Republic of the Philippines

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
National Prosecution Service
OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
Tagum City, Davao del Norte

HEIDE DAYOT, NPS-DOCKET NO. XI-09-INV-17J-0034

Private Complainant,

-versus- FOR: Viol. ART. 344 of the

RPC, RA 9262 and RA
No. 7610

KERWIN S. PORTEZ and ANA

MAE BARTOLOME,
Respondents
X X

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

THE UNDERSIGNED COMPLAINANT respectfully states:

1. INTRODUCTION.

The subject matter of this motion for reconsideration is the

Resolution, dated 09 December 2017, issued by Investigating
Assistant City Prosecutor Roman P. Bondaon and approved by
Chief City Prosecutor Noel Padilla Palma.

2. MATERIAL DATES.
The complainants received their copy of the aforecited
Resolution on 29 December 2017 through registered mail on
09 March 2018, which reads:
 “WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
recommended that three (3) separate
information be filed, to wit:

a. KERWIN S. PORTEZ and ANA MAE BARTOLOME

for CONCUBINAGE under Article 334 of the
RPC, as amended before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Tagum City
b. KERWIN S. PORTEZ for violation of Section 5 (h)
of RA no. 9262 before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2 of Tagum City;
c. ANA MAE BARTOLOME for violation Section 10
(a) of RA NO. 7610 before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2 of Tagum City.”

Since the fifteenth (15th) day or the last day within which the
complainants can move for the reconsideration of said Resolution
falls on a Sunday, March 25 2018, this Motion is being filed on
March 26, 2018, the next working day following a nonworking
day. Availing of their rights under section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules
of Court, complainants move for the reconsideration of the
Resolution promulgated on December 29, 2017.

3. GROUNDS.

The complainant assigns the following error/ground for this

motion for reconsideration:

The questioned Resolution erred in finding probable cause for the

crime charge on herein respondent based solely on the
complainant’s self- serving affidavit and allegations. That the
facts solely relied by the prosecution is not true and correct and
wherefore committed error in appreciating the case based on the
facts presented.

4. DISCUSSION.

The filing of this motion for reconsideration is held to be

consistent with the principle of due process and allowed under
Section 56 of the
Manual for Prosecutors, it is therefore, imperative that the herein
accused be given the chance to correct the pertinent facts which
if given the chance will warrant an insufficient basis to sustain a
prima facie case or a probable cause to form a sufficient belief as
to the guilt of the accused.
The complainant submits that the questioned Resolution should
be reconsidered and set aside and a new one be issued
considering the facts herein provided.

4.1. Complaint. – As a refresher, the Complaint

is reproduced herein below:

“x x x.

1. This is a case for the following:

a. violation of Article 334 of RPC otherwise known as

CONCUBINAGE
b. violation of the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004.”
c. violation of the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7610 otherwise known as Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act allegedly committed herein by Ana Bartolome

2. Respondent herein, KERWIN PORTEZ, is of legal age

and a resident of Purok 3, Barangay where summons
may be served
3. Respondent, KERWIN PORTEZ is a Sales Executive of x x
xx..

She handled the account of my sister-in-law x x xx who

wanted to buy a xxx car.

3. Upon advice of xxx, xxx made me and my husband

xxx, a younger brother of xxx, as the latter’s co-makers in
the car loan application of xxx with XXX BANK, the financing
arm of xxx.
4. In April 2015, my husband xxx and I submitted to
respondent xxx our Identification documents, Marriage Contract,
and Pay Slips.

Because it was Holy Week, we were unable at that time to

submit our Certificates of Employment and Tax Identification
Numbers.

5. I later found out that a fake, falsified and forged Certificate

of Employment was submitted by respondent xxx to XXX BANK
as part of the car loan application of xxx.

The XXX BANK verified the document with my employer, xxx,

which denied having issued the Certificate of Employment.

6. Later my employer filed an internal administrative case

against me for Falsification, Dishonesty, and the like on the
theory that I caused the issuance of the fake, forged and
falsified Certificate of Employment.

7. I know nothing about such document. The only person who

was in a position and who had the vested interest to prepare the
same was the respondent xxx to insure the approval of the car
loan application of xxx, thus, likewise insuring the commissions
and other perks due and owing to respondent xxx by reason of
such approval.

8. The criminal act of xxx has endangered my security of

tenure in my company and my name and honor as a citizen.

I now have to face and defend myself against the

administrative case filed against me.

9. Enclosed are copies of the following supporting documents:

9.1. Annex “A” - Affidavit, dated April 18, 2015, of xxx.

She is scheduled to leave abroad this month as an overseas
Filipino worker in xxx.

9.2. Annex “B” - MEMORANDUM, dated April 14, 2015,

issued by xxx to me.

It orders me to explain why I should not be dismissed from

the service.

It contains as an annex thereof a copy of the fake, forged and

falsified Certificate of Employment.

