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Phenomenology and phenomenography in educational research: A critique

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Phenomenology and phenomenography in

educational research: A critique

Steven A. Stolz

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educational research: A critique, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 52:10, 1077-1096, DOI:
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EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY
2020, VOL. 52, NO. 10, 1077–1096
https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2020.1724088

Phenomenology and phenomenography in educational

research: A critique
Steven A. Stolz
School of Education, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The use of phenomenology and phenomenography as a method in the Received 8 October 2019
educational research literature has risen in popularity, particularly by Revised 28 December 2019
researchers who are interested in understanding and generating know- Accepted 8 January 2020
ledge about first-person events, or the lived experiences of students in
KEYWORDS
certain educational contexts. With the rise of phenomenology and phe- Phenomenology; phenom-
nomenography as a method, some conceptual mistakes and associated enography; educational
confusion have also arisen; however, accounts examining both are lim- research; method(ology);
ited. As a result, this paper will be concerned with the discussion of two knowledge; experience
issues: (1) for the sake of conceptual clarity, I provide a brief outline of
phenomenology and phenomenography; and, (2) I then turn my atten-
tion to a critical discussion of phenomenography. In the latter case, I
argue that when phenomenography departs from phenomenology it
actually weakens its legitimacy as an approach to research. In order to
overcome this problem, I argue that it makes sense to consolidate phe-
nomenography within the broader research agenda of phenomenology
which extends on the work of Husserl. Of course, the caveat to this idea
is contingent upon a significant shift within phenomenography so it
closely aligns itself with phenomenological principles and methods. As a
way forward, I offer research direction to those who may be interested
in the study of human experience by opening-up interdisciplinary dia-
logue about phenomenology, and at the same time I explore core
methods used in phenomenology that extend on the continental trad-
ition of phenomenology.

Introduction
The use of phenomenology and phenomenography as a method in the educational research lit-
erature has risen in popularity, particularly by researchers who are interested in understanding
and generating knowledge about first-person events, or the lived experiences of students in cer-
tain educational contexts. Indeed, a precursory survey of the educational literature will show the
prevalence of “phenomenography” as a method that claims to be its own approach to research.1
Due to Marton (see for example, Marton, 1981, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 2015;
Marton & Booth, 2015; Marton & Pang, 2006, 2008; Marton & Pong, 2005) advocating for the use
of “phenomenography” as a distinct research approach in educational settings, it seems appro-
priate to acknowledge his contribution to the literature on phenomenography. As to be

CONTACT Steven A. Stolz steven.stolz@adelaide.edu.au School of Education, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA
5005, Australia.
An earlier version of this paper was presented in Sydney (Australia) at the Australian Association for Research in Education
(AARE) Conference in December 2018.
ß 2020 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
1078 S. A. STOLZ

expected with any new method, Marton’s phenomenographic approach has spawned other
researchers to adopt his approach in educational research.2 In this case, what concerns me is the
way in which phenomenography would appear to be similar to the philosophical tradition
known as “phenomenology”. In fact, phenomenography uses many of the same concepts and
ideas as phenomenology, but at the time claims to be different from phenomenology. Part of
the problem as I see it, is the way in which phenomenography picks-and-chooses ideas, con-
cepts, methods, and so on from phenomenology in an ad hoc way; however, at the same time
does not adhere to the same ideas, concepts, methods, and so on of phenomenology.
Unsurprisingly, the likelihood that this could lead to serious conceptual confusion, or even the
fallacious view that phenomenology and phenomenography are one-and-the-same research
method is deeply problematic and worth avoiding.
Another problem I have with phenomenography centres on the serious lack of interpretative
rigour which has caused many in the literature to criticise the method and methodological prac-
tices of phenomenography because the researcher’s presuppositions, misconceptions, biases, and
so on have not been removed from the research, and hence why phenomenological reduction,
or the practice of bracketing as a method may be beneficial.3 Consequently, for the purposes of
this paper I will be concerned with the discussion of two issues: firstly, for the sake of conceptual
clarity, I provide a brief outline of phenomenology and phenomenography; and, lastly, I then
turn my attention to a critical discussion of phenomenography. In the latter case, I argue that
when phenomenography departs from phenomenology it actually weakens its legitimacy as an
approach to research. In order to overcome this problem, I argue that it makes sense to consoli-
date phenomenography within the broader research agenda of phenomenology which extends
on the work of Husserl. Of course, the caveat to this idea is contingent upon a significant shift
within phenomenography so it closely aligns itself with phenomenological principles and meth-
ods that guides the practice of researchers who may want to employ this approach. As a way
forward, I offer research direction to those who may be interested in the study of human experi-
ence by opening-up interdisciplinary dialogue about phenomenology, and at the same time I
explore core methods used in phenomenology that extend on the continental tradition of
phenomenology.

What is phenomenology?
In order to make sense of phenomenology, it will be useful to briefly understand the historical
context from which it arose to prominence in Europe in the early twentieth-century. In the
period leading-up to the twentieth-century, the movement towards phenomenology was
grounded in a perceived concern that philosophy was too restricted by and/or narrowly focused
on analytical investigations of traditional logical and epistemological problems. To overcome this
perceived concern, Husserl and many of the original proponents and practitioners of phenomen-
ology emphasised the need for a renewal of philosophy through a new method of doing phil-
osophy that is not bound to any historical tradition of enquiry.4 Although Brentano anticipated
many of the themes found in phenomenology, Husserl (1900–1901/2001) in his Logical
Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen) demonstrates a new method of doing philosophy that is
concerned with clarifying the manner in which the world comes to exist for us, and in a sense is
meant to be ontologically neutral because it is beyond notions of realism and idealism.5 Even
though Husserl’s views of phenomenology changed from its initial conception as “descriptive
psychology” in the Prolegomena, his interest in the mystery of subjectivity and how our know-
ledge is constituted never changed, and remained a constant theme throughout his extensive
corpus. By the second German edition of Logical Investigations, Husserl’s view of phenomenology
shifts to an exploration and examination of “essences” by tracing acts of knowing or cognition
back to their fulfilment in intuition. In order to trace these acts of knowing or to fully understand
 EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 1079

the experiences of thinking and knowing, Husserl argues that phenomenological investigations
should aim to reveal and clarify:
… the essences which directly make themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have their
roots purely in such essences. Each such statement of essence is an a priori statement in the highest sense
of the word … [to the point that] … it lays bare the ‘sources’ from which the basic concepts and ideal
laws of pure logic ‘flow’, and back to which they must once more be traced, so as to give them all the
‘clearness and distinctness’ needed for an understanding, and for an epistemological critique, of pure logic.
(LI, Intro., §1, II, p. 166)6

