992671

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IPS0010.1177/0192512121992671International Political Science ReviewBonifácio and Botelho

Article

International Political Science Review

Class voting or economic voting?

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DOI: 10.1177/0192512121992671
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Robert Bonifácio and João Carlos Amoroso Botelho

Federal University of Goiás, Brazil

Abstract
This article analyses electoral support for chavismo in Venezuela from 1998 to 2015, comprising five
presidential elections (1998, 2000, 2006, 2012, and 2013) and the legislative election of 2015. Drawing on
a comprehensive historical series, the findings contradict an influential body of literature on Venezuelan
politics and show that economic voting prevailed during the analysed period. In relation to class voting, the
analysis does not find a monotonic vote, in which the poor supported Hugo Chávez and his allies, whereas
the rich rejected them, at each election. The direction of associations between these classes and voting for
chavismo varied over the investigated period. The findings have important implications for Latin American
politics, showing the relevance of economic factors for the left turn in regional politics and helping explain
the recent losses of leftist parties in presidential elections.

Keywords
Electoral behaviour, Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, left turn, Latin America

Introduction
During approximately two decades of chavismo supremacy in Venezuela, much has been written
to explain the electoral support given to Hugo Chávez and his political allies since his first elec-
tion as president in 1998. A common explanation relies on class voting, according to which the
poor are more likely to vote for chavismo, whereas the rich are more likely to vote against it.
Drawing on a comprehensive historical data series, this article contradicts this claim and shows
that voters’ assessment of the national economy plays a more important role as an explanatory
factor of the vote for chavismo over the analysed period. At the regional level, this finding rein-
forces the relevance of economic factors for the left turn in Latin America and helps explain the
recent difficulties of leftist presidents trying to hold office in the region. The article uses opinion
poll data to analyse five presidential elections (1998, 2000, 2006, 2012, and 2013) and one legis-
lative election (2015) in Venezuela1.

Corresponding author:
João Carlos Amoroso Botelho, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais, Federal University of Goiás, Campus II, Goiânia, Goiás
74001-970, Brazil.
Email: joaocarlosbotelho@hotmail.com
2 International Political Science Review 00(0)

Although class voting manifestations have been observed in Venezuela throughout the analysed
period, this was not a monotonic vote, in which the poor voted for chavismo, whereas the rich
rejected it, at each election. As expected by class voting theory, the lower and upper classes, respec-
tively, supported and rejected chavista candidates in the 2006 and 2012 elections. On the other
hand, in contrast to theoretical projections, these classes showed positive chances of voting for
chavismo in 1998, 2000, and 2013, and negative chances of doing so in 2015, when opposition
parties secured their main electoral victory since Chávez’s rise to power2.
Economic voting is the most noticeable and sustainable trend in all rounds of data to explain the
electoral support given to chavismo. It means that voters have rewarded or punished elected offi-
cials based on the country’s economic performance. Those who exhibited a positive perception of
the national economy supported Chávez and his successor, Nicolás Maduro, at the polls. This find-
ing helps explain the difficulties faced by Maduro in holding office amid the deteriorating econ-
omy in Venezuela and waves of demonstrations demanding his resignation.
Before presenting the statistical tests that led to the findings, it is necessary to contextualize the
chavista period and to interrogate theories of electoral behaviour and the left turn in Latin America.
The next section focuses on the political context in Venezuela since Chávez’s rise to power. The
third and fourth sections present theoretical discussions of class voting and economic voting, asso-
ciate them with the Venezuelan and the Latin American contexts and lead to the development of
specific propositions. Following an explanation of the methodological procedures, the data col-
lected are analysed. The article ends with some conclusions about the findings and expands on the
implications for politics across Latin America.

Overview of the political–electoral dispute under chavismo

Hugo Chávez, a military officer with no prior experience of electoral politics, was president of
Venezuela from 1999 to 2013, winning four consecutive elections (1998, 2000, 2006, and 2012).
During this period, he adopted a personalistic form of governing and built a political structure rooted
in loyalty to him. Chávez died in office of cancer in 2013 and was replaced by Nicolás Maduro, who
was vice-president at the time and won the presidential election that year. The article refers to chav-
ismo as the political group in power, whether under the leadership of Chávez or Maduro.
This historical section encompasses the period from the first presidential election won by
Chávez in 1998 to 2015, when the opposition parties came together in a coalition called Mesa de
la Unidad Democrática (MUD) and secured the majority of seats in the national assembly for the
first time since the inaugural election for this unicameral legislature held in 2000. Thus, a divided
government was established.
This had already happened to some extent during Chávez’s first year as president in 1999. At
that time, the traditional parties Acción Democrática (AD) and Comité de Organización Política
Electoral Independiente (COPEI) and new opposition forces had the majority of seats in the then
lower house of the legislature. The division between the executive and legislature had its origin in
the separate holding of parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively in November and
December 1998 (Molina, 2002). Chávez came from behind in the presidential run, which was ini-
tially led by a former Miss Universe.
Once in power, Chávez called a referendum on the formation of a constituent assembly to
draft a new constitution and obtained a favourable result. He secured victories in the constituent
elections and in the referendum on the draft constitution, also in 1999. The constituent assem-
bly decided to terminate the activities performed by deputies and senators elected in 1998 and
appointed a provisional commission to carry out legislative duties until the general election in
July 2000.
Bonifácio and Botelho 3