9.3. Annex “C” - My Demand Letter, dated April 18.

2015, to respondent xxx.

It demands a formal apology from respondent xxx, for the record.

10. In conclusion, I pray that respondent xxx be indicted

for FALSIFICATION AND FORGERY OF PRIVATE
COMMERICAL DOCUMENT, in the interest of justice.

X x x.”

4.2. By way of refresher, the REPLY-AFFIDAVIT of the

Complainant is reproduced hereinbelow:

“x x x.

1. This is a REPLY to the Counter-Affidavit, dated May 20,

2015, of the Respondent.
2. At the outset, I stress that my criminal complaint is based
on PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, CREDIBLE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE,
and COMMON SENSE.

2.1. It is not based on INSINUATION or SPECULATION.

3. X x x.

4. X x x.

5. The convenient defense of Respondent, aside from DENIAL,

is that as an Sales Executive/Agent of xxx her routine duty was
to simply that of a non-thinking ROBOT, i.e., to receive the
documents from the car loan applicant xxx and to forward the
same to XXX BANK for processing and approval.

6.1. This is not true.

6.2. Respondent was in FULL CONTROL of the different
xxx in- house processes, to wit:

6.2.1. Consolidation of all loan documents

6.2.2. Review of the completeness thereof
6.2.3. Consultations with her Supervisor in case of
issues Respondent could not handle/resolve alone
6.2.4. Safekeeping of the documents
6.2.5. Control of the documents and the in-house process
of assessment thereof prior to referral to XXX BANK
6.2.6. Transmittal of the consolidated and
assessed documents to XXX BANK as approved by her
Supervisor.

6. Annex “1” of the Counter-Affidavit allegedly written and

sent via iPad by a certain xxx (alleged XXX BANK account
officer) and
allegedly addressed to a certain xxx is unauthenticated, if not
spurious or manufactured, or at the least, self-serving.

6.1. It is not even under oath.

6.2. The unknown xxx was not even presented as a
witness before this Office with his own Affidavit sworn to
before the Investigating Prosecutor to affirm the alleged
contents thereof.
6.3. His Company ID Card was not even photocopied
and attached to the Counter-Affidavit.

7. In fact, if I recall right, sometime on April 1, 2015, Holy

Wednesday, when the Respondent received from me my
Identification Card, Marriage Contract, and Pay Slips, the
Respondent even had the temerity to ask me to sign some
blank documents.

7.1. She said they were needed by her to insure the

speedy approval by XXX BANK of the car loan of xxx.
7.2. I trusted her, and so I complied with her wishes
as a professional sales agent of xxx, even without scrutinizing
them.

8. The record of the administrative complaint that was

commenced by our Company against me and which was attached
by me to my Complaint-Affidavit was intended by me as a proof
of the painful consequences of the unlawful acts of the
Respondent.

8.1. Yes, it is not a proof of Falsification.

8.2. But it is a corroborating proof of my truthful theory
that because of the unlawful and wrongful act of the
Respondent, my security of tenure and honor as a citizen has
been placed in jeopardy.
8.3. I am now forced to face and suffer the shame, pain,
expense, and tediousness of the administrative case against me
-- all because of the said act of the Respondent.
9. The jurisprudence cited by the Respondent in her
Counter- Affidavit are irrelevant or inapplicable. See Par. 4
thereof.

9.1. “Colorable truth” is not an issue here.

9.2. It is a matter of evidence or defense that is proper
during the trial stage before the trial court and after an
indictment.
9.3. The same foregoing reason applies to the other
defenses raised in the Counter-Affidavit, to wit:

9.3.1. “Perversion of truth”

9.3.2. “Intent of injuring a third person”
9.3.3. “Animated by a desire to do wrong”

10. “Presumption of innocence” is not a defense to

destroy “probable cause”, if one is present.

10.1. If there is probable cause, “presumption of innocence”

is a matter of defense/evidence that is proper only during trial
and after indictment.

11. The Respondent thus has no basis/reason to apply/invoke

the Cabahug and the Salonga doctrines. See the Prayer Part of
her Counter-Affidavit.

11.1. The Investigating Prosecutor has the full prerogative to

determine probable cause based on the evidence, whether it be
direct, indirect, physical, autoptic, documentary, circumstantial,
of judicial notice, and backed up by common sense or the
natural course of events.

12. In conclusion, I humbly pray that respondent xxx be

indicted for FALSIFICATION AND FORGERY OF PRIVATE
COMMERICAL
DOCUMENT, or such other felonies or offenses as may be
warranted by the record and the evidence, in the interest of
justice.

X x x.”

4.3. Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is

reproduced hereinbelow for reference.

