Manuscript Details

Manuscript number JLP_2019_224

Title An evaluation of a fire risk of a transportation of liquefied petroleum gases by

road tankers

Article type Full Length Article

Abstract
An analysis of methods for an evaluation of a fire risk of a transportation of hazardous goods published in literature
was made. It was found that there is no well recgnized method for a quantitative risk assessment. On the basis of the
results published in literature the method was tested on an example of the transportation of LPG by road tankers. A
potential fire risk does not exceed 10-5 year-1 for a moderate traffic of the road tankers with LPG. Methods for a
decrease of the fire risk were proposed.

Keywords Road tankers; fire risk; transportation; liquefied petroleum gas.

Taxonomy Engineering, Chemical Engineering

Corresponding Author Yury Shebeko

Order of Authors Yury Shebeko, Aleksey Shebeko, Leonchuk Petr, Gordienko Denis

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Transportation TABLES.docx [Table]

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 COVER LETTER

Evaluating the Fire Risk of Transportating Liquefied Petroleum Gases by

Road Tankers

Shebeko, Yu.N.*, Shebeko, A.Yu., Gordienko, D.M., Leonchuk, P.A.

All Russian Scientific Research Institute for Fire Protection

VNIIPO 12, Balashiha – 3, Moscow Region, 143903, Russia
*Corresponding author email: yn_shebeko@mail.ru

Total number of words: 5800.

Total number of Tables: 5.
Total number of Figures: 2.
HIGHLIGHTS
 Fire risk of LPG transportation by road tankers was evaluated
 A method for an evaluation of the LPG transportation fire risk was
proposed
 The potential fire risk for a moderate traffic was calculated
An Evaluation of a Fire Risk of a Transportation of Liquefied
Petroleum Gases by Road Tankers

Shebeko, Yu.N.*, Shebeko, A.Yu., Gordienko, D.M., Leonchuk, P.A.

All Russian Scientific Research Institute for Fire Protection

VNIIPO 12, Balashiha – 3, Moscow Region, 143903, Russia
*Corresponding author email: yn_shebeko@mail.ru
ABSTRACT
An analysis of methods for an avaluation of a fire risk of a transportation of hazardous goods
published in literature was made. It was found that there is no well recognized method for a
quantitative risk assessment. On the basis of the results published in literature the method was tested
on an example of the transportation of LPG by road tankers. A potential fire risk does not exceed 10-5
year-1 for a moderate traffic of the road tankers with LPG. Methods for a decrease of the fire risk were
proposed.

HIGHLIGHTS
 Fire risk of a transportation of LPG by road tanks was evaluated
 A method for an evaluation of the fire risk of transportation was proposed
 A potential fire risk for a moderate traffic was calculated

KEYWORDS: Road tankers, fire risk, liquefied petroleum gas.

2
INTRODUCTION
Individual fnd societal risks of any industrial facilities are important values for a safety provision
of these facilities (Guidelines, 1999).The values of the individual and societal fire risk arising on
an industrial object should not exceed limiting values stated by normative acts (Ale, 1991). As to
industrial objects many methodologies exist (see for example (Jo, 2008)), but there is no well
recognized methodology for the fire risk assessment for a transportation of hazardous goods by a
railway and trucks. Therefore a task for a creation of such methodology is very important.

BACKGROUND
Let us analyze existing approaches to the risk assessment for a transportation of hazardous goods
by a railway and trucks. Frequencies of various scenarios of accidents are the main input data for
the fire risk assessment for the transportation of hazardous goods. The frequencies of the
accidents in France are presented in Table 1(Lanua, 1989). A brief analysis of 1793 accidents for
a period from 1960 to 1998 is made (Haastrup, 1990), and 39 % of these accidents took place for
the transportation of the hazardous goods. There were 682 accidents with fatalities, 27 % of these
accidents took place for the transportation. Three types of the transportation were considered: by
railway, trucks and pipelines. A distribution of the accidents on risks of these types of the
transportation is shown in Table 2.
120 accidents on the railway transport were analyzed in detail (Haastrup, 1990). 38 accidents
with LPG tanks, 2 accidents with ethylene tanks, 20 accidents with LNG tanks took place. Quite
all of these accidents caused fires and explosions, 6 accidents occur with BLEVEs. 11 accidents
were with collisions of the railway tanks, 9 accidents were connected with a derailment and an
overturn of the tanks. Though less quantities of hazardous substances are involved in the
transport accidents in comparison with a fixed installation, the consequences of the transport
accidents are nevertheless not less than for the accidents with the fixed installation, because at the
transport accidents population is closer to the place of the accident. The distribution of the
accidents with the railway tanks for the transportation of LPG, LNG and ethylene on reasons of
an occurrence is shown in Table 3.

