Investigation of the

Collapse of the Chirajara

Bridge
A summary of a study conducted by members of ACI Committee 133, Disaster
Reconnaissance

by Santiago Pujol, Michael E. Kreger, Jonathan D. Monical, and Arturo E. Schultz

T
he government of Colombia is conducting an The exterior spans were approximately 80 m (262 ft) long.
expansion of its built infrastructure, including the At the terminal ends of these shorter spans, massive
transportation system, through its Agencia Nacional de abutments were placed to provide reactions against a portion
Infraestructura (National Infrastructure Agency, ANI). The of the loads imposed on the longer center span.
Chirajara Bridge was one of 47 bridges in a project1 to expand The West Tower (at Axis B in Fig. 1) collapsed, claiming
the highway from Bogotá to Villavicencio from two to four
A B C D
lanes, with the bridge carrying two of those lanes. While 80.00 286.30 80.00

under construction, one-half of the Chirajara Bridge collapsed

on January 15, 2018.
The mission of ACI Committee 133, Disaster Reconnaissance,
is to collect information from disasters affecting reinforced
and prestressed concrete structures. The information collected
is used to inform ACI committees that develop code
provisions, design recommendations, and specifications.
Following the collapse, a representative of ACI Committee (a)
133 contacted ANI to request access to the site to collect any
information that could link the collapse to needed A
80.00
B

improvements in design recommendations. This article

summarizes the findings of the investigation.

The Bridge
Overview Stays not in place

The Chirajara Bridge was a cable-stayed bridge, with a

total projected length of 446.3 m (1464 ft), spanning the
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
nearly 150 m (500 ft) deep Chirajara gorge. It was supported 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

by two reinforced concrete towers, each to have 52 stay
cables. Each tower was 107.34 m (301 ft) tall (above a drilled
shaft foundation), and the center-to-center distance between
the towers was 286.3 m (938 ft). The stay cables consisted of
bundles of ASTM A416/A416M Grade 270 (270,000 psi
[1860 MPa] tensile strength) strands. The typical spacing of
stay anchorages along the length of the bridge deck was 9.25 m
(30 ft), shown in Fig. 1.
129.5 m completed deck
(b)
Fig. 1: The Chirajara Bridge was a cable-stayed bridge, with a total
projected length of 446.3 m (1464 ft), spanning the nearly 150 m
(500 ft) deep Chirajara gorge: (a) schematic of the completed bridge
(viewed from the south); and (b) schematic of the West Tower at the
time of the collapse on January 15, 2018 (Note: Dimensions are in m;
1 m = 3.3 ft)

