G.R. No.

133739      May 29, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TOMAS COCA JR., RICARDO COCA and RAMIL COCA, accused-appellants.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case
No. CBU-43013 convicting accused-appellants of the crime of murder; sentencing each of them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00,
plus the costs.1âwphi1.nêt

The Information against accused-appellants states:

That on or about the 20th day of March, 1996, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a gun,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly
attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Edilberto Banate, by shooting him with said gun,
thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries:

"GUNSHOT WOUND"

as a consequence of which said Edilberto Banate died after four (4) months.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon arraignment on January 23, 1997, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty. 3 Trial on the merits
thereafter followed.

Accused-appellants and the victim, Edilberto Banate, were related by affinity, and all residents of
Cabulihan, Guba, Cebu City. Brothers Ricardo Coca and Tomas Coca, Jr. are the first degree cousins of
Merolina Banate, the victim's wife; while Ramil Coca is the son of Ricardo Coca. 4

At about 9:00 in the evening of March 13, 1996, Tomas, Ricardo and Ramil Coca mauled the victim, as a
result of which the latter sustained several injuries and seriously broke his left shoulder. 5 Unluckily, this
was just the beginning of the dangers yet to beset him.

A week later, on March 20, 1996, at 7:00 in the evening, while the victim was having supper with his wife
Merolina and their two children inside their kitchen, a sudden burst of gunfire emanated from
underneath the house. Merolina peeped through the slits on the floor and saw three persons sitting on
their heels. The fluorescent lamp which illuminated their kitchen and the 100 watt bulb of the adjacent
house directly opposite the kitchen enabled Merolina to identify accused-appellant Tomas, Ricardo and
Ramil Coca, who were all underneath the house and looking upwards. Tomas Coca was positioned
between Ricardo and Ramil and aiming a gun at Edilberto. She turned and saw her husband, slumped on
the floor with blood oozing from his body.6

Meanwhile, Alexander Singson, a visitor at Merolina's house who left earlier to buy cigarettes was alerted
by the gunshots. He hurried to the scene and saw the three accused-appellants running away from the
house of the victim. Thereafter, he rushed to the house of the victim and helped bring him to the
hospital.7

The victim sustained a massive gunshot would on the chest. The bullet pierced the right rib, penetrating
the pulmonary region all the way to, and fracturing the spinal column, where the slug was embedded. As
a consequence, the victim became paralyzed from waist down. He eventually died on July 2, 1996. 8
Meronila purposely withheld the identity of the culprits. She feared that revealing the names of the
persons who shot her husband would endanger not only her life but also that of her children who were
alone in their house all throughout the time that she was in the hospital with her injured husband. It was
only after almost five months, or on August 19, 1996, that she finally divulged the identities of the
perpetrators.9

Accused-appellants, on the other hand, raised the defense of denial and alibi. Tomas Coca, Jr. testified
that at about 7:00 in the evening of March 20, 1996, he and Ricardo Coca attended a birthday party in
the house of a certain Mario Rebales10 at Calubihan, Guba, Cebu City. Sometime that evening, Ramil
Coca arrived and informed them that Edilberto Banate was shot. Then, he followed Ricardo Coca and
Pedro Soquib to the house of the victim but he did not proceed when he noticed that there were no more
people there.11 This was corroborated by Ricardo Coca who declared that on the night of March 20, 1996,
he and Tomas were in the house of Mario Rebales, as he was hired to cook the food for the birthday party
of Rebales' daughter. After sometime, his son, Ramil Coca, arrived and told them that Edilberto Banate
was shot. Thereafter, he and Pedro Soquib, followed by Ramil and Tomas, proceeded to the house of the
victim, but the latter was already brought to the hospital. 12

Ramil Coca affirmed the version of Ricardo and Tomas and added that on the night of March 20, 1996, he
was eating supper with his family when they heard three successive gunshots. When he and his mother
went out to check what happened, they saw Roel Soquib and Melino Leyson carrying the body of Edilberto
Banate. Then, at the instruction of his mother, he proceeded to the house of Mario Rebales to inform his
father of the shooting incident. Thereafter, his father, Ricardo and Pedro Soquib followed by Tomas,
proceeded to the scene of the crime; while he went home. 13

The version of the defense was further corroborated by the testimonies of defense witnesses Pedro Soquib
and Mario Rebales.14 Defense witnesses Sergio Borres and Roel Soquib, who helped bring the victim to the
hospital, further narrated that Merolina Banate told them that she was not able to recognize the culprit
because it was dark.15

On July 30, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction. The dispositive portion
thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances, accused Tomas Coca, Jr., Ricardo
Coca and Ramil Coca are hereby imposed each the penalty of RECLUSON PERPETUA with the accessory
penalties of the law; to jointly indemnify the heirs of the deceased Edilberto Banate in the sum of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The accused, however, are credited in full during the whole period of
their detention provided that they will signify in writing that they will abide by all the rules and
regulations of the penitentiary.

SO ORDERED.16

In their appeal, accused-appellants contend that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the identity of the perpetrators. They claimed that at 7:00 in the evening, it was impossible for
Merolina Banate to recognize the culprits through a ¾ inch gap on the bamboo flooring, considering that
the area underneath the house where the gunfire allegedly came from was dark. In the same vein,
accused-appellants assert that the testimony of Alexander Singson is fabricated. According to them, it is
unbelievable that Singson had committed to memory the appearance of the assailants not only because it
was dark, but also because Singson himself admitted that he saw the assailants only for the first time
during the incident. They further argued that if Merolina indeed recognized the perpetrators, she would
have immediately revealed their names to those who responded and to the members of the media who
interviewed her. Accused-appellants likewise alleged that Merolina's reaction immediately after the gun
bursts was contrary to human experience. The natural reaction would have been to seek cover, turn off
the light, shout for help, or cuddle the injured, and not to peep through the floor where the shots came
from. Finally, accused-appellants Ricardo and Ramil Coca contend that even assuming that the version of
the prosecution were true, they should have been acquitted considering that there was no evidence to
show that they connived with accused-appellant Tomas Coca, Jr.

The contentions are without merit.

Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness has identified the
perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the
witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally
be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of
persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations, be considered
sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground
unmeritorious.17

In the case at bar, the kitchen/dining area where the victim was shot from underneath the house was
illuminated by a fluorescent lamp. There would therefore be light falling on the faces of accused-
appellants, especially so that they were all facing upwards. Ordinary human experience would tell us that
bamboo flooring with gaps smaller than an inch allows every ray of light emanating from a fluorescent
lamp to freely penetrate through the bamboo slats. With this environmental milieu, the fluorescent lamp
would indeed provide sufficient illumination to identify the accused-appellants underneath a 3 to 4 feet
high bamboo flooring. What is more, the 100 watt bulb of the adjacent house, six meters away, and
directly opposite the kitchen where the victim was shot, provided additional illumination below the
victim's house. Clearly, therefore, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime certainly
obliterate the slightest shred of doubt on the veracity of accused-appellant's identification.

Moreover, it is not amiss to state that "relatives of a victim of a crime have a natural knack for
remembering the face of the assailant and they, more than anybody else, would be concerned with
obtaining justice for the victim by the malefactor being brought to the face of the law." Indeed, family
members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the
assailants.18 With more reason therefore that we should believe the positive identification of accused-
appellants by Merolina Banate. Being close blood relatives and residents of the same barangay, Merolina
would naturally and particularly be familiar with the face and build of accused-appellants.

A reading of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that even under cross-examination, Merolina
stayed firm and consistent in her identification of accused-appellants, thus –

ATTY. VAILOCES:

Q.       You will admit that you did not see the person or persons in the act of shooting your husband?

A.       I do not admit because I actually saw the persons who actually shot my husband.

Q.       What did you see?

A.       I saw the three of them.

x x x      x x x      x x x19

Q.       You said that you saw Tomas Coca in the act of shooting although that is not stated in your
affidavit. My question now is: how were you able to see when it was nighttime?

A.       I intently peep through the floor and because it was well-lighted by the fluorescent lamp I vividly
saw them underneath the house. I know them because they are my close relatives.

FISCAL GALANIDA:

There was a portion not translated:

WITNESS:

A.       And even the adjacent area it was also well lighted. Moreover, they are my close relatives even by
their smell I could sense they were (sic).

x x x      x x x      x x x

Q.       What light illumines (sic) from (sic) the outside portion of the house?

x x x      x x x      x x x

WITNESS:

A.       It was a 100 watt bulb near our house. It gave bright light from the outside.

Q.       How far is that bulb outside to the place where you allegedly saw Tomas Coca?

x x x      x x x      x x x

A.       Witness indicating a distance of six (6) meters

x x x      x x x      x x x20

ATTY. VAILOCES:

Q.       When you said you saw Tomas Coca underneath your house and then left your house of course he
was the only one you saw and no other persons?

A.       The three of them. It was Jr. Coca who held the firearm.

x x x      x x x      x x x

ATTY. VAILOCES:

Q.       Now, what were the other two doing at the time you saw them?

A.       They were by the side also looking towards us.

COURT:

Q.       You are sure of that?

A.       I am sure Your Honor.21

Accused-appellants were likewise positively identified by prosecution witness Alexander Singson as the
persons he saw running away from the house of the victim right after he heard the gunshots. But even if
we disregard the testimony of Singson, the persuasive and compelling testimony of the victim's wife,
juxtaposed with the circumstances which proved feasible the identification of accused-appellants, are
enough to prove their culpability beyond any scintilla of doubt.

Neither does the failure of Merolina to immediately reveal the identity of the culprits cast doubt on the
truthfulness of her testimony. It must be stressed that Merolina was anxious of her and her children's
safety. The threat on their lives was indeed a deterrent strong enough to mute her. As consistently held by
the Court, fear of reprisal and death threats are accepted as adequate explanations for the delay in
reporting crimes.22
Moreover, Merolina's act of peeping through the flooring immediately after they were fired upon was not
contrary to human experience. Merolina was not yet aware that her husband was hit when she
instinctively looked through the gaps in the bamboo floor. Hence, her instinct could not have told her at
that time to cuddle her husband. At any rate, it is a settled jurisprudence that different people react
differently to a given situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. One person's spontaneous response may be
aggression while another person's reaction may be cold indifference. 23

While it is true that accused-appellants Ricardo and Ramil Coca did not actually shoot the victim, their
conspiratorial acts and omissions would likewise make them liable for his death. Ricardo and Ramil
purposely accompanied Tomas underneath the house of the victim, such that they could not be
considered innocent spectators. They simultaneously left the scene of the crime together with Tomas and
did nothing to stop or prevent the latter from shooting the victim. Finally, they had the motive to kill the
victim as they in fact previously mauled him after a misunderstanding.

So also, the defenses of denial and alibi raised by accused-appellants must fail. Not only are said defenses
inherently weak, they cannot likewise prevail over their positive identification 24 by prosecution witness
Merolina Banate, who was not shown to have been impelled by any ill-motive to falsely impute the
commission of the crime against them, her very own relatives. Furthermore, the locus criminis is only 300
meters25 and 40 meters26 away, respectively, from the place where accused-appellants Ricardo and
Tomas, as well as Ramil, were allegedly at when the crime occurred. This negates the physical
impossibility of their presence at the scene of the crime at the time the felony was committed. 27

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially insure the execution of the
crime, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence
of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the person of the victim, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the latter.28 Judging from the circumstances which attended the
shooting of the deceased, treachery undoubtedly qualified the present case to murder. This is so because
accused-appellants obviously devised a way, that is, by shooting the victim from underneath the house, to
effectively execute the crime without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the unsuspecting
victim might put up.1âwphi1.nêt

In sum, the Court finds that the trial court did not err in upholding the version of the prosecution and
disregarding the defenses put up by accused-appellants. Though Merolina did not see the actual shooting
of her husband, the circumstantial evidences presented by the prosecution are sufficient to sustain a
conviction. Under the Rules of Court, conviction based on circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 29 Here,
more than one circumstance was presented by the prosecution. The victim's wife heard gunshots from
underneath their house. Immediately thereafter, she peeped through their bamboo flooring and saw the
three accused-appellants sitting on their heels and looking upwards. Accused-appellant Tomas Coca, Jr.
was holding a gun pointed upwards while seated between accused-appellants Ricardo and Ramil Coca.
When she turned to her husband, she saw that he was shot. As the three accused-appellants fled,
prosecution witness Alexander Singson saw them running away from the house of the victim. All these,
added to accused-appellants' previous altercation with the victim, form an unbroken chain of
circumstances pointing to accused-appellants, and no other, as the persons responsible for the victim's
death.