Table 1. Frequencies of various accidents at the transportation of the hazardous goods in France (Lanua,
1989)
Frequency of the
Conditional
accident,
Type of the transportation Time interval probability of an
10-7(transport
explosion
unit∙km)-1
Car trucks 1973-1980 2,6 0.0037
Railway transport 1973-1979 1,3 0.013
River transport 1965-1977 6,8 0.015
Sea transport (near a shore transportation) 1970-1979 1,8 0.00029-0.08

Table 2. Distribution of the accidents on various types of the transportation of the hazardous goods
(Haastrup, 1990)
Number of
Number of
Type of transportation Fraction, % accidents with Fraction, %
accidents
fatalities

3
 Car trucks 205 30 54 30
Railway transport 257 37 41 23
Pipeline transport 133 19 56 31
Sea transport 58 8 26 14
River transport 38 5 4 2

Table 3. Distribution of the accidents with the railway tanks for the transportation of LPG, LNG and
ethylene on reasons of an occurrence (Haastrup, 1990)

Reason of an occurrence Number of the accidents

Rupture of a tank envelope 15
Collision with a derailment 11
Overturn 6
Rupture of a pipeline at loading and repair operations 23
Unknown reasons 5

The study (Birk, 1990a) is aimed on a creation of models of processes at the accidents with the
railway tanks. The following processes are considered: a mechanical destruction of the tank, a
spillage of a liquid phase, an influence of a fire on neighboring fixed objects, an influence of a
fire on neighboring railway tanks, a vapor cloud explosion, a thermal radiation from fireballs, jet
fires and pool fires, propagation of the vapor cloud. The railway tank with propane was
considered. The proposition was made that a total amount of the liquid gas is involved into a
vapor cloud explosion and a fireball at the destruction of the tank. A realization of the proposed
models is described for some specific cases (Birk, 1990b). An investigation of methods for a
prevention of the accidents at the transportation and storage of liquid hydrocarbons is made
(Moodie, 1988; Shebeko, 2000).
An analysis of the transportation of liquefied gases in Great Britain was made (Purdy, 1988).
Models for an evaluation of the societal risk at the transportation of some hazardous goods by the
railway were described. The following aspects of the transportation were considered: the
accidents on stations and the accidents at a loading (uploading). Four hazardous goods were
selected for the consideration which cover 51 % of all transported goods: LPG (tanks of a volume
20 and 40 tons), chlorine (tanks of a volume 53 tons), petrol (tanks of a volume 29 tons),
ammonia (tanks of a volume 53 tons), petrol (tanks of a volume 32 and 75 tons). The models of
the accidents were created. The following densities of population near places of the accidents
were taken into account: cities – 4210 people/km2, near city zone – 1310 people/km2, villages –
210 people/ km2, near village zone – 20 people/ km2. It was found that 90% of the accidents give
holes in the tanks of an equivalent diameter of 50 mm, and 10% of the accidents cause
catastrophic destruction of the tanks. Calculations of the societal risk of the transportation of
chlorine and LPG were executed. The societal risk for the fatality number over 10 is equal to 10-4
year-1 both for chlorine and LPG.
A role of a jet flame in an escalation of the accidents on industrial objects (including the
transportation of the hazardous goods) is considered (Gomez-Mars, 2008). The jet flame at the
accidents on the railway tanks took place in 17.9 % cases and in 15.5 % cases in the road tankers
transportation. 61 % of the accidents with the jet fires took place on the LPG tanks. An event tree
was created, in which the primary event was the jet fire, and 45% accidents caused an explosion
of neighboring equipment. 28% leakages caused a formation of a vapor cloud, an ignition of
which gives the explosion (40.9%) or the flash – fire (59.1%). Approximately a half of the jet
fires are connected with the «domino» effects, and in 90% of such scenarios the tank explosion
takes place.

