Logic and Existence [Corrected Portion of an Article appearing in Proceedings of the

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 73 (1999)]

Author(s): Ian Rumfitt and Timothy Williamson
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 100 (2000), pp. 321-343
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
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 LOGIC AND EXISTENCE

Ian Rumfittand Timothy Williamson

II TimothyWilliamson

EXISTENCE AND CONTINGENCY1

ABSTRACT The paper defends the intelligibilityof unrestrictedquantification.

For any natural number n, 'There are at least n individuals'is logically true,
when the quantifieris unrestricted.In response to the objection that such sen-
tences should not count as logically true because existence is contingent, it is
argued by considerationof cross-worldcounting principlesthat in the relevant
sense of 'exist' existence is not contingent. A tentative extension of the upward
Lowenheim-Skolem theorem to proper classes is used to argue that a sound
and complete axiomatizationof the logic of unrestricteduniversalquantification
results from adding all sentences of the form 'There are at least n individuals'
as axioms to a standardaxiomatizationof the first-orderpredicatecalculus.

Of the many questions on which logic is neutral, one is usually

supposed to be this: 'How many individuals are there?' On the
alternative view defended below, truths about the number of
individuals are logically true. They are not contingent logical
truths, for it is not contingent what individualsthere are.

I
A n individual is a value of an individual variable. An indi-
vidual variable is a variable that takes name position. A
first-order quantifier is a quantifier that binds individual vari-
ables. Everything is an individual (read 'everything'as a first-
order quantifier).Only first-orderquantifiersare discussed here.
Bolzano and Tarski inspired the standard approach to logical
validity and logical truth. We begin with a sketch of one version;
its details are questioned later. Logical validity is a property of
arguments.An argument is a pair of a class of interpretedsen-
tences (the premises) and an interpreted sentence (the

1. An earlier version of this paper was the basis for the second Weatherhead Lecture
on Philosophy of Language, delivered at Tulane University in 1998. A still earlier
version was presented at CUNY Graduate Center. Thanks to Kit Fine, Graeme
Forbes, Jason Stanley and others for helpful comments.
322 II TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON

conclusion).2 Whether an argument is logically valid depends

only on its logical form. The logical form of an argumentis fixed
by the syntax of its constituent sentences, the meanings of their
logical constituents and the syntactic differences between their
nonlogical constituents, treated as variables. For example, the
argumentfrom p to p has the same logical form as the argument
from q to q but not as the argumentfromp to q, where 'p' and 'q'
are distinct propositionalvariables.A constituent of a sentenceis
logical just if it is formal in meaning, in the sense roughly that
its application is invariant under permutations of individuals.3
Thus '= ' is a logical constant because no permutationmaps two
individuals to one or one to two; 'e' is not a logical constant
because some permutationsinterchangea set and one of its mem-
bers. Truth-functors,the usual quantifiersand bound variables
also count as logical constants. An argument is logically valid
(its conclusion is a logical consequence of its premises) if and
only if the conclusion is true under every assignment of values
to variables (including all nonlogical expressions) under which
all its premises are true. A sentence is logically true if and only
if the argumentwith no premisesof which it is the conclusion is
logically valid, that is, if and only if the sentence is true under
every assignment of values to variables. For simplicity, we con-
centrate on logical truth rather than validity. We can regard
assignmentsof values to all variablesas modelsor interpretations;

2. For simplicity, multiple-conclusion arguments are ignored, as are complexities

arising from variations in context of utterance. All sentences of the language are
assumed to be declarative. For all that is said here, the primary bearers of truth are
propositions. It would not follow, however, that the primary bearers of logical truth
are propositions, even though logical truth entails truth. For example, if 'furze' and
'gorse' are synonyms, 'All furze is furze' and 'All furze is gorse' express the same
proposition, even though the former is a logical truth and the latter is not. Thus we
cannot define a logically true sentence as one that expresses a logically true
proposition.
3. Tarski 1986 (text of a lecture delivered in 1966) suggests invariance under permu-
tations of the universe as a criterion for a logical constant. Sher 1991 develops this
approach in an extensional way (contrast McCarthy 1981). Alternatively, one might
require the invariance to be necessary or a priori. On the view defended below, we
can also require logical constants to be invariant in extension across circumstances
of evaluation (worlds and times), so that a predicate applicable to everything if
Nelson died at Trafalgar and to nothing otherwise does not qualify as a logical con-
stant, even though we know a priori that it is necessarily permutation-invariant in
extension. Almog 1989 also characterizes logical truth by permutation invariance,
although the underlying conception is quite different. Our aim here is not finetuning
the notion of logical truth.
 LOGICAND EXISTENCE 323

logical truth is truth in every model, or under every interpret-

ation. In particular,a true sentence containing only logical con-
stants is logically true, since it has nothing for models to vary.
We define the complex quantifiers3' ('for at least n') and 3!'
('for exactly n') from the existential quantifier, identity, truth-
functors and variables in the standard way. Thus 3'x x= x (in
effect, 'There are at least n individuals') and 3!nx x =x ('There
are exactly n individuals')contain only logical constants. 32Xx=
x, for example, is obviously true; there are at least two individ-
uals. Therefore 32x x = x is logically true. This result is usually
regarded as anomalous; logic is not supposed to tell us about
how many individualsthere are.4Surely,we are told, 32 x= x is
not a logical consequence of 31 xx=x; how can it be logically
true? Standard model theory avoids that result by interpreting
the quantifiers as restricted to a domain of individuals, a set
dependent on the model. 32xX x is false in a model with a
singleton domain.5
For explicitness, we lay out a recursive definition of truth
under an interpretationI for a standardfirst-orderlanguagewith
identity. The domain of I is dom(I). I assigns values to all vari-
ables. Thus interpretations are individuated more finely than
standardmodels, since they assign values to individualvariables.
I assigns each singularterm t a denotation deni(t) in dom(J). For
any de dom(I) and variable v, I[v/d] is the interpretationlike I
except that it assigns d to v. I assigns each n-place predicateF an
extension ext1(F), a set of ordered n-tuples of members of
dom(I); since '= ' is a logical constant, ext1(= ) is always

