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SYLLECTA CLASSICA 20 (2009): 171–213
Robert L. Fowler
2 Not actually the ordinarius for Greek philology, but technically of rhetoric as
successor of Ernst Curtius (1814–1896); the former post was occupied by Adolf
Kirchhoff (1826–1908). Friedrich Althoff (1839–1908), Vortragender Rat in the
Prussian Ministry of Culture and responsible for universities, engineered his transfer
to Berlin from Göttingen. For Althoff and his management of university appointments
in the great age, see Brocke (1980), Calder (1989), Domaschke, Rüegg 135.
in the most detailed history of the period. There are several reasons. Of
course Wilamowitz was a very great scholar, and one would hope that
any serious practitioner would wish to read his works and contemplate
the circumstances in which they were written, both for their intrinsic
interest and instruction, and as a way of reflecting on one’s own scholarly
environment. But this is only part of the story. From the standpoint of
the early twenty-first century one would say that Wilamowitz is not like,
say, Casaubon or Scaliger, Heyne or Welcker. He is a watershed in the
history of classical scholarship; however much fashion has changed, there
is little doubt that his all-embracing and (as we would say) multi- and
interdisciplinary approach to the study of antiquity, itself an inheritance
from Boeckh and especially Welcker,5 but realised on a scale far beyond
anything seen before, fundamentally shaped the course of Classics in
the twentieth century. One can identify several critical junctures in the
history of our studies: the Peripatos, and its descendants in Alexandria
and Pergamon; Byzantine encyclopaedism; the Italian Renaissance; the
Enlightenment and its nineteenth-century avatars. Wilamowitz is clearly
one of the latter; but it is not so much the application of nineteenth-
century scientific method that distinguishes him, but the joining up
of history, philology, archaeology, art, religion, etc., to attain a richly
textured and fully rounded understanding of ancient life and culture;
the whole animated by passion, enlivened by the keenest historical vi-
sion, and embodied in a truly enormous output. As is often pointed
out,6 he reunified and revitalised a tradition whose separate streams were
running into the sand. Any book would illustrate his procedures, but if
one had to pick a single work it would probably be the commentary on
Euripides’ Herakles, whose impact upon its appearance was electrifying.
Almost without exception, all subsequent commentaries on tragedy and
comedy work along the same lines, whereas those preceding it come
from a different world of variae lectiones and grammatical notes. That
historical roundedness—thick awareness, to adapt a phrase—is probably
his most lasting legacy; it represents a cognitive shift.
On the other hand, one must add to the list of sea-changes the
mid twentieth-century revolution in humanities, in which approaches
5 For Welcker, see Calder, Köhnken, Kullmann, and Pflug (1986), (1981) 34–51.
Welcker is the first scholar mentioned in the list of formative influences; he is preceded
by Lessing, Plato, and Goethe.
8 See Gründer; Wilamowitz (1929) 128–30; Silk and Stern 95–109; Calder (1983a);
Goldsmith, esp. 583–87; Mansfeld.
FOWLER: WILAMOWITZ IN OXFORD 175
happened, those who know the name only by this route would indeed
not know it at all. But the quarrel is ultimately only an interesting co-
incidence, adding spice to the underlying issues. People get worked up
about Descartes, even if they detest him, because he still matters. The
twentieth century did not quite succeed in killing European rational-
ism or the Enlightenment; yet though they will not easily regain their
throne, and probably should not, a third way is not obvious, and is
complicated by the religious element in contemporary global politics.
For classicists, Wilamowitz (or for those who have not read him, what
they think he stands for) still matters; but the difference between clas-
sicists and Wilamowitz on the one hand and philosophers and Descartes
on the other is that philosophers are not worried about the survival of
their discipline.
Then there is scholarship, culture, and politics. In the same academic
session as Wilamowitz was honoured, Oxford bestowed a degree on Kai-
ser Wilhelm II.9 Europe was soon to tear itself apart in hideous conflict.
We cannot, from our viewpoint, help but consider events of this decade
in the light of the ensuing catastrophe. It is hard to make allowances
due to the ethos of the time for the strong nationalism in Wilamowitz’s
writings. It is harder still to retain a guiltless pride in the achievements of
European and Western civilisation which is historically the descendant
of classical antiquity. No one in Wilamowitz’s day doubted the essential
(in a strong sense) link between Classics and Europe. If insiders cannot
identify their own myths, this particular one, the myth of a European
(superior) essence, did not become fully apparent to Europeans until
much more recently than the end of WWI, so deeply rooted was it. But
the Great War began the work of deconstruction and disillusion. Before
the war, Wilamowitz’s German patriotism is on display most obviously
in Aus Kydathen,10 but he was not overtly involved in politics until 1914.
