The Other Partition: Separation of Burma from India and its Impact

Sajal Nag

Exactly a decade earlier than the historic partition of India was effected along with its
independence from two hundred years of colonial rule, another not so controverted partition
took place in the Indian subcontinent. It was the partition of India and Burma by which
Burma which was united with India in 1886 was separated from India. It did not raise any hue
and cry that partition of India and creation of Pakistan created as it was considered ‘normal.’
It was argued that Burma was never an integral part of India and it was an historical accident
of British conquests that brought the two countries under the same administration. Therefore
if its separation neither divided any habitat, people or create emotional turmoil. Indeed,
Burma was never a part of India, but its annexation to the British Indian Empire was neither a
‘political accident’ nor an ‘accident of contiguity’. Burma had a long history of relations with
India in terms of culture, religion, and trading activities, to cite a few examples. Early
Burmese history had been largely influenced by Indian traditions. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the British saw India and Burma together under one political umbrella in the
Nineteenth century. A series of Anglo–Burmese Wars (1824, 1852, and 1885) brought the
two countries together. In 1886 Burma became the Chief Commissioner’s province within the
jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Ten years later it was upgraded to become
a separate province, and it finally became a governor’s province in 1937. This was an
outcome of a sequence of colonial conquests and administrative developments. It cannot be
considered because of ‘political accident’ or a mere consequence of ‘geographical proximity.’
Such arguments betray the lack of geographical, historical and ethnographical knowledge of
the region. The Indo–Burma borderlands are also a meeting point of two regions—south Asia
and Southeast Asia. It is the frontier where India, Burma, China and Thailand meet. It is not
just the territories of these countries that meet in these frontier but also the people and ethnic
groups who spill over the frontiers of each other’s territory. Hence it is the borderland which
is impossible to demarcate ethnically and there are a number of ethnic and tribal communities
whose ancestral habitat crisscross the frontier. Squeezed between the neighbouring countries
of Bangladesh, India, China, Laos and Thailand, ethnic minority peoples such as the Zo’s or
Chins (Mizos/Zomis), Nagas, Kachins, Shans (Tais), Lahus and Karens, live in substantial
numbers on both sides of the current borders and in many areas constitute the majority. In

1
fact currently Myanmar has 7 states and 7 regions. The states are for what are officially
known as ethnic minorities that like to refer to themselves as ethnic communities – the Shin,
Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan. The term ethnic community signify the
distinction between the Bamar who are nearly 69% of the population and the rest. Most of the
Bamar communities and some ethnic community live in the central and southern Myanmar
and most ethnic communities are in the hill areas along the border with China, India,
Bangladesh, Laos and Thailand. Many of them are separated by the borders of two or more
countries. The Shans for example live in China, Myanmar and Thailand; the Kachin in
Myanmar and China and the Chin and Nagas in Myanmar and India. Even today ethnic
Burman influence is minimal in most border regions. Indeed, in the case of the Shan and
Kachin States, the first Burman-majority towns lie several hundred miles away from the
present international boundaries. Nonetheless, though there has continued to be a relatively
free movement of migrants and traders across these remote frontiers, the final delimitation of
Burma's borders by the British in the late 19th Century (approximating the territorial claims
of the Konbaung dynasty) was to have serious implications for the development of virtually
all the region's minority peoples who now found themselves cut off on either side. With the
twin motives of just security and profit, the mountain water-sheds and great rivers which the
British preferred for their borders were to divide many communities and peoples - and often
quite arbitrarily. The high mountain passes and rivers, such as the Salween, Mekong and
Moei, are rather the natural thoroughfares of the region. Neighbouring Tai (Shan), Lahu and
Akha communities, for example, are presently divided between Burma, China, Laos and
Thailand and four very different political and economic systems. The Zos (Chins), too, were
completely dissected between Burma and India by what the Zo historian Vumson describes
as an "imaginary line” drawn by British administrators across the hills from the source of the
Namsailung river.1 The British divisions were then further compounded by a second internal,
but artificial, separation of several minorities within colonial Burma between “Ministerial
Burma", where the monarchy was abolished and a form of Western-style democracy
gradually introduced, and the ethnic minority “Frontier Areas” which, in the main, were left
under their traditional chieftains, headmen and rulers. 2 These, however, were not the only
distortions to regional relationships and geography that have had long-running consequences
still felt today. For example, once it became clear that no easy trade road would be found into
China (which was the original target of British interest), the main focus of British concern
always remained with colonial India. Indeed, until 1937 Burma was effectively administered
as a province of the British Indian Empire. This integration of India and Burma was a

