facets; namely (i) denigration of the
independence of judiciary and its reputation and (ii) compromising the principle of
separation of powers amongst the three organs of the State.
20. (b); According to the passage, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar observed: “... The most that we
expect the Second Chamber to do is perhaps to hold dignified debates on important issues
and to delay legislation which might be the outcome of passions of the moment. Other
options have not been stated by him and are not included in the passage.
Passage 5
21. (a); The author has stated in the passage that despite numerous resolutions, Israel
continues to violate the human rights of Palestinian people which essentially shows the
failure of international community in holding them accountable and restoring the right of
people of Palestine.
22. (c); It has been mentioned in the passage that Likud party ignores the 4'* Geneva
Convention by which civilian settlement of occupied territory is specifically prohibited and
endorses the Jewish settlement by rejecting the idea of Palestine.
23. (b); UN Resolution 194 which insisted that refugees wishing to return to their homes and
live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable
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date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to
return.
24. (a); UNRWA stands for United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees by
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302. It was established in 1949 by the
UN General Assembly (UNGA) to provide relief to all refugees resulting from the 1948
conflict.
25. (d); The passage only mentions about options A to C to have been occupied by Israel after
the “Six-day” war.
Passage 6
26. (d); The passage states that India's commitment towards achieving UHC is clearly reflected
in policies and institutional mechanism and hence our approach cannot be said to be not
up to the mark. Further, the passage only states the recommendation of Bhore committee
but it is silent regarding the implementation. Hence (b) and (c) are incorrect.
27. (b); The passage does not convey anything about the free vaccination scheme for children
under the Ayushman Bharat scheme.

28. (b); Innovation in financing for health and increasing development assistance is covered
by the 4 — financing strategies in achieving UHC and not under the 3-core dimensions.
29. (c); The last paragraph of the passage deals with this issue where both A & B issues have
been highlighted.
30. (dj; In the last paragraph the author has mentioned “Not only financing and
institutionalization are critical for achieving UHC, but also measuring progress towards
UHC is equally important.”
Passage 7
31. (b); A small clinker grinding unit falls under category B2 which does not require an EIA.
Hence, the advice is incorrect.
32. (b); Aerial ropeways in ecologically sensitive areas fall under category B2 and hence do not
require an EIA. Hence, there is no violation involved.
33. (b); Before EIA Notification 2020, Karishma’s project would have to be assessed whether
it required an EIA. Hence, it would not be naturally exempted as it is under EIA Notification
2020.
34. (a); No violation, if reported by unconnected individuals, are acknowledged. Hence,
Nischay’s suit should not have been admitted as he did not have standing.
35. (c); Nischay is a stakeholder and the Aarhus Convention requires that sustainable
development must be through the involvement of all stakeholders. By not giving space to
Nischay’s complaint, his stakeholder status and its corresponding entitlement under the
EIA Notification 2020 is not respected.
Passage 8
36. (b); Three Bills on agriculture reforms — The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce
(Promotion and Facilitation) Bill, 2020; The Farmers (Empowerment and Protection)
Agreement of Price Assurance and Farm Services Bill, 2020 and The Essential Commodities
(Amendment) Bill, 2020 — were introduced in the Parliament on September 14.
37. (a); Since agriculture and markets are State subjects — entry 14 and 28 respectively in List
Il — the ordinances are being seen as a direct encroachment upon the functions of the
States and against the spirit of cooperative federalism enshrined in the Constitution. No
argument about Article 19 has been made in opposition to the proposed laws.
38. (b); The Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance removes cereals, pulses,
oilseeds, edible oils, onion and potatoes from the list of essential commodities.
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39. (a); The Farmers' Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Ordinance
provides a framework for electronic trading of agricultural produce. The Price Assurance
Bill, offers protection for farmers against price exploitation. The Farmers (Empowerment
and Protection) Agreement of Price Assurance and Farm Services Ordinance provides a
framework on trade agreements for the sale and purchase of farm produce.
40. (b); Agriculture is part of the State List and not the Concurrent List. Moreover, the passage
does not say anything about Food Security being part of the State List. So, the better
option will be (b)
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Passage 1
Nominee Director - Duty to Company v. Duty to Nominator —
In the U.K and other common law countries like India, the appointment of nominee directors
is acommon occurrence, especially in companies that have a big stake in another and want to
keep an eye on the activities of the company a shareholder has invested in. The concept of a
nominee director has been enshrined in Section 149(7) of the Act. The idea behind the
appointment of a nominee director is to safeguard the interest of the nominator, in a manner
that doesn’t come in the way of his fiduciary duty as a director. However, is it relevant to
mention that, in practical experience, the fiduciary duties of a nominee director often clash
with their duty towards the nominator. In other words, a nominee director has a dual and often
conflicting role to play: one, as a nominee of the nominator, and second, as a director of the
company, ensuring the larger interest of the company as a whole.
The conflict over who the nominee director owes his foremost allegiance to is not new, nor is
it confined to the Indian context. Courts of other commonwealth and non-commonwealth
nations including but not limited to England, Australia and New Zealand have oft been faced
with similar challenge of balancing the role of the nominee director.