In these elections, Chávez won a six-year term and saw his party secure a majority in the new
unicameral legislature. This marked the beginning of a gradual occupation of other state power
branches (Citizen, Electoral, and Judicial) by chavismo, eliminating the room for political disputes
to take place within institutions (Kornblith, 2007). The culmination of this process was the 2005
legislative election, in which chavismo won all seats in the national assembly after opposition par-
ties withdrew arguing that the National Electoral Council would not be able to guarantee a free and
fair process (Maingon, 2014).
As chavismo expanded its control over institutions, opposition forces established their trenches
on the streets and in the media. Two main initiatives were used for trying to turn the tide against
Chávez between the 2000 and 2005 elections, namely: (a) a coup d’état in April 2002; and (b) a
general strike between late 2002 and early 2003. The opposition parties did not play the leading
role in either. The main national associations of businessmen and workers at the time led both ini-
tiatives and had the support of military personnel and private television networks for the coup3
(Botelho, 2009). As Chávez resumed power, his opponents had to change their strategy, which
brought the opposition parties back to the scene. They met in Coordinadora Democrática, the fore-
runner of MUD, and succeeded in forcing the sitting president to subject himself to a recall refer-
endum, a mechanism provided by the 1999 constitution to revoke the mandate of any elected
official once half their term has elapsed. The 2004 recall referendum helped ease political tensions
by concentrating the opposition parties’ efforts on an institutional path to changing the president
(Botelho, 2009). Ultimately, Chávez remained in office.
Focused on the factors that cost him the presidency for almost 48 hours in 2002, Chávez articu-
lated his reaction on three fronts, namely: (a) the appointment of reliable officials to the highest-
ranking positions in the armed forces; (b) the formation of a state-owned mass media network; and
(c) the encouragement of popular circles to organize themselves and to defend the government and
its social programmes.
The results of the 2005 and 2006 national elections gave Chávez all seats in the national
assembly and a second six-year term, which reinforced the absence of opposition parties in insti-
tutional spaces.
It was from the streets, although with new actors, that opposition forces started gaining
ground. After protests led by students mainly from the Central University of Venezuela, the
constitutional reform approved by chavismo in the national assembly was rejected in the popu-
lar referendum held in 2007 (Kornblith, 2013). Although Chávez partly averted that outcome in
2009, when a constitutional amendment authorizing unlimited reelection was approved in a
new referendum, opposition parties reached in the 2012 and 2013 elections, against Chávez and
Maduro, respectively, the highest percentage of votes in the presidential disputes against chav-
ismo (see Table 1).
The performance of opposition candidates in the 2012 and 2013 presidential elections was not
enough to convince all opposition parties to wait for the next election to oust chavismo from power
(Botelho, 2015). Thus, street clashes escalated in 2014, when the first wave of protests against
Maduro took place, and 43 people were killed.
On the other hand, these protests were important to set up the confrontation between chavismo and
opposition forces within political institutions. The strategy of prioritizing street demonstrations was
criticized even by opposition politicians, who pointed out that it would be more appropriate to focus
on the 2015 legislative election in order to win the majority of seats in the national assembly (Botelho,
2016; Lewit and Brito, 2016). The MUD was able to conceal its most visible differences and ran in
2015 as the coalition of all opposition parties, which took the legislative majority from chavismo.
Thereby, the political conflict moved towards the institutional stage. The first episode took
place in late 2015. The chavista coalition appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice and succeeded
4 International Political Science Review 00(0)

Table 1.  Percentage of votes for president (1998–2013).

Election Chavista candidate % Main opponent %

1998 Hugo Chávez 56.20 Henrique Salas Romer 39.97
(Movimiento V República (MVR)) (Proyecto Venezuela)
2000 Hugo Chávez (MVR) 59.76 Francisco Arias Cárdenas 37.52
(La Causa Radical)
2006 Hugo Chávez (MVR) 62.84 Manuel Rosales 36.90
(Un Nuevo Tiempo)
2012 Hugo Chávez (Partido Socialista 55.07 Henrique Capriles Radonski 44.31
Unido de Venezuela (PSUV)) (Primero Justicia (PJ))
2013 Nicolás Maduro (PSUV) 50.61 Henrique Capriles Radonski (PJ) 49.12

Source: National Electoral Council (http://www.cne.gov.ve/web/index.php).

Table 2.  Legislative seats per political group (2000–2015).

Bloc 2000 2005 2010 2015

Chavismo 102 167 98 55
Opposition 61 0 65 112
Independents 2 0 2 0
Total 165 167 165 167

Note: opposition parties withdrew from the 2005 election.

Source: authors’ elaboration based on National Electoral Council, Lewit and Brito (2016) and Maingon (2014).

in disqualifying three elected deputies from the opposition bloc. Without them, the MUD would
not have enough legislative votes to reach the special majority threshold.
The opposition parties increased their seats in the national assembly from 65 to 112 between
2010 and 2015, whereas the chavismo group dropped from 98 to 55 (see Table 2). Primero Justicia
won the largest bloc in the opposition coalition, with 33 elected legislators (see Table 3), followed
by AD, with 26 (Lewit and Brito, 2016).

