Turning Regulation into Business Opportunities: A Brief History of

French Food Mass Retail (1949-2015)

Adam Dewittea

Corresponding author. Email: adam.dewitte@iae.univ-lille1.fr

Sebastian Billowsb

Xavier Lecocqc

a
IAE Lille, University of Lille, Lille, France

b
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany

c
IAE Lille, University of Lille, France and IESEG, France

1
Turning Regulation into Business Opportunities: A Brief History of
French Food Mass Retail (1949-2015)

The French retail market stands out among its European counterparts as being
more concentrated. Relative to its neighbors, it has a higher number of large
stores, such as hypermarkets. This article explains the origins of this market
structure by assessing the impact of regulation on the French food retail industry
between 1949 and 2015. Despite legislation aimed at curtailing their growth,
retailers were able to circumvent legal constraints. Over the period considered,
three ‘regulation-adaptation’ loops are described. Retailers’ responses to
regulatory regimes affected both the bargaining mechanisms with suppliers and
the business models they used to sell their products. By turning regulation into
business opportunities, French retailers have managed to create a powerful
oligopolistic industry, and are now among the largest retail groups in the world.

Keywords: retail; regulation; business model, store format; bargaining

mechanism

2
Turning Regulation into Business Opportunities: A Brief History of
French Food Mass Retail (1949-2015)

Introduction

French food retailing stands out among its European counterparts in two respects. First,

while in other European countries, such as Italy, the market is still dominated by small,

independent retailers, French retail is highly concentrated. In 2017, the market is

dominated by two retailers: Carrefour and E. Leclerc, who each control 20% of the

market. Overall, in France, the six largest retailers account for almost 90% of total food

sales. Some of them have thrived abroad: Carrefour is now the third-largest retailer

worldwide, and four French players are among the ten largest European retailers.1

Figure 1. Market Shares of Major French Retailers.

(Figure 1)

Note: from Kantar Worldpanel. Market shares were measured over a 12-week period ending in
February 2017.

Second, French retail is characterized by larger stores than elsewhere. Hypermarkets

and supermarkets are the dominant format. All 590 outlets run by French retail giant, E.

Leclerc, are hypermarkets. Carrefour runs convenience stores, supermarkets, and 242

hypermarkets. All other major French retailers also run hypermarkets. In other

European markets, consumers prefer small convenience stores and discount outlets. For

instance, in 2007, the combined market share of German convenience stores (of area

<400m²) and small supermarkets (of area 400-1,000m²) was 55%.2 While extremely

widespread in Germany, hard discount is comparatively small in France. Lidl, the most

successful hard discounter in France, only accounts for 5% of the food retail market.

Among its neighbors, French retail truly epitomizes the large ‘multi-outlet firms’

described in the retail-development literature.3 This structure, however, is an unexpected

3
outcome. Since the 1950s, the French state has introduced several pieces of legislation

to prevent the decline of small, independent shops, and to monitor and limit the growing

market power of French retailers vis-à-vis their suppliers. According to the OECD,

French regulation of retail is the most restrictive in Europe, the outcome of fifty years of

close monitoring of retail activities by the state.4 As we shall see throughout the article,

rather than hindering the high concentration of the French retail sector and the

prevalence of hypermarkets, the regulations introduced by the state actually increased

those characteristics. The very large size of French food retailers is both a cause and a

consequence of the regulatory framework applied to them. Starting in the 1950s, the

rapid growth of retailers and their subsequent hegemony over traditional retailers and

suppliers caused alarm, leading to rules to protect suppliers, and bans on the creation of

new stores. Yet, French retailers have consistently turned regulation into new business

opportunities, and have been able to gradually grow in power and size.

In most Western European countries, small-scale, atomistic competition

characterized the post-World War II retail industry. Some 20 years later in France, the

UK, and Germany, atomistic structures began to be replaced by oligopolies of large,

multiple retailers.5 Over the same period, retailing in the US has also been ‘transformed

by a progressive concentration of capital which has created an industry dominated by

“big capital” in the form of large multi-outlet firms’.6 This shift goes together with the

introduction of self-service, instead of counter-service and diversified selling (of both

food and non-food items) instead of specialized selling. In addition, larger retailers have

been quick to exploit ‘the advantage of operating a diversified structure of stores,

including small, local convenience stores and kiosks, as well as medium-sized

supermarkets and large, out-of-town and edge-of-town hypermarkets and superstores’.7

Thanks to this multi-format approach, they became able to exploit the full potential of

4
self-service and to overcome changes in the competitive environment and in the tastes

of consumers.

The literature on retail change contains many explanations by historians and

geographers of how those new retail business models came about.8 However, retail

change was not linear and did not display an identical pattern across every European

country. That is why many researchers have become interested in the ‘significant and

dynamic variations in the timing and extent of retail change’.9 They have set out to

explain the specific characteristics of national forms of retail development. While these

authors consider both internal and external factors,10 we focus here on external factors.

In particular, we are interested in the effect of the legal environment on retail change.

Assessments of the effect of regulation on retail change and retail development

has already been carried out in several case studies on national retail markets. As

highlighted by many, the rise of a ‘new order’, after the Second World War, was very

much an outcome of changes in political regulation,11 which led to unprecedented

institutional changes in retail.12 This idea goes back to E. R. Beem,13 who already

considered regulatory constraints as a significant determinant of post-war retail change.

Research on retail’s legal framework has highlighted how political action influenced the

industry’s competitive environment.14 For instance, in post-war Italy, public authorities

limited the ability of retailers to compete with each other, which enabled retailer

associations to ‘exercise a quasi-corporate power to limit competition and innovation

within the distribution sector’.15

Studying regulation and the legal context has helped account for differences

between one country and another. For instance, differences between British and US

retailing in the 1980s were, to a large extent, due to ‘the differential nature of the

regulatory environments in which the industries operated’.16 According to Wrigley, ‘the

5
urban and regional structure of grocery retailing in the two countries has been

fundamentally shaped by antitrust (competition) legislation’.17 Regulatory devices, such

as RPM (Resale Price Maintenance) in the UK, and the Robinson-Patman Act in the

US, helped sustain smaller independent grocers by offering protection against larger

chains. In most cases, ‘the specifically retailing-oriented policies that have emerged in

most [western] nations have been of a restrictive rather than a supportive nature’ in

terms of retail innovations, although, ‘various specific types of retailers (usually small

and/or traditional ones) have, at times, benefited from handicap legislation imposed

upon competitors’.18 For instance, devices used by public authorities to restrain the

growth of large retailers have included land-use controls, store-hour limitations,

discriminatory taxes or anti-price-discrimination legislation. But those regulations have

had unanticipated effects: ‘In the short or medium run, the policy of protecting small

retailers has usually succeeded in slowing down retail innovations. However, in the long

run, economic and other factors have usually nullified or greatly reduced its

effectiveness. […] Finally, one should not overemphasize the role of public policy

because many changes in retailing actors, business models, processes, structures, and

functions have succeeded or failed in the absence of, or in spite of, relevant policy’.19

Although a major focus of the retail-change literature, there has been little work

so far on the effect of regulation on the evolution of French retail.20 Rather, historians of

French retail have focused on the internal factors associated with retail development and

change, such as the role of entrepreneurs or technology adoption.21 Conversely, the

literature on French retail regulation disregards change and considers each piece of

regulation without questioning its roots.22 Yet understanding the real impact of

regulation on the business strategies and the business models adopted by mass retailers

requires a longitudinal approach. In this work, we focus on two types of regulation that

6
were used by the French state to slow down the development of mass retailing:

competition law and rules restricting the opening of new stores. A large part of French

competition law covers the relationship between retailers and their suppliers. Rules

prohibiting below-cost resale and price discrimination have had a huge impact on retail

development in France. Since the Royer Act was passed in 1973, the opening of new

stores has been authorized only if stringent conditions are met. Analyzing French retail

in this light, and comparing it with other national markets, helps explain the regional

differences in European retail.