In England, in the case of Boulting v. Association of Cinematograph Television and Allied
Technicians[4], Lord Denning while dealing with fiduciary nature of Directors’ duties made it
abundantly clear that directors have an overarching duty of “undivided loyalty” towards a
company. Lord Denning placed great reliance on the principle stated by Lord Cranworth L.C. in
Aberdeen Railway Co. v. Blaikie Brothers[5]. He observed that no person having duties that are
fiduciary in nature can be allowed to enter into a binding agreement which would result in him
disregarding his duties or acting in contravention of such duties.
In the same case, Lord Denning also commented on the position of nominee directors by saying
that there is nothing wrong with a director being nominated by a particular shareholder to
represent his interests as long as the director is left free to exercise his best judgment in the
interests of the company which he serves. However, if the shareholder mandates the director
to follow his nominator’s express directions, then that is unlawful and in breach of his fiduciary
duty to the company.
In India, in the case of lonic Metalliks vs. Union of India, the Gujarat High Court observed that
the extent of a nominee director’s rights and the scope of supervision by the shareholders are
contained inthe contract that enables such appointments, or in the relevant statute. However,
nominee directors must be especially mindful about not only acting in the interests of their
nominators, but acting in the best interests of the company and its shareholders as a whole.
In the case of AES OPG Holding (Mauritius) and Ors. v Orissa Power Generation Corporation
Ltd and Ors., the erstwhile Company Law Board noted that a conflict of interest arises when a
person owes allegiance to two or more entities/people and has to make decisions which would
have an impact on such entities/people. In such a scenario, directors have to decide in favour
of the company, otherwise they would be in breach of their fiduciary duties. This is particularly
true for nominee directors.
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In the case of Rolta India Ltd. & Anr. vs. Venire Industries Ltd. & Ors., the Bombay High Court ,
while dealing with the validity of pooling agreements entered into the shareholders of a
company held that shareholders are entitled to consider their own interest without keeping in
mind the interest of other shareholders. This is contrary to the position of directors. Directors
being fiduciaries of the company and the shareholders and are duty bound to do what they
consider to be in the best interest of the company and cannot abdicate their independent
judgment by entering into pooling agreements.
[Extracted from Nominee Director - The tug of war between duty to company and duty to
nominator published in Bar and Bench]
1. Can it be inferred from the above passage that a nominee director's primary loyalty is to
the nominator?
(a) Yes
(b) Yes, but only to the extent that it does not contradict the company’s interests
(c) Yes, because the nominee director can choose who to be loyal to depending on the
facts and circumstances
(d)No
2. The appointment of nominee directors is a common practice in
a) Common law countries

b) Civil law countries
(c) Commonwealth countries
(d) Both (a) and (b)
3. Can the nominee director act in the nominator’s interest, as per Lord Denning?
(a) No
(b) Only when it clashes with the company’s interest
(c) Only when it does not clash with the company’s interest
(d) Only when the nominator specifically asks the nominee director to act in their interest
4. What is the extra burden placed on nominee directors?
(a) To act not only in the interests of their nominators, but in the best interests of the
company and its shareholders as a whole
(b) To work within the nominator’s supervision to the extent required by the law of the
land
(c) To put nominator’s interests over the company’s interests
(d) To work within the nominator’s supervision to the extent mentioned in the
appointment contract
5. Is there any difference between legitimate actions of shareholders and nominee
directors?
(a) Yes, shareholders have more freedom

(b) Yes, nominee directors have more freedom
(c) No, company has fiduciary duty to both
(d) No, they have equal authority to act
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Passage 2
Court of Arbitration for Sport overturns Manchester City’s Champions League Ban —
On Monday 13 July, Manchester City saw its two-year Champions League ban overturned by
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Switzerland. This means the club is now able to
compete in future European competitions after the CAS found that “most of the alleged
breaches [of financial fair play rules (FFP)] were either not established or time-barred”.
Manchester City first came to the attention of the Union of European Football Associations
(UEFA) after German magazine Der Spiegel published leaked internal emails at the club, which
allegedly showed the club’s executives discussing ways to avoid FFP rules. The reports also
suggested that the £67.5m annual sponsorship offered by Etihad Airlines had previously been
paid by a company owned by Sheikh Mansour, Manchester City’s owner.
The CAS in Switzerland is considered the final arbiter of global sports disputes and has lifted
the unprecedented sanction previously imposed by UEFA and reduced a €30m fine to €10m.
This decision is another in a list of high profile appeals that UEFA have lost in an attempt to
hold some of the largest clubs in football to account, including France’s Paris Saint Germain
and Italy's AC Milan. The CAS has also overturned another high-profile ban in football this
season. On 6 December 2019, Chelsea saw their two-window transfer ban imposed by FIFA
slashed to just one window.

There remains an option for UEFA to appeal the CAS decision to the Swiss Federal Court, an
option enabled by the nature of sport arbitration being seated in Switzerland. A seat in
arbitration determines the law governing the relationship between the tribunal and the courts,
and also determines which court has supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration. However,
any appeal to the Swiss Federal on the basis of this legal mechanism is limited to the procedural
aspects of the trial. In the view of Gregory loannidis, a leading sports lawyer who teaches at
Sheffield Hallam University, “CAS judgements are rarely reversed by the Swiss Federal Court
and such CAS decisions are usually solid”. Therefore, it is unlikely that European football’s
governing body will take advantage of this option.
The current case joins a growing list of decisions in which the CAS has sided with football clubs
rather than football’s governing bodies. Indeed, many now question if the CAS is the legal entity
most equipped to enable governing bodies to hold the wealthiest clubs in football to account.
LaLiga president Javier Tebas is one of these individuals, who told the media “we have to
reassess whether the CAS is the appropriate body to which to appeal institutional decisions in
football... Switzerland is a country with a great history of arbitration, the CAS is not up to
standard”.
The same FFP rules in question have now been relaxed for the upcoming season as European
football looks to counteract the adverse financial effects resulting from COVID-19. The
combination of this decision and the CAS ruling may prompt deregulation in the sport. Such
would elevate the outcome of the case to a similar standing as the Bosman ruling, a 1995
decision by the ECJ that made it easier for players to move between clubs, sparking a price hike
in transfer fees and record broadcasting contracts.

