[G.R. NO.

162447 : December 27, 2006]

ANABELLE MUAJE-TUAZON and ALMER R. ABING, Petitioners, v. WENPHIL CORPORATION,

ELIZABETH P. ORBITA*, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the Decision1 dated August 27, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75419 and its Resolution dated February 23, 2004 denying reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations Commission's finding of illegal dismissal.

The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Annabelle M. Tuazon and Almer R. Abing worked as branch managers of the Wendy's food
chains in MCU Caloocan and Meycauayan, respectively, of respondent Wenphil Corporation. From
September 14 to November 8, 1998, Wendy's had a "Biggie Size It! Crew Challenge" promotion contest. The
branch with the highest sales of "Biggie Size It" wins. The Meycauayan and MCU Caloocan branches won
first and second places, respectively. Because of its success, respondent had a second run of the contest
from April 26 to July 4, 1999. The Meycauayan branch won again. The MCU Caloocan branch failed to make
it among the winners.2

Before the start of the third round from October 18, 1999 to January 16, 2000, Abing was assigned to the
SM North Edsa Annex branch while Tuazon was assigned to the Meycauayan branch. Before the
announcement of the third round winners, management received reports that as early as the first round of
the contest, the Meycauayan, MCU Caloocan, Tandang Sora and Fairview branches cheated. An internal
investigation ensued.3

On February 3, 2000, petitioners were summoned to the main office regarding the reported anomaly.
Petitioners denied there was cheating. Immediately thereafter, petitioners were notified, in writing, of
hearings scheduled on February 4 and 7, 2000 and of their immediate suspension.4 Thereafter, on February
29, 2000, petitioners were dismissed.

Petitioners filed, with the Regional Arbitration Branch, a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal
against respondent Wenphil Corporation and its General Manager, Elizabeth P. Orbita. Petitioners insisted
that they were innocent of the accusations and were dismissed without cause. They claimed that the real
reason for their termination was their persistent demands for overtime and holiday pay. They aver that (a)
they were not notified beforehand why they were called to the main office; (b) their right to due process
was denied; and (c) they were not afforded counsel despite their request for one.

In their defense, respondents maintained that petitioners were terminated for dishonesty amounting to
serious misconduct and willful breach of trust. They presented affidavits of witnesses, receipts and other
documents to support the charges against petitioners. Respondents posited that since petitioners occupied
managerial positions, loss of trust and confidence by the employer was sufficient cause for their termination.
Moreover, respondents insisted that petitioners were afforded due process, with two required notices, and
the opportunity to defend themselves. Lastly, respondents asserted that the preventive suspension was
necessary for the protection of the company's property and possible destruction of evidence pending
investigation.

During the hearings, the Labor Arbiter disregarded the affidavits of respondents' witnesses for being
executed only after the company investigation and held that respondents' evidence insufficiently proved the
alleged cheating of the petitioners. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the suspension and dismissal of complainants Almer R.
Abing and Annabelle M. Tuazon illegal. Respondent WENPHIL CORPORATION is hereby ordered to:
1. immediately reinstate complainants to their former or equivalent position, actual or in payroll at, their
option, without loss of seniority rights and benefits.

2. to pay them backwages from the time they were illegally dismissed on 03 February 2000 until their
reinstatement, computed as of the date of this decision, as follows:

([P15,000] + 3,000 + 2,000 + 1,000) x 10 months = P210,000.00 for each complainant.

3. to pay them ten (10%) percent attorney's fees.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.5

Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed with
modification the decision of the Labor Arbiter in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED but with the following modifications:

1. Declaring the preventive suspension of the complainants to be legal. Accordingly, the period from
February 3-28, 2000, during which they were preventively suspended, shall be excluded in the computation
of their backwages; andcralawlibrary

2. Ordering respondent company to pay complainants separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, at the rate of
one (1) month salary for every year of service to be computed from the date of employment up to the actual
payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.6

Denied reconsideration, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which found substantial
proof of petitioners' misconduct. The appellate court held that although the affidavits were executed after
the company investigation, the facts and issues therein were discussed during the investigation and
submitted to the management before the decision to dismiss the petitioners was made. It also ruled that
respondent Wenphil sufficiently complied with the due process requirement. The appellate court ruled as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission dated January 30, 2002 and September 24, 2002
are hereby SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated December 8, 2000 rendered in NLRC NCR Cases Nos. 30-03-00993-00
and 30-03-01020-00. The private respondents' complaints filed in the aforementioned cases are hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Petitioners now come before us assigning
the following errors:
I. THE FACTUAL BASES USED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN REVERSING THE RULING OF THE NLRC
IS (sic) ACTUALLY UNFOUNDED;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DELIBERATELY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE
INTERROGATION PROCESS CONDUCTED BY THE EMPLOYER IS VOID AB INITIO, HENCE, CANNOT BE
USED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR LAWFUL INVESTIGATION FOR PURPOSES OF DUE PROCESS;