Research Design

Qualitative research methodologies have long been used in disciplines other than

management sciences. They contribute to an approach where the aim is to ‘respect the

time dimension; assess the causality and make fruitful explanations’.23 Since our period

starts as early as 1949, there was a need to collect historical data. There are three main

types of sources for historical materials: primary (archives), secondary (published

material), and tertiary (work on the topic by historians and those from other

disciplines).24 Historical data is found in archives.25 ‘Whether they are written or oral,

ancient or contemporary’, archives reflect the reality of the firm. Their use in

management science can ‘produce knowledge on practices and trends’.26 According to

Kenneth Liparito, archives ‘produced during the time under study are the best primary

sources’.27 The artifacts that may constitute an archive are extremely diverse: movies,

books, and data stored on computers. In the end, we believe that ‘everything is

source’.28

To perform this study we have mainly investigated two collections: the Etienne

Thil Collection (at the Archives Nationales du Monde du Travail), the archive collection

7
of Intermarché group. Because we lack a strong historiography on retailer-supplier

relationships,29 our material also comes from newspapers published during the period

we studied. A press review covering the period 1953-1987 was conducted using Le

Monde, a well-regarded French newspaper. The selected articles were used to identify

the major changes that affected the consumer market over our period. Other sources

used during this research were: ‘Les Cahiers de l’ILEC’, an official publication of the

Institut de Liaisons et d’Etudes des industries de la Consommation (a trade organization

founded by large suppliers in 1959) and ‘Libre-Service actualités’ (LSA), a press

magazine founded in 1958, specializing in retail. LSA is a weekly magazine read by

both retailers and suppliers. On the public-sector side, we analyzed the Revue de la

Concurrence et de la Consommation, the official journal of the former Direction des

Prix (the National Prices Authority). Founded in 1977, and published quarterly, it

contains reports from the Direction Générale de la Concurrence et de la Consommation

(DGCC, the National Competition and Consumption Authority) as well as economic

and legal analysis produced by civil servants and academics.

Moreover, we conducted five semi-structured interviews (four with ex-CEOs of

a top-five retail group and one with the chairman of a trade body) and held informal

discussions with senior managers from the retail industry at trade fairs, colloquiums,

etc. The interviews were used to strengthen the results of the secondary data analysis.

This helped us corroborate the multiple causal links between retail business models and

the regulatory barriers identified. Using a combination of both interviews and archive

collections as ‘data collectors’ allowed us to simultaneously approach both the

unintentional and intentional evidence in our data gathering30 and to carry out an

indepth investigation of our topic, particularly in the determination of causality.31

8
 Our study focuses on a single topic:32 the French food retail industry. ‘The

typical approach in business history research is the ‘descriptive’ case study. The use of

case study analysis is crucial for the advancement of business history and has important

corollaries in other fields, such as management and organization studies’.33 Here, we

consider the case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary

phenomenon within its context’.34 This is ideal for an exploratory and abductive

approach,35 such as the one followed in this paper.

The methodology is applied from 1949 (when the first discount shop appeared in

France) to 2015. Thus, we conducted a chronological analysis of the case.36 The

investigation carried out allows us to ‘establish facts, combos, causes and

responsibilities’.37 According to Antoine Prost, such an investigation will highlight the

hotlines, ruptures, and changes in management practices, to give them a time dimension

without turning away from the present.38

The Royer Act (1973) and the rise of retail giants

The Origins of French Mass Retail

The rise of French mass retail began in the 1950s. Two innovations fueled this

phenomenon. First, the introduction of discount retail, which challenged the ‘push

system’, where upstream players dominated the supply chain.39 Small shopkeepers shied

away from price competition. According to a civil servant who was active during that

period, French shopkeepers tacitly agreed with each other on a standard 25% margin.40

The new discount retailers, such as E. Leclerc, fought for a ‘pull system’, where they

bought products in bulk and cut prices. The first discount-based store was opened in

1949 by Edouard Leclerc in Landerneau. At first, it was simply a local shop where

Edouard Leclerc applied low margins (around half the average margin in the industry)

9
on his products. From 1955, he offered other shop owners the opportunity to join his

organization and combine their purchasing activities. By 1959, there were 24 members

in his group.41 Together, they intended to use their bargaining power to lower prices and

increase their competitiveness. By doing so (selling at lower prices and cutting

margins), Edouard Leclerc triggered the rise of the modern food-retail industry in

France.

The second innovation that fueled the rise of French mass retail was the

supermarket. Invented in the United States around 1915, the supermarket can be

characterized as an outlet with self-service, fixed prices, and checkouts.42 In the 1950s,

Edouard Leclerc was very skeptical about the supermarket model, let alone self-

service.43 Despite this, other entrepreneurs began to copy the American retail outlet

model, which led to the first French supermarket being built in 1957. The French

business community became aware of the supermarket model as a result of ‘productivity

missions’.44 Until the end of the 1950s, however, the rate of increase of supermarkets

remained slow, compared with other European countries. As Jean-Claude Daumas

noted, ‘by mid-1959, France had only three [supermarkets], compared with 86 in the

United Kingdom, 34 in Germany, and 22 in Switzerland.’45

The real surge in French food mass retail took place in the early 1960s. In 1963,

Carrefour opened the first French hypermarket in Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois (Essonne).

It represented a revolution: 2,500m² of retail space offering a very wide range of

products. ‘Everything under the same roof’ became the core principle of the

hypermarket model. The origins of Carrefour were very different from E. Leclerc.

While E. Leclerc operated as a franchise of independent shop owners, Carrefour was an

integrated company. While E. Leclerc stood against established shop owners, Carrefour

was founded by Marcel Fournier and the Defforey brothers, who had already been

10
successful as shop owners and opened their first supermarket in 1959. Yet, it took

several more years for the supermarket and hypermarket business models to become

truly established in France. By the end of the 1960s, the country had more than 100

established hypermarkets, alongside 200 supermarkets. In 1969, E. Leclerc followed

suit and opened its first hypermarket.46

Early regulatory responses to the rise of mass retail (1959-1969)

At first, the French government took sides with the emerging supermarket chains. In

1960, to fight against ‘sales refusal’ and ‘discrimination’, the government introduced

the ‘Fontanet’ Regulation.47 It targeted suppliers who had repeatedly refused to sell their

products to the new mass retail chains. Instead, suppliers preferred signing exclusivity

agreements with smaller retailers, thus discriminating against the newer retail outlets.