Here, phenomenology emphasises what is given or evident in intuitive experience in accord-

ance with the act of consciousness. Since the act of consciousness is intentional means we are
directed towards what is given or evident in the way we see things, which in turn is confirmed
by self-evident truisms.7 In a sense, our knowledge of universals or essences is gained by abstrac-
tion from the phenomena, and for this reason involves a relationship between the perceiver and
the thing being perceived.8 Take for instance the following example involving two red billiard
balls, which I will call X and Y.9 The red colour of X can be clearly seen by the perceiver and is
located in space where X is. Likewise, the red colour of Y can also be clearly seen by the per-
ceiver and is located in the space where Y is. Since they are located in two separate locations
means the colour of X is not identical with Y (and vice versa), however, they are instances of the
same shade of colour which are similar to other instances or objects which share the same col-
our shade.
So how do we come to know the abstract property of red or redness? How we come to
know the abstract property of red or the shade of redness in instances can be likened to a uni-
versal form of “universal redness”. In this case, phenomenology asserts that we have direct per-
ception of instances of redness, but also the capacity to directly perceive aspects of universal
redness. It is by different types of intuition – such as transcendent, eidetic, and immanent – that
we perceive, or intuit universals or essences in the same way we perceive or intuit particulars,
like a tree, a chair, a man, and so on.10 It is important to point out that essences can be pre-
sented in the mind in its entirety as an act of intuition, whereas perceived objects can never be
presented in totality because we can only perceive aspects of, say a red billiard ball. The distinc-
tion between perceptual and abstract properties, such as universal redness is an important fea-
ture of phenomenology, and hence worth exploring further what is means to perceive aspects of
a red billiard ball. For instance, firstly, we need to be able to distinguish between the red colour
of X, which is a property of X, and our experience of perceiving X that is located where X is.
Even though X is uniformly coloured red, does not mean we necessarily perceive uniform red-
ness because the lighting in the room may caste a dark shadow over half the ball. Secondly, the
perception of a spatial object, such as X can only be perceived from a point of view, and thereby
we can only perceive half of X irrespective of our point of view. So our knowledge of universal
properties, or essences can be known directly when we attend to them on the one hand, and
perceptual objects can only be known indirectly through their aspects on the other.
So how does phenomenology overcome the potential distortion of human perception, or mis-
leading naturalistic assumptions of the world to reveal the essences of intentional consciousness,
particularly in relation to how objectivity is constituted out of subjectivity? In order to overcome
this problem, Husserl introduces what he generally labels as the “reduction” which underpins his
method of phenomenology. Indeed, it is important to point out that the practice of phenomeno-
logical reduction is a defining method of Husserlian phenomenology, and hence why it is men-
tioned in this section because it is used for analysing the different variants and modes of
intuition (i.e., transcendent, eidetic, and immanent). Although, Husserl characterises the notion of
reduction at various times in different ways – which range from “phenomenological reduction”
in The Idea of Phenomenology to as many as eight different kinds of reduction found in the
Cartesian Mediations – there seems to be two central features of phenomenological reduction
worth sharing. These being as follows: (1) it involves the practice of epoch
e, which consists of
1080 S. A. STOLZ

“bracketing” or “suspending” all our natural attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, opinions, and so on
about the world that have been accrued by psychology, science, religion, philosophy, and so on;
and, (2) by bracketing and suspending all natural assumptions, it forces us to go back to, and
isolate the central structures of consciousness by revealing the pure essence of our eidetic or
mental acts.
A central feature of phenomenological reduction, or the practice of bracketing as a method,
is the prevention of attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, opinions, and so on distorting an experience
into an experience of another kind. For instance, when someone is looking at, and holding bil-
liard ball X, there occurs a mental act where our attention is drawn to X in a special manner. By
an individual attending to X, visual and tactile perception grasps the object in such a way that
we come to know the object from concrete experience to the point that we can know X without
holding and/or perceiving X abstractly, say through imagination. From this kind of example, we
can gain a sense of the phenomenological reduction, and how concrete experience attempts to
reveal or uncover something about conscious acts. So phenomenological reduction, or the prac-
tice of bracketing involves isolating those features of the phenomenon that is common, say
when we both look at a billiard ball. By trying to identify the logical structure of the phenom-
enon when we are directed toward the same billiard ball, we recognise that it is a billiard ball
with certain universal properties, such as the species of colour “redness”. It is important to point
out, that there is a difference between objects perceived in the outside world, and objects of
the world of consciousness. In the former, objects such as X are never given to use in their total-
ity in a single mental act of perception because they are indirectly knowable, whereas in the lat-
ter, X is directly knowable when we attend to X because we make it an object of my
consciousness. In a sense, it also highlights how the transcendental ego or transcendental subject-
ivity is the source of all meaning because our encounters with objects from being in the world
reinforces the view that nothing can be conceived without consciousness. Here, Husserl’s com-
mitment to a form of transcendental idealism is made known due to the position he holds,
namely that objects are constituted by consciousness and could not exist without being an
object of consciousness.11
So can others share in the experience of publically accessible objects or does phenomenology
end in a form of transcendental solipsism? In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Cartesian
Meditations and Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl (1929/
1969, 1931/1950, 1936/1970) tries to overcome the charge of solipsism levelled against his phe-
nomenological method by explaining how an individual can intuitively understand another per-
son’s experiences, but they can’t undergo the other person’s experience directly, or fully
comprehend the experiences of others. In addressing the “illusion” that phenomenology will end
in transcendental solipsism, Husserl in §96 of Formal and Transcendental Logic argues that the
“ … world is continually there for us; but in the first place it is there for me … otherwise there
could be no sense for me in which the world is there for us … ” (FTL, §96 b, p. 242). In develop-
ing his concept of intersubjectivity and its role in the “intersubjective world” or “life-world”
(Lebenswelt), Husserl makes it clear that we come to understand the transcendental other because
the world starts with “me”, and due to my transcendental ego that we can gain a sense of the
“open community of Egos” and the endless whole of transcendental intersubjectivity (FTL, §99,
pp. 250–255). In using an earlier example, the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity is
grasped from my own perception and/or experience of billiard ball X, and hence why I know
others can perceive and/or experience billiard ball X because it is a publically accessible object. I
need to stress that this does not mean that I can live in the others experience, or know with cer-
tainty what others may be experiencing beyond what I experience of publically accessible
objects. My point here being that even though I may live in a world of shared objects, shared
environments, shared language, shared meanings, and so on, we need to be extremely cautious
about the close relationship between subjectivity and objectivity.
 EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 1081

When you take into consideration that phenomenology is concerned with clarifying the man-
ner in which the world comes to exist for us, means that any descriptions, accounts, interpreta-
tions, and so on of experience, activity, objects, and so on need to be carefully interrogated for
prejudice, cultural and historical bias, perceptual distortions, and so on, via the practice of phe-
nomenological reduction or bracketing. For instance, if a person known as “person A” was pre-
sented with billiard ball X, and they claimed X was irregular shaped with green polka-dots, then
it could be viewed the person A is hallucinating, or imagining something that does not exist in
reality because my own and everyone else’s episodic perceptions and/or experiences ultimately
validates X with properties of “universal redness”, and a three-dimensional shape with curves
known as a “ball”. From a phenomenological point of view, all experience, all truth, all meaning
is grounded in transcendental subjectivity, and so one of the greatest contributions that phe-
nomenology can make in any field or discipline area is its rigorous and systematic exploration of
subjectivity, particularly in relation to how our knowledge is constituted as objective, or con-
crete fact.

What is phenomenography?
Although phenomenography and phenomenology share the term “phenomenon”, the former
with the suffix “graph” claims to be a different research approach to the latter using the suffix
“logos”. Marton (1981) in an article titled “Phenomenography: Describing Conceptions of the
World Around Us” coins the term “phenomenography” for the first time in print as a research
approach which “ … aims at description, analysis, and understanding of experiences … ” (p.
180). Indeed, Marton goes on to emphasise how phenomenography “resembles” and shares
many “similarities” with phenomenology, but is ultimately different in understanding and in prac-
tice. Despite these similarities, Marton (1981) outlines four distinct differences between phenom-
enography and phenomenology.
The first difference relates to phenomenography being interested in second-order descriptions.
To Marton, phenomenology alleges to be mainly interested in how agents orient themselves
toward the world from a first-person point of view or “first-order” perspective, and hence is not
necessarily interested in the agent’s way of experiencing the world, whereas phenomenography
is interested in investigating people’s conceptions of the world or their experiences of it from a
“second-order” perspective.12
This leads to the second difference, and the interest in investigating people’s experience of
something becomes the object of research for phenomenography. In drawing from phenomenol-
ogy’s interest in studying the “essence” of consciousness in order to understand an object and
make it more intelligible, Marton (1981, p. 181) borrows the term “essence” as the basis of phe-
nomenographic research because it is concerned with investigating “intersubjective” variation
and the architecture of this variation because “ … aspects of reality, are experienced (or concep-
tualized) in a relatively limited number of qualitatively different ways … ”, and for this reason
there appears to exist “modes of experience” that is “ … [i]nbetween the common and the idio-
syncratic … ” worth researching.
In the third difference, the subject-matter of phenomenography is concerned with investigat-
ing the qualitatively different ways in which people experience, conceptualise, perceive, and
think about various aspects of phenomena in the world. The point of departure for phenomen-
ography turns on a structure of categories of description provided that are said to be relational,
experiential, content-orientated, and qualitative from a “second-order” perspective. Here, phe-
nomenographic researchers aim to categorise their subjects’ descriptions, and these categories in
turn form the basis of phenomenographic research.
The last difference extends on the former point being made that phenomenography is con-
cerned with revealing individual and collective levels of variation by focusing on the way people
1082 S. A. STOLZ

