Judicial Ethics

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(Promulgated June 21, 1988)

CHAPTER I. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage
any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND
CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of
the defenseless or the oppressed.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall
not refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the
extent necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily
prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name
shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is
permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that
said partner is deceased.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from
the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law
allows him to practice law currently.
Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business.
CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM BY
INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS
IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST
IN DISSEMINATING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not
to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused
is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.
CHAPTER II. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application
for admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the
bar of any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character,
education, or other relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR
TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the
bar in good standing.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that,

upon the latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time
to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a
deceased lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement
plan even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing
agreement.
CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the
text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS
AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge, motives not supported by
the record or have no materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO
ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately
prepared himself on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will
adduce and the order of its proferrence. He should also be ready with the
original documents for comparison with the copies.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same
cause.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse Court processes.
Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break
or recess in the trial, while the witness is still under examination.
Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent
himself or to impersonate another.
Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor
needlessly inconvenience him.
Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client,
except: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an

instrument, and the like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the
ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the
trial of the case to another counsel.
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM
ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF
INFLUENCING THE COURT.

Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality
to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding
a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch
or agency of the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.
CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.

Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on
account of the latter's race, sex. creed or status of life, or because of his
own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient
cause, an appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a
request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for
rendition of free legal aid.
Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent
client unless: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;

(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective
client or between a present client and the prospective client.
Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his
professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his
relations with paying clients.
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall
ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict
with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the
prospective client.
Rule 15.02.- A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in
respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as
mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and
honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case,
neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence
any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws
and the principles of fairness.
Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether
he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply
so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured
for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
client's interest are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when
in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter he is handling for the client.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such
service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for
information.
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
THE LAW.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal,
shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he
shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules
of Court.
Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in
handling the case.
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining
his fees: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of
the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the
IBP chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the
client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the
client, be entitled to a division of fees in proportion to the work performed
and responsibility assumed.
Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the
client, accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or
forwarding allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to his
professional employment from anyone other than the client.
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud.
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his
client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of
the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or
associates or by judicial action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to
his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full
knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client,
give information from his files to an outside agency seeking such information
for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any
similar purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to
partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent
those whose services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences
or secrets of the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's
affairs even with members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a
particular case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.
CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON
NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following
case: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in

connection with the matter he is handling;
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these
canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best
interest of the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult
for him to carry out the employment effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or
fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
(g) Other similar cases.
Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a
retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the
client is entitled, and shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly
transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.
ASSIGNED CASES
In Re: Borromeo
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, who has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from
1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts,
dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme
Court. Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence to
undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review
proceedings. Expectedly, the results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his
interminable and quite unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and
circulate many scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their employees, as well as his
adversaries, for which he is now being called to account. In those publicly circulated writings, he
calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of the Constitution and the laws, etc.
1. Joaquin T. Borromeo, is NOT A LAWYER but has read some law books and ostensibly come to
possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules.
2. For 16 years now from 1978, he has been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various
courts and represented himself in numerous original and review proceedings
3. Borromeo’s ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by transactions which he had
with 3 banks (Traders Royal Bank – TRB; United Coco Planters Bank – UCPB; Security Bank &
Trust Co. – SBTC)
4. Respondent obtained loans or credit accommodations from these banks and secured mortgages
over immovables which belonged to him, his family or 3rd persons.
5. He failed to pay his obligations and when DEMANDS WERE MADE, he laid his own terms for
their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with his obliges or prescribed
by law.
6. He has continuously filed cases with the Courts for 16 years with his repetitive, and baseless
complaints and contentions
Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
"One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering
first aid to himself."
When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and
procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.
Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when
they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law.
Small claims cases a. Section 19. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. — No attorney shall appear
in behalf of or represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant. If the
court determines that a party cannot properly present his/ her claim or defense and needs assistance,
the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is not an attorney to assist that party
upon the latter’s consent. (2016 Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims) 2. Katarungang
Pambarangay a. Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. — In all katarungang pambarangay
proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative,
except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.
(Republic Act No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991)
Non-Lawyers can appear before the Labor Tribunal if: They represent themselves They represent
their organization or members thereof with written authorization of the latter Duly accredited
members of any legal aid office duly recognized by the DOJ or IBP, in cases referred to by the latter.
A non-lawyer agent or friend of a party litigant may, in an MTC, MCTC, be appointed by a party
litigant to conduct his litigation. The rule is applicable not only in civil cases but also in criminal
cases where the party litigant may appoint an agent or friend as private prosecutor under the
supervision and control of the trial public prosecutor. (please take note that representation of an agent
or a friend is limited only to MTC or MCTC bec proceedings in lower courts are simple and not
complicated not like RTC and above)
General Rule: A Non-Lawyer may represent a party before the MTC Exception: Criminal case Exc to
the exc: In a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not available Reason being that
proceedings in the MTC are far less complex compared to those in the higher level courts
Public Officials Who CANNOT Practice Law:

1. President, Vice President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants (Section 13,
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
2. Members of Constitutional Commissions i.e. Commission on Elections, Civil Service
Commission, and Commission on Audit (Section 2, Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution)
3. Ombudsman and his deputies (Section 8, Article IX, 1987 Constitution) – insofar as private
practice of law
4. Judges and other officials or employees of the superior court (Section 35, Rule 138, Rules of
Court)
5. Officials and employees of the Office of the Solicitor General (Section 35, Rule 138, Rules
of Court)
6. Government prosecutors
7. Members of the Judicial Bar Council
8. All governors, city and municipal mayors (Section 90, Title III, Book 1, R.A. No. 7160)
9. Those who by special law are prohibited from engaging in the practice of their legal
profession
A retired justice or judge receiving pension from the government cannot act as counsel in any civil
case in which the government or any of its subdivisions or agencies is the adverse party or in a
criminal case wherein an officer of employee of the government is accused of an offense in relation
to his office.
cannot act as counsel in any civil case where govt is the adverse party and criminal cases wherein an
officer/employee of govt is accused of an offense in relation to his office
Barangay Captains can engage in the practice of law with the consent of the DILG.
Councilors are allowed
FOUR FOLD DUTIES OF A LAWYER
 Duty to Society. ...
 Duties to the Legal Profession. ...
 Duties to the Court. ...
 Duties to the Client.
Requirements for admission to the Bar: CRAGEN

1. Citizen of the Philippines
2. Resident of the Philippines
3. At least 21 years old
4. Good moral character
5. Evidence of Good moral character
6. No charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines
Who are the public officials
who cannot practice law in the
Philippines? JOG2PCOT
a. Judges and other
officials/employees of the
superior court
b. Officials and employees of
the OSG
c. Government prosecutors
d. Governors, city/municipal
mayors
e. President, VP, cabinet
members, their deputies and
assistant
f. Chairmen & members of
the Const. Commission
g. Ombudsman & his deputies
h. Those who by special law
are prohibited from engaging in
the practice of their legal
profession
Who are the public officials
who cannot practice law in the
a. Judges and other
officials/employees of the
superior court
b. Officials and employees of
the OSG
c. Government prosecutors
d. Governors, city/municipal
mayors
e. President, VP, cabinet
assistant
f. Chairmen & members of
the Const. Commission
g. Ombudsman & his deputies
h. Those who by special law
are prohibited from engaging in
the practice of their legal
profession
Who are the public officials who
cannot practice law in the
a. Judges and other
officials/employees of the superior
court
b. Officials and employees of the
OSG
c. Government prosecutors
d. Governors, city/municipal
mayors
e. President, VP, cabinet
assistant
f. Chairmen & members of the
Const. Commission
g. Ombudsman & his deputies
h. Those who by special law are
prohibited from engaging in the
practice of their legal profession
a. Judges and other
court
OSG
mayors
assistant
Const. Commission
a. Judges and other
court
OSG
mayors
assistant
Const. Commission
2
Who are the public officials who cannot practice law in the Philippines? JOG PCOT
a. Judges and other

court
OSG
mayors
assistant
Const. Commission
a. Judges and other
court
OSG
mayors
assistant
Const. Commission
a. Judges and other
court
OSG
mayors
assistant
a. Judges and other
court
OSG
mayors
assistant
a. Judges and other
court
OSG
mayors
assistant
1. Judges and other "officials as employees of the Supreme Court (Rule 148, Sec. 35, RRC).
2. Officials and employees of the OSG (Ibid.)
3. Government prosecutors (People v. Villanueva, 14 SORA 109).
4. Governors, city and municipal mayors (R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 90). 8. Those prohibited by special law
5. President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants (Art. VI/I Sec. 15,
1987 Constitution).
5. Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commission (Art IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution)
6. Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. IX, Sec. 8(2nd par), 1987 Constitution)
7. Those prohibited by special law
Who are the public officials with

restrictions in the practice of law?
CReSS
a. Civil service
officers/employees w/o permit
from their respective dep’t heads
b. Retired justice/judge (w/in 1 yr
from date of retirement. Magistrate
particular court
where he performed his judicial
duties)
c. Senators and members of
House of Reps
d. Sanggunian members
Who are the public officials with restrictions in the practice of law? CReSS
Civil service officers/employees

w/o permit from their respective
dep’t heads
particular court
duties)
House of Reps
Civil service officers/employees
w/o permit from their respective
dep’t heads
particular court
duties)
House of Reps
https://www.studocu.com/ph/document/san-beda-university/basic-legal-ethics/legal-ethics-reviewer-
summary/9259923
The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the constitution of the
MCLE Committee. Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after
the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall
begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period.
Requirements for completion of MCLE: at least 36 hours of continuing legal education activities per
3 years:
The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries
of Executives Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members
of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers
covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviews and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least 10
years accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial
Lectures of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors
(m) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
*Consequences for Non-Compliance* 1. listed as delinquent member by the IBP Board of
Governors upon the recommendation of the Committee on MCLE - the listing as a delinquent
member is administrative in nature but shall be made with notice and hearing by the Committee on
MCLE.
*When it comes to pleadings filed before the court and quasi-judicial bodies:* he lawyer shall be
imposed a fine of P2,000 for the first offense, P3,000 for the second offense and P4,000 for the third
offense;
BONGALONTA vs CASTILLO and MARTIJA CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995
Facts:
Complainant Bongalonta charged respondents Castillo and Martija, both members of the Philippine Bar,
with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme
to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. The letter-
complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for estafa, against the Sps.
Abuel. She also filed a separate civil action, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary
attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under
TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid
criminal and civil cases. During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed for collection of a
sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps.
Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps.
Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-
parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin.
A writ of esanxecution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by
complainant was levied upon. Complainant further alleged that, in all the pleadings filed in the three (3)
aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same
PTR and the same IBP receipt number. The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case against
Martija, and recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his corespondent Atty. Alfonso
M. Martija.
Issue:
Whether the IBP Board of Governors recommendation of Castillo’s suspension be granted
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the IBP Board of Governors’ findings. The practice of law is
not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these
requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand,
has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
Maria Elena Moreno v. Atty. Ernesto Araneta (A.C. No. 1109)
Facts:
Maria Elena Moreno filed a complaint against Atty. Ernesto Araneta for nonpayment of debts. On
October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her with a promise that he will pay within the shortest time
possible. On May 1972, Araneta borrowed P6,000 with the same promise to pay. When Araneta issued
two Bank of America checks in Moreno's favor, both were dishonored because the account was closed.
In his defense, Araneta denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He admitted that he issued two
checks upon Moreno's request, only so she could show her creditors she "had money" coming to her.
Araneta further claims that he warned her that the checks belonged to the unused portion of a closed
account and could not be encashed. There was also a Court Resolution on 2005 indefinitely suspending
Araneta for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document.
Issue:
Whether or not Araneta be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law for issuing invalid checks
Ruling:
Yes, Araneta could be suspended or even disbarred for issuing invalid checks. Issuance of worthless
checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the effect transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. A lawyer may be
sanctioned with one year's suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial
payment of the obligation (Co. v. Bernardino, Lao v. Medel). However, Araneta has, in the intervening
time, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document; a crime involving moral turpitude. He was indefinitely suspended since then. Moral turpitude
involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Wherefore, Atty. Ernesto Araneta was disbarred from the practice of law.
EDUARDO A. ABELLA vs RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR. Adm. Case No. 7332 June 18, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts:
Respondent acting as Labor arbiter asked how much would be his share to the case presented by
the complainant in exchange of a favorable decision. Thereafter, complainant issued a writ of
execution but nevertheless reduced the award in a second writ of execution he issued in a motion to
quash filed by PT&T. Complainant now filed a disbarment complaint for violation of Rule 6.02, Canon
6 of the CPR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one’s
public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private
interests to interfere with public duties. It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a government office may
be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as
a lawyer. The infractions of the respondent constitute gross misconduct. Jurisprudence illumines that
immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference
to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. transgressions as discussed
herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or similar acts in the future.
Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc. B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993
Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease
and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of
said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by
herein petitioner are as follows: Annex A SECRET MARRIAGE? P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA. THEN Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B GUAM DIVORCE DON PARKINSON an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on
Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. Guam divorce.
Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's
Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic. THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251 522-2041; 521-0767 It is
the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before
quoted. In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes
practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of law.
The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined: Black
defines "practice of law" as: "The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law." The contention of respondent that it
merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services
being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real.
In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains
the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a
copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so-called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her
on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving
legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out
its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of
legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of
the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
MANUEL G. VILLATUYA v. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012
Facts:
Complainant averred that he was employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the
respondent in a number of corporate rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal
agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to 10% of the fees paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18
Stay Orders that was issued by the courts as a result of his work and the respondent being able to rake in
millions from the cases that they were working on together, the latter did not pay the amount due to him.
He also alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial
consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services. In his defense, respondent denied charges against him
and asserted that the complainant was not an employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms. To support his contention, respondent
attached a Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations of Jesi
and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a
dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been
retracted by the affiant himself. Issue: Whether or not respondent violated the rule against unlawful
solicitation. Ruling: YES. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that
respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific
provision that was breached. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety
arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer;
or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if
handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law. It is clear from the documentary
evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a
financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure
professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Rule 15.08 of the Code
mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. In this case, it is
confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating
Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
KHAN vs SIMBILLO A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone
number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her
husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court
decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of
children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48, 000.00, half of which is payable
at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered. Additional
research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5,
2000 issue of The Philippine Star. On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. Respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that his acts
for advertising and solicitation are not prohibited acts. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s act was a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo violated Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. Also, practice of law is not a business. It is a profession
in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients. There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admitted that
he caused the publication of the advertisements. The Court ruled that respondent
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. Also, he is suspended
from the practice of law for one year.
B.M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004

In the matter of disqualification of bar examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 BAR Examinations and for
disciplinary actions as member of the Philippine Shari’a BAR, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez, petitioner.
Issue:
Whether Meling’s act of concealing his criminal cases upon filing for a petition to take the BAR would
bar to his good moral character
Facts:
This case was filed by the Petitioner, Aty. Froilan R. Melendrez, against Haron S. Meling, to disqualify
the latter for taking the 2002 BAR Examination and to impose appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a BAR. Melendrez alleged that Meling failed to disclose in his petition to
take the BAR that he has three (3) pending criminal cases filed in the RTC of Cotabato City. These cases
were filed during one instance wherein the defendant herein allegedly uttered derogatory words against
Atty. Melendrez and his wife while around media practitioners. Meling’s defense was that, in good faith,
he thought that the cases filed against him by the herein petitioner were already closed and terminated, for
the reason that they have already settled the issue as advised by a retired Judge.
Decision:
Whether the cases filed against Meling were closed or still pending, he still has to disclose it in his
petition to take the BAR, for the court to ascertain his good moral character. His acts of concealing the
cases filed against him constitute dishonesty. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
Therefore, it was recommended that if ever Meling passed the BAR, he will not be allowed to take the
oath and sign the roll of attorneys. However, Meling failed to pass the 2002 BAR Examination thus, the
case was dismissed for being moot and academic.
Bar Matter 2012: Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service

