Moral Theories in Professional Practice:
Do they make a difference?
Sue Hendler
ABSTRACT
There has been much discussion regarding the inte­
gration of moral philosophy and professions. Some
writers have focused their attention on the use of pro­
fessional codes as a means to facilitate this integra­
tion. An apparent underlying premise of much of this
work is that one's choice of ethical theory affects the
code resulting from an application of this theory. Thus,
a code, and the behaviour it advocates, which is based
on a deontological view of moral philosophy, is pre­
sumed to be substantively different than one founded
on consequentialist principles. Both empirical data and
conceptual analysis however, bring into question this
assumption. I argue that moral theories appear to have
limited effect on the content of professional codes but
can alter the process used to develop codes as well as
justifications for their formulation and use.
Les theories morales dans la pratique professionnelle:
font-e/les une difference? II y a eu beaucoup de dis­
cussion concernant I'integration de la philosophie
morale et des professions. Certains ecrivains ont con­
centre leur attention sur I'utilisation de codes profes­
sionnels comme mOYE?n de faciliter cette integration.
Une premisse sous-jacente apparente d'une bonne
part de ce travail est que Ie choix d'une theorie ethique
affecte Ie code resultant d'une application de cette
tMorie. Donc, un code, et Ie comportement qu'il preco­
nise, Jequel est base sur une vision deontologique de
la philosophie morale, est presume s'averer essentiel­
lement different qu'un autre fonde sur des principes
consequentialistes. Les donnees empiriques et I'ana­
lyse conceptuelle questionnent cependant toutes deux,
cette supposition. J'affirme que les theories morales
semblent avoir un effet limite sur Ie contenu des codes
profession nels, mais peuvent alterer Ie processus
employe pour developper des codes aussi bien que
des justifications pour leur formulation et leur usage.
Keywords
Planning, ethics, professional codes, moral· theories,
deontological versus consequential
INTRODUCTION
The application of ethical theories to professional activ­
ities is widespread. Recent and up-coming confer­
ences in Canada and the United States are devoted
entirely to issues regarding ethics in government and
the professions. Ethics columns and articles in periodi­
cals of professions such as public administration and
planning as well as national daily newspapers are no
longer a rarity. An underlying premise of many such
endeavours is that different moral theories, when
applied to practical problems, give rise to different
sorts of solutions and conclusions. This is said to be
due to the fact that such theories are based on signifi­
cantly divergent ethical premises, many of which con­
flict in a pronounced manner.
These discussions are of interest to theorists con­
cerned with the internal logic of arguments made in
defense of given moral theories. The pragmatist, how­
ever, must ask what difference it makes in practice
whether one theory is favoured over another. For if an
individual's adherence to a given moral theory has little
effect upon that person's behaviour and moral judg­
ments, one must question not only consistency
between values and actions, but also whether the the­
ories are in fact as different as they appear and
whether moral theorists are asking the right questions
when they do moral philosophy. Answers to these
questions will have a significant impact upon efforts to
apply ethics to professions. .
The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in
which ethical theories may have an impact upon pro­
fessional'codes such as those in the urban and region­
al planning profession. Both conceptual discussion and
empirical data are used to this end. .
The paper begins with a brief introduction to ethics;
a subsequent section includes a discussion of the
nature of professional codes in areas as diverse as
psychology and engineering, business and planning.
These introductory discussions form the basis of an
identification of the ways one's choice of ethical theory
affects the codes arising from such a selection. I con­
clude with some implications of my argument regarding
the use of ethics and ethical codes in professions such
as planning.
 Hendler
Ethics and ethical theories
Ethics is used here in the sense that we can evaluate
behaviour and give coherent reasons as to why it may
be regarded as good or bad, right or wrong. This use
of the term is consistent with that used in philosophy;
ethics then, is synonymous here with moral philosophy
and represents the study of moral questions (see for
I example Regan, 1984). Ethical theories, that is, gener­
al principles which seem to unify our considered moral
~eliefs (Regan, 1984), have generally been defined as
tieing of two sorts. First, teleological theories empha­
size the consequences of an action in that a good
action is said to lead to good results. An example com­
monly given of teleological theories is utilitarianism,
where the 'utility' of a behaviour determines whether it
is good or bad. Classic utilitarianism refers to the famil­
iar maxim of bringing about the 'greatest good for the
greatest number', or sometimes the greatest balance
of good over harmful consequences for those affected
by a given action. Variations on this theme are act­
and rule-utilitarianism, where the former pertains to the
examination of the utility of individual actions and the
LJatter to the utility of rules governing sets of actions.