{Extracted from Ban-on-D’or: Manchester City ban overturned by CAS published in Little Law]
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6. On which of the following grounds did the CAS overturn Manchester City’s ban?
X-— claims were not proved
Y — claims were time barred
Z— claims were not relevant
(a)X and Z
(b)Y and Z
(c) X, YandZ
(d)X and Y
7. Who is the highest body to arbitrate European football disputes?
a) Swiss federal court
b) Union of European Football Associations
c) Fédération Internationale de Football Association
d) Court of Arbitration for Sport
ae
8. A seat in arbitration determines

X— the venue of arbitration
Y — the law governing the relationship between the tribunal and the courts
Z— which court has supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration
(a)Y and Z
(b)X and Z
(c) X, YandZ
(d)X and Y
9. Which of the following criticisms does the CAS face with respect to institutional football
disputes?
X— CAS is not up to the standards of other impartial tribunals
Y — CAS favours clubs over leagues and associations in its decisions
Z— CAS does not hold wealthy clubs to account for their illicit activities
(a)Y and Z
(b)X and Z
(c) X, YandZ
(d)X and Y
10. Which of the following reasons made the author conclude that football might be
deregulated?
W — this CAS decision
X—the global health pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus
Y —the financial crisis caused by COVID-19
Z — the increasing wealth gap between football clubs
(a) W and Y
(b)X and Z
(c) W and X
(d)W, X and Y
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Passage 3
On Sunday, Rajya Sabha passed two of the three farm reforms Bills that have seen widespread
protests in recent weeks, particularly in Haryana and Punjab, where the ruling BJP has lost its
ally Shiromani Akali Dal. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has reiterated that farmers will benefit
from the changes, first mentioned as part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan package. The
Bills replaced three ordinances promulgated earlier.
The first thing to do is to simplify the names of these ordinances as agriculture economist
Sudha Narayanan (of the IGIDR) has done.
So, think of “The Farmers Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation)
Ordinance, 2020” as the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) Bypass Ordinance.
Treat “The Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020” as “The Freedom of Food
Stocking by Agribusinesses Ordinance”, and “The Farmers (Empowerment and Protection)
Agreement on Price Assurance and Farm Services Ordinance, 2020” as the Contract Farming
Ordinance.
On paper, what the first one attempts to co is allow farmers to sell their produce at places
other than the APMC-regulated mandis. It is crucial to note that the idea is not to shut down
APMCs but to expand a farmer’s choices. So, if a farmer believes a better deal is possible with
some other private buyer then he can take that option instead of selling in the APMC mandi.
The second Bill proposes to allow economic agents to stock food articles freely without the
fear of being prosecuted for hoarding.
The third Bill provides a framework for farmers to enter into contract farming — that is signing
a written contract with a company to produce what the company wants in return of a healthy
remuneration.
The idea with all three Bills is to liberalise the farm markets in the hope that doing so will make
the system more efficient and allow for better price realisations for all concerned, especially
the farmers. The central concern, presumably, is to make Indian farming a more remunerative
enterprise than it is right now.
There are two diametrically opposite ways to look at these changes.
One is to believe that the plan on paper will operationalise perfectly in real life. This would
mean farmers will get out of the clutches of the monopoly of APMC mandis and evade the
rent-seeking behaviour of the traditional intermediaries (called arhatiyas). A farmer would be
able to pick and choose who to sell to, and at what price, after making an informed decision.
And that, most crucially, when he does this, more often than not, he will end up earning more
than what he typically did in the past when he sold his produce through the “exploitative”
arhatiyas in the APMC mandis.
The polar opposite viewpoint, from the protesters, is that this move towards greater play of
free markets is a ploy by the government to get away from its traditional role of being the
guarantor of minimum support prices (MSPs). To be sure, MSPs work in the formally regulated
APMC mandis, and not in private deals.
Farmers, especially in Punjab and Haryana where MSPs are more prominently employed, are
suspicious of what the markets will offer and how the “big companies” will treat them. Farmers
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can influence the most powerful governments through the electoral process but vis-a-vis big
companies, they are exposed as minor players, incapable of bargaining effectively.
11. What is the objective of the Farmers Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and
Facilitation) Ordinance, 2020?
(a) To shut down the APMCs
(b) To force farmers to sell their products only to APMCs
(c) To not allow farmers to sell theri products to APMCs
12. Where can a farmer sell their products to as per the Farmers Produce Trade and
Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Ordinance, 2020?
(a) APMC
(b) Private parties
(c) (a) or (ob) whoever gives the higher price for product
(d) Both (a) and (b)
13. What are the aims of the three bills?
P —to liberalise the farm markets
Q- make the system more efficient
R — allow for better price realisations for all concerned, especially the farmers
S — make Indian farming a more remunerative enterprise
(a)Q,R ands
(b)P, Q, R and &
(c) P, QandR
(d)P,Rand$
14. Three of the following statements are reasons for the fourth statement, which is the
primary argument for supporters of the bill:
A- farmer will get out of the clutches of the monopoly of APMC mandis
B- farmer will end up earning more than what he typically did in the past
C-— farmer would be able to pick and choose who to sell to, and at what price, after
making an informed decision
D- farmer will evade the rent-seeking behaviour of arhatiyas
Which of the above statements is not a reason for the primary argument?
(a)D
(b)A
(c)B
(d)C
15. Which of the following is not a question raised about the effectiveness of the bills?
(a) It would take away the MSP protection
(b) It would lead to more corruption
(c) It would make farmers vulnerable to exploitation by big companies
(d) There is no guarantee that market price will be higher than MSP
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Passage 4
Indian Matchmaking and the Legal Criteria for Hindu Marriages; Malavika Rajkumar (Nyaay
Blog) -
Indian Matchmaking is the Netflix Show which has made waves in the Indian marriage market.
It attempts to portray how the Indian matchmaking industry works. As entertaining as this
show is, the discussions revolve around the complexion, height, wealth and caste of the suitors
involved. These social factors may or may not be important to you, but one must look at what
the legal criteria are for Hindu Marriages in India.
For a marriage to be legally recognized as a Hindu Marriage, certain criteria need to be met
under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. If you want to marry under the Hindu Marriage Act, you
have to be one of the following set of persons:
e Any person who is a Hindu by religion. This includes Veerashaiva, Lingayat or a follower
of the Brahmo, Prarthana, or Arya Samaj.
e Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion.
e Persons who practise other religions such as Muslims, Christians, Parsis, or Jews cannot
get married under this law.
As per Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the minimum age for a marriage under Hindu law
is 21 years of age for the groom and 18 years of age for the bride. If this age criterion is not
met, then not only is your marriage not legal, but it will also be considered to be child marriage.
Further, you may also be punished with jail time of 15 days or a fine or Rs.1000 or both if
convicted by a Court. There is no upper limit when it comes to age.
Valid Hindu marriages require both the bride and groom to give consent to the marriage. If you
are not able to give consent because of:
e Unsoundness of mind or
e Because of a mental disorder which makes you ‘unfit for marriage and the procreation
of children’ or;
e If you get ‘recurrent attacks of insanity’, your marriage will not be valid.
Since the Hindu Marriage Act is silent on the definitions of sound mind and insanity, Courts
have given some clarification regarding the meaning of sound or unsound mind.
The Supreme Court in State Of Rajasthan vs Shera Ram (2011) stated that having an unsound
mind would mean a mental condition because of which a person cannot be expected to be
aware of the consequences of his actions. Some examples mentioned by the Court include
dementia, loss of memory, and hallucinations.