www.concreteinternational.com | Ci | JUNE 2019 29

the lives of nine workers. At the time, bridge construction was
near completion, with the ends of the deck that cantilevered
from each tower being approximately 30 m (98 ft) from one
another. No construction activities involving heavy weights or
large forces are reported to have been taking place on the
collapsed portion at the time of failure.
Key components, dimensions, and properties
The deck was a 13 m (43 ft) wide, composite steel-concrete
structure with two 1500 mm (59 in.) deep steel longitudinal
girders and 840 mm (33 in.) deep steel transverse beams
supporting a 200 mm (8 in.) thick reinforced concrete slab
every 3 m (9.8 ft).
Each tower had a hollow 38 m (125 ft) tall mast to anchor
the stay cables (Fig. 2). The mast had a rectangular section
and was supported by a structure with a diamond-shape
elevation; the widest part of the diamond accommodated the
roadway. The specified compressive strength for the tower
concrete was 35 MPa (5000 psi). Standard cylinder test
reports provided to the supervision company show results
exceeding the specified strength.
The outer dimensions of the cross section of the mast were
6 m (20 ft) in the longitudinal direction of the deck and 4.6 m
(15 ft) in the transverse direction. The corresponding inner
dimensions were 4 and 3.8 m (13 and 12.5 ft), respectively. The
walls were therefore 1000 and 400 mm (39 and 16 in.) thick.
0.60
4.60
0.60
4.60
1.00
6.00
1.00
Columns supporting the mast were 6 by 1.6 m (20 by 5.2 ft)
in cross section (solid), with the longer side oriented in the
longitudinal direction of the deck. The lower part of the tower
included a 500 mm (20 in.) thick wall acting as a web between
the columns (Fig. 3).
At the top of this web and below the deck was a 6 m wide,
600 mm (24 in.) thick slab (Fig. 4). The slab acted as a tie
between the columns at the elevation with the widest
separation between the columns. This element was referred to
as the “tower slab” in the drawings.
The standard to be met by the deformed reinforcing bars
was not specified in the design drawings provided to the
authors. Nevertheless, mill certificates provided to a
supervision company for the highway expansion project listed
minimum and maximum yield strengths of 60,000 and
78,000 psi (420 and 540 MPa), respectively, with a required
minimum elongation of 14%. This indicates that the bars were
specified as ASTM A706/A706M Grade 60.
According to the drawings, longitudinal reinforcement in
each column comprised 146 No. 10 bars (the drawings
indicated the bar size using ASTM A706/A706M
nomenclature), resulting in a reinforcement ratio of 1.2%.
The volumetric transverse reinforcement ratio was 0.5%.
Longitudinal (vertical) reinforcement in the mast comprised
156 No. 10 bars near the outer perimeter face of the hollow
section and 46 No. 6 bars near the inner perimeter face,
resulting in a reinforcement ratio of 1.1%. The volumetric
ratio of transverse reinforcement in the mast also was 1.1%.
The interior of the mast was lined with steel plates. The plates
1.00

0.075 15 No. 10 0.075

0.40 at 0.10
38.0

No. 3 crossties

No. 4 tie at 0.20

1.40
70.00

2.15

No. 6 bar at 0.20

No. 8 vertical bar at 0.20 (72 total each face of web)

1.60
32.00

11 No. 4 crossties at 0.20

58 No. 10 at 0.10

0.5
6

13.00
0.050
14.15
17.62
1.60
Tower No. 4 bar at 0.2
slab
37.34
32.34

Web

4.00
0.25
2.38 8.50
5.00

8.50 1.6

Fig. 3: Section through tower column and web (Note: Dimensions are in m; 1 m =
Fig. 2: Schematic views of a bridge tower 3.3 ft; bar sizes are indicated using ASTM A706/A706M nomenclature—
(Note: Dimensions are in m; 1 m = 3.3 ft) roughly, diameters in multiples of 1/8 in.)

30 JUNE 2019 | Ci | www.concreteinternational.com

 12 tendons of one (1) 0.60 in. diameter strand
14 tendons of eight (8) 0.60 in. diameter strands

No. 4 at 0.25 L = 2.95

3 No. 4 at 0.30

0.10
No. 4 at 0.25 L = 12.00
0.60 L = 1.75

No. 4 at 0.25 L = 2.95 No. 4 at 0.25 L = 12.00

57 No. 4 at 0.25 L = 5.90 both faces

Column Web Column

Fig. 4: Section through slab that acted as a tie between the columns at the elevation with the widest separation (Note: Dimensions are in m
unless noted otherwise; 1 m = 3.3 ft; 1 in. = 25 mm)

were 20 mm (0.8 in.) thick in the direction of the deck and
25 mm (1 in.) thick in the perpendicular direction, and they
were anchored to the concrete with headed studs.
The web connecting the lower columns of the tower was
reinforced with vertical and horizontal bars near each face.
The vertical reinforcement comprised No. 8 deformed bars
(1% reinforcement ratio) and the horizontal reinforcement
comprised No. 4 bars (0.26% reinforcement ratio). The
drawings showed No. 4 crossties at approximately every third
vertical bar (as shown in Fig. 3). While the drawings also
called for a spacing of 200 mm (8 in.) for both the vertical and
horizontal bars, we observed in the remains of the West Tower
web that the vertical spacing of the No. 4 bars varied between
100 and 200 mm (4 and 8 in.). A design section shows that the
horizontal web reinforcement was terminated at hooks
anchored at exterior longitudinal bars in the column (Fig. 3).
The tower slab reinforcement is shown in Fig. 4.
Reinforcement anchored in the columns consisted of twelve