The trial court did not overlook any fact of weight and substance which, if properly considered, would
have altered the result of the case. Hence, its findings of facts and assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses deserve to be sustained on appeal. For having had the distinct opportunity of directly observing
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses under oath, the trial court is in a better position to ascertain
whether or not a witness is telling the truth. 30
The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death.31 The two penalties being both
indivisible, and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
offense, the lesser of the two penalties, which is reclusion perpetua, should be applied pursuant to the
second paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

As for accused-appellant's civil liability, he should, in addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the
costs, further pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages in line with
recent jurisprudence.32

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-43013, finding accused-appellants Tomas Coca, Jr., Ricardo Coca, and
Ramil Coca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in addition to the
P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs, accused-appellants are further ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 107383             February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from
private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial,
rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner
of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion
to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages;
P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and
papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent.
For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent,
ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only
ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers
(marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and,
therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross
misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of
the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other
things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the
documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the
injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note
of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:" 2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:

....

4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there
was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents
Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's
request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked
upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the
questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use
petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath,
Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him.
Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and
use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration
that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their
genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no
means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents
and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO
issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial
court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and
papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding." 5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992

NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO, as Presiding

Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, Respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Petitioner.

Bince, Oficiana & Dancel for Private Respondent.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This petition brings into focus the rule on the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship.
Petitioner urges this Court to strike down as being violative thereof the resolution of public respondent
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991 denying due course to a petition to annul the order of the
trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not
as an attending physician of petitioner.

The parties are in agreement as to the following facts:

Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.

On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly
suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the
present." After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. Private
respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on his own
behalf. On 11 January 1989, private respondent’s counsel announced that he would present as his next
witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of
Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify on 25 January 1989. Petitioner’s counsel
opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged
since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be
suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued on 12 January 1989.

On 24 January 1989, petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and
suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the motion.

Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25 January 1989, the court heard this urgent motion.
Movant argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is
barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship. Counsel
for private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness
and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional
capacity. The trial court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify. Dr.
Acampado thus took the witness stand, was qualified by counsel for private respondent as an expert
witness and was asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the
illness she examined and treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the
medicines she had prescribed.

Since petitioner’s counsel insisted that the ruling of the court on the motion be reduced to writing,
respondent Judge issued the following Order on the same date:
"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only yesterday, January 24, 1989, petitioner seeks to prevent
Dr. Lydia Acampado from testifying because she saw and examined respondent Nelly Lim in her
professional capacity perforce her testimony is covered by the privileged (sic) communication rule.

Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being presented as an expert witness and that she will not
testify on any information she acquired in (sic) attending to Nelly Lim in her professional capacity.

Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the Court denied the respondent’s motion
and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. However, the Court advised counsel for respondent to
interpose his objection once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule.

On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as an expert in
psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine tablets applied
to; she was asked to render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts respecting certain behaviours of a
person; and finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she never revealed what illness she
examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic) the medicines
she prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated January 19, 1989 is hereby DENIED." 1

On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition 2
for certiorari and prohibition, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991, to annul the aforesaid order of
respondent Judge on the ground that the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr. Acampado’s testimony.

On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3 denying due course to the
petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony
given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she testified on January 25, 1989." Hence, the respondent
Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion. In support thereof, the respondent Court discussed the
conditions which would render as inadmissible testimonial evidence between a physician and his patient
under paragraph (c), Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court and made the following findings:

"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of marriage and the person whose testimony is sought to
be stopped as a privileged communication is a physician, who was summoned by the patient in her
professional capacity for curative remedy or treatment. The divergence in views is whether the information
given by the physician in her testimony in open court on January 25, 1989 was a privileged
communication. We are of the opinion that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged
communication because the information were (sic) not obtained from the patient while attending her in
her professional capacity and neither were (sic) the information necessary to enable the physician to
prescribe or give treatment to the patient Nelly Lim. And neither does the information obtained from the
physician tend to blacken the character of the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr.
Acampado is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge (sic) of the Female Service of the National Center for
Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board
of Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of
petitioner.

After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado’s testimony, We find no declaration that
touched (sic) or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the
period she attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that she examined and
interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the course of her examination,
interview and treatment of her patient. Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical question, Dr.
Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history and behaviour of the fictitious character in the
hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer and (sic)
had no bearing to (sic) whatever information or findings the doctor obtained from attending the (sic)
patient. A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patient’s ailment, when he can
disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make answer solely on facts related in (sic)
the hypothetical question. (Butler v. Role, 242 Pac. 436; Supreme Court of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926). Expert
testimony of a physician based on hypothetical question (sic) as to cause of illness of a person whom he
has attended is not privileged, provided the physician does not give testimony tending to disclose
confidential information related to him in his professional capacity while attending to the patient. (Crago
v. City of Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354, see Jones on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.).

The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds from the
fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be confidential in their
origin. Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It might
be implied according to circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the nature of the ailment
and the occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the burden of establishing in each
instance all the facts necessary to create the privilege, including the confidential nature of the information
given." 4

Her motion to reconsider the resolution having been denied, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. In her view, the respondent Court of Appeals "seriously erred" :

"I.

. . . in not finding that all the essential elements of the rule on physician-patient privileged
communication under Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence) exist in the case at bar.

II.

. . . in believing that Dr. Acampado ‘was summoned as an expert witness and not as an attending
physician of petitioner.’

III.

. . . in concluding that Dr. Acampado made ‘no declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any information
which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she attended her patient in a
professional capacity.’

IV.

. . . in declaring that ‘the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony given by
or obtained from Dr. Acampado.’" 5

We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda 6 after
the private respondent filed his Comment 7 and the petitioner submitted her reply 8 thereto. The parties
subsequently filed their separate Memoranda.

The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its
challenged resolution.

The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:

"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
x          x          x

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which
he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient." 