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD WHIMSICALLY GIVE[N] TOO MUCH WEIGHT TO THE AFFIDAVITS
WHICH ASIDE FROM BEING SELF-SERVING, ARE NON-EXISTEN[T] AT THE TIME THEY WERE USED AS
A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONERS;

IV. IN REVERSING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LABOR TRIBUNALS, THE COURT OF APPEALS
WENT TO THE EXTENT OF OVER-EXPANDING ITS CERTIORARI JURISDICTION, IN VIOLATION OF LAW
AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;

V. THE LABOR ARBITER, BEING THE ONE WHO ACTUALLY CONDUCTED THE HEARING IN THE
ARBITRATION STATE AND HAD PERSONALLY OBSERVED THE DEMEANOR OF [THE] PARTIES DURING
THE HEARING, HIS FACTUAL FINDINGS (sic) CARRY HEAVIER WEIGHT THAN THE EVALUATION OF
[THE] COURT OF APPEALS' JUSTICES WHO MERELY RELY (sic) THEIR FINDINGS SOLELY FROM THE
RECORD OF THE CASE (sic).8

Essentially, we are asked to resolve the following issues: (1) Did the appellate court act in excess of its
jurisdiction when it reviewed factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC? (2) Was there compliance with
the due process requirement? (3) Were petitioners illegally dismissed?cralawlibrary

On the threshold procedural issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court went beyond its jurisdiction
when it re-evaluated the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter also affirmed by the NLRC.

Respondents counter that the appellate court correctly exercised its power of certiorari since the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC gravely abused their discretion when it failed to consider the affidavits of the
witnesses against the petitioners. They also point out that the present petition raises questions of fact
which are not proper in a Petition for Review under Rule 45.

The rule is that a petition for certiorari is available when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.9 Generally, factual issues are not proper subjects
for certiorari which is limited to the issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.10 Grave abuse of
discretion is committed when the board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial function fails to consider
evidence adduced by the parties.11 In the present case, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC disregarded the
affidavits of the witnesses against the petitioners.

Moreover, where the party's contention appears to be clearly tenable, or where the broader interest of
justice and public policy so require, the court may, in a certiorari proceeding, correct the error
committed.12 Hence, in our view, the Court of Appeals correctly exercised its power of certiorari when it re-
evaluated the findings of fact by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of this Court in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 is confined to a
review of questions of law. Further, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, when supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties, and are not reviewed by this Court, except
when the findings are contrary with those of the lower court or quasi-judicial bodies.13 The contradictory
findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals provide sufficient justification for our review of the facts.
On the second issue. Did Wenphil comply with the due process requirement before dismissing the
petitioners?cralawlibrary

Petitioners aver that their right to due process was violated. They were not notified of the accusation
against them before they were summoned to the main office of Wenphil on February 3, 2000 for
investigation. Further, they assert that the company investigation was irregular or void since they were not
allowed to seek the assistance of counsel, and that they were not present when the testimonies of the
witnesses were taken, and they were not given the opportunity to confront the witnesses against them.

First, the law requires that the employee be given two written notices before terminating his employment,
namely: (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss
him.14

The records show that the petitioners were given written notices informing them that they were charged
with serious misconduct and dishonesty in relation to the "Biggie Size It! Crew Challenge" program, and
notifying them of the scheduled hearings on February 4 and 7, 2000.15 Although notices were given to them
only on February 3, 2000, it will be noted that there were other investigations or hearings set after February
4 and 7 where they had the opportunity to explain their side after they were apprised of their alleged
infractions. We note likewise that petitioners, thinking that their verbal explanations were sufficient, opted
to forego a written explanation, and did not appear during the set hearing. These actions were choices that
petitioners voluntarily made.

On record are the written notices dated February 29, 2000,16 whereby petitioners were notified of
respondents' decision to terminate them. Petitioner Tuazon acknowledged receipt of her notice as
evidenced by her signature on the company's copy. Petitioner Abing's refusal to sign the company's copy,
despite his own copy having been tendered to him, does not invalidate the notice of his termination.