Neither husband nor wife can be married at the time of marrying each other. For example,
Indian law allows for remarriage only when the bride or groom has divorced their partner or
annulled their marriage.
16. Sudheesh, a Hindu from an orthodox Brahmin family, and Mini, a Syrian Christian, wants
to marry each other. Can they get married under the Hindu Marriage Act?
(a) Yes; since Sudheesh is a Hindu by religion, they can get married under Hindu Marriage
Act
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(b) No; Hindu Marriage Act requires both bride and groom to be Hindu by religion
(c) No; Sudheesh and Mini’s marriage are not approved by their parents and such a
marriage cannot be permitted under the law
17. If Mini converts herself to Buddhism, can the couple then get married under Hindu
Marriage Act?
(a) Yes; Buddhists are considered as Hindus for the purpose of Hindu Marriage Act
(b) No; Since Mini’s conversion was only for marrying Sudheesh and not due to genuine
belief in Buddhism, her conversion will not be valid
(c) No; Buddhists are not considered as Hindus under Hindu Marriage Act
18. Ramesh and Lekha, both Hindus, have been in love for over 5 years. After initial troubles
from their respective families, they finally got married with blessings from Ramesh’s
parents. The marriage happened as per the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act.
However, the day after marriage, Ramesh had an accident, and as a result, lost the sanity
of his mind. Lekha’s parents, who never agreed to the marriage, has now challenged their
marriage saying that Ramesh is of unsound mind and such a marriage is not valid. ls their
argument valid?
(a) Yes; People with unsound mind are not allowed to be married under Hindu Marriage
Act
(b) No; The marriage is valid since Ramesh was of sound mind at the time of marriage.
(c) No; Only Lekha can challenge the validity of her marriage
19. What is the minimum age requirement under Hindu Marriage Act for the groom & bride
respectively?
(a) 18 & 21
(b)21 & 21
(c) 18 & 18
20. Raj & Simran, both Hindus, are married under Hindu Marriage Act. However, Raj is also in
love with Anjali, while Simran is in love with Rahul. Both Raj & Simran do not want to
separate from each other. Will Raj & Simran be able to marry their respective lovers
without getting divorced?
(a) Raj can marry Anjali even though Simran cannot marry Rahul
(b) Raj can marry Anjali and Simran will also be able to marry Rahul
(c) Neither can marry again unless they get divorced first
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Passage 5
Lok Sabha Passes Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 —
The Lok Sabha on Saturday passed a bill that seeks to decriminalise certain offences under the
Companies Act, 2013, in case of defaults but not involving frauds.
The Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020, was passed by Lok Sabha through voice vote. Around
48 sections of the Companies Act, 2013 will be amended to decriminalise various offences.
Speaking on the bill, Finance and Corporate Affairs Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said
decriminalisation of various provisions under the companies law will also help small companies
by reducing the litigation burden on them.
Sitharaman said there are currently around 124 penal provisions compared to 134 under the
Companies Act, 2013. Stressing that there will be no relaxation for serious offences, including
fraud and those that cause "injury to public interest or deceit", the minister said the number
of "non-compoundable" offences under the Act remains the same at 35.
The bill was introduced in Lok Sabha by Sitharaman.
Here are some of the changes introduced in the Companies Act:
Changes to offenses: The bill removes the penalty, imprisonment for certain offenses, and
reduces the amount of fine payable in certain cases. However, Under the Act, one-person
companies or small companies are only liable to pay up to 50% of the penalty for certain
offences.
Exclusion from listed companies: The Bill empowers the Centre in consultation with the Sebi,
to exclude companies issuing specified classes of securities from the definition of a “listed
company”.
Exemptions from filing resolutions: The Act requires companies to file certain resolutions with
the Registrar of Companies, which include resolutions of the Board of Directors of the company
to borrow money, or grant loans. However, banking companies are exempt from filing
resolutions passed to grant loans or to provide guarantees or security for a loan. This
exemption has been extended to registered nonbanking financial companies and housing
finance companies.
CSR: The Bill exempts companies with a CSR liability of up to Rs 50 lakh a year from setting up
CSR Committees.
Benches of NCLAT: The Bill seeks to establish benches of the National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal in New Delhi.
Direct listing in foreign jurisdictions: The Bill empowers the central government to allow certain
classes of public companies to list classes of securities in foreign jurisdictions.
[From Changes to Companies Act: Here are the amendments passed by Lok Sabha published in
Business Standard News]
21. How has the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2020 changed the penalties for offences?
(a) There will be no criminal penalty for most offences
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(b) There will be no criminal penalty for any offence
(c) There will be no criminal penalty for some offences
(d) There will be criminal penalty for all offences
22. How will the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2020 impact small companies?
(a) It will increase the cost of complying with laws and regulations.
(b) It will decrease the cost of complying with laws and regulations.
(c) There will not be any change in cost of complying with laws and regulations.
d) Either (a) or (b) depending on the company’s actions.
23. Which of the following can pay part of the penalty for certain offences, as per the
Amendment?
1)One person company
2)Foreign company
3)Government company
4)Public Sector Undertaking
}Small Company
)
}(4) and (5) only
} (2) and (4) only
}(1} and (5)
24. Who is exempted from filing resolutions regarding granting loans or borrowing money
under the Companies Act, 2013?
(a) Banking companies
(b) Registered nonbanking financial companies
(c) Housing finance companies
25. What have companies with corporate social responsibility liability of less than Rs SOlakha
year been exempted from?
(a) Disclosing CSR expenditure of the previous year
(b) Audit of CSR account

