6 PETRONAS PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS Hazards and Operability ( HAZOP ) Study PTS 16.71.03 May 2014 te cording otherwise ars are Companys interral standardsPTS 16.71.08; HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 personas Page 2 of 30. FOREWORD PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) has been developed based on the accumulated knowledge, experience and best practices of the PETRONAS group supplementing National and International standards where appropriate. The key objective of PTS is to ensure standard technical practice across the PETRONAS group. Compliance to PTS is compulsory for PETRONAS-operated facilities and Joint Ventures (JVs) where PETRONAS has more than fifty percent (50%) shareholding and/or operational control, and includes all phases of work activities. Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers who use PTS are solely responsible in ensuring the quality of work, goods and services meet the required design and engineering standards. In the case where specific requirements are not covered in the PTS, it is the responsibility of the Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers to propose other proven or internationally established standards or practices of the same lovel of quality and integrity as reflected in the PTS, In issuing and making the PTS available, PETRONAS is not making any warranty on the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in PTS. The Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers shall ensure accuracy and completeness of the PTS used for the intended design and engineering requirement and shall inform the Owner for any conflicting requirement with other international codes and technical standards before start of any work PETRONAS is the sole copyright holder of PTS. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored ima retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, recording ‘or otherwise) or be disclosed by users to any company or person whomsoever, without the prior ‘written consent of PETRONAS. The PTS shall be used exclusively for the authorised purpose. The users shall arrange for PTS to be kept in safe custody and shall ensure its secrecy is maintained and provide satisfactory information to PETRONAS that this requirement is met.PTS 16.71.03, HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 nas, Page 3 of 30, ANNOUNCEMENT Please be informed that the entire PTS inventory is currently undergoing transformation exercise from 2013 - 2015 which includes revision to numbering system, format and content, As part of this, change, the PTS numbering system has been revised to 6-digit numbers and drawings, forms and requisition to 7-digit numbers. All newly revised PTS will adopt this new numbering system, and ‘where required make reference to other PTS in its revised numbering to ensure consistency. Users are requested to refer to PTS 00.01.01 (Index to PTS) for mapping between old and revised PTS numbers for clarity. For ‘further inquiries, contact PTS administrator at| PTS 16.71.03 1.0 INTRODUCTION HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 Page 4 of 30 5 11 Score 6 1.2. GLOSSARY OF TERMS 6 1.3. SUMMARY OF CHANGES... 8 2.0 GENERAL REQUIREMENT 9 2.1 TECHNICAL CONSIDERATION... 9 2.2 HAZOP STUDY LEADER. 9 2.3. HAZOP STUDY SCRIBE son 10 2.4 HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBERS wns u 3.0 THE TECHNIQUE OF HAZOP STUDY 3.1 HAZOP STUDY IN A PROJECT LIFECYCLE somes 12 3.2. HAZOP STUDY IN EXISTING OPERATING FACILITY 2 3.3. INTERFACE WITH THE HAZARD AND EFFECT REGISTER (HER). B 3.4 HAZOP STUDY METHODOLOGY. ss “ 4 3.5 HAZOP STUDY RECORDING AND REPORTING... as 19 3.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS AND FOLLOW UP. 20 2.7 OTHER TYPE OF HAZOP STUDY TECHNIQUE 4.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY. APPENDIX 1.~ HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBER FUNCTIONS APPENDIX 2 ~ DETAILS OF HAZOP STUDY TYPES IN PROJECT LIFE CYCLE . APPENDIX 3 ~ LIST OF PARAMETERS AND GUIDEWORDS APPENDIX 4 ~ TYPICAL HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET... APPENDIX 5 ~ HAZOP STUDY REPORT CONTENT,10 PTS 16.71.03 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (AZOP) STUDY May 2014 raonas Page 5 of 30 INTRODUCTION This PTS provides the minimum technical requirements for Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) study. This PTS complement GHSE through HSEMS (refer PTS 18.00.01), HEMP. {refer PTS 18.04.02) and PHA (refer PTS 18.53.04} HAZOP study is a structured hazard identification tool using deviation analysis by a ‘multi-discipline team for the identification of process hazards in the design and operation phase of a facility. ‘The