Last February 10, 2009, the Supreme Court approved Bar Matter 2012 or the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid
Service governing the mandatory requirement for practicing lawyers to render free legal aid services in all
cases (whether civil, criminal, or administrative) involving indigent and pauper litigants where the assistance of
a lawyer is needed. It also mandates other members of the legal profession to support the legal aid program of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
All practicing lawyers are required to render a minimum of sixty (60) hours of free legal aid services to indigent
litigants in a year. Clerks of Court and the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter are designated to
coordinate with a lawyer for cases where he may render free legal aid service.
The following lawyers are excluded in the term “practicing lawyer”:
1. Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice;
2. Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;
3. Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited legal clinics of law
schools and lawyers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and peoples organizations (POs) like the Free
Legal Assistance Group who by the nature of their work already render free legal aid to indigent and pauper
litigants and
4. Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (1) to (3) including those who are employed in the private
sector but do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.
Indigent and pauper litigants are those whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed
an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and those who not own any real property. They
are exempt from payment of docket fees and lawful fees as well as transcripts of stenographic notes.
A penalty of Php 4,000 shall be imposed on the lawyer who fails to meet the required minimum number of
hours of legal aid service each year required by the IBP without satisfactory explanation. The lawyer shall have
a “not in good standing” status and shall not be allowed to appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as
counsel for a period of 3 months. A lawyer who fails to comply with the duties in the Rule for at least 3
consecutive years shall be subject to disciplinary proceedings and may be suspended from the practice of law
for 1 year.
EN BANC [B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

R E S O L U T I O N ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR
MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine
Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal
Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following Revised
Rules for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. - Continuing legal education is required of members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast
with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of
the practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. - Within two (2) months from the approval of these
Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall
commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in
accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. - Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall
complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities
approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit
units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five (5)
credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and
jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four (4)
credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international conventions
equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period shall begin not later than
three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for
members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods
shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance
period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement shall be
divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:
(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are
assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may be
available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the program.
- Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be
assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of
admission or readmission. The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin
on the first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of
all other members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial
compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved continuing
legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance period in
which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a
number of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in
the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number. Rule 4.
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)
SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS
measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of the
lawyer’s participation in the MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines for computing credit
units and the supporting documents required therefor:
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS,

WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7
AND OTHER RELATED RULES
1.1 PARTICIPANT/ ATTENDEE 1 CU PER HOUR OF ATTENDANCE CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

WITH NUMBER OF HOURS
1.2 LECTURER RESOURCE SPEAKER FULL CU FOR THE SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD
PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR SPONSOR’S CERTIFICATION
1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR COMMENTATOR/ MODERATOR/ COORDINATOR/ FACILITATOR 1/2 OF CU

FOR THE SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD CERTIFICATION FROM SPONSORING ORGANIZATION
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT LESS THAN 100 PAGES FULL CU FOR THE SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE
PERIOD PUBLISHED BOOK
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY PUBLISHED BOOK WITH PROOF AS
EDITOR
2.3 RESEARCH PAPER INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ CREATIVE PROJECT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE SUBJECT
PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD DULY CERTIFIED/ PUBLISHED TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT LEAST TEN (10) PAGES 1/2 OF CU FOR THE SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE
PERIOD PUBLISHED ARTICLE
2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ LAW JOURNAL EDITOR 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED

NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL
2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ BAR REVIEW LECTURE LAW TEACHING/ FULL CU FOR THE SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD CERTIFICATION OF LAW DEAN OR BAR REVIEW DIRECTOR
Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS SECTION
1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or nonparticipatory.
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory credit units may be claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia, in-
house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker,
moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. - Non-participatory credit units may be claimed per
compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication,
e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal
education of the author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the member’s
practice or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)
SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent
in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS SECTION
1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of the Bar are exempt from the
MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and
Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members
of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers
covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least
ten (10) years in accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial
Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. - The following Members of the Bar are likewise
exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement -A member may file a
verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post
graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any
of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a
procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
B.M. No. 1922 June 3, 2008
RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED

IN ALL PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008
"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel’s MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. – The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2,
2008, of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on Legal
Education and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing interest of the members of the Bar
in the MCLE requirement program.
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and
Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before
the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding
compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of
the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.
The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation." Caprio-Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave. (adv216a)
OCA CIRCULAR NO. 79-2014
TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS, THE OFFICE
OF THE STATE PROSECUTOR, PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AND THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
SUBJECT: BAR MATTER NO. 1922 (RE: RECOMMENDATION OF THE MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION [MCLE] BOARD TO INDICATE IN ALL PLEADINGS FILED WITH THE COURTS THE COUNSEL'S
MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE OR CERTIFICATE OF EXEMPTION)
In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated January 14, 2014 in the above-cited administrative matter,
the Court RESOLVED, upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to:
(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase “Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records” and replacing it with “Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to
appropriate penalty and disciplinary action”; and
(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure of current MCLE compliance/exemption number in
the pleadings:
(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of P2,000.00 for the first offense, P3,000.00 for the second offense
and P4,000.00 for the third offense;
(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a delinquent member of the Bar pursuant to Section
2, Rule 13 of Bar Matter No. 850 and its implementing rules and regulations; and
(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged from the case and the client/s shall be allowed to
secure the services of a new counsel with the concomitant right to demand the return of fees already
paid to the non-compliant lawyer.
This revokes OCA Circular No. 66-2008 dated July 22, 2008, and any prior circular from the Office of the
Court Administrator on this matter which is contrary to the foregoing is hereby superseded. For your
information, guidance and strict compliance. 26 May 2014
PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 151805 (2005)
FACTS:
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega
loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors
and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.
A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I
Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos,
his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG
issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage
of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos.
The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor
General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and
counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.
It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function
as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this
court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The
prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”
HELD:
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it
is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However, there is still the issue of whether there
exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing
respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of
“intervention” that he made on the matter.
Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at
bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent
Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do
not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had
nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK.
He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of
GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen
is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In
the metes and bounds of the “intervention”.
The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a
person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by
the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as
innocuous such as “drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.”
The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely
petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not
strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting
the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.

Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having
once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept
employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such
office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote
or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened
as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held
public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in
the government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the service.
B.M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004
In the matter of disqualification of bar examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 BAR Examinations
and for disciplinary actions as member of the Philippine Shari’a BAR, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether Meling’s act of concealing his criminal cases upon filing for a petition to take the BAR would
bar to his good moral character.
Facts:
This case was filed by the Petitioner, Aty. Froilan R. Melendrez, against Haron S. Meling, to disqualify
the latter for taking the 2002 BAR Examination and to impose appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a BAR. Melendrez alleged that Meling failed to disclose in his petition to
take the BAR that he has three (3) pending criminal cases filed in the RTC of Cotabato City. These cases
were filed during one instance wherein the defendant herein allegedly uttered derogatory words against
Atty. Melendrez and his wife while around media practitioners. Meling’s defense was that, in good faith,
he thought that the cases filed against him by the herein petitioner were already closed and terminated, for
the reason that they have already settled the issue as advised by a retired Judge.
Decision:
Whether the cases filed against Meling were closed or still pending, he still has to disclose it in his
petition to take the BAR, for the court to ascertain his good moral character. His acts of concealing the
cases filed against him constitute dishonesty.
Good moral character includes at least common honesty. Therefore, it was recommended that if
ever Meling passed the BAR, he will not be allowed to take the oath and sign the roll of attorneys.
However, Meling failed to pass the 2002 BAR Examination thus, the case was dismissed for being moot
and academic.
RULE 139-A
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Section 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
"Integrated Bar of the Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Section 2. Purposes. — The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to elevate the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Section 3. Regions. — The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to
wit:
(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva
Vizcaya, and Quirino.
(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga,
Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales;
(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;
(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque,

Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;
(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur,

Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon;
(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte,
Northern Samar, Samar, and Southern Leyte;
(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor.
(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan Del Sur,
Bukidnon, Camiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental,
Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and
(i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces
of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.
In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of
the Supreme Court, determine the Region to which the said province shall belong.
Section 4. Chapters. — A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province.
Except as hereinbelow provided, every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is
geographically situated.
A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas;
(a) The sub-province of Aurora;
(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;
(c) Quezon City;
(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;
(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;
(f) Cebu City; and

(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than
one Chapter.
Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed
by the Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this
Rule notwithstanding.
Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of
common concern.
Section 5. House of Delegates. — The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more
than one hundred twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as
may be according to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least
one Delegate. On or before December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall make an apportionment of Delegates.
The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of
the House and shall end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next
succeeding annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two terms.
The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during
the month of April of each year for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports
including the annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other business as may
be referred to it by the Board, and the consideration of such additional matters as may be requested
in writing by at least twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board
of Governors to consider only such matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates
who have registered for a convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do
business.
Section 6. Board of Governors. — The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors.
Nine Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the
representation basis of one Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list
of nominees submitted by the Delegates from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee
shall come from any Chapter. The President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the
Governors from outside of themselves as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become
members of the Board.
The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and
until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for
more than two terms.
The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it
shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business.
Special meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the Board.
Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate
Canons of Professional Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the
Canons may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the
Board of Governors.
The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry
out the purposes of the Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.
Section 7. Officers. — The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President
who shall be chosen by the Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among
themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors.
Each of the regional members of the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which he
represents.
The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date
of their election and until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President
shall automatically become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall
rotate from year to year among all the nine Regions in such order or rotation as the Board of
Governors shall prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar for more than one term.
The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as
may be required by the Board of Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Board, and to hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said officers
and employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar.
Section 8. Vacancies. — In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall be
performed by the Executive Vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of
the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of
the term of the office thus vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of
both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting
President to hold office until the next succeeding election or during the period of disability.
The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of
Officers of the Integrated Bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or
position is for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the
unexpired term.
Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as
the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare
Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Section 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement. — A member may terminate his

membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall
immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a
member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys. Reinstatement may
be made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of
Governors and approved by the Court.
Section 12. Grievance procedures. — The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for
grievance procedures for the enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of
the Integrated Bar, but no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal
of his name from the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme
Court.
Section 13. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity
tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No
lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election of appointment to any
position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts
appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
Section 14. Positions honorary. — Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the

Supreme Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall
receive any compensation, allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any
service rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge
of his functions.
Section 15. Fiscal matters. — The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated
Bar and shall have the power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause
proper Books of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that
the proper audit is made of all accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof.
Section 16. Journal. — The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of
the Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.
Section 17. Voluntary Bar associations. — All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may
hereafter be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes
therewith.
Section 18. Amendments. — This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or
upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.
Section 19. Organizational period. — The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local
Chapters and toward this end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all
Judges throughout the Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday,
February 17, 1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time and
place of the meeting called to organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose,
including the election of a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors.
The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the
Chapters as nearly as may be in proportion to the number of their respective members, but each
Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. The President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its
Delegate to the House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, except where the
Chapter is entitled to have more than one Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also be a
Delegate.
The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate
Delegates.
The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the
Purpose of electing a Board of Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and
forthwith meet to elect the Officers of the Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately
assume their respective positions.
Section 20. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.
In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978)

Facts:
This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee
and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the
IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and
thereby null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the
respondent.
Held:
The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that
are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP
however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual
fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the
practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the
respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with
regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of
attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.
Santos v. Llamas, AC No. 4749, January 20, 2000
TOPIC: Canon 7
FACTS:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and nonpayment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas. Atty. Llamas filed an action against Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date &
place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using
this for at least three years already. This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1
which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law".
There is also Rule 139A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys."
The findings of the IBP:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent’s non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and
PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his
use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years." The records also show a "Certification dated March 24,
1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter resident Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP
dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked
and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he
is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear
per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of
Respondents Memorandum).
Therefore, respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore
liable for his actions.
HELD:
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his
dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants
senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual
taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership
or association dues.
The Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the
penalty for one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later, is appropriate. SUSPENDED.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009
TOPIC: Canon 8
Facts:
Complainant – Pedro Linsangan filed a disbarment case against Respondent - Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complainant averred
that respondent, making known his false and deceptive services connive with paralegal assistant named
Fe Maria L. Labiano for personal gain thru paid agents. Respondent – Atty Nicomedes in his calling card
shows deceptive and unprofessional services which would impair the sanctity and character of legal
profession, also respondent convinced other clients to transfer legal representation in exchanged of
favorable suit and giving them financial assistance.
Issues:
Whether or not Atty Nicomedes violates code of professional responsibility?
Rulings:
Yes, Atty Nicomedes violated code of professional responsibility, specifically
Rule 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of CPR. Rule 1.03 “A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt
motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
Rule 2.03 “A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 8.02 “A laywer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Rule 16.04 “A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.
Canon 3 “A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair dignified and
objective information or statement of facts”.
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA VS ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE A.C. No. 7269,
November 23, 2011
Facts:
In a civil case before the RTC, Pasig City, Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she
was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in the case, while Atty. Yolando Busmente was the counsel
for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso.
Alleging that Ulaso's deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA2481 was annulled, an
ejectment case was filed before the MTC, San Juan, in which, Busmente also appeared as a counsel.
Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-
Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa would accompany Ulaso
in court, projecting herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel. He further alleged that the court
orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente's collaborating counsel but upon verification
with the court and the IBP, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente asserted that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and has been his paralegal assistant for a few years,
but ended in 2000. He also alleged that Dela Rosa was able to misrepresent herself as a lawyer in the case
by conniving with his former secretary, Regine Macasieb and he also alleged that he did not represent
Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and his signature in the answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was
forged.
Issue:
Whether or not Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of
law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law?
Ruling:
The court agreed with IBP’s decision in suspending Busmente from the practice of law for 6 months. It
has been established that Dela Rosa who is not a member of the Bar misrepresented herself as
respondent’s collaborating counsel. There was also sufficient evidence to prove that respondent allowed
Dela Rosa to illegally practice law, appear in court, and give legal assistance to respondent’s client.
In Busmente’s allegation that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284, it was clearly showed in
Ulaso’s counter-affidavit that the respondent was the legal counsel and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give
legal assistance to Ulaso and he also failed to impugn his signatures in other documents.
Proven that Busmente allowed Dela Rosa to appear in court and give legal assistance, the respondent
violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “A lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.” The term “practice of law” implies
customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts
indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a
client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. The lawyer's duty
to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public
interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character.
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C.

FLORIDO, respondent.
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
FACTS:
Complainant and Respondent are estranged couple with two children ages 5 and 3 who are in the former's
custody. Sometime in December 2001, respondent went to complainants’ residence in Tanjay City,
Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He
showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which
supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody but he failed to show the original copy
of such. Complainant's lawyer did not also receive any motion filed by respondent.
Upon close examination, found out that it bore two dates, sensing something amiss she refused to give
custody of the children. In Jan. 15, 2002, respondent accompanied by armed men supposed to be NBI
arrived and demanded for the surrender of custody while the complainant and children are in the school.
Complainant then sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police and at the police station, respondent
caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally
served on complainant the appellate courts resolution/order.
In order to diffuse the tension, complainant allow children to sleep with the respondent within the city.
She later on received information that the children were to be taken to Bacolod City which prompted her
to go to the hotel where the children are transferred to other room. Respondent filed with RTC
Dumaguete a verified petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the
children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution meanwhile the complainant was able to
obtained a Certification from the CA that no such resolution had been issued. Respondent did not appear
during the hearing. Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated
his attorney’s oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution
in and outside a court of law.
Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the country. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six years with a warning that another offense of this nature will
result in his disbarment.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to
enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Ruling:
Yes. Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be
devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due
recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client’s cause, it
must never be at the expense of the truth.
Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states: Moreover, the records show that respondent used
offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer’s language
should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession.
The lawyer’s arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel
and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another. By calling
complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to
the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the
legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed
by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN G.R. No. 123698 August 5, 1998
FACTS:
private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seeli won against Central Dyeing & Finishing C
orporation in their complaint for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Ti
tle issued in the name of said corporation.
However, the execution thereof was delayed for 17 years by the Eternal Gardens,
who was the buyer of the subject lot from Dyeing, through petitions for review
RULING:
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that while lawyers owe entire devotion to
the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should
not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and e
fficient administration of justice.
They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a ca
se, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al., S
upreme Court ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. The
y do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only aadd to the workload of the judiciary, es
pecially this Court, which is burdened enough
as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case such as this, should not
be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested
judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
In The Matter Of Proceeding For Disciplinary Action Against ATTY. Vicente Raul Almacen in
L-27654, Antonio H. Calero vs. Virginia Y. Yaptinchay G.R. No. L-27654 February 17, 1970
CASTRO, J:
FACTS:
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but
Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed
to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed
but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which
outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution. That earned the ire of Almacen who called such
minute resolutions as unconstitutional.
He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he
claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high court are men
who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute
resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became “one
of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted to wait
for Almacen to actually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s
certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be
permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him in an open
and public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court
cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise, the High Court
would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is
to decide “only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It
should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so, there is no need to fully explain the
court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’
opinion.
KELLY R. WICKER v. PAUL T. ARCANGEL
This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders dated December 3, 1993 and December 17,
1993 of respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the RTC, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners
guilty of direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for five
(5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering
Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and
others, for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park,
which the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled
in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to co-
defendant Jose Poe. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134
formerly presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by respondent Judge
Paul T. Arcangel.
It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion
seeking the inhibition of respondent judge from the consideration of the case. The motion
alleged in pertinent part:
1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able to
maneuver the three (3) successive postponements for the presentation for cross-examination of
Mrs. Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she was not presented;
2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his
station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in
that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His
Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the
south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member
of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case
No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the
reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos' relief;
4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give a fighting
chance for plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be the last case to recover the partnership
property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit himself and set this case for re-raffle;
5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first instance that
a litigant doubts the partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should immediately move
for his inhibition.
The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.
Considering the allegations to be "malicious, derogatory and contemptuous," respondent judge

ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to show cause
why they should not be cited for contempt of court."[2]
In a pleading entitled "Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt
Directed Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel," Atty. Rayos claimed that the
allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views because he merely signed the
motion "in a representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering," for Kelly
Wicker, who said in a note to him that a "young man possibly employed by the
Court" had advised him to have the case re raffled, when the opposing counsel
Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge both failed to come for a hearing,
because their absence was an indication that Atty. Santos knew who "the judge
may be and when he would appear." Wicker's sense of disquiet increased when at the next
two hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos and the latter's witness, Mrs. Remedios
Porcuna, were all absent, while the other counsels were present.[3]
Finding petitioners' explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated December

3, 1993, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five
(5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit
in his order of December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent judge directed petitioners to
appear before him on January 7, 1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their sentence.
In their petition before this Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for contempt. They
argue that "when a person, impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful
manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby become guilty
of contempt."
In his comment, respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93 dated
September 2, 1993 of this Court and not because, as petitioners alleged, he was "personally
recruited from the South" by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he
assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started holding sessions on October 18, 1993;
that when all male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner Kelly Wicker he failed to
pick out the young man who was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the filing of the
motion for inhibition; that he was not vindictive and that he in fact refrained from implementing
the execution of his order dated December 3, 1993 to enable petitioners to "avail themselves of
all possible remedies"; that after holding petitioners in contempt, he issued an order dated
December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil Case No. 14048; that Atty. Rayos' claim
that he was just "lawyering" and acting as "the vehicle or mouthpiece of his client" is untenable
because his (Atty. Rayos') duties to the court are more important than those which he owes to
his client; and that by tendering their "profuse apologies" in their motion for reconsideration of
the December 3, 1993 order, petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their accusations against
him; and that the petitioners have taken inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil Case
No. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated November 18, 1993 they asked that the
case be re raffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati, while in their petition dated November
29, 1993, which they filed with the Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked that Judge
Capulong be allowed to continue hearing the case on the ground that he had a "full grasp of the
case."
In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge, petitioners claim that although they wanted a
reraffle of the case, it was upon the suggestion of respondent judge himself that they filed the
petition with the Court Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the case.
What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading
allegedly containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or
judge in which the proceedings are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another
case. The former has been held to be equivalent to "misbehavior committed in the presence of
or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning
of Rule 71, § 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt. [6]
It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive contempt,
the contemnor may be punished only "after charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel," whereas in case of direct contempt, the
respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of
indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt only judgments of
contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable.
Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence
even if petitioners are right about the nature of the case against them by contending that it
involves indirect contempt, they have no ground for complaint since they were afforded a
hearing before they were held guilty of contempt. What is important to determine now is
whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners liable for
direct contempt.
We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be
invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail. The
contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to
strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court.
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court
sustains Judge Arcangel's finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of the
allegations in petitioners' motion for inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof:
2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one
hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing,
counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not
reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the
south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member
of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case
No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the
reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos' relief;
leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing counsel
in the case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his transfer to the
RTC of Makati, which necessitated "easing out" the former judge to make room for such
transfer.
These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and constitute
an unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They suggest that
lawyers, if they are well connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage.
The truth is that the assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court, by
virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely "in the interest of an efficient
administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution." This is a
matter of record which could have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he claims, he
"deliberated" for two months whether or not to file the offending motion for inhibition as his
client allegedly asked him to do.
In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden to
do by his client of whom he was merely a "mouthpiece." He was just "lawyering" and "he cannot
be gagged," even if the allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed
were false since it was his client who verified the same.
To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had been told by an
unidentified young man, whom he thought to be employed in the court, that it seemed the
opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who the replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos did
not show up in court on the same days the new judge failed to come. It would, therefore, appear
that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been "personally recruited"
by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been "eased out" were Atty. Rayos'
and not Wicker's. Atty. Rayos is thus understating his part in the preparation of the motion for
inhibition.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he
is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in the
representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set
by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep.[11] Even a hired gun cannot be
excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous
allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client.
Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others"[12] and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives
not supported by the record or have materiality to the case."[13]
After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners' "profuse apologies" and
indicated that he would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence, petitioners served on
respondent judge a copy of their instant petition which prayed in part that "Respondent Judge
Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati
where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City." If nothing else, this personal
attack on the judge only serves to confirm the "contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant
belligerence" first evident in petitioners' motion for inhibition belying their protestations of
good faith.
Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. Masaquel:
Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even members of the Supreme Court, were
asked to inhibit themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration of a case, but
scarcely were the movants punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which they based
their motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is only when
there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to disqualify the judge,
done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in
contempt of court.
It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to cite for
contempt must be exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle we think that the
jail sentence on petitioners may be dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. In
the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater reason for doing so considering that the
particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear to have come from
him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in years (80) and
in failing health (suffering from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker may
have indeed been the recipient of such a remark although he could not point a court employee
who was the source of the same. At least he had the grace to admit his mistake both as to the
source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge Arcangel was also willing to waive
the imposition of the jail sentence on petitioners until he came upon petitioners' description of
him in the instant petition as a judge who cannot make the grade in the RTC of Makati, where
complex cases are being filed. In response to this, he cited the fact that the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines chose him as one of the most outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court
Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and that he is a 1963 graduate of the U.P. College of Law.
In Ceniza v. Sebastian, which likewise involved a motion for inhibition which described the
judge "corrupt," the Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt, removed the jail
sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial court for the reason that
Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion, considering the
background of this occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was not
duly mindful of the exacting standard of preservation of the dignity of his office not indulging
his sense of grievance sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is the view of
the Court that under the circumstances the fine imposed should be increased to P500.00.
The same justification also holds true in this case.
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of

imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P 100.00 to P200.00 for each
of the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED “RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE
OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT” A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, 08 March 2011,
Sanction awaits a subordinate who misbehaves. The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers
must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be
protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but
members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have
exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.
Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (the
Vinuya decision), the case involving the Filipino comfort women during the Japanese occupation, the
counsel for the petitioners therein filed, first, a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the fundamental
responsibility of states in protecting its citizens’ human rights specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms
and, second, a supplement thereto asserting that the Vinuya decision was plagiarized from different
sources and that the true intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente, Justice Mariano
del Castillo (Justice del Castillo), to suit the arguments laid down in said decision.
Vis-a-vis the Court’s formation of an ethics committee tasked to investigate the veracity of the
alleged plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly plagiarized sent their respective letters to the
Supreme Court, noting the misreading and/or misrepresentation of their articles. Hence, in their
articles, they argue that the crimes of rape, torture and sexual slavery can be classified as crimes against
humanity, thus attaining the jus cogens status; consequently, it shall be obligatory upon the State to seek
remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. However, the Vinuya decision cited them to support the
contrary stand.
In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP College of Law came up with a statement entitled
“Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” (Restoring
Integrity Statement), which statement alleged plagiarism against Justice del Castillo, treating the same not
only as an established fact, but as a truth. Said statement was posted online and at the College’s bulletin
board and was submitted to the Supreme Court.
The manner in presenting the arguments and the language used therein, the Court believed, were
inappropriate considering its signatories are lawyers. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause
Resolution directing respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar
for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conversely, compliance to such resolution was
unsatisfactory, except for one respondent.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution denies respondents their freedom of expression
2.) Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution violates respondents’ academic freedom as law professors
HELD:
Petition DENIED. The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression A
reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that respondents had
criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by
which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in
favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the “proper disposition” and consideration of the
Court that gave rise to said Resolution.
The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive
and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to
this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement. The right to criticize, which is
guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. Thus, proscribed are the use
of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration, or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members
of the Court. In other words, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. In a long line of cases, the Court has held that the right to
criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics
are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this
Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or
extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.
The Show Cause Resolution does not violate respondents’ academic freedom as law professors. There is
nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach
and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct
and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing
proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers. Academic freedom cannot be
successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The constitutional right to freedom of expression of
members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the
courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system.
The Court believes that the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers
applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors. The Court reiterates that lawyers
when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other
disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold
the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured
against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact
of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
SOLEDAD NUÑEZ VS. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT A.C. NO. 5054. MAY 29, 2002
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO
ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Facts:
Sometime in October 1982 petitioner authorized respondent attorney to sell her two parcels
of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent 10% of
the price as commission. Respondent succeeded in selling the lots, but despite
complainant’s repeated demands, he did not turn over to her the proceeds of the sale.
This forced complainant to file against respondent and his wife an action for a sum of money
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Respondent was declared in default and judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner.

Respondent appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed for
failure to pay the docket fee within the required period.
A writ of execution was issued, it appeared however that only a partial amount has
been paid by the lawyer. Four postdated checks were subsequently issued to cover
the balance. Said checks however, upon presentment were dishonored because the
account against which they were drawn was closed. Demands to make good the checks
were to no avail so a case for violation of BP 22 was filed by petitioner.
The lawyer denied the allegations and filed several motions for extension of time to file
comment. Complainant filed a motion to cite lawyer for contempt for his alleged
delaying tactics unbecoming of a lawyer and a law dean.
Issue:
What is the liability of the lawyer?
Held:
Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with

complainant. Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct”.
Respondent had no intention to “honor” the money judgment against him in as can be

gleaned from his (1) issuance of postdated checks; (2) closing of the account against which
said checks were drawn; and (3) continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks.
Santiago vs. Atty. Rafanan
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS
IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST
IN DISSEMINATING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
Facts:
Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology filed for the disbarment of
Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The petition stated that respondent, in notarizing several documents on
different dates failed and/or refused to:
a) make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants;
b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and
c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had
notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the
same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. The IBP Board of Governors
modified the disbarment proposal and instead imposed a penalty of P3,000 with a warning that any
repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.
Contention of the petitioner: He did not know that the rule is to be applied strictly in notarizing
documents because some of his colleagues are not doing it.
Issue:
Whether the penalty imposed by the IBP is proper
Held:
Yes. Atty. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries
public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number,
place of issue and date as part of such certification.
They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized
by them; and to “give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before them a number
corresponding to the one in their register and to state therein the page or pages of their register, on which
the same is recorded.” Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission
as notaries public.
Canon 5 is also violated because the canon states the obligation of lawyers to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence
which the respondent failed to satisfy by not. With regard to the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in
favor of his clients, the Supreme Court held that it was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients,
since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his
residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his
Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Hence, the penalty imposed by the IBP is proper.
Cesar Lantoria v. Atty. Irineo Bunyi (1992)
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Lantoria against Bunyi, a member of the Philippine Bar, on the
ground that Bunyi committed acts of graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the IBP, and corruption of the judge and bribery.
This is in relation to Bunyi’s handling of a civil case wherein Bunyi was counsel of Mrs. Mascarinas.
The latter was the owner of the farm and Lantoria is the supervisor and manager of the said farm.
The 3 civil cases presided by Judge Galicia involved an ejectment suit of squatters in the said farm. The
defendants in the said cases were declared in default.
Correspondences between Lantoria and Bunyi showed that Bunyi initially enclosed a letter in an envelope
addressed to Judge Galicia in a confidential and private manner. Judge Galicia thru the mediation of
Lantoria informed Bunyi that he is willing to let Bunyi write the decisions for the 3 civil cases.
Lantoria informed the same to Bunyi which later delivered the 3 decisions thru Lantoria.
Three years later, Lantoria file the present case against Bunyi alleging that they won the said cases
because Bunyi wrote the decisions in those cases.
Bunyi contends that Lantoria had knowledge of the request of Judge Galicia to Bunyi as the said judge
had two salas before him. Also, Bunyi contends that the drafting of the decision was not an idea spawned
by him. Furthermore, he contends that his participation is merely on revision.
The solicitor general investigated the matters and found that Bunyi prepared the draft of the decisions and
that he had previous communications with the judge regarding drafting the same. Moreover, Bunyi
admitted that he prepared the said decisions and that the subject letters do exist.
The Solicitor General found Bunyi guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure
to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary
and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in
which he is counsel. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year.
Lantoria did not attend hearing of the case and later filed his withdrawal of the same. Bunyi gave an
apology but he denied the allegations of offering a gift to judge Galicia.
Issue:
Bunyi violated the code of professional responsibility for lawyers?
Held:
YES. The determination of the merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding
withdrawal of complaint due to the Bunyi having admitted that the letters in question truly exist,
and that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters had on his duty as
a lawyer.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on attempts to exert
personal influence on the court.
A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending
cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special
personal consideration or favor.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as
shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01.
CANON 13:
A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01
A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating
familiarity with judges.
Court finds Bunyi guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he had
pending civil case. Suspended for 1 year.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 465, G.R. Nos. 159486-88 November 25, 2003
Doctrines:
Court will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial
system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the
Court for, if well-founded can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone,
by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
A lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed,
should insist on similar conduct by others.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar
conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality,
integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded seeking to impede,
obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
FACTS:
1. Atty. Allan Paguia the legal counsel for the deposed president Joseph Ejercito Estrada filed a Special
Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Seeking the following relief:
a. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify
themselves from hearing and deciding this petition; “
b. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and “
c. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Atty. Paguia further asserts that members of the Supreme Court should inhibit in deciding on the case
as justices are prohibited in any partisan political activity as some have participated in the EDSA 2 rally,
which is a violation of Rule 5.10 of Code of Judicial Conduct.
3. Several Resolution had been filed by the legal counsel which is in the disguise of forum shopping,
to which the court issued a resolution on July 08, 2003 with a warning to Atty. Allan Paguia it states, “on
pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to
this Court or to its Members.”
4. Atty. Paguia even after the court’s warning persist on filing cases after cases, to which the Supreme
Court rendered its decision dismissing the certiorari and demanding the petitioner Joseph Ejercito
Estradato show cause and provide a valid reason on why the Supreme Court should not suspend the
legal counsel for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and officer of the court.
5. Atty. Allan Paguia submitted a response with a continuous claim of political partisan ship of some of
the member of the court, and quoting Canon 5.10 to attack the member of the court. Canon 5(10) “A
judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political
partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse
candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities”
6. The court responded on the allegations of Atty. Paguia, citing Section 79(b) of the Omnibus
Election Code defines the term “partisan political activities;” the law states: “The term ‘election
campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
“(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
“(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate.
“(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election
of any candidate for public office;
“(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election
of any candidate; or
“(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.”
7. The court then flagged Atty. Paguia on possible nonobservance of, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others.
8. The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Court’s well-meant
admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say:
“What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s right to due process of law? It renders the
decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were not observed.
There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide
and his fellow justices had already committed to the other party, GMA, with a judgment already made
and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to
voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?”
Issue:
Whether Atty. Paguia violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Paguia had been warned repeatedly on the conduct that should be observed along with the
privilege of a practicing law.
In Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility it mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by
others. While Rule 13.02 of Code of Professional Responsibility states that, “A lawyer shall not make
public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party.”
In this case the Atty. Paguia was repeatedly warned, however feeling passionate about the case, he failed
to observe the etiquette that is expected from a lawyer when he repeatedly filed several cases which
are already a forum shopping in nature, responded with an unfounded claim that some justices violated
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, when the law is clear on the definition of partisan political activity, and
going out to the media stating again his unfounded claim, when the Code of Professional Responsibility is
clear on the limitation on issuance of statements on a pending case which will arouse public opinion that
may affect the people’s trust and confidence on the legal and judicial system.
Wherefore, for the violation of Rule 11 and 13.2 the Code of Professional Responsibility, Mr. Allan
Paguia is indefinitely suspended of practice of law, inside and outside of the Halls of Justice. Let the
copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bat of the Philippines,
and Office of the Court Administrator.
(VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD
NORDISTA, complainants, vs. ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent)
CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.
FACTS:
The case is for disbarment of respondent Fojas, counsel of the complainants, due to malpractice,
neglect and other offenses. It arose from the following facts. Complainants were officers of the Far
Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA). They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino
Salvador. Salvador then commenced with DOLE a complaint to declare illegal his expulsion from
the union. Med-Arbiter, in its resolution, declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and directed his
reinstatement in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto which
was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of DOLE. Subsequently, Salvador filed with the RTC a
complaint against the complainants for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. As complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion
to dismiss the said case on grounds of:
(1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter and
(2) lack of jurisdiction, being an intraunion issue cognizable by the DOLE.
The trial court granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. However, it was reconsidered
and the case reinstated upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, and required the complainants to file
their answer within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice. Instead of filing an answer,
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case but was denied. The
respondent, then, filed with the SC a petition for certiorari, which was referred to the CA but was also
denied. Because of failure to still file an answer by the respondent despite such denial, the complainants,
upon Salvador's motion, were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-
parte. Respondent then filed to set aside such order and the ex-parte reception but to no avail. The trial
court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador
which was affirmed by CA. The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to SC,
but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally
terminated by complainant Santiago.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in
failing to file an answer that declared the complainants to be in default and judgment was rendered
against them on the sole basis of plaintiff’s evidence, which was received ex parte.
HELD:
Yes. ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more
careful in the performance of his duty to his clients. The respondent committed a breach of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which requires him to serve his clients, the
complainants, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that the case was in fact a "losing cause" for the
complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter
declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere
afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any
defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of
the CPR expressly provides: “A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor
understanding the prospects of the case.” It is also axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline
employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the CPR. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client,
the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. Further, whether the respondent’s reason be "overzealousness" that presupposes his full and
continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction
that the trial court had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order
reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to
reconsider the said order, on the one hand; or "volume and pressure of legal work" that is purely based on
forgetfulness because of his other commitments, on the other; such should provide no excuse for the
respondent's inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every
case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Lastly, if much is demanded from an attorney,
it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.
Other Details:
Complainants Veronica S. Santiago Benjamin Q. Hontiveros Mr. Soccoro F. Manas Trinidad Nordista
Respondent Atty. Amador R. Fojas Paulino Salvador Med-Arbiter Trial Court Judge Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Amount ordered to be paid by the complainants in the complaint for damages by Salvador
President of FEUFA Vice-President Treasurer Auditor Initially, counsel of the complainants in the case
filed by Salvador Plaintiff in the complaint for damages against the complainants Santiago Tomas
Falconitin Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172.
The amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective
damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS, Complainant,