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massive boon for the transfrontier Naga, Chin, Zo, Kachin, Karen, Shan, Lahu and Rohingia
people. It was effectively an official and political integration of their habitat. In other words
this Indo frontier borderland which was the meeting place of south Asia and South Asia was
the undivided habitat of these numerous tribal and ethnic communities. This habitat was not
controlled by any of these large states. In the words of James Scott these were of habitat of
communities who were escaping from the control of large states like that of China, India,
Burma or Thailand. It however does not mean they were stateless people. They had evolved
their own states in the form of chieftainships. Even when the British conquered north eastern
India and Burma, large part of these frontier remained outside the reach of the colonialists.
Realising the impossibility of reaching these region and futility of trying to control them, the
British coined the concept of ‘Unadministered Tracts.’ Therefore large tracts of this frontier
remained unadministered by any modern state either in India or Burma. The tribes were free
to live according to their own customs, politics and economic systems amidst kinship group.
Modern commerce did touch them but by and large it only supplemented their traditional
economic exchanges. The only time a modern state made its intervention felt in this frontier
was the partition. Separation of Burma from India and creation of an artificial border actually
divided their habitat, impeded their cultural and economic exchanges, disturbed their political
life and actually divided families and kinsmen. In some cases it actually divided homes very
similar to the case of India-Pakistan partition. Initially the tribal did not realise the impact of
this separation as the states were slow to actually implement partition and draw a border
dividing the countries. But soon unadministered tracts began to be policed by border security
forces of respective countries, customs duties were imposed and normal trades were branded
as illegal and trans-frontier. When homes, families and kinship groups were divided between
countries, migration halted, outlets shrunk and union of kinsmen disrupted it created
emotional turmoil and disrupted union and even matrimonial ties. In the frontiers the
partition had actually divided people, homes, families, habitats and even resulted eviction and
displacements very similar to those created by the partition of India and Pakistan. But in case
of the latter there were state support to rehabilitate the displaced, in these remote regions
there were none. Tribals were left to themselves to cope with the massive calamity and their
predicament unsung and uncared for.
There were other issues too that resulted from the separation. The unification of Burma and
India created a huge integration economic zone. Taking advantage of their head start in
western education and experience in functioning o colonial economy a massive labouring
population had migration and settled in Burma. One side-result was a massive immigration of

3
labour from India (by 1931 the Indian population had already passed the one million mark,
out of a total population of 14,650,000) and this was a major factor behind the fast-spreading
Burmese national liberation movement of the 1920s and 30s. The competition over scarce
resources and employment between the indigenous Burmese and immigrant Indians was
fierce. The Burmese disliked the completion from the advanced Indians and there was
resistance to further migration of labouring people from India. Violent anti-Indian riots, in
which hundreds died, broke out several times in the 1930s. Eventually in the Second World
War an estimated 500,000 Indians were chased out of the country (unknown numbers were
killed) by Aung San and the young nationalists of the Burma Independence Army. 3
Subsequently, another 300,000 Indians left Burma following Ne Win's mass nationalisation
programmes of the 1960s.