Petitioners contend that they were not given the opportunity to confront the witnesses against them.
Petitioners must be reminded, however, that confrontation of witnesses is required only in adversarial
criminal prosecutions, and not in company investigations for the administrative liability of the
employee.17 Additionally, actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification, or when
there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. This is not an
inherent right, and in company investigations, summary proceedings may be conducted.18

Finally, on the last issue. Petitioners contend that respondents did not sufficiently prove the existence of a
just cause for their termination, hence they were illegally dismissed.

There is no denying that petitioners were managerial employees. They executed management policies, they
had the power to hire personnel and assign them tasks; and discipline the employees in their branch. They
recommended actions on employees to the head office.19 Pertinent is Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code
defining a managerial employee as one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
Consequently, as managerial employees, in the case of petitioners, the mere existence of grounds for the
loss of trust and confidence justify their dismissal.20 Pursuant to our ruling in Caoile v. National Labor
Relations Commission,21 as long as the employer has a reasonable ground to believe that the managerial
employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, or the nature of his participation renders
him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position, the managerial employee can be
dismissed.

In the present case, the tape receipts presented by respondents showed that there were anomalies
committed in the branches managed by the petitioners. On the principle of respondeat superior  or command
responsibility alone, petitioners may be held liable for negligence in the performance of their managerial
duties, unless petitioners can positively show that they were not involved. Their position requires a high
degree of responsibility that necessarily includes unearthing of fraudulent and irregular activities.22 Their
bare, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated denial of any participation in the cheating does not prove their
innocence nor disprove their alleged guilt.23 Additionally, some employees declared in their affidavits24 that
the cheating was actually the idea of the petitioners.
Petitioners make much of the fact that the affidavits were executed only after the investigation. This is of no
moment. For even without the affidavits, sufficient basis exists for respondents' loss of trust and confidence
on the petitioners as managerial officers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 27, 2003 and Resolution dated February
23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75419 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Carpio Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr, JJ., concur.

2ND CASE A.M. ORETA & CO., INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SIXTO GRULLA,
JR. G.R. No. 74004. August 10, 1989

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the Resolution
of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated January 17, 1986 (p. 24, Rollo) in BES Case
No. 81-1371 entitled, "SIXTO GRULLA, JR., Complainant, versus A.M. ORETA & COMPANY, INC. and/or
ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CO. (ENDECO), Respondents", affirming
the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) awarding to private respondent
herein Sixto Grulla the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract.

The antecedent facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Private respondent Grulla was engaged by Engineering Construction and Industrial Development Company
(ENDECO) through A.M. Oreta and Co., Inc. as a carpenter in its project in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The
contract of employment, which was entered into on June 11, 1980 was for a period of twelve (12) months.
Respondent Grulla left the Philippines for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5, 1980.

On August 15, 1980, Grulla met an accident which fractured his lumbar vertebrae while working at the
jobsite. He was rushed to the New Jeddah Clinic and was confined there for twelve (12) days. On August 27,
1980, Grulla was discharged from the hospital and was told that he could resume his normal duties after
undergoing physical therapy for two weeks.

On September 18, 1980, respondent Grulla reported back to his Project Manager and presented to the
latter a medical certificate declaring the former already physically fit for work. Since then, he stated working
again until he received a notice of termination of his employment on October 9, 1980.

In December, 1981, respondent Grulla filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, recovery of medical benefits,
unpaid wages for the unexpired ten (10) months of his contract and the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement
of medical expenses against A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc. and Engineering Construction and Industrial
Development Co. (ENDECO) with the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA).

The petitioner A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc. and ENDECO filed their answer and alleged that the contract
of employment entered into between petitioners and Grulla provides, as one of the grounds for termination
of employment, violation of the rules and regulations promulgated by the contractor; and that Grulla was
dismissed because he has not performed his duties satisfactorily within the probationary period of three
months.

On August 8,1985, the POEA rendered a decision (pp. 97-107, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which
states, inter alia:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of the foregoing, this Office finds and so holds that complainant’s dismissal was illegal and warrants
the award of his wages for the unexpired portion of the contract.

"2. Anent the complainant’s claim for medical expenses, this Office finds the same to be well-taken.
Respondent did not deny either specifically or generally said claim. Hence, it is deemed admitted.

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc. and its
foreign principal Engineering Construction and Industrial Development Company (ENDECO) jointly and
severally to pay complainant within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order the sum of THREE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED US DOLLAR (US $3,700.00) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing
complainant’s salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for ten (10) months and the sum of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) representing reimbursement of medical expenses.

"Respondent is likewise ordered to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award.