objective of a HAZOP study is to carry out a rigorous and systematic evaluation of process systems with respect to operational safety and potential hazards with foreseeable upsetting conditions. This can be summarized as follows: |. To identify/analyse potential hazards and operability issues due to deviations from normal process or operating conditions or intended design in a systematic li, To evaluate the adequacy of the existing safeguards with respect to safety and ‘operations to address the causes and / or the consequences. lil, To Identify additional safeguards required for the system under study to address the causes and minimise the consequences of deviation. iv. Torecommend ways to mitigate the Consequences of deviations and return to normal and safe operations. HAZOP study represent one of the methods available to be applied in the Hazard Identification phase of HEMP, which is the methodology employed to achieve demonstrably the HSE objectives which are defined in, and to be managed by the HSEMS. The relationship between this document and its component parts and HSEMS is shown schematically in Figure 1.1PTS 16.71.03 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 personas Page 6 of 30 HSEMS, 2 siall systerr for managing Heat Safety Er. ronment sks a fF Aueting 2 one sta 2 1583 fo \ 1! Reset fication Figure 1.1: HSEMS Relations with HAZOP study 1a scoPE This PTS shall *") be applied to the development, planning, implementation, follow up, auditing and reviewing of HAZOP study within PETRONAS new and existing facilities covering upstream and downstream. The HAZOP study is applicable to: i. Greenfield developments Brownfield projects Periodically assessing hazard in existing facility as identified by PHA Facility modifications as identified by MOC (refer to PTS 18.53.01) v. Operating procedures vi, Instrumentation and Control vii, Preparation for CIMAH Report, DOSO Report, and other relevant statutory requirements 1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 1.2.1 General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations Refer to PTS Requirements, General Definition of Terms, Abbreviations & Reading Guide PTS 00.01.03 for General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations. 1.2.2 Specific Definition of Terms NoneHAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY PTS 16.71.03 May 2014 Page 7 of 30 1.2.3 Specific Abbreviations No | Abbreviation Description 1 | HseMs Health, Safety and Environment Management System 2 | Heme Hazards and Effects Management Process 3 | PHA Process Hazard Analysis 4 | moc ‘Management of Change 5 | cimaH Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards 6 — | 00s0 Demonstration of Safe Operation 7 | Psi Process Safety Information a | tor Terms of Reference 9 | Her Hazard and Effect Register 10 | cces Center for Chemical Process Safety 11 | Lopa Layer of Protection Analysis a2 | HAZID Hazard Identification 13 | ara Quantitative Risk Assessment | 1s | PFS. Process Flow Schemes 15 | PEFS Process Engineering Flow SchemesPTS 16.71.03 heen ore pansy Tar PETRONAS _ [Page 8 of | vo | treatin — 16 csDs Chemical Safety Data Sheet 21 FMEA | Failure Mode Effects Analysis 1 suman orouncts ‘This PTS 16.71.03 replaces PTS 60.2209 (December, 2010)20 2a 24a 2412 243 214 245 2.16 27 22 224 224 PTS 16.71.03 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAz0P) STUDY May 2014 Page 9 of 30, GENERAL REQUIREMENT TECHNICAL CONSIDERATION Design review shall be conducted prior to HAZOP study. The comments and agreed actions must be incorporated into the design in order for the HAZOP study to be effective. HAZOP study shall be included in the Project Schedule on the critical path, with the availability of PSI (refer to PTS 18.53.03) The HAZOP study team shall consist of multi-disciplinary personnel due to the brainstorming methodology relies on the broad experience of the team to identify potential hazards and operability problems (refer to section 2.4). HAZOP study Leader shall be independent of the specific facility / project under study to ensure impartial assessment. Faclity/Project owner shall approve the HAZOP study final report. The relevant Facility/Project Owner for each HAZOP Study shall be accountable for the implementation of the HAZOP study recommendations. Responsible action parties (e.g, designer, operation, engineers) shall be responsible for the closed out of the action items, Each Facility/Project Owner should develop their site specific HAZOP study TOR/procedures based on this PTS. HAZOP STUDY LEADER Roles & Responsibilities ‘The main role of the HAZOP study Leader can be broken down into the following sections: i. Preparation ji, Facilitate the HAZOP study lil, Produce HAZOP study