The partition

The idea behind the movement for the ‘separation of Burma from India’ did not originate
from the Burmans but was put forward by the British themselves. But the so-called
‘separation of Burma from India’ did not happen without any political undercurrents, and this
needs to be examined. ‘[T]he earliest proposal for separation’, according to F. Burton
Leach’s rather revealing remark, ‘came from the Rangoon Chamber of Commerce in 1884
seeking the Chief Commissioner in the financial and general interests of the country’. 4 Later
on, Sir George Scott wrote in the introduction to Joseph Dautremer’s book (1913): ‘Burma
ought never to have been joined on to the Indian Empire’.5
Arguments to justify the case for ‘separation’ had also come from topmost colonial officials
in Burma. Lieutenant Governor Harcourt Butler (1915–17; 1922–27) believed that ‘the
Burmans differ radically from Indians’6, while Lieutenant Governor Reginald Craddock
asserted that Burma’s incorporation with India was a ‘political accident’. 7 To add to this
group of dissenters, S. V. Donnison thought that Burma’s inclusion in British India was ‘the
accident of contiguity’.8 All these statements undoubtedly revealed the ideological origins of
‘separation’ as lying with the colonial rulers rather than the Burmans, with inputs largely
from the business class. The view expressed by the British officers in Burma was clear:
Burma had never been an integral part of India. The reason for such a stand was, as J. S.
Furnivall explains, ‘chiefly because they expected to have greater influence under the
Colonial Office than under the Indian Government’.9 It is now clear that control of Burma’s
economy and politics was the driving force behind combined colonial-business interests in
‘separation’.

4
But the paradox is that the British themselves wanted Burma separated from India and hardly
bargained for that cause. No doubt the politics behind such move, as explained above, were
driven by vested interests in obtaining power to control the economy of Burma The question
is: why did the idea of ‘separation’ not originate from the Burmans but rather from the
British? Does this have anything to do with Burman nationalism? In fact, when political
reforms were looming in India in 1916, Lieutenant Harcourt Butler noted that the Burmans
saw that ‘very little change was necessary’ in their country. 10 F. S. V. Donnison also agreed
that ‘until this time there had been little or no interest in politics on the part of the Burmese’. 11
But when the Mont-Ford Reforms, also known as the Government of India Act 1919 was
enacted, it excluded Burma on the ground that ‘Burma is not India’ and that ‘its problems are
12
altogether different’. The Reform was responded to with protests which suddenly arose in
Burma and ‘took everybody by surprise’.13 The people took to the streets because they did
not want to be left out of the Reform. Sir Reginald Craddock remarked: ‘Never was a country
and its people more untimely ripped from the womb of political future progress than Burma
and the Burmese, when Mr. Montagu with his magic midwifery from across the Bay of
Bengal started to disturb them from their placid contentment’. 14 J.S. Furnivall, in his study on
the Annual Reports and Administration in Burma, indicated that some Burmans were aware
of international events such as the Japanese victory over Russia in1905, while others looked
to the Indian national movement led by the Congress as an example. The Burmans also
participated in insurrections after each of the British Anglo–Burmese wars. 15 Nevertheless, it
is widely accepted that large-scale political awareness in Burma came only after the Montagu
proposal had stirred them up. The roots of political organisation in Burma may be traced to
the formation of the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) in 1906. The YMBA was
initially concerned with religious issues only, but it soon became nationally widespread and
organised. In 1917 it sent delegations to India to meet the British parliamentary envoys and
16
requested them not to exclude Burma from the proposed constitutional reforms. The
YMBA also raised some 2000 pounds to dispatch three representatives to London for the
same cause.17 At a national convention held between 1919 and 1920 the YMBA merged with
various organisations and formed the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) at
its annual conference in Prome.18 For these reasons Frank N. Trager aptly says, ‘Burmese
nationalism did not spring up suddenly in 1919. What changed was the mode of
expression’.19 Burman protest finally paid off. With the passing of the Government of Burma
Act 1921, Burma was brought in line with the other provinces of the Indian Empire. The
Burma Reforms Committee, headed by Sir Frederick Whyte, was set up to sort out matters

