TOPIC: PROBABLE CAUSE

Sec. 2, Art III . The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The task of determining probable cause is lodged with the public prosecutor and ultimately, the
Secretary of Justice. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts have no right to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive
Branch of the Government.

Probable Cause - such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that:
 1. an offense has been committed
 2. the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.

Personal Determination by the Judge

 On determining the probable cause:
o The judge must make an exhaustive and probing examination of witnesses and
applicant and not merely routine or pro forma examination [Nala v. Barroso, Jr.,
G.R. No. 153087 (2003)].
 The determination of probable cause calls for an exercise of judgment after a judicial
appraisal of the facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any
rule to the contrary.

Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58. A search warrant shall not issue except for probable
cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or thing to be seized."

Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas,

G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937

FACTS:
 An affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, petitioner Alvarez kept in his
house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers
used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender, charging usurious rates
of interest in violation of the law, was presented by the chief of secret service to Judge
Eduardo Gutierrez David.
 In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his
answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not
swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the
information received by him from a reliable person.
 The Judge issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the
search of the petitioner's house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books
 and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be
disposed of in accordance with the law.
 With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store
and residence, and seized the several pertinent articles. The search for and seizure of
said articles were made with the opposition of Alvarez on the ground that the agents
seized even the originals of the documents.
 Alvarez claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been
based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he
had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance
of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from
a person whom he considered reliable.
 To the question "What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant", appearing
in the affidavit, the agent answered: "It has been reported to me by a person whom I
consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises, books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a
money- lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law" and in
attesting the truth of his statements contained in the affidavit, the said agent stated that
he found them to be correct and true to the best of his knowledge and belief.||| 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the manner the oath was made is taken in consideration when determining the
existence of probable cause.

RULING:
 YES.
 The Court called upon Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to
the bill of rights and Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 to settle the issue.
 The Court noted that both provisions require that there be not only probable cause
before the issuance of a search warrant but also that the search warrant must be based
upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce.
 An oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in
conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an
outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made
under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause.
 The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and
affiant be held liable for damages caused.
 The Court further explains that unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace
against which the constitutional guaranties afford full protection. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which
 the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.
 The Court held that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search
warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath
was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in
any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.

Mata v. Bayona
GR No. 50720, March 26, 1984

FACTS:
 Petitioner Soriano Mata contends that the search warrant issued by respondent
Judge Josephine Bayona was based merely on the application for search warrant
and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully subscribed and
sworn to. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of respondent Judge
to attach the necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant
wherein petitioner is accused under PD 810.
 In the complaint prior to the issuance of the search warrant, it was alleged that
Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal
tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." 
 Mata claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that the records of the
said case does not include the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected
to the issuance of the same, and when asked regarding its whereabouts, the
respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court".
 The petitioner then filed a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the
return of the articles seized. The motion was denied by respondent Judge, stating
the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately
to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not
specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-attachment of the search warrant in the records of the case invalidates
its admissibility.

RULING:
 1

People v. Musa y Hantatalu

G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993

FACTS:
 On 14 December 1989, Musa sold 2 wrappers containing marijuana leaves to Sgt.
Amado Ani in a buy-bust operation in Zamboanga City. The said buy-bust operation
was planned since a civilian informer told that accused was engaged in selling marijuana
and therefore, a test-buy was conducted the day prior to the said buy-bust operation.
 During the buy-bust operation, after Sgt. Ani handed the money to Musa, Musa entered
his house to get the wrappings.
 Upon his return and with the inspection of the wrappings, Musa was arrested, but the
marked money used as payment cannot be found with him, prompting the NARCOM
agents to go inside his house. There, they could not find the marked money, but they
found more marijuana leaves hidden in a plastic bag inside the kitchen. The leaves were
confirmed as marijuana by the forensic chemist of the PC crime laboratory, who later on
served as a witness, along with T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, the team leader of the buy-bust
operation and Sgt. Ani.
 The defense gave a different version of what happened on 14 December 1989 wherein
he and his wife, Ahara Musa, served as witnesses. They said that the NARCOM agents,
dressed in civilian clothes, got inside their house since the door was open, and upon
entering, declared that they were NARCOM agents and searched the house, despite
demands of the couple for a search warrant. The agents found a red bag whose
contents were unknown to the Musas.
 Musa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court. On appeal, Musa
contests that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He also questioned the
credibility of the witnesses, as well as the admissibility of the seized plastic bag as
evidence since it violates his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures provided in Art. III, Sec. 2.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seized plastic bag containing marijuana is admissible as evidence.