vs.
Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO, Respondent.
Representing conflicting interests is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Unless all
the affected clients’ written consent is given after a full disclosure of all relevant facts, attorneys
guilty of representing conflicting interests shall as a rule be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law.
This administrative case stems from a sworn Letter-Complaint filed with the Integrated Bar of the
1
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Ben A. Nicolas, acting for himself and on
behalf of Northwestern University, Inc. In that Letter-Complaint, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo was
charged with deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney
by representing conflicting interests. The material averments of the Complaint are summarized
by the IBP-CBD as follows:
Herein complainants, Northwestern University, Inc. and Mr. Ben A. Nicolas, accused herein
respondent, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, of engaging in conflicting interest in a case before the
National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando, La
Union.
Complainant alleges that in a consolidated case, herein respondent appeared and acted as
counsels for both complainants (eight out of the eighteen complainants therein) and
respondent (one out of the ten respondents therein).
In a consolidation of NLRC Cases [Nos.] 1-05-1086-97, 1-05-1087-97, 1-05-1088-97, 1-05-1091-97,

1-05-1092-97, 1-05-1097-97, 1-05-1109-97, 1-05-1096-97 ("consolidated cases"), herein respondent
appeared as counsel for complainants therein, Teresita A. Velasco, Gervacio A. Velasco, Mariel S.
Hernando, Virginio C. Rasos, Bonifacio S. Blas, Ronald A. Daoang, Luzviminda T. Urcio and Araceli
Quimoyog. In the very same consolidated case, respondent was also the counsel of one of the
respondents therein, Jose G. Castro.
Complainants, as their evidence, submitted the Motion to Dismiss dated August 12, 1997 filed by
Jose G. Castro, represented by his counsel, herein respondent filed before the NLRC of San
Fernando, La Union. Sixteen (16) days later or on August 28, 1997, respondent filed
a Complainant’s Consolidated Position Paper, this time representing some of the complainants in
the very same consolidated case.
Respondent failed to file his Answer to the Complaint despite a June 24 1998 Order of the 3
IBP-CBD directing him to do so. Even after receiving five notices, he failed to appear in any of
the scheduled hearings. Consequently, he was deemed to have waived his right to participate in
the proceedings. Thereafter, the complainants were ordered to submit their verified position paper
with supporting documents, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for decision. In their
Manifestation dated August 30, 2004, they said that they would no longer file a position paper. They
agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of their Letter-Affidavit dated March 16, 1998,
together with all the accompanying documents.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In his Report, Commissioner Dennis B. Funa found respondent guilty of violating the conflict-
of-interests rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the former
recommended the latter’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-415 dated October 7, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted
the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Funa, with the modification that the period of
suspension was increased to two (2) years.
On December 12, 2004, the Resolution and the records of the case were transmitted to this Court for
final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. On January 20, 2005,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to set aside Resolution No. XVI-2004-415. The IBP
denied the Motion.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the recommended period of
suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers
shall not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients’ written consent, given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
8
When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence
of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is
required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when
the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously
affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any
knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorney’s duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to
the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that
duty.9
In the present case, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, as counsel for Respondent Jose C. Castro in NLRC
Case Nos. I-05-1083-97 to I-05-1109-97, filed a Motion to Dismiss those cases. Shortly thereafter, a
position paper was filed by Atty. Arquillo as counsel for several complainants in consolidated NLRC
Case Nos. I-05-1087-97, I-05-1088-97, I-05-1091-97, I-05-1092-97, I-05-1096-97, I-05-1097-97, and
I-05-1109-97. All the cases in the second set were included in the first one, for which he had filed the
subject Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, in his position paper for the complainants, Atty. Arquillo
protected his other client, Respondent Jose C. Castro, in these words:
More than lack of valid cause for the dismissal of complainants, respondents, except Atty. Jose C.
Castro and Atty. Ernesto B. Asuncion, should be made accountable for not according complainants
their right to due process."
10
In his two-page Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Arquillo claims that there was no conflict of
interest in his representation of both the respondent and the complainants in the same
consolidated cases, because all of them were allegedly on the same side. Attaching to the
Motion the Decision of Labor Arbiter Norma C. Olegario on the consolidated NLRC cases, Atty.
Arquillo theorizes that her judgment absolved Castro of personal liability for the illegal dismissal of
the complainants; this fact allegedly showed that there was no conflict in the interests of all the
parties concerned.
This Court does not agree. Atty. Arquillo’s acts cannot be justified by the fact that, in the end, Castro
was proven to be not personally liable for the claims of the dismissed employees. Having agreed to
represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer should have known that there was an obvious
conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same side. It cannot be
denied that the dismissed employees were the complainants in the same cases in which Castro was
one of the respondents. Indeed, Commissioner Funa correctly enounced:
As counsel for complainants, respondent had the duty to oppose the Motion to Dismiss filed by Jose
G. Castro. But under the circumstance, it would be impossible since respondent is also the counsel
of Jose G. Castro. And it appears that it was respondent who prepared the Motion to Dismiss, which
he should be opposing as counsel of Jose G. Castro, Respondent had the duty to prove the
Complaint wrong. But Respondent cannot do this because he is the counsel for the
complainants. Here lies the inconsistency. The inconsistency of interests is very clear.
The attorney in that situation will not be able to pursue, with vigor and zeal, the client’s claim against
the other and to properly represent the latter in the unrelated action, or, if he can do so, he cannot
avoid being suspected by the defeated client of disloyalty or partiality in favor of the successful
client. The foregoing considerations will strongly tend to deprive the relation of attorney and client of
those special elements which make it one of trust and confidence. (Legal Ethics, Agpalo, p. 230, 4th
ed.; In re De la Rosa, 21 Phil. 258)"11
An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy
that a lawyer’s representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies
when the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight such
conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith. 12
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for two years. Considering, however, prior rulings in cases also involving attorneys
representing conflicting interests, we reduce the suspension to one (1) year. 13
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo is found GUILTY of misconduct and is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in
the future.
LOLITA ARTEZUELA VS. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO A.C. NO. 4354. APRIL 22, 2002
Facts:
Artezuela filed before the Supreme Court a verified complaint for disbarment against the
respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as
her lawyer in a damage suit and failed to represent her interests with zeal and
enthusiasm. According to her, when her case was scheduled for pre-trial conference,
respondent asked for its postponement although all the parties were present.
Notwithstanding complainant’s persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do
anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining
complainant’s consent.
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests.
While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia’s Answer to the
Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in respondent’s office.
Complainant further averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case,
misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.
Held:
Yes. He is guilty of representing conflicting interests prohibited by Rule 15.03

of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not

also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold
himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the
adverse party’s conflicting interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most
obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had
a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and
conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-
record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward,
with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
A.C. No. 3701 Ponente: J. Bidin Date: March 28, 1995

Complainant: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK Respondent: ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO
FACTS:
Atty. Telesforo Cedo is the former Assistant Vice President of the Asset Management Group of PNB, who is now
the counsel of Milagros Ong Siy in a case against PNB. Complainant-bank charged Atty Cedo with violation of
Canon 5, rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while i n said service.”
Almeda case: Atty Pedro Singson of PNB attested that in one of the hearings, Atty. Cedo was present although he
did not enter his appearance, and was dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. He also
admitted in one of the hearings that he was the partner of Atty Ferrer.
IBP recommended suspension from the practice for 3 years. Cedo violated Rule 15.02 of the CPR, since the
client’s secrets and confidential records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members
at all times. There also was a deliberate intent to devise ways and means to attract as client’s former borrowers of
PNB since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of PNB. He sacrificed ethics in consideration of
money. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
DISPOSITIVE:
This Court resolves to suspend Atty Cedo from the practice of law for 3 years.
PNB stated that while Atty Cedo was still employed in their bank, he participated in arranging sale of steel
sheets in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy for P200,000. He even “noted” the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr.
Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division
Compound.
Similarly, Atty. Cedo already appeared as a counsel for Mr. Elefan in an administrative case against PNB, but was
disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of
dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of
the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. (Hilado v David).
Atty. Cedo also became the counsel of Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda against PNB as they were represented by the
law firm “Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates” (of which Cedo is one of the Senior Partners). PNB added that
while Atty Cedo was still with them, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses.
ATTY CEDO’s DEFENSE:
Ong Siy case:
He appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision.
He did not participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court.
Almeda case:
He never appeared as counsel for them. Only Atty. Pedro Ferrer of the said law firm handled the case. He also added
that the law firm was not of a general partnership. They are only using the name to designate a law firm maintained
by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. They handle
their cases independently and individually.
ISSUE
1: Whether or not Atty. Cedo was guilty of violating Canon 6 – YES
HELD/RATIO:
This case was referred to the IBP. Their findings are the ff:
He was the counsel through the law firm and was fined by the court in the amount of P1,000 for forum
shopping.
REGALA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (262 SCRA 122)

G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996

FACTS:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), raised a complaint before

the Sandiganbayan (SB) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his
partners in the ACCRA law firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which
includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No.
0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."

During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint on his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder.

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG
similarly grant the same treatment to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has offered to
the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco but the ACCRA lawyers have
refused to disclose the identities of their clients. ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for
certiorari, invoking that the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion:
1. In subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who acted to the strict application of
the law of agency
2. In not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly
situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.
3. In not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s)
and other information requested by PCGG.
4. In not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be
based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to equal
protection of the law

ISSUE:
the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of
their clients and the other information requested by the PCGG.

HELD:
ACCRA lawyers & Roco are similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment
Being “similarly situated” in that ACCRA LAWYERS’ and ROCO’s acts were made in
furtherance of “legitimate lawyering, PCGG must show that there exist other conditions and
circumstances which would warrant their treating ROCO differently from ACCRA
LAWYERS in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
To justify the dropping of ROCO from the case or the filing of the suit in the Sandiganbayan
without him, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as a species apart
from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial
distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of
the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for
their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the
same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon the
question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected
transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing
expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.
UNITY FISHING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. DANILO G.