5
related to ‘reserved’ and ‘transferred’ subjects.20 In accordance with the Reforms
Committee’s recommendation, the adoption of the constitutional reforms in Burma came into
effect in January 1923. Accordingly, dyarchy was extended in principle to the province of
Burma. However, the governor was to exercise direct control over the Shan, Karen, Kachin,
Chin (Zo), and tribal hill areas, which constituted more than 40 per cent of Burma’s total
area, and included between 10 to 15 per cent of its population. 21 However, the Reforms ‘had
covered up a multitude of sins’, Reginald Craddock lamented, 22 and another observer was
amazed that the Burmans were taught ‘all such vices of bribery, intimidation and personation’
in such a short period of time. The Simon Commission also noticed that Burma’s ‘interests
diverge very considerably from those of India in terms economic, military, constitutional
matters…’23 It was based on this finding that the Simon Commission decided that ‘to
postpone separation would be so unpopular in Burma as to endanger the working of any
reforms’ and ‘therefore, that Burma should be separated from India immediately’. 24 The
Burman dilemma of ‘separation’ was, however, far from over. The rising political awareness
and diverse perspectives on dyarchy resulted in the split of the GCBA. The GCBA was
divided into a British-educated-led moderate group, who advocated for Council entry and
believed in orderly step-by-step progress, and the monk-led wunthanus, who stood for
‘substantially all or nothing’.25 With the breakup of the GCBA into two, a new political
pattern emerged in Burma, which maintained political activity on two fronts: in the
legislature as well as in the country outside. These political organizations further led to a
triangular conflict between the British, the moderates, and the wunthanus. The wunthanus
even labelled their movement ‘non-participation’ in line with Gandhi’s movement in India.
One of Gandhi’s lieutenants was said to have come over to Burma and delivered speeches
and private instructions, which supposedly added more fuel to the flames. 26 Paradoxically, the
more the Burma government pressed for separation, the more suspicion developed among
sections of the Burman nationalists, who feared that if Burma were to be separated from India
it would drop out of the stream of constitutional advancement. 27 The suspicion kept growing
as the question of separation became an election issue in 1932. The Burman dilemma
worsened because of the unanimity among the government of Burma, big business, and the
European press in favour of separation.28 On the other side, some of the Burman nationalists
took this as an opportunity to form a new kind of relationship with the Indians. Furnivall
29
aptly says, ‘Burmans’ dislike of Indians was replaced by their distrust of Europeans’. The
real test for the Burman nationalists came in the 1932 elections. It was a triangular fight
between the anti-separationist league led by Ba Maw, the ‘21 Party’ who campaigned for the

6
separationist policy, and pro-British minorities first known as the Progressive Party and later
as the Independent Party, or popularly known as the Golden Valley Party. Strikingly enough,
the election results came out in favour of the anti-separationist nationalists. This group
actually wanted to defer separation until after Burma had derived maximum political
advantages from India. At the end of the day, ‘all factions among the nationalists, however
much they debated it merits would accept a new political arrangement that would take Burma
out of the Indian Empire’.30 Sir Hugh Lansdowne Stephenson, Governor of Burma from 1932
to 36, explained how his government took control of the Burman dilemma: ‘after the Burma
Legislative Council had on three separate occasions refused to give a clear indication of their
preference between the two alternatives offered to them, Parliament definitely decided on
separation’.31 The Government of India Act 1935 followed suit, which finally sealed the fact
of Burma’s separation from India. On this Donnison remarks: ‘separation was “forced” upon
Burma and accepted with a sigh of relief: there was no audible criticism’. 32 Ripples of the
so-called ‘separation of Burma from India’ were felt in other parts of the Indian subcontinent.
In his four-page leaflet issued in July 1935, C. Rahmat Ali, who claimed to be the ‘founder of
the Pakistan National Movement’, argued: ‘While Burma is being separated from
Hindoostan, it remains a mystery to us why Pakistan…is to be forced into the Indian
Federation’.33 In 1939 another eminent Muslim leader of the Punjab, Nawab Sir Muhammad
Shah Nawaz, cited the case of Burma as a precedent in his proposal to divide India into five
‘countries’, all of which would be federations in themselves. 34 The British ‘misadventure’ in
Burma seems to have become a precedent for others in the Indian subcontinent, albeit
inadvertently. The unfolding political developments did not affect the status of the ‘scheduled
areas’ or ‘excluded areas’. But what seems like the imposition of the status quo was in reality
a political surgery: behind the screen of the ‘separation of Burma from India’ lay the
fragmentation of the indigenous hill territories in the Indo–Burma borderlands. Such
implications seem to have never been imagined by the colonial rulers, but these fragmented
territories were going to have a far reaching impact even in the post-colonial period. To
salvage the hill peoples from the impending political fallout there was a proposal for the
creation of a ‘Crown colony’ from concerned colonial officers. But to what extent such
proposal was a viable alternative against the backdrop of the Second World War needs an in-
depth analysis. The Indian Statutory Commission, or the Simon Commission’s
recommendation, which said, ‘Burma should be separated from India immediately’, 35 came
36
into effect on 1 April 1937following the passing of the Acts of 1935 by the British
parliament. As a result, British Burma and British India were separated. A new governor was