(c) Forming a CSR committee
(d) Penalty for failure in fulfilling CSR obligations
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Passage 6
The Banking Regulation (Amendment) Bill, 2020 —
e Exclusions: The Banking Regulation Act, 1949 does not apply to certain co-operative
societies such as primary agricultural credit societies and co-operative land mortgage banks.
The Bill amends this to state that the Act will not apply to: (i) primary agricultural credit
societies and (ii) co-operative societies whose principal business is long term financing for
agricultural development. Further, these societies must not use the words ‘bank’, ‘banker’ or
‘banking’ in their name or in connection with their business, or act as an entity that clears
cheques.
Issuance of shares and securities by co-operative banks: The Bill provides that a co-operative
bank may issue equity, preference, or special shares on face value or at a premium to its
members or to any other person residing within its area of operation. Further, it may issue
unsecured debentures or bonds or similar securities with maturity of ten or more years to such
persons. Such issuance will be subject to the prior approval of the RBI, and any other
conditions as may be specified by RBI.
e Further, the Board of Directors must have at least 51% of members with special
knowledge or experience in areas such as accountancy, banking, economics or law. RBI may
direct a bank to reconstitute its Board if it does not conform to the requirements. If the bank
does not comply, RBI may remove individual directors and appoint suitable persons.
° Power to exempt cooperative banks: The Bill states that RBI may exempt a cooperative
bank or a class of cooperative banks from certain provisions of the Act through notification.
These provisions relate to restrictions of certain types of employment, qualifications of the
Board of Directors and, appointment of a chairman. The time period and conditions for the
exemption will be specified by RBI.
° Supersession of Board of Directors: The Act states that RBI may supersede the Board
of Directors of a multi-state co-operative bank for up to five years under certain conditions.
These conditions include cases where it is in the public interest for RBI to supersede the Board,
and to protect depositors. The Bill adds that in case of a co-operative bank registered with the
Registrar of Co-operative Societies of a state, RBI may supersede the Board of Directors after
consultation with the concerned state government, seeking their comments within such period
as specified by it.
° Certain provisions omitted: The Bill omits certain provisions from the Act. One of them
relates to a restriction on a co-operative bank from making loans or advances on the security
of its own shares. Further, it prohibits the grant of unsecured loans or advances to its directors,
and to private companies where the bank’s directors or chairman is an interested party. The
Act also specifies conditions when unsecured loans or advances may be granted and specifies
the manner in which the loans may be reported to RBI. The Bill omits this provision from the
Act.
[Extracted from The Banking Regulation (Amendment) Bill, 2020 published by PRSIndia]
26. Yaxis Bank has 18 directors on its board. How many of them must have special knowledge
or experience in banking, economics, accountancy or law?
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a)
b)
c)
(a)8
(b)9
(c) 10
(d)11
27. Which of the following statements is true?
(a) RBI has the power to supersede the Board of a co-operative bank
(b) RBI can supersede the Board of co-operative bank for at up to five years
(c) RBI can supersede the Board of a co-operative bank only after consulting with the
government
(d) RBI can supersede the Board of a co-operative bank to protect borrowers
28. Which of the following changes are not covered by the Banking Regulation (Amendment)
Bill, 2020?
(a) Co-operative bank can make loans or advances on the security of its own shares
(b) Co-operative bank can give unsecured loans to its directors

(c) Co-operative bank can give secured loans to private parties where the bank’s
director(s) or chair is an interested party
(d) Unsecured loans or advances can be granted under specific circumstances.
29. If the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Bill, 2020 becomes an Act and comes into effect,
which of the following will be excluded from the operation of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949?
(a) Primary agricultural credit societies
(b) Co-operative land mortgage banks
(c) Co-operative societies whose principal business is short term financing for agricultural
development
30. Which of the following restrictions can the RBI exempt a co-operative society from, as per
the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Bill, 2020?
(a) Certain types of employment
(b) Qualifications of the Board of Directors
(c) Appointment of a chairman