Class and the vote

A frequent claim in the literature on electoral behaviour is that class voting is an outdated analytical
category to explain citizens’ electoral preferences (Dalton, 1996). Evans (1999, 2000) addressed
this point and suggested important explanations for the supposed decline in class relevance as an
element guiding electoral choices. These included transformations observed in left parties since the
beginning of the twentieth century. Left leaning parties changed their political platforms and
adopted a catch-all approach in efforts to achieve electoral success. Consequently, class issues
were downgraded and even overlooked, while discussions aimed at more middle-class concerns
were incorporated into the parties’ agendas. Additionally, the transformation of class structures
based on extensive inter- and intragenerational social mobility contributed to the atomization of
classes and the erosion of the dichotomy between capital and labour, which shaped party-political
disputes for many years (Evans, 1999).
Finally, experts have emphasized the transformation of individual values, mainly in the post-
Second World War period. The rise in education levels and cognitive mobilization contributed to
an electoral logic focused on meeting individual demands rather than defending collective interests
Bonifácio and Botelho 5

Table 3.  Legislative seats per political party (2000–2015).

Party 2000 2005 2010 2015

Acción Democrática 33 0 22 26
Alianza Bravo Pueblo 1 0 0 1
Avanzada Progresista 0 0 0 3
Consejo Nacional Indio de Venezuela 3 0 1 0
Convergencia 4 0 1 1
Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente 6 0 6 0
Cuentas Claras 0 0 1 2
Fuerza Ciudadana 0 0 0 1
Fundacidi 0 0 1 0
Gente Emergente 0 0 0 1
La Causa Radical 3 0 2 4
MiZulia 0 0 1 0
Movimiento al Socialismo 6 0 0 0
Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo 0 11 0 0
MiGato 1 0 0 0
Movimiento Progresista de Venezuela 0 0 0 4
Partido Comunista de Venezuela 0 8 0 2
Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela/Movimiento V República 92 114 96 53
Patria Para Todos 1 11 2 0
Por la Democracia Social 0 15 2 0
Primero Justicia 5 0 15 33
Proyecto Venezuela 6 0 3 1
Pueblos Unidos Multiétnicos del Amazonas 1 0 0 0
Un Nuevo Tiempo 3 0 12 20
Unidad Popular Venezolana 0 8 0 0
Voluntad Popular 0 0 0 14
Vente Venezuela 0 0 0 1
Total 165 167 165 167

Note: opposition parties withdrew from the 2005 election.

Source: authors’ elaboration based on National Electoral Council, Lewit and Brito (2016) and Maingon (2014).

(Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). At the same time, values   prevailing in many societies of developed
countries gradually changed, and post-materialist values came to predominate over materialistic
ones. As Inglehart and Welzel concluded, self-expression issues, as opposed to economic security
and class position gained prominence. Consequently, class lost ground in the electoral debate to
issues such as race, gender, the environment, and consumer protection.
However, part of the specific literature on Venezuela concludes that politics was marked by
classism from the 1990s, unlike what had prevailed in the previous two decades, when there was a
catch-all and bipartisan political-party system formed around AD and COPEI. According to Heath
(2009b), the economic crisis which deteriorated from 1989 in Venezuela contributed to weakening
the two established parties and to increasing low-income class numbers, but this did not promptly
lead to a new party system. Political misalignment and electoral availability among AD and COPEI
traditional voters opened room for new issues and for the emergence of new political leaders. Weak
ties to established parties, in association with widespread dissatisfaction with the political situation
in Venezuela, created a scenario in which political action and leadership would matter more than
6 International Political Science Review 00(0)

expected. In such situations, voters would use simpler shortcuts to assess candidates, which Heath
(2009b) defines as a fertile ground for charismatic leaders and populism. Thereby, the author
understands class politics in Venezuela as the response to a top-down process, which means that
class has gained importance in Venezuelan politics from the 1990s due to political elites’ action,
although the socio-economic conjuncture had also contributed to this outcome.
During the chavista period, Chávez promoted himself by attacking Venezuelan oligarchies and
those he considered allies of this group, such as traditional parties and the United States. He took
advantage of economic and political crises in the late 1990s in Venezuela to instigate class polari-
zation in a discursive way. As part of his strategy, Chávez always claimed to be on the side of the
poorest citizens, even if he could electorally attract other social strata.
Once in power, Chávez adopted measures to support his rhetoric. The 1999 constitution and
social programmes implemented under his administration – the so-called misiones – were the prac-
tical tools mostly used in his discursive strategy of class polarization.
After the coup d’état in 2002, Chávez radicalized his discourse. Class polarization was used by
him to recruit anyone who was willing to defend chavismo at all costs. In order to do so, he
appealed to the poor origins of young members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces and encouraged
the formation of popular groups to defend his government – the so-called Bolivarian circles.
Heath’s (2009b) findings and the contextual analysis of the chavista period suggest that class
voting may have been more relevant in Venezuela since the 1990s, partly due to the effort made by
political elites to activate it. More specifically, chavismo had focused on lower income groups in
its rhetoric by adopting the ‘us against them’ discourse (‘us’, the poor and the new dominant politi-
cal group; and ‘them’, both economic elites and their allies in traditional parties and in the United
States).
Analyses focused on class voting in Venezuela using data from opinion polls show mixed
results. Heath (2009b) examines pre-chavismo and post-chavismo periods, from 1973 to 2003, and
identifies two main trends, namely: lack of any class voting pattern in the period prior to chavismo;
and support from the lower class for Chávez in the later elections analysed by the author. On the
other hand, Lupu (2010) identifies monotonic class voting4 for Chávez only in the 1998 election,
which was the first one won by the former president. Lupu argues that this relationship faded over
time, since the poorest and the richest voters supported Chávez in the 2006 election, whereas the
middle class rejected him. Thus, both authors agree that chavismo won the support of the lower
class. Nevertheless, there is no consensus about the persistence and nature of this relationship5.
This article interrogates whether a class voting pattern existed in Venezuela from 1998 to 2015, in
order to contribute to the debate on what explains voter choices at these elections.