7
to head the government of Burma; he was to be directly responsible to the Secretary of State
for Burma in London.
The 1600 km long borderline followed the existing ‘traditional’ line between the two states,
or the administrative border delimited by the colonial rulers at the turn of nineteenth century.
This ‘traditional’ line of demarcation remained unaltered when Burma was separated from
India on 1April 1937; it was instead inherited by independent India and Burma. Post-colonial
nation-states often inherit colonial boundaries. The Indo–Burma boundary was delimited
through a bilateral treaty signed by both the countries on 10 March 1967.

The impact on Kinship groups

The immediate impact of the partition was the separation of certain tribes from each other
who now straddle the two countries of India and Myanmar. The tribes divided between
Burma and India are the Konyak, Nocte, Thangsa and Wangcho of Arunachal Pradesh
(India). In Myanmar they have been given different names. It is the Kuki (near Moreh), Paite
(Churachandpur) Tangkhul (Ukhrul) of Manipur who are divided between the two countries.
The Mizo, Paite, Chins (70,000) of Mizoram and Manipur too are divided between the two
countries whereas it is the Chakesang, Sangtam, Khyaniungam and Konyak of Nagaland who
live in India but have their counterparts in Myanmar. Even the Konyak Cheif’s house is
divided between Nagaland and the Hukong valley. In fact in four townships of Myanmar
these Naga tribes have a recognizable presence. 37 The Konyak, Tangkhul, Phom and Yimchunger
Nagas live in the Burmese border of Manipur. Many major Naga tribes live in Burma. In fact the
entire Somra district of Burma is inhabited by Naga people. The Naga tribes in Myanmar are anal,
Konyak, Htangan, Khiamnungam) Konyak, , Makury, Nokaw (or Noko), Para, Tangshang or
Tase, Lamkang, Leinong or Lainong or Lainung and Yimchunger.38 There are many more
Naga tribes residing in Myanmar along the banks of the Chindwin River, the
Satih/Nanteleik/Tizu River and the Nawin River. But they presently claim a different identity
as Red Shans and Tamans though themselves agree that they were once on the Hills with the
Nagas after they left Inn Daw Gyi in Kachin State. This is weakening the Naga solidarity
movement. The Nagas in Myanmar occupy a compact area of the Northwestern region
between the Chin state on the south and the Kachin state on the north of Myanmar. Until
recent time, the Naga territory was under one district or one administrative zone i.e. Khamti
district of Saging division with little part in Kachin state. But with drafting of 2008
constitution of Myanmar the Naga territory was badly damaged and sliced into pieces. The

8
hill townships: Layshi, Lahe and Namyung were given as Naga Self-Administered
Region  carving out Khamti, Homalin and Tamu under Sagaing division. The Burmese Nagas
had made repeated appeal to the international community to rescue them from the division
and devastation of their land by the Burmese Junta regime. When Myanmar was given
independence by the British, the emerging Myanmarese evolved a constitution where Nagas
were given ten years agreement after which they had the liberty to leave the state of Myanmar
and form their own aunomous administration. In fact Angami Zapu Phizo started his political
career by fighting for the Burmese Naga rights in the newly independent Burmese state. He
shifted his attention to the Indian Nagas after winning the rights of the Nagas of Burma.