He then became very outspoken, advocating a strongly conservative line
on war policy. He was Rector Magnificus of the University of Berlin
in 1916. In his speeches he defended German militarism—which he
claimed was not at odds with German scholarship—and protested Ger-
many’s innocence; he believed that total victory was the only response to
9 It was conferred at a ceremony 15 November 1907 at Windsor Castle, rather than
in June at the Encaenia in Oxford; see Pogge von Strandmann 87.
10 He was a veteran of the Franco-Prussian War 1870–71; see Wilamowitz (1929)
105–26.
176 SYLLECTA CLASSICA 20 (2009)
a naked attempt to destroy his country and the freedom of its citizens.
He was a signatory to the infamous Aufruf an die Kulturwelt signed by
93 German professors; though he foolishly gave his name without see-
ing the outrageous final version, which he and many others regretted
afterwards, he never disavowed the substance and wrote a similar, if
milder, statement for all Hochschullehrer, which was signed by more
than 4000 teachers of higher education—that is to say, nearly every last
one of them in 53 institutions.11
Given his time and place, Wilamowitz’s actions bring the issues
around scholarship and politics into acute focus. On the one hand, by
contemporary standards he was no chauvinist; like everybody else, he
thought in terms of essential national characters, and certainly believed
in German excellence if not superiority, but often spoke warmly of the
virtues of other nations and did not think Germany had a right to con-
quest. On the other hand, he spoke rather too much and too passionately
about these essential differences between nations and their necessary
connection with culture and universities, such that his argument for
unity-in-difference in the international republic is self-deconstructing,
and as we would see it, symptomatic of the whole problem. The locus
classicus in his works is the speech delivered to an international gathering
at the centenary of the Humboldt University in 1910, and reprinted at
the end of his Erinnerungen, which were written in 1928, in vain hope
and in spite of the lessons of the Great War (which, to be sure, few if
any had yet learned). The speech vacillates sentence by sentence between
the unity of scholarship in the service of Truth, and talk of national es-
sences and differences, by implication each with their own Truth: who
has the real Truth, and to what lengths would one go to defend it? One
expects such nationalism in the writings of the period, and one can just
about accept it by realising that no other way of thinking could even be
imagined; but it is not easy. In a similar way, the anti-Semitism in the
discussion of the Jews in the Erinnerungen (38–41), painfully clear to a
holocaust refugee of my acquaintance who could bring himself to read
no further, merely reflected the attitude of many contemporaries (not
only in Germany, and not necessarily worst there), and in Wilamowitz’s
11 For a superb discussion of these issues, see vom Brocke (1985); for “more than
4000,” see esp. 651. Vom Brocke reprints both documents, which can also be found
in Böhme 47–50; see also von Ungern-Sternberg. Some of Wilamowitz’s speeches
were published in instalments as Reden aus der Kriegszeit (1915–16); for a full list, see
Armstrong for the years 1914–19.
FOWLER: WILAMOWITZ IN OXFORD 177
case did not translate into actions against individual Jews. Far from it:
he despised this kind of anti-Semitism, and furthered the careers of
Jews in German universities (where there was such anti-Semitism), just
as after the war he did more than some others to restore international
relations among scholars. Nevertheless, from our point of view, when
Wilamowitz defends the militarism of German society and the Prussian
ethos, or when he speaks like that about Jews, it is very hard not to feel,
at the very least, uneasy; some will be simply revolted.
Yet of all possible reactions, smug complacency is surely out of place.
None of us can know what stance we might have taken had we lived
then, or what stance we might in all earnestness and conviction of truth
adopt in the future, despite the lessons of history. It is a particularly rep-
rehensible form of this smugness to dismiss Wilamowitz as a proto-Nazi.
