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S
Social Comparison Theory
J. P. Gerber
Gordon College, Wenham, MA, USA
Definition
Social comparison theory concerns the psycho-
logical processes by which individuals compare
themselves to other people.
Introduction
Social comparison has been a continuously active
research topic in social and personality psychol-
ogy since 1954. Over time, one initial theoretical
article developed into a broader field with links to
social cognition, individual differences, develop-
mental psychology, and experimental social psy-
chology. The overarching concerns are to examine
how people make social comparisons, why they
make them, to identify who makes comparisons,
and the effects of those comparisons. This entry
addresses the key historical and current issues in
social comparison research, draws together
research on individual differences in social com-
parison, and identifies links between social com-
parison and thinking about personhood. We finish
with a brief discussion of research measures and
related topics.
# Springer International Publishing AG 2018
V. Zeigler-Hill, T.K. Shackelford (eds.), Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28099-8_1182-1
The Initial Formulation
The initial theory of social comparison explored
the manner in which social comparisons occur in
informal groups and how such comparisons lead
to group uniformity (Festinger 1954). This theo-
rizing involved a series of nine hypotheses, many
of which formed the basis for future research. In
brief, Festinger argued that comparisons arise
under conditions of uncertainty, when one’s own
abilities or opinions are not and cannot be known
in isolation (e.g., “How correct is my opinion?”
“Am I smart?”). For abilities, people should tend
to compare themselves to others who are slightly
better (called the unidirectional drive upward),
while for opinions people should compare them-
selves to similar others. These comparisons,
undertaken by the group, will lead to increased
attention to and pressure on individuals who devi-
ate from the majority, and the eventual expulsion
(or ostracism) of those who refuse to change.
While much of this Lewinian-based work has
stood the test of time, research on social compar-
ison has moved to a broader frame.
Current models of social comparison expand
beyond Festinger’s initial group setting and divide
the broader process of social comparison into four
parts: who people compare with, why they com-
pare, the effects of those comparisons, and who is
likely to compare. Research has similarly been
extended to variables other than ability and opin-
ion, including mood, self-esteem, performance
satisfaction, future career intentions, and future
performance intentions. We now review each
2 Social Comparison Theory
facet of this process with reference to meta-
analytic results by Gerber et al. (2018).
With Whom Do we Choose to Compare?
(Target Selection)
The initial empirical work on social comparison
(included in the first Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology supplement of 1966) largely
concerned comparison selection, the “with
whom” of comparison. With this empirical work
came the rank order paradigm (Wheeler, 1966), a
now-classic laboratory manipulation in which
participants are given a test and told their score
(usually a nonanchored score such as 410) and
rank (usually 4th out of 7 participants) and are
then given an opportunity to select the rank of a
participant whose score they wish to view. Thus,
the participant may make an upward comparison
(to someone ranked higher than them) or a down-
ward comparison (to someone ranked lower than
them). Sometimes, people are allowed to choose
more than one target.
Selection can also be assessed by diary
methods, where people write down, usually on a
daily basis, those with whom they compare in
their daily lives. Retrospective interviews have
also been used, although such interviews are less
immediate and subject to recall bias.
Selection studies suggest that people tend to
compare upward (rather than downward) on abil-
ity measures at a ratio of approximately 2:1 in the
lab, but closer to 1:1 in the field. Threat leads to
slight increases in the number of downward com-
parisons, but the inclusion of a lateral target
removes this trend, suggesting that threatened
people prefer similar targets more than downward
targets.
Festinger hypothesized that people are most
likely to choose a target close in ability to compare
to, rather than a distant target, a finding confirmed
in the literature. Similarity is easy to determine in
a rank order paradigm but harder in real life. How
can one choose a similar target before making the
comparison? The related attributes hypothesis
(Goethals and Darley 1977) suggests that people
select a target by first assessing them on attributes
related to the comparison in question. For exam-
ple, a high school student might choose someone
of similar age and schooling for a comparison of
intelligence because schooling and age are related
to intelligence. The related attributes hypothesis
was derived from attribution theory and further
suggests that we choose dissimilar targets when
trying to validate our opinions. It means more if
my enemies agree with me than if my friends do.