MACALINO, RESPONDENT.
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Under consideration is this petition by way of a complaint for disbarment filed by Unity Fishing
Development Corporation against Atty. Danilo Macalino for having violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
On July 26, 1996, respondent filed a motion for extension of thirty (30) days within which to file
comment, which motion was granted by the Court in its resolution of August 21, 1996.
On August 26, 1996, respondent filed another motion for extension, this time for an additional period of
fifteen (15) days. The motion was similarly granted by the Court in its resolution of October 7, 1996.
Still, on September 19, 1996, respondent filed a third and "last extension of time to file comment". Again,
this was granted by the Court via its resolution of November 27, 1996.
Unfortunately, no comment was ever filed by respondent.
Hence, and taking note of complainant's "Motion to Conduct Further Proceedings", filed on March 23,
1998, the Court, in its resolution of April 27, 1998, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
Acting on the referral, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline designated Atty. Cesar R. Dulay as
investigating commissioner. It appears, however, that even while the case was already under formal
investigation, respondent displayed the same attitude of lack of concern. As reported by Atty. Dulay:
The Commission issued a notice setting the case for hearing on October 8, 1998, at which hearing
complainant represented by its legal counsel and respondent appeared. Again, respondent asked for
fifteen days from October 8, 1998 to file his Answer. Complainant also asked the same period within
which to file his reply.
On November 5, 1998, respondent filed an urgent motion for extension of time to file answer.
On November 9, 1998, respondent again filed an urgent motion for last extension of time or a period of
fifteen (15) days from November 15, 1998 to file answer, which was granted by the Commission.
Since the respondent has not filed his answer as required by the Honorable Supreme Court and the
Commission, the case was again set for hearing on November 9, 1999.
On said date, only the counsel for complainant appeared. Respondent was absent. However, records show
the notice sent to him was returned unserved with the annotation "Moved." Records also show that
respondent has not filed his answer and again he was given a last chance to file his answer within ten (10)
days from receipt of the Order dated November 9, 1999 and the hearing of the case was reset to December
9, 1999.
On December 9, 1999, only counsel for complainant appeared and moved that respondent's right to file
answer be deemed waived and that complainant be allowed to file Memorandum after which, the case
shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 14, 1999, respondent again filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of fifteen (15) days from
December 4, 1999 within which to file his answer.
On January 7, 2000, the complainant filed a Memorandum, a copy of which was furnished to respondent
and which was not controverted by respondent.
All told, respondent filed six (6) motions for extension of time to file Answer and up to this time, which is
almost seven (7) years from the time the Honorable Supreme Court required respondent to file his answer
to the complaint, respondent has not filed any answer, on account of which the investigating
commissioner considered the case as "now ready for resolution".
Thereafter, the investigating commissioner submitted his Report. Dated January 20, 2003, the Report
recites the factual background of the case and the commissioner's discussion and findings thereon, thus:
"Frabal Fishing and Ice Plant Corporation (hereinafter, Frabal) was the owner of a parcel of land located
along Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard, Sta. Mesa, Manila which was leased to Wheels Distributors, Inc.
(hereinafter, Wheels), an authorized dealer of cars and motor vehicles of various make;
A dispute arose between Frabal and Wheels regarding the terms and conditions of the lease contract. The
dispute eventually led to a lawsuit. Frabal hired the services of respondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino as
counsel for the purpose of representing its interest in the said lawsuit;
Frabal merged and was absorbed by Petitioner corporation on February 12, 1991, with the former
conveying, assigning and transferring all its business assets and liabilities to the latter, including all
judicial and extra-judicial claims. Hence, Petitioner was substituted in lieu of Frabal in the former's
lawsuit with Wheels;
As Petitioner's legal counsel, Respondent advised Petitioner to severe all contractual relationship with
Wheels as a step towards eventually evicting the latter from the property they were occupying;
Hence, upon advice of Respondent, the contract of lease between Frabal and Wheels was terminated.
Respondent likewise advised Petitioner to return the guarantee deposit equivalent to two (2) months
rental or the amount of P50,000.00 to Wheels;
On March 2, 1988, Petitioner prepared Metrobank Check No. MB350288 dated March 8, 1988 for the
amount of P50,000.00. The check was crossed and made payable to the Wheels Distributors, Inc. (Annex
"A").
Respondent volunteered to bring the check to the office of Wheels himself and to make them accept it.
Hence, on March 3, 1988, Respondent sent his representative to Petitioner's office to get the said check;
Respondent's representative duly received the said check from Petitioner, as proof of which he signed
Check Voucher No. 3-012 (Annex "B");
Thereafter, Respondent represented to Petitioner that he was able to deliver the check to Wheels
Distributors, Inc.;
The suit between Petitioner and Wheels continued for several years. In the meantime, Petitioner changed
counsels, replacing Respondent with someone else;
Finally, sometime in May 1994, the suit ended in amicable settlement. In the process of negotiating the
terms and conditions of the settlement, Wheels informed Petitioner that it never received there fund-
guarantee deposit in the amount of P50,000.00;
Petitioner was shocked to learn this piece of information from Wheels Distributors as all along
Respondent had represented to Petitioner that Wheels has already received the guarantee deposit of
P50,000.00;
Petitioner searched its files for the subject check. After locating the check, Petitioner noted that at the
back of the check was a rubber stamp marking indicating that it was deposited with the United Savings
Bank Head Office on May 13, 1988 to Account No. CA-483-3. United Savings Bank has since been
acquired by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and is now known as UCPB Savings Bank;
Petitioner checked with Wheels Distributors from whom it later learned that the latter never maintained
an account with the United Savings Bank, now the UCPB Savings Bank;
Petitioner wrote to Respondent on May 19, 1994 to explain why the check in issue never reached Wheels
Distributors and how it was endorsed and encashed despite the fact that it was a crossed check (Copy of
said letter is Annex "C");
Despite receipt of said letter, however, Respondent never responded nor attempted to explain his side to
what strongly appears to be a gross misappropriation of the money for his own personal use;
Hence, Petitioner was constrained to institute an action for damages against Respondent Danilo G.
Macalino as well as UCPB Savings Bank with the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72 where the
same is now docketed as Civil Case No. 2382-MN;
That Respondent misappropriated the amount of P50,000.00 for his own personal use cannot be denied.
An employee of UCPB in the person of Eduardo Estremadura testified in the aforestated case for damages
that Respondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino was the one maintaining Account No. CA-483-37 at UCPB, to
which the crossed check payable to Wheels was deposited (TSN, p. 8, Aug. 24, 1995, copy of the TSN is
Annex "D");
The Metrobank Check No. MB350288 dated March 8, 1988 for the amount of P50,000.00 was deposited
to Respondent's account is further shown in United Savings Bank Current Account Deposit Slip
accomplished by Respondent when he deposited said check with United Savings Bank on May 13, 1988
(Copy of said deposit slip is Annex "E").
Respondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino was given all the opportunity to answer and present his defenses to
the complaint. Regrettably, the records show that despite the orders of the Supreme Court and this
Commission respondent has not taken any step to verify and inquire as to the status of the complaint
against him. Almost three years since the submission of the complainant's memorandum, respondent has
not reacted nor made any move to protect himself and answer the complaint. Due process consists in
being given the opportunity to be heard and we believe that in this case respondent has been given all the
opportunity to be heard.
On the basis of the above, the investigating commissioner concluded his Report with the following -
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years and be ordered to account to complainant the amount of P50,000.00. Respondent should be
warned that a similar offense will merit a more severe penalty.
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2003-341, adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner with a modification as to the
penalty, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as
Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, with modification as to the penalty to conform to the evidence, and considering
respondent's failure to account for the funds received by him in trust from complainant in gross violation
of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as for respondent's lax, remiss and
untroubled attitude in this case, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year and Ordered to account to complainant the amount of P50,000.00 with a Warning
that a similar offense will merit a more severe penalty.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and
good faith. It is designed "to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being
done for the protection of the client". So it is that the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
ROSARIO JUNIO, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GRUPO, respondent.
FACTS:
1. Complainant Rosario Junio engaged the services of respondent, Atty. Salvador Grupo, then a private
practitioner, for the redemption of a parcel of land registered in the name of her parents.
2. Complainant entrusted to respondent the amount of P25,000 in cash to be used in the redemption of the
aforesaid property.
3. When the respondent’s efforts failed, the complainant acceded to the respondent’s request that the P25,000 be
converted into a loan in favor of the latter, to help defray his children’s educational expenses. A promissory note
was thereafter executed by Atty. Grupo in favor of Rosario Junio for the said amount.
4. Despite repeated demands made by complainant and without justiﬁable cause, respondent had continuously
refused to refund the money entrusted to him.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. What rule was violated? Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility: “A lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice.” This rule is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over the client. This rule
is especially significant in the instant case where the respondent enjoys an immense ascendancy over the
complainant who, as well as two of his sisters, had served respondents family as household helpers for many years.
2. Whether or not there was attorney-client relationship despite respondent’s contention that the bases of his
rendering legal services were:
(a) the close family ties between his family and the complainant’s; and
(b) that the legal services involved no consideration and purely gratuitous. Yes. “If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation,
then the professional employment must be regarded as established.”
FLAVIANO A. PELMOKA v. JUDGE FELIX T. DIAZ
In a verified complaint dated December 4, 1981, Flaviano A. Pelmoka charged Judge Felix T. Diaz, Jr. of
the CFI of Nueva Ecija and Attorneys Facundo T. Bautista and Inocencio B. Garampil, Sr. with serious
misconduct in connection with Civil Case No. 279-G, entitled Eustacio Nepomuceno, et al. vs. Ester
Garampil, et al.
The charge against Judge Diaz is for gross ignorance of the law and judicial proceedings; failure to protect
the complainant's charging lien as one of the lawyers who intervened in the aforementioned civil case; and
partiality, bias prejudice or malicious motive.
This decision concerns Judge Diaz only who was required to file an answer to the complaint. The answer
denies the allegations of the complaint with a prayer that it be dismissed. The complainant filed a reply to
the answer and issues having been joined, it was ascertained that the case could be decided on the basis of
the documentary evidence submitted without resorting to a formal hearing.
The Rollo of the case reveals, according to Deputy Court Administrator Romeo D. Mendoza, the
following:
"Civil Case No. 279-G was a case for partition and reconveyance filed with the CFI of Nueva Ecija, Branch
IV, on March 4, 1972, long before respondent judge was appointed to the Bench. When the respondent
judge inherited the case in 1976, there were many side issues and/or incidents pending to be resolved,
among which were:
(a) Motion to exclude defendant Ester Garampil as an heir of the late Leon Arguelles; and
(b) Motion for appointment of commissioners to partition the properties, both filed by herein com-
plainant. Respondent judge issued an order denying the motion of the plaintiffs for exclusion of defendant
Ester Garampil as heir so as to avoid the piecemeal adjudication of the issues raised in the case. (p. 74.)
The motion of the plaintiffs for the appointment of commissioners was likewise denied by respondent
judge for the reason that there was then pending before the Court of Appeals, an appeal involving the
same parties and the same properties whereby the legality of a Deed of Donation concerning the same
properties being litigated, is the very issue to be resolved. (p. 75.) It was for this reason that respondent
judge held in abeyance the trial of Civil Case No. 279-G pending termination of the appeal before the
Court of Appeals. (p. 80.)
"On May 4, 1981, a Motion to set the case for conference among the parties, was filed by defendants
Serranos, Rigors and Garcias who were represented by Atty. Facundo T. Bautista. After a hearing on the
aforesaid motion was held, the defendants moved for the approval of the 'Compromise Agreement' dated
July 1, 1981, which was signed by all the parties to the case (except defendant Ester Garampil), as well as
by all the lawyers of the said parties, namely, complainant himself, representing the plaintiffs, Atty.
Facundo Bautista, representing the defendants, and Atty. Inocencio Garampil, representing defendant
Ester Garampil. (pp.89-94.) The parties agreed that they would partition the properties being litigated in
the manner specified in the 'Compromise Agreement' and that they would be separately responsible for
the payment of the fees of their respective lawyers. On September 21, 1981, the respondent judge issued a
decision approving the said compromise agreement on July 1, 1981. (pp. 97-100.)
"Defendant Ester Garampil thereafter filed a motion to deposit in court, the purchase price of a
commercial property in the amount of P250,000.00 in order that the proceeds thereof may be disposed of
in accordance with the approved compromise agreement. Complainant then filed a motion for the
payment of his professional fee in the amount of P57,519.00, (pp. 104-105.) which was later raised to
P79,186.00 in two subsequent motions of the complainant. (pp. 113-119.)
"On October 22, 1981, defendant Ester Garampil filed a motion for the withdrawal of the sum of
P20,000.00 (p. 109.) from the amount deposited with the court, representing partial payment of her
share in the estate pursuant to the expressed agreement of the heirs of the deceased contained in the
compromise agreement, which motion was granted by the respondent judge. (p. 110.) The other parties
thereafter moved to withdraw their respective shares in the cash deposit with the court, and on the basis
of the said motions, respondent judge issued the Order dated October 30, 1981, allowing the defendants to
withdraw their shares, (p. 120.) and the Order dated November 20, 1981, granting the request of the other
parties for the withdrawal of their respective shares. (pp. 135-137.)
"In his complaint, complainant charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and judicial
proceedings committed in the following manner: (a) unduly delaying the disposition of Civil Case No.
279-G when respondent judge denied plaintiffs' motion for the appointment of commissioners to partition
the properties; (b) not resolving plaintiffs' motion to exclude defendant Ester Garampil as heir of
deceased Leon Arguelles despite early pronouncement of Judge Placido Ramos, respondent judge's
predecessor, that Ester Garampil is not an heir of the deceased; (c) approving the compromise agreement
of partition entered into by all the parties; (d) allowing Ester Garampil to withdraw the amount of
P20,000.00 from the cash deposit with the court, considering that she is not an heir of the deceased; and
(e) ignoring complainant's motion for payment of his fees out of the money deposited with the court.
"The complainant further alleged that the respondent judge failed to protect his charging lien or his
attorney's fees when he allowed plaintiffs to withdraw their share from the said deposit. He likewise
charged respondent judge with bias and partiality when he allowed all the parties to withdraw their
respective shares while the complainant was not allowed to do the same in so far as his charging lien is
concerned.
"Respondent judge, in his Answer dated January 13, 1982, (pp. 62-71.) denied all the charges in the
complaint. The respondent judge alleged that Civil Case No. 279-G was a case for reconveyance and
partition of the estate of deceased Leon Arguelles which had been heard and tried by no less than four (4)
judges before him. When he inherited the case in 1976, there were several side issues and/or incidents
pending to be resolved and while all these side issues were pending before the court a quo, an appeal in-
volving the same parties and the same properties being litigated, was then pending before the Court of
Appeals. It was for this reason that the respondent judge denied complainant's motion for appointment of
a commissioner as well as his motion to exclude defendant Ester Garampil as an heir.
"Respondent judge also stated that he allowed the parties, including defendant Ester Garampil who is not
a compulsory heir, to withdraw their respective shares from the cash portion of the estate in order to
implement the compromise agreement entered into by all the parties and their respective lawyers.
"With respect to the charge of the complainant that the respondent judge failed to protect his charging
lien or his attorney's fees, the respondent judge explained that he did not grant complainant's motion for
payment of his professional fees because he could not ascertain the exact amount of complainant's just,
reasonable and fair fee, considering that his claim of P79,186.00 was contested by the plaintiffs as being
exorbitant."
Deputy Court Administrator Mendoza has assessed the charges against Judge Diaz in the light of the
record as follows:
"The respondent judge cannot be faulted for dismissing complainant's motion for appointment of
commissioners as well as his motion to exclude defendant Ester Garampil as an heir. The respondent
judge had to dismiss the said motions to avoid piecemeal adjudication of the issues raised before him. In
fact, respondent judge even suspended the trial of the case until after the Court of Appeals shall have
resolved the issue pending before it which involved the same parties and the same properties being
litigated.
"The respondent judge was likewise justified in granting the motion of the parties to withdraw their
respective shares from the cash portion of the estate. The respondent judge only implemented the
compromise agreement entered into by all the parties and signed by all their respective lawyers including
complainant herein. With respect to complainant's professional fees, it was specified in the compromise
agreement that the parties would be separately responsible for the payment of the fees of their respective
lawyers. Since the plaintiffs (complainant's clients), refused to pay complainant's claim for attorney's fee
in the amount of P79,186.00 on the ground that the same is exorbitant, the remedy of the complainant is
to file a separate action for recovery of his fees where the parties will be afforded the chance to prove their
respective claims and defenses.
"In the case of Bongco vs. Judge Serapio, (Adm. Matter No. 1804-CAR, Feb. 28, 1980.) this Court held
that where it does not appear from the facts in an administrative complaint that the assailed judicial acts
of respondent judge were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were done in persistent
disregard of well known legal rules, the complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit."
The assessment is well taken except in respect of the failure of the respondent to protect the complainant's
right to collect his professional fees.
The respondent should not have allowed the clients of the complainant to withdraw their shares from the
cash deposit without extending ample protection to the latter's claim. This error was compounded by his
order allowing even Ester Garampil to withdraw her share when she did not sign the compromise agree-
ment of July 1, 1981.
It was grossly unfair for the respondent to leave the complainant holding an empty bag, so to speak, after
he had rendered his professional services as counsel to the plaintiffs. True it is that the compromise
agreement stipulates that the parties shall be separately responsible for the payment of the fees for their
respective lawyers; nevertheless, the respondent should not have improvidently allowed the clients of the
complainant to withdraw their shares without first determining his reasonable fees.
A lawyer has the right to claim the fruits of his labor. He has the equitable right to be paid his fees out of
the judgment which he has obtained from a court of justice. Any allegation of exorbitant or excessive fees
should have been resolved by the respondent Judge on the basis of quantum meruit. Or the respondent
could have inquired from the plaintiffs what they considered as reasonable attorney's fees for the services
of complainant, direct the payment of such "reasonable amount" as partial payment of his attorney's fees,
and set for hearing the disputed difference between the claim of the complainant and the amount
considered reasonable by the plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, for his failure to protect the complainant's charging lien, the respondent is hereby
reprimanded.
[A.C. No. 5829. October 28, 2003.]