4
The study (Paltriniery, 2009) is aimed on an investigation of a possibility of a risk reduction at
the LPG transportation by means of an application of a passive fire protection (using of a thermal
insulation). This method is useful for the transportation of the hazardous goods by the railway
and the road tankers across cities (Vilchez, 1995). It was mentioned that the most hazardous
phenomenon at the LPG transportation is BLEVE, which can take place in the case of a fire and
in the case of a collision of the tanks. The characteristics of the typical accidents with BLEVE at
the LPG transportation are presented in Table 4 (Paltriniery, 2009).

Table 4. Distribution of the accidents with the railway tanks for the transportation of LPG, LNG and
ethylene on reasons of an occurrence

Number of the accidents with BLEVE

Type of transportation
with fires without fires total
Railway transport transportation 32 5 37
Road tankers transportation 6 1 7
Total 38 (86.4 %) 6 (13.6 %) 44 (100 %)

It was found that the thermal insulation of the LPG tanks can be an effective tool in the reduction
of the risk of the accidents with BLEVE. All railway tanks for the LPG transportation in the USA
and Canada must be equipped with the thermal insulation and safety relief valves. The road LPG
tankers should be equipped by the same way in Hong Kong, but European countries do not have
such obligatory requirements. The calculations show that unprotected road tankers (volume 60
m3) and unprotected railway tanks (volume 95 m3) for the LPG transportation are destroyed after
less than 20 min of an action of a fire. But the tanks equipped with the thermal insulation do not
ruptured during 100 min of the action of the fire. After 20 min of the action a temperature of their
dry walls was near 50ºC, and after 100 min - 250ºC. Calculations of the potential and societal
risk of the LPG transportation were carried out. The scenarios, which were taken into account,
and the appropriate impact zones are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Characteristics of the main scenarios of the accidents at the LPG transportation (Vilchez, 1995)
Conditional Conditional
Size of the
Initiating event probability of Scenario probability of
impact zone, m
the event the scenario
Discharge from a hole of a Jet fire 0.8 155
0.195
diameter 50 mm Flash fire 0.2 164
Instantaneous destruction of the Fire ball 0.8 270
0.105
tank Flash fire 0.2 132

Methods for the risk evaluation at the transportation of the hazardous goods are described
(Milazzo, 2002). It was found that an availability of the thermal insulation on the tank walls
causes a reduction of the potential risk on 20-40% near a road or a railway line, on 60-80% at the
distance 100 m and on 80-100% at the distance 270 m. The jet fire gives the main input into the
risk at low distances and BLEVE at high distances. An analysis of F-N curves (the societal risk)
was made. At N≤30 the jet fire gives the main input into the risk, at N≥30 BLEVE and the flash
fire give the main input.
The study (Chakrabarti, 2011) is dedicated to the risk assessment of the transportation of the
hazardous goods by the trucks. The following procedure of the risk assessment should take into
account:
a) a determination of frequencies of various types of the accidents (collision, overturn etc.);

5
b) a determination of conditional probabilities of releases of the hazardous good due to the
accident;
c) a determination of frequencies of various scenarios due to the releases of the hazardous good
(BLEVE, jet fire, vapor cloud explosion, flash fire etc.).
Traffic is one of the most important points at the calculation of the risk of the transportation of
the hazardous goods. The risk assessment begins with a division of a road net on parts lying in an
urban and village zones with various densities of population. A frequency of the accidents inside
each part of the road is accepted to be constant. Then the annual traffic is evaluated. It was
accepted that a fraction of the trucks is 7.5-7.9 %, and 2-15 % of these trucks transported the
hazardous goods. 57 % of the accidents with a tank rupture cause a spillage of the hazardous
goods. A frequency of the spillage Pacc can be calculated by a formula:
Pacc = RL∙SS∙(ADТ∙365∙10-6) (%HVG/100), (1)
where RL is a length of the part of the road; SS is the intensity of the accidents in which the
spillage of the hazardous goods occur; АDТ is a mean daily traffic; % HVG is a fraction of the
trucks transported the hazardous goods. In Great Britain the frequency of the accidents with the
spillage of the hazardous goods is near 5∙10-8 (trucks∙km)-1.
It follows from the presented brief analysis that in literature there is not widely used
methodology for the risk assessment of the transportation of the hazardous goods. Therefore this
study is dedicated to the creation of the method for the fire risk evaluation of the LPG
transportation by the road tankers.