4. See also Etchemendy 1990, Hanson 1997 and Soames 1999: 117-136 for more
discussion.
5. Tarski 1936 does not mention domains. Sher argues that he must nevertheless
have intended variable domains, since the chief model-theoretic theorems he and
others had already proved depend on them (1991: 41). She also criticizes the claim
in Tarski 1936 that formal consequence coincides with material consequence if all
terms of the language are counted as logical, which implies that logical truth coincides
with truth, on the grounds that it fails for sentences about the number of individuals
(1991: 45-46). But if Tarski did not intend relativization to a domain, his claim is
obviously correct. We should be reluctant to interpret Tarski in ways that involve
attributing elementary logical errors to him. Tarski seems to have envisaged a fixed
domain containing absolutely all entities of the lowest order of a hierarchy of types;
the variable domains of model theory merely reflect the restriction of the quantifiers
by a nonlogical monadic predicate. This is close to the view defended below. For
helpful discussion of Tarski's conception of the domain see G6mez-Torrente 1996:
137-145 and Milne 1999: 152-159.
324 II TIMOTHYWILLIAMSON

{(d, d): de dom(I)}. For any singular terms t1, ..., t", n-place
predicateF and formulas a and 3:
FTRUE Ft,...t, is true under
I X (den, (t,), ..., den, (t,))e ext, (F).
-TRUE - a is true under I i ocis not true under I.
&TRUE a&: is true under I * a is true under I and ,Bis true uinder
I.
VTRUE Vvaois true under I <Xi for every de dom(I) a is true under
I[v/d].
3TRUE 3va is true under I <=tfor some de dom(I) a is true under
I[v/d].

No interpretation has an empty domain, for no function

assigns membersof the empty set to variables.6Thus 3'x x = x is
true under all interpretations,so logically true. Logic is not per-
fectly neutral on the question 'How many individualsare there?';
it excludes the answer '0'. That 31x x = x has a much better claim
than 32Xx x to logical truth is not obvious. Although redefining
truth under an interpretationto permit the empty domain is less
straightforwardthan one might imagine, we pretend that it has
been done, as a concession to the neutral stance.7
Any set is the domain of some interpretation.Thus any cardi-
nal number is the number of individuals in the domain of some
interpretation.In that sense, logic is perfectlyneutralas to which
cardinal numberis the number of individualsin the domain. But
standard model theory forbids the domain to be too large to
constitute a set. Following Vann McGee, we define a quantifier
3AI, read 'there are absolutely intinitelymany', that is, too many
to form a set:8
3AITRUE 3 va is true under . ) :et cointiuns all de dom(I) such
that a is true und(r 14v/d].

Since the image of a set under a permutation is a set, 3A is a

logical constant. Since dom(I) Esitself a set containing every de
dom(I) such that a is true under I['/d], ]AIVais never true under

6. If an interpretation could assign items outside its domain, FxD3xFx would not
be logically true.
7. See Bencivenga 1986: 379-382 on the history of logic with the empty domain and
Williamson 1999 for one approach to the problem.
8. McGee 1992: 279.
 LOGIC AND EXISTENCE 325

I. Thus -3Aix x= x is true -undercvery interpretation: 'Tlere are

not absolutely infinitely many individuals' is logically true. As
McGee says, this is a problem for the model-theoreticaccount of
logical truth, because in its intended sense 'There are absolutely
infinitely many individuals' is true. For since there is no set of
all sets, there are absolutely infinitely many sets; since we can
name sets and quantify over them with variables in name pos-
ition, sets are values of individualvariablesand thereforeindivid-
uals; so there are absolutely infinitely many individuals. Then
__3AI x = x is logically true but not true. Yet surely logical
truths are truths. This is a version of the old problem that stan-
dard model theory excludes the intended interpretation of
quantification over all sets.9 Indeed, it excludes the intended
sense of the very quantification over all models that it uses to
define logical truth, for there is no set of all models.10
Can we solve the problem by retainingthe definitionof logical
truth as truth under all interpretations but generalizing the
notion of an interpretation,allowing its domain to be any class,
whether or not it constitutes a set? That would make logic even
more neutral over the size of the domain. Neither 3AIX X= x nor
its negation would be logically true. By contrast, first-orderlogic
with only the usual quantifiers retains the same set of logical
truths, as Kreisel pointed out, for if a is true under all interpret-
ations with set domains then by the completeness theorem one
can prove a with standard axioms and rules, which evidently
preservetruth under all interpretationswith class domains, so a
is true under all such interpretations;since sets are classes, the
converse is trivial.'1 But merely permitting models with proper
class domains does not enable us to give every sentence its
intended interpretation,for quantificationover all classes would
requirea model whose domain contains every class, whereaspro-
per classes avoid Russell's paradox by not being candidates for
membership.We might do better to replace quantificationover
9. Strictly speaking, many interpretations are equally intended, since we do not
uniquely intend a particular assignment of values to free variables. This does not
affect the problem.
10. The objection does not confuse object-language and meta-language; it raises a
problem for applying a model-theoretic schema for defining 'logical truth in L' in a
meta-language L+ for L to define 'logical truth in L+' in a meta-language L+ for L+.
11. Kreisel 1967. Shapiro 1987 discusses Kreisel's conjecture that the equivalence
holds for higher-order logics too.
326 1I--TIMOTHYWILLIAMSON