This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court with two
(2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment given by him," and (b)
substitution of the word reputation for the word character. Said Section 21 in turn is a reproduction of
paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the
change of the phrase "which would tend to blacken" in the latter to "would blacken." 9 Verily, these
changes affected the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was sufficient if the
information would tend to blacken the character of the patient. In the 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter
requirement was imposed; it was imperative that the information would blacken such character. With the
advent of the Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July 1989, the rule was relaxed once more by the
substitution of the word character with the word reputation. There is a distinction between these two
concepts." ‘Character’ is what a man is, and ‘reputation’ is what he is supposed to be in what people say
he is.’Character’ depends on attributes possessed, and ‘reputation’ on attributes which others believe one
to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at present." 10

This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential
disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the
end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his
patient. 11 It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community. 12

Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to
the physician’s testimony. 13

In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur:

"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;

2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics;

3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity;

4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and

5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of
the patient." 14

These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a
privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit:

"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties.

3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered

4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 15

The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient
for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to
the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. 16 It
is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of
making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are
therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." 17

One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites. 18

Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of action but to agree with
the respondent Court’s observation that the petitioner failed to discharge that burden. In the first place,
Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment
of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to
and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the
patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her
relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner.
Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the
petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As
an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. The rule on this point is
summarized as follows:

"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory physician-patient
privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony
in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental condition of a
patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical
facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have concerning
such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where it is asserted in such a
case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding
from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician and patient
relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal professional knowledge of
the patient’s condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion." 19

Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the petitioner was never interviewed alone.
Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party, thus:

"Q I am asking you, doctor, whom did you interview?

A I interviewed the husband first, then the father and after having the history, I interviewed the patient,
Nelly.

Q How many times did Juan Sim and Nelly Lim go to your office?

A Now, the two (2) of them came three (3) times. As I have stated before, once in the month of April of
1987 and two (2) times for the month of June 1987, and after that, since July of 1987, it was the father of
Nelly, Dr. Lim, who was bringing Nelly to me until November of 1987.

Q Now, Dr. Lim is a fellow physician?

A Yes, I understand.

Q Was there anything that he told you when he visited with you in a clinic?

A I would say that there was none. Even if I asked information about Nelly, I could not get anything from
Dr. Lim.

Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your clinic, was there any doctor who was also present
during that interview?

A No, sir, I don’t remember any." 20

There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the
presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege:

"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the confidential nature of the
communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys the privilege, and that under such
circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts have reached a contrary result." 21

Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping claim — that" (T)he information given by Dr. Acampado
brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely making it appear in the eyes of the trial
court and the public that the latter was suffering from a mental disturbance called schizophrenia —
which caused, and continues to cause, irreparable injury to the name and reputation of petitioner and
her family," 22 — which is based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show
that indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the former’s "character" (or
"reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner regarding the
latter’s ailment and the treatment recommended therefor.

Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said
subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings
that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an
answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his
objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered
by the privileged communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony
of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition 23 and Memorandum, 24 and in the private
respondent’s Memorandum, 25 do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex
gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably
object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127745            April 22, 2003

FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA, EDUARDO A.

MONTINOLA, JR., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, as Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing Sy, respondents-appellees.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Court of Appeals Decision of May 31, 1996 and Resolution of December 9, 1996.

On February 7, 1990, herein petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as creditor,
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
4497, for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the deceased) who died on January 10, 1990.
Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of P603,000.00 and to his sister
Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00.1

Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later filed
separate claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00,
respectively.2

By Order of February 12, 1991, Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC to which the petition was raffled, appointed
Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, as administratrix of his estate, following which she was
issued letters of administration.3

During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola, wife of
claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over the objection of
the administratrix who invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court otherwise known as
the Dead Man’s Statute which reads:

SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.—Parties or assignors of parties

to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind. (Emphasis supplied)

Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction with the
deceased which is evidenced by six checks 4 issued by him before his death; before the deceased died,
Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the checks from his (the deceased’s) son Jerry who told her that
his father would settle them once he got well but he never did; and after the death of the deceased,
Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were dishonored 5 due to the closure of his
account.6

Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the deceased issued
five checks7 to Sanson in settlement of a debt; and after the death of the deceased, Sanson presented the
checks to the bank for payment but were returned due to the closure of his account. 8

Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and mother-in-law Angeles,
testified that on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000 and P150,000 from her husband and
mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the deceased, 9 two to Angeles and the
other10 to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.; before the deceased died or sometime in August 1989, they advised
him that they would be depositing the checks, but he told them not to as he would pay them cash, but he
never did; and after the deceased died on January 10, 1990, they deposited the checks but were
dishonored as the account against which they were drawn was closed, 11 hence, their legal counsel sent a
demand letter12 dated February 6, 1990 addressed to the deceased’s heirs Melicia, James, Mini and Jerry
Sy, and Symmels I & II but the checks have remained unsettled. 13

The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the claims, nevertheless alleged that if they ever existed, they had been paid and extinguished, are
usurious and illegal and are, in any event, barred by prescription. 14 And she objected to the admission of
the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by the claimants upon the ground that the
witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified under the Dead Man’s Statute.

Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the administratrix asserted that they
are inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and wife of claimant Eduardo
Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the above-said rule on disqualification.

At all events, the administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were issued by the deceased and that the
return slips were issued by the depository/clearing bank. 15

After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four separate manifestations informing the
trial court that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their claims.16

Finding that the Dead Man’s Statute does not apply to the witnesses who testified in support of the
subject claims against the estate, the trial court issued an Order of December 8, 1993, 17 the dispositive
portion of which reads: Court ruled in favor of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, Judicial Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, is hereby ordered, to pay, in due course of
administration, creditors-claimants Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00; Celedonia S.
Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00;18 Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00 and
Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00, from the assets and/or properties of the above-
entitled intestate estate.

On appeal by the administratrix upon the following assignment of errors:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S] FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE FILING
FEES THEREON

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S] BECAUSE [THEY ARE] ALREADY
BARRED BY THE LAW OF LIMITATIONS OR STATUTE OF NON-CLAIMS

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT CLAIMANT[S’] EVIDENCE OF THE CLAIM IS
INCOMPETENT UNDER THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE, AND INADMISSIBLE

IV.