report, iv. Clarification of HAZOP study recommendations (if required) Competency HAZOP study Leader shall be certified by PETRONAS or its approved equivalent certification ‘with minimum competency requirement as follow but not limited to: |. ExperiencePTS 16.71.03, HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY [NAZOP) STUDY May 2034 mas Page 10 of 30 a) Has work and acquire skills in the oil, gas and petrochemical industry, both in theoretical and practical application of the design and operation of oil and gas production/pracessing facilities. b) Adequate knowledge of equipment, procedural and human failures that can lead to major incidents, with a sound appreciation of process design and safeguarding. c) Adequate knowledge of process, equipment, procedural and human failures that can lead to major accidents, with a sound application of process design and operation. ji. Training a) Attended recognized HAZOP study leadership course, which meets the requirements of this PTS. b) Undergone mentoring with subsequent recommendation from a competent HAZOP study Leader. ©) Appreciation of other risk assessment techniques (e.g. LOPA, HAZID, ara) fil, Facilitation skills a) Hazard identification skill b) Suitable application of the HAZOP study methodology to identify significant hazards and issues. jv. Time management skills a). Ability to plan the study in depth and estimate the time required for the HAZOP study. This includes maintaining the pace and momentum of study and suitable allocation of time for deliberation of issues. v. Communications/motivation skills a) Able to keep the team’s focus and working together and motivate all members of the team. b) Form 2 good working relationship with the Scribe and supervise the Scribe's work to ensure that adequate minutes are recorded. 2.3 HAZOP STUDY SCRIBE 2.3.1 Roles & Responsibilities The role of HAZOP study Scribe is to record discussions during the HAZOP study. The record shall be complete, clear, and accurate. This includes a complete record of points discussed and not just a record of recommendation.PTS 16.71.03 AZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 Page 11 of 30 232 Competency HAZOP study Seribe should have training and experience similar to that required by the Leader. The Scribe should also be able to take minutes in a concise and accurate manner. 2.4 — HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBERS 24.4 Roles & Responsibilities HAZOP study team members are responsibie for providing essential information and input through active involvement in workshop and contribute their skills, knowledge and experience to the process. 24.2 Competency HAZOP study team member should have minimum competency requirement as follow but not limited to: Sufficient experience and knowledge of respective area and discipline both in theoretical and practical application of the design and operation of the facility / unit under study. Team member shall have sound knowledge in codes, standards, Adequate knowledge to anticipate potential equipment, procedural and human failures operational with a sound appreciation of process design and safeguarding. Detail description of function for individual discipline for HAZOP study team member is summarized in Appendix 1PTS 16.71.03 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 Page 12 of 30 3.0 THE TECHNIQUE OF HAZOP STUDY 3.1 HAZOP STUDY IN A PROJECT LIFECYCLE During a project lifecycle, different types of HAZOP studies are applied at different stages during course ofthe project as demonstrated in Figure 3.1. The sequence of HAZOP studies should be planned, varying in scope from conceptual to detail. Details of each type of HAZOP study in a project lifecycle (based on PETRONAS Project Management System, PPMS) are described in Appendix? FRONTENG LOADING Figure 3.1: Sequence of HAZOP Studies throughout a Project Lifecycle 3.2. HAZOP STUDY IN EXISTING OPERATING FACILITY 3.2.1 Facilityin Operation Existing facilities have an inherent hazard potential and may undergo modifications or debottlenecking several times. Whilst, older facilities may never been subjected to any HAZOP study or other comprehensive safety studies. Therefore to demonstrate adequate management of hazards for existing faclities, PHA study is required and HAZOP study shall be the main methodology.3.2.2 33 PTS 16.71.03 [HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY ‘May 2014 Page 13 of 30 Revamp/modification projects (brown- Id developments) HAZOP study shall be conducted on relevant MOC to ensure that the proposed modification is safe and operable. interfaces between the modification and the existing facilities must not jeopardise the original design basis of the facilities. ‘The requirements