Allowing large retailers to put pressure on suppliers was popular. At that time, there

was a growing consensus that the retail system was too fragmented. As early as 1952,

an article from a mainstream newspaper complained about the fact that France had ‘one

shopkeeper for every 32 inhabitants’. According to the article, France was lagging

behind Britain, a much more efficient country, with only one shopkeeper for 68 people.

Large suppliers protested against the Fontanet Regulation. As allies of the large

suppliers, in what can be described as a push system, small shopkeepers were also very

critical of it.48 Eventually, the regulation effectively prohibited suppliers from setting

minimum prices and refusing to sell their products. Consequently, retailers became free

to buy products from suppliers and sell them at their own prices.

The business model of independent shopkeepers was completely overtaken by

the new form of retailing developed by E. Leclerc and his successors. Their ability to set

much lower prices than traditional small shops immediately satisfied consumer

11
preferences. However, although public authorities ruled in favor of modern retailers and

against large suppliers, they were also concerned about the adverse political effects of

the rise of mass retail. Small store owners tried to fight back by mobilizing public

opinion against government retail policy. They launched new movements and initiatives

to defend themselves against nascent supermarkets and hypermarkets; examples

include: the UDCA (Union de Défense des Commerçants et des Artisans), which was

created by Pierre Poujade in 1953, or CIDUNATI (Comité d’Information et de Défense

et d’Union Nationale des Travailleurs Indépendants) created by Gérard Nicoud in 1969.

These movements sometimes resorted to violent, disruptive action. On April 9, 1969,

Nicoud attacked a tax office, and, by doing so, became the figurehead of the small

shopkeepers’ struggle against modern retailers.

Against this background of social discontent and strikes, and fearing the

radicalization of these movements, the government decided to limit the creation of new

supermarkets and hypermarkets. The ‘Royer’ Act was passed in December 1973,49

following an initial regulation in July 1969.50 This was the first major law regulating the

opening of new stores. From then on, retailers had to obtain agreement from local

authorities every time they wanted to open a new store with more than 1,000m² of floor

space (or 1,500m² in a town with a population over 40,000).

The paradoxical effects of the Royer Act

Although many new stores were turned down under the Royer Act (83% of applications

were refused in 1978), the act did not prevent new large retail shops from opening.

Rather, it had the opposite effect: an even more rapid disappearance of small shops.

Independent retailers collapsed: Montlaur, Euromarché (both acquired by Carrefour),

Rallye (acquired by Casino), and others disappeared from the retail landscape. Against

12
increasingly powerful groups, which only faced local competition with no viable

external threats (authorizations to build were not granted to large foreign retailers),

small independent retailers had no choice but to differentiate heavily, something that

increased business risk and, therefore, failure rates.

The complex procedure for opening new stores primarily benefitted incumbents

and left their revenue streams secure. This reinforced the oligopolistic positions enjoyed

by the larger retailers who, using their new business model, offered lower prices than

their independent competitors. One adjustment had to be made, however: large retail

chains partly circumvented the law by developing chains of smaller stores (with floor

areas of less than 1,000m²), competing even more directly with small shopkeepers. A

former CEO of Intermarché, the third largest French food retailer (and 27th largest

retailer worldwide)51 and the second-largest French franchised-owned retailer, explained

to us during one of our interviews that:

‘when [they] built shops of around 900m² after [1973], it was obviously in order to
continue expanding geographically without having to deal with the local
authorities’.

Thus, modern retailers diversified their formats, providing them with economies

of scale and more ways to capture value in the industry. Both former CEOs of

Intermarché, whom we interviewed, confirmed this last point:

‘Legislation has two sides. It constrains us a lot. But, at the same time, we adapt.
We react very quickly and we can see that no matter what the law says, we will end
up opening new stores. We adapt structures, we reorganize, we hire.’
‘You have to find a way to go forward. We were back in the race, fighting back by
using a new formula.’

13
Table 1. Combined Market Shares of large food retail chainsd.
(Table 1)

Note: This table is based on various INSEE (the French national institute for statistics)
databases (e.g. ‘Comptes du Commerce’ and ‘Economie et statistique’).

As table 1 shows, between 1975 (two years after the Royer Act was passed) and 1995,

the market share of large retail chains in the market for consumer food products

increased from 21, 3% to 63, 2%. Examining the annual number of large stores opened

from 1962 to 2006, we can make at least two observations: the number of large discount

stores (supermarkets and hypermarkets) began to explode in the late 1960s, more than a

decade after these business models were introduced; this phenomenon reached a peak in

the mid-1980s with a maximum number of 140 new stores a year.52 Yet, at that time,

retailers still needed approval from public authorities to open new stores (as the Royer

Act required).

The regulation of the opening of new stores had a further effect on the retail sector:

the acceleration of the industry’s concentration and modernization. The Royer Act

precluded retailers from developing through the opening of new stores. In order to

bypass this obstacle, retailers started to acquire their direct competitors. This

concentration phenomenon unfolded at the expense of independent players, an outcome

which was not anticipated by the regulator. To avoid the threat of being taken over by

competitors, large retailers entered a race to reach a critical size. A larger size had two

advantages: increasing one’s bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers and outcompeting

other retailers.53 Consequently, the concentration of the industry was both vertical (the

creation of central buying groups that scaled up the purchasing operations and the

power of retailers against suppliers) and horizontal (resulting in the creation of retail
d
Combined market shares of large food retail chains’ hypermarkets and supermarkets outlets
only. A supermarket is defined as an establishment for self-service retail sales with more than
two thirds of its turnover in foodstuffs, and a sales area of between 400 and 2,500 m². A
hypermarket is a self-service retail store deriving more than one-third of its sales from food and
having a sales floor area of 2,500 m² or more.

14
groups with large market shares). Two figures illustrate this trend toward concentration

perfectly:

 While 90% of French hypermarkets were owned by 22 different retail groups in

1981,54 this number was down to five retailers by 2002. That year, half of the

supermarkets in France were owned by just two players.

 In 2003, the market share of the top-six central buying groups in France

amounted to 94% of the total market share (LSA, No. 1822, July 2003). In 2000,

these buying groups sold 90% of grocery products across the country,55

compared with 80% in 1985.56

Lastly, these unexpected strategic responses from retailers against the Royer Act have

ended the domination of the traditional independent small shops and unbalanced the

supplier-retailer relationship in favor of the newly created large retail groups. The

comfortable position that retailers had gradually acquired since the late 1960s forced the

public authorities to revise their position with respect to the relationship between

retailers and their suppliers.

The Galland Act (1996): high margins and limited price competition

The growing tensions between suppliers and retailers

Conflicts between suppliers and retailers date back to the 1950s. For instance, we have

evidence that Edouard Leclerc experienced numerous conflicts with large industrial

suppliers in 1959. Large suppliers refused to sell him their most popular brands. Bel, a

dairy company, turned down Leclerc’s orders of ‘Laughing Cow’ products.57 Large

suppliers preferred selling their products to small retailers rather than to the new larger

ones. The emphasis was on quality and well-known brands rather than low prices. In

15
1963, as a gesture of compromise toward suppliers, the government passed an additional

regulation that made it illegal to sell products at a price below purchasing costs.