The Sagaing region is situated in the north west of Myanmar between the Chin state on the
south west and Kachin state on the north east. It borders on India’s Nagaland and Manipur
state. It was a division till the 2008 constitution of Myanmar changed the Divisions into
Regions. It has a Naga Self Administered Zone. There is constant unofficial movement
between the borders and also intermarriages between the tribes living in Myanmar and
Arunachal Pradesh – more in Changlang than in Tirap districts of Arunachal Pradesh. In
practice there is open border between Nagaland in India and Myanmar because villages from
Mon in Nagaland to Monyakshu in Myanmar depend on the Indian border trade for supplies.
The Hukong Valley to its east is far from Mandalay. It is easier to come from here to the
Indian side of the border than go to Mandalay. Most shops are on the Nagaland side of the
border and people from Sagaing go there to buy goods.
Since then the border fencing between the two countries has started in which India is likely to
turn 3,500 fertile acres into “No-Man’s Land” on its eastern border with Myanmar as
construction of a fence has started between the existing border pillars demarcating the two
neighbouring nations. The fencing is going ahead despite an agitation by Naga villagers who
said the move will affect their livelihood as the area has been used by them for years. The
district administration, located in the border town of Noklak, has begun preparations to seal
off farmers’ passage to the 3,500 acres of land, according to sources. Village Councils say the
fencing between existing border pillars 139 and 146 will leave 10,000 villagers belonging to
the Khiamniungans Naga tribe, living on both sides of the border, without a livelihood. 39 This
would further divide the two kinsmen who were so far allowed the privilege of FMP (free
movement passage) by the government of India under the pressure of the Naga nationalist
Naga organizations.

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The separation of Burma from India separated the Mizos between India and Burma after the
independence of India a number of Mizo wanted to join Burma and accordingly a political
party advocating merger with Burma – UMFO was also formed. But with the independence
of Burma a year later in 1948 a large number of Burmese Mizos migrated to Kale-Kabaw
Valley and Tahan areas in the border. The Mizo people in Burma are concentrated in the
Kale-Kabaw Mythia Valleys, lower-Burma in Arakan, the Somra Tracts and Hkamti district
in the Chin state totalling about 6.5 lakhs (1971). The Mizo subtribese who are divided
between the two countries are Chins, Khami, Masho, Asho, Ponguiu, Sawhan, Kayam and
Hemi, Zou Tlan, Ralte, Pawi, Pang (Pualnam), Paite, Mara or Lakhar (in Burma they are
called Shamtu Zo and Miram), Magh, Lugei, Singphos in Hualngo (Chak-Chwaka).

A survey among the divided people by a research institute showed that the first issue
identified by both the groups and individuals was the communications between relatives and
family members suffer because they are separated by the border. The second is the growing
disintegration of families. Even when the tribe is separated by international borders, family
relations remain of paramount importance. The women respondents were concerned about the
new cultural that makes it difficult for children of the new generation to realte to their
counterparts across border. The chin and Naga villagers reported that their family members
and relatives separated by border find it difficult to meet each other not only due to the border
but also due to distance. The current dispensation in both the countries allow people to visit
families upto sixteen miles without visa formality but just by a permit but many do not avail
it as they were not aware of it. They often travel illegally and are caught and jailed by the
border guards for illegal trespassing. The man power short tribal villages also experience
shoratage of labour due to partition. They are mostly swidden cultivators which require
shifting of farming sites and huge manpower. But the partition has divided the people and
space to such an extent that both have become scarce as mobility is restricted. Being located
in the remote region in both the countries, respective governments also pay scant attention to
their development. There is scarcity of resources, access to water, land, market and modern
facilities like schools, medical facility and electricity. Many communities reported that
partition has destroyed the integrity of their tribes. Due to their distances same tribes use
different names for their identification which created confusion about themselves. Some even
feel that their counterparts in the Indian side try to hegemonies and dominate them as Indian
side of the tribals have experienced comparatively more development. However it is only the
trade exchanges initiated by the respective governments recently that established border

10
marts and legalised traditional exchanges between themselves where dispersed kinsmen have
an opportunity to meet and make cultural, matrimonial, economic and political exchanges.

