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Hansen The Value of Philosophicalb Antropology
Hansen The Value of Philosophicalb Antropology
Max Hansen
Department of Philosophy, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg
max.hansen@student.uni-halle.de
that require a way more distinguished defi- question is asked in such a way that only
nition in an in-depth discussion of the issue. two alternatives are possible: Yes or no.
Thus at this point, the distinction between The scientist asks a closed question (Pless-
natural sciences and humanities should be ner 1981, 175ff.).
made in accordance with the popular un- The answer is found by a certain proce-
derstanding of their methodology. The con- dure: the experiment. In this procedure,
cept of a human is drawn from the Western the relevant factors are first established,
tradition. The human being is a subject and then all other factors are controlled
that confronts a world of objects. I am not in order to keep the examined things, phe-
saying that this is an accurate definition nomena or situations free from disturbance.
of a human, only that it is understandable The aim is to achieve a precise measure-
and sufficient for us to begin with. I hope ment. If this is ensured, and corresponds to
you will excuse these somewhat rough gen- the experimental setup of the question, the
eralizations. researcher obtains a guaranteed response:
yes or no.
Methods of the Sciences It’s ultimately about explaining causal
relationships, reproducing and predicting
Usually, different scientific fields are distin- them, and designating the operating mech-
guished by their content, by what they in- anisms – that’s the aim of the natural sci-
vestigate. Thus there are natural sciences, ences, no more, no less. For this kind of sci-
which examine matter, and there are hu- ence it’s essential not to interact with the
manities, which investigate inner phenom- object of study in any way. It’s observed
ena. In this understanding of science, the from a distance. The objects shouldn’t be
method derives naturally from the nature perceived as pretty or ugly, desirable or re-
of the objects of the respective domains. pulsive, or having any other property than
I want to show that the objects are not the predefined.
naturally determined, but are constituted The humanities are of another nature.
by the method. If so, the respective scien- Keeping a proper distance from the object
tific method gains a certain precedence over of study is a tough balancing act, as the
the actual contents of the sciences. I want objects are also of a completely different
to develop the distinction between the two nature. We are well aware that the objects
areas of science, starting from three points of history, sociology or economics are cer-
of departure: tainly physical as well: buildings, artefacts,
• the scientific question; and bodies in “physical” interaction, such
as communication via acoustic waves or the
• the procedure (method); exchange of goods or data. But something
still needs to be added to those physical
• the aim of the two areas. properties of the objects, and this is “sense”.
The distinguishing feature of scientific A meaning must be attached to them. This
practice is not only to ask questions, but should not be understood as if a human
to ask questions in a controlled manner, being would firstly perceive an object and
so that the type and formulation of the only then attach a meaning, because those
question already contains the possibility of actions are not actually separate.
its answer (Plessner 1981, 176ff.). A sim- Thus the humanities aim to explain the
ple surprise in the form of “What’s that?” meaning of objects in every dimension,
is therefore initially useless as a scientific preferably, which is never ultimately ac-
question. In the natural sciences, the ques- complished (Plessner 1981, 179). One link
tions are designed to guarantee their an- in the chain of meaningful objects is the in-
swer along with their answerability. The terpreter, with his own horizon of meaning
MAX HANSEN: THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 129
(Plessner 1975, 301). This is the subjec- pose that this is the essence of all human-
tive factor we need to consider when doing istic research, as distinguished as the par-
research. This is a popular point of criti- ticular disciplines might appear: In anthro-
cism aimed at the humanities: accusations pology, the researcher, even if he has been
that they are non-serious, and demands part of the examined culture, still needs to
that they adapt to objective mathemati- describe his findings using a certain system
cal methods (Wheeler 1928, 304; Wilson of categories; and in history, the researcher
1980, 271; Werber 2013, 176ff.). But this will always be a part of history itself.
approach would be completely senseless for So what is this that we call a human be-
the humanities. For example, studying ing? And why is this question of impor-
the printed letter “A” using every possible tance for hermeneutics? Well, apparently
chemical and physical procedure wouldn’t the subjective factor I mentioned is the hu-
lead to a convenient result. I will try to man factor. That is why it is important
show that the humanities can only proceed to grasp that factor for the hermeneutic
in accordance with human “nature”, not dif- method (Lindemann 2008, 9). This is of
ferently from it. course just one step in the infinite dance
Hence it might be better to desist from of hermeneutics. It is one possible step to
simple entanglement in the concepts of start with.