Retailers had started using the ‘island of losses in an ocean of profits’ technique: big

discounts were made on highly popular products and were compensated for by slight

price increases on all the other products.58 Retailers would typically sell the popular

products at a price lower than the initial purchase price. Suppliers were very critical of

this commercial strategy because it put deflationary pressure on their key products.

The early 1980s witnessed tremendous consolidation among supermarket chains.

In the late 1970s, the retail sector was still relatively fragmented. An official survey,

published in 1981, found that the retail market was shared among 22 different chains.59

By then, the pressure exercised by supermarket chains on their suppliers had already

created concern in official circles. An official report published a few months earlier

stated that ‘the relations between retailers and suppliers are more and more unfavorable

to the latter’ and that ‘retailers had managed to concentrate their activities faster than the

suppliers.’60 Yet, later, things became even worse for suppliers. In the early 1980s,

many retailers merged, or were bought out by other firms. Additionally, some retailers

signed alliances to merge their procurement activities, thus increasing their buying

power. By 1985, seven buying entities controlled 80% of the food retail market.61 The

biggest suppliers, represented by ILEC, lobbied the government to take action. ILEC

executives stated in a 1985 press article62 that given the concentration of the retail

industry, the market had ‘reached a point where true competition no longer existed’.

Government officials from the Direction Générale de la Concurrence, de la

Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes (DGCCRF, the national authority for

the enforcement of competition law, consumer rights, and health and safety regulations)

were sympathetic to the complaints made by suppliers. In the previous years, official

16
reports drafted by the authority had shown increasing concern about the pressure that

supermarket chains were placing on their suppliers.

From the 1980s on, DGCCRF officials began to dismantle the non-

discrimination Fontanet Regulation against retailers. Initially the Fontanet Regulation

was meant to ensure that all retailers were treated equally by suppliers. In order to

address the power of the supermarket chains, the DGCCRF began interpreting the

regulation in a creative way. As a retailer, demanding lower prices from a supplier was

now considered ‘discriminatory’ because other supermarket chains would not benefit

from the price deduction. The core principle was to make the suppliers’ price lists

inviolable. Any price reductions awarded to the retailer had to be justified on an

‘objective’ basis. This meant that there should be a material compensation for a price

deduction. The retailer had to buy more products or offer ‘commercial cooperation’

services (such as leaflets, or better product positioning on the shelves).

Despite this new interpretation of the legislation, conflicts between retailers and

suppliers grew. Suppliers published yearly price lists, called ‘tariffs’. With the new

interpretation of the Fontanet Regulation promoted by the DGCCRF, retailers were no

longer able to demand a lower tariff. Yet they still demanded discounts. What was

especially infuriating for suppliers was that the courts had not reached a consensus over

the interpretation of the rule prohibiting below cost resale, rendering it largely

ineffective. Retailers could demand discounts and use them to lower their retail prices.

Supermarket chains were constantly trying to outcompete each other in this respect,

creating a deflationary spiral that was damaging for suppliers.

17
The Galland Act and the rise of back margins

In 1995, in a context of increasing tension between retailers and suppliers, the

government began to discuss new legislation. While DGCCRF executives were opposed

to the idea of new legislation, further regulation was enacted by Jacques Chirac, who

had just been elected president.

‘Jacques Chirac declared that large retail stores should be burned down with
napalm (...). That was in his campaign manifesto, so it’s something he expected us
to implement. Then we realized we had to improvise, because Chirac’s statement
was just an empty campaign slogan. Chirac did, however, expect us to do
something.’ (Interview with a DGCCRF executive)

The new right-wing majority elected in 1995 wanted something done about large

retailers. Chirac had close ties with the CGPME (the small-business association) and

farmers’ organizations. The CGPME was led by Lucien Rebuffel, a vocal opponent of

large retail companies.63

Chirac’s demands were vague, yet DGCCRF officials seized them as an

opportunity to quell the growing conflicts between retailers and their suppliers. The

Galland Act, passed in 1996, had two main provisions. The first specified that the final

price paid by the retailer should match the tariff set by the supplier. This would ensure

all retailers paid a similar price. The second provision tightened the rules against below-

cost resale. It became almost impossible for retailers to demand discounts on the tariff

and use them to lower retail prices. In combination, these provisions immediately

triggered the rise of ‘back margins’. It was now illegal for retailers to demand any price

deductions. It was during this period that tariffs stopped being a mere legal fiction: they

were applied to everyone. Every retailer was required to buy products at the same price.

This rule was combined with the strict prohibition of below-cost resale. When the new

rules were introduced, suppliers significantly raised their tariffs. Because suppliers set

18
high tariffs, retailers drastically reduced their margins. In most cases the margin was

zero: the tariff had become the standard resale price for consumers. Wherever they went

shopping, consumers typically paid the same price for the same product. No profit could

be made by retailers on ‘front’ margins anymore.

Large suppliers were satisfied with the majority of the Galland Act. They

welcomed the fact that the same tariff was applied to all retailers and that price

competition was effectively prevented. Price rises led to high inflation. In August 2001,

the annual rate of inflation reached 6.5%.64 But suppliers were unhappy with retailers’

demands for more and more back margins. The only way for retailers to make money

was by obtaining back margins from suppliers. This was performed via increasingly

large ‘commercial cooperation’ packages. ‘Commercial cooperation’ was initially

meant to serve as a compensation for top shelves or leaflets. As back margins grew, the

services offered as compensation for the back margins became increasingly fictitious.

Retailers could no longer challenge the price rises imposed by suppliers, and so, as

prices increased, they demanded higher back margins. According to DGCCRF figures,

from 2003, yearly price increases represented €13 billion (a cost borne by consumers).

Of that €13 billion, supermarket chains recovered at least €8 billion through back

margins. This led to an inflationary spiral: the more suppliers increased their tariffs, the

more back margins were demanded by retailers, which, in turn, encouraged suppliers to

increase their tariffs still further in order to be able to offer those margins.

Retailers had mixed feelings about back margins. They virtually froze price

competition, which proved disastrous for chains that had thrived on lower prices, such

as E. Leclerc. Michel-Edouard Leclerc, Edouard Leclerc’s son and the current chairman

of E. Leclerc, was one of the most vocal opponents of the back margins system. Other

chains, such as Carrefour and Auchan, viewed the back-margins system as an

19
opportunity. The new system allowed those chains to accumulate a lot of cash (back

margins accounted for up to 40% of the price of a typical product) and use it to expand

abroad. Carrefour became the number-two retailer worldwide, just behind Wal-Mart. In

2004, half of Carrefour’s annual revenue came from abroad.65 To a great extent,

Carrefour owed this position to the cash generated by back margins in the 2000s.

Surviving the rise of hard discounters

Hard discount originated in Germany after the Second World War.66 Its rise in France

occurred during the 2000s. However, the first hard-discount stores were established in

France in 1988. The deterioration of household purchasing power, an inflationary

environment, and limited openings of hypermarkets and supermarkets, contributed to

the success of this new retail business model.