Passage 7
Uttarakhand High Court bans alcohol consumption - .
(Source: Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy,
https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/tag/directive-principles-of-state-policy/)
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Yesterday, the High Court of Uttarakhand took it upon itself to ban the consumption of alcohol
in three districts in the State of Uttarakhand. Like the Supreme Court’s order, the strange thing
about the Uttarakhand High Court’s judgment (which runs into 34 pages) is that the public
interest petitioner never even made a prayer for banning. The petition was about the alleged
fact that the Government had opened a liquor bar in Haridwar, in contravention of its own
Government Order, passed in 2002, which imposed prohibition within a 1.6 kilometre radius
of Haridwar.
This is a rather narrow and specific prayer. That does not, however, stop the High Court from
embarking upon a moralising homily about alcohol consumption and its ill effects. After that,
the High Court cites a number of Supreme Court judgments for the proposition that there is
no fundamental right to trade or conduct commerce in alcohol. All the Supreme Court
decisions that the High Court cites are about the constitutional validity of a complete or partial
State-imposed prohibition, not about the Court itse/f imposing prohibition in the absence of
any law. Much like the Supreme Court last week, the High Court seems to suffer from a rather
basic confusion between what is desirable, and what is legal. Throughout the 34-page long
judgment, the High Court cites exactly one constitutional provision: Article 47, which provides
that “the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its
people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the
State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal
purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.”

The Court goes to the length of quoting the Constituent Assembly Debates for the purpose
behind Article 47, but strangely, seems to be unaware of the existence of Article 37, which
begins with the words “the provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any
court...”
There is little ambiguity in the phrase “shall not be enforceable by any court“. To convert it
from passive to active voice, it means that the Constitution prohibits the Court from enforcing
a Directive Principle of State Policy. One would have expected the Uttarakhand High Court to
at least invoke Article 21 in order to provide the regulation, customary fig-leaf of legitimacy,
but even that is nowhere to be found in the judgment.
Under a Constitution that makes the judiciary the final arbiter of its own powers, the only
effective check upon it is self-restraint. The last two weeks have shown that when it comes to
directly encroaching upon personal rights and freedoms, that self-restraint is in short supply.
31. The passage argues that the Parliament has some say in regulating the powers of the
Judiciary.
(a) True
(b) False

32. The passage says that all directive principles of state policy may not be enforced in a court,
but only article 47 may be enforced in a limited way.
(a) True and False
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(b) True and True
(c) False and True
33. The author construes the order of the court as one which is
(a) Moralising
(b) Legal
(c) Political
d) Environmental
34. The author argues that another ground could have been invoked to grant a semblance of
legitimacy. Which ground was that?
(a) Article 19
(b) Article 47
(c) Fundamental duties
(d) Article 21
35. The author believes that the self-restraint of the Court is
a) Lacking
b) Abundant.
c) Comparable to other judicial organs
— pe Po
d)None of the above
Passage 8
Upsetting the ‘apple’ cart: the latest onslaught on press freedom in Hong Kong - .
(Source: Oxford Human Rights Hub, http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/upsetting-the-apple-cart-the-
latest-onslaught-on-press-freedom-in-hong-kong/)
The press is always the first casualty of a new despotism. On 10 August 2020, Jimmy Lai,
founder of the pro-democracy Apple Daily newspaper, was arrested in Hong Kong — the first in
a wave of arrests, while over 100 police officers raided the newspaper’s offices for 9 hours.
They were released on bail the following day, but with serious charges still dangling over their
heads like the sword of Damocles.
The supposed crime? Alleged collusion with a foreign country or external elements, in violation
of Article 29 of the National Security Law which Beijing has recently imposed on Hong Kong
(carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment). Their real crime? Advocacy of democracy
and vocal criticism of the Chinese and Hong Kong governments.
It was the darkest day yet for the freedom of speech and of the press, as enshrined in Article
27 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) (which are analogous to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights). The provisions of the ICCPR have been incorporated into Hong Kong law by the Bill of
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Rights Ordinance (BORO), and Article 39 of the Basic Law expressly guarantees that the
provisions of the ICCPR shall be implemented through the laws of Hong Kong.
The violations arising from the recent arrests were therefore threefold.
First, the arrest of journalists on loosely-defined grounds of ‘collusion’ without cogent evidence
of any national security threat is a textbook interference with free speech. Second, the
weaponisation of the law against pro-democracy journalism is itself a violation of the
government’s positive obligation to protect free speech (as recognised in e.g. Ozgiir Gindem
v Turkey (application no. 23144/93) at [43]). Third, the search/seizure of journalistic materials
during the police raid patently went beyond the scope of the search warrant — it was an
unlawful intrusion upon journalistic sources and press freedom.
Government mouthpieces have characterised Apple Daily as a biased ‘political group’, which
confirms that the arrests were politically motivated. Absent any incitement to violence, the
government simply “..cannot, with reference to the protection of territorial integrity or national
security... restrict the right of the public to be informed of [political ideas] by bringing the weight
of the criminal law to bear on the media”: Sener v Turkey (application no. 26680/95) at [42].
The purpose of every assault on free speech is its chilling effect, but the people of Hong Kong
will not be silenced.

36. The author argues that the arrest was a violation but cannot be construed as a typical case
of interference with the press due to political undertones.
(a) True
(b) False
37. The government’s obligation to protect free speech was recognised in
a) Article 29 of the ICCPR.
b) Ozgtir Giindem v Turkey.
c) Sener v Turkey.
d) Article 19 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong.
—_
38. The right of the public to be informed of political ideas may be restricted when
(a) There is a national security interest.
(b) Protection of territorial integrity is required.
(c) There is incitement to violence.
(d) There is a criminal case pending.