There is for a start no evidence for this preposterous but persistent idea;
rather some evidence to the contrary.12 Hitler capitalised on anger about
Versailles, but not all those angry about Versailles supported Hitler. There
is a world of difference between fascism and Wilamowitz’s aristocratic
view of the proper place of democracy. In the 1920s he largely withdrew
from public engagement. There is something more than disinterested
judgement going on in this hostile attack, which curiously has spared
12 See vom Brocke (1985) 714 ff. (including cases where Wilamowitz supported
liberal politicians), and the extract from a 1929 letter to Adolf Erman published by
Goldsmith 612: Erman had written “Among my ancestors are three Frenchmen and
a Jew, so I cannot claim to be a pure German nor even a ‘pure Aryan’. Naturally I am
wicked enough not to believe in these advantages of the ‘pure race”’; Wilamowitz replies,
“Your family history is a truly rare advantage, not only because it is a splendid rebuff
to the race hounds.” “In the historical forecourt of Nazism there have been gathered
in the course of time Luther, old Fritz and Bismarck, Wilhelm Busch, Struwwelpeter
and Grimms’ Fairy Tales: why not try it with Wilamowitz?” writes Kassel in his review
of Calder (1985) 542, in response to Luciano Canfora’s essay “Wilamowitz: ‘Politik’
in der Wissenschaft.” Wilamowitz’s opinion of Hitler is not recorded, but Lloyd-Jones
is right that he would have regarded him as a “socialist and a guttersnipe” (1990,
400). Latest to try is Flaig, arguing (for instance) that when Wilamowitz diagnoses
a monotheistic tendency in Greek religion he is anti-Semitic because his real aim is
to deny credit to the (of course unmentioned) Jews. Wilamowitz was hardly alone
in this idea; what is going on here is a desire by those raised in the Judaeo-Christian
tradition to graft the Greek tradition on to it, and assimilate the latter to the former,
rather than cut the former out. Nietzsche’s ridicule of the practice as Christian hits
the mark (see Henrichs 1986, 203 f.). Anti-Semitism would be more justly diagnosed
in Gladstone’s work on Homer’s religion, for which see Lloyd-Jones (1982) 110–25.
178 SYLLECTA CLASSICA 20 (2009)
Struth only first for-yesterday is one, and struth the second of the
Williamsonian Forreadings, struth in your name but still none-
theless on that account to my house directed, to me come. The
therewith however accompanyingly enclosed letter stated, another
Forreading, and struth the by rights first one, namely Apollo,
be already begun, will however only first after onetwo weeks be
postally offsent. Struth already the history writing one is well good
six hours in Delivery to occupy likely, and all whatsoever even
only moderately intelligible englishing strongestly resists. The your
devotedest G.M.20
Cuts were duly made.21 In the same letter, Murray expresses the sur-
prising view that he thought the lectures not up to Wilamowitz’s usual
17 See Calder (1979).
18 For Gilbert Murray (1866–1957) see Wilson; R. L. Fowler (1990); Bierl.
19 “Murray wird für mich zwei Vorträge übersetzen, die ich Anfang Juni in Oxford
halten soll, von der Universität ganz officiell eingeladen, wo ich denn nicht ablehnen
durfte, so schwer es mich belastet, zumal ich englisch gar nicht reden kann” (Tièche 20).
20 New Bodleian Library, Murray MS 459 12, quoted by Wilson 129, who is doubtless
right that “struth” represents “zwar.”
21 A longer version of the “history writing one” appeared in the fourth edition of
Wilamowitz’s Reden und Vorträge 216–46 as “Griechische Geschichtsschreibung,” but
it is clearly not Murray’s original.
180 SYLLECTA CLASSICA 20 (2009)
the historiographical piece, Paul Shorey at any rate wrote a rave review
in Classical Philology,25 stressing its stimulating insights; it is hard to see
why Murray found it wanting.
Some contemporary impressions of the visit survive. There is first
of all a report in The Times of 8 June, p. 11D:
27 Arthur Hunt (1871–1934): ODNB xxviii 835–36; Bierl, index s.v.; Huxley
543–44. With B. P. Grenfell (1869–1926; ODNB xxiii 706–07; Wilcken 557–60)
Hunt published the text as POxy 852; their notes incorporate the comments of various
scholars including Wilamowitz. The definitive text is by Richard Kannicht in TrGF
V; commentary by M. J. Cropp in Collard, Cropp, and Gibert’s Euripides: Selected
Fragmentary Plays. See also Collard and Cropp’s Euripides: Fragments, vol. 2.
184 SYLLECTA CLASSICA 20 (2009)
where once the founder of the College, Henry VIII,28 and Anna
[sic] Boleyn had slept, to go up to Grenfell and Hunt at Queen’s
College and cast an eye on their papyrus treasures (though to be sure
there was no Ibscher)29—all of this was in its way as enchanting as
a long drive at Windsor amid blooming rhododendra as high as a
man, or to be present at a regatta at Cambridge.30
28 Henry VIII completed Christ Church; Magdalen was founded in 1448 by William
of Waynflete, Bishop of Winchester.