Since the 2000s, German hard discounters have attracted a growing number of

French consumers at the expense of large French retailers. In 2011, 4,800 hard-discount

stores were active across the country (compared with 2,700 in 2001). At the expense of

larger retailers, French hard discounters increased their market share on food products

from 9.4% in 2001 to almost 14% in 2010.67 Around 71% of households visit hard

discount stores on a regular basis.68The institutionalization of this model was followed

by the emergence of specific regulatory frameworks from the public authorities, and by

strategic responses from established retail actors.

The hard-discount model is based on offering a limited range of products to

customers. This explains why the average retail space of hard-discount stores does not

exceed 700m². Consequently, as a result of operating retail spaces that have a lower area

than the threshold above which retailers must obtain public authorization to open a

store, this retail business model was not constrained by the Royer Act (which strongly

20
constrained the development of supermarket and hypermarket models). A means of

amending the Royer Act, the ‘Raffarin’ Act (1996) was passed to counter the German

hard discounters, whose growth was threatening national retailers. Now, all creation of,

extension of, or transfer of activities to, a store with an area above 300m² had to go

through the authorization process. Essentially, every brick-and-mortar model was now

constrained by this regulation. It resulted in a strong brake on competition, because it

became almost impossible to open a new store. Once again, it favored incumbents who

already owned a large number of stores. However, this time, the public authorities were

well aware of such consequences, which amounted to the protection of French

‘champions’ against foreign competitors.

This state of affairs gave French retailers time to develop new strategies to

counter German hard discounters. Thus, some retailers created their own hard-discount

groups, such as Carrefour with ED, and Intermarché with Netto. Their price policies

became more aggressive as a result of the creation of new private labels (such as

Carrefour’s ‘Carrefour Discount’ brand) or the launch of TV commercials that stressed

low prices (e.g. E.Leclerc and its price comparator). Gradually, the actions of retailers

have affected the hard discounters’ competitive edge and frozen their market share.

Even though hard discounters had attained a significant foothold in the retail

landscape, their gain in market share was not high enough to overshadow the other

issues affecting the industry, especially the management of supplier-retailer

relationships with regard to purchasing conditions. Moreover, since the mid-1990s,

retailers have had to face even greater challenges, namely the rise of e-commerce

alongside the rapid digitalization of the industry.

21
The LME Act (2008): increased competition and expansion into new areas

The origins of the LME Act

In the name of consumer purchasing power, the back margins system was eventually

dismantled. In the early 2000s, the government became concerned about rising

consumer prices, and, in 2002, despite flat inflation rates across Europe, the French

Consumer Price Index reached high levels. This was a direct outcome of the back-

margins system. Suppliers had control over the retail price of their products. Retailers

had little incentive to bring these prices down; in fact, they were broadly similar across

the retail market. For a given supermarket chain, profit was merely a function of the

volume of sales and the amount of ‘commercial cooperation’ purchased by their

suppliers. The system eventually came to an end through two new pieces of legislation.

A first act, in 2005, (the ‘Dutreil’ Act) relaxed the ban on below-cost resale. A second

act, in 2008, (the ‘LME’ Act) changed the invoicing rules in a way that made price

competition more likely. Nicolas Sarkozy played an active role in both laws. He

initiated the Dutreil Act, as Minister of Economics, and the LME Act, as President.

Sarkozy’s main aim in addressing the back-margins system was to help retailers

obtain lower prices from their suppliers, thereby increasing consumers’ purchasing

power.69 But the arguments used by proponents of the reform in more expert circles

focused on antitrust law. The legal complexities of ‘commercial cooperation’ were

criticized as a source of price rigidity. As the white paper drafted in preparation for the

LME Act argued, ‘It is hard to argue in favor of maintaining a legal norm that creates

a situation where prices become a peripheral issue in commercial negotiation.’70 A

similar point was made by legal counsels working for the retailers who were active in

lobbying against the back-margin system. They pointed out that there should be no

material compensation for a lower price. According to them, it was now legitimate for a

22
more powerful ‘business partner’ to demand a better price solely based on its market

power. The compensation lay in the market power itself, because more market power

means access to a larger number of consumers. One lawyer told us: ‘We get a price

deduction. In essence, the compensation is making the price for the consumer more

competitive.’ A lobbyist working for the retailers’ trade association held a similar view:

‘Our role is not selling services (...). Our role is selling products. We want our sourcing

people to obtain competitive prices on our products. Their role isn’t to come up with

incredibly sophisticated stuff in order to reduce the price.’

Eventually, the reformers who wanted to scrap the back-margins system were

successful. An intense price war between the retail chains began around 2010 and has

continued until now. The LME Act has led to deflation in food prices.

The return of price competition

The major effect of the LME Act was the disappearance of the back-margins system,

but it took the retailers several years to actually gain control over their prices. This

finally happened in 2013-2014, when Casino, one of the most expensive retailers,

dropped its price index by ten points. Other retailers had to react. This was especially

true for E. Leclerc and Carrefour, the two incumbents.

Figure 2. Price Indexes of Major Retailers, January 2013-November 2014.

(Figure 2)

Note: This data was provided by Olivier Dauvers, an independent French reporter who
specializes in mass food-retail. He collected this data in partnership with a3distrib, a
consultancy. The data points presented here are average monthly prices of identical products,
based on the prices indicated on retailers’ websites.

While retailers were managing their positions against suppliers within a context of an

unfavorable regulatory framework, they had to deal, at the same time, with another

23
major challenge: the rise of e-commerce, a spin-off of the rapid development of the

internet in the late 1990s. After the Raffarin Act of 1996, retail competition reached a

virtual standstill. With the rise of the internet, the conditions for a competitive game,

with the potential for unprecedented growth, were, once again, in place. Websites

eliminated the need for physical retail spaces and the internet became a new

competitive arena, which was not regulated by previous laws. In fact, the regulatory

framework did not apply to retail business models with no physical point of sale. Yet,

the geographical aspects have not disappeared as a result of the internet.71 However, the

retail market is widening. Rather than building or buying brick-and-mortar shops to

penetrate a geographic area, retailers now use websites to enter new, online territories

and start selling to new markets. Therefore, with the help of newly available

technologies, retail groups have developed innovative e-business models (e-shops and

drive-thru models), centered on innovation and customer-efficiency.72 These business

models circumvented controls on the opening of new stores which had been reinforced

by the state through the Raffarin Act. Moreover, they are able to deliver an identical

offer in terms of products, yet with little to no retail space needed (e-shop models and

drive-thru) enhanced customer benefits (such as saved time, less energy-intensive

operation, and ease of access [‘circulatory proximity’]). It also allows them to bypass

fiscal constraints.73 One of our respondents reported that ‘there is also non-market

competition created by the TaSCom [a tax on retail spaces], which is not collected on

drive-thru stores and online retail.’ All of this resulted in the first e-shop being

launched in 1999 by Galeries Lafayette, a few months before Carrefour’s own online

shop. And, in 2004, the first drive-thru model was launched by Chronodrive, a start-up

founded in 2000 by entrepreneurs from northern France.

