Putang ina mo

Rodrigo Duterte saying putang inaduring a 5 September 2016 speech at Francisco Bangoy International
Airport.
Owing partly to its use in speeches by Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, the phrase putang ina
mo (sometimes shortened to tang ina or minced as PI)[7]has received considerable international
attention and controversy as to its meaning. Puta is a borrowed word from Spanish, in which
language it means "whore". Ina is Tagalog for mother, while mo is the indirect second person
singular pronoun. Therefore, if translated word-for-word, the phrase means "your mother that is a
whore".[8]
However, most Tagalog speakers dispute this simplistic translation, instead alternately rendering the
phrase as "son of a bitch"[9] or as a variation of the word "fuck".[10]
According to linguist Ben Zimmer, given the context and how the meaning of puta has shifted in
Tagalog, the best translation of Duterte's original "Putang-ina, mumurahin kita diyan sa forum na
iyan. Huwag mo akong ganunin." would be "Fuck, I will cuss you out at that forum. Don't do that to
me."[8]
Besides being directed at people, putang ina can be just as well directed at inanimate
objects: University of the Philippines Los Baños alumnus Cheeno Marlo M. Sayuno has documented
the use of "tang ina error!" as an expression of exasperation due to PC errors, and "Uy net! Putang
ina mo!" as something akin to "Hey, [slow] internet [connection], fuck you!" [7] As in the
English fucking, the phrase can also be used as an adjective, as in the case of "putanginang aso"
("fucking dog") or "Diyos ko, putanginang buhay ko!" ("God, fuck my shitty life!")[11]
This non-literal meaning of the phrase putang ina mo has twice been affirmed by the Supreme Court
of the Philippines: first in 1969 in its decision to Rosauro Reyes v. The People of the
Philippines(G.R. No. L-21528 and No. L-21529),[12] and then in 2006 in its decision to Noel
Villanueva v. People of the Philippines and Yolanda Castro (G.R. No. 160351).[13] In Reyes,
a certiorari appeal to a criminal defamation and grave threats case, the court acquitted the
defendant, ruling that his use of a protest sign reading "Agustin, putang ina mo" did not constitute
defamation as[12]
[Putang ina mo] is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to
slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by
the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother.
In Villanueva, another slander case involving two local politicians of Concepcion, Tarlac, the court
reiterated its interpretation of the phrase, but the other facts of the case precluded acquittal. [13]
ORIGINAL CASE:
 EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. L-21528 & L-21529. March 28, 1969.]

ROSAURO REYES,  petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Jose F  .  Mañacop  for petitioner.

Solicitor General Arturo A.  Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico
P.  de Castro  and  Solicitor Antonio M  .  Martinez  for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATIONS; AMENDMENT THEREOF.

— The rule is that after the accused has pleaded, the information may be
amended as to all matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of Court.). Amendments that
touch upon matters of substance cannot be permitted after the plea is
entered.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMENDMENT IN INSTANT CASE IS MERELY FORMAL.
— Where all the elements of the crime of grave threats had been alleged
in the information in order that petitioner could have been convicted
thereunder and the particular manner in which threat is made is not a
qualifying ingredient of the offense such that the deletion of the word
"orally" in the information did not affect the nature and essence of the
crime as charged originally, the amendment neither changing the basic
theory of the prosecution nor exposing the petitioner to the danger of
conviction for a different penalty, but apparently effected to make the
information conformable to the evidence to be presented, such deletion
was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's
right. 
cdasia

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO SECOND PLEA IS NECESSARY WHERE

AMENDMENT IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL. — Where the amendment in the
 information was not substantial, a second plea regarding such amended
information is not necessary.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; GRAVE THREATS; CRIME COMMITTED IN INSTANT
CASE. — The demonstration led by petitioner against Agustin Hallare in
front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with
threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their
persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the
demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated
threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion:
that the threats were made "with deliberate purpose of creating in the
mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried
into effect." The appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's
conviction for the offense of grave coercion.
5. ID.; ORAL DEFAMATION; SUCH CRIME WAS NOT COMMITTED IN
INSTANT CASE. — Where the charge of oral defamation stemmed from
the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo", made in connection
with the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to
make the threats more emphatic, appellant should not be held guilty of
oral defamation. Such words are common enough expression in the
dialect that are often employed, not really to slander but rather to express
anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the
hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtue of the mother. 
cdll