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www.concreteinternational.com | Ci | JUNE 2019 31

0.6 in. (15 mm) diameter unbonded
post-tensioning strands. We believe that
these were specified as ASTM A416/
A416M Grade 270 strands. Notice that
the deformed reinforcement was
terminated near each column face.
Because the construction process
resulted in cold joints between the
concrete in the tower slab and the
columns, the deformed bars would
have been incapable of transferring
tension forces between the tower slab
and the columns.
Deformed reinforcing bars were lap
spliced. Splices were located away from
critical sections.

Construction sequence
After the towers and abutments were
constructed, the deck was built from
each abutment to the adjacent tower.
Shoring supported the deck during this
operation. Deck segments were added
from each tower toward the center of the
middle span. These segments were
supported by stay cables, and the weight
of each was balanced by a corresponding
segment on the opposite side of the
tower supporting it. Once the initial
seven pairs of stay cables were installed
for each tower, additional segments in
the center span were balanced by the
stays anchored in the nearest abutment.
Collapse
Reported conditions
For the portion of the bridge that
collapsed (supported by the West
Tower, on Axis B), 13 pairs of stay
cables are reported to have been
installed from the tower toward
mid-span, with the total length of deck
cantilevered approximately 129.5 m
(425 ft) from the center of the tower
(shown in Fig. 1). We understand that
the 200 mm thick reinforced concrete
deck slab had been cast along this
entire length. We also understand that
the deck supported by the collapsed
tower contained only small live loads at
the time of collapse. On the deck carried
by the (remaining) East Tower, 12 pairs
of stay cables had been installed, and
deck framing had been installed for the
13th deck segment. Nevertheless, no
Fig. 5: Frames from a video of the collapse of the West Tower, recorded by a nearby security
camera north of the bridge. The time interval between each frame is approximately 1 second
concrete had been placed for the 12th
and 13th deck segments.
It is also important to review what the
structure was not experiencing at the
time of collapse. Neither portion of
bridge was carrying significant live load,
and the concrete deck did not yet have a
planned asphalt wearing course. Lastly,
there were no seismic demands, no
reports of strong winds, and no
indication of foundation distress at the
base of the towers.
Video evidence
A security camera recorded the West
Tower during the collapse. Frames
extracted from this video are shown in
Fig. 5. The sequence shows clearly that
the dominant feature of the collapse
involved separation between the
columns on opposing sides of the tower,
suggesting a tensile failure at or near the
tower slab. The other bridge components
fall almost directly downward.
Field Assessment
The debris
The displacements seen in the video
simplified the task of identifying and
labeling the structural members in the
debris field (Fig. 6). Examination of the
debris revealed that failure involved
separation between the lower columns
and web. Figure 7 shows that the
horizontal No. 4 bars in the web
fractured at the juncture with a column.
Despite the collapse, the remains of the
web had limited cracking, indicating
that strains were concentrated near the
columns, where the horizontal web
reinforcement fractured. We observed no
failures in stay-cable anchorages in the
bridge deck, and we noted that deck
girders fractured at splice locations.
The remaining tower
On January 25-26, 2018, the East
Tower was still in place as constructed.
We inspected the tower with a powerful