While retailers were managing their positions against suppliers within a context

24
of an unfavorable regulatory framework, they had to deal, at the same time, with

another major challenge: the rise of e-commerce, a spin-off of the rapid development of

the internet in the late 1990s. After the Raffarin Act of 1996, retail competition reached

a virtual standstill. With the rise of the internet, the conditions for a competitive game,

with the potential for unprecedented growth, were, once again, in place. Websites

eliminated the need for physical retail spaces and the internet became a new

competitive arena, which was not regulated by previous laws. In fact, the regulatory

framework did not apply to retail business models with no physical point of sale. Yet,

the geographical aspects have not disappeared as a result of the internet.74 However, the

retail market is widening. Rather than building or buying brick-and-mortar shops to

penetrate a geographic area, retailers now use websites to enter new, online territories

and start selling to new markets. Therefore, with the help of newly available

technologies, retail groups have developed innovative e-business models (e-shops and

drive-thru models), centered on innovation and customer efficiency.75 These business

models circumvented controls on the opening of new stores which had been reinforced

by the state through the Raffarin Act. Moreover, they are able to deliver an identical

offer in terms of products, yet with little to no retail space needed (e-shop and drive-

thru models) enhanced customer benefits (such as saved time, less energy-intensive

operation, and ease of access [‘circulatory proximity’]). It also allows them to bypass

fiscal constraints.76 One of our respondents reported that ‘there is also non-market

competition created by the TaSCom (a tax on retail spaces), which is not collected on

drive-thru stores and online retail.’ All of this resulted in the first e-shop being

launched in 1999 by Galeries Lafayette, a few months before Carrefour’s own online

shop. And, in 2004, the first drive-thru model was launched by Chronodrive, a start-up

founded in 2000 by entrepreneurs from northern France.

25
 After the dot-com bubble burst, leading to the bankruptcy of many start-ups in

the early 2000s, e-commerce was taken up by multichannel retailers. Pure players were

replaced by large click-and-mortar retail groups. E-commerce has not led to a disruptive

new era for retail, but, instead, has seen itself integrated into the existing commercial

landscape.77 Physical access to shops remains the dominant form of contact between

consumers and retailers in food retail. Nonetheless, the internet still offers a vast

opportunity to reinvent customer-retailer relations.78 Retail competition will, without

doubt, undergo huge changes over the coming years, offering new business models, new

experiences and services which will be made possible by technological developments.

However, with the expansion of retail-industry e-business models, the public

authorities established new regulatory constraints to control and limit their

development, as well as reducing the constraints on small brick-and-mortar models. The

LME Act (2008) is a turning point, raising the authorization threshold to 1,000m² for

new stores and partially instituting fair competition between e-commerce and the

physical retail trade. Lastly, the acceleration of the ‘drive-thru’ phenomenon, which

offers low start-up costs and no requirement for permission to be granted by public

authorities, led to the introduction of the ALUR Act and the Pinel Act in 2014. The

opening of drive-thru stores is now subject to approval by public authorities from ‘0m²’.

Retailers, in turn, have been led to launch new convenience store models.

Against renewed competition; an expansion into new areas

Driven by consumers’ interests, the government planned to reintroduce competition,

through the LME Act, its objective being to reduce prices within two years, following

the Act’s coming into force. The new legislation also introduces new deadlines for

payments: retailers now have a maximum of 60 days from the effective date of the

26
transaction. Although the LME Act greatly affects retailers’ traditional levers (back

margins and payment delays), the erosion of sales seen in the years leading up to the

LME Act had prompted reactions to improve operational performance and maintain

margins. In this respect, all retailers are implementing significant projects to restructure

their supply chains. Supply chain management has become a strategic competency that

allows them to support their offering while controlling logistics costs and mitigating the

impacts of regulation. As such, and partly due to the new regulatory constraints,

logistics now play a key role.

Carrefour’s supply chain reorganization illustrates attempts to circumvent the

impact of the LME Act. Presented as a green measure (that of reducing CO2 emissions)

to justify its legitimacy, Carrefour has gradually refocused its reorganization projects in

order to be able to bypass the act. Since 2007, the group has transformed its logistics

operations by creating a national network of warehouses for small-supplier deliveries.

The legal structure behind this organization is particularly pertinent in illustrating how

Carrefour has dealt with the threats created by the LME Act. Carrefour has developed a

logistical service contract between suppliers and the Carrefour contractors charged with

implementing the project. The retailer has selected eight different contractors to manage

its warehouses, putting Carrefour in a powerful position to negotiate on tariffs. The

logistical contract does not bind Carrefour to smaller suppliers, but, rather, its

contractors - who bear the costs of the logistical services. The contract also stipulates

that the transfer of ownership now takes place performed at the storage facility exit.

This new mode of operation allows Carrefour to secure its supply chain while reducing

its storage costs. Moreover, transfer of ownership later in the supply chain also helps the

retailer to reduce the effects of the shorter payment timescales introduced by the LME

Act.79

27
 Moreover, a new regulatory regime has resulted in new forms of adaptation by

the retailers. Alongside innovation in supply chain management to mitigate the

consequences of the LME Act, retailers are also seeking new pathways to growth.

While big-box stores have saturated suburban areas and are liable to competition from

e-commerce, retailers are turning toward city centers and responding to a renewed

desire among consumers for local shopping. New convenience store models are being

rolled out in the largest cities in the country and represent huge levels of investment.

The French food retail industry is, once again, involved in another round of regulation-

adaptation, stemming, this time, from a new regulation seized upon by retailers as an

opportunity to generate new business.

All retailers are now joining an impressive race to open new convenience

stores. Urban areas are being targeted in the hope that this new business model will

counterbalance the slowdown at larger stores (in particular, hypermarkets) and the new

regulations applying to e-commerce. Historical players in ‘local retailing’ (for example,

Casino, Carrefour, and Monoprix) are establishing ambitious objectives in terms of

opening new stores. For instance, Casino set an objective of 530 new convenience

stores in 2011, following its opening of 300 in 2010.80 Retailers anticipate huge returns

from this business model, which involves saturating every geographical area, from city

centers to rural localities. They have upgraded their old convenience stores, enriching

the concept with services such as delivery, online ordering, or click-and-collect

lockers81. New convenience store models are responding to an increasing demand from

consumers for convenience and local services. They are also expected to

counterbalance the scale back of larger formats. Lastly, they currently offer an ideal

way to extend retailers’ store networks, given that no regulations have been targeted at

them… yet.

28
Conclusion

The empirical section has described three ‘regulation-adaptation’ loops that have led to

the domination of French retail by large, multi-channel retailers. Table 2 summarizes

the main elements of each loop addressed in the document.

Table 2. The three main laws targeting French retail, and the associated strategic
adaptations.
(Table 2)

Note: see text.

Passed in 1973, the Royer Act was the first instance of the French state trying to curtail

the growth of mass retail. Its outcome was the opposite of that intended: because fewer

stores could be opened, an incentive was created for large retail chains to become even

larger. Rather than curtailing the growth of mass retail, this horizontal concentration of

the market accelerated the modernization and rationalization of French retail.