Why Do People Compare?
From its inception, social comparison drew upon
the Lewinian topological tradition within social
psychology. As such, initial studies sought to
manipulate situations to explore the motivations
for social behavior.
Festinger’s original theory emphasized the
motive of self-evaluation and this motive is
supported by people’s preference for near upward
targets. Further evidence for self-evaluation moti-
vation comes from the observation that compari-
son selections often focus on the extreme scores if
the range is unknown (Wheeler et al. 1969).
Self-enhancement can also motivate social
comparison. Downward comparisons – which
may be more flattering to the self than upward
comparisons but less informative – are more
likely to occur when negative traits are examined,
suggesting that people avoid self-knowledge to
enhance themselves (Thornton and Arrowood
1966).
Self-improvement may also motivate social
comparison, but there is little experimental
research to prove this possibility. Instead, the
best evidence for self-improvement motives
comes from questionnaire measures.
However, the most influential motivational
account is downward comparison theory (Wills,
1981). This theory suggests that people can feel
less threatened, or better about themselves, by
comparing with someone who is worse off than
themselves, and that people who are threatened
feel better for doing so. The evidence for down-
ward comparison theory is mixed at best. Retro-
spective interview studies with breast cancer
patients/survivors suggest that downward com-
parisons are common in this population but diary
studies suggest similarity and upward compari-
sons remain common. Furthermore, contrary to
downward comparison theory, experimental
Social Comparison Theory
evidence suggests that people with high self-
esteem make more downward comparisons than
people with low self-esteem, although it may be
the case that low self-esteem people have simply
not learned the effective strategy of choosing
downward comparisons.
Despite this range of evidence, motivations are
often hard to fathom. If someone compares
upward, is it for aspiration? Or is it for self-
knowledge? Motivations are difficult to directly
assess, ultimately making their determination
difficult.
What Effect Does Comparison Have?
(Reaction Studies)
The bulk of research on social comparison has
examined the effects of comparison on individ-
uals and the moderators of these effects. The clas-
sic design is the two-condition reaction study, in
which participants are presented with either an
upward target (someone better than them on the
ability in question) or a downward target
(someone worse than them on the ability in ques-
tion). Use of a third “no-comparison” control
group is less common but the evidence suggests
upward and downward comparisons have equal
effects, so little seems to have been lost in this
omission.
The two-condition reaction study could reveal
one of two major patterns: assimilation or con-
trast. In the most technical sense (Wheeler and
Suls 2007), assimilation occurs when people
shift their self-estimate closer to a target following
the comparison, whereas contrast occurs when
people shift their self-estimate away from the
target. For example, consider the classic
Mr. Clean study by Morse and Gergen (1970).
Job applicants wait for an interview in the pres-
ence of a well (or poorly) dressed confederate.
Assimilation occurs if the interviewee feels better
about their prospects after waiting with Mr. Clean
or worse about their prospects after waiting with
Mr. Dirty. Contrast occurs if the participant feels
worse about themselves after waiting with
Mr. Clean or better about themselves after waiting
with Mr. Dirty. Assessing this shift requires either
a repeated measures design, matching on ability,
or trust in random assignment but repeated
3
measures and matching designs are rare in social
comparison research. Instead, any two-condition
up/down reaction design is conventionally taken
to be evidence for a pre–post shift due to assimi-
lation/contrast.
Reactions to comparison, with few exceptions,
are contrastive, and not assimilative. Upward
comparisons, relative to downward comparisons,
lead to lowered ability estimates, mood, and self-
esteem. Ways to heighten the contrast include
making the comparison in situ and creating uncer-
tainty by using novel dimensions for the compar-
ison and/or giving false feedback to the
participant on their abilities. The dominance of
contrast is surprising given social cognition’s
emphasis on assimilation and it is fitting that the
exception to this contrast rule comes from social-
cognitive research. Priming similarity (either
through priming tasks such as word unscrambling
or via similarity inductions in the instructions)
leads to assimilative responses to weak social
comparison.