The Political ramification

The Nagas has been fighting a secessionist war against the Indian state for half a century. In
this war they have always talked about their Naga kinsmen who had remained in the State of
Myanmar. Currently they are on the process of negotiating with the Indian State about the
possibility of integrating all the Nagas dispersed in different provinces of India in one single
political unit. But in these negotiations the question of Nagas living in Myanmar has ceased
to figure. In fact the Nagas of Myanmar are in terrible condition and are subjected to untold
oppression under the military regime there. The Myanmarese Nagas need the support of their
ethnic counterparts in India more than anything else. But realizing that the inclusion of
Myanmarese Nagas in their political agenda would be futile, the Naga apex organization the
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (IM) seems to have decided to leave the former to
their own fate. Therefore the Naga unification under one Naga state movement has
weakened and both the Naga groups are fighting their separate wars in their respective
countries.

The Mizos had launched a Zo Reunification Movement in the 1970’s with the objective of
unifying and integration all Mizo people similarly dispersed in different territories in India,
Bangladesh and Myanmar in one single province. The movement had gained immediate
support and enthusiasm of all Mizos. So much so that though Myanmarese Mizos were as
much a foreigner as an American in India, they were allowed to cross over and settle in
Mizoram province of India. It was illegal but the empathy of the Indian Mizos and the
unofficial support of the Mizoram government allowed the settlement to continue. It was
neither reported officially nor illegalized. But once Mizoram was granted the status of
separate statehood, a murmur began about the unabated migration of Myanmarese Mizos in
this Indian state leading to scarcity in land resources, shrinkage of employment opportunities,
spurt in criminal activities, increase in drug and small arms peddling, spread of HIV and
AIDS and intensification of anti-national movements in this border state. There was
discussion to initiate some regulation over their unabated infiltration. The murmur developed
into a chorus in the 1990’s.

One example of such campaign was against the Mizo migrants from Myanmar. The
Myamarese Mizos trickled into Mizoram through the porous border from the 1970’s. The

11
Myanmarese are generally poverty stricken, uneducated and victims of oppression and
deprivation by the majority Myanmarese as well as the Government. They migrate to India to
work as maid servants, wage labourers, small time vendors, shop keepers and smugglers of
contraband goods and items. In contrast the Indian Mizos due their advancement in
educational pursuits (Mizos have one of the highest literacy rates in India) and State
Preferential Policy are relatively well off. By the turn of the century there were an estimated
one lakh Myanmarese Mizos in Mizoram. Once their number began to increase and they
began to be visible in the socio-economic space their presence was began to be discussed.
Despite the appropriation and exploitation of their cheap labour, there began to be targeted
for their illegal migration, land-grabbing, inter marriage, pollution of culture, import of drugs
and small arms and criminalizing the Mizo society. Even the Governor Lt Gen (rtd) M M
Lakhera, bowing to pressure from the state government, the Mizo social organizations and
the churches, supported the holding of a census of Myanmarese nationals staying in
Mizoram. It was estimated that 50,000 Myanmarese nationals were in Mizoram (unofficial
estimates claimed 75,000). Furthermore, the Governor warned against the enrolment of
Myanmarese migrants in the Census 2011. The partition of the country therefore permanently
damaged the kinship of the communities and divided them into two hostile communities.

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 1
Vumson, Zo History (Aizawl, Mizoram, 1986), p.107 cited in Martin Smith, ‘Burma’s Ethnic Minorities:A Central
or peripheral problem in the regional context,’ in Kaladan News, 12 September 2007 downloaded from
http://www.kaladanpress.org/index.php/seminar-and-event-mainmenu-38/68-on-burma/869-burmas-ethnic-
minoritiesa-central-or-peripheral-problem-in-the-regional-context.html on 3rd August 2017.

2
Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (Zed Books, London, 1991). pp.44-8 cited in ibid

3
Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (Zed Books, London, 1991). pp.43-44 cited in ibid

4
F. Burton Leach, The future of Burma (Rangoon: British Burma Press, 1936), p. 45.

5
Joseph Dautremer, Burma under British rule (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), p. 10.

6
53 Quoted in Harcourt Butler, ‘Burma and its problems’, Foreign Affairs vol. 10, no. 4 (July 1932), p. 656.