In 1996, the French Parliament passed the Galland Act to protect suppliers. The

main effect of this legislation was to freeze price competition. Suppliers took control of

pricing and drove consumer prices higher. This represented a threat for incumbents in

the retail business. As prices rose, consumers flocked to the newly opened hard-discount

stores. Owned by German chains such as Aldi or Lidl, these stores circumvented the

Galland Act by selling entirely own-brand products. Additionally, thanks to a retail

space beneath the threshold fixed for submitting stores creation to public authorization,

this business model also circumvented the Royer Act (which strongly constrained the

development of supermarket and hypermarket models). French incumbents responded

by creating their own hard-discount chains. They also made the most of the high back

margins they received from suppliers by expanding abroad. By doing this, Carrefour

became the second-biggest retailer in the world, just behind Wal-Mart.

29
 The third major piece of legislation was introduced in 2008. The LME Act

scrapped most of the new rules introduced by the Galland Act in 1996. Retailers

regained control over their prices and started a price war. This dramatically decreased

their margins. Faced with increased price competition, they diversified by creating new

business models and entering the online retail business. In the meantime, they improved

supply chain management in order to reduce storage costs and postpone the transfer of

ownership of goods.

As Alexander states, thorough research on retail ‘requires attention from both an

historical as well as a management perspective’.82 The results presented in this paper

follow this line of research and contribute toward a multidisciplinary understanding of

retail development. Paying close attention to the French retail sector reinforces our

understanding of the ‘significant and dynamic variations in the timing and extent of

retail change’83 in Europe and in the world. The results provide a detailed account of the

effects of regulation on retail development in France, an issue yet to be addressed in an

English-language publication. As the analysis shows, France is a case where the study

of regulation in understanding retail development is especially appropriate.84 The

development trajectory of French retail is unique in terms of the severity of its legal

framework.

This study, therefore, represents a step toward comparative multiple case studies

at European level, which could lead to a more theoretical approach of the history of

retail.85 Viewed in a comparative light, our results allow us to draw more systematic

conclusions about the effects of regulation on retail development. Throughout Europe,

retailers’ strategic choices are linked to regulatory frameworks. Regulating the opening

of new stores has very different outcomes depending on the type of policy. When store-

opening regulation targets primarily the legal status of retailers, as it does in Italy,

30
independent retail is more likely to develop.86 In contrast, French regulation, which

required retailers to obtain administrative authorization to open large stores, had the

opposite effect, reinforcing the market power of very large retailers. The effects of rules

to maintain retail prices or prevent discrimination also vary. The crucial factor here is

the stage of development that a retail market has reached. As the UK example shows,

implementing RPM at a time when mass retail had not fully developed leads retailers to

increase their horizontal power and their vertical integration.87 RPM was banned in

Britain in 1964 when the modern retail market was still nascent and suppliers were still

powerful. In France, a similar policy implemented by the Galland Act in 1996 had the

opposite effect. French retailers had already reached a critical size. The lack of price

competition led retailers to exercise increasing amounts of pressure on their suppliers,

leading to the ‘back margin era’.

The results also contribute to a better understanding of how multi-outlet retailers

have developed competitive advantages in the long run. As Currah and Wrigley noted in

2004, ‘competitiveness of the [retailer] increasingly rests upon its ability to adapt the

portfolio of retail formats to different and rapidly changing business environments’.88 In

fact, the ability of retail firms to develop and use innovative business models tailored to

local contexts is, largely, what determines their success. As the case of the French

retailers shows, players must coordinate online and offline business models within an

integrated portfolio89 which optimizes both the value created and realized, in a context

where market conditions are changing, especially in terms of the regulatory constraints

they face.90

Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Peter Scott and the two anonymous reviewers for their

valuable advice. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Retail Trade

31
Workshop held in 2015 in Paris. All remaining errors and omissions are the authors’

sole responsibility.

Fundings

This research has benefited from funding from Agence Nationale de la Recherche (n°

ANR-13-Soin-0001-05) (Better Business Models).

32
Tables and figures

Figure 1. Market Shares of Major French Retailers.

11.3
21

10.3

11
20.9

11.4

14.1

E. Leclerc Carrefour Intermarché Casino

Auchan Système U Other
Note: from Kantar Worldpanel. Market shares were measured over a 12-week period ending in
February 2017.

Table 1. Combined Market Shares of large food retail chainse.

Share of large retail chains in the market for

Year
consumer food productsf
1965 2.80%
1975 21.30%
1985 45.20%
1995 63.20%
e
Combined market shares of large food retail chains’ hypermarkets and supermarkets

outlets only. A supermarket is defined as an establishment for self-service retail sales

with more than two thirds of its turnover in foodstuffs, and a sales area of between 400

and 2,500 m². A hypermarket is a self-service retail store deriving more than one-third

of its sales from food and having a sales floor area of 2,500 m² or more.
f
Regarding food products only.

33
 2005 67.60%
2015 65.50%
Note: This table is based on various INSEE (the French national institute for statistics)
databases (e.g. ‘Comptes du Commerce’ and ‘Economie et statistique’).

Figure 2. Price Indexes of Major Retailers, January 2013-November 2014.

110

105

100

Auchan
Carrefour
95 E. Leclerc
Géant Casino

90

85
13

14
13

13

14

14
-1

l-1

-1

l-1
-1

-1
p-

p-
n-

v-

n-

v-
ay
ay
ar

ar
Ju

Ju
No

No
Se

Se
Ja

Ja
M

M
M

Note: This data was provided by Olivier Dauvers, an independent French reporter who
specializes in mass food-retail. He collected this data in partnership with a3distrib, a
consultancy. The data points presented here are average monthly prices of identical products,
based on the prices indicated on retailers’ websites.

Table 2. The three main laws targeting French retail, and the associated strategic
adaptations.

New rules Market structure Strategic Adaptations

Royer Act Restrictions on the Larger shops and Domestic expansion, mergers
(1973) opening of new larger retail chains and acquisitions, creation of
stores

34
 central buying groups

Introduction of hard-discount
business model

Protection of International expansion

suppliers
Galland Act
Internationalization Introduction of drive-thru and
Raffarin Act Further restrictions of larger retailers e- shop business models
(1996) on the opening of
new stores ‘Back-margin era’

Partial removal of Cost cutting

rules protecting
suppliers Introduction of new
Oligopoly convenience store business
LME Act Stricter rules on models
Multinational,
(2008) payment terms multichannel Supply chain management
retailers
Deregulation of (reducing storage costs and
the opening of postponing the transfer of
new stores ownership of goods)
Note: see text.