RULING:
 NO.
 The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.
 However, the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
 It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain
view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of
the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Stated differently, it must
be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. In the case herein,
the agents found the plastic bag inside the kitchen, and upon asking about the
contents of the bag, the accused did not answer, making the agents open the bag and
find marijuana leaves.
Concept of Stop and Frisk
There is a justifiable cause to stop and frisk persons who flee upon seeing law enforcement.

People v. Tuazon y Nicolas

G.R. No. 175783, September 3, 2007

FACTS:
 Bernardo Tuazon had in his possession seven (7) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
of methylamphetamine hydrochloride also known as shabu for a total weight of 250.74
grams. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty.
 The prosecutions version of the case relied heavily on the testimony of PO3 Glenon
Bueno. In the Joint Affidavit executed by PO3 Bueno and PO1 Padlan, it was stated
that when they frisked appellant, they discovered 2 big plastic bags and 5 medium size
plastics and a 9 mm. pistol marked Parabellum bearing serial number C-9890 with one
loaded magazine with eleven ammunition.
 The trial court found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to support a
guilty verdict and imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00. On September 17, 2003, the Court resolved to accept the
appeal interposed by appellant and required the parties to file their respective briefs. In
addition to the required brief, appellant filed a supplementary pleading in which he
questioned the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence presented
against him. 
 He contends that at the time of his warrantless arrest, he was merely driving within
Marville Subdivision. He had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to
commit any crime which could have justified his apprehension. He goes on to argue
that even if he had waived the issue regarding the validity of his arrest by his failure to
raise the matter before entering his plea, such waiver did not affect the unlawfulness of
the search and seizure conducted by the police. 
 Appellant claims that as the confidential informant had been cooperating with the
police for three weeks prior to his arrest, the authorities were already informed of his
identity and his alleged illegal activities. They should have conducted a prior
surveillance and then sought a search warrant from the court. Absent said warrant,
the shabu seized from him should be excluded from evidence. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the findings and conclusion of the court a quo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search of Tuazon’s vehicle was valid.

RULING:
 YES.
 The court held that When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the
 search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched.
 Constitutional provisions against warrantless searches and seizures admit of certain
exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances. 
 The police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven
by appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to
deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a
team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the
informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place
where it was said to be bringing shabu. 
 When they stopped the car, they saw a gun tucked in appellant’s waist. Appellant did not
have any document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more
strengthened the police officers’ suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car, they
found on the driver’s seat plastic sachets containing white powdery substance. These
circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the
warrantless search of the Gemini car.

People v. Del Rosario y Lopez

G.R. No. 109633 July 20, 1994

FACTS:
 Normando del Rosario was charged before Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of
the Fourth Judicial Region stationed in Cavite City with Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunitions and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs.
 Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
of Cavite City, the RTC Judge issued a search warrant (authorizing the search and
seizure of an undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrocholoride commonly
known as shabu and its paraphernalias in the premises of appellant’s house.
 During the search, the police barged into the residence of Del Rosario and found him
lying down, and immediately arrested and detained him in the living room while they
searched the other parts of the house. They fetched two persons to witness the search
after the policemen had already entered accused-appellant's residence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search is valid.

RULING:
 NO.
  The way the police officers conducted the subsequent and much-delayed search is
highly irregular. The witnesses were called in only after the policemen had already
entered accused-appellant's residence and, therefore, the policemen had more than
ample time to plant the shabu. Corollary to the constitutional precept that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, which
is under Sec. 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, is the rule that in order to convict an
accused the circumstances of the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis
consistent with his innocence. The facts of the case do not rule out the hypothesis that
accused-appellant is innocent.

Go y Tambunting v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992

FACTS:
 Go, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with
another vehicle. Go thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and
drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number
and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner.
6 days after the shooting, Go presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2
lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against
him.
 Go posted bail, and the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and
commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner
has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such
situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section
5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless
arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions
undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. 

RULING:
 NO.
 The Court believed that the warrantless "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant
case does not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
 "Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
o (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
o (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
 o (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
 Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days
after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact
just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
 Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon
which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses
to the shooting -- one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal
knowledge." It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.