Economy and the vote

If electoral behaviour scholars tend to underestimate class voting, the opposite happens with eco-
nomic voting. It is almost consensus that individual perceptions about the economy are a central
force in electoral decision-making. As well as ideology, government evaluation, party identifica-
tion, and candidate charisma, among others, the economy is understood as a structural factor
underpinning electoral behaviour.
Venezuela has experienced fluctuation in economic indicators throughout Chávez and Maduro’s
mandates due to internal and external factors. Oil prices have been an especially relevant factor,
since the country’s economy depends on oil exports. Chavismo often took advantage of its majority
in the national assembly and used a legal mechanism called ley habilitante to grant the president
special powers to issue decrees. It was only after a set of decrees issued in 2001 that Chávez faced
the first general strike against him, which was followed by the coup of 2002 and by a two-month
Bonifácio and Botelho 7

Figure 1.  Economic indicators during the chavismo period.

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (http://www.cepal.org/es).
(1) gross domestic product annual growth rate at constant prices (%); (2) consumer price index annual variation (%);
and (3) average annual unemployment rate (%).

strike between that year and 2003. This process affected the national economy, which experienced
a cumulative contraction of 16.7% in 2002 and 2003 (see Figure 1), according to data from the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The increase in oil prices from 2002 to 2008, along with an initially favourable outlook com-
pared to the years of economic downturn, enabled Venezuela to recover quickly. The national
cumulative growth rate reached 52.6% from 2004 to 2008, an average of 10.5% a year. This allowed
Chávez to expand social programme spending. However, he was not able to make the economy
less dependent on oil. Thus, problems arose again as oil prices dropped.
Venezuela’s economic situation deteriorated further after Maduro took office in 2013 (see Figure 1).
According to the ECLAC, the cumulative downturn reached 9.6%  in 2014 and 2015. Inflation, which
had already reached 62.2% in 2014, rose to 121.7% in 2015. Among the main economic indicators,
the decline in unemployment between 2013 and 2015 was the only favourable one for Maduro.
Heath (2009b) analyses the association between perceptions of the economy and voting in
Venezuela, before and after the emergence of chavismo, and he identifies the following trends: (a)
there was a clear association between discontent with the economy and voting for opposition par-
ties in elections held prior to the 1990s; (b) dissatisfaction with the economic situation increased
voter abstention rates in the 1993 election; and (c) dissatisfied citizens were more likely to vote for
opposition candidates during the chavista period.
In summary, except for the 1993 election, Heath (2009b) identifies a clear association between
the economy and voting, which means that a negative perception about the economic situation
increases the chances of voting for opposition parties. The current article tests whether those dis-
satisfied with the economy tend to vote for candidates opposed to chavismo, and vice versa, from
1998 to 2015.

The left turn in Latin America

According to Levitsky and Roberts (2011), the election of Chávez as president in 1998 started a left turn
in Latin America. After his election, other leftist candidates in the region were also elected. For almost
all cases they won a second term or supported a candidate who was elected in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay from 2000 to 2014 (see Table 4).
8 International Political Science Review 00(0)

Table 4.  Leftist governments in Latin America since 1998.

Country First election Second election

Argentina 2003 2007
Néstor Kirchner (Partido Justicialista (PJ)) Cristina Kirchner (PJ)
Bolivia 2005 2009
Evo Morales (Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS)) Evo Morales (MAS)
Brazil 2002 2006
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Partido dos Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT)
Trabalhadores (PT))
Chile 2000 2006
Ricardo Lagos (Partido por la Democracia) Michelle Bachelet
(Partido Socialista de Chile)
Ecuador 2006 2009
Rafael Correa (Alianza País) Rafael Correa (Alianza País)
El Salvador 2009 2014
Mauricio Funes (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Salvador Sánchez Cerén (FMLN)
Liberación Nacional (FMLN))
Nicaragua 2006 2011
Daniel Ortega (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Daniel Ortega (FSLN)
Nacional (FSLN))
Paraguay 2008 –
Fernando Lugo (Alianza Patriótica por el Cambio) –
Uruguay 2004 2009
Tabaré Vázquez (Frente Amplio (FA)) José Mujica (FA)
Venezuela 1998 2000
Hugo Chávez (Movimiento V República (MVR)) Hugo Chávez (MVR)

Note: table includes candidates from the same party or coalition of the first elected president.
Source: authors’ elaboration.

Although these developments were described as a trend called the ‘left turn’ (Castañeda, 2006;
Cleary, 2006; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011) or ‘pink tide’ (Remmer, 2012), several scholars have
pointed out that the Latin American left is not homogeneous6. Dichotomies such as moderate ver-
sus radical (Weyland, 2009), social democratic versus populist (Lanzaro, 2006; Lynch, 2007;
Panizza, 2005a), and ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’ (Castañeda, 2006) were formulated to account for these
distinctions.
Multiple explanations for the left turn are considered in the literature. According to Levitsky
and Roberts (2011), the explanation is essentially economic. First, they claim that the socioeco-
nomic inequality observed in the late 1990s and the institutionalization of elections created favour-
able conditions for the left parties to attract voters in Latin America. The determining factor in their
argument about the leftist rise to power is that the economic crisis that took place between 1998
and 2002 undermined the support given to conservative governments in power at that time and to
their neoliberal policies. Finally, the boom in commodity prices, experienced from 2002, boosted
economic growth in Latin America and provided funds allowing leftist presidents to implement
social policies, thereby easing their re-election.
There is also a class-based explanation. According to Cleary (2006), the left turn relied on pre-
existing organizational structures that enabled class-based mobilizations rooted in the high level of
inequality in Latin America. Since these inequalities were not new in the region, a shift in the left-
wing’s approach to electoral politics explains the timing of the left turn.
Bonifácio and Botelho 9

Table 5.  Information about the surveys.