THE ALLEGED CHECKS ARE INADMISSIBLE AS PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, 19

the Court of Appeals set aside the December 8, 1993 Order of the trial court, by Decision of May 31,
1996, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and another order is entered dismissing the
claims of:

1. Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00;

2. Celdonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00; 20

3. Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00; and

4. Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00 against the estate of the deceased JUAN BON
FING SY.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Italics supplied)

The claimants’ Motion for Reconsideration 21 of the Court of Appeals decision having been denied by
Resolution of December 9, 1996,22 they filed the present petition anchored on the following assigned
errors:

FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF

JADE MONTINOLA IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CLAIMS OF CLAIMANTS ANGELES A. MONTINOLA
AND EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR..

SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLAIMANT FELICITO G.

SANSON IS DISQUALIFIED TO TESTIFY [ON] THE CLAIM OF CELEDONIA SANSON-SA[Q]UIN AND
VI[C]E VERSA. (Underscoring in the original) 23

With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners argue that since the administratrix did not deny the
testimony of Jade nor present any evidence to controvert it, and neither did she deny the execution and
genuineness of the checks issued by the deceased (as well as the check return slips issued by the clearing
bank), it was error for the Court of Appeals to find the evidence of the Montinolas insufficient to prove
their claims.

The administratrix counters that the due execution and authenticity of the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas were not duly proven since Jade did not categorically state that she saw the filling up and
signing of the checks by the deceased, hence, her testimony is self-serving; besides, as Jade had identical
and unitary interest with her husband and mother-in-law, her testimony was a circumvention of the Dead
Man’s Statute.24

The administratrix’s counter-argument does not lie. Relationship to a party has never been recognized as
an adverse factor in determining either the credibility of the witness or—subject only to well-recognized
exceptions none of which is here present—the admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of
relationship to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the assessment of a
witness’ testimony but is not necessarily a negative element which should be taken as diminishing the
credit otherwise accorded to it.25

Jade’s testimony on the genuineness of the deceased’s signature on the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas
is clear:

xxx
Q:         Showing to you this check dated July 16, 1989, Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No.
84262, in the amount of P100,000.00, is this the check you are referring to?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         There appears a signature in the face of the check. Whose signature is this?

A:         That is the signature of Mr. Sy.

Q:         Why do you know that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?

A:         Because he signed this check I was . . . I was present when he signed this check.

xxx

Q:         Showing to you this check dated September 8, 1989, is this the check you are referring to?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Why do you know that this is his signature?

A:         I was there when he signed the same.

xxx

Q:         Showing to you this Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 84262 dated July 6, 1989, in
the amount of P50,000.00, in the name of Eduardo Montinola, are you referring to this check?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Whose signature is this appearing on the face of this check?

A:         Mr. Sy’s signature.

Q:         Why do you know that it is his signature?

A:         I was there when he signed the same.

x x x26 (Emphasis supplied)

The genuineness of the deceased’s signature having been shown, he is prima facie presumed to have
become a party to the check for value, following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which
reads:

Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. – Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to

have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon
to have become a party thereto for value. (Underscoring and italics in the original; emphasis supplied),

Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima facie presumption was not rebutted
or contradicted by the administratrix who expressly manifested that she was dispensing with the
presentation of evidence against their claims, it has become conclusive.

As for the administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule
renders incompetent:  1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.

xxx
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify
persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not
prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he
took no active part therein.

x x x27 (Italics supplied)

Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being
prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the
case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their
testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there
would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later,
independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of
their documentary evidence—the checks.

As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as
witnesses to each other’s claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man’s
Statute;28 besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.

The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review,
the pertinent portion of which reads:

The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each
other’s favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.

Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between
testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his
co-parties. The law speaks of "parties or assignors of parties to a case." Apparently, the testimonies of
Sanson and Saquin on each other’s behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition.
(Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied)

But Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is
a third party with respect to Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson’s
claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other’s transaction.

In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a
claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of
testimony.29 Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-
documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.

This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing on the
checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonia’s account, she "knows" the signature of the
deceased.

xxx

Q:         Showing to you these checks already marked as Exhibit "A" to "E", please go over these checks if
you know the signatures of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy? on these checks?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Insofar as the amount that he borrowed from you, he also issued checks?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         And therefore, you know his signature?

A:         Yes, sir.

x x x30

Sanson testified too that he "knows" the signature of the deceased:

xxx

Q:         I show you now checks which were already marked as Exhibit "A" to "G-1" – Saquin, please go
over this if these are the checks that you said was issued by the late Juan Bon Fing Sy in favor of your
sister?

A:         Yes, these are the same che[c]ks.

Q:         Do you know the signature of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         And these signatures are the same signatures that you know?

A:         Yes, sir.

x x x31

While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the quantum of proof
under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. x x x,

not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison 32 with the naked eye of the
deceased’s signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with that of the checks-
exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn from the same account, they appear to
have been affixed by one and the same hand.

In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence, substantiated their claims against the
estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix who, however, expressly
opted not to discharge the same when she manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of
evidence against the claims.

WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and
another rendered ordering the intestate estate of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy, through Administratrix
Melecia T. Sy, to pay:

1) Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of P603,500.00;

2) Celedonia S. Saquin, the amount of P315.000.00;33

3) Angeles Montinola, the amount of P150,000.00; and

4) Eduardo Montinola, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00.

representing unsettled checks issued by the deceased.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998

CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and
ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19, 1994,
finding private respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling petitioners' extra-
judicial partition of the decedent's estate.

The facts are as follows:

On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco
sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the then Court
of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners
claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor,
leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners
amended their petition by alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021,
listed therein as belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner
being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.

Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late
mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the
name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad,
TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad
Gonzales. The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs.
Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.

On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad
Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special Proceedings
No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of
Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during this period,
their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private
respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad
with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the
exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the
existence of said three children in other to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.

On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof,
filed a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar
Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents' motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but
allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.

Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and
64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mother's estate. Accordingly, on
October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by
petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said
properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural children of
the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;

(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and
Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as such entitled to
succeed to the entire estate of said deceased, subject to the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-
owner of any of the property of said estate that may have been acquired thru her joint efforts with the
deceased during the period they lived together as husband and wife;

(3) Denying the petition of decedent's collateral relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M. Tioseco and
Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and excluding them from participating in the administration and
settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad;

(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and

(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all property or properties, monies and
such papers that came into his possession by virtue of his appointment as administrator, which
appointment is hereby revoked. 1

The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latter's motion for
annulment of certain documents. On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors' Motion for Annulment, dated October 4, 1973 to be
meritorious and accordingly —

1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all registered
in the name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT
No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa
Abad-Gonzales, and the residential house situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San Andres Subdivision, Manila,
to be the properties of the late Ricardo Abad;

2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de Mesa, executed
on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No. 86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972 of the notarial book of Faustino
S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to be inexistent and void from the
beginning;

3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and issuance in lieu
thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484;

4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa Abad; TCT No.
108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales and in lieu
thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding certificate of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;

5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3) real estate mortgages executed on July
7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as Doc. No. 145, Page No. 30, Book
No. XX, Series of 1972, (b) petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco, identified as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No.
XX, Series of 1972; and (c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, identified as Doe. No. 144, Page No. 30,
Book No. XX, Series of 1972, all of the notarial book of Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina
C. Viola, and orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration or annotation thereof from
the back of the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to surrender to the
new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484 within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the trial court.
Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed out of time.
Because of this ruling, petitioners, instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of
Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974, the appellate court granted
petitioners' petition and ordered the lower court to give due course to the latter's appeal. The trial court,
however, again dismissed petitioners' appeal on the ground that their record on appeal was filed out of
time.

Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19, 1974 ruling of
the trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground that it had been filed
out of time.

Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again

instituted certiorari and  mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R.
No. SP-04352. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals, prompting petitioners to
appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 9, 1985, this Court directed the trial court to give due course to
petitioners' appeal from the order of November 2, 1973 declaring private respondents heirs of the
deceased Ricardo Abad, and the order dated November 19, 1974, annulling certain documents pertaining
to the intestate estate of deceased.

The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the appellate court. On October 19, 1994,
the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The orders of
the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit:

1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in substance that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie, all
surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural children and the only surviving heirs of the deceased
Ricardo Abad;

2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in substance that the six (6) parcels of land described in
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the properties of Ricardo Abad; that the extra-judicial partition of
the estate of the deceased Lucila de Mesa executed on May 2, 1972 is inexistent and void from the
beginning, the cancellation of the aforementioned TCTs is null and void; the Register of Deeds be ordered
to restore and/or issue the corresponding Certificates of Title in the name of Ricardo Abad; and

3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco
from the latter Order, for being filed out of time, are all AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against petitioner-
appellants.

SO ORDERED. 3

Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS OWNED BY THE
DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE MOTHER OF PETITIONERS AND
RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.

We are not persuaded.

Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's filiation, submit the startling theory that
the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were
born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.

It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to
Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the
birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943,
petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.

The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that he was
legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian are not
Ricardo Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. Article 256, the
applicable provision of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. 4

To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application for enrolment at Mapua Institute
of Technology of Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:

Father's Name: Jose Libunao

Occupation: engineer (mining)

Mother's Name: Honoria Empaynado5

as well as Cesar Libunao's 1958 application for enrolment at the Mapua Institute of Technology, which
states:

Father's Name: Jose Libunao

Occupation: none

Mother's Name: Honoria Empaynado6

Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said applications were
accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children would have stated so. These not being the case, they
conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.

Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos 7 stating
that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow, Honoria Empaynado, and
that the former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.

Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, 8 Ricardo Abad's physician, declaring that in
1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter
had become sterile as a consequence thereof.

With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the illegitimate
children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado.
At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial court's finding of
facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. 9 Petitioners,
however, argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court when there
appears in the record of the case some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the
result of the case. 10

This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.

First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the least,
far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one's parent is "deceased" is not
necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished.
Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose
Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter's death at that time, being merely
secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death certificate would have been the best evidence as to
when the latter died. Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is
no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose
Libunao's death. More telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain
Jose  Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria
Empaynado's first husband, the latter's name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is
different. Jose Bautista Libunao's wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was
Honoria Empaynado.

As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 11 The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or
treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient
existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the
advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally
attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and
e) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient. 12

Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the
finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners
conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which
most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility
alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be
sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence.
And the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by
the trial court:

In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: "The
privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established precedents. It
is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be
promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and
disclosures which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are
not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and
disclosures made under the seal of the statute.

Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim by
the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by private
respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. We
quote with approval the trial court's decision, thus:
In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years 1958 and 1970, and in all his
individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, he has declared
therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia,
Marian (except in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs. 12 to 19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44).

x x x           x x x          x x x

In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11) years old, and Marian,
then (5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and
paid for their premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; 34-B to C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 7-20).

In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund account of P100,000,00 with the People's
Bank and Trust Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable to either of them in the event of
death (Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5, 1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund of P100,000.00 with the
same bank, payable to his daughter Marian (Exh. 37-A). On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister
Dolores Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income of their
P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic) be paid monthly to the account reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC
Savings Account No. 49053 in the name of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia Abad (Exh. 38) where the income
of the trust fund intended for Cecilia was also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 21-36).
Ricardo Abad had also deposited (money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of his
daughter Marian, represented by him, as father, under Savings Account 17348 which has (sic) a balance
of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B). . .

With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are
precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are:

Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased.

Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Emphasis
supplied).

As to petitioners' claim that the properties m the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their mother
Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by private
respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of
fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a
better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying in the case. 13 In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that
they are entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.

Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9,
1985, this Court had already ruled that the same was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the dictum
that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994

MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.

Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.

Oscar F. Martinez for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trial court in a
petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the
report is the husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the
report.

The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents
of the report. After failing to convince the trial court and the appellate court, she is now before us on a
petition for review on certiorari.

On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de Paul
Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl Wilhelm and
Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy
one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain.
The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact.

In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and
signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978, presenting the report
among others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in
Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera
conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." 1 On 10 July
1979, the decree was confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite." 2

Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br. II,
issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial
court. 3 In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely
denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant." 4

At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation
expressing her "continuing objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the
physician-patient privileged communication rule," 5 and thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record
asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim
'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground being completely false, fabricated and
merely an afterthought." 6 Before leaving for Spain where she has since resided after their separation, Ma.
Paz also authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim even
during her absence.
On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the confidential
psychiatric report as evidence, 7 and afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz' Statement for the Record. 8

On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report
in evidence and ruling that —

. . . the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to sustain the Opposition to the respondent's Motion;
first, because the very issue in this case is whether or not the respondent had been suffering from
psychological incapacity; and secondly, when the said psychiatric report was referred to in the complaint,
the respondent did not object thereto on the ground of the supposed privileged communication between
patient and physician. What was raised by the respondent was that the said psychiatric report was
irrelevant. So, the Court feels that in the interest of justice and for the purpose of determining whether
the respondent as alleged in the petition was suffering from psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric
report is very material and may be testified to by petitioner (Edgar Krohn, Jr.) without prejudice on the
part of the respondent to dispute the said report or to cross-examination first the petitioner and later the
psychiatrist who prepared the same if the latter will be presented. 9

On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to Reconsider Order dated June 4, 1991, and
directed that the Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off the record. A subsequent
motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel was likewise denied.

Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision promulgated 30
October 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari. 10 On 5 February 1993, the motion
to reconsider the dismissal was likewise denied. Hence, the instant petition for review.

Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric report
and prays for the admission of her Statement for the Record to form part of the records of the case. She
argues that since
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which
he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should
be third person (like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on
privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or
evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and
privileged relation with a patient." 12 She says that the reason behind the prohibition is —

. . . to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure by a patient to his physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced
disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct
opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. 13

She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation
report "will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in
preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of physician and his patient." 14 Her thesis
is that what cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly.

Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply reiterates under oath what she asserted in
her Answer, which she failed to verify as she had already left for Spain when her Answer was filed. She
maintains that her "Statement for the Record is a plain and simple pleading and is not as it has never
been intended to take the place of her testimony;" 15 hence, there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever
to expunge it from the records.

Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the prohibition
applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar
where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the husband and
not the physician of the petitioner." 16 In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony
considering that a husband may testify against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the other.

Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by the person entitled
thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her unconditional consent to the use of the
psychiatric evaluation report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which
took it into account among others in deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and void. Private
respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied consent when she failed to specifically
object to the admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely described the evaluation report as
"either unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate, failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest
opportunity to the evidence presented on privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver.

With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner, private respondent posits that this in
reality is an amendment of her Answer and thus should comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court, hence, its exclusion from the records for failure to comply with the Rules is proper.

The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication between physician and
patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed, statutes making communications between
physician and patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to
make a full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition. 17 Consequently, this prevents the
physician from making public information that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to
the patient. 18 For, the patient should rest assured with the knowledge that the law recognizes the
communication as confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his
reputation tarnished by their subsequent disclosure. 19 The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of
privacy, intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of his ailments.
Indeed, certain types of information communicated in the context of the physician-patient relationship fall
within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy, 20 including a patient's interest in keeping his mental
health records confidential. 21 Thus, it has been observed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
founded upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be prevented by encouraging those
in need of treatment for emotional problems to secure the services of a psychotherapist.

Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals  22 clearly lays down
the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil
case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in
his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e)
the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the
patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a
document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed
prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his
testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient
and executed the report.

Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the ground
that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule
on privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For,
in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make
such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full attention of this Court. The allegations
contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations of private respondent's declarations which
may be denied or disproved during the trial.

The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for annulment. Three years have already lapsed and
private respondent herein, as petitioner before the trial court, has yet to conclude his testimony thereat.
We thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties' respective counsel to act with deliberate speed in resolving
the main action, and avoid any and all stratagems that may further delay this case. If all lawyers are
allowed to appeal every perceived indiscretion of a judge in the course of trial and include in their appeals
depthless issues, there will be no end to litigations, and the docket of appellate courts will forever be
clogged with inconsequential cases. Hence, counsel should exercise prudence in appealing lower court
rulings and raise only legitimate issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases. Indeed, there is no
point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded
couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in
the company of each other. 23

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131636            March 5, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Before us for automatic review1 is the Decision2 dated 22 September 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9375, finding accused-appellant Artemio Invencion y
Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his 16-year-old daughter
Cynthia P. Invencion, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay Cynthia the sum of
P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.

Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape in separate
complaints docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9363 to 9375, all dated 17 October 1996. The cases were
consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.

The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Elven Invencion, Eddie Sicat,
Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty. Florencio Canlas. Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria
Pagala and Celestino Navarro.

Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary School in Tarlac, Tarlac,
testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife.
Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father
Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthia’s loud cries. Looking
towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his
father put on his short pants.3

Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily
prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven
and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino Navarro. 4

Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac,
testified that on the second week of March 1996, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was passing by
the house of Artemio on his way to the field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped
through a small opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemio’s house. He saw Cynthia
lying on her back and crying, while her father was on top of her, doing a pumping motion. Eddie observed
them for about fifteen seconds, and then he left and proceeded to the field to catch fish. 5 He reported
what he had witnessed to Artemio’s stepfather, Celestino, later that morning. 6

Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio, testified that she and
Artemio started living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in February 1969. Out of their common-law
relationship, they had six children, one of whom was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted
ways permanently. Later, Gloria and her children lived in Pura, Tarlac. When Artemio’s mother died
sometime in 1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a small one-room dwelling owned by Celestino and
located in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac.7 On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told her that
Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition.
The latter confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father. Gloria then went to the office of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done to their daughter
Cynthia.8

Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia on 16 September 1996.
She found Cynthia to be five to six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations
at 3, 5, 8 o’clock positions, which could have been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign body
inserted in her private part.9

Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied by her
mother, complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her
father Artemio. She then executed a written statement,10 which she subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Canlas.11

The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida,
took the witness stand and testified for the defense. He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the same day
when he testified before the court), between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to the house
of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog. The hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked, and its
windows were shut. When he went around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls on
the front and left and right sides of the hut, he could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and
his children used to sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it was dark inside. 12 Atty. Salamida then
concluded that prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth when he declared having seen
what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in the sawali wall of the house in
the early morning sometime on the second week of March 1996.