"SO ORDERED"

Petitioner appealed from the adverse decision to the respondent Commission. On January 17, 1986,
respondent Commission dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the decision of the
POEA..

On April 1, 1986, the instant petition was filed on the ground that the respondent Commission committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the POEA. A temporary restraining order was issued by
this Court on April 23, 1986, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the questioned resolution of the
respondent Commission.

The issues to be resolved in the instant case are whether or not the employment of respondent Grulla was
illegally terminated by the petitioner; and whether or not the respondent Grulla is entitled to salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract.

Petitioner contends that the respondent Grulla was validly dismissed because the latter was still a
probationary employee; and that his dismissal was justified on the basis of his unsatisfactory performance of
his job during the probationary period. This contention has no merit.

Article 280 (formerly Article 281) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employment or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is far the duration of the season.

"An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, that
any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such actually exists."cralaw virtua1aw library

It may be well to cite at this point Policy Instructions No. 12 of the then Minister of Labor (now Secretary of
Labor and Employment) which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"PD 850 has defined the concept of regular and casual employment. What determines regularity or
casualness is not the employment contract, written or otherwise, but the nature of the job. If the job is
usually necessary or desirable to the main business of the employer, then employment is regular. . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Petitioner admitted that respondent Grulla was employed in the company as a carpenter for a period of
twelve months before he was dismissed on October 9, 1980. A perusal of the employment contract reveals
that although the period of employment of respondent Grulla is twelve (12) months, the contract period is
renewable subject to future agreement of the parties. It is clear from the employment contract that the
respondent Grulla was hired by the company as a regular employee and not just a mere probationary
employee.

On the matter of probationary employment, the law in point is Article 281 (formerly Article 252) of the
Labor Code which provides in part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 281. Probationary Employment. — . . . . The services of an employee who has been engaged on a
probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered regular
employee." (Emphasis ours)

The law is clear to the effect that in all cases involving employees engaged on probationary’ basis, the
employer shall make known to the employee at the time he is hired, the standards by which he will qualify as
a regular employee. Nowhere in the employment contract executed between petitioner company and
respondent Grulla is there a stipulation that the latter shall undergo a probationary period for three months
before he can quality as a regular employee. There is also no evidence on record showing that the
respondent Grulla had been apprised of his probationary status and the requirements which he should
comply in order to be a regular employee. In the absence of these requisites, there is justification in
concluding that respondent Grulla was a regular employee at the time he was dismissed by petitioner. As
such, he is entitled to security of tenure during his period of employment and his services cannot be
terminated except for just and authorized causes enumerated under the Labor Code and under the
employment contract.

Granting, in gratia argumenti, that respondent is a probationary employee, he cannot, likewise, be removed
except for cause during the period of probation. Although a probationary or temporary employee has limited
tenure, he still enjoys security of tenure. During his tenure of employment or before his contract expires, he
cannot be removed except for cause as provided for by law (Euro-Linea Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, No. L-75782,
December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 78; Manila Hotel Corporation v. NLRC, No. L-53453, January 22, 1986, 141
SCRA 169).

Article 282 of the Labor Code sets forth the following just causes for which an employer may terminate an
employment, namely:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;

"(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

"(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;

"(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and

"(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing."cralaw virtua1aw library

The alleged ground of unsatisfactory performance relied upon by petitioner for dismissing respondent Grulla
is not one of the just causes for dismissal provided in the Labor Code. Neither is it included among the
grounds for termination of employment under Article VII of the contract of employment executed by
petitioner company and respondent Grulla (p. 18, Rollo). Moreover, petitioner has failed to show proof of
the particular acts or omissions constituting the unsatisfactory performance of Grulla of his duties, which
was allegedly due to his poor physical state after the accident. Contrary to petitioner’s claims, records show
that the medical certificate issued by the hospital where respondent Grulla was confined as a result of the
accident, clearly and positively stated that Grulla was already physically fit for work after he was released
from the hospital (p. 102, Rollo).

Anent the respondent Commission’s finding of lack of due process in the dismissal of Grulla, the petitioner
claims that notice and hearing are important only if the employee is not aware of the problems affecting his
employment; that the same is not true in the instant case where respondent Grulla knew all along that he
could no longer effectively perform his job due to his physical condition. We find that this contention has no
legal basis.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The twin requirements of notice and healing constitute essential elements of due process in cases of
employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the
employer’s intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal, while the requirement of hearing
affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer’s changes against him and accordingly to
defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected. Neither of these requirements can be dispensed with
without running afoul of the due process requirement of the Constitution (Century Textile Mills, Inc., Et. Al.
v. NLRC, Et Al., G.R. No. 77859, May 25, 1988).