METHODOLOGY
The formula for the potential risk assessment at the transportation of LPG by the road tankers
was accepted similar to the case of the transportation of hazardous gases or liquids by pipelines
(Methods, 2009):
J0 Ko Х 2 jk

P(r )     j (m)Q jk Q ljk ( x, r )dx , (2)

j 1 k 1 Х 1 jk

where P(r) is the potential risk value at a distance r from the pipeline , (year-1); λj(m) is a specific
frequency of the tank rupture of a type j (year-1∙m-1); Qjk is a conditional probability of the k-th
scenario of the tank rupture; K0 is a number of the scenarios of the fire hazardous situation or the
fire; Qljk is a conditional probability of a human injuring at the given point on a locality at the
distance r from the pipeline in the case of the k-th scenario with the j-th type of the rupture of the
hazardous event (spillage or/and fire) at a point with a coordinate x along the pipelines; x1jk and
x2jk are coordinates of a beginning and finishing of an influencing pipeline part (m). Boundaries
of the influencing pipeline part are determined by a condition, that the impact zone does not
reach the considered point at the distance r from the pipeline.
An event tree was created for a determination of a necessary number of the scenarios (Fig.1.).
Some simplifications were made (Paltraniery, 2009; Chakrabarti, 2011):
a) two types of the rupture were considered (the discharge from a hole with a diameter 50 mm
and the total destruction of the tank);
b) only the jet fire, the flash fire and the fire ball were taken into account. It should be noted that
the fireball and the flash fire are the main events at the total rupture of the LPG tanks.
Let us consider each branch of the event tree.

6
Jet fire
The horizontal jet fire is considered with the conditional probability 0.67. The size of the impact
zone along the x coordinate is described by an expression.

2 L2f  r 2 if L f  r
x2  x1   , (3)
0 if L f  r
where Lf is a length of the jet (m).
The conditional probability of an injuring was accepted to be equal 1, if x2-x1>0 and the jet fire is
directed to a human. The injuring of people in the horizontal jet flame occurs in a sector with an
angle 30º and a radius equal to the length of the jet flame, that is a probability of such direction of
the jet is equal to 0.167.
It was accepted to a determination of the length of the jet flame that a release of a liquid occurs
(this is the most hazardous case) (Methods, 2009):
Lf =15 G0.4, (4)
where G is a mass release rate (kg/s).
The G value was calculated by the formulas (Sallet, 1990):

 L 
   PR
 V  , (5)
G L  GV 
 
1,22  TR3 / 2

P M 
GV    Ahol  C   PC  0,167  PR5  0,534  PR1,95  , (6)
R T 
 g C 
there Gv is the mass release rate of the liquid phase (kg/s); ρL, ρV are densities of the liquid and
vapor phase (kg/m3); PR, TR are nondimensional pressure and the temperature of the product , PR
= P/Pc, TR = T/Tc; P, T are the pressure and the temperature of the product (Pa), (K); Pc, Tc are the
critical pressure and the temperature of the product (Pa), (K); μ is a discharge coefficient; Ahol is a
hole area, (m2); M is the molar mass of the product (kg/mole); Rg is the universal gas constant
equal to 8.31 (J/ (K ∙ mole)).
Flash fire
A radius of the impact zone for hot combustion products at combustion of a vapor cloud in a
regime of the flash fire RF is determined by the formula (Methods, 2009):
RF = 1.2 RLFL, (7)
where RLFL is a horizontal size of an explosion zone (m). The value RLFL for the LPG release is
described by the formula (Methods, 2009):
RLFL = 40 (G/u)0.5, (8)
where G is the mass release rate (kg/s), calculated by the formula (5); u is a wind velocity (m/s).
At the total rupture of the tank the RLFL value is calculated by the formula (Methods, 2009):
0 , 33
 mg  , (9)
RLFL  7,8   
  С 
 g LFL 