and certain groups or populations experience specified aspects of the world as a means of
understanding other people’s understandings so these in turn can be described according to
one of the categories. It is these categorised descriptions made by the phenomenographic
researcher that are seen as the primary outcomes of this research enterprise. In subsequent
work, Marton (1986, 1988b; Marton & Booth, 1997) goes to great lengths to point out how phe-
nomenography is different from phenomenology.13 Indeed, Marton (1986, 1988b) adds to the
earlier list of differences by emphasising a “fundamental” point of divergence between phenom-
enography and phenomenology. He goes on to refer to Husserl’s phenomenological reduction or
“bracketing” as a method used in phenomenology which is not used and/or required by phe-
nomenographic research because it is assumed that the structural framework that describes the
various categories of understanding will be limited by the number of qualitatively different ways
in which the phenomena or aspects are experienced or comprehended. Consequently, to Marton
(1986, 1988b), the use of categories of description highlights the most obvious difference
between phenomenography and phenomenology as the onus is heavily placed on the construc-
tion and production of second-order descriptions offered by the phenomenographic researcher.
So in phenomenographic research, what methods are used, or how do you carry-out phenom-
enographic research? In order to answer this question, it will be useful to understand how phe-
nomenography evolved into an approach to research in education. According to Marton (1986,
1988b, 1994a; Marton & Booth, 1997), phenomenography emerged from a range of research
challenges in the early 1970s concerning how to account for qualitative differences in learning
outcomes found in educational settings.14 Based on earlier research conducted, it was found
that qualitative explanations provided more meaningful details about the process of learning
than quantitative explanations. Early studies by Marton (1975) and Marton & S€aljo €, 1976b) relat-
ing to learning from academic texts that used individual interviews of university students
explaining their experience of how they read and comprehended the same text are worth not-
ing. From this research, it was found that there were four qualitatively different ways in which
students understood the same text.15 To explain these differences in learning, two levels of proc-
essing were detectable from the students’ responses which were referred to as “surface-level”
and “deep-level” approaches to learning. In this case, the former approach to learning (surface-
level) was associated with less than satisfactory learning outcomes (i.e., levels C and D), whereas
the latter approach (deep-level) was in most cases associated with comprehending what the
author was arguing for in the text (i.e., levels A and B). Since qualitatively different understand-
ings of academic text could be classified into four categories led to the conclusion that “ … peo-
ple in general hold qualitatively different conceptions of all kinds of phenomena … [and, hence
these] … differences could be a potent source of explanation when investigating … ” the quali-
tative differences found in learning (Marton, 1986, p. 37). This is reinforced by Marton (1988b, p.
189), when he states that the “basic idea of phenomenography” is grounded in the notion that:
When we ask people about their experience or conceptualization of various phenomena in the world
around them, whether or not these phenomena or aspects have been objects of educational experiences,
again and again we find a limited number of qualitatively different ways in which the phenomena or aspect
are seen or apprehended.

In the interests of explicating the methods used by phenomenographic research, to Marton

(1994a) the dominant and preferred method of “collecting data” is the individual interview.16 He
goes on to add that an interview should not have too many questions or details determined in
advance because the “ … point is to establish the phenomenon as experienced and to explore
its different aspects jointly and as fully as possible” by asking the subject or participant in the
research project open-ended type questions, such as: “What do you mean by learning?”, “Can
you tell me about something you have learned?”, and so on (Marton, 1994a, pp. 4427–4428).
After the interviews have been conducted, the recordings of the interview are transcribed, and
these transcripts of the interview become the “data” for analysis in the next phase of research. It
 EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 1083

is interesting to note in Chapter 6 (“The Idea of Phenomenography”) of Learning and Awareness

(Marton & Booth, 1997, p. 129), that the “ … methods of phenomenographic data collection and
data analysis are inseparable … [because] … during the collection of data … analysis is taking
place, and early phases of analysis can influence later data collection”.17 Understandably, the role
of the phenomenographic researcher becomes central to this whole research approach because
it becomes the responsibility of the researcher to consider how others experience the phenom-
enon of interest according to the research situation they have specifically designed or
“moulded”. Implicit within this structural design or moulding undertaken by the phenomeno-
graphic researcher is a concern that the research effort will have an effect on the outcome of
learning, and that the researcher will be able to bring to light the subjects experience
of learning.
In response to known problems between what is being researched and the processes that the
phenomenographic researcher goes through to conduct research, Marton and Booth (1997) dis-
cuss some of these complexities of “collecting data” by commencing at “meta-awareness” of the
interviewees, the complexities surrounding potential “psychotherapeutic aspects” of the phenom-
enological interview, the “degree” of reflection demonstrated by the interviewees, the “power”
imbalance between the interviewer and interviewee, and so on. Once the “data” has been col-
lected, the task shifts to what Marton (1986, 1988b, 1994a; Marton & Booth, 1997) refers to as
the “data analysis” phase, and how to “reduce the data” from what is relevant, and what is not
relevant to the research topic, or the phenomenon being investigated. Here, the main task of
the researcher turns to identifying and grouping ways the subject experienced, or conceptualised
the phenomenon (e.g., literally or metaphorically) based on the various statements made in the
interview. This process of sorting material based on what has been expressed through the inter-
view transcripts via extracts or quotes (or equivalent data) by the individual subject, and the col-
lective data set forms two contexts. In the first context, the collective data set obtained from
what all the participants expressed is what Marton (1994a) calls the “pool of meaning”; whereas,
the second context relates to what the individual subject expressed about the same thing being
investigated. It is during this process that the phenomenographic researcher discovers the quali-
tatively different ways, or variations in the way people experience, or conceptualise a certain
phenomenon. This phase is what Marton (1986, 1988b, 1994a; Marton & Booth, 1997) refers to as
“hermeneutic element”, or “interpretation of essence” of phenomenographic analysis. After the
collected data has been grouped according to the critical attributes and distinguishing features
between each group, these can then be turned into “categories of description”. Once the cat-
egory or categories of description have been established, a logical relationship found between
the categories constitutes what Marton (1994a; Marton & Booth, 1997) refers to as the “outcome
space” of that phenomenon.18

