LESSONS LEARNED FROM INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

ID: AS/006/2020 Grounding of vessel at Thunder Bay, Canada

Vessel berthed stbd side to at MobilEx berth, at Thunder Bay for loading wheat
in bulk. During loading at berth, the vessel experienced severe ice conditions
and air temperature of minus 15 deg C. On completion of loading the final
drafts were read and confirmed by Chief Officer along with the surveyor as F
8.04 m / M 8.06 m / A 8.11 m.
The vessel departed berth at 0830 LT under pilotage. As per VDR records, at
0856 LT, the Master noticed the vessel was listed about 1.5 degrees to the port
side.
Soon after the Bridge team was engaged in trying to establish the reasons for
vessel listing while vessel was underway in the river under pilotage. Master
was frequently communicating with chief officer on deck for information related
to soundings at berth and vessel draft. Master regularly requested Pilot to ask
tugs to read port side drafts and hence Pilot was also getting distracted in
exchanging draft information from Tug to Master.
As per the VDR records, Pilot was seen having difficulty in keeping vessel
position and was making use of bold helm in trying to manoeuvre the vessel
and maintain her courses.
Bridge team momentarily did not have adequate situational awareness about
vessel drifting to shallow patch due to distraction from trying to establish
reasons for vessel list. There was no challenge from Master or Third Officer to
Pilot with regards to the developing situation and there was no attempt made to
Incident Description use the tugs and engine to avoid the grounding.
(What happened):
After proceeding about 0.8 NM from the berth, at 0910 LT, the vessel ran
aground on the starboard side of the channel in Mission River, between A17
and A15 buoys in Position 48 21.46 N / 089 13.56W.
The vessel refloated with the assistance of the tugs. The vessel anchored at
Thunder bay anchorage for investigation and making the vessel upright prior to
departure.

Additional Notes

There is a possibility that due to silting and shifting of sandbanks, which could
not be ascertained by hand lead line soundings at berth, the vessel was
touching bottom at berth and listed as soon as she came off the berth.As per
Sailing directions the entrance channel and river are subject to silting.

There could be another reason for the list that the ship staff was not able to
detect some extra ballast, due to the freezing of the sounding pipe. No.4 (P)
WBT sounding pipe showed 6 cm water before and after the listing. The vessel
pumped out about 80 MT of water from 4(P) WBT to correct the list. It indicates
either the soundings that were taken by ship staff were incorrect or the
sounding pipe may be either iced or partly blocked which could have resulted
in the incorrect sounding of the ballast tank.

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 LESSONS LEARNED FROM INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Photos:

Due to shallow water and bank effect, the vessel’s bow was cushioned and
canted to starboard. The speed through the water at this moment was 1.1
knots. Hence the correcting helm had little effect of controlling the vessel’s
heading.

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 LESSONS LEARNED FROM INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Potential Outcome Structural damage to the vessel and pollution

(What else could
have gone wrong):
Very shallow and narrow channel transit. Water depth of navigable Channel H
about 9.6 m (Sounding chart depth 8.8 m + height of water provided by the
pilot 0.77m), vessel max draft d = 8.2m due to list to port. The width of the
navigable channel about 60 m, LOA =199.98M. Thus both shallow water effect
(H/d <1.5) and Wall effect (W/L< 0.5) affected.

Immediate Causes:

Canadian Sailing direction Chapter 7 Thunder Bay - Mission River mentions

“Caution – The entrance channel and river are subject to silting”.

Extracts from Canadian Sailing Direction – Chapter 7 Thunder Bay

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 LESSONS LEARNED FROM INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Incorrect navigation or ship handling

 While the vessel bow was canting to starboard, the Main Engine was
STOP which caused rudder ineffective despite of the rudder was kept hard
a port
 Failure to closely monitor vessel position by Bridge Team while transiting
in channel
Failure to make full use of two tug boats to assist for maneuvering. The tugs
were instructed to check vessel drafts.

Lack of Situational awareness:

Distraction of bridge team (Master, pilot and duty officer) due to vessel list. The
Root / Basic vessel was listed on departure port which kept the Master occupied as he was
looking for reasons of the list and discussing with deck officers and engaging
Causes:
pilot to obtain drafts from escorting Tugs. Lack of situational awareness of
Bridge team. Developing grounding situation and difficulty in controlling vessel
movement were not being noticed by bridge team in time.

Action Responsibility
Corrective/Preventiv
Master and duty officer have been scheduled to FPD
e Measures:
carry out a BTM training before next joining
The bridge team should not be distracted from primary responsibility of safe
Key Message: navigation.

1. The bridge team should not be distracted with other tasks while navigating
under pilotage, noting that depending upon the severity of the matter at
hand, if possible, vessel should stop/anchor or suspend the pilotage to
investigate the matter properly.

2. Bridge team should always diligently monitor the vessel's position in close
Lessons Learned: consultation with the pilot, noting that action as/if required should be taken
sufficiently early to prevent any untoward incident.

3. Vessel must have due regard to the cold/extreme weather precautions and
associated hazards resulting in freezing of ballast water in tanks or blocking
of sounding pipes. The vessel specific checklist for Winter/cold weather
precaution should be referred and complied.

Team engagement / Have you experience similar incidents before?

discussion topics What were the causes and actions taken?
How can we prevent the similar incident on our vessel?
Are you aware of the Winter / Cold weather precautions while handling ballast
?

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