39. The charges against Jimmy Lao, as per the passage, were
(a) Dropped
(b) Pending
(c) Concluded
40. Collusion with external elements would invite sanction based on
(a) ICCPR
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(b) Basic Law of Hong Kong
(c) National Security Law
(d) European Convention on Human Rights
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Passage 1
1. (b); Reason: it can be inferred that a nominee director’s primary loyalty is that with the
nominator, to the extent it does not contradict with the interests of the company. When
there is a conflict of interest, the nominee director must choose the interest of the
company, instead of merely acting as a puppet on behalf of the nominator.
2. (a); Reason: In the U.K and other common law countries like India, the appointment of
nominee directors is a common occurrence, especially in companies that have a big stake
in another and want to keep an eye on the activities of the company a shareholder has
invested in.
3. (c); Reason: In the case of Boulting v. Association of Cinematograph Television and Allied
Technicians, Lord Denning while dealing with fiduciary nature of Directors’ duties made it
abundantly clear that directors have an overarching duty of “undivided loyalty” towards a
company. He observed that no person having duties that are fiduciary in nature can be
allowed to enter into a binding agreement which would result in him disregarding his
duties or acting in contravention of such duties.

4. (a); Reason: In the case of lonic Metalliks vs. Union of India, the Gujarat High Court
observed that the extent of a nominee director’s rights and the scope of supervision by
the shareholders are contained in the contract that enables such appointments, or in the
relevant statute. However, nominee directors must be especially mindful about not only
acting in the interests of their nominators, but acting in the best interests of the company
and its shareholders as a whole.
5. (a); Reason: In the case of Rolta India Ltd. & Anr. vs. Venire Industries Ltd. & Ors., the
Bombay High Court , while dealing with the validity of pooling agreements entered into
the shareholders of a company held that shareholders are entitled to consider their own
interest without keeping in mind the interest of other shareholders. This is contrary to the
position of directors. Directors being fiduciaries of the company and the shareholders are
duty bound to do what they consider to be in the best interest of the company and cannot
abdicate their independent judgment by entering into pooling agreements.
Passage 2
6. (d); Reason: Manchester City saw its two-year Champions League ban overturned by the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Switzerland. This means the club is now able to
compete in future European competitions after the CAS found that “most of the alleged
breaches [of financial fair play rules (FFP)] were either not established or time-barred”.
7. (d); Reason: The CAS in Switzerland is considered the final arbiter of global sports
disputes
8. (a); Reason: A seat in arbitration determines the law governing the relationship between
the tribunal and the courts, and also determines which court has supervisory jurisdiction
over the arbitration.
9. (c); Reason: Many now question if the CAS is the legal entity most equipped to enable
governing bodies to hold the wealthiest clubs in football to account. LaLiga president Javier
Tebas is one of these individuals, who told the media “we have to reassess whether the
CAS is the appropriate body to which to appeal institutional decisions in football...
Switzerland is a country with a great history of arbitration, the CAS is not up to standard”.
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10. (a); Reason: The FFP rules have now been relaxed for the upcoming season as European
football looks to counteract the adverse financial effects resulting from COVID-19. The
combination of this decision and the CAS ruling may prompt deregulation in the sport.
Passage 3
11. (d); Reason: The Farmers Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation)
Ordinance, 2020 allows farmers to sell their produce at places other than the APMC-
regulated mandis. The idea is not to shut down APMCs but to expand a farmer’s choices.
12. (d); Reason: If a farmer believes a better deal is possible with some other private buyer
then he can take that option instead of selling in the APMC mandi. It is entirely the farmer’s
choice.
13. (b); Reason: The idea with all three Bills is to liberalise the farm markets in the hope that
doing so will make the system more efficient and allow for better price realisations for all
concerned, especially the farmers. The central concern, presumably, is to make Indian
farming a more remunerative enterprise than it is right now.
14. (c); Reason: One way to view the bils is to believe that the plan on paper will operationalise
perfectly in real life. This would mean farmers will get out of the clutches of the monopoly
of APMC mandis and evade the rent-seeking behaviour of the traditional intermediaries
(called arhatiyas). A farmer would be able to pick and choose who to sell to, and at what
price, after making an informed decision. And that, most crucially, when he does this, more
often than not, he will end up earning more than what he typically did in the past when
he sold his produce through the “exploitative” arhatiyas in the APMC mandis.
15. (b); Reason: The viewpoint, from the protesters, is that this move is a ploy by the
government to get away from its traditional role of being the guarantor of minimum
support prices (MSPs). Farmers are suspicious of what the markets will offer and how the
“big companies” will treat them. Farmers can influence the most powerful governments
through the electoral process but vis-a-vis big companies, they are exposed as minor
players, incapable of bargaining effectively.
Passage 4
16. (b); To be married under the Hindu Marriage Act, the participants have to be Hindu by
religion. No mention is made of parental approval so the answer cannot be (c).
17. (a); Under Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, Buddhists are also considered as Hindus.
No information is given in the passage to substantiate option (b) so it cannot be the right
answer.
18. (b); The purpose of mandating a sound mind for marriage is to ensure that the participants
have freely given their consent to marriage. Therefore, it is obvious that what the law
requires is for a person to have a sound mind at the time of marriage. No information to
justify option (c) is given in the passage so that cannot be the answer.
19. (d); The Minimum age for marriage under Hindu Marriage Act is 21 for the groom & 18 for
the bride, and not vice versa. So, option (a) to (c) is incorrect.
20. (c); Indian law allows for remarriage only when the bride or groom has divorced their
partner or annulled their marriage. Bigamy is not allowed for either man or woman under
Hindu Marriage Act.
Passage 5
21. (c); Reason: Sitharaman said there are currently around 124 penal provisions compared to
134 under the Companies Act, 2013. Stressing that there will be no relaxation for serious
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offences, including fraud and those that cause "injury to public interest or deceit", the
minister said the number of "non-compoundable" offences under the Act remains the
same at 35.
22. (b); Reason: Speaking on the bill, Finance and Corporate Affairs Minister Nirmala
Sitharaman said decriminalisation of various provisions under the companies law will also
help small companies by reducing the litigation burden on them.
23. (d); Reason: The bill removes the penalty, imprisonment for certain offenses, and reduces
the amount of fine payable in certain cases. However, Under the Act, one-person
companies or small companies are only liable to pay up to 50% of the penalty for certain
offences.
24. (a); Reason: The Companies Act 2013 requires companies to file certain resolutions with
the Registrar of Companies, which include resolutions of the Board of Directors of the
company to borrow money, or grant loans. However, banking companies are exempt from
filing resolutions passed to grant loans or to provide guarantees or security for a loan. This
exemption has been extended with the amendment to registered nonbanking financial
companies and housing finance companies.
25. (c); Reason: The Bill exempts companies with a CSR liability of up to Rs 50 lakh a year from
setting up CSR Committees.
Passage 6
26. (c); Reason: the Board of Directors must have at least 51% of members with special
knowledge or experience in areas such as accountancy, banking, economics or law.
27. (b); Reason: The Act states that RBI may supersede the Board of Directors of a multi-state
co-operative bank for up to five years under certain conditions. These conditions include
cases where it is in the public interest for RBI to supersede the Board, and to protect
depositors. The Bill adds that in case of a co-operative bank registered with the Registrar
of Co-operative Societies of a state, RBI may supersede the Board of Directors after
consultation with the concerned state government, seeking their comments within such
period as specified by it.
28. (c); Reason: The Bill omits certain provisions from the Act. One of them relates to a
restriction on a co-operative bank from making loans or advances on the security of its
own shares. Further, it prohibits the grant of unsecured loans or advances to its directors,
and to private companies where the bank’s directors or chairman is an interested party.
The Act also specifies conditions when unsecured loans or advances may be granted and
specifies the manner in which the loans may be reported to RBI. The Bill omits this
provision from the Act.
29. (a); Reason: The Act does not apply to certain co-operative societies such as primary
agricultural credit societies and co-operative land mortgage banks. The Bill amends this
to state that the Act will not apply to: (i) primary agricultural credit societies and (ii) co-
operative societies whose principal business is long term financing for agricultural
development.
30. (d); Reason: The Bill states that RBI may exempt a cooperative bank or a class of
cooperative banks from certain provisions of the Act through notification. These
provisions relate to restrictions of certain types of employment, qualifications of the Board
19 MOBILE: +91 95084 42123