29 Hugo Ibscher (1874–1943), the founder of papyrus conservation; see Sinz; Gundel.
As Oliver Primavesi points out to me, Wilamowitz’s point is not that Grenfell and
Hunt were inferior to Ibscher, but that the Oxford team in these early days lacked his
kind of specialist contribution. See Wilamowitz (1903) 3 for Ibscher’s work on this
papyrus. Sinz tells a story of Wilamowitz presenting Ibscher to the Kaiser when the
conserved papyrus was handed over to the Royal Museums.
31 (1960) 591. Like other arcana quoted in The Prussian and the Poet, this reference
is owed to P. G. Naiditch.
32 For Sandys see Hammond. The Oxford degree was not conferred at Encaenia (24
June 1908) by which time Wilamowitz was back in Berlin: Oxford University Gazette
no. 1243, vol. XXXVIII, 824. It was decreed by Convocation on 2 June (OU Gazette.
no. 1240, vol. XXXVIII, 702); I have not located the text of any oration that would
have been given by A. D. Godley (ODNB xxii 581) who, though not elected Orator
FOWLER: WILAMOWITZ IN OXFORD 185
Wilamowitz was the greatest foreign classic whom I had the honour
of receiving, in 1908, when he too came for an honorary degree,
and may have been a good deal puzzled by the May races to which
I took him, introducing him to Walter Headlam there. It was but a
few days later [18 June 1908] that Headlam died, and Wilamowitz
sent me some beautiful Greek elegiacs in memory of him.33
The May Bumps are not so very difficult to understand, after all, except
in name (they come at the end of the May term, in June); at any rate,
Wilamowitz appreciated their spirit, which he recalled years later in
commenting on the first stanza of Pindar’s fifth Isthmian.34
The two lectures may be briefly summarised. “Greek Historical
Writing” advances the thesis that the Greeks “were even further from a
genuine science of history than from a genuine science of nature” (4).
It opens with a comparison of Gibbon35 and Plutarch, who, in spite of
differences in temperament, were neither of them researchers in the strict
sense, discovering no new facts: they worked from available sources,
and added their interpretations. Similarly Livy “accepted the tradition
as he found it” and shaped it in the spirit of the rhetor and in the tone
of Augustan romanticism, “not only without research but without any
feeling for what we call historical truth” (4). Modern scientific history is
scarcely more than a century old. Yet just as modern research on natural
science rests on Greek foundations, so does modern historiography. A
brief survey of other ancient and medieval traditions (Indian, Egyptian,
until 1910, acted for W. W. Merry while the latter was Vice-Chancellor, and for some
time beyond; see Merry 95. Possibly a text lurks among Godley’s papers in the Bodleian.
33 204f. The elegiacs were published in CR 22 (1908) 63 = Wilamowitz (1938) 30.
36 Grenfell and Hunt (above, n. 27); the reference is to POxy 842 = FGrHist 66, the
Hellenica Oxyrhynchia; it is idle to speculate if Wilamowitz would change his view of
Theopompus if he did not accept his authorship of the papyrus.
FOWLER: WILAMOWITZ IN OXFORD 187
that they ignored Mr. Dryasdust,37 the tedious collector of facts, who
“is no very agreeable companion, but he is indispensable” (25). Then
the peroration, whose point comes as a complete surprise:
37 The Rev. Jonas Dryasdust, fictional antiquarian in Scott’s The Antiquary, and the
dedicatee of Ivanhoe; but just as famous from Carlyle’s “Anti-Dryasdust,” his remarkable
Introduction to Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches. “Sei nie zu vornehm wie
Carlyles Mr. Dryas Dust zu arbeiten” is half of one of the antitheses in Wilamowitz’s
philological catechism, Erinnerungen (1929) 104; he mentions Carlyle also in his Latin
autobiography (Calder, 1981) 160. Silk and Stern shrewdly guess that Nietzsche is
one of the “very famous persons” who according to Wilamowitz have ignored Mr.
Dryasdust to their detriment in modern times.
38 “Greek Historical Writing,” 25. Aesch. Ag. 312, 314, with δρόμοι mistakenly
quoted from memory for νόμοι.
FOWLER: WILAMOWITZ IN OXFORD 189
it, Apollo remains an unsolved problem. Against the Asiatic thesis, for
which Wilamowitz marshalled a strong case, powerful objections have
been raised (but it still finds its champions); the favourite alternative is
Burkert’s updated arguments for Müller’s Dorian god,42 which has more
adherents but cannot be said to have won the day. If we are dealing with
the syncretism of several similar deities, Greek and pre-Greek, the process
lies deep in pre-history, and cannot be unpicked on current evidence.