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, J  :p

This case is before us on appeal by certiorari from the decision of

the Court of Appeals affirming that of the municipal court of Cavite City,
convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral
defamation, and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594,
to four (4) months and ten (10) days arresto mayor and to pay a fine of
P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in the
second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of from
four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of  prision correccional, and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as
moral damages, with costs in both cases.
The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian
employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services
were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a
group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the
main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried
placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamamatay ka"; "To, alla
boss con Nolan"; "Frank do not be a common funk"; "Agustin,
mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you"; "Agustin, alla bos con
Nolan"; "Agustin, dillega el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting"; and others. The
base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricio Monzon, who as
Philippine Military Liason Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of
preserving harmonious relations between the personnel of the naval
station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister
requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet
the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro
Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura. Upon learning that the demonstration
was not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare and
a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of
Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them
to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they
would like the people in the station to know how they felt about Hallare
and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use
violence, as "they just wanted to blow off steam."  cda

At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station.
When he learned about the demonstration he became apprehensive
about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel
thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out
of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col.
Monzon purposely slowed down to accommodate the request of Reyes.
He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the
placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they
shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and
followed the car. One jeep overtook and passed the car while the other
two trailed behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front
of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of
Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice. Rosauro Reyes got off his
jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his
pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin,
putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin
kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the
premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and
the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.
On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on
July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral defamation,
respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of
Cavite City), as follows:
"The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accused
Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined by Article
282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 2 of the
same Article, committed as follows:
"That on or about June 6, 1961 in the City of Cavite, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, orally threaten to kill one Agustin Hallare.
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 24, 1961.

DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
City Fiscal

BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ

Special Counsel"
"The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an
oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of
Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of
the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
 "That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic
of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused, without any justifiable motive but with
the intention to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt to the
undersigned complainant, in the presence of and within hearing of
several persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously utter to the undersigned complainant the following
insulting and serious defamatory remarks, to wit: "AGUSTIN, PUTANG
INA MO", which if translated into English are as follows: "Agustin,
Your mother is a whore."
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 25, 1961.

(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE

Complainant
"Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of July,
1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.

(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ

Special Counsel"

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges

and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of the hearing the
prosecution moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594
for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally." The defense
counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had
already been arraigned on the original information and that the
amendment "would affect materially the interest of the accused."
Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial
proceeded.  cdlex

From the judgment of conviction the accused appealed to the Court

of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the accused brought this appeal
by certiorari.
Petitioners avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the
proceedings in the lower court allowing the substantial amendment of the
information for grave threats after petitioner had been arraigned on the
original information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of grave
threats without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the amended
information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both offenses when he could
legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy
of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in convicting petitioner
of grave threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court
tend to establish the offense of light threats only; and (5) in convicting
petitioner of gráve oral defamation when the evidence tend to establish
that of simple slander only.
 
On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has
pleaded the information may be amended as to all matters of form by
leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110,
New Rules of Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of substance
cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.  LLjur

After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that

all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 1 of
the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged
therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the
infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a
crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence
petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that
under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the
threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the
deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the
crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the
prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to
require the petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in
his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence of the
Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the
danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for
a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended
information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view
the deletion of the "orally" was effected in order to make the information
conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It was
merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's
rights. 
Cdphil

Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment

was properly allowed, the trial court committed a reversible error in
proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter
his plea to the amended information. Considering, however, that the
amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.
The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed
together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court convicting him of grave threats and of grave oral
defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, and in
convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence adduced and
considered by the court indicates the commission of light threats only.
The demonstration led by petitioner against Agustin Hallare in front
of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with
threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their
persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the
demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated
threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion;
that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the
mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried
into effect." 2 Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that
he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home,
wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be
denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a
temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of
petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the
appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the
offense of grave threats. cdtai

The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the

words, "Agustin, putang ina mo." This is a common enough expression in
the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense
by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the
instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant
against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the
case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
"The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more
threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal
aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the
letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks
culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks
express the heat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter,
which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a
threat. This is more important and serious offense committed by the
accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study
of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and
principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory
to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel,
for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats
and which should be considered as part of the more important
offense of threats."