DANIEL LEMOINE, Complainant, v. ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., Respondent.
On December 17, 1999, complainant Daniel Lemoine, a French national, filed a verified
complaint against respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., for estafa and misconduct before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-679, was
referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline to an Investigator for investigation, report and
recommendation.es irtua1 1aw 1ibrary
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In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance
Company (Metropolitan Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As complainant
encountered problems in pursuing his claim which was initially rejected, his friend, a certain
Jesus "Jess" Garcia (Garcia), arranged for the engagement of respondent’s services.
By letter 3 of October 21, 1998 addressed to Elde Management, Inc., "ATTN: Mr. Daniel
Lemoine," under whose care complainant could be reached, respondent advised
complainant, whom he had not before met, that for his legal services he was charging "25%
of the actual amount being recovered payable upon successful recovery;" an advance
payment of P50,000.00 "to be charged to complainant to be deducted from whatever
amount would be successfully collected;" P1,000.00 "as appearance and conference fee for
each and every court hearings, conferences outside our law office and meetings before the
Office of the Insurance Commission which will be also charged to our 25% recovery fee;"
and legal expenses "such as but not limited to filing fee, messengerial and postage
expenses . . . and other miscellaneous but related expenses," to be charged to
complainant’s account which would be reimbursed upon presentation statement of account.
The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorney’s fees does not bear complainant’s
conformity, he not having agreed therewith.
It appears that Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to settle complainant’s claim, for by
letter 4 of December 9, 1998 addressed to it, respondent confirmed his acceptance of its
offer to settle the claim of complainant "in an ex-gratia basis of 75% of his policy coverage
which is therefore FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P525,000.00) PESOS."cralaw
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A day or a few days before December 23, 1998 when complainant left for France, he, on the
advice of respondent, signed an already prepared undated Special Power of Attorney 6
authorizing respondent and/or Garcia to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for
the satisfaction of complainant’s claim as well as to "negotiate, sign, compromise[,] encash
and receive payment" from it. The Special Power of Attorney was later dated December 23,
1998 on which same date Metropolitan Insurance issued a Chinabank Check No. 841172
payable to complainant in the amount of P525,000.00 as full settlement of the claim. 7 The
check was received by Respondent.
In the meantime, complainant returned to the Philippines in early January 1999 but left
again on the 24th of the same month. 8 On inquiry about the status of his claim, Garcia
echoed to complainant what respondent had written him (Garcia) in respondent’s letter 9 of
March 26, 1999 that the claim was still pending with Metropolitan Insurance and that it was
still subject of negotiations in which Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle it for
P350,000.00 representing fifty percent thereof. In the same letter to Garcia, respondent
suggested the acceptance of the offer of settlement to avoid a protracted litigation.
On December 6, 1999, on complainant’s personal visit to the office of Metropolitan

Insurance, he was informed that his claim had long been settled via a December 23, 1998
check given to respondent the year before. 10 Complainant lost no time in going to the law
office of respondent who was not around, however, but whom he was able to talk by
telephone during which he demanded that he turn over the proceeds of his claim. 11
Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a December 7, 1999 letter 12 wherein he

acknowledged having in his possession the proceeds of the encashed check which he
retained, however, as attorney’s lien pending complainant’s payment of his attorney’s fee,
equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of the entire amount collected. In the same letter,
respondent protested what he branded as the "uncivilized and unprofessional behavior"
complainant "reportedly demonstrated" at respondent’s office. Respondent winded up his
letter as follows, quoted verbatim:s virtual 1aw library
We would like to make it clear that we cannot give you the aforesaid amount until and
unless our attorney’s fees will be forthwith agreed and settled. In the same manner, should
you be barbaric and uncivilized with your approached, we will not hesitate to make a proper
representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for the authenticity of your
visa, Department of Labor and Employment for your working status, Bureau of Internal
Revenue for your taxation compliance and the National Bureau of Investigation with which
we have a good network.
While it is your prerogative to file a legal action against us, it is also our prerogative to file a
case against you. We will rather suggest if you could request your lawyer to just confer with
us for the peaceful settlement of this matter.
As despite written demands, respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the insurance
claim and to acknowledge the unreasonableness of the attorney’s fees he was demanding,
complainant instituted the administrative action at bar on December 17, 1999.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that" it appears that there was ‘irregularity’
with the check," it having been issued payable to him, but "and/or AMADEO BALON" was
therein intercalated after his complainant’s name.
Maintaining that respondent was entitled to only P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees, 15

complainant decried respondent’s continued possession of the proceeds of his claim 16 and
his misrepresentations that the recovery thereof was fraught with difficulties.
In his Counter-Affidavit 18 of February 18, 2000, respondent asserted that his continued
retention of the proceeds of complainant’s claim is in lawful exercise of his lien for unpaid
attorney’s fees. He expressed readiness, however, to account for and turn them over once
he got paid fifty percent (50%) thereof, he citing the so called contingent fee billing method
of "no cure, no pay" adopted by practicing lawyers in the insurance industry as the basis of
the amount of his attorney’s fees, which to him was justified in the absence of an attorney-
client contract between him and complainant, the latter having rejected respondent’s letter-
proposal of October 21, 1998.
Respondent also highlighted the value of the time and efforts he extended in pursuing
complainant’s claim and the expenses he incurred in connection therewith. He went on to
assert that his inability to contact complainant whose whereabouts he did not know
prompted him to encash the check and keep the proceeds thereof in conformity with the
Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor.
During the hearings conducted by the IBP Investigator, complainant echoed his allegations
in his Complaint-Affidavit and stressed that he turned down as unreasonable respondent’s
proposal in his October 21, 1998 letter that he be paid 25% of the actual amount collected
for his legal services. And he presented documentary evidence, including the March 26,
1999 letter of respondent informing his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia of the supposedly still
unrecovered claim and suggesting acceptance of the purported offer of Metropolitan
Insurance to settle complainant’s claim at P350,000.00.
Explaining how his above-mentioned March 26, 1999 letter to Garcia came about,
respondent declared that it was made upon Garcia’s request, intended for a certain Joel
Ramiscal (Ramiscal) who was said to be Garcia’s business partner.
Respondent later submitted a June 13, 2001 Supplement 24 to his Counter-Affidavit

reiterating his explanation that it was on Garcia’s express request that he wrote the March
26, 1999 letter, which was directed to the fax number of Ramiscal.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Additionally, respondent declared that in the first week of May 1999, on the representation
of Garcia that he had talked to complainant about respondent’s retention of fifty percent
(50%) of the insurance proceeds for professional fees less expenses, he gave Garcia, on a
staggered basis, the total amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent averred, is the
amount of insurance claim complainant is entitled to receive less attorney’s fees and
expenses. Thus, respondent claimed that he gave Garcia the amount of P30,000.00 on May
31, 1999 at Dulcinea Restaurant in Greenbelt, Makati; the amounts of P50,000.00,
P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 on different occasions at his (respondent’s) former address
through his executive secretary Sally I. Leonardo; the amount of P20,000.00 at the office of
his (respondent’s) former employer Commonwealth Insurance Company through his
subordinate Glen V. Roxas; and several other payments at Dulcinea, and at Manila
Intercontinental Hotel’s coffee shop sometime in October 1999. 27 Respondent submitted
the separate sworn statements of Leonardo and Roxas.
Explaining why no written memorandum of the turn-over of various payments to Garcia was
made, respondent alleged that there was no need therefor since he very well knew Garcia
who is a co-Rotarian and co-attorney-in-fact and whom he really dealt with regarding
complainant’s claim. 29
Respondent furthermore declared that he rejected complainant’s offer to pay him

P50,000.00 for his services, insisting that since there had been no clear-cut agreement on
his professional fees and it was through him that Metropolitan Insurance favorably
reconsidered its initial rejection of complainant’s claim, he is entitled to a contingent fee of
50% of the net proceeds thereof.
Finally, respondent declared that he, in connection with his follow-up of the insurance claim,
incurred representation expenses of P35,000.00, entertainment and other representation
expenses on various occasions of P10,000.00, and transportation and gasoline expenses
and parking fees of P5,000.00; 31 and that his retention of complainant’s money was
justified in light of his apprehension that complainant, being an alien without a valid working
permit in the Philippines, might leave the country anytime without settling his professional
fees. 32
The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and Recommendation 33 of October 26, 2001,

found respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended that he be disbarred and directed
to immediately turn over to complainant the sum of P475,000.00 representing the amount
of the P525,000.00 insurance claim less respondent’s professional fees of P50,000.00, as
proposed by complainant.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, acting on the Investigator’s
Report, issued Resolution No. XV-2002-401 34 on August 3, 2002, reading:chanrob1es
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RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" ; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification,
and considering respondent’s dishonesty which amounted to grave misconduct and grossly
unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent but the noble
profession to which he belongs, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months with the directive to turn over the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Five
Thousand. (P525,000.00) Pesos to the complainant without prejudice to respondent’s right
to claim attorney’s fees which he may collect in the proper forum. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent, by a Motion for Reconsideration 35 filed with this Court, assails the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation as not supported by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. He prays for the reopening of the case and its remand to
the Investigator so that Garcia can personally appear for his (respondent’s) confrontation.
There is no need for a reopening of the case. The facts material to its resolution are either
admitted or documented.
This Court is in full accord with the findings of the IBP Investigator that respondent violated
the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:virtual 1aw library
In fact, long after respondent received the December 23, 1998 check for P525,000.00 he,
by his letter of March 26, 1999 to Garcia, had even the temerity to state that the claim was
still pending and recommend "acceptance of the 50% offer which is P350,000.00 pesos." His
explanation that he prepared and sent this letter on Garcia’s express request is nauseating.
A lawyer, like respondent, would not and should not commit prevarication, documented at
that, on the mere request of a friend.
By respondent’s failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the
benefit of his client, he committed professional misconduct. Such misconduct is
reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously done on purpose through the
employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about the
release of the check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been deprived of
the use of the proceeds thereof.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his
duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the client’s cause but also degrades himself and
besmirches the fair name of an honorable profession.
That respondent had a lien on complainant’s funds for his attorney’s fees did not relieve him
of his duty to account for it. 40 The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien
presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorney’s fees to be charged. In case
of disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being unconscionable,
however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of
his fees. 41 He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion
with the proper court to fix the amount of such fees.
In respondent’s case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring the matter of his
compensation for judicial determination so that his and complainant’s sharp disagreement
thereon could have been put to an end. Instead, respondent stubbornly and in bad faith
held on to complainant’s funds with the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree to the
amount of attorney’s fees sought. This is an appalling abuse by respondent of the exercise
of an attorney’s retaining lien which by no means is an absolute right and cannot at all
justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon
demand.
Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorney’s fees. After he
received the check and after complainant had discovered its release to him, he was already
asking for 50%, objection to which complainant communicated to him. Why respondent had
to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about one year when all the while he has been
in custody of the proceeds of the check defies comprehension. At any rate, it smacks of
opportunism, to say the least.
As for respondent’s claim in his June 2001, Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he had
on several occasions from May 1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total of
P233,000.00 out of the insurance proceeds to Garcia in trust for complainant, this does not
persuade, for it is bereft of any written memorandum thereof. It is difficult to believe that a
lawyer like respondent could have entrusted such total amount of money to Garcia without
documenting it, especially at a time when, as respondent alleged, he and Garcia were not in
good terms. 43 Not only that. As stated earlier, respondent’s Counter-Affidavit of February
18, 2000 and his December 7, 1999 letter to complainant unequivocally contained his
express admission that the total amount of P525,000.00 was in his custody. Such illogical,
futile attempt to exculpate himself only aggravates his misconduct. Respondent’s claim
discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo and Roxas who, acting allegedly for him, purportedly
gave Garcia some amounts forming part of the P233,000.00 are thus highly suspect and
merit no consideration.
The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the gravity of his professional
misconduct.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The intercalation of respondent’s name to the Chinabank check that was issued payable
solely in favor of complainant as twice certified by Metropolitan Insurance 44 is clearly a
brazen act of falsification of a commercial document which respondent resorted to in order
to encash the check.
Respondent’s threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to possible

sanctions from certain government agencies with which he bragged to have a "good
network" reflects lack of character, self-respect, and justness.
It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in possession of
complainant’s funds in the amount of over half a million pesos. The deceptions and lies that
he peddled to conceal, until its discovery by complainant after about a year, his receipt of
the funds and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly oppressive manner point to his lack
of good moral character. Worse, by respondent’s turnaround in his Supplement to his
Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to complainant’s friend Garcia the amount of
P233,000.00 which, so respondent claims, is all that complainant is entitled to, he in effect
has declared that he has nothing more to turn over to complainant. Such incredible position
is tantamount to a refusal to remit complainant’s funds, and gives rise to the conclusion that
he has misappropriated them.
In fine, by respondent’s questioned acts, he has shown that he is no longer fit to remain a
member of the noble profession that is the law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit
and gross misconduct in the practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby
DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll
of Attorneys and to inform all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of this
Decision.
Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant, Daniel Lemoine, the amount of

P525,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice, without prejudice to whatever judicial
action he may take to recover his attorney’s fees and purported expenses incurred in
securing the release thereof from Metropolitan Insurance.
Rule 138-A Law Student Practice
For Level 1 Certification:
1) Interview prospective clients

2) Give legal advice to the client
3) Negotiate for and on behalf of the client
4) Draft legal documents such as affidavit, compromise, agreements, contracts, demand
letter, position papers and the like
5) Represents eligible parties before quasi-judicial or administrative bodies
6) Provide public legal orientation
7) Assist in public interest advocacies for policy formulation and implementation
For Level 2 Certification:
1) Perform all activities under Level 1 Certification

2) Assist in the taking of depositions and/or preparing
3) Appear on behalf of the client at any stage of the proceedings or trial, before any court,
quasi-judicial or administrative body
4) In criminal cases, subject to the provisions of Sec. 5
5) In appealed cases, to prepare the pleadings required in the case
CYNTHIA ROSACIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN BULALACAO, respondent
A.C. No. 3745. October 2, 1995
FACTS
Case: disbarment complaint
Parties: Complainant Rosacia – president of Tacma Phils., Inc. Respondent Atty Bulalacao – retained counsel of
corporation     
On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written agreement, Atty. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel by Tacma
Phils. On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between respondent and Tacma Phils., was severed as
shown by another agreement after almost 9 months from said termination, several employees consulted
respondent for purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal respondent agreed to handle the case for said
employees against Tacma Phils. by filing a complaint before the NLRC. Respondent does not dispute this. In
fact, in his motion for reconsideration, he admitted that he "did commit an act bordering on grave misconduct, if not
outright violation of his attorney's oath.” He is also pleading for the Court’s compassion and lenience to reduce
the 3-month suspension to either a fine or admonition on the ff grounds:
o he is relatively new in the profession (admitted to the Bar April 1990 at age of 46 and complained conduct was on
August 1991)
o he is of humble beginnings, his suspension will deprive his family of its only source of livelihood
o he has fully realized his mistake
o he has already severed his relationship with the employees by withdrawing his appearance as counsel
o he pledges not to commit the same mistake + strictly adhere to standards set forth by CPR
ISSUE
Atty. Bulalacao breached his oath of office for representing the employees of his former client, Tacma Phils.
after the termination of their attorney-client relationship
Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Commission on Bar Discipline:
Yes, IBP investigating commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of office and accordingly
recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.
IBP Board of Governors:
Yes, IBP Board of Governors adopted the commissioner’s report and recommendation.
SC RULING:
Yes, Affirmed IBP’s findings that respondent breached his oath of office. The Court held that an attorney owes
loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and
client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person
against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case.
The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in the highest degree. A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him . An attorney not only
becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak
and strong points of the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients
obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by
the loss of the confidence of the Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. Having just hurdled the bar
examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of the CPR to keep inviolate the
client's trust and confidence even after the attorney-client relation is terminated must have been still fresh in his
mind. A lawyer starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by
the norms of conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the
legal profession as well.
LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION represented by Mr. SOLOMON U.

LORENZANA, JR., as its President and General Manager, and/or Mrs.
ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, as its Vice-President, Petitioners, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO L.
DARIA, Respondent.
Respondent was hired by complainant Lorenzana Food Corporation on January 8, 1981

as its legal counsel and was designated as its personnel manager six months later. On
May 23, 1983, LFC employee, Violeta Hanopol, filed a complaint for Illegal dismissal
and other monetary claims against complainant before the Department of Labor and
Employment. On May 30, 1983, summons was served on the parties with the
requirement that position papers be submitted.
During the initial hearing on June 13, 1973, Hanopol and respondent tried to explore
the possibility of an amicable settlement. Since no agreement was reached, the hearing
was reset to June 17, 1983. On the pretext that Hanopol was supposed to go to her
office to work on that date, respondent failed to appear for the second setting. So, the
Labor Arbiter was constrained to further reset the hearing to June 23, 1983.
Respondent received on June 23, 1983 the Order for the resetting to June 1983.
In the meantime, on June 20, 1983, respondent received an Order in another labor
case, setting the hearing therein also on June 28, 1983. Faced with a conflicting
schedule, respondent decided to move to postpone the hearing in the Hanopol case.
However, instead of filing a written motion for postponement, he opted to call, through
his secretary, the Office of the Labor Arbiter to move for postponement. Respondent’s
telephone message apparently failed to reach the Labor Arbiter, because at the hearing
on June 28, 1983, he considered the case submitted for decision on the basis of
Hanopol’s complaint and affidavit. Respondent had not submitted a position paper.
After a month, on July 29, 1983, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision directing LFC to
pay Hanopol the total sum of P6,469.60 in labor benefits, on the basis of Hanopol’s
evidence alone.
Respondent Daria appealed the Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on August 23, 1983. The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further
proceedings. The case was set for hearing on June 25, 1984 and July 12, 1984 wherein
attempts for an amicable settlement still proved futile. The Labor Arbiter set two more
dates for hearing: July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984.
In the meantime, the middle of June 1984, respondent signified to management his
intention to resign. In the light of this development, management hired Atty. Rogelio
Udarbe to take his place on July 16, 1984, the effective date of his resignation.
Respondent endorsed the cases of complainant to Atty. Udarbe.
During the hearings in the Hanopol case on July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984, no one
appeared for complainant. So, on August 15, 1984, Hanopol filed a "Manifestation and
Motion" praying that the earlier Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated July 29, 1983 be
revived.
On September 1, 1984, Atty. Jose Loy, Jr. was hired by complainant LFC vice Atty.
Udarbe and he immediately came across the above-mentioned "Manifestation and
Motion." On September 5, 1984, he filed an Opposition thereto, and on September 19,
1984, he followed this up with a position paper for LFC. However, the Labor Arbiter had
already revived his earlier Decision dated July 29, 1983 in another Decision dated
September 4, 1984, thereby prompting Atty. Loy to appeal the latter Decision. In a
resolution dated May 9, 1985, the NLRC ordered anew the remand of the case for
further proceedings.
In connection with the other charge of betrayal by respondent of his former client’s
confidences, the following facts appear on record.chanr1es vual 1awlirary
While respondent was still connected with complainant, its general manager, Sebastian
Cortes, issued a memorandum dated February 28, 1984 to its employee, Roberto San
Juan, requiring him to submit a written explanation for his alleged double liquidation
and unliquidated cash advances. Another memorandum dated March 15, 1984 was
issued this time by complainant’s internal auditor, Rosario L. Bernardo, addressed to
complainant’s president, summing up San Juan’s unliquidated advances amounting to
P9,351.15. Respondent was furnished a copy of this memorandum. The executive
committee, to which respondent belongs, investigated San Juan on his unliquidated
advances. On account of the gravity of the charge, respondent placed San Juan under
preventive suspension, per his letter to him dated April 25, 1984.
On September 20, 1984, when respondent had already resigned, complainant sent a
demand letter to San Juan requiring him to restitute the amount of P9,351.15. Since he
failed to pay the amount demanded, a complaint for estafa was lodged against him
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. San Juan thereafter resigned and sought the
assistance of respondent in the preparation of his counter affidavit in January 1985.
Respondent prepared San Juan’s counter affidavit and signed it. San Juan then
submitted his counter affidavit to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal.
For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the
Hanopol case which resulted in complainant LFC’s default and judgment against it by
the Labor Arbiter, the respondent is faulted for negligence. The respondent avers that
Hanopol should have seen him in his office to work out a compromise agreement, on
the scheduled day of the second hearing, June 17, 1983, but did not.
It is the finding of the Solicitor General that this excuse by the respondent is not borne
by the Constancia setting the case for hearing. The Constancia clearly states: "By
agreement of the parties, case reset to June 17, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. as previously
scheduled." Since it was signed, both Hanopol and the respondent, the Solicitor General
argues that the respondent’s explanation is manifestly unsatisfactory. c
With regard to his second non-appearance for the hearing on June 2, 1983, the
respondent justified his absence by claiming that he had another hearing on the same
date and that he told his secretary to call up the Office of the Labor Arbiter to have the
hearing of the Hanopol case postponed.
The Solicitor General avers: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . It is submitted that respondent’s actuation was not warranted by the