On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live was a small hut with some
destroyed portions in its sawali walls. When she went there to visit her children sometime in December
1995, there was a hole in front and at the sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot where people passed by
to fish in a nearby brook.13 When she went to the place again sometime in September 1996 after she was
informed of Cynthia’s pregnancy, she noticed that the destroyed portions of the hut’s sawali walls were
not yet repaired.14

The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio, testified that he is the owner of the
small house where Artemio and his children used to reside. At the time that Artemio and his children,
including Cynthia, were living in that house, the hut’s old sawali walls had some small holes in them,
thus confirming the testimony of Eddie Sicat. After Artemio was arrested on the basis of Cynthia’s
complaint before the NBI, Celestino made some repairs in the hut by, among other things, placing
galvanized iron sheets to cover the holes at the destroyed portions of the sawali walls. Thereafter, a
person named Alvin occupied the house.15

In its Decision of 22 September 1997, the trial court convicted Artemio in Criminal Case No. 9375. It,
however, acquitted him in all the other twelve cases for lack of evidence.

In his Appellant’s Brief, Artemio contends that the trial court erred in

x x x BELIEVING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;

II

x x xNOT DISMISSING THIS CASE FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE [HIS] GUILT x x x
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son,
should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 25(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.16 Besides, Elven’s testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to say, as
the questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in testifying against
him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.
In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, Artemio points to the
following inconsistencies in their testimonies: (1) as to the time of the commission of the crime, Elven
testified having seen Artemio on top of his sister one night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat testified
having seen them in the same position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. in the second week of March 1996; (2)
as to the residence of Cynthia in 1996, Gloria testified that the former was living with her in Guimba from
November 1995 to September 1996, while Elven and Eddie declared that she was in Sapang Tagalog in
March 1996; and (3) as to the residence of Artemio, Jr., Gloria stated that he was living with the
appellant, but later she declared that he was living with her in Pura.

Artemio also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark even at daytime, it was
impossible for Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly doing pumping motion on top of Cynthia. In his Reply
Brief, he likewise urges us to disregard the testimonies of rebuttal witnesses Celestino and Gloria.
According to him, Celestino had an ax to grind against him (Artemio) because he had been badgering
Celestino for his share of the lot where the hut stands, which was owned by Artemio’s deceased mother.
On the other hand, Gloria wanted to get rid of Artemio because she was already cohabiting with another
man.

In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of Artemio’s
conviction and sentence, but recommends that a civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000 be awarded in
addition to the awards of moral and exemplary damages.

We find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the culpability of Artemio.

It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because
the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of
truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive
glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the
scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien. 17 This rule, however, admits
of exceptions, as where there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that has been ignored
or misconstrued by the court, or where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the
facts.18 We do not find any of these exceptions in the case at bar.

As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court,19 otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule on
disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an
ascendant.20 The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father;
he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he
was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only "to tell the truth." 21

Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecution’s act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section
10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court22 expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of
tender years like Elven.

The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration.
Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender
age, could not have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive
other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sister’s virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified
because of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly
pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that where
there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.23
We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time that the rape was committed, i.e.,
during the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. per the testimony of Eddie. The
exact time or date of the commission of rape is not an element of the crime. What is decisive in a rape
charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused has been sufficiently proved. Inconsistencies
and discrepancies as to minor matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered
grounds for acquittal.24 In this case, we believe that the crime of rape was, indeed, committed as testified
to by Elven and Eddie.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair the credibility of
these witnesses. We agree with the trial court that they are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the
credibility of the witnesses. We have held in a number of cases that inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses that refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses’ credibility.25 On the
contrary, they may even be considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the
material points in the testimonies. What is important is that the testimonies agree on essential facts and
substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent whole.26

Artemio’s allegation that it was impossible for both Elven and Eddie to have seen and witnessed the crime
because the room was dark even at daytime was convincingly disputed by rebuttal witnesses Gloria
Pagala and Celestino Navarro. Furthermore, as observed by the OSG, even if the hut was without
electricity, Elven could not have been mistaken in his identification of Artemio because he had known the
latter for a long time. Moreover, Elven was at the time only two meters away from Cynthia and Artemio.
Even without sufficient illumination, Elven, who was jostled out of his sleep by Cynthia’s loud cry, could
observe the pumping motion made by his father. 27

The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and Celestino were not sufficiently proved. Nothing in the
records suggests any reason that would motivate Gloria to testify falsely against Artemio, who is the
father of her other children. Moreover, we have repeatedly held that no mother would subject her child to
the humiliation, disgrace, and trauma attendant to the prosecution for rape if she were not motivated
solely by the desire to have the person responsible for her child’s defilement incarcerated. 28 As for
Celestino, he testified that the lot where the hut stands is owned by his daughter Erlinda, and not by
Artemio’s mother.29 At any rate, even without Celestino’s testimony, Artemio’s conviction would stand.

The remaining issue for our resolution is the correctness of the penalty of death imposed by the trial
court. The death penalty was imposed because of the trial court’s appreciation of the special qualifying
circumstances that Artemio is the father of the victim and the latter was less than 18 years old at the
time the crime was committed.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which is the governing law in this
case, pertinently reads:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. –

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.

To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father on a daughter, the minority
of the victim and her relationship with the offender, which are special qualifying circumstances, must be
alleged in the complaint or information and proved by the prosecution during the trial by the quantum of
proof required for conviction. The accusatory portion of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 9375 reads as
follows:

That on or about the month of March 1996 at Sapang Tagalog, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Artemio S. Invencion
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by using force and intimidation have carnal
knowledge of his daughter Cynthia P. Invencion who was sixteen (16) years old, in their house.

CONTRARY TO LAW.30

Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the complaint and duly
established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the complaint regarding her age was not clearly
proved.

In the very recent case of People v. Pruna,31 we set the guidelines in appreciating age either as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as
the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother
or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and offered in
evidence to prove Cynthia’s age. The statement in the medical certificate showing Cynthia’s age is not
proof thereof, since a medical certificate does not authenticate the date of birth of the victim. Moreover,
pursuant to Pruna, Gloria’s testimony regarding Cynthia’s age was insufficient, since Cynthia was alleged
to be 16 years old already at the time of the rape and what is sought to be proved is that she was then 18
years old. Moreover, the trial court did not even make a categorical finding on Cynthia’s minority. Finally,
the silence of Artemio or his failure to object to the testimonial evidence regarding Cynthia’s age could not
be taken against him.
It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once
carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting
rules of procedure and evidence.32 Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of Cynthia’s minority,
Artemio cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only
be convicted of simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 are insufficient. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon
the finding of the fact of rape,33 should also be awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the victim
shall not be less than P50,000.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, in Criminal Case No.
9375 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that that accused Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as indemnity;
P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.