Year Pollster Sample Scope Period Election

1998 Latino-barómetro 1200 National Pre-election 1998 (presidential)
2000 Consultores 21 1500 National Pre-election 2000 (presidential)
2007 Americas barometer 1510 National Post-election 2006 (presidential)
2011 Latino-barómetro 1200 National Pre-election 2012 (presidential)
2013 Latino-barómetro 1200 National Post-election 2013 (presidential)
2015 Latino-barómetro 1200 National Pre-election 2015 (legislative)

Source: authors’ elaboration.

Between economic and class-based explanations, there are authors who mix factors. According
to Remmer (2012), the odds of electing a leftist president rose as the terms of trade improved,
whereas the support given to them was positively associated with popular satisfaction with democ-
racy and the economy, and with anti-Americanism.
As the election of Chávez as president in 1998 started the left turn, the analysis of electoral sup-
port for chavismo provides an important test for the explanatory factors of this turn in Latin
America. It also helps shed light on what created room for the reverse trend in countries such as
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, where right-wing candidates were elected to replace leftist
presidents.

Data and techniques

The article makes data comparisons from a longitudinal perspective, by focusing on the period
from Chávez’s rise to power in 1998 to 2015. The goal is to have a comprehensive view of the
electoral behaviour during the chavista period, by analysing all presidential elections from 1998 to
2013, as well as the last episode that counted on the mass participation of opposition parties, which
is the 2015 legislative election. In order to accomplish this goal, surveys conducted by different
polling companies were necessary, since it was not possible to find a single source of polls which
would be capable of providing all the variables analysed in the article for each of the elections.
Opinion polls conducted in periods close to the national elections in Venezuela were selected for
analysis. The 1998, 2000, 2007, 2011, and 2013 surveys provided information about voting inten-
tions in presidential elections, and the 2015 poll provided information about the legislative election
held in that year (see Table 5). The surveys were selected using three criteria, namely: (a) the prox-
imity between the date of the interviews and each national election; (b) the existence of variables
for the explanatory factors considered here, as well as similarity in their measurements7, which
means prioritizing data comparability as much as possible; and (c) the use of samples that were
representative of the whole country.
Different approaches are used to measure class status. Evans (1999, 2000) suggests using occupa-
tional categories formulated by Goldthorpe (1982) and Goldthorpe et al. (1980)8, who define the inser-
tion of individuals into a service or employment contract as a measurement. However, this alternative
was not feasible due to lack of variables about occupation in most of the surveys available. Thus, the
household assets (durable goods, such as automobiles, refrigerators, and television) based-index was
adopted and segmented into quintiles as a class status indicator. Methodological instruments proposed
by Córdova (2009) were replicated to create ownership of goods categories9. This approach to measure
class status is adequate, since Lupu (2010) and Portes and Hoffman (2003) point out that categories of
income and family goods are strongly associated with occupation categories. Citizens’ perceptions
10 International Political Science Review 00(0)

Figure 2.  Social profiles and voting for chavismo (1998).

.7

.6
Probability of voting

.5

.4

0 1 2 3
Social profiles

Note: 0 = poorest + negative perception about country’s economy; 1 = richest + negative perception about country’s
economy; 2 = poorest + positive perception about country’s economy; and 3 = richest + positive perception about
country’s economy.
Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from 1998 Latinobarómetro.

about the economy in the previous 12 months (retrospective evaluation), regarding both national (soci-
otropic) and individual (egotropic) conditions, were used to assess economic voting.
A binary logistic model was deployed as the goal was to analyse the vote for chavismo. Thus,
it was not necessary to segment the analysis of votes for opposition candidates, which would
have required the use of multinomial models. Moreover, the presidential races held throughout
the investigated period were polarized between Chávez or Maduro and an opposition candidate
and thus assumed a binary (and plebiscitary) nature. Exponential values   of beta, which indicates
the odds ratio, were transformed into percentage effects in order to interpret the data. This trans-
formation was based on the following formula: [Exp (B) - 1] * 100. It makes the result interpre-
tation easier because it allows presenting the interpretation in percentages, rather than in odds
ratio. Finally, tests of predicted values were used to calculate the probability of having the social
profiles created here voting for chavismo. Figures 2 to 6 provide a graphical overview of the
tests. They do not show information about the control variables used in these tests (see Appendix
B for these results).
Four social profiles were built through the interaction of variables indicating good evaluation of
the national economy (aggregation of categories indicating that the economic situation was equal
or better in the previous 12 months) and poor evaluation of the national economy (a category indi-
cating that the economic situation was worse in the previous 12 months) with the categories of
household goods (richest – fourth and fifth quintiles; poorest – first, second, and third quintiles).
These tests were not conducted with data from the 2000 opinion poll due to a lack of variables that
could be used to create profiles comparable to the ones built based on data from other surveys.
Bonifácio and Botelho 11

Figure 3.  Social profiles and voting for chavismo (2007).

.9

.8

.7
Probability of voting

.6

.5

.4

0 1 2 3
Social profiles

Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from 2007 AmericasBarometer.

Figure 4.  Social profiles and voting for chavismo (2011).

.8
Probability of voting

.6

.4

.2

0 1 2 3
Social profiles

Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from 2011 Latinobarómetro.