when preparing for a HAZOP study on a brown-field project are: Sufficient information shall be available to the HAZOP study team to assess the simultaneous operating mode risks. The design must clearly identify and address simultaneous operating modes whilst the new facility is being constructed and commissioned li, The physical interfaces of the new with the existing installation shall be clearly shown on the HAZOP study drawings. Prior to the study the process engineer shall analyse the extent to which the process parameters change within the existing facilities due to the modification (including those that have to be made to other systems to accommodate the new facilities, e.g. changes in relief valve sizes) iii, Nodes should include all parts of the existing facilities where a change in process conditions is caused as a result of the modification. Likewise the operator shall analyse the applicability of existing procedures to the modification and the applicability of any modified procedures to the modifications as well as to the existing facility Iv. The selection of the nodes for a modification HAZOP study should reflect the interfaces with, and allow analysis of, the effects on the surrounding systems. The HAZOP study should focus on ensuring that the philosophy is consistently applied across the modifications to achieve a safe design. vi, Sufficient design and operating information must be available for all common systems (vents, drains, etc.) as well as the existing facility local to the tie-in points liable to be affected by the new development. vil, The interfaces between the new and existing facility {tie-in points, etc.) must be sufficiently understood and documented so that the team can establish if any hazards can crass the boundary, INTERFACE WITH THE HAZARD AND EFFECT REGISTER (HER) The HER shall provide information of the HSE hazards pertinent to the facility/project to the HAZOP study team as part of the information package for the HAZOP study. Once the HAZOP study completed, the HAZOP study final report shall provide the reference to the HER for detail scenarios and safeguard of process hazards in the facility/project,PTS 16.71.03 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 Page 14 of 30 3.4 HAZOP STUDY METHODOLOGY 3.4.1 PREPARATION Activities that shall be carried out prior to HAZOP study sessions to ensure effectiveness of. the HAZOP study is described below: Team Selection HAZOP study Leader shall identify the balanced team members to provide an appropriate level of project/process knowledge coupled with independent members providing relevant expertise based on the scope of HAZOP study stated in the TOR. Appendix 4 provides a guideline on selecting HAZOP study team members. Resource Planning and Scheduling HAZOP study Leader shall ensure the followings are available; i. Update and finalized information package (e.g. PEFS, CSDS / MSDS, plot plan, Cause and Effect Diagram) li, Tools (e.g. briefing package, software) i, Administrative requirements (e.g. oom, refreshments, meeting notification) HAZOP study Leader shall plan and schedule the HAZOP study based on the node identified to optimize time and resources.1516.71.03 | HAZARDS AND OPERABLY (WAZOP) STUDY May 2014 Page 15 of 30 3.4.2 CONDUCTING HAZOP STUDY The HAZOP study work flow is summarized in Figure 3.2 below. The work flow is also applicable for other HAZOP study techniques e.g. Batch Process, Activity Base and Procedural Divide System into Node Define Node and Design Intent ¥ Select Parameter and Deviation + Identity ll Possible Causes + ‘Assess all Credible Consequences | Identify Existing Safeguards J Propose Recommendations (if necessary) a Last Deviation? >= a = peat No last Node? J ves ESPTS 16.71.03 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 Page 16 of 30 Figure 3.2 HAZOP study work flow Establish Scope of HAZOP study HAZOP study Leader shall establish the scope of the study stated in the TOR, appropriate HAZOP study technique and the assumptions with agreement with team members to be applied throughout the studies. Basis of HAZOP study is as follow but not limited to; Only single failure results in hazard ~ no double jeopardy. Facilities are well maintained and operated with acceptable standard and in accordance with applicable Operating Procedure. Piping, valves and equipment are well designed, with proper material selected, installed, maintained and inspected regularly under a wall thickness/corrosion ‘monitoring program. Equipment, valves and piping have been given adequate design pressures and adequate maximum and minimum design temperatures, reflecting start-up, operation, capacity changes and shutdown conditions, Safeguards (e.g. PRD, SDV, etc.) failure