FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT

STUDIES
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE (HONOURS) PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES
STUDENT NAME: MWASHITA CAXTON STUDENT NO: L0202850N

DATE: 11/11/2020 COURSE CODE: HPSS 1108

COURSE DESCRIPTION: CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES

PHONE NUMBER: 0773640661

TOPIC: NEGOTIATION

CATEGORY MARK COMMENTS

How well is each part of the question
answered? (30 marks)
Is the question answered with the use
of literature and student’s own-in-depth
analysis? (40 marks)
Is the assignment structured with the
use of sub-headings and does it follow
a logical order? ((10 marks)
Is the presentation and referencing
appropriate for the under-graduate
level? (10 marks)
Preparation and clarity of expression
(10 marks)
(less and deduction for lateness)
TOTAL
Overall Comments
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Lecturer :__________________________ Signature : _______________________

Date Marked : __________________________ Overall Mark: _________ %

a) What is negotiation
According to Thompson (2010), negotiation is a communication between parties which occurs
whenever they cannot achieve their goals without the cooperation of others as also concurred
with by Pareto (1935) when he described negotiation as an interpersonal decision making
process which is necessary whenever an objectives is not achieved single-handedly. Therefore
negotiation is a talk between parties to reach a common ground in resolving a conflict between
them. An example is when A wants to buy a beast from B and the prize has been pegged at
UD$500 but in A’s budget he has $400. To reach a consensus and make sure a beast has been
bought a discussion between A and B has to be done to reach at each other’s favorable point of
cost which is termed negotiation.
Pareto (1935) is of the view that negotiation is a process which when done negotiators should be
in a position to take cognizance of the negotiators’ behaviors, cognitions, emotions, and
motivations.
According to Pareto (1935) the negotiation outcomes should include the integrative and
distributive features of the agreement. The Integrative feature is achieved when all creative
opportunities are leveraged and no resources are left on the table thereby benefiting all parties.
The distributive feature is achieved when negotiators are mainly concerned about their own
economic outcomes and not the joint outcomes of all negotiating parties. Each party is vying to
bargain on another, (Ochs & Roth 1989).
For example in a game one person player 1 receives a fixed amount of money $100 to divide
with another person. Player 1 proposes a split of the $100, if player 2 agrees, the proposed split
takes effect. If player 2 rejects the proposal, each party gets $0. The split that Player 1 proposes
can be perceived to be fair or acceptable to player 2, leading player 2 to accept the offer. In this
case, the distributive aspect of the negotiation is the proportion of the original $100 that each
negotiator receives (Guth et al. 1982, Ochs & Roth 1989).
According to Curhan, Elfenbein and Xu (2006) in finding out what value is aimed to be
achieved when people negotiate came up with four distinct considerations in negotiation
emerged which includes feelings about instrumental outcomes that is how much money the
parties made, feelings about themselves that is how competent they were in the negotiation,
feelings about the process that is whether the conversation was constructive and feelings about
the relationship to focus on whether the negotiation preserved or strengthened it.
An example of value claiming is in the example of Trump where he depicted negotiation as a
competitive exercise in which the ultimate goal is to get a better deal than one’s opponent.
Value claimers such as Donald Trump focus on beating the other party by aiming high, making
minimal concessions, guarding information, and at times threatening, ridiculing, or intimidating
their adversaries to get their way in the campaign for the presidential polls.

b) Citing relevant examples explain in detail the negotiator’s dilemma.

As negotiation is a process which every party when coming to the table of discussion has certain
objectives in mind which are aimed to be achieved at the end of the process and to achieve them
needs certain strategies to be employed in the process of negotiation for the mission to be a
success and these options of strategies puts the negotiator in a dilemma.

Negotiator’s dilemma, according to Lax et Sebenius, (1986) is the inherent tension between
using cooperative and competitive tactics in negotiation. A choice the negotiator must make
between following competitive strategy or cooperative strategy when engaging another partner
who have two dimensions which are value creating and value claiming or adversarial behaviors.

The value creating behaviors are those used by negotiators to come to a cooperative, win-win
situation and they possess the following characteristics and behaviors, cooperative, open and
honest, seek and find common ground, don’t criticize, share information freely and they look for
numerous options for both parties without compromise.

The adversarial or value claiming approach typically involves misleading the other party about
ones’ concerns and minimal requirements, exaggerating diverging positions, concealing,
exercising threat of sanctions and defecting. Lax et Sebenius, (1986) view the adversarial aim as
to win at negotiating, and thus make the other lose where one must start high and concede
slowly, and exaggerate the value of concessions minimizing the benefits of the other’s
concessions, concealing information, argue forcefully on behalf of the principles that imply
favorable settlements, make commitments to accept only highly favorable agreements and be
willing to outwait the other fellow.
Putnam, (1994) in his productive conflict negotiation journal is of the notion that negotiators face
a tactical dilemma at each stage of the negotiating process in the adoption of the most adapted
strategy as they are interdependent and the result of the disputed resources for one party depends
on the moves of the other party. He also adds that resorting in isolation to a cooperative tactic put
the negotiator at risk of being exploited by the other party. If one negotiator impulses a
cooperative strategy, he immediately places himself in a vulnerable position and risks losing the
greatest share of the disputed outcomes and if the other party, acting rationally decides on his
part to claim the largest value.
Negotiators can ignore or try to minimize this tension by resorting to problem solving tactics, yet
they cannot completely escape the dilemma. Every negotiation is characterized by elements of
cooperation and competition: for instance, once the pie has been enlarged, the question of the
division of the gains remains, and still presents a potential for disputes.
Thompson and Hastie (1990) are of the opinion that the dilemma of the negotiator has different
scenarios which keeps the negotiator unsettled about the decision he is to take. He posits that if
both parties choose to create value that is they compete, they both receive a superior mutual
outcome both parties are likely to come up with a good outcome. On the other hand, if both
parties decide to jointly claim value, that is they all cooperate, they end up with the less desirable
outcome which will be a mediocre value for both parties.
In addition to the dilemma, the negotiators can deny the dilemma when their attitude is
exemplified by the win-win philosophy that produces the mutual gains or principled negotiation
scenario (Wilson 1992). He also assets that the assumption of a complete elimination of hostility
between the partners is highly questionable if taken literally, the win-win negotiation appears
elusive and inapplicable.
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, (1994) argue that the dilemma can be overcome when the partners try to
change the rules of the game by resorting to the assistance of a mediator who will usher in the
ways which are suitable for negotiation without any stress to the negotiator himself while Wilson
(1992) seconded the notion and stressed that the negotiators are encouraged to explore the
reconciliation of their respective interests rather than engage in a contest over fixed positions
thereby overcoming the dilemma I negotiation.

Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991) ushered in the dilemma in a job related environment where he is of

the view that it is neither purely conflictual nor purely cooperative, but a mixture of both which
was also seconded by Walton and McKersie (1965) on the analysis of labor-management
negotiations where the agenda has significant elements of conflict and considerable potential for
integration and they brought about the need to engage in integrative type bargaining to increase
the scope of joint gain and then adopt distributive tactics to get as large a share of that gain as
possible. Thus overcoming the dilemma in a job related negotiation.
Walton and McKersie (1965) also identify a number of dilemmas facing a negotiator wishing to
engage in problem-solving in a mixed bargaining situation where trust is held to be one of the
conditions necessary for cooperation and problem-solving in negotiation. He also postulates that
negotiators need to be confident that their problems will be recognized, their openness will not
be exploited and all suggestions will be fully explored. He went on to figure out trust in the sense
of generally having faith in the word of another and in the benevolence of the relationship.
In negating the extent of openness, Walton and McKersie (1965) also envisaged that if the
negotiators were too open with each other in the integrative stage of mixed bargaining then they
would be vulnerable during the distributive phase however if they were not open enough, then
they would not realize the potential for joint gain.
Tracy and Peterson (1986) also supports the issue of openness where negotiators might find
difficulty in being open in the early stages of a negotiation knowing that the parties will
eventually be engaging in competitive negotiation to close off the negotiation. This is
necessitated by the presence of constituencies or a deadline where both parties tend to encourage
a distributive approach from the onset. This notion concurs with Friedman and Gal (1991)
assertion that these difficulties are reduced if the relationship between the parties is itself
cooperative or if the parties bargain over how to bargain.
The difficulties which negotiators face include managing the constituents to ensure that the
negotiated outcome is acceptable as contributed by Heckscher and Hall (1994) as they asserted
that overcoming the expectations which constrain the negotiators is achieved as they face each
other across the table Friedman and Gal (1991).
According to Lax and Sebenius (1986) negotiation theory puts a paradox inherent in the very
nature of all negotiation at the heart of its analysis. This shows the tension between two rational,
antagonistic entities which are cooperation and competition which concludes the negotiator’s
dilemma and role conflict that needs to be resolved. On the other hand Walton & McKersie
(1965) postulates that negotiators who had more attractive resistance points were in a more
powerful position because they could simply offer the other party just enough to meet their
resistance point and claim the rest for themselves thus being a strength on overcoming the
dilemma.
An example of the negotiator’s dilemma can be of a hiring manager at a manufacturing company
who is preparing to make a job offer to a prized candidate. Through their discussions, three main
issues have emerged as worthy for negotiation the first being salary which they haven’t discussed
about, but the manager would like to stay under $100,000, the next being commuting where the
candidate has asked to work from home up to three days a week, but the manager would like him
in the office more often and contract duration which the candidate wants a one-year contract but
the company has asked for a three-year contract. Limiting the number of commuting days is the
manager’s top priority he isn’t sure which issue the candidate values most.

Rather than presenting a single package or negotiating the issues one by one, the manager might
put together three packages, such as the following, and ask the candidate to choose among them
where he offered package ‘A’ with $100,000, one remote workday per week and three-year
contract. The second package “B’ $95,000, one remote workday per week and two-year contract
and package ‘C” $90,000, two remote workdays per week and one-year contract

The manager values each package equally and if the candidate chose any one of them without
negotiating further he would be very pleased. Moreover, all three offers are fairly aggressive on
the issue of commuting, the manager’s main concern however, is package C which gives the
candidate room to try to negotiate for three remote workdays per week in exchange for a lower
salary.

Suppose the candidate responds to the three offers by saying he likes Package B best but that the
salary is too low. This choice makes it clear that he is flexible on remote workdays and contract
duration, and more concerned about salary. The parties can then bargain further on salary and are
more likely to reach a mutually beneficial agreement than if they negotiated a single offer.
(Leonardelli, Gu, McRuer, Medvec, and Galinsky 2019).

In wrapping up the dilemmas faced by negotiators, Heider (1958) documented that two people
can be connected by a third party, who strengthens or disturbs the relationship among the two
when the negotiation is not bound by trust in practice. This also adds to Carnevale & Isen (1986)
notion that negotiators may sometimes behave less cooperatively when they have visual access
to one another than when they do not thus overcoming the dilemma.

Conclusion

Negotiators play interactive roles between rival parties in contending to a desired outcome either
for the good of one or for all. In this enormous interface, Tactics to employ and the consequences
of those tactics in achieving the desired goals remains a dilemma to the negotiator hence the need
to pacify each party in the negotiation process in order to reach a consensus.
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