Article 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or

ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act
or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or

proceeding statements other than those in fact made by
them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be
a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different
from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical
minister who shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the
preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or
document of such character that its falsification may affect the
civil status of persons.
4.4. Article 172 of the same Code is reproduced hereinbelow,
for reference:
Article 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of
falsified documents. - The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the
falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any
public or official document or letter of exchange or any other
kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the
intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any
judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the
intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents
embraced in the next preceding article, or in any of the foregoing
subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next
lower in degree.
4.5. PROPER PARTY-COMPLAINANT in a criminal case for
falsification and forgery is not limited to the locus standi or
personality of the Employer (who was made by the respondent
to appear as having issued the Certificate of Employment
subject matter of the complaint).

The injured employee is a proper party-complainant, a real party

in interest, and an indispensable party as a result of the
commission by the respondent of the crime that caused such
employee pain, injury, damage, and suffering.

4.6. It will be noted that under Article 4 of the Rev. Penal

Code CRIMINAL LIABILITY is incurred:

(1)By any person committing a felony (delito) although the

wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; and
(2)By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

4.7. Perhaps it is good to review at this juncture who are

the persons liable in a criminal complaint by reproducing
hereinbelow Articles 16 to 19 of the same Code.

“x x x.
Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies
Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The following are
criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Who are criminally liable. - The following are criminally
liable for grave and less grave felonies:

1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices.
Article 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
Article 18. Accomplices. - Accomplices are those persons who, not
being included in article 17, cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
Article 19. Accessories. - Accessories are those who, having
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without
having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit
by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the
effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of
his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty
of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of
the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime.

X x x.”

4.8. Is the victim (i.e., herein complainant) a proper

party- complainant, a real party-in-interest-complainant, or
an indispensable party-complainant in the commission of a
felony which has resulted in her damage, injury, and
suffering?

The answer thereto of the questioned Resolution was in the

negative.

The complainant humbly submits that the questioned Resolution

is in patent error on this procedural point.

Technical rules of procedures “shall be liberally construed in

order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.” (Sec. 6,
Rule 1, Rev.
Rules of Civil Procedure).

The Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable “by analogy or in a

suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.”
(Sec. 4, Rule 1, Rules of Civil Procedure).
4.9. Sec. 2, Rule 2, Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.—A real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

4.10. Secs. 6 to 9 of the same Rules are relevant:

SEC. 6. Permissive joinder of parties.—All persons in whom or

against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the
same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may except as
otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined
as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise
in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just
to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or
put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he
may have no interest. (6)
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.—
Parties in interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action shall be joined either s plaintiffs or
defendants. (7)
SEC. 8. Necessary party.—A necessary party is one who is not
indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete
relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action. (8a)
SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded.—
Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a
necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his
name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the
court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may
order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction
over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without
justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against
such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court
from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein
shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
(8a, 9a)
X x x.”

5. An OFFENDED PARTY in a criminal case, like the herein

complainant (who is a real and an actual aggrieved victim of the
effects and results of the falsified Certificate of Employment
subject matter of this case and who was administratively charged
by her employer for the existence and use by the herein
respondent xxx of such falsified Certificate of Employment), is a
proper party-in-interest who has the right to file the criminal
complaint and, in the interest of justice, the herein complainant
may not be deprived by the investigating prosecutor of her right
to commence a criminal case to seek relief and redress.

5.1. In the case of HILARIO P. SORIANO vs. HON. CAESAR A.

CASANOVA, et. al., G.R. NO. 163400, March 31, 2006, it was
held that a public crime (like falsification, forgery, estafa, and the
like) may be commenced by the private offended party or by a
victim of the
crime or by any member of the general public or by
“any competent person”.

“x x x.

Citing the ruling of this Court in Ebarle v. Sucaldito, G.R. Nos. L-

33628 and L-34162, December 29, 1987, 156 SCRA 803, the
Court of Appeals correctly held that a complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation by the

fiscal need not be filed by the offended party. The rule has been
that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary
investigation purposes, by any competent person. The crime of
estafa is a public crime which can be initiated by “any
competent person.”The witnesses who executed the affidavits
based on their
personal knowledge of the acts committed by the petitioner fall
within the purview of “any competent person” who may institute
the complaint for a public crime. X x x.

X x x.”

5.2. Sec. 3, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) provides

that “a complaint is a sworn written statement charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any
peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated.”

The complainant has complied therewith.

5.3. Sec.6, Rule 110 (Sufficiency of complaint or information)

provides that “a complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.”

The complainant has complied therewith.

5.4. Sec. 12, Rule 110 (Name of the offended party)

provides that “the complaint or information must state the name
and surname of the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed, or any appellation or
nickname by which such person has been or is known.”

The complainant has complied therewith.

5.5. Sec. 1, Rule 111, (Institution of criminal and civil actions.—
provides that “when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action”.

This allows the classification of the herein complainant as a

property party, being a private offended party.