The most prominent model explaining these
effects is the selective accessibility model (SAM,
Mussweiler and Strack 2000). Under this model,
individuals first make a judgment of overall sim-
ilarity between themselves and a target. If the
initial assessment is one of similarity, then confir-
matory evidence of similarity is sought, and the
comparer will move their ability closer to the
target. If the initial assessment is one of dissimi-
larity, then evidence of dissimilarity is sought and
the comparer will move their self-estimate away
from the target. The known effect of similarity
instructions and primes is consistent with this
model because both should prime an initial holis-
tic assessment of similarity.
There are other models of assimilation and
contrast in social comparison. The GLOMO
model (Förster et al. 2008) suggests global pro-
cessing leads to assimilation, whereas local pro-
cessing is contrastive. The identification-contrast
model (Buunk and Ybema 1997) argues that iden-
tifying with a target leads to assimilation. None of
these models engage as directly with the empirical
conditions for assimilation, and only Festinger’s
model is adequate for dealing with moderators
such as in situ comparisons and false feedback.
4 Social Comparison Theory
In fairness, although the SAM does explain
assimilation via priming, it does have difficulty
dealing with the genius effect (Alicke et al. 1997;
but see Brickman and Bullman 1977 for the ger-
minal argument). In this effect, the implications of
comparisons are discounted when the target can
be construed as substantially different from the
comparer. For example, an upward comparison
to an intelligent college student will lead to con-
trast, but an upward comparison to Einstein may
lead to assimilation, because Einstein is consid-
ered to be in a different category than the
comparer. The SAM does not predict the genius
effect. If anything, the SAM predicts greater
assimilation for the college student (due to greater
overall similarity) than for Einstein.
It is possible that both directions of social
comparison have contrastive and assimilative
effects. For example, Buunk et al. (1990) argue
that upward comparisons could be hopeful or
hurtful, and downward comparisons could be
relieving or worrying. While this may be true,
there are still general effects, and those are of
contrast primarily, with assimilation occurring in
only some instances.
Aside from the question of assimilation/con-
trast, reactions to social comparison can also be
quantified along different types of outcomes: abil-
ity, self-esteem, and mood. Effects of social com-
parison are strongest for the ability in question.
The effect sizes are smaller as the outcome moves
further away from the ability estimate, with ability
effects being stronger than mood effects, which
are, in turn, stronger than effects on self-esteem.
There is little research looking at differences in
dimensions of comparison. Work has focused on
intelligence, appearance, opinions, and likely
interpersonal success, but it is very difficult to
make changes in these dimensions commensurate,
limiting researchers’ ability to draw meaningful
comparisons between them.
Who Compares? (Individual Differences in
Comparison)
There is comparatively less theoretical focus on
individual differences in social comparison, per-
haps because of the social psychological approach
taken early on that focused more heavily on
group processes. Nevertheless, there are many
individual differences examined throughout the
literature, only some of which are reviewed by
Wheeler (2000).
(a) Social comparison orientation. Individuals
differ in the frequency with which they com-
pare with others, called comparison orienta-
tion. Comparison orientation is often assessed
by the INCOM (Iowa-Netherlands Compari-
son Orientation Measure, Gibbons and Buunk
1999), and, in the appearance literature, by
Thompson’s Physical Appearance Compari-
son Scale (Thompson et al. 1991). Compari-
son orientation is associated with a variety of
important psychological outcomes, including
poorer wellbeing in widows (Semerjian and
Stephens 2007), lower job satisfaction (White
et al. 2006), and a greater tendency towards
multiple suicide attempts in black youth
(Merchant et al. 2009). While most of these
results have not been replicated or meta-
analyzed, there is a consistent trend for people
high in comparison orientation to both make
more comparisons and for those comparisons
to each have greater impact.
(b) Gender. Gender differences in social compar-
ison occur particularly with respect to appear-
ance comparisons. Females with high
comparison orientation (from high-school
onwards) compare more frequently on their
appearance than do males, and these compar-
isons are associated with low body satisfac-
tion and increased eating disorders in females.