is not a cause of a process devistion since itis expected to function and maintained according to its performance criteria Piping and instrumentation diagrams reflect actual field conditions. Fire protection and mitigation equipment is installed, adequately sized, functional, and tested as necessary to ensure reliability. (Over-pressuring and exceeding design specifications have the potential for loss of containment (LOC), and any LOC of hydrocarbons may cause a fire or explosion should it reach a source of ignition, Electrical classification of equipment is correct for the hazardous material in the unit, Check valves associated with this unit wil likely prevent reverse flow, but not necessarily reverse pressure. External forces, such as tidal waves, hurricanes, tornadoes, acts of sabotage, etc. will not be considered in this HAZOP study. Careful consideration should be taken when applying these assumptions so that significant hazard will not be overlookedPTS 16.71.03 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY Mey 2014 Ona Page 17 of 30 ide System into Node HAZOP study Leader and with agreement with team members shall determine the selection of the node sizes and the route through the systems before starting the study. HAZOP study Leader shall select and mark up the nodes in the document for differentiation and assist the study. ‘The HAZOP study Leader shall select the nodes based on; i. Manageable segment of system which has distinct design intent. The node, typically comprise one major equipment (vessels, etc.), associated minor equipment (pumps, valves, etc), instrumentation, and other ancillary equipment ction of Process flow fii, Start and end at an isolation point (valve or equipment item) of where the line enters or leaves the PEFS Define a Node and Design intent HAZOP study Leader with assistant with team member shall define and record the node land its design intent. The design intent should provide specific information on how the ‘node will be operated under all system operating conditions (described parameters such as pressure, temperature, flow rate, level, etc), HAZOP study team member should give a brief description of the design intent and also specific hazard at the beginning of each node and give a brief step by-step description of start-up and shutdown actions. Select Parameter and Deviation HAZOP study Leader shall select and record the parameter and deviation relevant to the ‘nodes, mode of operation and HAZOP study technique applied, Appendix 3 shows the list of parameters and guidewords normally used in various types of HAZOP study technique,P15 16.71.03 | HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY {HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 Page 18 of 30 Ident all Possibl HAZOP study team shall identify and record all possible causes of a node guided by the parameter and deviation selected. ‘The possible causes shall be within the node (Except for nodes at interfaces, battery limit or beginning of a system), credible and specific in the description. Avoid double jeopardy scenarios but not to be mistaken with latent failure. Brainstorm and list all the possible ‘cause before proceeding with the consequence. Assess all Credible Consequences HAZOP study team shall assess and record the credible consequences of each cause by assuming there is no safeguard in place. The consequence statement shall consist of the initial system response to the worst credible consequence. Consequence also can be upstream or downstream of the node Under study but not as detail as within node. Consequences should consider the effect to People, Environment, Asset or Reputation Identify Existing Safeguard HAZOP study team shall identify and record the existing safeguards. The safeguards can be within of outside the node (upstream or downstream).Safeguard shall be able to address causes and consequences. Safeguards can be categorized into these three types: i. Prevention - prevents deviation from happening (e.g, check valves, relief, trip system) Detection - detects causes or consequences (e.g. alarms, gas detectors) Mitigation - control or reduce the consequences (e.g. fire fighting system, tank bund } Credit to operator intervention in responding to alarm can be considered only if operator: 1. Is aware of the process deviation {i.e. alarm to DCS panel) ii. Has a simple obvious possible response. li, Has sufficient time to respond to an alarm (for analysis, decision and response time). In this case, the alarm would be considered as a safeguard, as the opposite of the operator response which is not considered independent; iv, Inthe case of a manual work, operator training can be taken as a safeguard for ‘a manual activity with the