classes in the revised definition of a model by second-order

quantificationover properties.12Let us allow that some such suit-
ably generalizednotion of a domain survives objections of this
kind.
The use of domains, whether sets, classes or properties,
assumesthat what individualsthe truth-valueof a quantifiedsen-
tence depends on is not a logical matter; it varies between
interpretations. Rather than allowing generalizations in the
object-language to depend for their truth-values on the same
individuals as generalizations in the meta-language, VTRUE,
3TRUE and 3AITRUE explicitly restrict them with the qualifi-
cation 'Edom(I)'. But then the meta-languagehas the resources
to define the unrestrictedanalogues of those quantifiers(identi-
fied by the subscript 'U'), simply by dropping that qualification
from VTRUE, iTRUE and 3AITRUE and the definition of
I[v/d]:
VUTRUE VUvais true under I < for every d a is true under I[v/d].
3UTRUE 3Uva is true under I * for some d a is true under I[v/d].
3UAITRUE ]UAIva is true under I X no set contains all d such that a is
true under I[v/d].
jUn and ]!Un are defined analogously. Those are standard clauses
in a quasi-homophonicdefinitionof truth, except that the assign-
ments to which they are relativizedassign values to predicateas
well as individualvariables.Even if the meta-languagequantifiers
are binary, taking two predicatesas arguments('EveryF is a G';
'Some F is a G'), we can still drop the restriction 'de dom(I)'
and make the first argument logically universal ('individual'
replaces 'F').
Although the clauses for the unrestrictedquantifiers do not
referto dom(I), we can retain it to interpretthe restrictedquanti-
fiers, for we can have quantifiersof both kinds in the same lan-
guage. If we add an atomic monadic predicateD whose extension
12. The use of property restrictions has the additional advantage of permitting non-
rigid restrictions: in 'If more of my friends had been here, not everyone would have
fitted in this room', 'everyone' is restricted by the property of being here, which
different individuals have in different circumstances. By contrast, class membership
is rigid; whether something belongs to a class is noncontingent (at least, given that
both exist). The use of plural quantifiers to state a theory of restricted quantification
is problematic for the same reason: given some Xs, whether x is one of them is
presumably noncontingent, so a quantifier restriction to the Xs is rigid (thus plural
quantifiers are not equivalent to property quantifiers).
 LOGICAND EXISTENCE 327

under I is stipulatedto be dom(I), then V, 3 and 3AI are in effect

the restrictionsby D of Vu, 3u and 3UAI respectively.Thus Vvac
is equivalent to VUv(DvDa), 3va to 3Uv(Dv & a) and 3AIva to
3UAIV(Dv & a). When dom(I) is the universal class, VU, 3U and
3UAI are equivalent to the corresponding special cases of V, 3
and 3AI. VU, 3U and 3UAI are just as well-definedas V, 3 and 3AI
respectively;the meta-linguistic resources needed to define the
latter member of each pair include those needed to define the
former. A restricted quantifier makes sense only if the corre-
sponding unrestrictedquantifierdoes too.
If we retain dom(I), we should no longer restrictthe extensions
of n-place atomic predicatesto n-tuplesof its members,for other-
wise we might be unable to give them their intended interpret-
ations. For example, (d, d) should be in the extension of '='
whetheror not d E dom(I); Vux x = x is logically true. Thus exten-
sions may be proper classes, or we might replace the notion of
an extension by that of a second-orderassignmentof a property
to a predicatevariable.
Since the unrestricted quantifiers are insensitive to permu-
tations of individuals, they are logical constants. But then
3U2X x= x ('Speaking unrestrictedly,there are at least two indi-
viduals') is logically true, for it is true and contains only logical
constants. Indeed, granted set theory with an axiom of infinity,
3Unx x x is true and therefore logically true for each natural
number n, for, as noted above, sets are individuals. Even
jtJAIx x= x is logically true.'3 But logic was supposed to be neu-
tral on these matters. To ban unrestrictedquantificationsimply
because it yields unwanted logical truths would be utterly unil-
luminating,for the unrestrictedquantifiersseem quite intelligible.
Might they be banned on grounds independentof logical truth?

II
Clauses such as VUTRUE violate one conception of a model.
For whether VUva is true under I may depend on the properties
and relations of individuals outside dom(I). That is anomalous
if a model is a self-enclosed subworld, bounded by its domain,

13. Sher 1996:666-667 seemsfalselyto assumethat domain-independent quantifi-

cation over all actual individualsexcludessets while the domain of a model may
includesets.
328 11-TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON

about which we are speaking exclusively. If truth in a model is

truth in a proper subworld of the real world, then we have no
obvious guarantee that truth in all models entails truth under
the intended interpretationfor languagescontaining unrestricted
quantifiers.But models were not introduced as subworlds;they
were introduced as devices for interpreting the nonlogical
expressionsof a language. Such a device may permit unrestricted
quantification. The domain of an interpretationis not there to
circumscribea subworldbut to interpretthe nonlogical aspect of
a restricted quantifier. Since an unrestrictedquantifier has no
such nonlogical aspect, it needs no domain. The subworld con-
ception has no force against unrestrictedquantification.
Model theory is mathematically more tractable when all
object-language quantifiers are restricted to a set domain; but
our interestin interpretationsis not solely for the sake of proving
resultsin model theory. Our interestin logical truth requiresthat,
if we define it by generalizingover interpretations,we should not
exclude the intended interpretationsof our words.
There are more pertinent concerns about unrestrictedquanti-
fication. One is that it will generateparadoxes.This concern sug-
gests quite weak quantifier restrictions. For we could avoid
paradox by requiring the domain to be an infinite set, thereby
making 3"xx x logically true for each natural number n; the
paradoxes have no bearing on that problem about logical truth.
In any case, clauses like VUTRUE and 3UTRUE generate no
paradoxes. The object-languagequantifiersvary no more widely
than do the meta-languagequantifiersused to define them. If the
unrestrictedobject-languagequantifiers generate paradoxes, so
do the meta-languagequantifiers,in which case we ought not to
have been using that meta-languagein the first place. In using
a meta-language, we are committed to the intelligibility of its
quantifiers. Must the meta-linguisticquantifiersbe restrictedin
the sense that they do not take absolutely all individuals as
values? The charge that unrestrictedquantifiers generate para-
doxes has never been properly substantiated. Indeed, the state-
ment of the allegedly necessary constraint itself generates
paradoxes. For 'No quantifiercan take all individualsas values'
forbids quantifiersto range as widely as the quantifier'all indi-
viduals' does in that very injunction. Nor have we good reason
to postulate a constraint here that can be shown but not said.
 LOGIC AND EXISTENCE 329