of Directors and, appointment of a chairman. The time period and conditions for the
exemption will be specified by RBI.
Passage 7
31. (b); The author argues that only the Judiciary can regulate itself.
32. (a); The author argues that none of the directive principles are applicable and that the
court was not justified in ignoring this when it enforced article 47.
33. (a); The author mentions that the court is embarking on a “moralising homily”, and that
the basis of its order has no legal justification. This implies the existence of a moral
motivation.
34. (d); The author mentions that the Court should “at least invoke Article 21 in order to
provide the regulation, customary fig-leaf of legitimacy”.
35. (a); The author is critical of the lack of self-restraint by the Court in the final paragraph.
Passage 8
36. (b); The author argues, firstly, that the interference is a “textbook example”.
37. (b); The case recognised the obligation of the government to protect free speech, as per
the passage.
38. (c); Sener v Turkey recognises that such restriction may be allowed only in the event that
there is incitement to violence first.
39. (b); The charges were still pending as per the second paragraph of the passage.
AO. (c); The passage mentions that Article 29 of the National Security Law would be
applicable.
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VISHRUT JAIN, AUTHOR, CLAT 2.0

LEGAL REASONING SECTIONAL TEST 1

Dharmadhikari (Bar & Bench Article) -

if the Act, a post-independence law, is to be repealed. Courts cannot refuse to implement

derived from the Constitution itself.

1. Which of these arguments is not made by the Author in this article?

(a) The Law of Contempt protects the individual reputation of Judges

(b) The Law of Contempt upholds the majesty of law.

(a) Supreme Court

(b) High Court

(c) Both (a) and (b)

(d) None of the above

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VISHRUT JAIN, AUTHOR, CLAT 2.0

3. Is ‘truth’ a defense against Contempt of Court proceedings?

(a) Truth is an absolute defense against Contempt proceedings

(b) Truth can be a defense if it is in public interest

(d) Truth is not a defense against Contempt proceedings

4. Which of these statements is made by the author in this piece?

(d) None of the Above

5. What is the central argument in this excerpt?

decide whether or not to repeal it

(c) The law of Contempt is constitutional as the it is provided by the Constitution

(Indian Constitutional Law & Philosophy) -

To that extent, the order is contrary to law. (...}

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VISHRUT JAIN, AUTHOR, CLAT 2.0

21 of the Indian Constitution?

(i) Right to Livelihood

ii) Right to Housing

iii) Right to Privacy

(b (i) & (ii)

(c) (i) & (iii)

(d) (ii) & (iii)

(ii) Right to Cities

(iii) Right to Rehabilitation

(a) Only (i)

(b) (i) & (ii)

(c) (ii) & (iii)

(d) (i) & (iii)

Indian Constitution. Will the decision of the Supreme Court be valid?

therefore, is not recognized by Indian laws

think will be sound in a challenge against this decision?

by the Indian Constitution

(d) None of the above

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VISHRUT JAIN, AUTHOR, CLAT 2.0

10. In this excerpt, the term PIL is used to denote

(a) Public Interest Litigation

(b) Private International Law

(c) Public International Law

(d) Publicity Interest Litigation

contradicts the direction issued by the political party to which he belongs.

new political party or opted to function as a separate group.

proceedings under the Tenth Schedule.

Parliament to consider establishing an independent tribunal to impartially adjudicate upon

minority opinion in Kihoto Hollohan.

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