32 JUNE 2019 | Ci | www.concreteinternational.com

scope, cameras with zoom lenses, and Analyses of the Towers
an aerial robot (drone) (Fig. 8(a)), and Simple idealization of the tower
we observed that the cold joints at the as a truss
ends of the tie (or tower slab) were open The video of the collapse suggests
(Fig. 8(b)). We also noted a large crack that the failure was related to gravity
in the north side of the web, starting demands. We made the following
near the cold joint and extending toward estimate of the vertical load acting on
the foundation. We estimated the crack the West Tower at the time of the
to be 8 to 9 m (26 to 30 ft) in length collapse.
(Fig. 8(c)). Figure 9 shows a free-body diagram
of the West Tower and deck at the time
of the collapse. The distributed deck
load was about 6.5 kPa (135 psf),
including the concrete slab and stay
cables. The deck cantilevered 129.5 m
(425 ft) from the West Tower, so this
deck portion totaled about 129.5 m × 13 m
× 6.5 kPa = 11,000 kN (2.5 million lbf).
Because the 80 m (262 ft) span
measured to the outermost stay of the
exterior span was shorter than the
cantilevered portion, the group of stay
cables anchored in the abutment must
have been stressed to balance the
system. The vertical component of
forces in these stays would have added
to the vertical forces acting on the
Fig. 6: View of collapse site captured using an aerial robot (drone). LCS and LCN indicate
lower column south and north sides, respectively; and UCS and UCN indicate upper column
south and north sides, respectively (images courtesy of Xenital S.A.S.)
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Views of the lower column south (LCS), showing the remnants of horizontal No. 4 bars at what had been the junction with the web:
(a) overall view; (b) view of bars that were bent downward as the column fell away from the web; and (c) closeup of bars that necked down
and fractured at the juncture
www.concreteinternational.com | Ci | JUNE 2019
mast. We were not provided with
records of the cable-stressing
operations. However, we estimated this
component to be 3600 kN (820,000 lbf)
by assuming that the horizontal
component and the concrete transition
block (discussed in the next paragraph)
balanced the cantilever load.
The deck in the exterior span totaled
about 66 m × 13 m × 6.5 kPa = 5600 kN
(1.26 million lbf), where the 66 m (217 ft)
dimension is the approximate length of
the deck from the tower center toward
the abutment. A concrete transition
block (about 3 x 3 m [9.8 x 9.8 ft] in
cross section and 15.7 m [51.5 ft] in
length) had been placed between the
deck and the abutment. This block
included voids and weighed about
2220 kN (500,000 lbf), and half of the
weight was supported by the end of
the deck.
The total force delivered by the stay
cables to the mast atop the West Tower
was therefore 11,000 + 3600 + 5600 +
2220/2 = 21,300 kN (4.79 million lbf).
The mast itself weighed nearly
12,000 kN (2.7 million lbf). The total
vertical force introduced by the mast to
the upper columns was therefore
21,300 + 12,000 ≈ 33,300 kN (about
7.49 million lbf). Lastly, the columns in
the upper portion of the tower weighed
nearly 8000 kN (1.8 million lbf) each.
If one idealizes the upper half of the
tower as a simple arch (that is, a
two-element truss), with the weight of
its elements being applied in halves at
element ends, the horizontal component
of the axial force in each of the upper
columns would be approximately
(c)
33
 Resisting a critical tensile force of nearly 1 million lbf
  8000 kN   1 1
33,300 kN + 2  2
  × × = 4130 kN ≈ 928, 000 lbf (4450 kN)—designing mechanisms to transfer it from one
   2 5 element to another, ensuring reliable long-term capacity, and