12 International Political Science Review 00(0)

Figure 5.  Social profiles and voting for chavismo (2013).

.8

.6
Probability of voting

.4

.2

0 1 2 3
Social profiles

Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from 2013 Latinobarómetro.

Figure 6.  Social profiles and voting for chavismo (2015).

.8

.6
Probability of voting

.4

.2

0 1 2 3
Social profiles

Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from 2015 Latinobarómetro.

Bonifácio and Botelho 13

Data analysis
Interpretation of the regression results requires taking into deep consideration the two explanatory
variables, class voting and economic voting, as well as analysing the association between educa-
tion level, a factor initially theorized as a control variable, and the support given to chavista candi-
dates (see Appendix A).
With respect to class voting, there are no consistent trends over time. Although voters belonging
to the second and fourth quintiles of goods ownership show a positive association with voting for
chavismo in all rounds of data, this association has low intensity and lacks statistical significance
in most cases10. Thus, there is not enough evidence of a support pattern from the middle class
towards chavismo over the analysed period.
In their turn, the first and fifth quintiles, which comprise the classes representing the lowest
and highest ownership of goods, respectively, show associations of varying directions over the
investigated period and without statistical significance in most cases. As predicted by class vot-
ing theory, the poor and the rich, respectively, supported and rejected chavista candidates in the
2006 and 2012 elections. On the other hand, running counter to theoretical expectations, these
classes show positive odds of voting for chavismo in 1998, 2000, and 2013 and negative odds for
doing so in 2015.
Based on the set of results for the analysed period, although some class voting manifestations
have been observed in which the poorest voters supported chavismo, whereas the richest ones
rejected it, the pattern is variable. With respect to economic voting, there is an almost perfect con-
vergence with literature assumptions. Voters who positively evaluate the economic situation are
more likely to vote for chavismo, whereas those who negatively evaluate it favour the opposition
throughout the analysed period. Sociotropic economic evaluation is the only variable presenting
statistical significance across all models, a fact that reinforces the economic voting theory. The
evaluation of the national economy is more relevant to the electoral behaviour of Venezuelans
under chavismo than the evaluation of their own economic situation.
As an opposition candidate in 1998, Chávez had the support of voters who negatively evaluated
the economic situation, mainly from those holding negative perceptions about the country’s econ-
omy than about their personal condition. Once Chávez came to power, ruling coalition candidates
had support from those who displayed satisfaction with the national economy and with their per-
sonal economic situations11. The 2012 and 2013 elections were emblematic in this regard. There
were high percentages of odds of voting for chavismo among those satisfied with the economy –
the odds of voting for Chávez reached approximately 83% in 201212.
It is also important to highlight the association between education level and voting for chav-
ismo, which presents a negative direction and a statistically significant effect in the tests with data
from all surveys. The odds of voting for chavista candidates decreases as the voter’s education
level increases13. This outcome suggests aversion from the most educated citizens towards chav-
ismo, despite the changes observed in the national scenario over two decades.
Tests of predicted values   of voting for chavista candidates were carried out by building social
profiles based on household goods and on individuals’ perceptions about the economy. These tests
help check the most relevant variables for electoral behaviour in Venezuela, since they enable
analysis of the interaction of dissonant categories associated with support for chavismo, such as
perceiving that the economic situation was worse (rejection of chavista candidates since 2000) and
being circumscribed to the lowest quintile of household goods (class that supported chavismo until
2015). The four social profiles built here are described in a note with Figure 2 and identified by
numbers (0, 1, 2, and 3) in Figures 2 to 6.
There is a considerable difference in the probability of voting for chavismo between the profiles
that expressed, as one of the features, a positive perception of the country’s economy and those that
14 International Political Science Review 00(0)

expressed a negative perception about it in the elections held at the time Chávez or Maduro was in
power, which means all elections that were analysed here, except for the one held in 1998.
In tests with data from the 2007 poll, there was almost twice as much probability of having
profiles that expressed positive perception about the national economy voting for chavismo, in
comparison to profiles that expressed negative perception about the country’s economy. For the
following surveys, there was approximately three times more of a probability in having profiles
that expressed positive perception about the national economy voting for chavismo in 2011 and
2015, and five times more of a probability of it in 2013 (see Appendix B). These results support the
assumption that perception about the country’s economy is a strong predictor of voting for chav-
ismo. Even when categories that could restrain this association are included in the analysis, such as
the highest quintile of household goods for the 2013 and 2015 elections, the probability of voting
for chavista candidates remains high.
Social profiles that have a negative perception of the national economy as one of the features
always show higher probability of voting for chavismo when there is interaction with the lowest
quintile of household goods. In other words, the poorest are the least averse to chavismo among
those who are less likely to vote for chavista candidates – voters who negatively evaluate the coun-
try’s economy.