The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal Case No.
2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and affirmed
with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs
against petitioner.
Concepcion, C  .J  ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez Fernando,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ  ., concur.
Castro and Capistrano, JJ  ., did not take part.

 
Footnotes

1.ARTICLE 282. Grave Threats. — Any person who shall threaten another with the
infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of
any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:
   1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he
threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat
demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not
unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender
shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall
be imposed. If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
  2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat
shall not have been made subject to a condition.
2.U.S. vs. Sevilla, 1 Phil. 143; U.S. vs. Paguirigan 14 Phil. 450.
 
 

  (Reyes v. People, G.R. Nos. L-21528 & L-21529, [March 28, 1969], 137 PHIL 112-
|||

120)

2. Joel Jimenez vs. Remedios Cañizares

August 31, 1960

The Case: Joel married Remedios on August 3, 1950 before a judge of the municipal
court of Zamboanga City. But he wanted their marriage annulled because he claims
that her vagina was "too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for
copulation." He said that was the reason why he left their conjugal home just two
nights and one day after they had been married. On June 7, 1955 he filed an
annulment case at the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. Remedios didn't ever
appear in court and, in fact, also ignored an order to have herself examined by a lady
doctor.
Court Document Excerpt: "Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear
in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising
out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of
this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority.

"This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not
self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to
be a witness against herself. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband
that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear
asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife."

Outcome: The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

3. ERECTION

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997.]

CHI MING TSOI,  petitioner, vs.  COURT  OF  APPEALS  and  GINA  L

AO-TSOI,  respondents.

Arturo S.  Santos  for petitioner.

Prisciliano I.  Casis  for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; ASSAILED

DECISION ON ANNULMENT NOT BASED THEREON WHERE JUDGMENT WAS
RENDERED AFTER TRIAL; CASE AT BAR. — Section 1, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision
seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-
examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony.
After such evidence was presented. it became incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them. To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why,
as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101 [par. 2]) and the
Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19). The
case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage
to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the
parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only
telling the truth.
2. ID.; ID.; EITHER SPOUSE MAY PETITION COURT FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. — Neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains,
however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since
the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even
the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; SENSELESS AND PROTRACTED
REFUSAL OF ONE OF THE PARTIES TO FULFILL MARITAL OBLIGATION,
EQUIVALENT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. — Assuming it to be so,
petitioner would have discussed with private respondent or asked her what
is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the
record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem
with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical
Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is
capable of erection. Since it is petitioner' s claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim. "If a
spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity." Evidently, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is
the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar,
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

DECISION

TORRES,  JR., J  :
p

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage

in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over
time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him
who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her
uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89)
which decreed the annulment ofthe marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the
Trial Court's decision on November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the
motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 in its decision are as follows:
"From the evidence adduced, the following facts were preponderantly
established:
"Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the
defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as
evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
 After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception
at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house
defendant's mother.
"There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room
for the first night of their married life.
"It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned
his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between
them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.
"In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where
they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife,
they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother,
an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the
defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days.
But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between
them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during
siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living
room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed
since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he
claims, that she did not even see her husband's private parts nor did
he see hers.
"Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese
General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
"The results of their physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine
was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he
never did.
"The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
"The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile-with her husband.
"On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the
fault lies with his wife.
"But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2)
that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can,
still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them
has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be
cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by
the intervention of medical technology or science.
"The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse
with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims,
that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not
continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
"There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why
the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate
their marriage.
"The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.
"The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination.
His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the
 purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof,
Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is
stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and
he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
"The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate
to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that
from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the
penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
 