circumstances. As it turned out, the telephone request apparently did not reach the
Labor Arbiter, thereby constraining him to declare complainant in default and render
judgment against it.
In an effort to extricate himself from this charge, the respondent submits that since he
was able to persuade the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal to set
aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and to remand the case for further proceedings,
then the charge of negligence should be considered moot and academic already. We
find this submission not meritorious. Instead, we agree with the position of the Solicitor
General.nrob1es virtual 1aw library
Respondent’s plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor
Arbiter cannot obliterate the effects of respondent’s negligence. Indeed, had respondent
attended the two scheduled hearings and filed the required position paper, then at
least, there would have been no delay in the resolution of the case, which, perhaps,
would have been in favor of complainant. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to
complainant because it deprived successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be
devoting to other cases of complainant. In fact, he had to prepare complainant’s
position paper which respondent should have done earlier.
From the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a
clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ADARNE VS ALDABA.A.C. NO. 801. JUNE 27, 1978.83 SCRA 734
FACTS:
Complainant Cesario Adarne were the defendants in an action for forcible entry filed by plaintiffs
Spouses Cumpion in the Justice of the Peace of Alangalang, Leyte. He was first represented by Atty.
Isauro Marmita (first lawyer) who raised the issue of ownership of the land in question. It was dismissed
but upon appeal to Court of First Instance (CFI) Leyte, it was remanded to the lower court. It was again
dismissed. Again, plaintiffs appealed to CFI Leyte. This time, complainant was represented by Atty.
Mirales and Casimpan (2nd and 3rd lawyer). At the hearing of the case on Aug 7, 1961, the said lawyers
were absent so he asked her third degree cousin, Atty. Damian Aldaba to make a SPECIAL
APPEARANCE and moved for postponement of trial and dismissal of case (the plaintiff’s lawyers were
also absent). Both motions were granted. Plaintiffs appealed to CA where the said court remanded the
case to CFI Leyte. Again, complainant asked Atty. Aldaba to enter a “special appearance”. They asked if
they could be allowed to file action for quieting of title. However, during the hearing in June 17, 1965,
complainant failed to appear and plaintiffs presented evidence. CFI Leyte rendered decision in favor of
the plaintiffs. Aggrieved, complainant filed disbarment complaint against Atty. Aldaba for being
negligent as counsel which led him to lose in the civil case. Atty. Aldaba denied they have an agreement
with complainant to handle the case except for “special appearance”.
ISSUE:
Should Atty. Aldaba be disbarred?
RULING:
No. An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and
skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other
human being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts
honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge. In disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against
the respondent attorney must be established by convincing proof. The Supreme Court ruled that the
judgment by default rendered against complainant cannot be attributed to respondent attorney as the
blamed lies with the former for having engaged the services of several lawyers to handle his case without
formally withdrawing the authority he had given them to appear in his behalf as to place the responsibility
upon the Respondent. Finding no convincing proof to warrant the disbarment of respondent attorney, the
administrative complaint filed against him was dismissed.
In A.C. No. 5835, (Carlos B. Reyes vs. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), April 15, 2005,
Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6) months; and ordered to pay complainant ₱17,000.00 with
interest of 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of the Decision until the full amount
shall have been returned. Per records, the Court’s decision was received by him on May 13, 2005,
and his suspension would have ended on November 13, 2005.
In this connection, the OBC noted respondent’s shrewdness by moving out of his given address to
evade receipt of the copy of the decision/resolutions of the Court. After diligent efforts at searching
for respondent’s correct address proved unavailing, the Court in its Resolution dated July 17, 2007,
considered the March 6, 2007 Resolution as having been served on respondent.
In a Report dated February 23, 2010, the OBC noted that respondent has been repeatedly
suspended from the practice of law, for an aggregate period of 30 months or 2 ½ years. Accordingly,
respondent should have served the orders of suspension successively pursuant to the Court’s
resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857, entitled "Gabriel de la Paz v. Judge Santos B. Adiong," where
the Court clearly stated that "in case of two or more suspensions, the same shall be served
successively by the erring respondent. It is, therefore, incumbent upon respondent to show to the
Court that he has desisted from the practice of law for a period of at least 2 ½ years.1avvphi1
The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago vs. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios, issued the guidelines
on the lifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict observance thereof. However, the Court
will not hesitate to withhold the privilege of the practice of law if it is shown that respondent, as an
officer of the Court, is still not worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public.
Thus, applying the guidelines in Maniago, the Court Resolved to GRANT Respondent’s Petition for
Reinstatement, effective upon his submission to the Court of a Sworn Statement attesting to the fact:
1) that he has completely served the four (4) suspensions imposed on him successively;
2) that he had desisted from the practice of law, and has not appeared as counsel in any
court during the periods of suspension, as follows:
(a) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 5835 from May 13, 2005 to November 13,
2005;
(b) One (1) year suspension in A.C. No. 6051 from April 18, 2007 to April 18, 2008;
(c) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6441 from November 12, 2004 to May 12,
2005; and
(d) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6955 from date of receipt of the Resolution
dated March 6, 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated
July 27, 2006.
3) that he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by the Court in
the following cases, attaching proofs thereof:
(a) In A.C. No. 5835 – the sum of ₱17,000 with interest of 12% per annum from the
date of promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have been returned;
and
(b) In A.C. No. 6441 – the amount of ₱30,000.
Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is further directed to FURNISH copies of the Sworn Statement to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge(s), as mandated in Maniago.
Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the Respondent under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
GONZALES vs ATTY. MIGUEL SABACAJAN
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
THE LAW.
FACTS:
Sometime in October 1994, complainants were informed by the Register of Deeds of CDO City that
the duplicate of title covering their lands were entrusted to the office secretary of the respondent
who in turn entrusted the same to respondent. Respondent admitted and confirmed to the
complainants that their titles are in his custody and has even shown the same to the complainant Salud
B. Pantanosas but when demanded to deliver the said titles to the complainant in a formal demand
letter, respondent refused without any justification to give their titles and when confronted,
respondent challenged the complainants to file any case in any court even in the SC.
Respondent’s challenge to them is a manifestation of his arrogance taking undue advantage of his legal
profession over the simplicity, innocence and ignorance of the complainants. Due to his challenge, the
complainants sent a letter to the SC for enlightenment for which the Supreme Court required legible
copies of a verified complaint. In spite of repeated demands, respondent still failed and refused without
justification to surrender the said titles to the rightful owners, which act is tantamount to willful
and malicious defiance of legal and moral obligations emanating from his professional capacity as a
lawyer who had sworn to uphold law and justice, to the prejudice and damage of the complainants.
On March 1995, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint. But he denied on
those allegations. From the foregoing proceedings taken on this matter, the Court finds that respondent
admitted having taken possession of the certificates of title of complainants but refused to surrender the
same despite demands made by the latter. It follows, therefore, that it was incumbent upon him to
show that he was legally justified in doing so. Instead, all he did was to inform this Court that "his
obligation to deliver the certificates to Mr. Samto Uy excludes the delivery of said certificates to
anyone else." Respondent submitted xerox copies of certain certificates of title in an effort to explain
why he kept the certificates of title of complainants, for the purpose of subdividing the property.
However, an examination of the same does not show any connection thereof to respondent's claim. In
fact, the two sets of certificates of title appear to be entirely different from each other.
As a lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful remedies provided by law to protect the
interests of his client. The records do not show that he or his client have availed of said remedies. The
Court finds that respondent has not exercised the good faith and diligence required of lawyers in
handling the legal affairs of their clients.
ISSUE:
Resp Lawyer is liable for violation of Canon 19 of the CPR?
Canon 19, Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present unfounded
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent has closely skirted this
proscription, if he has not in fact transgressed the same.
PENALTY:
SUSPENDED from the practice of law until he can duly show to this Court that the disputed
certificates of title have been returned to and the receipt thereof duly acknowledged by
complainants, or can present a judicial order or appropriate legal authority justifying the
possession by him or his client of said certificates. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar or any other administrative misconduct will be punished more severely.
BENEDICTO LEVISTE, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
The issue in this case is whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis
may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client's refusal to appeal the
decision of the trial court.
On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with
the private respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the
holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property at Sales
Street, Quiapo, Manila, was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner's contingent
fee would be thirty-five per cent (35%) of the property that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the
will.
In accordance with their agreement, Leviste performed the following services as Del Rosario's
counsel:
(1) Thoroughly researched and studied the law on probate and succession;
(2) Looked for and interviewed witnesses, and took their affidavits;
(3) Filed the petition for. probate is Special Proceeding No. 58325;
(4) Made the proper publications;
(5) Presented at the trial the 5 witnesses
On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was
terminating his services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." This consisted, according to the
letter, in petitioner's moral obligation to protect the interest of his brother-in-law, Gaudencio M.
Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other parties in the probate proceeding intended to eject as
lessee of the property which was bequeathed to Del Rosario under the will.
On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for
Professional Services."
In an order dated November 12, 1965 the trial court denied his motion on the ground that he had
"not filed a claim for attorney's fees nor recorded his attorney's lien."
On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a "Formal Statement of Claim for Attorney's Fees and
Recording of Attorney's Lien,' which was noted in the court's order of December 20, 1965.
Although the order denying his motion to intervene had become final, petitioner continued to receive
copies of the court's orders, as well the pleadings of the other parties in the case. He also continued
to file pleadings. The case was submitted for decision without the respondents' evidence.
On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed a
"Motion to Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del Rosario waived her rights to the devise in
her favor and agreed that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her petition for probate,
shall inherit all the properties left by the decedent.
In an order dated April 13, 1967 the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for being
contrary to public policy.
Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements
for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses testified that the will and the testatrix's
signature were in the handwriting of Maxima Reselva.
The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The private respondents
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was not a party in interest.
The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a direct and material
interest in the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked that he be substituted as party-
petitioner, in lieu of his former client, Ms. Del Rosario.
On March 28, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner's motion for
substitution.
The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus praying that the trial court be
ordered to give due course to his appeal and to grant his motion for substitution.
On May 22, 1968, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and
substance as the petitioner did not appear to be the proper party to appeal the decision in Special
Proceeding No. 58325 (Annex 1, p. 77, Rollo).
Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed by certiorari to this Court,
assigning the following errors against the Court of Appeals' resolution:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner appears not to be the
proper party to appeal the decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
2. Assuming the petitioner's right of appeal is doubtful, the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing his petition for mandamus; and
3. The Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325
denying the probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva, said
decision being patently erroneous.
Under his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that by virtue of his contract of services with Del
Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Article 1052 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors,
the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the
amount of their credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to
the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with
the rules established in this Code, it may belong.
he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in her favor
(which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contingent attorney's fees.
The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That
legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del
Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the
holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did
not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.
Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal
heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent's
will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to
accept in her name.
This Court had ruled in the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the contract (for
contingent attorney's fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to the appellee (lawyer) any right
whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs. Harden's) aforesaid share in the conjugal
partnership. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees."
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for while it is true that, as
contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow
that every will that is presented for probate, should be allowed. The law lays down procedures which
should be observed and requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated. Those
procedures and requirements were not followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the will.
There being no valid will, the motion to withdraw the probate petition was inconsequential.
Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in
the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a
prospective heir. In Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occassion to rule that one who is only
indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate. Thus:
... the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that
thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would justify or
necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not
be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the
estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso,
35 Phil. 244, 246.)
We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that notice of an
attorney's lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his
client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case
his client is awarded a certain sum by the court.
WILFREDO D. LICUDAN v. CA, GR No. 91958, 1991-01-24
Facts:
On September 19, 1979, the trial court handling Civil Case No. Q-12254 ordered the
annotation at the back of TCT No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City of the
respondent lawyer's Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 signed by
petitioner Wifredo Licudan and Aurelio Licudan on his own behalf and on behalf of his
daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos.
Issues:
Whether or not the award of attorney's fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature
of contingent fees, is the principal issue.
Ruling:
Principles:
It is a well-entrenched rule that attorney's fees may be claimed in the very action in which
the services in question have been rendered or as an incident of the main action. The fees
may be properly adjudged after such litigation is terminated and the subject of recovery is at
the disposition of the court
It is an equally deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law.
They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20, Rule
20.01 of the recently promulgated Code of Professional Responsibility.
Section 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
13. Contingent Fees
A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all
the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but
should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness."
There is no dispute in the instant case that the attorney's fees claimed by the respondent
lawyer are in the nature of a contingent fee. There is nothing irregular about the execution
of a written contract for professional services even after the termination of a case as long as
it is based on a previous agreement on contingent fees by the parties concerned and as long
as the said contract does not contain stipulations which are contrary to law, good morals,
good customs, public policy or public order.
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court

"SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled
to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable."
ANA F. RETUYA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. IÑEGO A. GORDUIZ, RESPONDENT.