“objective” and “true” and attach method-
ological processes to those concepts in- The Human Being
stead. “Objective” would then no longer
mean “true”, which could be appropriate
After having been shown that the objects
for a science which merely theorizes un-
of science are constituted by the sciences
til it’s proven wrong or theorizes better.
rather than found, one can furthermore ask
Therefore sciences should focus on certain
what conditions make objects of appari-
methodologies which are appropriate for
tions. Since this construction is a human
their objects. Which method could meet
activity, a human being itself has to be
that criterion for the humanities, which
examined. This should form the basis of
have, as mentioned, a subjective factor?
hermeneutics, on which the findings of the
Apparently there is a particular type humanities can be relativised and revised.
of questioning for the humanities as well. Therefore the human being must be de-
And, likewise, the type and formulation of scribed as a structure which is sufficiently
the question already contains the possibil- formal and dynamic not to absolutise any
ity of its answer. In contrast to the closed modus vivendi (Plessner 1981, 155). Nev-
question of the natural sciences, the hu- ertheless, I will begin by explicating the
manities can’t provide a guaranteed answer “Western” image of man. I would now like
in terms of yes or no. The question remains to introduce the structure of human beings
open (Plessner 1981, 108f.). as seen by Helmuth Plessner, which I be-
To answer a question raised in the hu- lieve to be very productive for the devel-
manities it is essential to include the ques- opment of a genuinely humanistic-scientific
tioning person, namely the researcher, and method. A basic assumption for hermeneu-
therefore to reflect on his social, histor- tics can be developed based on this struc-
ical and economic state (Plessner 1981, ture.
182). After explaining the object by mak- Before I explain the human structure,
ing recourse to the person of the researcher, one viewpoint needs to be clarified. Human
the explanation must be further elabo- beings, as living beings, are essentially or-
rated with regard to every stage of the re- ganic bodies. Living organic bodies gener-
search process. This very method is what ally realise themselves by a particular con-
hermeneutics is all about. I’d like to pro- figuration of their borders (Plessner 1975,
130 ANTROPOWEBZIN 3–4/2015: ESEJE
That being said about the physical individual because said individual was un-
sphere of human existence, a similar dual- able to find itself. If one accepted the in-
aspect problem exists for the psychologi- terweaving of the internal and the external
cal sphere, which Plessner names the inner world but referred only to the peripheral
world (“Innenwelt”). Experiences and men- aspects, one could even describe the prin-
tal phenomena are the material that forms ciples ruling the interior of living objects,
this sphere (Plessner 1975, 295f.). The two but there would still be no way of telling
distinctive aspects are the central “to be whether the one doing the describing was
an experience” (“Erlebnis sein”) and the pe- part of the world being described.
ripheral “to have a soul” (“Seele haben”).
I claim that a restriction to peripheral
Assuming that pure experience is analo- aspects is the ideal of the natural sciences.
gous to the experience of an animal, the Neither science nor any other human insti-
human being finds itself in a new situa- tution can be established that is restricted
tion, being able to look at itself from its to the central aspects of the inner and outer
periphery and having the distance to cre- worlds. It is a peculiarity of the peripheral
ate an image of itself. All of a sudden aspect to shape persistent objects within
something like a fixed character appears, its process, which is not to say that the
which can only be changed within certain restriction to peripheral aspects allows the
specific rules. Furthermore, the aspect of process to be scientific. Despite a certain
the soul makes it clear that the world it- completeness, the “I” would still be missing
self exists independently, instead of merely (Nagel 1992, 27, 60).
being caused by experiences. What makes
The “I” appears in the third sphere
the internal world differ from the external
by the name of Mitwelt, a compound of
world is that humans can apply both the
“with” (“mit”) and “world” (“Welt”). Ev-
perspective of experience and the perspec-
ery attempt to find a proper transla-
tive of soul to the perception of the “I”, as
tion of Mitwelt into English has failed.
well as to the perception of others. This
The Mitwelt consists of the formed inter-
means that the human being can look at its
nal world and the formed external world
own state with and without distance – with
(Plessner 1975, 302). Being the dimension
thoughts and emotions on the one hand,
of “I” and “We”, it shows up as “I” from the
and perceptions of, for example, images or
central aspect and as “We” from the periph-
acoustic qualities on the other.
eral aspect. Both aspects are necessarily
The preceding description might create mutually dependent, none stands above the
the impression of several spheres of living other, and the distinction between having
being split into two aspects each, but this and being no longer works here. There is no
impression would be false because these as- “I” without a counterpart. Looking at the
pects are interwoven. As the internal world counterpart means looking at the other and
and external world relate strongly to each at oneself at the same time, hence the coun-
other, a real internal world would be ba- terpart is neither “You” nor “I” but “We”
sically inconceivable without an external (Plessner 1975, 301). “We” does not refer
world. Their depiction was selected such to a given society, because this would mean
that it clarifies the way phenomena become that there was some kind of matter which
objects in the peripheral aspect. If the pe- the Mitwelt would consist of and arise from.