Wilamowitz of course knew nothing of Linear B and regarded Homer
as close to the beginning of Greek history. His hope that further knowl-
edge of Lycian might contribute to a solution is, however, apposite (32):
not long after he died a god Ap(p)aliunas turned up in a 13th-century
treaty, not in Lycian but in Hittite, between Alakšandu of Wilusa and
the Great King Muwattalli II, which at the very least supports some
kind of Anatolian connection.43
The general outlook on religion is of greater interest.44 Wilamowitz’s
historical analysis of the god is to be expected. In the wake of Welcker
and especially of Müller, and reacting to nineteenth-century symbolic
approaches to Greek religion, in which gods could be reduced to abstrac-
tions or ciphers for the weather, he aimed at detailed reconstruction of the
historical circumstances of the lived religion, and imaginative recovery
of the feelings of the believers. A particular bugbear for him was the
practice of etymologising, pseudo-history if ever there was, undeserving
of any credence; the immediate target of his jibe was Hermann Usener’s
Götternamen (1896).45
Set against the historical analysis, however, are some powerful preju-
dices about true religion, which render the analysis more schematic and
42 Burkert (1975); cf. Graf in Brill’s New Pauly Vol. 1, 851, and at length in Graf
130–42, 184.
43 The facts are accessible in Latacz (2004) 40 with n. 47, 103–12; see also Graf 136.
45 Henrichs (1985) 278–90. On Usener, see also the perceptive assessment of
Landfester (1979) 160 ff., and particularly Bremmer. Ironically enough, Welcker was
sympathetic to symbolic interpretation, and Müller had a somewhat complicated
relation to it; on the latter, see Blok.
192 SYLLECTA CLASSICA 20 (2009)
less fine-grained than would satisfy today’s historian, and at bottom are
thoroughly subjective. For Wilamowitz true religion is a matter of faith
not cult, and the best religion is that of the great artists and thinkers.
The title of his last book, The Faith of the Greeks, from the start attracted
adverse comment if it did not raise a smile. Though on the one hand
he recognises the existence of many Apollos, on the other he constructs
a single Apollo from the writings of the elite, so as to be in a position
to say that this Apollo represents only one side of Greek religion. The
whole vision and the best of Greek faith was for Wilamowitz represented
by Plato, who provided him quite literally with his own religion: fidem
profiteor Platonicam, Eduard Norden reports him saying, and he meant
it in all seriousness (668).46 He characterises Apollo as rationalist, not
otherworldly or mystical.47 Being a god whose message is neither other-
worldly nor supernatural, he cannot be Platonic. Reason is only a part
of Plato’s scheme; necessary too is the fire of emotion, specifically Eros.
The Hellenic vision is rational and emotional in due measure, eyes fixed
on the other world but with no unGreek mysticism. True religion, we
infer, is otherworldly but not mystical, a distinction that must be difficult
to preserve in many real-life situations. It is a necessary distinction if
Wilamowitz, having accepted Nietzsche’s dichotomy, is to avoid rush-
ing from the rejected Apollo into the arms of the mystical Dionysus.
We infer too that true religion lacks theology, at least of the hard
kind; Wilamowitz being an unphilosophical sort of person, this view
is unsurprising. Of all philosophers Plato is most apt to appeal to the
unphilosophical reader. The idea that his is the truest Hellenic religion
is not, however, a view shared by every modern scholar. A line of inter-
pretation descending from Schiller and Goethe through Nietzsche and
Erwin Rohde to Walter F. Otto, E.R. Dodds, and Hugh Lloyd-Jones
draws a very different picture of the nature of Greek divinity and its
relations with mankind, stressing as the most fundamental point that
gods are immortal and humans are not; whereas for Plato and his master
46 The same sentiment repeatedly occurs also in the Latin autobiography (Calder,
1981). At his 60th birthday celebrations he declared Platonicum me esse profiteor:
Reinhardt (1966b) 365. See further below.
47 Michael Konaris points out per litt. that this comes from Müller vol. 4, 399 (cf.
Müller 1979, vol. 2, 289–90). Also from Müller is the rejection of the solar theory (vol.
2, 284 ff.). But Müller is one of those for whom Apollo is the most Greek of gods; so
too Curtius 48. Curtius like Wilamowitz stresses the role of Delphi.