35
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36
Pettigrew, A. M. (1991). Longitudinal field research in change: theory and practice, Organization
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37
Prost, A. (1996). Douze leçons sur l’histoire, Paris : Le Seuil.
38
To go further, the use of the past in organisation studies has been helpfully summarized by Foster et al.
(2016).
39
Watson, Bartholomew. 2011. “Nations of Retailers: The Comparative Political Economy of Retail
Trade.” Ph.D. Dissertation, UC Berkeley.
40
Jolly, Maurice. 1983. “Aperçu historique sur l’interdiction des pratiques anticoncurrentielles «
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41
Carluer-Lossouarn, F. (2008), Leclerc : enquête sur un système, Paris, Bertrand Gobin.
42
Strasser, S. (1989), Satisfaction Guaranteed: The Making of the American Mass Market, New York
(NY), Pantheon Books.
43
Daumas, « L’invention des usines à vendre ».
44
Boulat, R. (2004), « Jean Fourastié et la naissance de la société de consommation en France », dans
Chatriot, A., Chessel, M.-E., Hilton, M. (dir.), Au nom du consommateur. Consommation et politique en
Europe et aux États-Unis au XXe siècle, Paris, La Découverte, p. 98-114. Productivity missions
(“missions de productivité”) were state sponsored visits to the United States organized between 1950 and
1953. Business leaders, academics, and labor representatives were sent to the United States to identify the
key factors of economic success of that country.
45
Daumas, “Mass Selling”.
46
http://www.histoireetarchives.leclerc/a-la-une/le-premier-hypermarche-eleclerc-1969
47
Jacques, “Refus de vente interdit !”
48
The Times, 14/04/1960, «Canute at the Counter»: the British newspaper reported about a group of
shopkeepers who decided to “go on strike” in protest of the Fontanet regulation.
49
Loi n° 73-1193 du 27 décembre 1973 d'orientation du commerce et de l'artisanat.
50
Circulaire du 29 juillet 1969 relative à la place de l'équipement commercial dans le développement urbain.
51
Source: Deloitte’s 18th annual Global Powers of Retailing report (2015).
52
Cliquet, G., Des Garets V., Basset G., & Perrigot R. 2008. « 50 ans de grandes surfaces en France: entre
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53
Filser, M. 1998. « Taille critique et stratégie du distributeur : analyse théorique et implications
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54
Revue de la concurrence et de la consommation, Michèle Trestour, 1981, « Evolution des résultats des
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55
Le Déaut, J.-Y., & Charié, J.-P. (2000). Rapport d’information n°2072 sur l’évolution de la distribution.
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56
Revue de la concurrence et de la consommation, « L’évolution de la puissance d’achat en France »,
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57
http://www.e-leclerc-histoireetarchives.com/document/5907c//lettre-de-la-fromagerie-bel-%C3%A0-el-
1959/254
58
Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 124-146.
59
Trestour, Michèle, « Évolution des résultats des principales sociétés du grand commerce depuis 1975 »,
Revue de la concurrence et de la consommation, 3e trimestre 1981 n° 15, p. 19-25.
60
Baudry, Jean. 1980. “Les orientations d’une politique de la concurrence dans l’industrie française.”
Revue de la concurrence, des prix et de la consommation (10):12–15.
61
« L’évolution de la puissance d’achat en France », n°32, 4e trimestre 1985, p. 5-7.
62
« Les super-centrales d’achat contestées par les fabricants », Le Monde, 08/01/1985. “Si l’on en croit
MM. Bernard Lambournac et Alexis Perron, respectivement président et délégué général de l’ILEC
(Institut de liaisons et d’études des industries de consommation), « on dépasse le niveau à partir duquel la
véritable concurrence n’existe plus ».
63
« Nous voulons une loi anti-trust, anti-monopole et anti-entente », Les Echos, 27/11/1995.
64
INSEE : indice des prix à la consommation, catégorie : prix alimentaires.
65
Daumas, “Mass Selling”, 71.
66
Wortmann, Michael. 2004. “Aldi and the German Model: Structural Change in German Grocery
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67
Kantar Worldpanel, Etude Hard Discount, 05/10/2011.
68
See note 67 above.
69
« Sarkozy défend sa loi bec et ongles », Le Parisien, 14/05/2008.
70
Hagelsteen, Marie-Domonique, « La négociabilité des tarifs et des conditions générales de vente »,
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71
Volle, P. 2000. « Du marketing des points de vente à celui des sites marchands: spécificités,
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Durand, B. 2008. « Les magasins de proximité : un atout logistique pour l’épicerie en ligne », Revue des
Sciences de Gestion, 229, 75-83 ; Sorescu, A., Frambach R. T., Singh J., Rangaswamy A., & Bridges C.
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73
Rapport d’information de la commission des finances du Sénat, « Le développement du commerce
électronique : quel impact sur les finances publiques ? », 2010.
74
Volle, P. 2000. « Du marketing des points de vente à celui des sites marchands: spécificités,
opportunités et questions de recherche », Revue Française du Marketing, 177, 83-101.
75
Durand, B. 2008. « Les magasins de proximité : un atout logistique pour l’épicerie en ligne », Revue des
Sciences de Gestion, 229, 75-83 ; Sorescu, A., Frambach R. T., Singh J., Rangaswamy A., & Bridges C.
2011. « Innovations in Retail Business Models », Journal of Retailing, 87(1), 3-16.
76
Rapport d’information de la commission des finances du Sénat, « Le développement du commerce
électronique : quel impact sur les finances publiques ? », 2010.
77
Rallet, A. 2010. L’évolution de l’e-commerce à l’ère de l’économie numérique, Paris: CCIP Collection
Prospective et Entreprise.
78
Cliquet et al., « 50 ans de grandes surfaces en France: entre croissance débridée et contraintes légales ».
79
Livolsi, L., & Camman C. 2012. « La mutualisation logistique dans le canal de distribution : une
stratégie de contournement de la Loi de Modernisation de l’Economie », Management & Avenir, 52(2),
99-118.
80
Capo, C., & Chanut O. 2012. « Quand la proximité crée la convenience : une grille de lecture du système
de distribution japonais », Les cahiers scientifiques du transport, 61, 91-117.
81
Rapport d’information du Sénat. « Le développement du commerce électronique », 2010.
82
Alexander, “British Overseas Retailing, 1900–60: International firm Characteristics, Market Selections
and Entry Modes”, 531.
83
Shaw et al., “Structural and Spatial Trends in British Retailing: The Importance of Firm-Level Studies”
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84
Spencer, J. W., T. P. Murtha, S. A. Lenway. 2005. “How Governments Matter to New Industry
Creation”. Academy of Management Review, 30(2), pp. 321-337.
85
de Jong et al., “Towards a new business history?”.
86
Morris, “Contesting retail space in Italy: competition and corporatism 1915-60”.
87
Wrigley, “Antitrust regulation and the restructuring of grocery retailing in Britain and the USA”;
Morelli, ”Constructing a Balance Between Price and Non-Price Competition in British Multiple Food
Retailing 1954-64”.
88
Andrew Currah, Neil Wrigley. 2004. “Networks of Organizational Learning and Adaptation in Retail
TNCs”. Global Networks, 4(1), pp. 1–23.
89
E.g. see Pentina, I.; L. E. Pelton; R. W. Hasty (2009), Performance implications of online entry timing by
store-based retailers: A longitudinal investigation, Journal of Retailing, 85: 2, 177–193.
90
Sorescu et al., « Innovations in Retail Business Models »; Dewitte A. 2016. “The Development of a
Business Model Portfolio in a Changing Legal Environment: Pursuing Growth in the Retail Industry”. 32nd
EGOS Colloquium, July 7-9, Naples.