7
Sir Reginald Craddock, The dilemma in India (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1929), p. 126.

8
F. S. V. Donnison, Public administration in Burma: A study of development during the British connexion (NewYork:
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), p. 72.

9
J. S. Furnivall, Colonial policy and practice: A comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1948), p. 166.

10
Harcourt Butler, ‘Burma and its problems’, Foreign Affairs vol. 10, no. 4 (July 1932), p. 655.

11
F. S. V. Donnison, Public administration in Burma: A study of development during the British connexion (New York:
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), p. 52.

12
ISC, vol. XI, p. 565.

13
D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1955), p. 626.

14
Sir Reginald Craddock, The dilemma in India (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1929), p. 109.

15
J. S. Furnivall, Colonial policy and practice: A comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1948), p. 140.Also see, Frank N. Trager, Burma from kingdom to republic: A
historical and political analysis (London: Pall Mall Press,1966), p. 42.

16
John L. Christian, Modern Burma: A survey of political and economic development, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1942, p. 62.

17
Sir Reginald Craddock, The dilemma in India (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1929),, p. 116.

18
Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 282-83. Also see, Maung
Maung Pye, Burma in the crucible (Rangoon: Khittaya Publishing House, 1951).
19
Frank N. Trager, Burma from kingdom to republic: A historical and political analysis (London: Pall Mall Press,1966), p.
47.

20
John Leroy Christian, Modern Burma: A survey of political and economic development (Los Angeles: Universityof
California Press, 1942), pp. 62-3.

21
Frank N. Trager, Burma from kingdom to republic: A historical and political analysis (London: Pall Mall Press,1966), p.
48.

22
Sir Reginald Craddock, The dilemma in India (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1929),, p. 120.

23
ISC, vol. XI, p. 567.

24
ISC, vol. II, p. 188.

25
Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a revolution 1939-46(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968),pp. 10
&49.

26
Sir Reginald Craddock, The dilemma in India (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1929),, pp. 118-9.

27
F. S. V. Donnison, Public administration in Burma: A study of development during the British connexion (New York:
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953),, p. 73.

28
J. S. Furnivall, Colonial policy and practice: A comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1948), p. 166.

29
J. S. Furnivall, Colonial policy and practice: A comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1948)p. 167.

30
Frank N. Trager, Burma from kingdom to republic: A historical and political analysis (London: Pall Mall Press,1966) pp.
49-51.

31
Sir Hugh Stephenson, ‘Some Problems of a Separated Burma’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol.35, issue
3(1938), p. 400.

F. S. V. Donnison, Public administration in Burma: A study of development during the British connexion (New York:
32

Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), p. 73.

33
R. Coupland, The Indian problem: Report to the constitutional problem in India (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1944),
p. 200.

34
R. Coupland, The Indian problem: Report to the constitutional problem in India (London: Oxford UniversityPress,
1944p. 203. Five countries include: 1. The Indus Regions, 2. Hindu India, a central block comprising all that is not covered
by the other ‘countries’, 3. Rajastan, containing the States of Rajputana and Central India, 4. The Deccan States, mainly
Hyderabad and Mysore, and 5. Bengal, without its present Hindu districts but including parts of Assam and a number of
disconnected States
35
Indian Statutory Commission Report, (ISC), vol. II, p. 188.

36
The Government of India Act 1935 and the Government of Burma Act 1935.

37
Walter Fernandes, Tiken Das, Zaw Goan, Than Naing Lin, Furzee Kashyap, Relations Across Borders: Communities
separated by the Indo-Myanmar Border, NESRC, Guwahati & Animation and Research Centre, Myanmar Yangon,
Guwahati and yangon, 2015, p 25

38
S. R. Tohring, Violence and identity in North-east India: Naga-Kuki conflict. Mittal Publications. Delhi, 2010, pp. xv–
xvii.

39
The Shillont times, 3rd January 2017, p. 7