What may generateparadoxesis the assumptionthat each model

contains something, an unrestricted domain, over which the
unrestricted quantifiers range; but their intelligibility does not
requires that assumption, as VUTRUE, EUTRUE and
3UAITRUE make manifest by not referringto any such domain.
Even restrictedquantificationcan dispensewith that assumption,
by formulatingthe restrictionsin second-orderterms."4
A differentconcern is that if the meta-languagequantifiersare
themselves tacitly restricted by some kind of contextual effect,
the object-language quantifiers they were used to define are
equally restricted. Now if the semantic clauses for the object-
language quantifiers are understood as generalizations across
contexts, so as to cover contexts other than that in which the
theorist is speaking, they would not pass on the contextual vari-
ation in the meta-language quantifiers to the object-language
quantifiers,any more than the stipulation "'X" as used by any-
one is to denote me' passes on the indexicality of 'me' to 'X'.
That clause makes 'X' a name of the particulartheorist who is
speaking; it is not equivalent to "'X" as used by any speaker S
denotes S'. In Kripke's terminology, 'me' fixes the referenceof
'X' without giving its meaning. Similarly, the envisaged use of
context-dependentmeta-languagequantifierswould fix the refer-
ence of context-independentobject-languagequantifierswithout
making the latter synonymous with the former.
Still, if one fixes the referenceof a quantifierexpression Q by
using a context-dependentquantifierin an arbitrarycontext, Q
is ill-qualifiedto count as a logical constant, for there is no rea-
son to expect the particular contextual restriction which hap-
pened to be operative during the reference-fixingto have any
special logical status. If this problem is genuine, it also threatens
standard definitions of truth under an interpretation. For
instance, if the restricted meta-language quantifier 'every de
dom(I)' in VTRUE were subject to some furthertacit restriction
by context, VTRUE would not have its intendedeffect;the quan-
tifierwould not be truly universaleven within its domain. If tacit
contextual restrictions are ineliminable, it will not help to say
that they are understood not to exclude any membersof dom(I),

14. Cartwright 1994 forcefully defends unrestricted quantification against the charge
of paradoxicality.
330 II-TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON

for that understandingwill itself be subject to tacit contextual

restrictions. Moreover, 'I' here is a variable, not a name, and
any individuala contextual restrictionexcludeswill belong to the
domain of some interpretationI. This specific problem does not
arise if wheneverxEy and y satisfiesthe contextual restrictionso
does x, for example because the restriction is to sets below a
given rank in the set-theoretichierarchy,but restrictionsof that
form depend on the fear of paradox already discussed. Ordinary
contextual restrictions obey no such downward closure con-
dition. One mathematician may ask another 'Is every set infi-
nite?', referring only to some pure sets of current interest; the
null set has the ancestralof E to every pure set in the hierarchy
but is there excluded from 'every set'. The standard account
secures its intended effect only on the assumption that any con-
textual restrictionsin the meta-languagecan be set to zero. The
present account makes the same assumption. VU, 3U and 3UAI
are not preventedby tacit contextual restrictionsfrom counting
as logical constants.
Of course, natural language quantifiersare typically subjectto
tacit contextual restrictions.But VUTRUEand 3]JTRUEare not
intended to pass on all the subtleties of 'every' and 'some' in
English to VU and 3u, any more than the clause &TRUE is
intended to pass on all the subtleties of 'and' in English to &.
Rather, on the contextually appropriate understanding of the
clauses above in the definition of truth under an interpretation,
they are insensitive to such subtleties. If one is interestedin the
logic of quantifiers restricted by an arbitrarynonlogical predi-
cate, one's concern will be quantifierslike V and 3 as charac-
terized by VTRUE and 3TRUE. They may be closer to
quantifiersas ordinarilyused in natural languages. But one can
also investigatethe logic of unrestrictedquantifiers;then VU and
3u as characterized by VUTRUE and jUTRUE are relevant.
They too correspond to some uses of quantifiers in natural
languages, for example in the meta-linguisticuses above.
No account on which 'There are at least n individuals'fails of
logical truth merely because in some everyday contexts we
restrict our attention to fewer than n individuals does justice to
the natural objection that even if the sentence is in fact true of
our world, it is not logic that tells us so. For that objection takes
the unrestrictednature of the quantification seriously and still
resists the claim of logical truth.
 LOGICAND EXISTENCE 331