FOWLER: WILAMOWITZ IN OXFORD 193
Socrates, the soul is immortal and joins the gods after death, and our
purpose in life is to discover what god thinks is right and best and to
make our behaviour conform to these notions.48 Orphic influence is
obvious in Plato, and to the extent that we adhere to a dichotomy of
mainstream (polis) religion vs. subterranean streams such as Orphism,
we will deny Plato a central place (if we even enter into the game of
constructing the “truest” Hellenic religion). We have more evidence for
Orphism and similar mysteries than Wilamowitz did, and the dichotomy
has come under pressure, but it is still easy to maintain that Plato’s ap-
proach is not at all typical of ordinary Greeks. Curiously Wilamowitz
does acknowledge the early existence of Orphism, but obviously would
not wish to consider it the decisive influence on Plato, given that ac-
cording to him it contributed to the disintegration of Greek culture. His
idea is rather that Plato, out of his own genius, took to sublime heights
the best aspects of Greek gods as objects of faith as represented in the
best writers such as Pindar or Aeschylus.49 Of this complete Greek faith
Apollo could only represent a part, if a noble part. Dionysus remains
irredeemably foreign; in this Wilamowitz rejects Nietzsche, wrongly as
we would now think; he is right, however, to reject Nietzsche’s aberrant
idea that Apollo is a god of illusion (as is acknowledged by his followers
mentioned above).
The statement that the Apolline religion is not at all typical of
Greeks of the great period, Sophocles excepted, is the kind of paradox
Wilamowitz enjoyed perpetrating. Most of his contemporaries would
have regarded the white-marble, ethereal, perfectly beautiful statues of
Apollo as quintessentially Greek. Wilamowitz found idealising classicism
repellent—an “abomination,” even50—and antithetical to true histori-
48 Burkert (1985) 1 notes the modern tradition, most easily accessed via Lloyd-Jones
(1983); cf. “Ancient Greek Religion and Modern Ethics,” in Lloyd-Jones (2005) 415–32.
49 On Pindar and Aeschylus see Wilamowitz (1932) 129–38 (126–36 in the 1955
reprint); on Plato, 246–60 (244–57). See also Wilamowitz (1920) 193 ff., 251
n. 1 on Orpheus. Henrichs (1985) 304–05 documents Wilamowitz’s hardening
skepticism about early Orphism in the course of his career. For his loathing of
mysticism cf. Wilamowitz (1932) 205 (1955, 202): “Die Hellenen, welche den Perser
zurückgeschlagen hatten, konnten für weltflüchtige Gefühle nicht empfanglich sein”
(“The Greeks who beat back the Persian were not receptive to world-renouncing
feelings”).
50 Letter to W. Schadewaldt published by Calder (1983b) 257–63; cf. Schadewaldt.
194 SYLLECTA CLASSICA 20 (2009)
Then you are shot of classicism: but then you are in a position all the
more to recognise what is truly classic and therefore incomparable
and eternal (Wilamowitz 1929, 203).
and future. For that one needs a cool head, but a heart burning
with love. Only Eros leads to the vision of truth, and the eternally
living (Wilamowitz 1929, 104).
And finally, others reveal the link with deep personal conviction:
The central thesis, that the Greeks had no scientific history, is not one
that would seem very helpful to scholars today. The result is a foregone
conclusion, given the definition of history. The Greeks cannot win at this
game (neither can Gibbon). Yet at the same time, Wilamowitz wants to
rate the Greek achievement higher than anybody else’s in antiquity. He
arrives at this estimate by making a distinction, surely futile, between
Greeks and other nations who had only historical narratives, but no
historians. Thus the Greeks got started on the path to scientific history,
and nearly got there with Thucydides, but for one reason or another
were baffled in their progress. Every one of the numerous historians sum-
moned for examination fails in respect either of the rigour of research
or of the purpose to which the research was applied. The paradox that
the Greeks had on the one hand the first historians but on the other no
history is one which Wilamowitz frankly acknowledges in the longer,
German version of this lecture, without realising the damage it does to
his thesis.57 The apparent failure to question his key concept of scientific
history would have seemed disappointing, if not jejune, to philosophers
of history even of his day, and might be damningly criticised as itself a
failure of historical imagination.
Yet—and this happens all the time with Wilamowitz—while espous-
ing a thesis we would today regard as a non-starter, he delivers himself
of remarks in passing that strike one as just, as worth following up, or
as anticipating later work: the comment about what modern historians
would do in the Alexandrian library, for instance (and wouldn’t we think
we could do more?), or the remark that ancient psychology regarded
woman or child as imperfect man, or the observation that history was not
one of the seven liberal arts but was a species of rhetoric, or (in “Apollo”)
the comment that “the being who was like this Night can scarcely have
been a sun-god,” or that the god “is not permanently in his temple, but
comes there, invited and welcomed by his special communities or the
choir of dancers which represents them” (33).58 The comparison with
historical novels anticipates a large body of twentieth-century theoretical
work; with respect to Ctesias, a recent article advises readers to appreciate
57 Above, n. 21. Similar views are expressed also in the 1917 address
“Geschichtsschreibung” (1972d).