7
where mg is a mass of the gas released from the tank at the accidents (kg); ρg is a density of the
gas at a given temperature and atmospheric pressure (kg/m3); CLFL is the lower flammability limit
(% (vol.)).
Fireball
An intensity of the thermal radiation from the fireball q (kW/m2) is determined by the formula:
q  E f  Fq   , (10)

where Ef is the mean thermal radiation intensity from the surface of the fireball (kW/m2); Fq is an
angular coefficient determined by the formula:
DS2 , (11)
Fq 

4 H 2  r2 
where H is a height of the ball center (m); Ds is an effective diameter of the fireball (m); r is a
distance from an irradiated object to the point immediately under the center of the fire ball.
The effective diameter of the fire ball Ds (m) is determined by the formula:
Ds = 5.33 m0.327, (12)
where m is a mass of the product released (kg). The value H can be accepted to be equal Ds/2.
A coefficient of a transparency of atmosphere τ for the fire ball is determined by the formula:
DS . (13)
  exp[7,0 10 4  ( r 2  H 2  )]
2
The frequency of the release of LPG λ (m-1year-1) was determined by the formula (Chakrabarti,
2011).:
λ = R∙TR∙D/L, (14)
where R is a frequency of an accident with any truck with the release of the hazardous good on a
unity of a length of the road (m-1); TR is a year traffic of cars on a considered part of the road
(m∙year-1); D is a fraction of LPG tanks among all cars; L is a length of the considered part of the
road (m).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The parameters R, TR, D, L were determined using the results of the study (Chakrabarti, 2011).
The values of these parameters were the following: R = 5∙10-8 km-1, D = 0.001, L = 7∙103 m, TR =
4∙106 km/year. The physical sense of the parameter R is a specific number of road accidents
taking into account all the cars, and the parameter TR is a product of numbers of the cars traveled
on the considered part of the road during a year and a length of the part traveled by the cars. In
this case a ratio TR/L characterizes a number of the cars travelled on the considered part of the
road during a unit of time. This value λ is equal to TR/L = 65 cars∙hour-1 for the presented above
parameters and is related to all the cars (not only for the transportation of the hazardous goods).
The value is equal to λ = 2.9∙10-8 m-1 year-1 in this case. For comparison the typical frequencies
of a depressurization of gas and oil pipelines are equal to 1.4∙10-7 and 2.4∙10-7 m-1 year-1
respectively (Methods, 2009).
The rest input data were taken from (Reid, 1977): μ = 1; Ahol = πd2/4=1.96∙10-3 m2; Pc = 41.9∙105
Pa; M = 44∙10-3 kg/mole; Tc = 369.8 К; T = 300 К; P = 1.3∙106 Pa; ρl = 485.5 kg/m3; ρv = 17.74
kg/m3.
Using the presented values we can calculate the values of the parameters Gv, Gl and Lf: Gv =
2.4∙103 kg∙m-2∙s-1, Gl = 6.6∙103 kg∙m-2∙s-1, Lf = 53 m.