presumption that the operator is physically there toPTS 16.71.03, HAZARDS AND OPERA May 2014 peraonas Page 19 of 30 35 monitor the manual work and hence can respond to any deviation from normal, Propose Recommendations HAZOP study team shall propose and record recommendations when they feel that existing safeguarding system is nat adequate to protect the system under study. The HAZOP study recommendation shall address the cause and/or the consequences. HAZOP study team shall propose recommendations and the underlying rationale. Recommendations should be presented in the form: 1. What is required to be done li, Where the recommendation applies li, Why the recommendation should be implemented (to avoid what) Risk ranking of recommendation is not required for HAZOP study other than for existing, facility cyclic PHA study. HAZOP study Leader shall identify action party for any recommendation(s) issued. Recommendations can generally come in two forms: |. Definitive ~ Recommendations that are implementable as they stand, li, Initiating - Recommendations that initiate further work to clarify the required Actions HAZOP STUDY RECORDING AND REPORTING HAZOP study discussion shall be recorded in HAZOP study worksheet (see Appendix 4 for typical HAZOP study worksheet). The record shall be complete and accurate. This includes recording all deviation discussed even though the deviation does not cause significant consequences and no recommendation generated. HAZOP study Leader shall prepare the HAZOP study report after completion of a study. The HAZOP study report is an important document describing the objectives and success of the whole study and is used to compile and preserve the results of the study for future reference. HAZOP study final report format shall contain the follow reporting contents as shown in Appendix 5, The draft final report shall he reviewed by relevant parties prior to the formal and, timely issue. HAZOP study final report shall be distributed to relevant parties affected by the HAZOP study.PTS 16.71.03) HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 BETIONAS Page 20 of 30 36 a7 37. 37, IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS AND FOLLOW UP. The recommendations arising from the HAZOP study shall be presented to the Facility/Project Owner by the HAZOP study Leader or representative. This provides an opportunity to challenge the recommendations and to agree on actions, assign responsibilities and define priorities for implementation. Where the priority of a Fecommendation is downgraded or the recommendation is rejected, this shall be supported by a sound justification and formally documented. (OTHER TYPE OF HAZOP STUDY TECHNIQUE Other variation of HAZOP study technique for special cases or situations are; i. Batch Process ii, Activity Based il, Procedural 1 Batch Process HAZOP Study ‘The HAZOP study method for batch processes deals with each part of the facility in exactly the same manner as the more familiar method for continuous processes. Differences occur when the team examines the changes in facility configuration as the steps in the batch process are progressed. The status of the system changes frequently and in order to perform an adequate study, the valve positions and process conditions must be adequately described for each separate stage. As these are normally cyclical operations, it may be necessary to prepare diagrams showing the status of each line and vessel throughout the process. Operating instructions, including logic diagrams or instrument sequence diagrams, are essential in understanding the steps. Time-dependent concepts (sooner/later) are added to the guide words. 2 Activity Based HAZOP Study The activity based HAZOP study technique consists of the systematic critical search for deviations and hazards applied to activities and the facilities involved in operations. The technique examines sequences of mechanical and manual handling operations. Such activities may be: i Drilling ji, Unloading at a jetty iil, Well workover iv. ShutdownHAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY PTS 16.71.03 May 2014 Page 21 of 30 The basic technique is the same as other HAZOP studies. Specific activity guide words, ete: are used. These include incorrect activity and the time/movement elements of movement and early/late operation. Additional parameters included are: time, decision and position, The recommendations from an activity based HAZOP study are not necessarily limited to the operating procedures. Changes both to the design of the equipment and the operating. procedures may be suggested 3.7.3 Procedural HAZOP Study Procedural HAZOP study can be perform to evaluate each steps during development of procedure and also a structure