For males, appearance comparison orienta-
tion gets focused on muscle-tone and leads
to muscle-building behavior in a general (not
differentiated as gay or straight) male sample,
and higher body dissatisfaction in a gay sam-
ple. Males are more likely to live in hope that
their bodies will change, while females are
more likely to be depressed with their current
state. Brassai et al. (2013) report that compar-
ison orientation in boys is related to greater
life meaning, perhaps because comparisons
create a feeling of uniqueness that is more
culturally sanctioned for boys.
Social Comparison Theory
(c) Age. Comparisons change at the extremes of
the life span. Social comparison is commonly
observed from elementary-school age
onwards (e.g. Ruble et al. 1976 – only
Mosatche and Bragonier, 1981, have
observed it in preschoolers), becomes more
covert as children age (Pomerantz et al.
1995), and is less common in high-achieving
children (Ruble and Flett 1988, although this
changes in adulthood). In older age, temporal
comparison (comparing to past selves)
becomes increasingly important (Ferring and
Hoffmann 2007).
(d) Self-esteem and dysphoria. As reviewed by
Wheeler (2000), the effects of self-esteem and
depression on comparisons are mixed,
although most evidence supports a cognitive
(and not downward comparison) model, in
that nondepressed and/or high self-esteem
people are more likely to make comparisons
that result in better feelings. For example,
those with high self-esteem are more likely
to engage in downward comparisons than low
self-esteem individuals. Again, although peo-
ple benefit from downward comparisons, low
self-esteem people do not seek them, whereas
downward comparison theory argues that per-
ceived threat leads to selection of downward
targets. As Wheeler notes, people may not do
what makes them feel best.
(e) The Big Five. The Big Five personality fac-
tors show mixed relationships to social com-
parison. For example, higher neuroticism
sometimes leads to better outcomes from
downward comparisons (Wheeler 2000,
p. 153), sometimes to no difference (Van der
Zee et al. 1999), and sometimes to worse out-
comes (Van der Zee et al. 1998). More con-
sistently, extraverted people tend to compare
downward more often, and agreeableness and
openness are associated with better reactions
to upward comparison.
(f) Values. Personal values can also influence
selection strategies. People focused on inter-
personal communion are more likely to make
comparisons that emphasize similarity with
others (as compared to generalized differences
with others), and people with values of agency
5
tend to make more downward comparisons
(better/worse; Locke and Nekich 2000).
What Does Social Comparison Say about
Personhood?
Having talked about how individual differences
affect social comparison, we now ask how social
comparison affects our understanding of person-
ality and personhood. All people compare and are
affected by comparisons. This accords well with
relational models of personality, from Lacan
to Sullivan to Klein. People do not know their
abilities and opinions, reduce their feeling of
threat, or enhance themselves by referring only
to themselves. Instead, comparison plays a role in
all these critical parts of personhood.
By and large, comparisons give us a window
onto reality and hence to understanding of our-
selves. However, there are two exceptions to this
general rule. First, people are able to strain com-
parisons to suit themselves. For example, we can
discount unfavorable comparisons (see the genius
effect). Second, some people use comparison
strategies that appear to be self-defeating, includ-
ing people with eating disorders and people with
depression.
Festinger’s initial formulation of social com-
parison theory depended on a reality with no firm
answers, a world in which intelligence, wealth,
and attractiveness are comparatively, and not ulti-
mately, known. While this may be true for some
attributes, it is not true for all, and humans appear
to wisely stop comparing when it is unnecessary.
Hansson et al. (1982) studied Oklahomans living
in Tulsa’s floodplain and found that social com-
parison produced optimism among those who had
never experienced a flood, but no effect for those
whose house had been flooded in previous floods.
Social comparison only helps until you actually
have been flooded.
Scales for Social Comparison
There are many scales to measure aspects of social
comparison.
6 Social Comparison Theory
(a) Orientation measures. As mentioned above,
the INCOM and PACS are commonly used to
measure social comparison orientation.
(b) Appearance measures. Apart from the
PACS, Thompson et al.’s (1999) body com-
parison scale also measures how often people
compare various parts of their body (e.g.,
face, arms) with others. O’Brien et al.