III
There are no good grounds for banning unrestrictedquantifi-
cation; it is as intelligibleas it seems. We might thereforeseek an
alternative account of logical truth on which 3Unxx x ('There
are at least n individuals')is not logically true. Before we do that,
we should examine whether the informal grounds for denying its
logical truth are really cogent.
Some deny that 3Ufx x= x is logically true on the grounds that
there could have been fewer than n individuals altogether. That
reasoning is unsound, given the meta-theory.For it includes set-
theory, which if true at all consists of necessary truths. There
could not have been fewer than absolutely infinitely many sets;
there could not have been only finitely many. Since sets are indi-
viduals, there could not have been just one individual.'5
Even if there could not in fact have been fewer than n individ-
uals, that by itself does not show that 3Unxx= x is logically true.
Some necessary truths are not logical truths: 'Water contains
hydrogen', for example. The doubt might be elaborated thus:
'Ufux x= x is equivalentto "At least n individualsexist". Even if
infinitely many sets exist necessarily, existence is not in general
necessary. Ordinary spatiotemporal objects exist contingently.
Existence is not a logical property. So claims about how many
individuals have it are not logically true.' We can question that
line of thought where it may seem strongest, by denying that
existence in the relevant sense is contingent.'6
We can formulate modal existence claims in the object-lan-
guage, using an operator D2,'It is necessary that...'. Let us first
try the method of possible worlds semantics, relativizing truth
under an interpretation to members of a class W of possible
worlds:
DTRUEW 0 a is true at w under I X for all w* E W
a is true at w* under I.
15. On some views, logical truth requires only truth at the actual worlds of contexts,
so sentences such as 'I am here now' and 'It is raining only if it is actually raining'
with false necessitations may be logically true (Kaplan 1989, Davies and Humber-
stone 1980, Zalta 1988; on the other side Hanson 1997: 371-372). If so, the objection
to the logical truth of ]Ux x =x is that it could have been false with its present
meaning, not that 03u"x x =x is false; the objection still fails, because 3Ux x =x
could not have been false with its present meaning. Almog 1989 argues that there are
contingent logical truths about the number of individuals and criticizes Ramsey's
attempt to argue for their necessity.
16. Etchemendy 1990 and Hanson 1997 defend modal conceptions of logical truth.
332 11--TIMOTHY WILLIA-MSON

This clause guarantees the truth of all theorems of the prop-

ositional modal logic S5; for weaker modal systems one could
introduce an accessibilityrelation between worlds. To make the
other truth clauses work together with ETRUE, we relativize
them to worlds:
VUTRUE, VUva is true at w under I X for every d
a is true at It' under I[r/d].
3UTRUE, 3Uva is true at w under I X for some d
a is true at w under I[v/d].

The denotations of terms and the extensions of atomic predicates

are also relativized to worlds. To give '= ' its intended interpret-
ations, for every interpretationI and world w let ext,11.(=) con-
tain (d, d) for every individual d and nothing else. Truth under
an interpretationI, unrelativizedto a world, is truth at the actual
world under I. W is not relativizedto all interpretationbecause
unintended interpretationsof D are irrelevanthere. For present
purposeswe can treat D]as a logical constant;this does not affect
the logical truth of nonmodal claims.
We can easily show that iVux 03uy x y ('Necessarilyevery-
thing necessarily exists') is true under any interpretationI. For
any individual d, x=y is true at any world w* under I[x/d]
[y/d], so 3uy x= y is true at any world wV underI[x/d], so W3Uy
x= y is true at any world w under I[x/d]. Thus Vux LI3Uyx= y
is true at any world w under 1, so ZVUx 3'yJy x = y is true under
I. The proof is trivial, because nothing in the semantics of the
quantifiers or '= ' engages with the variation across worlds intro-
duced by 0. For the same reason, the Barcan formula VUx LiUD
LVuxat and its converse are true under every interpretation.
Someone schooled in Kripke's semantics for quantifiedmodal
logic may protest that the truth-valueof quantifiedsentences at
a world w depends on what individualsexist at w. Thus there is
a domain dom(w) of whatever individuals exist at w; VUTRUE,,
and EUTRUE,,become:
VUdTRUE, va is true at w under I < for every de dom(w)
a is true at iv under I[v/d].
3udTRUE,, 3va is true at w under I X for some de dom(w)
a is true at w under I[v/d].

If for some world w dom(w) contains an individual d not in

dom(w*) for some world w*, then V"x WUy x =y is false at w.
 LOGIC AND EXISTENCE 333

Hence DVUx WEUy x= is actually false if the domain varies

across worlds. For similar reasons, the Barcan formula and its
converse fail if the domain varies. But VUdTRUEWand
jUdTRUE,, cannot be the fundamental semantic clauses for
unrestrictedquantifiers,just because they restrict the quantifiers
by dom(w).
Someone might object that the quantifiers characterizedby
vUdTRUE,,,and 3UdTRUE,,,are as unrestrictedas any quantifi-
ers can be, because a quantifierhas nothing to range over at a
world except what exists at that world. This is to deny that
VUTRUE,, and 3UTRUE,, characterizegenuine quantifiers, for
they omit the allegedly essential restriction. Since the resources
necessary for formulating VUdTRUE,,W and 3UdTRUE,Vare suf-
ficient for formulatingVUTRUEI,,and 3UTRUE,,,W, how could the
latter fail to state genuine truth-conditionsif the former succeed?
The position resembles that for the unrestricted nonmodal
clauses VUTRUE and 3UTRUE and their restricted analogues
VTRUE and 3TRUE, except that the restricting domain now
depends on the world ratherthan the interpretation.The general
objectionsto unrestrictedquantificationare no more cogent here.
But there is a difference. VUTRUE,,.,3*'dTRUEW,, VUdTRUEW,
and 3udTRUE,, are semantic clauses for a modal object-lan-
guage in a nonmodal meta-language; they contain no modal
operators. We might suspect that a modal object-languagecan
receive a fully faithful semanticsonly in a modal meta-language.
Only in the latter, perhaps, are the fundamental constraints
on stating genuine truth-conditions visible. The qualification
' dom(w)', which appears as an optional restrictionin the non-
modal meta-language, inight be required by a modal semantic
clause with no such restriction.
Some modal meta-theory has been developed for modal lan-
guages, overshadowed by the dominant tradition of possible
worlds semantics.'7The minority tradition sacrificesexplanatory
power for faithfulness of interpretation.The validity of modal
arguments is no longer explained by the more familiar validity
of quantificational arguments. The alleged invalidity of
FrUx E03uyx =y, the Barcan formula and its converse is not