ripheral aspect of the external world was The Mitwelt is humankind in the human in-
absolutised, a complete description of the dividual – the dimension in which one hu-
physical reality would be possible, for no man being confronts others, in which the
object would be missing. However, one foundation of culture is generated. “The
could no longer argue sensibly that the sphere of the spirit” is an alternative name
world appears as arranged around a human given by Plessner. What does it mean for
132 ANTROPOWEBZIN 3–4/2015: ESEJE
a human being to confront others? How it ing. Why are humans naturally artificial?
is possible? Because a human being is divided into two
I would again remind you that all of these aspects and three dimensions that it can
dimensions and aspects thereof are inextri- never integrate conclusively, but must try
cably intertwined. In the Mitwelt, humans to again and again, and because it happens
transform the objects and processes of the to be the case that a human being is only
internal and the external world and load one thing, which has to repeatedly com-
them with meaning. The individual can plete itself and also convey itself to others
also load its own body or the bodies of oth- (Plessner 1975, 310). This is a never-ending
ers with meaning. Besides giving meaning process: barely has a human being found
to solid objects, humans are able to give itself when it again becomes aware of its
meaning to sounds, thereby creating lan- disunity (Plessner 1975, 341). As I pointed
guages. out in discussing the spheres, a human be-
Up to this point I hope to have shown ing is able to stand far behind itself in or-
that physical objects loaded with meaning der to transcend itself in the future and
are the objects of the humanities. Due to the past, and thus to preserve the past in
their nature, humans have no choice but to itself and anticipate its future needs and
express themselves, and as they are forced pleasures. Thus, the things that complete
to do so the possibility of analyzing oneself a human being include the things that com-
becomes available. Assuming that a hu- plete its body (“Körperleib”), such as stocks
man being can see itself in terms of exter- and homes. Since it must also complete
nal world, internal world and Mitwelt, it its inner life and take on a character, with
can do so only on the basis of the dimen- its highs and lows anticipated due to the
sion of the spirit. Now, I can elucidate the past, and convey itself to others, it not only
basic principles of the hermeneutic method makes soul arrangements but sometimes in-
and proceed to the anthropological laws. vests objects of its everyday life with inter-
personal meaning, and even creates things
without “practical” benefits. For example,
The Anthropological Laws
religion: Over time, humans create a spir-
itual world which will situate them (Pless-
These laws follow from the structure of hu- ner 1975, 342). However, the time will
man existence. The anthropological laws come when they realise that they them-
that I am describing are divided into two selves were the originator of that religion
categories: The first is formed on the basis and then discard it and proceed to a “true”
of the human being as a natural being, and spirituality. The same is true for commu-
the other on the basis of the human being nities that match its nature best. Humans
as a cultural being. Both of them repre- will realize that they are much more, and
sent two sides of the same coin and engage can be a lot more still (Plessner 1975, 320).
with each other; only the starting point
is different. The hermeneutical principles The second law is that of mediated im-
that refer back to humans as natural be- mediacy. This seemingly paradoxical no-
ings are the law of natural artificiality and tion tries to encapsulate the consequences
the law of mediated immediacy. The two of the twofold aspect. From this law it be-
principles of the human being as a cultural comes clear why science is a current prob-
being are the law of inscrutability (“Uner- lem for human beings and how they have to
gründlichkeit”) and the principle that hu- resolve it. From its centre, a human being
mans are the attributive subject of their perceives everything immediately. What it
world. sees, it sees the way it is, what it hears,
First of all I would like to explain the it hears as it is. From the peripheral as-
laws of man’s emergence as a natural be- pect it conveys to itself every phenomenon
MAX HANSEN: THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 133
through itself (its border). Its body in- goes deeper into this matter, it is question-
trudes between its perception and reality. able whether one discipline of the human-
Mediated immediacy means that medi- ities is sufficient to understand the human
ation is needed for being (Plessner 1975, being in its comprehensive cultural aspects.
324). This is the human condition. In fact, I want to start with the law of humans as
the phenomena that seem to be immediate subjects of their attribution in the world.
are actually mediate. For man is doubly Both laws emphasize several aspects of the
separated from reality. On the one hand, human being, as it sets out to what it is.
he is stuck in his body, but on the other The human being as the subject of its
hand he can still abstract from his pure “I”. self-attribution means that a human be-
Apparently, man recognizes his fundamen- ing is both historically conditioned and his-
tal separation from reality, but he is just torically conditioning (Plessner 1981, 190).
stuck too deep down in himself to ever be This is the consequence of the fact that
able to achieve that reality. This is called humans have no “natural” authority above
immanence. them – neither a god nor nature nor a peo-
However, for Plessner reality becomes ple, nor anything else. He himself cre-
tangible only by a principled separation in ates those and then submits to these con-
the immanence of man. The fact that he structs so willingly that they become sec-
recognizes that he is divorced from reality ond nature to him. Man needs to under-
gains as much importance for him as re- stand himself from his creations, but al-
ality does. The trick seems to be that it low them to pass him at the same time.