"In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is
no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated." 2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive

portion of which reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as
VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant
on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio
de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
"SO ORDERED."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was
no sexual intercourse between the parties without making any
findings of fact.
II
 in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have
sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity
inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the
parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that
there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141,
private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her
complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the
alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for
the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts
intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on
the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a
product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What
said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The
assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When
private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-
examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony.
After such evidence was presented, it became incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated
by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a
marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101 [par. 2]) and the
Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).  cda

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between
the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have
been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-
Reyes, viz.:
"The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by
this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether
or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 112019,
January 4, 1995)." 4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that

the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points
out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about
the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons
for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to psychological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders,
such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in
a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains,
however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since
the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even
the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to
show that any of the parties is suffering from psychological incapacity.
Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent;
that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner would have discussed
with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks
and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He
never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is
petitioner' s claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him
to prove such a claim.
"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
 incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity." 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family

Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
"An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the
husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with
him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but
he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with
his wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he deserves to be
doubted for not having asserted his rights even though she balked
(Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p.
330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife who was suffering from
incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by
the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated
by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the
Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her
private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to
rest her marital status.
"We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the
evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform
the sexual act which is not psychological incapacity, and which can
be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten
months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant
or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he
professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality
 disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the
basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family
Code." 7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate of court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say
"I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations. cda

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and

private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and
wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy
but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the
other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

 
Footnotes

1.Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J.,  ponente, Eduardo

G. Montenegro and Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.
2.Rollo, pp. 20-24.
3.Ibid.
4.Rollo, p. 34.
5.Exhs. "2", "2-B" and "2-C".
6.Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the
Philippines Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51.
7.Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.

  (Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, [January 16, 1997], 334
|||

PHIL 294-305)

4. Death v. Graves
Alan and Demetri Death sued Graves & Co. (among others) for crashing their vehicle
into the Death family motorcycle. Fortunately, Death lived. These are the things TV
crime dramas always get wrong.

Not sure if "Comical Case Names" deserves its own category, but if so this one, filed in San
Francisco on April 17, will be in it:

Alan Death; Demetri "Mimi" Death v. Graves & Co., et al., CGC-06-451316 (filed Apr. 17,
2006) (alleging that the defendants’ vehicle crashed into the plaintiff’s Harley Davidson
motorcycle, injuring him.)

It appears that Death lived.

5. Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang
Juicy Whip, Inc. sued Orange Bang, Inc., claiming infringement on its beverage-
dispensing patent. The court upheld their patent, and Orange Bang felt the frosty brain
freeze of the law.

Juicy Whip, Inc., Plaintiff-appellant, v. Orange Bang, Inc. and

Unique Beverage Dispensers, Inc.,defendants-appellees, 185
F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999)

Annotate this Case

US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir.
1999)DECIDED: August 6. 1999

Appealed from: United States District Court for the Central District of California
Judge Audrey B. CollinsErnie L. Brooks, Brooks & Kushman, P.C., of Southfield,
Michigan, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Frank A.
Angileri, William G. Abbatt, and John E. Nemazi.

Michael A. Painter, Isaacman, Kaufman & Painter, of Beverly Hills, California, argued
for defendants-appellees.

Before RICH,1  SCHALL, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges.

BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

The district court in this case held a patent invalid for lack of utility on the ground
that the patented invention was designed to deceive customers by imitating
another product and thereby increasing sales of a particular good. We reverse and
remand.
* Juicy Whip, Inc., is the assignee of United States Patent No. 5,575,405, which is
entitled "Post-Mix Beverage Dispenser With an Associated Simulated Display of
Beverage." A "post-mix" beverage dispenser stores beverage syrup concentrate and
water in separate locations until the beverage is ready to be dispensed. The syrup
and water are mixed together immediately before the beverage is dispensed, which
is usually after the consumer requests the beverage. In contrast, in a "pre-mix"
beverage dispenser, the syrup concentrate and water are pre-mixed and the
beverage is stored in a display reservoir bowl until it is ready to be dispensed. The
display bowl is said to stimulate impulse buying by providing the consumer with a
visual beverage display. A pre-mix display bowl, however, has a limited capacity and
is subject to contamination by bacteria. It therefore must be refilled and cleaned
frequently.
The invention claimed in the '405 patent is a post-mix beverage dispenser that is
designed to look like a pre-mix beverage dispenser. The claims require the post-mix
dispenser to have a transparent bowl that is filled with a fluid that simulates the
appearance of the dispensed beverage and is resistant to bacterial growth. The
claims also require that the dispenser create the visual impression that the bowl is
the principal source of the dispensed beverage, although in fact the beverage is
mixed immediately before it is dispensed, as in conventional post-mix dispensers.
Claim 1 is representative of the claims at issue. It reads as follows:
In a post-mix beverage dispenser of the type having an outlet for discharging
beverage components in predetermined proportions to provide a serving of
dispensed beverage, the improvement which comprises:
a transparent bowl having no fluid connection with the outlet and visibly containing
a quantity of fluid;
said fluid being resistant to organic growth and simulating the appearance of the
dispensed beverage;
said bowl being positioned relative to the outlet to create the visual impression that
said bowl is the reservoir and principal source of the dispensed beverage from the
outlet; and
said bowl and said quantity of fluid visible within said bowl cooperating to create
the visual impression that multiple servings of the dispensed beverage are stored
within said bowl.
Juicy Whip sued defendants Orange Bang, Inc., and Unique Beverage Dispensers,
Inc., (collectively, "Orange Bang") in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, alleging that they were infringing the claims of the '405 patent.
Orange Bang moved for summary judgment of invalidity, and the district court
granted Orange Bang's motion on the ground that the invention lacked utility and
thus was unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The court concluded that the invention lacked utility because its purpose was to
increase sales by deception, i.e., through imitation of another product. The court
explained that the purpose of the invention "is to create an illusion, whereby
customers believe that the fluid contained in the bowl is the actual beverage that
they are receiving, when of course it is not." Although the court acknowledged Juicy
Whip's argument that the invention provides an accurate representation of the
dispensed beverage for the consumer's benefit while eliminating the need for
retailers to clean their display bowls, the court concluded that those claimed
reasons for the patent's utility "are not independent of its deceptive purpose, and
are thus insufficient to raise a disputed factual issue to present to a jury." The court
further held that the invention lacked utility because it "improves the prior art only
to the extent that it increases the salability of beverages dispensed from post-mix
dispensers"; an invention lacks utility, the court stated, if it confers no benefit to the
public other than the opportunity for making a product more salable. Finally, the
court ruled that the invention lacked utility because it "is merely an imitation of the
pre-mix dispenser," and thus does not constitute a new and useful machine.