Why phenomenography should be consolidated within the broader research

agenda of phenomenology
Even though Marton and others continue to claim that phenomenography is not an “offspring”
of phenomenology, I remain unconvinced by both the extent, and the ways that phenomenogra-
phy differs from phenomenology, particularly when phenomenography uses many of the same
concepts and ideas as phenomenology. As the founder of phenomenography, clearly Marton has
a vested interest to argue that phenomenography is an alternative method of research. Initially,
Marton (1986, 1988b, 1994a) goes to great lengths to outline some of the methodological
aspects of phenomenography as a research method in education; however, in subsequent work
this position is rejected in chapter 6 (“The Idea of Phenomenography”) of Learning and
Awareness (Marton & Booth, 1997) when it is argued that “[p]henomenography is not a method
in itself … [but] … rather a way of – an approach to – identifying, formulating, and tackling
1084 S. A. STOLZ

certain sorts of research questions … [concerning] … learning and understanding in an educa-

tional setting”.19 In this case, clearly Marton is trying to distance phenomenography from the
theories and methods of phenomenology first articulated by Husserl that was intended to be a
philosophical method. In doing so, we are left with a fallacious situation where Marton and
others want to claim some status as a research method without being methodological, and at
the same time some theoretical status without being completely theoretical.
Compounding the issue further is an acknowledgement by Marton and Booth (1997, p. 117)
that phenomenography and phenomenology “both aim to reveal the nature of human experi-
ence and awareness” to the point that phenomenography shares some of the “theories and
methods” of phenomenology to the point that it could “legitimately be seen as a child of the
phenomenology family”. Although I would argue that there are many similarities between phe-
nomenology and phenomenography, yet at the same time what is the cause of considerable
confusion is the way in which phenomenography intentionally aims to place a different
emphasis on concepts from how they are used within phenomenology. For instance, phenomen-
ography borrows, or takes many concepts used in phenomenology, such as: phenomenon, inten-
tionality, essence, bracketing, reduction, experience, knowledge, and so on. So I agree with
Giorgi (1999) that I do not have an issue with phenomenography using these concepts, but
what I take issue with is the way in which phenomenography picks-and-chooses in an ad hoc
way from phenomenology, and at the same time does not adhere to the same methods of phe-
nomenology. Interestingly, Giorgi (1999, p. 90) does raise some legitimate criticisms against phe-
nomenography for basically wanting to have its “cake” and “eat it too”, which in turn has
created a situation which gives “ … phenomenographers complete license to be theoretical or
not, or methodical or not, according to whichever position is most advantageous at the
moment”.20 Not only does this reflect a certain level of conceptual confusion, it is also highlights
how phenomenography is incomplete because it is not prepared to fully commit to a position.
Consequently, when phenomenography departs from the rigorous demands of phenomenology
it actually weakens its legitimacy as an approach to research.
So in order to demonstrate how phenomenography could gain much from a stronger associ-
ation with phenomenology, let me start out by addressing my first concern. The claim made by
phenomenography that everything that is experienced by an agent is limited by a number of
variations that can be logically categorised according to second-order perspectives and descrip-
tions. What I want to challenge here, is a series of unquestioned assumptions which can be sche-
matically represented as follows:
(P1) Let X be a phenomena under investigation.

(P2) Phenomena are defined as experiences, and thereby all experiences of X are knowable by human
agents in the same way.

(P3) Since human agent’s basically share a similar way of making-sense of X through their experiences
means they are a reliable source of data.

(P4) By collecting data from human agents who experienced X – say from individual interview – means this
data can be collated and analysed by the phenomenographic researcher from a second-order perceptive.

(P5) The role of the phenomenographic researcher is to interpret X (i.e. second-order perspective) from the
collated data so it can be categorised and hierarchically ordered according to the variations discovered.

(C) Thus, we can know X, and as a result, teachers, educators, researchers, policy-makers, and so on can
bring about the desired aim of learning in educational settings.

In P1, we need a common conception of a phenomena under investigation in order to be

able to claim that there are deviations from it, but none are provided in a universal form (i.e.,
 EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 1085

types or kinds, properties, and relations) that can be instantiated or exemplified within a commu-
nity of observers. As for P2, the idea that all experiences are the same, and thereby the phenom-
enon of X is knowable from an epistemological point of view is problematic, particularly from
what Marton refers to as a second-order perspective. An obvious example why P2 is problematic
can be found in human perception. For instance, when it comes to human perception, it is easy
to be deceived into thinking that we see one purple cube, when in fact there is two red billiard
balls. In this case, the fallacy of false cause (non causa pro causa) brings to our attention how we
can be tempted to presuppose, or led to presuppose some specific cause-and-effect relation
when in fact it does not really exist in the act of understanding the “phenomenon” being
studied. In a sense, this is why phenomenological reduction, or the practice of bracketing is
needed. Likewise in P3, there is the assumption that the ways in which human agents come to
know, or make-sense of X is either similar or limited in variation. This leads to P4, and the view
that the phenomenographic researcher can come to know X via the analysis of collected data
(e.g., individual interviews of agents by the phenomenographic researcher) is equally problematic
because the investigator has failed to bracket, or set aside prior assumptions of X. What is prob-
ably the most troubling assumption from this schematic representation can be found in P5 con-
cerning the phenomenographic researcher interpreting X from the collated data. Not only does
this exclude any possibility that the agent who experienced X has the final authority because
the final authority has been co-opted by the phenomenographic researcher for the purposes of
categorising and hierarchically ordering X. Furthermore, a second-order perspective of an agent’s
experience of X is not straightforward as it requires the phenomenographic researcher to
renounce a number of assumptions and presuppositions (i.e., phenomenological reduction or the
practice of bracketing) so the interpretation does not merge into a first-order description of X.
The tension between descriptive and interpretative phenomenology seem to be left unresolved
to the point that the meaning of the experience is viewed as an idiosyncratic and personal con-
struction that are entirely dependent on the researcher’s “say-so” or warranted assertion.
Inevitably, this leads to a dangerous situation where a conclusion has already been pre-deter-
mined, and the interpretation of the experience is invented or constructed to fit with a pre-
determined conclusion. On a number of levels, this is unmistakeably problematic, but at the end
of day we are no closer to understanding X or the phenomena that is being studied. The main
point here is that the assumptions found in P1, P2, P3, P4, and P5 are ill-conceived, which in
turn invalidates the conclusion expressed in C. As such, it is quite clear to me that phenomenog-
raphy could benefit from phenomenological reduction, or the practice of bracketing, and if it is
not prepared to modify its approach to research, then maybe it should abandon it all together.21
In extending on the previous point made about phenomenography, Marton (1986, 1988b)
contradicts himself when he argues that phenomenological reduction or bracketing as a method
used in phenomenology is not required by phenomenographic researchers because it is assumed
that human agents experience of phenomena is either similar or limited in variation (as per (P3)
above in my schema). Later, Marton (1994a, p. 4428) makes reference to the importance of
“bracketing” in the “Analysis” section of his account on phenomenography, stating:
… it is the researcher who is supposed to bracket preconceived ideas. Instead of judging to what extent
the responses reflect an understanding of the phenomenon in question which is similar to their own, he or
she is supposed to focus on similarities and differences between the ways in which the phenomenon
appears to the participants.