17. See Peacocke 1978 and Humberstone 1996. Prior 1977 and Forbes 1989 present
views on which quantification over worlds is understood in terms of modal operators
rather than vice versa.
334 II TIMOTHYWILLIAMSON

explained by appeal to differentdomains; the direction of expla-

nation is reversed. Rather than attempting to determine here
whether modal languages requiremodal meta-languages,we can
simply discuss in modal terms whetherit is contingentwhat there
is.
In one sense it is obviously contingent what exists. This table
might not have existed. But 'exist' has more than one sense. For
in one sense events do not exist; they occur. Three-dimensional
physical objects exist when they are somewhere. Call that the
substantivalsense of 'exist' ('S-exist'), since we might conjecture
that only substances exist in that sense (in some sense of 'sub-
stance'). In another sense events do exist, simply because there
are events; to exist is to be something. Call that the logical sense
of exist ('L-exist'), since it is definable given identity and the
unrestrictedquantifier.Trivially, everything L-exists; not every-
thing S-exists, because events do not.
In which sense might this table not have existed?It might not
have S-existed, because it might never have been anywhere.For
the same reason it might not have L-existed either, if necessarily
this table is something only if it is in space. Isn't that obvious?
Isn't it in the nature of a table to be in space?What is obvious
is that necessarilyall tables are in space; there is no subtle meta-
physical way for something to be a table without being in space.
It does not follow that necessarilythis table is something only if
it is in space; although necessarilyall bachelors are unmarried,it
does not follow that necessarilythis bachelor is something only
if he is unmarried,for he could have married.To conclude that
necessarilythis table is something only if it is in space, we would
need the extra premise that necessarily this table is something
only if it is a table. Isn't that obvious? What else could a table
have been?
Answer: a possible table. By the Brouwerianprinciplethat no
truth could have been impossible (equivalently aDLOKa,a the-
orem of the modal system S5), if this is a table then necessarily
possibly it is a table, so necessarilyit is a possible table. If this
table had never been anywhere, it would not have been a table;
it would have been a merely possible table. A merely possible
table is not a table of a strange kind, one that contingently fails
to exist. Rather, x is a possible table if and only if possibly x is
a table; x is a merely possible table if and only if although x is a
 LOGICAND EXISTENCE 335

possible table, x is not a table. You are a possible lottery winner

because you could have won the lottery, not because you did win
the lottery and could have existed. Merely possible tables need
not occupy space; they need only be possible space occupants.
We can compare possible tables to past tables. When some-
thing is a table, it occupies space; once it ceases to occupy space,
it ceases to be a table. A past table is not a table that no longer
exists; it is no longer a table. We can count past tables, or past
popes. The question 'How many popes have there been?' can at
a pinch be heard as asking for the largest number n such that at
some past or presenttime there were simultaneouslyn popes. But
it is more naturallyconstruedas asking for the much largernum-
ber of past or present people who were at some time pope; they
were never all alive simultaneously.
Counting across possibilities is analogous to counting across
times. The intelligibility of counting questions can depend on
possible physical objects. Naturally, since the possible is infinitely
more varied than the past, fewer questions about possible physi-
cal objects than questions about past physical objects have finite
answers. There are infinitely many possible fat men who could
have been in that doorway and only finitely many past fat men
who were once in that doorway, although none of those possible
or past fat men is in that doorway. But some counting questions
about possible physical objects do have finite answers. Imagine,
for instance, a factory in which workers make knives by fitting
blades into handles. Considertwo interchangeableblades B1 and
B2 and two interchangeablehandles H1 and H2 at a time t before
they have been fitted together. We can ask 'How many knives
could have been made by fitting together B1, B2, H1 and H2 at
t?'. In one sense of the question the answer is two; that is the
largest number n for which it is possible that n knives should
have been made by fitting together B1, B2, H1 and H2 at t. But
in another readily intelligiblesense of the question the answer is
four, because there are four possible knives each of which could
have been made by fitting together B1, B2, H1 and H2 at t. They
would have been made by fitting together B, + H1, B1+ H2,
B2+ H1 and B2+ H2 respectively.The differencesin composition
are too great for any two combinations of blade and handle to
be possible combinations for the same possible knife. Not all
four possible knives are compossible. We are expected to count
336 II TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON

possible knives, which are not in fact knives,just as in answering

'How many popes have there been?' we are expected to count
past popes, who are no longer popes.
Hoping to avoid referenceto merely possible physical objects,
someone might try to paraphrasethe second readingof the ques-
tion thus: 'For how many subsets X of {BI, B2, HI, H2} could
a knife have been made without remainderby fitting together the
membersof X at t?'. But this construal does not generalizeprop-
eriy to cases in which more than one possible artifact could be
made of exactly the same subset of components, by fitting them
together differently. An appeal to sequences rather than sets of
componients would err in the opposite direction, since many
sequences can provide the components of which the same poss-
ible artifact could be made. Similar problems face attempts to
answer the question by counting possible situations rather than
possible knives; one gets the right answer only by individuating
possible situationsaccordingto the identity of the possible knives
in them. Such ad hoc reconstruals do not capture our under-
standing of the original question, which counts possible artifacts
themselves.What we can count, we can quantify over.
These remarks only begin to address the issues raised by the
individuation of possible physical objects. The issues are closely
related to those raised by the individuation of past physical
objects. Past physical objects are not individuated by their pre-
sent physical propertiesor relations;they may have left no trace
in the present. Similarly, possible physical objects are not indi-
viduated by their actual physical properties or relations; they
may have none. Past physical objects can be individuatedby their
past physical properties and relations, possible physical objects
by their possible physical propertiesand relations.'8
Physical objects do not demonstrate the contingency of L-
existence. An argument will now be sketched for its noncontin-
gency: necessarily everything is necessarily something. Let /[t]
stand proxy for a sentence in which the term t occurs. If there
could have been an individualx for which there could have been
an individual y for which it could have happened that x and y
were distinct and neither /[x] nor 0[y], how many of x and y