In the case at bar, respondent Grulla was not, in any manner, notified of the charges against him before he
was outrightly dismissed. Neither was any hearing or investigation conducted by the company to give the
respondent a chance to be heard concerning the alleged unsatisfactory performance of his work.

In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of respondent Grulla violated the security of tenure under the
contract of employment which specifically provides that the contract term shall be for a period of twelve
(12) calendar months. Consequently, the respondent Grulla should be paid his salary for the unexpired
portion of his contract of employment which is ten (10) months (See Cuales v. NLRC, at al., No. L-57379,
April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 812).

The findings of the POEA and the respondent Commission that the respondent Grulla is entitled to salaries
in the amount of US $3,700.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency for the unexpired portion of his
contract and the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement of medical expenses bear great weight. Well-
established is the principle that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.
Judicial review by this Court on labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence
upon which the labor officer or office based his or its determination but are limited to issues of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion (Special Events and Central Shipping Office Workers Union v. San Miguel
Corporation, Nos. L-61 002-06, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 557). In the instant case, the assailed Resolution
of the respondent Commission is not tainted with arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction and therefore, We find no reason to disturb the same.

ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the resolution
of the respondent Commission dated January 17, 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining
order issued on April 23, 1986 is lifted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

3RD CASE ALEJANDRO MARAGUINOT v. NLRC, GR No. 120969, 1998-01-22

Facts:
Petitioner Alejandro Maraguinot, Jr.
Paulino Enero... sought the assistance of their supervisor, Mrs. Alejandria Cesario, to facilitate their request
that private respondents adjust their salary in accordance with the minimum wage law.
Mrs. Cesario informed petitioners that Mr. Vic... del Rosario would agree to increase their salary only if they
signed a blank employment contract. As petitioners refused to sign, private respondents forced Enero to go
on leave... then refused to take him back when he reported for work
Meanwhile,... Maraguinot was... dropped from the company payroll... private respondents terminated his
services... found... the Labor Arbiter... that complainants were illegally dismissed.
The NLRC, in reversing the Labor Arbiter, then concluded that these circumstances, taken together,
indicated that complainant... s... were "project employees."... petitioners filed the instant petition, claiming
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in: (1)...
finding that petitioners were project employees; (2) ruling that petitioners were not illegally dismissed; and
(3) reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
To support their claim that they were regular (and not project) employees of private respondents,
petitioners cited their performance of activities that were necessary or desirable in the usual trade or
business of private respondents and added that their work was continuous,... i.e., after one project was
completed they were assigned to another project.
The OSG likewise rejects petitioners' contention that since they were hired not for one project, but for a
series of projects, they should be deemed regular employees.
the OSG asserts that what matters is that there... was a time-frame for each movie project made known to
petitioners at the time of their hiring.
Issues:
whether an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and private respondents or any
one of private respondents... whether petitioners were illegally dismissed
Ruling:
The relationship between VIVA and its producers or associate producers seems to be that of agency,... as
the latter make movies on behalf of VIVA, whose business is to "make" movies. As such, the employment
relationship between petitioners and... producers is actually one between petitioners and VIVA, with the
latter being the direct employer.
The employer-employee relationship between petitioners and VIVA can further be established by the
"control test." While four elements are usually considered in determining the existence of an employment
relationship, namely: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b)... the payment of wages; (c) the
power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct, the most important
element is the employer's control of the employee's conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be
done but also as to the means and methods... to accomplish the same
These four elements are present here. In their position paper submitted to the Labor Arbiter, private
respondents narrated the following circumstances:
In the instant case, the evidence on record shows that petitioner Enero was employed for a total of two (2)
years and engaged in at least eighteen (18) projects, while petitioner Maraguinot was employed for some
three (3) years and worked on at least twenty-three (23)... projects.
Moreover, as petitioners' tasks involved, among other chores, the loading, unloading and arranging of movie
equipment in the shooting area as instructed by the cameramen, returning the equipment to the Viva Films'
warehouse, and... assisting in the "fixing" of the lighting system, it may not be gainsaid that these tasks were
vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer.
Lest it be misunderstood, this ruling does not mean that simply because an... employee is a project or work
pool employee even outside the construction industry, he is deemed, ipso jure, a regular employee. All that
we hold today is that once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to
intermittently, re-hired by the same... employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are
vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer, then the employee must
be deemed a regular employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code and jurisprudence.
In closing then, as petitioners had already gained the status of regular employees, their dismissal was
unwarranted... the instant petition is GRANTED.