Although, Marton is aware of the concept of phenomenological reduction or bracketing, noth-

ing more is stated about how it should be used by phenomenographic researchers, nor are there
any examples of its application. In the context of this section, phenomenography appears to be
particularly prone to interpreting the collected data too early, or in a way that distorts the actual
student’s experience of the phenomena. The reason why this happens can be attributed to the
stages of data collection and data analysis being viewed as inseparable in phenomenographic
1086 S. A. STOLZ

research. So in a sense, I agree with Ashworth and Lucas (1998) that if the aim of phenomenog-
raphy is to “ … actually enter the world of the experience of the research participant, an epoch
e
of theoretical presuppositions is logically entailed” (p. 420). There is also the dilemma found in
phenomenographic research that even if the practice of phenomenological reduction or bracket-
ing was employed satisfactorily, the researcher is expected to have some knowledge of the sub-
ject-matter so they can understand the experience of the student for the purposes of
categorising and hierarchically ordering variations discovered (as per (P5) above in my schema).
As such, there does appear to be a fundamental flaw in phenomenography because it fails to
both reveal the process of second-order interpretations, and how the phenomenographic
researcher is to practice phenomenological reduction or bracketing so their beliefs, assumptions,
opinions, and so on, do not import their own first-order descriptions.
To overcome this problem, phenomenography tends to call on external criteria to determine
students’ experiences as similar or different from the “authoritative source”. Unfortunately, this
leads to the undesirable situation where the research findings can appear to be more contrived
than phenomenographic researchers realise. It is undeniable that Marton and other phenomeno-
graphic researchers place a considerable amount of weight on “authorised conceptions” (i.e.,
textbook accounts of a discipline and its associated system of definitions), and thereby any devi-
ation by the student, or subject from this ideal is deemed to be deficient. Furthermore, the ten-
dency to represent the findings generated by phenomenographic research – albeit interpreted
by phenomenographic researchers – in ways that are more abstract than how a student or sub-
ject would experience something is perplexing to me because the whole point and purpose of
phenomenography is to initially describe the student or subject’s experiences of the phenomena,
not ignore them in favour of categorised and hierarchically ordered generalisations.
In saying this, probably the biggest difference between phenomenography and phenomen-
ology can be attributed to the emphasis each places on first-and-second-order perspectives. For
instance, phenomenography is generally interested in the study of second-order perspectives,
whereas as we have seen from the first section of this paper on phenomenology, phenomen-
ology is mainly interested in the investigation of first-order or first-person perspectives, and
more importantly, through the use of phenomenological reduction or bracketing, coming to
understand many of the variants and modes surrounding intuition (i.e., transcendent, eidetic,
and immanent). In the former case (i.e., phenomenography), how the researcher subjectively
interprets how the subject experienced, or conceptualised the phenomenon seems to be more
important than the truth. In the latter case (i.e., phenomenology), the phenomenological method
necessitates that the researcher engages in the embodied practice of phenomenological reduc-
tion or bracketing, and hence why it is important to emphasise two things. These being: (1)
reduction is more than a formal method used for analysing subjective experience, but should be
approached as an effective embodied practice that can gain access to different variants and
modes of intuition (i.e., transcendent, eidetic, and immanent); and, (2) as an embodied practice,
reduction goes beyond merely describing individual subjective experience, and should be viewed
as an approach that can give rise to a new type of objectification that is on par with science in
terms of the rigour involved in its practice (see for example, Depraz, 1999).
Due to the issues alluded to in my critical discussion found in this section, the use of second-
order perspectives in phenomenographic research demonstrates why phenomenography is fun-
damentally flawed, and seriously diminished without phenomenology. Indeed, rather than con-
tinue a research agenda that is grounded on a conceptual mistake, which in turn has caused
unnecessary confusion in education and educational research, I think it is reasonable that phe-
nomenography should either modify, or abandon its approach to research altogether. To me it
seems reasonable to adopt the former option, and thereby consolidate phenomenography within
the broader research agenda of phenomenology which extends on the work of Husserl.22 This
would entail revising the method of phenomenological reduction or bracketing; however, we
should not lose sight of the fact that when it comes to exploring lived experience, a disciplined
 EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 1087

approach is needed that can analyse constitution from the point of view of intersubjective items
of knowledge, which in turn can be verified by intersubjective subjectivity in an objective way.
Take for instance my earlier example of two red billiard balls. As soon as I am directed towards
these objects, my perception is caught-up in the complex visual act of perceiving its spatio-tem-
poral properties, such as determining the location of X and Y relative to where I am located at a
certain point in time. Likewise, I will be absorbed with trying to identifying the physical proper-
ties of colour presented to me by the billiard balls. If I make a special effort to step back, or sus-
pend what we take as self-evident by altering how we see these objects, my manner of visual
disposition will change, and so too will my understanding of these billiard balls because my
focus turns to a shared comprehension of the concrete essence(s) (i.e., redness, ball, and so on),
as opposed to interpreting and reporting the experience of others like phenomenography.
In one sense, phenomenological reduction or bracketing makes it possible to identify invari-
ants that emerge from the experience via different reductive pathways.23 I am the first to
acknowledge that such an approach presupposes a certain degree of work and labour, but at
least the embodied practice of phenomenological reduction can access and take into account
the communitarian dimension we all share with others via our intersubjectivity. In another sense,
the phenomenographic researcher should practice phenomenological reduction or bracketing
precisely so their beliefs, assumptions, opinions, and so on, do not become first-order descrip-
tions of their subjects experience of the red billiard balls. Of course, the caveat to this idea is
contingent upon a significant shift within phenomenography so it aligns closely with phenom-
enological principles and methods, such as phenomenological reduction or bracketing. I do real-
ise this may be too difficult to achieve for some because the use of phenomenology in
educational research is often misconceived and misconstrued as the study of someone’s personal
experience of phenomena from a first-person perspective. Despite phenomenology being inter-
ested in subjectivity, it is important to stress that these investigations are concerned with
accounts of experience that are general to every human being because this knowledge is consti-
tuted as objective (e.g., universals, such as the colour of red), and hence why these results are
not personal or a kind of subjectivism (see for example, Thorburn & Stolz, 2020).
Rather than continue to outline errors or flaws found in phenomenography, as a way forward
I want to offer research direction to educational researchers, postgraduate students, and those
who may be interested in the study of human experience, particularly the lived experiences of
students in educational contexts. Interestingly, recent attempts to merge phenomenology, cogni-
tive science, neuroscience, and psychology have gone some way to close what Levine (1983)
refers to as the “explanatory gap”, and at the same time led to some exciting developments in
the literature (for some examples, see Gallagher & Schmicking, 2010; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008;
Varela & Shear, 1999a; Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch, 2003; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Roy,
Petitot, Pachoud, & Varela, 1999; Petitot, Varela, Pachoud, & Roy, 1999). Indeed, the interest in
phenomenology by cognitive science and other fields is not an accident due to the positive con-
tribution and insights it makes to a diverse array of discipline areas that are interested in the
structure of human experience. This renewed interest in phenomenology has led to emerging
areas of research, such as embodied cognition, enactive perception, dynamic systems, and so on.
Although interesting, what is of interest to this section relates to the methods of phenomen-
ology, and why phenomenography would benefit from closely aligning itself with phenomeno-
logical principles and methods. In taking this idea forward, I agree with Schmicking (2010) in his
discussion of phenomenology and phenomenological methods that one of the future tasks of
phenomenology is to open-up interdisciplinary communication in a way that decreases the large
number of misrepresentations of phenomenology, and at the same time explore a “middle way”
or find a shared common understanding of what may constitute a phenomenological method so
it can be used by a broad range of fields in the rigorous study of human experience. A useful
starting point to deal with the notion of method in phenomenology can be found in
Spiegelberg’s (1975, 1994) books titled, Doing Phenonemology and The Phenomenological
1088 S. A. STOLZ

Movement. The latter of the two offers the most accessible account of a phenomenological
method that builds on both the work of Husserl and the continental tradition of philosophy. In
Part 5 (i.e., “The Essentials of the Phenomenological Method”), Spiegelberg (1994, pp. 681–717)
characterises the phenomenological method as a series of steps, which he refers to as follows:

1. Investigating particular phenomena;

2. Investigating general essences;
3. Apprehending essential relationships among essences;
4. Watching modes of appearing;
5. Watching the constitution of phenomena in consciousness;
6. Suspending belief in the existence of the phenomena; and,
7. Interpreting the meaning of phenomena.