8
For a determination of the RLFL at the release of the liquid phase of propane for the hole of a
diameter 50 mm a wind velocity was taken equal to 2 m∙s-1, that is a rather conservative case was
considered. The mass release rate calculated by the formulas (5) and (6) is equal to 23.5 kg∙s-1.
Therefore RLFL = 137 m and RF = 165 m.
In the case of a catastrophic rupture of the tank we used the following values of the parameters: a
tank volume 30 m3, mg = 13∙103 kg, ρg = 1.87 kg/m3, CLFL = 2,0 % (vol.). In this case RLFL = 115
m.
In order to determine a radius of an impact zone for a thermal radiation from the fireball a critical
level of the thermal radiation intensity was taken to be equal to 7 kW∙m-2. According to
(Methods, 2009) this value corresponds to a high level pain at a duration of an action 20-30 s,
first degree of a burn after the action during 15-20 s, second degree of the burn after the action
during 30-40 s. In this case the impact zone radius is equal to 336 m.
It was accepted for a simplicity that at distances lower than the impact radius a conditional
probability of a fatality is equal to 1, and at the higher distances this probability is equal to 0.
A dependence of a potential fire risk on a distance from the road is presented in Fig. 2. It can be
seen that the main input into the value of the potential fire risk is given from the fireball scenario,
and at the distances higher than 100 m from the road the input from the fireball scenario exceeds
substantially the inputs from other scenarios. This conclusion coincides with the results of the
study (Paltriery, 2009), where the main role of the fireball in the fire risk of a LPG transportation
was mentioned. In this case the conclusion of the study (Paltriery, 2009) is confirmed that a
thermal insulation of the LPG tanks can substantially decrease the risk of the LPG transportation.
The potential fire risk value at the distances from the road lower than 300 m exceeds 10-6 year-1.
Thus the individual risk for a population living near the road at the distances lower than 300 m
exceeds the tolerable value (10-6 year-1) (Ale, 1991) .
Two main methods for the fire risk reduction can be proposed (exept a transfer of dwellings): a) a
decrease of the traffic of the road tankers transportng LPG; b) using the thermal insulation on the
tank walls (this measure can reduce the potential fire risk on 80-100 % depending on the distance
from the road (Paltriery, 2009). Some other methods can be used also (for example an increasing
the thickness of the walls of the tanks) but for our opinion they are not so effective as the thermal
insulation.

CONCLUSIONS
In this study a method for a assessment of the potential fire risk at the LPG transportation with
road tankers is proposed. A testing of this method was made by means of a model example. It
was found that the main input into the potential fire risk is given by the scenario with the fireball
formation. One of the effective measures for the fire risk reduction is an application of the
thermal insulation on the tank walls. This method can be recommended for a practical application
after the further testing.
This work was supported by All Russian Scientific Research Institute for Fire Protection.

REFERENCES
Ale, B.J.M., 1991. Risk analysis and risk policy in the Netherlands and the EEC. Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries. 4 (1) 58-64.
Birk, A.M. et al., 1990a. A computer simulation of a determent accident: Part I-Model basis. Journal of
Hazardous Materials. 25, 121-147.
Birk, A.M. et al., 1990b. A computer simulation of a derailment accident: Part II. Sample simulation.
Journal of Hazardous Materials. 25, 149-165.

9
 Chakrabarti, U.K., Parikh, J.R., 2011. Route evaluation for hazmat transportation based on total risk. A
case of Indian state Highways. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24, 524-530 .
Gomez-Mars, A. et al., 2008. Jet fires and the domino effect. Fire Safety Journal 43, 583-588.
Guidelines for quantitative risk assessment. “Purple Book” (1999). CPR 18E. Den Haag, Committee for
the prevention of disasters.
Haastrup, P., Brockhoff, L., 1990. Severity of accidents with hazardous materials. A comparison
between ransportation and fixed installations. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 3, 395-
405.
Jo, Y.D., Crowl, D.A., 2008. Individual risk analysis of high-pressure natural gas pipelines. Journal of
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 21, 589-595.
Lanua, A., 1989. An evaluation of consequences of an accidental release of toxic or flammable gases
into atmosphere. R.G.S 81 (February).
Methods for a determination of fire risk values on industrial objects. Moscow, VNIIPO, 2009. 76 pp. (in
Russian).
Milazzo, M.F. et al., 2002. Haz Mat transport though Messina town: from risk analysis suggestions for
improving territorial safety. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15, 347-356.
Moodie, K.,1988. Experiments and modeling: an overview with particular reference to fire engulfment.
Journal of Hazardous Materials. 20(1-3)149-175.
Paltrinieri, N. et al.. 2009. Risk reduction in road and rail LPG transportation by passive fire protection.
Journal of Hazardous Materials. 167, 332-344.
Purdy, G., 1988. An analysis of risks arising from the transport of liquefied gases in Great Britain.
Journal of Hazardous Materials. 20, 335-355 .
Reid, R.C. et al., 1977. The properties of gases and liquids. Third edition, New York, Mc-Graw Hill
Book Company, 1977. 591 pp.
Sallet D., 1990. Critical two-phase mass flow rates of liquefied gases. Journal of Loss Prevention in the
Process Industries. 3(1)38-42.
Shebeko, Yu.N. et al., 2000. A study of the behavior of a protected vessel containing LPG during pool
fire engulfment. Journal of Hazardous Materials. A77(1)43-56.
Vilchez, J.A. et al., 1995. Historical analysis of accidents in chemical plants and in the transportation of
hazardous materials. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 8, 87-96 .