58 This anticipates Otto’s description of Apollo as “Gott der Ferne” (53). The sun-god
hypothesis has been revived by Moreau.
198 SYLLECTA CLASSICA 20 (2009)
him in precisely this light.59 And typically too when his passion carries
him away Wilamowitz produces one of those magnificent contradic-
tions that rescue the whole enterprise. Had he stopped before he turns
“in mere justice” to consider another side, the lecture would have been
irredeemably naive. Until that point we have (bons mots apart) nothing
but unproblematised objectivity vs. subjectivity, modern science vs.
ancient bellettrism; thereafter come much more interesting nuances,
and a confessio fidei. Wilamowitz would clearly never be willing to col-
lapse utterly the distinction between history and historical novels, as the
Flaubert example shows,60 but he is willing to let the ancients have their
way if they choose to call Ctesias an historian. This opens the door a tiny
crack on the possibility of a different paradigm. Then the peroration
takes us in entirely new directions: no longer the detached observer of
given phenomena, the historian, it seems, must animate the phenomena
before they can be received.
The “blood for the ghosts” line is famous.61 I suppose one’s first
assessment of it is that it is a poetic and memorable way of saying that
the scholar most have the utmost intensity of commitment. But the
implications run much deeper. Wilamowitz’s claim is that the ghosts
will not even speak if we do not thus feed them. Without such sacrifice
the tradition is silent, and you will not even get it to yield answers to
your questions, much less true ones. The reward for the sacrifice of one’s
59 Stronk who overlooks Wilamowitz’s lecture; he does however cite Die griechische
Literatur des Altertums (1912) 98: “Ktesias hat den ersten historischen Roman
geschrieben.”
60 In “Geschichtsschreibung” 141 f. he has slightly more to say about historical novels,
the best of which he views in a very positive light.
61 Gilbert Murray cited it in his inaugural lecture, “The Interpretation of Ancient
Greek Literature” (“As was said in this room last year by the great leader of contemporary
Greek scholars…” 1909, 19); another Regius Professor, Hugh Lloyd-Jones, borrowed
it for the title of a book. Silk and Stern have spotted that Wilamowitz was not the first;
none other than Nietzsche could be the unacknowledged source: “These works can
only survive through our giving them our soul, and our blood alone enables them to
talk to us. Real ‘historical’ discourse would talk ghostly speech to ghosts. We honour
the great artists less by that barren timidity that leaves every word, every note as it is
than by energetic endeavours to aid them continually to a new life” (Nietzsche 126).
One wonders if there is a common source in the German classics, or a scholar like
Welcker; I have yet to find it.
FOWLER: WILAMOWITZ IN OXFORD 199
62 (1913a) 98–119, esp. 108f. The text is quoted at Braun 40. Braun’s essay collects
and astutely comments on many other pertinent quotations.
63 “Der griechische Unterricht auf dem Gymnasium,” 77–89; “Der Unterricht
im Griechischen,” 90–114; “Die Geltung des klassischen Altertums im Wandel der
Zeiten,” 144–53.
200 SYLLECTA CLASSICA 20 (2009)
the Greeks, so that their greatness was appreciated for much sounder
reasons. These researches also made us realise more and more just how
like us the Greeks were (“Die Geltung des klassischen Altertums,” 151).
This is another article of faith, that the Greeks are Menschen wie du und
ich; and it is another article that separates Wilamowitz from his suc-
cessors, for whom the alienness of the Greeks is established doctrine,
springing from the anthropology with which Wilamowitz was out of
sympathy. Though modern anthropology is in spite of some disclaimers
a universalising discipline, its starting point is difference; one studies
other human societies as an outsider. A classicising view of the past
makes its objects not so much different as unreal, of a different order:
demigods, not people. Wilamowitz wanted the Greeks to be understood
in real terms, so that we could see just how good they really were. He
acknowledges that one could study any past society and derive valuable
lessons, but argues for the primacy of Greece in education first on the
grounds that every aspect of European civilisation is imbricated with the
Hellenic heritage, which is indispensable for its understanding (ibid.).64
But that is a matter only of relative values; ultimately, we have the great
works of art, the great thoughts, the great men. It is these that have
again and again revitalised civilisation. A classicist understanding of the
past cannot explain this power; it is the contact with historical reality,
not idealised abstracts, that fires the soul. What makes these artworks,
thoughts, and men great is their contact with the Platonic forms; they
impart a glimpse of eternal truth.