In this case, the first step consists of three phases, which commences with what Spiegelberg
refers to as “phenomenological intuiting”. Here, “intuiting” is often viewed as a “way of seeing”,
or grasping the phenomena under investigation that is both open (i.e., nothing is ruled “in” or
“out”), and at the same time free from unexamined presuppositions. The next phase involves
analysing, and this basically consists of “ … tracing the elements and the structure of the phe-
nomena obtained by intuiting … ” before describing or predicating particulars in their full
“concreteness” in a framework of descriptive concepts, such as quantitative value (i.e., 2 objects),
a geometrical object (i.e., ball/sphere), a colour (i.e., property of red or redness), and so on
(Spiegelberg, 1994, pp. 690–696).
Even though the first step already involves a consideration of essences; however, more fine
grained detail is needed, and hence why the second and third steps require a disciplined
approach that is notably rigorous to determine “essences” or “invariant structures”. In order to
investigate general essences or universals requires “eidetic intuiting” of particulars as a stepping
stone or a point of departure for the apprehension of the general essence (e.g., property of red
or redness). This is why intuitive apprehension of a general essence follows a similar operation
of analysis and description in the earlier stage, but in principle the task of the second operation
is to analytically distinguish structural affinities (i.e., red or redness) from other properties, and
then the role of the third operation is to determine where the general essence is located in the
framework of our descriptive concepts. Likewise, in the third step, any phenomenological study
of essences needs to investigate the essential relationships or invariant structures connected to
such essences. These essential relationships are of two types: (1) relationships within a single
essence (e.g., Can a ball/sphere have sides?); and, (2) relationships between several essences
(e.g., Are there variations of the property red or redness?).
In the fourth step, the systematic investigation of the phenomena turns its attention to the
ways in which things appear, or the different senses of appearance. According to Spiegelberg
(1994, pp. 703–706), there are at least three difference senses of appearance or “modes of given-
ness” that need to be distinguished and taken into consideration in any investigation of a par-
ticular phenomenon. These being as follows: (1) the perceiver can only see a side or aspect of
the given object from which we know the object as a whole (e.g., the perceiver cannot see the
whole ball/sphere in its entirety); (2) the perspectival view of the object may be distorted to the
perceiver (e.g., the perceiver sees one purple cube as opposed to two red billiard balls); and (3)
modes of clarity (e.g., if the perceiver is uncertain about the appearance of an object due to
poor light or location, they may intervene to improve the appearance by either introducing light
and/or changing their spatio-perspectival position so they can see and verify the appearance of
the two red billiard balls).
The way in which a phenomena establishes or “constitutes” itself in our consciousness forms
the basis of the fifth step. An example of constitution is the experience of getting orientated, or
coming to know a new city and how it gradually takes shape in our mind. It is important to
 EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 1089

point out that constitution is not the exclusive domain of mental or cognitive attainment, but
involves our body or embodiment in ways that combine to constitute an object as having a
meaning for human beings (e.g., two red billiard balls). Since objects are not in consciousness,
phenomenology is interested in the way these invariant structures combine or integrate to con-
stitute an experience as meaningful to human beings.
The sixth step shares some similarities with the first step, but they are not the same.
Suspending belief in the existence of objects is what is meant by phenomenological reduction;
however, this does not mean that “suspending belief” in the existence of objects under investi-
gation are negated or rejected in the world. In one sense, the basic function or technique of the
reduction is to step back or detach ourselves from the situation in preparation for an unpreju-
diced exploration of the structures and essential relationships of the given object or experience.
In another sense, the reduction aims to break what is familiar to us by drawing our attention
back to grasping the phenomena under investigation in a way that is open and free from
unexamined presuppositions (i.e., phenomenological intuiting). As such, reduction can be viewed
as a special type of reflection attitude that suspends our habitual thinking about what is
being examined.
In the last step (i.e., seventh step), concern turns to how we interpret the phenomena under
investigation. Spiegelberg raises some reservations about the hermeneutic approach, but con-
cedes that hermeneutic phenomenology must aim at something different and more ambitious.
This being the “ … discovery of meanings which are not immediately manifest to our intuiting,
analyzing, and describing … ” by going beyond what is directly given (Spiegelberg, 1994, p.
712). In addition, it must go beyond the enrichment of descriptive phenomenology, and seriously
consideration how descriptive phenomenology can cross-reference or verify statements made by
hermeneutic phenomenology (and vice versa) if it is going to make a significant contribution to
a diverse array of fields.
In summing up, if we take seriously Husserl’s (LI, Intro., §2, II) famous dictum to “ … go back
to the ‘things themselves’ … ” , it is crucial to note that this was never meant to be viewed as a
third-person objectification of the world, but a bracketing or suspension of what we think we
know in order to open a fresh look into the phenomena as it is experienced in its immediacy. In
order to obtain this natural attitude, an important starting point is phenomenological reduction,
or the practice of bracketing as a method, and as per Varela’s (1996) recent formulation, all forms
of reduction can be analysed into four interrelated moments or aspects: (1) inducing the attitude
of suspension; (2) gaining intuitive evidence concerning a domain; (3) providing descriptive
invariants; and (4) long-term training to acquire expertise in (1) to (3).24 As I see it, the first chal-
lenge is to make phenomenological reduction into a concrete method of practice that goes
beyond vague usage so it can actually be used by a diverse array of fields (see Depraz et al.,
2003). This leads to the second challenge concerning the reason or reasons why phenomenogra-
phy would benefit from closely aligning itself with phenomenological principles and methods. At
this juncture, it is important to note that by using Spiegelberg’s phenomenological method as
an example, it is not my intention to claim that there is only one method when it comes to phe-
nomenology, rather, my intention is to show that there is “ … enough connection between the
various versions of phenomenology to allow for a comprehensive account … ” to be shared, and
a “ … common core around which they can be arranged like concentric shells … ” (Spiegelberg,
1975, p. 56).25 Rather than labour the point, and go over old ground already covered, Varela and
Shear (1999b) reinforce why the phenomenological method is beneficial to all researchers who
are interested in the study of first-person events or the lived experiences of human beings, due
to the following:

1. Phenomenology provides a clear procedure (i.e. method) for accessing some phenomenal
domain; and,
1090 S. A. STOLZ

2. Phenomenology provides a clear means for an expression and validation (i.e. intersubjectivity)
within a community of observers who have familiarity with the procedures in (1).

So in a sense, other philosophers that proceeded Husserl, like Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty, and so on, either revised, extended on, or took his work in a different direction, but this
does not mean it was a free-for-all and there were no constraints in their work. My point that I
wish to emphasise, is that phenomenology is not a type of solipsism where the interpreter of
events is the final arbiter about what is true or false because of personal preference or role (e.g.,
phenomenographic researcher as interpreter of X). Indeed, phenomenologists or anyone who
wishes to engage with the investigation of phenomena in any meaningful way are bound by the
same checks-and-balances, or judgements as anyone else when it comes to claims being made
about notions of meaning and associated truth or truths. This is why at the end of the day, any
claims that are made about the phenomena being studied need to be validated and verified by
a community of observers who are familiar with the method being used. The final challenge was
to open-up interdisciplinary dialogue about phenomenology – particularly in educational
research – through the writing of this paper, and at the same time explore a middle ground
with respect to a common methodological foundation of phenomenology so it can be used as a
tool by a broad range of fields in the rigorous study of human experience.