methodology for revising/modifying procedures. They are usually conducted on the activities such as: i. commissioning inspections start-up maintenance v. facility testing shutdown emergency abnormal ‘The standard guide words of No, More, Less, As Well As, Part of, Reverse and Other Than take slightly different meanings. The results will specifically affect the procedures and in some cases may have an impact on the design of the equipment.40 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (WAZOP) STUDY BIBLIOGRAPHY PTS16.71.03 May 2014 Page 22 of 30 In this PTS, reference is made to the following Standards/Publications. Unless specifically designated by date, the latest edition of each publication shall be used, together with any supplements / revisions thereto: PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS Index to PTS and Guideline PTS Requirements, General Definition of Terms & Reading Guide Health, Safety and Environment Management System Hazards and Effects Management Process Design Management of Change Process Safety information Process Hazard Analysis Design integrity INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Third Edition, 2008 PTS.00.01.01, PTS.00.01.03, PTS 18.00.01, PTS 18.04.02 PTS 18.05.05 P1s18.53.01 PTs 18.53.03, PTS 18.53.04 PTS 18.53.06 (ccs)PTS 16.71.08 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 PeTHONAS Page 23 of 30 APPENDIX 1 ~ HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBER FUNCTIONS Type of HAZOP ‘eam Member rote Ray couse] oetat ] ini | Firat | eaten Jrrocedua Free Wionde eperiie_on the Engine process design andintended ‘Speration of te ality. Has 2° full krowleage of the sign history of the part of the fat blog studied 35 wall as 8 deep overal Understanding ofthe whole fact Prsectengnear | Powe the commerce 3 wos techie constants fon the projec Speraters | Frode epee Personnel information on intended work practices 96 ell 95 fwpeience of "operating ceauipment. tthe study tnderaien inns a | ¢ | c fe |e | ce c c ansacto's design phase, ‘he foiity/Proeet Owner shall supply the operational Input rather than the Mamierance | Provide exoetse Personnel ‘nlornation on Siro equment ‘maintenance onthe Tnaroment | Prowde sparse on [conwat Instrumentation onto and Systems sutomate preection Exgircer fevers and thor appleation. TSE taghnee | Provide eaeribe on speci. consequence assesment (fame length. ete) hstovial tae} e | e |e fe | e P ° probabties and spect Fegulllons or Standard Cr a specalets | mochinery and package | @ |p | pe |e |ePTS 16.71.03 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP] STUDY May 2014 PETRONAS Page 24 of 30 Vendors Provide exerine on vendor representatives. | designs who te pacage Studied.” The level of representation wit depen | @ | |e ‘nthe ste and omplety of the pacage | Gniy Sewer | Provide — awperise on Engincers | evl/strctral and spestie sectors ofthe facity.e@ | 4 |p |p ainage outing Spacalat TProide eerie on pee Engineers | dcpine. Examples would (oe be the need for electra! Itsrumentaton | engineers when conedering ec, | he intertace between | @ | oe |p r fomosion ete} | power tities and the fact, andthe potest for common mage aes,PTS.16.71.03 HAZAROS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 setsonas Page 25 of 30 APPENDIX 2~ DETAILS OF HAZOP STUDY TYPES IN PROJECT LIFE CYCLE TOFS owerpon Taine &Docometion sped purpose rest Taeaeara be | Te easraneno eae | Te Cae RIO wy | TR tiedearyina. | wanopstdysiyatyatine | petermed on Froshowre | wternst romctivewiee | erdefeedetpmetat [Sithemaprinctte | spprpateime ffoeratmineanay | trepraprsbasttrdsen. | examen Teer oer totunertedengn’ | Tresotmenereactesae. | Soee'stommetne | geatar an cera an incynberenynte, | studies rts mamensrcepoky. | « rocessrowsenenes os | opine nedeug and | Ssparang Thetchayianiiea | © formes osinee tmomicomenfint | iment ino ssmatmumaert | eomcn ‘ewan wih sou use tie sues = Pon Stops ote shed Ts stuor” | Seedereognen, | mayan mayo base process Myc wsveson pies | He fac fer season! Phicsonn « Preia ering a vanes ple Inout oak Hibs wamay | Tavs sano Fa | The DaaTRATOP maar s —| Te daar Thadestartortny | Weent ofthe weet Fertinedontetoporee | tense! the projetesrgtnerst spectrom rose iomend | Fordetenapoleraces | sed shoud Kmvesrd | necinseiars” | tagmeengtiow schemes | ennngur athe Searesingatine | pre (rusiserevottytne | Sordsened Sihenos Tmcetogecingfow | amuetote tts stv ere ws Samoebensvestiey |" shames er) ‘Gioia nazar stay | totter intnepotand | « pocesrow sthomeses) | sidered by omal | inormaton or ambesinewst | Spot ran ManonentotGunets | gomie Gealtnapeceotine | SCosea ete bigrns | cbecivestheaurence of | tnowede ofthe Sosun TORENT’ | insesateyottecorent | team Sra ‘ign cn to