The factor 1/2 is the inverse of the number of columns in prohibiting cracking in concrete—would require extreme care
the tower. The factor 1/5 is approximately the tangent of the in the design and meticulous detailing of the reinforcement.
angle between the column and the vertical. The weight of Idealizing the entire tower as a truss (that is, ignoring the
8000 kN is multiplied by 2 because there were two columns, web) would nearly double the estimated axial force in the slab
and it is divided by 2 to follow the common and stated that acted as a tie near tower mid-height (to almost 2 million
assumption that the weight of a truss element can be assigned lbf [8900 kN]). In contrast, the only continuous reinforcement
in halves to the nodes at its ends. in this element comprised twelve 0.6 in. diameter, Grade 270
The estimated force had to be resisted mostly by the tower unbonded strands. The nominal strength of these strands
slab that acted as a horizontal tie between the columns. The would have been about 12 × 0.217 in.2 × 270 ksi = 0.7 million lbf
deck itself did not help resist this tension because the only (3100 kN), which is much less than the 1 to 2 million lbf
direct connection with the tower occurred through bearing tensile force needed to hold the two columns in position at the
pads meant to support at least a fraction of the deck segment widest point in the tower.
directly over the tower. In the estimates given previously, it Therein lies the most glaring issue that may explain the
was assumed that this fraction was negligible relative to the collapse. The tower slab—the element that acted as a tie at
other weights involved. mid-height of the tower—did not have sufficient reinforcement.
The load on the bridge was smaller
than what was expected at service.
There was no reason for any stresses in
the system to be remotely close to
limiting values. Yet, statics and the
simple bridge representation described
previously show that the mid-height
tower slab acting as a tie to resist a
force did not have adequate capacity.
From that point of view, the reason for
the collapse should not be difficult to
(a) (b) (c)
understand.
Fig. 8: The East Tower was inspected using an aerial robot: (a) view of the joints between the
tower column, slab, and web; (b) magnified, lightened, and clarified detail showing opened Linear idealization of the tower
cold joint between tower column and slab; and (c) magnified, lightened, and clarified detail and web
showing large crack in the web We also made a linear idealization of
the tower, including a membrane to
B Vertical component of force imposed represent the web joining the columns of
Line of action of stays
anchored to abutment
by stays anchored to abutment = 3600 kN the lower half of the tower. This model
4200 kN resulted in a tensile force in the critical
Mast weight = 12,000 kN tower tie of about 1.5 million lbf
Upper column weight = 2(8000 kN) (6670 kN). Again, this force exceeds the
capacity of the tower slab. The number
98.5 m
6.5 kPa(13 m) = 84.5 kN/m of strands required to resist this tension
(working at strength) is 26 (many more
than the 12 strands provided). Including
factors of safety and accounting for
40°
loads not acting at the time of collapse,
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
one would expect this number to nearly
1110 kN
triple (to ~78 strands). Interestingly,
66 m 129.5 m
practically zero tension would be
expected in the transverse direction of
Lower column and web weight
the tower slab (longitudinal direction of
the deck). Nevertheless, the slab
Foundation reactions drawings show 14 tendons, each
Fig. 9: A free-body diagram of the West Tower and deck at the time of the collapse (Note: 1 m = containing eight strands, for a total of
3.3 ft; 1 kN = 225 lbf; 1 kPa = 21 psf) 112 strands in that direction.