Conclusion
In this paper I have intentionally raised some concerns about the use of phenomenography in
educational research. The reason why I have done so relates to the dangers of viewing phenom-
enography and phenomenology as one-and-the-same approach to research in educational set-
tings. Since phenomenography uses many of the same concepts and ideas as phenomenology,
but at the time claims to be different from phenomenology is deeply problematic because it is
the basis of unnecessary conceptual confusion. Indeed, I took issue with the way in which phe-
nomenography picks-and-chooses the ideas, concepts, and so on from phenomenology in an ad
hoc way without adhering to the same ideas, concepts, and so on of phenomenology.
Compounding the issue further is a lack of interpretative rigour found in the practices of phe-
nomenography because the researcher’s presuppositions, misconceptions, biases, and so on have
not been removed from the research. As such, for the sake of conceptual clarity, I provided a
brief outline of phenomenology and phenomenography in the second and third sections of
this paper.
In the fourth section of this paper, I turned my attention to a critical discussion of why phe-
nomenography should be consolidated within the broader research agenda of phenomenology
which extends on the work of Husserl. Here, I argued that when phenomenography departs
from the rigorous demands of phenomenology it actually weakens its legitimacy as an approach
to research. To demonstrate how phenomenography could gain much from a stronger associ-
ation with phenomenology, I provided a schematic representation of the underlying flaws found
inherent within phenomenographic research. I then raised some quite serious concerns sur-
rounding the role of the phenomenographic researcher who is responsible for interpreting the
collated data from a second-order perspective. In order to overcome this problem, I argued that
phenomenological reduction, or the practice of bracketing as a method would be beneficial in
preventing the attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, opinions, and so on of the researcher from distort-
ing an experience of the student, or subject into an experience of another kind. Taking into con-
sideration the significant issues surrounding the use of second-order interpretations in
phenomenography, not to mention the conceptual mistake in which it is grounded, I argued
that if phenomenography is not prepared to modify its approach to research, then maybe it
should abandon it all together. One potential solution to that I put forward, was to consolidate
 EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 1091

phenomenography within the broader research agenda of phenomenology. Of course, the caveat
to this idea is contingent upon a significant shift within phenomenography so it closely aligns
itself with phenomenological principles and methods that guides the practice of researchers who
may want to employ this approach. As a way forward, I offered research direction to those who
may be interested in the study of human experience by opening-up interdisciplinary dialogue
about phenomenology, and at the same time I explored core methods used in phenomenology
that extend on the continental tradition of phenomenology.

Notes
1. For some examples, see the following: “Phenomenography: Describing conceptions of the world around us”
(Marton, 1981), “Phenomenography: A research approach investigating different understandings of reality”
(Marton, 1986), “Phenomenography: Exploring different conceptions of reality” (Marton, 1988b),
“Phenomenography and the art of teaching all things to all men” (Marton, 1992), “Phenomenography”
(Marton, 1994a), “Reflections on phenomenography: Toward a methodology” (Dall’Alba & Hasselgren, 1996),
“Phenomenography in higher education [Special Issue]” (Bruce & Gerber, 1997), “The idea of
phenomenography and the pedagogy of conceptual change” (Marton & Pang, 2008), and “On the unit of
description in phenomenography” (Marton & Pong, 2005).
2. For some examples, see the following: “Variation and commonality in phenomenographic research methods”
(Åkerlind, 2005a), “Phenomenographic methods: A case illustration” (Åkerlind, 2005b), “Learning about
phenomenography: Interviewing, data analysis and the qualitative research paradigm” (Åkerlind, 2005c), “From
phenomenography to variation theory: A review of the development of the variation theory of learning and
implications for pedagogical design in higher education” (Åkerlind, 2015), “Learning to do phenomenography:
A reflective discussion” (Åkerlind, Bowden, & Green, 2005), “The potential of combining phenomenography,
variation theory and threshold concepts to inform curriculum design in higher education” (Åkerlind, McKenzie,
& Lupton, 2014), “Phenomenography: Opening a new territory for LIS research” (Bruce, 1999), “Variation and
the secret of the virtuoso” (Ko & Marton, 2004), “Phenomenography” (Limberg, 2005), “Toward a pedagogy of
learning” (Lo, Marton, & Pang, 2004), “Describing and improving learning” (Marton, 1988a), “On the structure
of teachers’ awareness” (Marton, 1994b), Necessary Conditions of Learning (Marton, 2015), Learning and
Awareness (Marton & Booth, 1997) and “On some necessary conditions of learning” (Marton & Pang, 2006).
3. I am cognisant that there exists some literature that has touched on this topic, such as the following: “The
uses of phenomenology and phenomenography: A critical review” (Cibangu & Hepworth, 2016),
“Phenomenographic or phenomenological analysis: does it matter? Examples from a study on
anaesthesiologists’ work” (Larsson & Holmstro €m, 2007), and “Context and Methodological Decontextualization
in Nursing Research with Examples from Phenomenography” (Friberg, Dahlberg, Petersson, & Ohl €
en, 2000),
and “Phenomenography – a “good-for-nothing brother” of phenomenology?: Outline of an analysis”
(Hasselgren & Beach, 1997). In saying this, my paper is distinctly different in the sense that my intention is to
argue that phenomenography would benefit from the broader research agenda of phenomenology,
particularly in relation to the methods (i.e. phenomenological reduction or the practice of bracketing) that
should be employed by those who want to engage in this type of research.
4. Husserl did not coin the term phenomenology, however, he did formalise a distinctive phenomenological
method, which in turn led to a general phenomenological movement in Europe. By formalising his
phenomenological method in his works, Husserl provided a foundation for other philosophers to interpret
phenomenology differently, and as a result, spawned a diverse array of works from well-known proponents,
such as Heidegger, Gadamer, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and so on. Despite its pervasive influence in the
Continental tradition of philosophy, it is worth mentioning that phenomenology does not have an agreed
method. In saying this, it could be argued that the interpretation of phenomenology by well-known
proponents is the basis of their method.
5. Due to space limitations, and for the purposes of this section, I will mainly focus on Husserl’s
phenomenological method. Since Husserl is often attributed with being the founder of phenomenology, it
seems apt to sketch-out some of the subject-matter, particularly the central concepts of his method.
Although I am the first to acknowledge that his ideas relating to phenomenology changed throughout his
extensive corpus, Husserl’s work offers a conceptually rich methodological framework that serves as a useful
starting point on this topic.
6. From here on in, I will follow the academic convention of citing Husserl’s work using the initials of the
English titles in the translations referred to in the reference section of this essay, followed by the
investigation or part number, relevant section or paragraph number, volume number in bold (i.e. vol. 1 ¼ I;
vol. 2 ¼ II) and the associated page number of the English translation. Thus the reference would read as
follows: LI, I, Intro., §1, II, p. 166.
1092 S. A. STOLZ