FIGURE CAPTIONS

Figure 1. Event tree for an accident with the LPG tank depressurization. The conditional probability for
various branches of the event tree were taken from (Vilchez, 1995; Manual, 2006).

Figure 2. Dependence of the potential fire risk on the distance from the road for various accidents scenarios.
1 - jet flame; 2 - flash fire at the catastrophic rupture of the tank; 3 - fireball; 4 - flash fire at a discharge
from a hole; 5 - total value of the potential fire risk.

10
 FIGURES

Figure 1. Event tree for an accident with the LPG tank depressurization. The
conditional probability for various branches of the event tree was taken from [12,
15].

Figure 2. Dependence of the potential fire risk on the distance from the road
for various accident scenarios. 1 - jet flame; 2 - flash fire at the catastrophic rupture
of the tank; 3 - fireball; 4 - flash fire at a discharge from a hole; 5 - total value of
the potential fire risk.
 TABLES

Table 1. Frequencies of various accidents in the transportation of hazardous goods

in France [3]
Frequency of
Conditional
the accident,
Type of the transportation Time interval probability of
10-7(transport
an explosion
unit∙km)-1
Car trucks 1973-1980 2,6
0.0037
Railway transport 1973-1979 1,3
0.013
River transport 1965-1977 6,8
0.015
Sea transport (near a shore 1970-1979 1,8
0.00029-0.08
transportation)

Table 2. Distribution of various types of accidents in transporting hazardous goods

[4]
Number of
Number of accidents
Type of transportation Fraction, % Fraction, %
accidents with
fatalities
Car trucks 205 30 54 30
Railway transport 257 37 41 23
Pipeline transport 133 19 56 31
Sea transport 58 8 26 14
River transport 38 5 4 2

Table 3. Distribution of the accidents relating to railway tanks transporting LPG,

LNG, and ethylene on reasons of an occurrence [4]
Reason of an occurrence Number of the accidents
Rupture of a tank envelope 15
Collision with a derailment 11
Overturn 6
Rupture of a pipeline at loading and repair operations 23
Unknown reasons 5
 Table 4. Distribution of the accidents relating to railway tanks in transporting
LPG, LNG and ethylene on reasons of an occurrence
Number of the accidents with BLEVE
Type of transportation
with fires without fires total
Railway tankers transportation 32 5 37
Road tankers transportation 6 1 7
Total 38 (86.4 %) 6 (13.6 %) 44 (100 %)

Table 5. Characteristics of the main scenarios of the accidents in the LPG

transportation [12]
Conditional
Conditional Size of the
probability
Initiating event probability Scenario impact
of the
of the event zone, m
scenario
Discharge from a hole of a Jet fire 0.8 155
0.195
diameter 50 mm Flashfire 0.2 164
Instantaneous destruction Fireball 0.8 270
0.105
of the tank Flashfire 0.2 132
 ABSTRACT

Analyzing the methods for evaluating fire risk of transporting hazardous goods
published in literature was made. It was found that there is no well-recognized
method for a quantitative risk assessment. On the basis of the results published
in the literature, the method was proposed and tested on an example of the LPG
transportation by road tankers. Potential fire risk does not exceed 10-5 year-1 for
a moderate traffic of the road tankers with LPG. Methods for a decrease of the
fire risk were proposed.