One can almost follow this: if you accept that there is a realm of
eternal truth opposed to worldly half-truths and falsehoods—and many
people do—then maybe you can accept that some societies, like some
individuals, collectively arrive at a better understanding of that realm
than other societies. They are simply better, and thus more worthy of
our study and imitation. But it must be admitted that this is strange
talk for an historicist, and not much different in the end than the talk
of the classicist, especially when linked to absolute, eternal values, of
which the Greeks happen to possess more than anybody else (“more than
all of history”). Moreover, when Wilamowitz descends from this lofty
level of generalisation to give some indication of the specific content
of this eternal Truth, it turns out to be the kind of thing seized upon
by generations of classical schoolmasters as the wisdom of the ancients:
patriotism, piety, duty, and so on.
64 He makes similar point in the Vorrede to the Griechisches Lesebuch v–vi.
FOWLER: WILAMOWITZ IN OXFORD 201
65
Cf. e.g., Wilamowitz (1889) 257, (1929) 104. See Henrichs (1985) 289; see also
Henrichs (1986) 225.
66 “Wenn sie uns dann Rede stehen” is the original of Murray’s “if they then abide
our question” as it appears in the 1925 version (Wilamowitz 1925).
67 I owe this striking formulation to Professor Bonnie Honig of the American Bar
Foundation and Northwestern University, whom I thank for stimulating comments.
She writes: “The historian demotes the god by giving him a history, but the classicist
gets the satisfaction of reverence that godliness grants. That is, the choice of subject
is vexed…but it is also a way for the Wilamowitz to give voice to this fundamental
tension—to perform it.”
202 SYLLECTA CLASSICA 20 (2009)
a proud and, as we would see it, naïve belief that he could actually think
himself into the mind of the past and see it for what it really was. He
does at least recognise that history is an ongoing dialogue between past
and present, and that every age reinterprets the past for itself. Like most
scholars then, however—and probably now, in spite of the rhetoric—he
still wants to maintain that truth is the object, and that somehow we
must cast out the subjective elements, even if our mortal condition, as
Socrates realised, condemns us to having no other way to undertake
our task but with tools compromised by subjectivity. Partial though our
successes can ever be, and condemned to be superseded, nevertheless it
is our duty to seek Truth.
It is the rhetoric of objectivity and truth that has led to the common
view of Wilamowitz as an arch-positivist. If one googles “Wilamowitz”
and “positivism” it takes little time to compile a list of representative
quotations. This is a rather nice example of presentism. Every age likes to
conceive of itself as more sophisticated than its predecessor, so a rhetorical
construct exists in which the previous age is “positivist” as opposed to
our “postmodern” times, the former naively believing in Truth and the
latter knowing better. Wilamowitz having the reputation of the greatest
scholar of the former Age, and predisposed like everybody else then to
believe in objective truth, is made into the straw man of stereotypical
positivism. This is only true in the flabby sense of “positivism” prevailing
nowadays. But it must be obvious from everything that has been said
up to now that Wilamowitz was no positivist. Positivism is the enemy
of metaphysics and therefore of Hellenism as he understood it.68 He
knew perfectly well that his scholarship was shot through and through
with values, which created a very difficult tension between objectivity
and subjectivity, at its starkest in the “blood for the ghosts” passage, in
which successive sentences state the opposite poles of the dilemma. As
further witness of his anti-positivism one may cite this passage from the
early work Aus Kydathen, which refers to the archetypal application of
Comte’s original positivism, botany:
ungoethisch: “Ohne jeden Zweifel ist Goethe gemeint. Und das paßt auch inhaltlich,
denn Goethe ist dem (Neu)Platonismus nahe verwandt. Er ist überzeugter Pantheist
und Spinozist, glaubt an die allbeseelte Natur, en kai pan, an die Great Chain of Being,
‘ungoethisch’ und ‘ungöttlich’ sind in diesem Sinne also klare Synonyme. Der ‘kalte’
Positivismus würde diese ‘warme’, harmonische Naturphilosophie unterminieren,
so scheint mir Wilamowitz’ Argument zu lauten.” Goethe and Plato were the two
foundations of Wilamowitz’s formation: see the Latin autobiography (Calder 1981);
Wilamowitz (1929) 65; Dubischar.
204 SYLLECTA CLASSICA 20 (2009)
71 It is worth noting that the enmity, though inherent, became acute only as
nineteenth-century historicism became ever more scientific; eighteenth-century
classicism was decidedly historicist as compared to early modern appreciations of the
Classics, as Hölscher (1995) points out, following Reinhardt (1966a).
FOWLER: WILAMOWITZ IN OXFORD 205
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