7. The use of the term “intentional” or “intentionality” has nothing to do with intending in the sense of being
goal directed or doing something with purpose. In this context, the term is a mode of being and is
concerned with meaningful correlates of conscious acts.
8. I am highly cognisant that there is a significant problem here about whether universals are real or not. For
instance, Plato would hold that universals are eternal forms, and actual objects in the material world
instantiate these. Although interesting, it is not possible, and arguably not relevant to expand on this line of
thought in more detail in this essay.
9. It is worth noting that I am using a common example derived from metaphysics of two red billiard balls
throughout my paper because is highlights the characteristics or qualities of a universal in philosophy. For
instance, the example brings to our attention three major kinds of characteristics or qualities, such as: (1)
types or kinds (e.g. ball/sphere); (2) properties (e.g. redness); and, (3) relations (e.g. next to). Equally, I could
have used the example of two green chairs in a room, or something similar, but I have decided to go with
two red billiard balls.
10. In Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy – First Book, Husserl (1913/
1982) reinforces the primacy of intuition as the “principle of all principles” because every act of knowledge is
legitimised by “ordinary presentive intuition” (see Ideas I, §24, p. 44).
11. See Husserl’s example of looking at, and touching a sheet of paper from Ideas I, §35, pp. 69–73.
12. In Marton’s (1981, p. 178) own words, a second order-order perspective involves: “ … orientat[ing] ourselves
toward people’s ideas about the world (or their experience of it) and … [by making] … statements about
people’s ideas about the world (or about their experience of it).”
13. Each piece of work by Marton (1986, 1988b) has a section titled, “phenomenography and phenomenology”,
“phenomenology vs. phenomenography”, and in Marton and Booth (1997), there is a section titled, “Is
phenomenography phenomenology?”. In each respective section, the four points of difference have already
been covered in this section. These being: (1) “second-hand” descriptions; (2) an interest in investigating
people’s experience of something becoming the object of research. In this case, a new point of difference
follows relating to “bracketing” not being used and/or required in phenomenographic research; (3) individual
and collective levels of description; and, (4) categories of description. In Learning and Awareness (Marton &
Booth, 1997), chapter 6 titled, “The Idea of Phenomenography” confirms these so-called differences between
phenomenography and phenomenology.
14. In the chapter titled, “Phenomenography: Exploring different conceptions of reality”, Marton (1988b) uses the
sub-headings of “Measuring and Improving Language Proficiency”, “Free Recall Learning” and “Learning from
Academic Texts” to highlight how phenomenography originated from a particular interest in learning within
an educational context. In the same work, Marton outlines what he calls “three lines of phenomenographic
research” that have been concerned with researching the following: (1) content-related studies of general
learning; (2) studies of learning and teaching in various content domains; and, (3) representing conceptions of
the world and its relating category of description to each.
15. The four qualitative differences in outcome of learning identified in Marton (1975) and Martin and S€aljo €
(1976a, 1976b), were as follows: (Level A) the subject or student provided an accurate reflection of the ideas
and content intended by the author of the text; (Level B) the subject or student presents some of the ideas
and content intended by the author of the text found in (A); (Level C) the subject or student gave an
explanation which is mostly contrary or the exact opposite of what was intended by the author in the text;
and, (Level D) the subject or student contributed ideas and content that were either not relevant or in most
cases an attempted literal translation of what they thought was intended by the author of the text.
16. Phenomenographic research has also been known to use a variety of means to “collect data” that range from
group interviews, observations, drawings, written responses, historical documents, artefacts, equipment, and
so on; however, the favoured method is the individual interview.
17. The section from chapter 6 that I am referring is titled, “Methods of Phenomenographic Research –
Constituting the Object of Research” (see Marton & Booth, 1997).
18. For some examples of phenomenographic methods of research, see the following: “Phenomenography and
the art of teaching all things to all men” (Marton, 1992), Necessary Conditions of Learning (Marton, 2015),
Learning and Awareness (Marton & Booth, 1997), “On some necessary conditions of learning” (Marton & Pang,
2006), “The idea of phenomenography and the pedagogy of conceptual change” (Marton & Pang, 2008), “On
the unit of description in phenomenography” (Marton & Pong, 2005), Classroom Discourse and the Space of
Learning (Marton & Tsui, 2004).
19. It begs the question: If phenomenography is interested in the investigation of human experience, then why
does it limit or restrict itself to “educational settings”?
20. It is worth pointing out that Giorgi’s work shares a number of resemblances with Marton’s work. This is due
to Marton adopting some of Giorgi’s ideas found in his work. Although, Giorgi describes his work as
“phenomenological psychology”, there are many striking similarities with phenomenography. For some
examples, see the following: “Sketch of a psychological phenomenological method” (Giorgi, 1985a),
 EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 1093

Phenomenology and Psychological Research (Giorgi, 1985b), The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in
Psychology (Giorgi, 2009), and “The descriptive phenomenological psychological method” (Giorgi, 2012).
21. You cannot have phenomena without phenomenological reduction or the practice of bracketing because that
is how we come to have the phenomena as common in the first place. When you remove bracketing, this in
turn means you have no way of establishing a phenomenon about which you can measure variations among
individuals.
22. My use of the term “broad” in “broader research agenda of phenomenology” is intentional because
phenomenography is mainly concerned with empirical descriptions of learning, and hence shares many
similarities with Giorgi’s (2009) Descriptive Phenomenological Method which is grounded in Husserlian
phenomenology, albeit specifically modified for the purposes of psychology. Interestingly, Giorgi (1986)
argues that there is “strong convergence” between phenomenology and phenomenography, and depending
on what is being researched (i.e. nature of phenomenon being investigated) may in fact bring each closer
together than each actually realise. From a logical point of view, since phenomenology precedes
phenomenography as a tradition, and knowing that phenomenography already picks-and-chooses ideas,
concepts, methods, and so on from phenomenology, it makes sense that phenomenography consolidate itself
within the broader research agenda of phenomenology. What I have in mind here, is sometimes referred to
as “empirical phenomenology” in the social sciences. In this case, the latter aligns nicely with some of Giorgi’s
work (1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1999, 2006, 2008a, 2008b, and others like Van Manen (1990, 2014, 2016).
23. I am referring to three reductive pathways that can be practised. These being as follows: the Cartesian way,
the psychological way, and the way of the life-world. Unfortunately, due to space restrictions, I am limited in
what I can say on this matter, but for some interesting literature on this topic, see: “The Phenomenological
Reduction as Praxis” (Depraz, 1999), and “Husserl’s Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction” (Luft, 2004).
24. It is worth noting Varela’s (1996, pp. 338–341) response to some common traps or myths in relation to
phenomenology. These being as follows: (1) Phenomenological analysis is not just introspection; (2) Intuition
is not some fluffy stuff; (3) There is life beyond the objective/subjective duality; and, (4) Better pragmatics
are needed.
25. Schmicking (2010, pp. 50–51) refers to phenomenologists as “toolmakers” who use “phenomenological tools”
in their work. He extends on the analogy by outlining a list of phenomenological tools, which
phenomenologists use, that range from: (1) Phenomenological reduction; (2) Investigating particular
phenomena (“description”); (3) Mereological analysis; (4) Investigating invariant structures and relationships;
(5) Analyzing typical/invariant modes of appearing; (6) Analyzing the static (embodied/kinaesthetic)
constitution of objects/experiences; (7) Analyzing genetic (embodied/kinaesthetic) constitution of objects/
experience; (8) (Hermeneutic) Interpretation of the meaning of existential phenomena; (9) Interpreting
experimental (dysfunctional) data and explanations; and, (10) Interpreting vicarious experience and second-
person methods in general. When you take into consideration the contestable nature of phenomenological
enquiry in the research literature (see for example, Van Manen, 2017; Smith, 2018), it makes sense to be
cautious of the ways it could be used in educational research. Indeed, the recent debate between Van Manen
(2017) and Smith (2018) highlights how phenomenology is part of an ongoing debate between its
practitioners that remains unresolved.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor
Steven A. Stolz, PhD, is a Senior Lecturer (Teaching and Research) and Program Director of the Master of Teaching
at The University of Adelaide, Australia. He has a diverse array of research interests, which ranges from: epistemol-
ogy, phenomenology, embodied cognition, ethics or applied ethics, narrative inquiry, psychology, virtue and char-
acter development. At the moment, his primary area of scholarship is concerned with the relationship between
theory and practice, particularly how theory informs practice, and/or how practice informs theory. Recent publica-
tions of note include: “Theory and Philosophy in Education Research: Methodological Dialogues” (Routledge),
“MacIntyre, Rationality and Education: Against Education of Our Age” (Springer), and “Measuring Up in Education:
1094 S. A. STOLZ

Philosophical Explorations for Justice and Democracy Within and Beyond Cultures of Measurement in Educational
Systems” (Routledge).

ORCID
Steven A. Stolz http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5900-0329

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