34 JUNE 2019 | Ci | www.concreteinternational.com

Finite element model of the tower and web
What is more difficult to explain is why the West Tower
supported loads for as long as it did and why the East Tower
remained standing after the collapse of the West Tower. We
believe that failure did not occur earlier during construction
because the structure was able to accommodate some force
redistribution through cracking and yielding of reinforcement
in the web of the tower.
To explore the issue further, we developed an approximate
model of the tower using SAP2000,2 based on the following
assumptions:
•• The tower was idealized as frame elements, with moments
transferred at column joints but with no moment or axial
load transferred at the connection between the columns and
the tower slab. In other words, the cold joints between the
slab and columns were represented by axial and moment
releases, uncoupling the corresponding degrees of freedom
between the slab and columns;
•• The tower slab and columns were modeled using linear
beam elements, with an assumed elastic modulus of
25,000 MPa (3.6 million psi);
•• The tower web between the lower columns was modeled
using nonlinear layered shell elements, with reinforcing
bars having a yield stress of 480 MPa and concrete having
a tensile strength of 1.7 MPa (250 psi). The tower slab
acted as a stiffener at the web top; and
•• The force applied by the 0.6 in. diameter unbonded strands
in the tower slab was modeled as an external clamping force.
Three analyses were made using different clamping forces.
The lowest force was 3100 kN, which is approximately the
(a) (b)
Fig. 10: Plots of stress in horizontal reinforcement in the web, determined using a finite element model of the tower (the full tower was
modeled, but columns are truncated in the illustration). Stress in horizontal reinforcement at the column-web joint varied significantly with
clamping force: (a) clamping force P = 700,000 lbf (3100 kN); (b) P = 800,000 lbf (3560 kN); and (c) P = 1 million lbf (4450 kN)
tensile strength of the 12 unbonded strands in the tower slab.
The other clamping forces were 3560 and 4450 kN. Analyses
were made in U.S. customary units (clamping forces of
700,000; 800,000; and 1 million lbf). At the highest clamping
force, no yielding was calculated in the horizontal web
reinforcement. For the lower clamping force values of 3100
and 3560 kN, yielding and concentrated strains were
calculated at the column-web joint. Figure 10 shows
horizontal reinforcement stress for the three analyses. Note
that stresses in the slab were also observed to be below the
expected tensile strength of concrete in direct tension (which
can be as low as 1.4 to 2.1 MPa [200 to 300 psi]).
Strain concentration, leading to brittle response, could be
expected at the web-column connection because the cracking
stress of the concrete in direct tension was about the same as the
gross stress over the concrete section at yield of the horizontal
reinforcement in the web. With a horizontal web reinforcement
ratio of 0.26%, the gross stress in the concrete can be calculated
as 0.26% × 480 MPa = 1.25 MPa (180 psi). This condition
will result in limited cracking, as strain will be concentrated at
initial cracks. Further, the unreinforced cold joint at the slab
ends would have acted as a crack initiator. Heavier web
reinforcement would have produced a more ductile structure
and possibly provided more time to react to the failure.
Cracking observed in the remaining (East) tower (shown in
Fig. 8) supports the hypothesis that strains concentrated at the
cold joint at the slab level and near the web-column
connection. Why did the remaining tower not collapse? Here
are a few plausible reasons:
•• Because concrete had not yet been placed in the two most
(c)
www.concreteinternational.com | Ci | JUNE 2019 35
 distant segments in the cantilever of the East Tower, the
East Tower had lower loads. The 200 mm thick concrete
deck resulted in a uniform load of 4.7 kPa applied over the
13 m wide deck area. Thus, relative to the West Tower, the
total stay force in the cantilever side could have been
reduced by 61 kN/m × 2 × 9.25 m = 1100 kN. Further, the
horizontal force in the stays anchored to the abutment
could have been reduced by 1340 kN to balance the
cantilever, resulting in a plausible reduction in the stay
force in the tower of 1100 + 1340 × tan(40) = 2220 kN
(a 10% reduction);
•• Post-tensioning in the tower slab of the East Tower
might have been more effective than in the collapsed
West Tower;
•• The East Tower might have had more web reinforcement; or
•• Initial shrinkage cracks might have distributed strains
better and reduced brittleness in the standing tower.
The answer may involve one or several of these plausible
reasons. In any case, it is clear that the East Tower was near
its limit. (Following a detailed study by a consulting firm, the
remaining portion of the Chirajara Bridge was brought down
by a controlled detonation in July 2018.)
The concentration of strains described previously implies
that the wall web reinforcement was likely to fracture early in
the collapse process. That failure would not necessarily lead
to collapse if the remaining structure had sufficient capacity. A
limit analysis of a failure mechanism that did not include web
yielding provided an estimated resistance smaller than the
estimated demand. For safe operation, the demand should be
much less than the resistance. Given the brittleness of the
web, it is unlikely that both web and columns (working as
parts of a plastic mechanism) reached their capacities at the
same time.
Conclusions
In our opinion, the West Tower of the Chirajara Bridge
collapsed because post-tensioned reinforcement placed in a
slab meant to act as a tie between columns was insufficient by
a large margin. In contrast, in the perpendicular direction (that
is, in the direction of the deck), where no large stresses would
have been expected, this slab tie (or tower slab) was provided
with nine times more reinforcement. Had the provided