Conclusions
Economic voting is the most noticeable and sustained explanation of the electoral support given to
chavismo over the analysed period. Chávez received strong support from voters who had negative
perceptions of the national economy when he ran as an opposition candidate in the 1998 election.
The reverse effect was observed in the later rounds of data when Chávez or Maduro was president.
In other words, voters who had positive perceptions of the country’s economy supported chavismo
at the polls. The same effect is visible at the 2015 legislative election.
This finding is reinforced by the tests of predicted values. Positive evaluation of the national
economy is a strong predictor of voting for chavista candidates, even in profiles presenting other
features that could restrain this association, such as the highest quintile of household goods in the
2013 and 2015 elections. The same applies to the 1998 election, with respect to the negative evalu-
ation of the country’s economy, since Chávez was an opposition candidate at the time.
There is no consistent trend of class voting over the analysed period. Based on a more compre-
hensive historical series than previous studies, the article finds that the poorest and the richest
voters did not constitute, respectively, the perennial foundations of support and rejection of chav-
ismo over the investigated period. Thus, there was not a monotonic class vote in Venezuela from
1998 to 2015.
In addition to providing support for the economic voting thesis, the findings show the relevance
of economic factors for the rise to power and the reelection of leftist presidents during the left turn
in Latin America. However, it does not mean that economic factors explain all cases throughout the
region. The Venezuelan case is especially relevant for the left turn, since the election of Chávez as
president in 1998 started this trend in Latin America.
The findings also help explain Maduro’s difficulties remaining in power after he took office in
2013, given the deterioration of the country’s economic conditions and waves of protests against
him. The article’s conclusions provide inputs for predictions about the political–electoral scenario
in Venezuela if free and fair elections for president are held in the short term.

Acknowledgements
We thank the anonymous reviewers and the International Political Science Review staff for their comments
on previous versions of the article and Noam Lupu for his kindness in sharing the data from a poll in Venezuela.
Bonifácio and Botelho 15

Funding
The research reported in this article received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, com-
mercial or not-for-profit sectors.

ORCID iD
João Carlos Amoroso Botelho https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0661-2975

Notes
  1. The article focuses on presidential elections. The 2015 legislative election was included in the study
because it was the last nationwide one, be it presidential or legislative, in which the main opposition
parties took part.
 2. Until 2015, chavismo had suffered a significant electoral defeat only in 2007, when constitutional
reforms approved in the national assembly were rejected by the population through a referendum.
  3. After the coup, the sitting president of Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción
de Venezuela, Pedro Carmona, was sworn in and replaced Chávez for almost 48 hours.
  4. The idea of monotonic class voting means that the likelihood of voting in a particular direction increases
or decreases linearly, depending on voter’s social class.
  5. See Canache (2004), Cannon (2008), Handelman (2000), Heath (2009a), Hellinger (2003, 2007), López
Maya (2003), López Maya and Lander (2007), and Roberts (2003), for other authors who, based on dif-
ferent evidence and techniques, point out that the poor are more likely to vote for chavismo, whereas the
rich are more likely to vote against it; and Briceño (2013), for an author who refutes or understates this
assumption.
  6. See Castañeda (2006), Flores-Macías (2010), Lanzaro (2006), Lynch (2007), Panizza (2005b), Schamis
(2006), Weyland (2009).
 7. The two criteria are met in almost all surveys. The 2000 survey is the only exception. Differences
between measurements taken in this survey and in the others used here are: (a) age is measured by range,
rather than continuously; (b) class measurement is based on self-perception, rather than on ownership of
goods; and (c) there is no measurement of economic voting.
  8. These categories comprise: petty bourgeoisie (small employers and freelancers); serving or salaried class
(professional and managerial groups); non-manual routine class (low level of white-collar workers); and
working class (foremen and technicians, non-skilled, partly skilled and skilled workforce).
  9. The household assets index is based on the count of goods owned by each interviewee. The number of
variables comprising the index changes per round of interviews, depending on the questions about own-
ership of goods found in each questionnaire. Items used in the index have different weights, which were
defined through principal component analysis. The reason for this procedure lies in the different impacts
each good has on individuals’ lives depending on their social profile. As an example, the ownership of a
television device tends to have more impact on the daily life of individuals living in rural areas than on
those living in urban areas. With respect to the index internal validity, Córdova (2009) finds variations
in each item among the five quintiles depending on the living standard in the country at survey time. For
example, access to running water has relatively less value in countries with a high living standard, such
as Costa Rica and Uruguay, than in others with a low living standard, such as Haiti and Belize.
10. The exceptions in terms of significance refer to the second quintile in 1998, with 94% odds of voting for
Chávez, and to the fourth quintile in 2013, with 89% odds of voting for Maduro.
11. An exception to the trend appeared in 2015, when there was a modest negative percentage effect on the
odds of voting for chavista parties among those who said that their personal economic situation had
improved in the previous 12 months (- 9% chances of voting, with no statistical significance).
12. The percentage refers to voters who positively evaluated the country’s economic situation, with refer-
ence to those who evaluated this situation as regular.
13. The exception lies in the 1998 election, for which the coefficient is positive although at minimum value
(0.1%). This does not compromise the interpretation.
16 International Political Science Review 00(0)

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Authors biographies
Robert Bonifácio is associate professor in political science at Federal University of Goiás (Brazil). Among his
research interests is comparative politics in Latin America, on which he has published multiple journal articles.
João Carlos Amoroso Botelho is associate professor in political science at Federal University of Goiás
(Brazil). Among his research interests is comparative politics in Latin America, on which he has published
multiple journal articles.
Appendices 18
Appendix A.  Binary logistic regressions (1998 – 2015)