crime s terotecton prams | fer than aking ada oe invaders ‘comme Legend ders acs population denies td infantrctar re particular sensitiv oc fers arse, ete) (Operating Piosopy SE Safety Pey? Posepny rarunton Ponty Previous HAZOP sud fiat poration its changePTS 16.71.03 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY. May 2014 personas Page 26 of 30 AROP Swat | oesrpion | tng Ooconetain | Stone Pupore reste THREATS — | HERVE RETRESRTAT | TASTE RIOT ASRS Snenioeceus [tneaswdceiensngs | oxtanatorstoy pine | renigine forse ocext | hencremograeatyto | wocndeaiatece mst | doers be trttestn oases | pportorcassacson ne | sestsestntos neste | titan te nengvancatne | Pes srobe ore dedeoncnuningen tne | Hho Study Seaitaeorsnay |epearoranctin | chmgertthedesn and | verse (hejsondaréandagreé on | thsna vendor dct, | Compe, The emaunazon [Ttalsuayis | Sapestarme nator Siete wuazor | esartouse | scyan changer thts ost Gfargernadetoe | fooving to say nouste trate once te Segre taroeuen | corey toma ‘sammonasion {ifopaanigs | rage of chong, Sorina ‘cating oe Snetnen Connactostin porter gn ctr a ne oper Srabayot ven The mtg | Wy Ted ——] TOP a cy — TTT dimiaratntale, | Manogenertetcan cin | ottrminorchanaetothe | nto te titzorsoiors | Beapetastanysagenine. | sang: towng he Dts | say shod brow tlt Secgndercipmentor | Natorsuyto contrat | xp a the anon | sonnet SStrqurcopestanotene | tiecngatn th cegnt | ars ened ines tenytesnproponé | doesnaaneciesstey ot | matovee cys Cioger mecocunene | Sevan ay Sherer wae VEO yt cao he ‘omatono rowed othePTS 16.71.03 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY May 2014 pevaowas Page 27 of 30 APPENDIX 3 ~ LIST OF PARAMETERS AND GUIDEWORDS. DEVIATION HAZOP TYPE PARAMETER ‘GUIDEWOROS conTmUOUS | BATCH — | PROCEDURA PROCESS. process | L/acnuiry | Flow NO. v ‘MORE LESS a ‘REVERSE MASORECT PRESSURE ‘MORE y LESS y Levee ‘MORE x ‘TEMPERATURE ‘MORE n E55 TIME NO. ay ‘MORE y y TESS n WOR x 2 SAME. n x STEP TOO LATE v TOO EARLY y UeFTOUT . BACKWARD. 5 ‘ACTION NONE: v REVERSE (WRONG) ¥ r ‘MORE v x ess n v ‘SEQUENCE ‘OTHER THAN v y INFORMATION NONE —_ x REVERSE (WRONG) x MORE Less x RELIEF ‘oTHea THAN z [-CONTAMINATION. ‘OTHER THAN 7 y IGNITION / sraTiC ‘OTHER THAN v yf LUTIUTY FAILURE ‘OTHER THAN x x "ABNORMAL OPERATION ‘OTHER THAN y 7 ‘SAMPLING ‘OTHER THAN y y "MAINTENANCE ‘OTHER THAN y x ‘CORROSION/ EROSION. ‘OTHER THAN x ri FACILITY STING ‘OTHER THAN y y [HUMAN FACTOR ‘OTHER THAN y zno aL HO won| wean | an nog| —_exoy a “a 1a | swouvawammonsy | ONTOS | coxanaswoo | sasm | nouwmaa | vaawvaw |ovomaains ror :epou ea area snon wey Avediwo anu patos 132HSNMOM AGNLS dOZVH W9IdAL- b XIONaddV og jaz a%eg 7102 hen 40z¥H- Aons ALmIOvUad0 ONY SauvZvH 010-97 Sia sBaystiom APms doz‘PTS 16.71.03 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY STUDY - HAZOP May 2014 ETRONAS Page 29 of 30, ! APPENDIX 5 ~ HAZOP STUDY REPORT CONTENT ‘The HAZOP study report should contain the following sections: 1.0 2.0 3.0 40 Introduction The introduction to the HAZOP study report should contain short descriptions of the following: ‘+The background to the project and the scope of the HAZOP study. ‘© The purpose and achievements of the meeting should be described ©The terms of reference given prior to the HAZOP study and other safety studies or HAZOP study reports used for reference. ‘© Schedule of the meeting ‘© The composition and affiliation of the team including the attendance of part-time members at each session © Methodology of HAZOP study adopted stating any variations from normal HAZOP. practice for the study. © Facility areas not covered because they were outside the scope of the study or documentation or key personnel were not available. © Description of the facility. Quality of the study An objective assessment of the quality of the study and the reliance, which may be placed on the results based on tearm composition, experience and their performance. The main study findings should be discussed in the report. A list of the (top ten or so) major issues is helpful to the response co-ordinator in expediting the important ones first. Areas of Pote ‘Weakness, Highlights potential weakness of the study such as a lack of specialist knowledge or incomplete drawings. HAZOP Study Recommendations List of all agreed HAZOP study recommendations and action parties| mien] | HAZARDS AND OPERAGILITY STUDY - HAZOP May 2014 PeTRONA Page 30 of 30 5.0 Further Studies Required Additional risk assessment studies that may be required to further analyse the hazardous scenarios e.g. FMEA, LOPA, ORA. 6.0 Appendices ‘The appendices should contain the following information: © Ust of guide words used © Node list © Worksheets © Drawings (master set) + List of background reference documents,