18. Williamson 1998 has more on the modal metaphysics and logic sketched here
and the role of the Barcan formula and its converse, and further references.
 LOGICAND EXISTENCE 337

would then have been a z such that O[z]?Answer:none. If it had

happened instead that p[x] but not 0[y], the answer would have
been: one. If it had happenedthat both O[x]and 0[y], the answer
would have been: two. We can state such banal numerical facts
in the formal object-language:

7VUx LNUy E((-x = y& -O[x] & -[y])D]!U0z

((x= zvy= z) &/[z]))

DVUx LUy },(( --x = y & O[x v
&-0[y]):D!Ulz

((x = z vy = z) & O[z]))

ux LIVUy EI((-x = y&

O[x] & 4[y1):D!U2z

(( = zvy = z) & ONz))

Underlying these examples are far more general recursiveprin-

ciples about counting, which we need not state here. For our
purposes we need only consider their analogues with just one
variable in the antecedent:

VUxD( - 0[x]D3!UOY(x=y & p[y]))

FIVUx L([x]D3!Uly(x = y & p[y]))

Substitutefor 0[t] in the last formula somethingtautologous such

as t= tDt= t. The result simplifies to LIVUxLI3!ulyx=y. Since
'exactly one' entails 'at least one', the latter formula yields
CLVuxW3uyx=y, which is what we want. From that we can
easily derivethe converse Barcanformula [TVUxaDVux Ooa; we
can thence derivethe Barcanformulaitself, using the Brouwerian
principle.To deny the necessary L-existence of individualsis by
implication to deny our ability to make numerical distinctions
that we can in fact make.
The noncontingency of L-existence resembles the noncontin-
gency of identity. Leibniz's Law and other background logical
principlescompel us to deny that it is contingentwhetherx and y
are two or one; similarly,backgroundprinciplesabout counting
compel us to deny that it is contingent whetherx is one or none.
We might mistakenly believe identity to be contingent in some
case if we confused it with having the same spatiotemporal
338 I-TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON

location, since two objects may contingently coincide or contin-

gently fail to coincide. Similarly,we might mistakenlybelieve L-
existence to be contingent in some case if we confused it with
having some spatiotemporallocation, since an object may con-
tingently be in spacetime. But having the same spatiotemporal
location is not equivalent to being identical, and having some
spatiotemporallocation is not equivalent to L-existing.19
Given the necessity of L-existence,we need not appeal to sets
in arguing that necessarilythere are infinitely many individuals,
for we can appeal to possible physical objects instead. We need
not even argue that there could have been infinitelymany physi-
cal objects. We need only argue that for each natural number n
there could have been at least n physical objects; then, by the
noncontingency of identity and L-existence, for each natural
numbern there are at least n possible physical objects, so at least
n individuals,so necessarilyat least n individuals.A fortiori, there
are at least n individuals. Thus the logical truth of 3uix x = x
does not depend on the existence of sets.

IV
Since L-existence is noncontingent, there is no sound objection
from contingency to the logical truth of 3Unxx= x. Noncontin-
gency also removes some objections to the account of logical
truth on which the positive argumentfor its logical truth relied.
Tarskian accounts are nonmodal; a sentence is actually logically
true if true under all actual interpretations.If there could have
been nonactual interpretations, an actual logical truth might
have been false under one of them-of course, interpreted
according to its actual logical form, not according to the logical
form it would have had in those circumstances. If so, logical
truth would not depend solely on logical form, contrary to Tar-
ski's intention. If what individuals there are is contingent, then
what values can be assigned to variables and so what interpret-
ations there are is contingent. But if what individuals there are
is noncontingent, what values can be assigned to individualvari-
ables is noncontingent. Moreover, on the naturalmetaphysicsof

19. Williamson 1990 explores the relation between noncontingency in identity and in
L-existence.
 LOGICAND EXISTENCE 339

classes, if what individuals there are is noncontingent, what

classes there are is noncontingent,so what classes can be assigned
as extensions to predicatevariablesis noncontingent.Hence what
models there are is noncontingent.20Similarly, whether a sen-
tence is true in a model is noncontingent.Thus Tarski'sdefinition
does not make it contingent whether a sentence is logically true;
the actual world already contains all the requiredvariations.
3Ufx x= x is logically true on various modal strengtheningsof
the definitionof logical truth. The same seems to go for epistemo-
logical strengtheningsinspired by the idea that logic should be a
priori, for if a priori knowledge is attainable, why should it not
include knowledge that there are at least n sets or possible physi-
cal objects?21As for the argumentthat 3Unxx= x is not a logical
truth because it is not analytic and all logical truths are analytic,
it is not a useful contribution until an appropriate standard of
analyticityhas been supplied. If it is sufficientfor s to be analytic
that necessarilyany sentencewith the actual meaning of s is true,
then 3'U"xx= x is analytic. If it is necessary for s to be analytic
that s is uninformativeto those who understand it, then many
logical truths are not analytic. The natural hypothesis is that the
logical truth of 3xtJn x= x is not the artifact of an ill-chosen defi-
nition; attempting to avoid it, we distort our understandingof
logical truth.
What, then, is the logic of unrestrictedquantifiers?To keep
things manageable, consider a standard nonmodal first-order
language. A U-interpretationtreats the quantifiersas absolutely
unrestricted;a model (in the traditional sense) treats them as
restrictedto nonempty sets. Given a formula a and a set of for-
mulas F, F t a just if a is true under every U-interpretation
under which every member of F is true; F hR a just if a is true in
every model in which every member of F is true; F F- a just if a
is provable from F in some standardproof system for first-order
logic. By the model-theoretic soundness and completeness of
20. Sher 1991: 54-55 and 1996 treats logical constants extensionally as functions
defined over models. If what individuals there are is contingent, what models there
are, and therefore what functions defined over models there are, is also contingent.
What functions Sher's account picks out may therefore be contingent.
21. All standard logical truths express a priori knowable propositions only on a gen-
erous conception of the a priori. One can know a priori that everything exists, but
can one know a priori that Cicero exists? Standard model-theoretic semantics makes
every instance 3y c = y of Vx 3y x = y logically true.
340 II-TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON

first-orderlogic, hR is equivalentto F-. An informal induction on

the length of proofs will show that if F F- a then F Ku. If the
language does not contain identity, the proof of the converse
imitates the easy proof of the upward Lowenheim-Skolem
theorem for that case. For if not FF- a then not FR a, so a is
false in some model I with a set domain in which every member
of F is true. We can expand I to a U-interpretationJ by picking
an arbitrarymember d of dom(I), defining a functionf from all
individualsto dom(I) with f(i) = i if ie dom(I) and f(i) = d other-
wise, and setting (i1, ..., iQ)eextj(F) just if (f(il), ...,f(i))E ext1(F)
(or an analogous second-orderassignmentof a property to 'F').
Since the new individuals are indistinguishablein J from d, the
same formulas are true under J as in I. In particular, a is false
under J and every member of F is true under J, so not F u a, as
required. For first-orderlanguages without identity, the differ-
ence between restrictedand unrestrictedquantificationmakes no
differenceto validity; a standardproof system serves both.
In the interesting case, the language contains identity. The
foregoing proof does not generalize, because J would not inter-
pret '=' as identity, and Ku is not equivalent to hR, because
Ku3x3y -x = y but not FR3x 3y-x = y (the superscript 'U' is
dropped henceforth). But we can try to prove that F K a if and
only if uAF- a, where A contains 3]x x = x for each n. Granted
the arguments above that u3]x xX X for each n, we can argue
that FuA F-a only if F u a by induction on the length of proofs.
For the converse, if not FuA F- a then by completenessa is false
in some model I with a set domain in which every member of
FuA is true; by definition of A, dom(I) is infinite. The plan is to
imitate the more complex argumentfor the upward Lowenheim-
Skolem theorem for this case to show that a is false and every
member of F true under some U-interpretation.A proper class
C of new constants is introduced;let E be the class containing
c= c* for each pair of distinct constants c and c* in C. Since
u{ -al} has the infinite model I, each finite subset of
Fut - a} u E has a model and is therefore syntacticallyconsist-
ent, so by syntactic compactness 7u{ - a} u E is syntactically
consistent. One then imitates the proof of the completeness
theorem in arguing that Fut - a} u E has a maximal consistent
and saturatedextension Z and definingan interpretationJ under
which every member of Z is true. Under the usual Henkin con-
struction, the domain of the interpretationconsists of equival-
ence classes of closed terms of the languageunder the equivalence
 LOGICAND EXISTENCE 341

relation which holds between terms c and c* just if Z contains

the sentence c= c *. Since Z includes E, this equivalencerelation
does not hold between distinct members of the proper class C,
so the equivalenceclasses are not in one-one correspondencewith
any set, and therefore are in one-one correspondencewith the
class of all individuals;hence there is a U-interpretationJ* under
which the same formulasare true as under J. Hence a is false and
every memberof F true underJ*, so not F u a. If an argumentof
this kind is valid, F ua if and only if a is a standardfirst-order
syntactic or semantic consequence of F and the infinity of the
domain. Thus we can give a sound and complete proof system for
the unrestrictedreading of the quantifiersby adding all formulas
3x x= x as extra axioms to a standard proof system. In fact,
since standard first-order consequence is compact,
F hua if and only if FH 3x x=xD a) (equivalently,if and only
if F hR3 X x = x Da) for some n. Naturally, these results do not
extend to noncompact languages with second-order or gen-
eralized quantifierssuch as 'For infinitelymany'.
The argumentrequiresthe axiom of global choice to well-order
properclasses of formulas, and appropriatecomprehensionprin-
ciples to set up the model. Different assumptions can validate
more formulas;Harvey Friedmanhas developed a conception of
the constraints on unrestrictedrelations for which 'R is not a
linear ordering'is logically true on an unrestrictedinterpretation
of the quantifiers.22Clearlythere is much to be investigatedhere;
some issues may remain controversial.We must not let an over-
restrictiveconception of logic blind us to such questions.
Frege and Russell took for granted the unrestrictedinterpret-
ation of the quantifiers whose coherence has been defended
here.23They lacked the accompanyingmetaphysical conception
on which, even if sets are not treatedas individuals,the unrestric-
ted universe is noncontingent and infinite in membership;hence
Russell's uneasinessabout his axiom of infinity.Whetherthe pre-
sent combination of logic and metaphysicsis more hospitable to
their logicism remains to be seen.
22. Friedman 1997, of which Theorem 2 is a stronger result on the lines of that
sketched in the text.
23. The completeness arguments in the text show that the absence of domain restric-
tions from Frege's intended interpretation of his formal language does not block
substantive metatheoretical investigation of validity under that interpretation (where
nonlogical constituents are treated as variables implicitly bound by universal quanti-
fiers). The point can also be argued by appeal to (attempted) consistency proofs
(Stanley 1996: 64); it holds trivially for propositional logic.
342 II-TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON

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