Ana F. Retuya, a widow with four minor children, filed a claim for workmen's compensation
against Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the employer of her husband who died in 1968. In a
decision dated December 4, 1970, the Workmen's Compensation Unit at Tacloban City awarded
to Ana the sum of P8,792.10 consisting of:
(a) P6,000 as compensation benefits,
(b) P2,292.10 for medical and hospitalization expenses,
(c) P200 as burial expenses and
(d) P300 as attorney's fees of Atty. Iñego Gorduiz (Case No. 9728).
The employer appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, the employer proposed to
compromise the claim by paying P4,396.05 or only one-half of the total award. Ana accepted
the proposal and directed that the amount be remitted to Fiscal Mamerto Daclan through the
Philippine National Bank's branch at Maasin, Southern Leyte.
The employer paid the reduced award on November 16, 1972. Ana sent to the employer the
receipt and release signed by her with a covering letter dated December 19, 1972 wherein she
explained that her lawyer, Gorduiz, did not sign the joint motion to dismiss the claim because he
wanted twenty percent of the award as his attorney's fees. She was willing to give him ten
percent.
After she had cashed the check for P4,396.05, she was not able to contact Gorduiz and pay his
fee. Then, unexpectedly, in February, 1973, she was served with a warrant of arrest issued in
Criminal Case No. R-2362 of the municipal court of Maasin. To avoid detention, she had to post
bail in the sum of one thousand pesos.
It turned out that on January 12, 1973, Atty. Gorduiz executed an affidavit stating that Ana had
misappropriated his attorney's fees amounting to three hundred pesos and that he had
demanded payment of the amount from her but she refused to make payment and, instead, she
went to Cebu and stayed there for a long time.
On the basis of that affidavit, the acting chief of police filed against Ana a complaint for estafa in
the municipal court of Maasin. After posting bail, she filed a motion to quash wherein she
explained that she did not pay the fees of Atty. Gorduiz because he was demanding one-third of
the award; that when she did not accede to his demand, he lowered his claim to eight hundred
pesos, and that she bargained for six hundred fifty pesos but he refused to accept that amount.
Ana averred that the estafa case was filed just to harass her.
Judge Paulo A. Equipilag denied the motion to quash. He granted the motion of Atty. Gorduiz
requiring Ana to produce a copy of the decision awarding her workmen's compensation for her
husband's death.
The estafa case was not tried. Atty. Erasmo M. Diola, as lawyer of Ana, offered to Atty. Gorduiz
the sum of five hundred pesos as settlement of the case. The offer was accepted.
On November 22, 1973, the acting chief of police filed a motion to dismiss the case on the basis
of the affidavit of Atty. Gorduiz executed on that date stating that the prosecution witnesses had
allegedly become hostile and that he was no longer interested in further prosecuting the case.
Also, on that same day, Judge Equipilag dismissed the case.
In spite of the dismissal of the estafa case, Ana F. Retuya felt aggrieved by the proceedings
therein. In a complaint dated July 24, 1974 but filed in this Court on October 30, 1974, she
asked for the disbarment or suspension of Atty. Gorduiz and Judge Equipilag. The disbarment
case against Gorduiz was referred to the Solicitor General.
The case against Judge Equipilag was investigated by the Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Southern Leyte."
This Court found that there was no justification for suspending respondent Judge. However, he
was admonished to be more prudent and circumspect in the discharge of his duties so as to
obviate the suspicion that, for an ulterior motive, he was in cahoots with the offended party in a
criminal case for the purpose of using the strong arm of the law against the accused in an
oppressive and vindictive manner.
The Solicitor General asked the provincial fiscal of Southern Leyte to investigate the case against
Gorduiz. The fiscal in her report of July 8, 1975 recommended the dismissal of the case.
The Solicitor General, disagreeing with that recommendation, filed in this Court against Gorduiz
a complaint wherein he prayed that Gorduiz be suspended for six months because the latter, in
filing the estafa case, had promoted a groundless suit against his client.
Ana F. Retuya testified before the investigating Fiscal that in December, 1972 she was willing to
pay Gorduiz six hundred fifty pesos as his attorney's fees but he demanded a bigger amount. He
lodged a complaint for estafa against her and she was arrested. She had to post bail in the sum
of one thousand pesos. As already stated above, the estafa case was later dismissed when Ana
paid Gorduiz the sum of five hundred pesos.
In his testimony before the investigating fiscal and this Court's legal officer, respondent Gorduiz
denied that he demanded as attorney's fees an amount higher than three hundred pesos. He
explained that he filed the estafa case because after Ana had received payment of the award, she
did not turn over to him the attorney's fees of three hundred pesos in spite of her promises to
pay the same and his demands for payment.
Gorduiz declared that Ana filed the disbarment case against him in order that she could evade
the payment of his attorney's fees in the other cases which he had handled for her. It was also
possible that someone who had a score to settle with Gorduiz had instigated the filing of this
case against him.
He further declared that he filed the estafa case because he thought that Ana had absconded
when she stayed in Cebu City for a long time (23-24 tsn, June 26, 1979). He claimed that he
spent one hundred pesos of his own money in gathering evidence which was presented in the
workmen's compensation case. He had also advanced around two hundred pesos to cover the
expenses in the other cases which he had handled for Ana.
After reflecting on the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that there is
justification for suspending the respondent.
Respondent acted precipitately in filing a criminal action against his client for the supposed
misappropriation of his attorney's fees. It is not altogether clear that his client had swindled
him and, therefore, there is some basis for concluding that, contrary to his lawyer's oath, he had
filed a groundless suit against her and had harassed and embarrassed her.
Paragraph 14 of the Canons of Legal Ethics prescribes that "controversies with clients
concerning compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his
self-respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his services; and lawsuits
with clients should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud".
WHEREFORE, the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months counted from notice of this decision. A copy of this decision should be attached to his
record in the Bar Confidant's office.
A.C. No. 6210. December 9, 2004
FEDERICO N. RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. PATRICIO A. NGASEO, respondent.
Facts:
Federico Ramos went to Atty. Patricio Ngaseo to engage his services as counsel in a case involving a
piece of land in Pangasinan. Atty. Ngaseo agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of
P20,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of meals, transportation and other
incidental expenses. Ramos alleged that he did not promise to pay the respondent 1,000 sq. m. of
land as appearance fees. On September 16, 1999, Ramos went to the Atty. Ngaseo’s office to inquire
about the status of the case. Atty. informed him that the decision was adverse to them because a
congressman exerted pressure upon the trial judge. However, Atty. Ngaseo assured him that they could
still appeal the adverse judgment and asked for the additional amount of P3,850.00 and another
P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as allowance for research made.
On January 29, 2003, Ramos received a demand letter from the Atty. Ngaseo asking for the delivery
of the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land which he allegedly promised as payment for his appearance fee. In
the same letter, Atty. also threatened to file a case in court if the complainant would not confer with
him and settle the matter within 30 days.
On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision ordering the return of the disputed
2-hectare land to the Ramos and his siblings. The said decision became final and executory on January
18, 2002. Since then, complainant allegedly failed to contact Atty. Ngaseo, which compelled him to send
a demand letter on January 29, 2003. Ramos then filed a complaint before the IBP charging his
former counsel, Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding
the delivery of 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land which was the subject of litigation.
IBP Commissioner found that Atty. Ngaseo guilty of grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. Atty. Ngaseo argues that he did not violate Article
1491 of the Civil Code because when he demanded the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. of land which
was offered and promised to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case has been terminated, when
the appellate court ordered the return of the 2-hectare parcel of land to the family of the
complainant. He further contends that he can collect the unpaid appearance fee even without a written
contract on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit. He claims that his acceptance and appearance
fees are reasonable because a Makati based legal practitioner, would not handle a case for an acceptance
fee of only P20,000.00 and P1,000.00 per court appearance.
Issue:
Whether Art. 1491 NCC prohibiting lawyers from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the
property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their
profession is violated by Atty. Ngaseo.
Held:
No. In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the
respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply.
Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a
prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such
demand for delivery is unethical, respondent’s act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The
letter of demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-
2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002.
G.R. No. L-26096 February 27, 1979
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. SILVERETRA ABABA, ET AL., claimants, JUAN
LARRAZABAL, MARTA C. DE LARRAZABAL, MAXIMO ABAROQUEZ and ANASTACIA
CABIGAS, petitioners-appellants, ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, adverse claimant-appellee
FACTS:
The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was retained as counsel by petitioner, Maximo
Abarquez, in a civil case for the annulment of a contract of sale with right of repurchase and for the
recovery of the land which was the subject matter thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered a
decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to the petitioner and so he appealed to the Court of Appeals. Litigating
as a pauper and engaging the services of his lawyer on a contingent basis, petitioner, executed a document
whereby he obliged himself to give to his lawyer one-half (1/2) of whatever he might recover from Lots
5600 and 5602 should the appeal prosper.
Thereafter, the case was resolved in favor of Maximo Abarquez but he refused to comply with his
obligation and instead offered to sell the whole parcels of land to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and
Marta C. de Larrazabal. In order to protect his interest, Atty. Fernandez filed an adverse claim for the half
portion of the land, and it was annotated in the certificate title of said land.
Notwithstanding the annotation of the adverse claim, petitioner-spouse Maximo Abarquez and Anastacia
Cabigas conveyed by deed of absolute sale two-thirds (2/3) of the lands to petitioner-spouses Juan
Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. Petitioner spouses petitioned for the cancellation of the adverse
claim, contending that it is contrary to law and of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract for a contingent fee, basis of the interest of Atty. Fernandez, is prohibited by
the Article 1491 of the New Civil Code and Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
HELD:
This contention is without merit. Article 1491 prohibits only the sale or assignment between the lawyer
and his client, of property which is the subject of litigation. A contract for a contingent fee is not covered
by Article 1491 because the transfer or assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only after the
finality of a favorable judgment.
In the instant case, the attorney's fees of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of one-half (1/2) of whatever
Maximo Abarquez might recover from his share in the lots in question, is contingent upon the success of
the appeal. Hence, the payment of the attorney's fees, that is, the transfer or assignment of one-half (1/2)
of the property in litigation will take place only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the transfer actually
takes effect after the finality of a favorable judgment rendered on appeal and not during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property in question. Consequently, the contract for a contingent fee is not
covered by Article 1491.
Petitioners her contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates the Canons of Professional Ethics.
This is likewise without merit. For while Canon 10 prohibits a lawyer from purchasing any interest in the
subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting", Canon 13, on the other hand, allowed a
reasonable contingent fee contract, thus:
"A contract for a contingent fee where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be
subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." Contracts of this nature are permitted
because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the client
has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the
sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation"
(Francisco, Legal Ethics, p. 294 [1949], citing Lipscomb vs. Adams 91 S.W. 1046, 1048 [1949]).
Oftentimes, contingent fees are the only means by which the poor and helpless can redress for injuries
sustained and have their rights vindicated. The one-half (½) interest of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in
question should therefore be respected. Indeed, he has a better right than petitioner-spouses, Juan
Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. They purchased their two-thirds (2/3) interest in the lots in
question with the knowledge of the adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez.
The adverse claim was annotated on the old transfer certificate of title and was later annotated on the new
transfer certificate of title issued to them. Having purchased the property with the knowledge of the
adverse claim, they are therefore in bad faith. Consequently, they are estopped from questioning the
validity of the adverse claim.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DENYING THE PETITION FOR THE
CANCELLATION OF THE ADVERSE CLAIM SHOULD BE, AS IT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANTS JUAN LARRAZABAL AND MARTA C. DE
LARRAZABAL.
PALE FEDERICO SUNTAY vs. ATTY. RAFAEL SUNTAY A.C. NO. 1890 August 7, 2002
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Facts:
This complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant against his nephew, Atty. Rafael Suntay,
alleging that the latter was the former’s legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was privy to all
his legal, financial and political affairs. However, since they parted ways because of politics and
respondent’s overweening political ambitions, respondent had been filing complaints and cases against
complainant, making use of confidential information gained while their attorney-client relationship
existed, and otherwise harassing him at every turn.
Apparently, Atty. Rafael Suntay acted as counsel for clients in cases involving subject matters (two
fishponds) regarding which he had either been previously consulted by complainant or which he
had previously helped complainant to administer as the latter’s counsel and confidant. Respondent
made use of the information he gained while he was the lawyer of complainant as basis for his complaint
for the building of illegal dikes. His possession and examination of Transfer Certificate of Title and
the blueprint plan provided him the information that there used to be two creeks traversing the
fishpond covered by the title. Since he helped in the administration of the fishpond, he also came to
know that the two creeks had disappeared. Thus, he gained the data which became the basis of his
complaint when he was a lawyer and part administrator of complainant. Under the circumstances, there is
a violation of professional confidence.
The IBP found respondent guilty and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law
for two years for immoral conduct. The Court finds the IBP recommendation to be well taken.
Issue:
Whether or not Privilege communication of attorney client relationship was violated
Ruling:
Atty. Rafael Suntay is suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating the
confidentiality of lawyer client relationship and for unethical conduct. A lawyer shall preserve the
confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of the attorney-client relation.
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair,
consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well- known facts. In the complexity of what is
said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry in the nature suggested would
lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant’s cause. The following was violated:
Rule 21.01. a lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) when authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b) when required by law;
c) c) when necessary to collect fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial
action.
Rule 21.02. a lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the
client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
FELICISIMO M. MONTANO, vs. IBP and Atty. JUAN S. DEALCA,
FACTS:
Atty. Dealca, counsel for Felicisimo Montano withdrew his services for his client upon the latter's
failure to comply with their retainer agreement. Complainant Felicisimo claimed that such conduct by
respondent counsel exceeded the ethical standards of the law profession and prays that the latter be
sternly dealt with administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the
maximum penalty of disbarment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Dealca's conduct just and proper?
HELD:
We find Atty Dealca’s conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and
upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when client
deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty.
Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the atty’s
fees. Rule 20.4 of Canon 290, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning
his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant (P 3,500.00), respondent lawyer failed to act in
accordance with the demands of the Code. But, only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyers an officer of the court and member of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as penalty.
Elmer Canoy, complainant v. Atty. Jose Max Ortiz, respondent

A.C. No. 5485 March 16, 2005
Facts
This is a case wherein complainant Elmer Canoy accused his former counsel, Atty. Jose Max Ortiz
of misconduct and malpractice. In 1998, Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his
former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, and was represented in said case by Atty. Ortiz.
Canoy, explained Ortiz, was one of his indigent clients, in that it was the latter’s practice since
commencing his practice of law to cater to indigent and low-income clients. In the labor case against
CCBP filed with the National Labor Relations Commission, the labor arbiter ordered the parties to
submit their respective petition papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and records to
Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper.
Canoy made several follow-ups with the office of his attorney, said visits were unfruitful until it
came to his knowledge on 2000, upon inquiring with the NLRC itself, that his complaint was
already dismissed way back in 1998 for failure to prosecute because the parties did not submit their
position papers. Canoy further claimed that Atty. Ortiz never informed him about the status of his case
nor of the fact that he failed to submit the position paper.
In his Comment, Atty. Ortiz admitted to not being able to submit the position paper because the
period within which to file it lapsed already, with arbiter already dismissing the case, but reasoned
out that his election as a Councilor of Bacolod City made him very preoccupied with his functions.
His duties as a public servant and a lawyer are “beyond physical limitation”, said Atty. Ortiz, so he had to
withdraw from his other cases. He also claimed of not being able to remember whether he immediately
informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, but recalled of Canoy conveying that he already has a
lawyer to handle the case. Hence, his office did not insist on refiling the case. Atty Ortiz also pointed
out that the dismissal of Canoy’s complaint was without prejudice.
Issue
Whether or not Atty. Ortiz is guilty of misconduct and malpractice
Ruling
Upon investigation of the case, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines concluded that clearly “Atty.
Ortiz failed to exercise the degree of competence and diligence required of him in prosecuting his
client” and recommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded. The Supreme Court, however, finds the
recommended penalty of the IBP too lenient and instead suspended Atty. Ortize from the practice of
law for one month, in lieu of the admonition or reprimand. According to the Court, Atty Ortiz severed
canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Specifically, Atty. Ortiz was guilty of violating Rule 18.03 of the Code, which states, “A lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable,” on account of his failure to file the position paper on time, tantamount to neglecting a legal
mater entrusted to him. That the case was dismissed without prejudice does not mitigate his liability.
Further, Ortiz also violated Rule 22.02, which states, “A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for
good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.” Therefore, even if Atty. Ortiz was
justified in terminating his services due to his elective position, he should have coordinated with the new
counsel of Canoy and turned over to the latter all papers and property which the Client is entitled and
should have cooperated with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, as per Rule 22.02.

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CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(Promulgated June 21, 1988)

CHAPTER II. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that,

CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS

(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an

CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;

CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in

Public Officials Who CANNOT Practice Law:

FOUR FOLD DUTIES OF A LAWYER

 Duty to Society. ...

 Duties to the Legal Profession. ...

 Duties to the Court. ...

 Duties to the Client.

Requirements for admission to the Bar: CRAGEN

a. Judges and other

2. Officials and employees of the OSG (Ibid.)

3. Government prosecutors (People v. Villanueva, 14 SORA 109).

7. Those prohibited by special law

Who are the public officials with

Civil service officers/employees

KHAN vs SIMBILLO A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

B.M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004

Bar Matter 2012: Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The following lawyers are excluded in the term “practicing lawyer”:

2. Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;

EN BANC [B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD

PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS,

1.1 PARTICIPANT/ ATTENDEE 1 CU PER HOUR OF ATTENDANCE CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR COMMENTATOR/ MODERATOR/ COORDINATOR/ FACILITATOR 1/2 OF CU

2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ LAW JOURNAL EDITOR 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED

Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS SECTION

1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or nonparticipatory.

(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.

(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)

Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS SECTION

(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;

(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;

(l) Governors and Mayors.

(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.

RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 79-2014

PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 151805 (2005)

Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.

B.M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004

Integrated Bar of the Philippines