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reinforcement been rotated 90 degrees, the collapse would not
have occurred.
The insufficient lateral restraint offered by the
reinforcement in the tower slab—a critical component that
acted as a tie between columns—forced the reinforced
concrete web between the columns to work in tension. Two
factors played a critical role in the response of the web to
this tension:
••
The web had minimum tensile reinforcement (with a
horizontal web reinforcement ratio of 0.26%). Its strength
was comparable to the expected cracking stress of the
concrete in direct tension. When cracking stress and
reinforcement strength are similar, deformations
concentrate at a single or few cracks and tend to result in
brittle failure; and
•• The cold joint formed at the connection between the tower
slab and the columns created a discontinuity, forcing
further concentration of strain and increasing the brittleness
of the system.
Critical elements required to work in tension should be
reinforced with amounts of reinforcement exceeding the code
minima to avoid brittleness. The brittleness of the web
prevented better redistribution of forces, which could have
delayed the collapse.
This tragic example emphasizes once again the importance
of peer review of all projects—especially projects with large
and complex structures.
Acknowledgments
Our deepest condolences are expressed to the families of the workers
who lost their lives in this tragedy. The only purpose of our work is to
avoid similar tragedies in the future.
Xenital S.A.S., under the direction of Sebastian Uribe, assisted the
team in the inspection of the bridge using a drone-mounted camera.
The Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura (ANI), Fiscalia General, and
Ministerio de Transporte, all government agencies in Colombia, are
thanked for their assistance in our investigation.
Special gratitude is expressed to Ron Burg and Matthew Senecal of ACI,
Luis Fernando Mejia of ANI, Luís E. Garcia, and Omar D. Cardona.
Their support and assistance were indispensable.
Santiago Pujol, FACI, is a Professor of
civil engineering at the Lyles School of
Civil Engineering at Purdue University,
West Lafayette, IN. His research
interests include seismic vulnerability
of structures, response of structures
to impulsive loads, structural health
monitoring, repair, and strengthening
of structures. He is a member of ACI
Committees 133, Disaster Reconnaissance, and 314, Simplified
Design of Concrete Buildings; ACI Subcommittee 318-R, High
Strength Reinforcement; and Joint ACI-ASCE Committees 441,
Reinforced Concrete Columns, and 445, Shear and Torsion.
Michael E. Kreger, FACI, is the Garry
Neil Drummond Endowed Chair in
Civil Engineering and Director of the
Large-Scale Structures Laboratory in
the Department of Civil, Construction
and Environmental Engineering at the
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa,
AL. He is a member of the ACI Board
of Direction and ACI Committees 133,
Disaster Reconnaissance; 318, Structural Concrete Building
Code; and 374, Performance-Based Seismic Design of Concrete
Buildings; ACI Subcommittees 318-C, Safety, Serviceability, and
Analysis; and 318-J, Joints and Connections; and Joint ACI-ASCE
Committees 352, Joints and Connections in Monolithic Concrete
Structures, and 441, Reinforced Concrete Columns.
Jonathan D. Monical is pursuing his PhD
at the Lyles School of Civil Engineering
at Purdue University, where he received
his BSCE in 2016 and his MSCE in
structural engineering in 2017. He is a
recipient of the school’s 2017 John E.
Goldberg Fellowship.

Disclaimer
This article contains the opinions and observations solely of the writers. Arturo E. Schultz is a Professor of civil
It does not reflect the views of any organization with which they are engineering and Director of Hybrid
associated. The writers shall not assume any responsibility related to use Simulation at the Department of Civil,
of their opinions by others. Environmental, and Geo- Engineering
at the University of Minnesota, Twin
References Cities, Minneapolis, MN. His research
1. ANI website, Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura (National interests include the seismic design and
Infrastructure Agency), Colombia, www.ani.gov.co/proyecto/carretero/ performance of concrete and masonry
bogota-villavicencio-21255. (last accessed Feb. 2019) structures. He is a member of Joint ACI-
2. SAP2000, “Integrated Software for Structural Analysis and ASCE Committees 335, Composite and
Design,” Computers & Structures, Inc. (CSI), 2018. Hybrid Structures, and 441, Reinforced Concrete Columns.

Selected for reader interest by the editors.

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