(2009) have a scale that splits appearance
comparison tendencies into upward and
downward components.
(c) General reaction scales. Allan and Gilbert’s
(1995) social comparison scale measures how
people generally feel compared to others
across a range of attributes. Van der Zee et
al. (2000) report a scale measuring general
tendencies towards identification and contrast
following upward and downward
comparison.
(d) General motivation scales. Sohn
(2010) reports a 23-item scale assessing the
motives for measuring social comparison.
Tigges (2009) reports a 19-item scale
assessing motives.
(e) Health. Dibb and Yardley (2006) report a
scale measuring social comparison in illness
which assesses both motivations for compar-
ing when ill, and the outcomes of those com-
parisons. Wilson et al. (1997) report a scale
measuring the types of comparisons people
with sickle cell anemia might make.
(f) Scales with partial relation to social com-
parison. Efklides et al. (2003) have a life
satisfaction scale for elderly people containing
some items on comparisons to other people.
Turner et al. (2003) reports a social thoughts
and belief scale which has some items about
feeling unattractive and unintelligent when in
the presence of others. Smith et al.
(2013) report a scale measuring the effects of
social comparison on Facebook status
updating. Adler and Fagley’s (2005) apprecia-
tion scale has a social comparison subscale.
The Interpersonal Orientation Scale, created
by Hill (1987), has four subscales on affilia-
tion motivations, one of which concerns pref-
erences for affiliating in order to compare with
others.
A Short Note on Stapel
Diederik Stapel, a fraudulent researcher,
published some research on social comparison.
Given the “replicability crisis” in psychology,
one might reasonably wonder whether Stapel’s
work led to overstating the results in this area.
Even with Stapel’s fraudulent work included,
there are almost no changes to meta-analytic
results (Gerber et al. 2018). Stapel acknowledges
faking his data so well that they did not stick out
from the rank and file of other published research.
This is not to say, however, that his theories were
correct. Stapel’s major theory (that implicit com-
parisons lead to contrast) is not supported by any
research outside one of his own retracted papers.
Closely Related Concepts
1. Opinion change. Social comparison was orig-
inally formulated in the realm of ability and
opinion comparison, but most of the work in
the area has focused on abilities and not opin-
ions. Opinion change has been researched
more extensively in the persuasion literature.
2. Attractiveness and body image. The Physical
Appearance Social Comparison Scale
(Thompson et al. 1991) has encouraged the
linkage of research on body image and social
comparison theory. This research typically
uses multiple magazine images (not single tar-
gets) typifying the cultural ideals for body
shape and finds that such comparisons lead to
contrast (feeling worse about one’s own body),
and are also associated with eating disorders.
The difference between multiple comparisons
and single comparisons is not widely studied.
3. The better-than-average effect. This effect is
found when people compare themselves to an
“average other.” Comparisons to a single target
can be distinguished both conceptually
(an average other is not a real target) and
empirically (Zell and Alicke 2009).
4. Relative deprivation. Relative deprivation
occurs when people feel they are disadvan-
taged compared to others, with the other in
this instance tending to be a group. Many
Social Comparison Theory
studies have examined relative deprivation in
the context of work and play, and home-life,
but they do not use distinct comparison targets,
and hence are probably not best construed as
social comparison proper.
5. Big-fish-little-pond effect. Marsh and col-
leagues (e.g., Marsh and Parker 1984) have
extensively found that smart children from
small schools fare worse when they move to
selective schools (where most children are
highly intelligent). This is considered to be
the result of multiple comparisons with peers.
Conclusion
Social comparison research has grown from a
theory developed to understand group uniformity
into a broader experimental and observational
field with robust experimental methods and scale
measures. Although the individual differences
implications of social comparison are less well-
developed, the personhood implications are clear:
we tend to compare when things are unknown,
and cease comparing if firmer information is
available.
Cross-References
▶ Attitude Change
▶ Better-Than-Average-Effect
▶ Big-Fish-Little-Pond Effect
▶ Body Image
▶ Kurt Lewin
▶ Relative Deprivation
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