There are two (2) private offended parties in a falsification,

forgery, or estafa cases: the Employer (e.g., xxx ) and the
injured Employee (e.g., herein complainant).

Hence, the herein complainant has the locus standi to

commence the instant criminal case.

5.6. The recent case of LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE VS.
CHUA PUE CHIN LEE, G.R. No. 181658, August 07, 2013 is
instructive.

The Supreme Court in the said case held that the basis of civil
liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our
law that
“[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable.”

It stated that “underlying this legal principle is the traditional

theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two
entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the
political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and
(2) the individual member of that society whose person, right,
honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission.”

The Supreme Court further held that “for the recovery of civil
liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private
prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110 which
provides that “where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by
counsel in the prosecution of the offense.”

Furthermore, defining who the “offended party” is and “what are

the rights of the offended party”, the Supreme Court held therein:

“x x x.

Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,

as amended, defines an offended party as “the person against
whom or against whose property the offense was committed.” In
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, this Court rejected petitioner’s theory
that it is only the State which is the offended party in public
offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language of
Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to
assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime,
public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly
liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender
is civilly liable is the offended party.
X x x.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual
whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or
directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the
accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by
the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has
a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the
action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to
recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right
to the demand and the accused will be protected by the
satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a
mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of
the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated
party. X x x.
X x x.
In Chua v. Court of Appeals, as a result of the complaint-
affidavit filed by private respondent who is also the
corporation’s Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public
documents (Minutes of Annual
Stockholder’s Meeting) was instituted by the City Prosecutor
against petitioner and his wife. After private respondent’s
testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner moved to
exclude her counsels as private prosecutors on the ground that
she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. The
MeTC granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of said
private prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court reversed
the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the private prosecutors
in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed
his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in
allowing the private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial
of the criminal case. Thus:
X x x.
X x x. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is
the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also
civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two
entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political
entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the
individual member of the society whose person, right, honor,
chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or
omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise
to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it
caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the
civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another
by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally
or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay
forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability
arising from the offense charged which includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111,
the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that, “[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.”
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she
reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil
action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we
find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the
criminal action.
X x x.”

5.7. In fact, in the case of CRISTINA PEREZ vs. HAGONOY RURAL

BANK, INC., and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 126210.
March 9, 2000, the Supreme Court further bolstered the locus
standi of an offended party to file a Rule 65 special civil action for
certiorari by holding that “the private respondent, as private
complainant, had legal personality to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case against the petitioner on the ground that the order
of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.”

In the said case, the Supreme Court held that "in a special civil
action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be
filed by the person aggrieved.”

The Supreme Court stated that “in such case, the aggrieved
parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant.”

It added that “the complainant has an interest in the civil aspect

of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional
grounds” and that “in so doing, the complainant should not bring
the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action
may be prosecuted in (the) name of the said complainant."

It stressed that “the private offended party retains the right to

bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal
proceedings before the courts of law” and that “it follows,
therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may file a
special civil action for certiorari, then with more reason does it
have legal personality to move for a reconsideration of the order
of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges against the
petitioner. In fact, as a general rule, a special civil action will not
lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its
assigned errors.”

6. PURE TECHNICALITY. - Please note that the questioned

Resolution did not determine the existence or non-existence of
PROBABLE CAUSE.

The questioned Resolution is mysteriously quiet on the matter.

It simply dismissed the Complaint for alleged lack of locus

standi of the Complainant.

This is a glaring error of judgment, an abuse of discretion, and an

act of gross negligence on the part of the Investigating Prosecutor.

He should have discussed, resolved and determine the merits or

lack of merits (or the substance) of the Complaint, not only the
alleged technical defect of alleged lack of locus standi of the
complainant, considering the presence in the Complaint of
substantial evidence to establish probable cause.

To stress:

The Investigating Prosecutor did not discuss at all the weight and
probative value of the evidence presented in the Complaint.
He evaded and escaped such legal duty by merely relying on the
alleged lack of locus standi of the complainant to conveniently
dismiss her Complaint.

7. RELIEF.

WHEREFORE, premises considered and in the interest of justice,

the complainant respectfully prays that the questioned
Resolution, dated 11 September 2015, be reconsidered and set
aside and a new one be issued indicting the respondent for the
crime of Falsification and Forgery of Private Commercial
Document as charged in the Complaint.

Further, it is respectfully prayed (a) that the Investigating Assistant

City Prosecutor be disqualified from participating in any manner
whatsoever in the resolution of this motion for reconsideration for
reasons of delicadeza and legal ethics and (b) that the Case
Record hereof be elevated to the Office of the Chief City
Prosecutor for further review.

Finally, the complainant respectfully prays for such and other

reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.

xxx City, January 7, 2016.

Xxxxxx
x x Complainant