is only by a dual separation of human be- This law expresses that humans are not
ings in the world that a human being gains simply the result of their past, but rather
reality and that phenomena gain a regu- construe the past from their current posi-
lar and persevering character, which makes tion. Only against the background of its
them objects of reality (Plessner 1975, 270f, history can a human being be responsible
332). The phenomena lose the character of to itself. That is what the subject of at-
mere perceptions that have no external cor- tribution means. This law is an expres-
respondence. As man is thus never alone, sion of the critical humanities, which be-
he must convey his situation of immanence came aware of their own conditions. This
to others. However, reality is only consti- critical awareness should, and has already,
tuted through double isolation from reality, become a self-understanding of the human-
which is always questionable through dou- ities at large. However, this critical aware-
ble isolation by its very nature (Plessner ness must apply to all of science. As a con-
1975, 330). sequence, this means that there can be no
The human being conveys its situation definitive progress in history. What would
of immanence to itself and others through be the opposite?
expressions. These expressions take many The opposite would be that humans
forms: body language, natural languages could be determined in their current sit-
(especially metaphors), images and other uation, causally, by their past. This would
models. This is the reason why I’m talk- be an exact adaptation of the classical nat-
ing about this law. This is important for ural sciences approach to the humanities.
the question of science as I proposed at the I don’t want to say that this is demanded
outset (Plessner 1975, 330). as a procedure for the humanities by the
Before I summarise my results, I’m go- natural sciences. However, I would like to
ing to outline the two anthropological laws argue that this would be the consequence
from the perspective of human beings as for science. Strictly speaking, if the natu-
cultural beings. As the leading science for ral sciences try to take account of this situ-
these laws, Plessner selected history. If one ation, in which a theory is only valid until
134 ANTROPOWEBZIN 3–4/2015: ESEJE
a better one is found, it would be consis- man being as a natural and artificial being
tent to assert that there will be no clear is also true for its surroundings, especially
progress. for culture. Science is part of human cul-
There is currently no clear rule concern- ture, which makes it an object of the hu-
ing how humans conceive their presence in manities.
the future out of their past. Here I have One topic could be the study of the his-
mentioned a yet-unnamed aspect of this tory of science, which does not reveal clear
law. A human being indicates its past by progress (e. g. biology). A different topic
its presence in the future. could be the question of the meaning of
The second law, the inscrutability of hu- sciences, which would not reveal a singu-
man beings, is more radical as a scientific lar and ultimate meaning.
imperative. This law summarises most ex- There are a plurality of meanings of the
tensively the intentions of this essay. It sciences in a society. For some, the sci-
has a regulatory nature for all the sciences ences might be an ideology, the fundamen-
concerning the human being and all its ac- tals of a worldview. For others, they are the
tivities, even science itself (Plessner 1981, means to subdue the world, an approach
180). As already explained, the human be- probably represented best in sociology. An-
ing is never a fixed entity due to its struc- other meaning of science is science as an
ture, and always projects, rejects and then end in itself, which could mean two things:
projects itself again. In fact, nothing is Firstly, science satisfies the human thirst
necessary and definite where human beings for knowledge; secondly, it’s up to the sci-
are concerned. There is no neutral (in the ences to evolve methods that clarify the
traditional sense), objective position which conditions of the possibilities of knowledge
definitively captures the human being as about the world, and to generalize these
a whole. However, the human being cannot methods. This is also the aim of this pre-
help but create a picture of itself. Strictly sentation.
speaking, a human being does not even On the other hand, it has to be possi-
need to understand itself as a human be- ble to consider cultural aspects with a view
ing. It could also understand itself as an of the natural sciences, as is done, for
animal or a rational being. It is also pos- example, in the neurosciences. Another
sible that it never questions its existence, task of the various disciplines is to sup-
but exists only in its habits and daily life. port and criticise each other, in order to
Therefore, what a human being is must re- produce interdisciplinary research deserv-
main an open question. For the sciences, ing this name. Until then, for the sake of
this means that they cannot take a posi- science as a whole, the humanities need to
tion from which they try to fathom what apply, develop and refine their own meth-
a human being is, both in the disciplines as ods.
well as in the methodological foundations.
A hermeneutic, i. e. humanistic, considera- Acknowledgements
tion of the human being must be aware of
its own boundaries. I would like to thank Rike and Axel Jäh-
nichen for their support. I would also like
Back to the Point: Sciences to thank Dr. Uta Eichler for her encour-
agement.
How could all those general considerations
of the human being, which shall provide
the foundation for a new method, illumi-
nate the question of the nature or sense of
the sciences? Well, what is true for the hu-
MAX HANSEN: THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 135