Variables 1998 2000 2007 2011 2013 2015

Male sex 43.5** (0.208) 35.2*** (0.156) −7.9 (0.161) −13.8 (0.185) −29.5* (0.127) 2.9 (0.191)
Age −0.1 (0.005) −0.1 (0.006) −0.9 (0.006) 0.6 (0.006) 0.2 (0.006)
Years of study 0.1 (0.021) −8.3*** (0.029) −10.1*** (0.018) −1.1 (0.011) −12.4*** (0.027) −5.6* (0.028)
Ownership of goods: 1st quintile 16.2 (0.272) 46.6 (0.393) 83.9 (0.817) 147.5*** (0.803) −12.4 (0.265)
Ownership of goods: 2nd quintile 94.0*** (0.453) 39.8 (0.406) 97.4 (0.830) 19.0 (0.311) 19.8 (0.339)
Ownership of goods: 4th quintile 8.2 (0.244) 0.5 (0.270) 3.6 (0.453) 89.0** (0.520) 17.8 (0.338)
Ownership of goods: 5th quintile 1.2 (0.232) −26.5 (0.187) −13.8 (0.343) 50.7 (0.433) −62.0*** (0.112)
Retrospective sociotropic 51.1** (0.244) −78.3*** (0.045) −69.5 (0.075)*** −86.4*** (0.030) −77.8*** (0.050)
economic evaluation (12
months): worsened
Retrospective sociotropic 1.8 (0.242) 134.3*** (0.650) 831.5 (4.036)*** 72.7** (0.438) 69.8* (0.476)
economic evaluation (12
months): improved
Retrospective egotropic 1.3 (0.179) −35.6** (0.134) −26.6 (0.192) −39.0* (0.156) −65.0*** (0.087)
economic evaluation (12
months): worsened
Retrospective egotropic −18.7 (0.150) 117.0*** (0.587) 100.3 (0.601)** 161.7*** (0.582) −9.0 (0.210)
economic evaluation (12
months): improved
25-34 years old −6.8 (0.148)  
35-44 years old 2.1 (0.174)  
45-54 years old 8.7 (0.226)  
55 years old or more 9.8 (0.222)  
High middle class perception 152.5 (1.708)  
Middle class perception 276.9** (2.329)  
Low middle class perception 177.4* (1.721)  
Lower-class perception 164.8 (1.640)  
Constant −40.3 (0.249) −30.0 (0.465) 1714.6*** (8.260) 265.1 (1.968)** 438.7*** (0.582) 311.2** (2.449)
N 824 1292 967 651 854 690
R² Nagelkerke 2.68% 1.4% 23.0% 30.6% 32.0% 23.8%
Chi-square 30.28** 24.94*** 248.97*** 236.32*** 375.75*** 224.34***
Log likelihood −550.8736 −852.04929 −415.1361 −274.91913 −397.96589 −358.49887
International Political Science Review 00(0)

Note: The reference categories are: ownership of goods - third quintile; evaluation of sociotropic and egotropic economic situation - stable; age - 18 to 24 years old; class per-
ception - popular. Cell values (except for the last four rows in the table) are expressed in percentages.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from the surveys
Bonifácio and Botelho 19

Appendix B.  Complete results of the tests of predicted values

1998 Latinobarómetro
Delta-method
Margin Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]

x1x2
0 .5467378 .0345837 15.81 0.000 .4789551 .6145205
1 .6173171 .0356375 17.32 0.000 .5474689 .6871654
2 .4364759 .0294579 14.82 0.000 .3787396 .4942123
3 .5622601 .042429 13.25 0.000 .4791009 .6454193

2007 AmericasBarometer

Delta-method
Margin Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]

x1x2
0 .4426586 .045394 9.75 0.000 .353688 .5316292
1 .4425967 .0433038 10.22 0.000 .3577227 .5274707
2 .8969419 .017055 52.59 0.000 .8635147 .930369
3 .8648123 .017492 49.44 0.000 .8305286 .8990961

2011 Latinobarómetro
Delta-method
Margin Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]

x1x2
0 .4462461 .0503644 8.86 0.000 .3475338 .5449584
1 .3565059 .04316 8.26 0.000 .2719138 .4410979
2 .9076777 .0193269 46.96 0.000 .8697976 .9455577
3 .8383628 .0258576 32.42 0.000 .7876828 .8890427

2013 Latinobarómetro

Delta-method
Margin Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]

x1x2
0 .2613651 .0332619 7.86 0.000 .196173 .3265572
1 .1327663 .0293473 4.52 0.000 .0752467 .1902859
2 .7520064 .0265977 28.27 0.000 .6998759 .804137
3 .8314779 .0243867 34.10 0.000 .7836808 .879275

2015 Latinobarómetro

Delta-method
Margin Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]

x1x2
0 .2571573 .0320183 8.03 0.000 .1944027 .319912
1 .1802097 .0297062 6.07 0.000 .1219867 .2384327
2 .6963754 .0346265 20.11 0.000 .6285087 .7642422
3 .7039637 .040845 17.23 0.000 .6239089 .7840185
20 International Political Science Review 00(0)

Appendix C.  Variables collected from each survey

1998 Latinobarómetro
sp53, s1, s2, sp83, s9b, s9c, s9d, s9e, s9f, s9g, s9h, s9k, s9m, s11, sp2, sp5;

2000 Consultores 21
v56, v91, v84, v86;

2007 AmericasBarometer
vb3, q1, q2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r12, r15, q10d, soct2, idio2;
2011 Latinobarómetro
p38st, s16, s17, s20, s10icc12, s28b, s28c, s28d, s28e, s28f, s28g, s28h, s28i, s28k, p4st,
p7sticc3;

2013 Latinobarómetro
s10, s11, s17, s6, s22_b, s22_c, s22_d, s22_e, s22_f, s22_g, s22_h, s22_i, s22_k, p4stgbs,
p7stgbs;

2015 Latinobarómetro
p23tgbs_a, s12, s18, s4, s24_b, s24_c, s24_d, s24_e, s24_f, s24_g, s24_h, s24_i, s24_j, s24_k,
s4, p4stgbs, p7stgbs, s13, s19.