II
Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101, provides that " [w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof," may obtain a
patent on the invention or discovery. The threshold of utility is not high: An
invention is "useful" under section 101 if it is capable of providing some identifiable
benefit. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966); Brooktree Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("To violate § 101
the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a useful result"); Fuller v.
Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (test for utility is whether invention "is
incapable of serving any beneficial end").
To be sure, since Justice Story's opinion in Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1817), it has been stated that inventions that are "injurious to the well-being,
good policy, or sound morals of society" are unpatentable. As examples of such
inventions, Justice Story listed "a new invention to poison people, or to promote
debauchery, or to facilitate private assassination." Id. at 1019. Courts have
continued to recite Justice Story's formulation, see Tol-o-matic, Inc. v. Proma
Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1552-53, 20 USPQ 1332,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 178-79, 126 USPQ 242, 249 (CCPA
1960), but the principle that inventions are invalid if they are principally designed to
serve immoral or illegal purposes has not been applied broadly in recent years. For
example, years ago courts invalidated patents on gambling devices on the ground
that they were immoral, see e.g., Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512 (7th Cir. 1922);
Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1897); National Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd,
40 F. 89 (N.D. Ill. 1889), but that is no longer the law, see In re Murphy, 200 USPQ
801 (PTO Bd. App. 1977).
In holding the patent in this case invalid for lack of utility, the district court relied on
two Second Circuit cases dating from the early years of this century, Rickard v. Du
Bon, 103 F. 868 (2d Cir. 1900), and Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d
1003 (2d Cir. 1925). In the Rickard case, the court held invalid a patent on a process
for treating tobacco plants to make their leaves appear spotted. At the time of the
invention, according to the court, cigar smokers considered cigars with spotted
wrappers to be of superior quality, and the invention was designed to make
unspotted tobacco leaves appear to be of the spotted -- and thus more desirable --
type. The court noted that the invention did not promote the burning quality of the
leaf or improve its quality in any way; "the only effect, if not the only object, of such
treatment, is to spot the tobacco, and counterfeit the leaf spotted by natural
causes." Id. at 869.
The Aristo Hosiery case concerned a patent claiming a seamless stocking with a
structure on the back of the stocking that imitated a seamed stocking. The imitation
was commercially useful because at the time of the invention many consumers
regarded seams in stockings as an indication of higher quality. The court noted that
the imitation seam did not "change or improve the structure or the utility of the
article," and that the record in the case justified the conclusion that true seamed
stockings were superior to the seamless stockings that were the subject of the
patent. See Aristo Hosiery, 7 F.2d at 1004. "At best," the court stated, "the seamless
stocking has imitation marks for the purposes of deception, and the idea prevails
that with such imitation the article is more salable." Id. That was not enough, the
court concluded, to render the invention patentable.
We decline to follow Rickard and Aristo Hosiery, as we do not regard them as
representing the correct view of the doctrine of utility under the Patent Act of 1952.
The fact that one product can be altered to make it look like another is in itself a
specific benefit sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility.
It is not at all unusual for a product to be designed to appear to viewers to be
something it is not. For example, cubic zirconium is designed to simulate a
diamond, imitation gold leaf is designed to imitate real gold leaf, synthetic fabrics
are designed to simulate expensive natural fabrics, and imitation leather is
designed to look like real leather. In each case, the invention of the product or
process that makes such imitation possible has "utility" within the meaning of the
patent statute, and indeed there are numerous patents directed toward making
one product imitate another. See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 5,762,968 (method for
producing imitation grill marks on food without using heat); U.S. Pat. No. 5,899,038
(laminated flooring imitating wood); U.S. Pat. No. 5,571,545 (imitation hamburger).
Much of the value of such products resides in the fact that they appear to be
something they are not. Thus, in this case the claimed post-mix dispenser meets
the statutory requirement of utility by embodying the features of a post-mix
dispenser while imitating the visual appearance of a pre-mix dispenser.
The fact that customers may believe they are receiving fluid directly from the
display tank does not deprive the invention of utility. Orange Bang has not argued
that it is unlawful to display a representation of the beverage in the manner that
fluid is displayed in the reservoir of the invention, even though the fluid is not what
the customer will actually receive. Moreover, even if the use of a reservoir
containing fluid that is not dispensed is considered deceptive, that is not by itself
sufficient to render the invention unpatentable. The requirement of "utility" in
patent law is not a directive to the Patent and Trademark Office or the courts to
serve as arbiters of deceptive trade practices. Other agencies, such as the Federal
Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, are assigned the task of
protecting consumers from fraud and deception in the sale of food products. Cf. In
re Watson, 517 F.2d 465, 474-76, 186 USPQ 11, 19 (CCPA 1975) (stating that it is not
the province of the Patent Office to determine, under section 101, whether drugs
are safe). As the Supreme Court put the point more generally, "Congress never
intended that the patent laws should displace the police powers of the States,
meaning by that term those powers by which the health, good order, peace and
general welfare of the community are promoted." Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344,
347-48 (1880).
Of course, Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatentable
for a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (exempting
from patent protection inventions useful solely in connection with special nuclear
material or atomic weapons). Until such time as Congress does so, however, we
find no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for
lack of utility simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of the
public. The district court therefore erred in holding that the invention of the '405
patent lacks utility because it deceives the public through imitation in a manner
that is designed to increase product sales.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
 1
Circuit Judge Rich heard oral argument in this case but died on June 9, 1999. This
case was decided by the remaining judges in accordance with Federal Circuit Rule
47.11.
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