Second, non-teleological or deontological theories
reject the notion that the consequences of an action
wholly determine its moral value. Rather, an act in and
of itself is viewed as being right or wrong. Kant pro­
vides a commonly-held view of ethics conforming to
this characterization. He maintained that persons,[1] as
individuals with morally relevant characteristics, were
of value and that actions which detracted from this val­
ue were ethically wrong. Individuals exhibiting these
characteristics (e.g" consciousness) were said to have
natural or moral rights which are universal and inalien­
able. Wrong actions, then, violate these rights, while
right actions recognize them.
These are two sorts of ethical theories and they
appear to attract the most attention in the philosophical
literature.(2) Criticisms of both abound (e.g,; Macintyre,
1981; Williams, 1985) and neither a clear victor nor an
acceptable compromise has emerged. In that the pur­
pose of this paper is not to analyze moral theories per
se but rather to see how such theories might make a
difference to professions in general and planning in
particular, I now turn to a discussion of ethical codes
as one way to inject ethical concepts into professional
thought and practice.
Professions and professional codes
It has been argued that different moral theories may
have pronounced effects on planning and related
fields. Beatley (1984), for example, held that variations
of utilitarianism and rights-based perspectives associ­
ated with urban growth management schemes varied
21
in terms of their effects on individual wealth and well­
being. Further, Bunda (1985) argued that the potential
impact of moral theories on program planning and
evaluation is significant. One moral theory might identi­
fy a certain situation as a problem; another may not. In
this way, Bunda maintained that the identification of
problems, the assessment of needs, the development
of solutions and the adoption of a' particular course of
action are all'dependent upon one's choice of moral
theory. Finally, Harper and Stein (1983a) show that
different views of ethics give rise to different justifica­
tion for varying amounts and types of public interven­
tion. This premise, that moral theories can substantive­
ly affect the normative positions and/or behaviour of
profeSSionals, is the focus of the following discussion.
There are a number of ways ethical theory can be
integrated with professions such as planning. Exam­
ples include the incorporation of moral philosophy into
planning theory (McConnell, 1981; Klosterman, 1978;
Harper and Stein, 1983b), development of ethics com­
mittees (following health ,services) with the intent of
providing expert moral advice to practitioners, and
requirement of a 'working knowledge' of ethics to be
tested in planning education and/or professional mem­
bership organizations.(3) All of these, as well as oth­
ers,(4) are possibilities (see also Wachs, 1985). While
not wanting to devalue the potential importance of any
of these options, I concentrate here on ethical codes
as one means of integrating the two fields.
Professional codes are often seen as representing
the complete set of professional ethics activities in a
given area of work and study (Chalk et al., 1980). They
are prominent statements but perceptions of their val­
ue vary widely (Kernaghan, 1974; Frankel, 1983; Lue­
genbiehl, 1983). Some researchers (e.g. Ladd, 1980;
Mead in Luegenbiehl, 1983; Pullen, 1986) question
their value because they find them to be unsystematic
or poorly conceived, Such codes may therefore be
unenforceable, internally inconsistent and/or irrational
(see for instance, Lucy, 1988). My position (Hendler,
1990a) is that the careful and reasonable formulation
of a professional code, rooted in moral philosophy,
would serve to detract from some of this criticism. In
any event, the following represents an examination of
the case where, were codes to be useful, moral theo­
ries may have an effect on their substance and on the
process used to develop them.
Before embarking on this analysis however, some
discussion of the usual nature of codes is useful.
Codes are generally thought to be 'directed towards
members of a profession, the profession as a whole,
employers and clients, employees/research subjectsl
students, society and others (Chalk et al., 1980). The
last of these can presumably refer to obligations to
self, to knowledge, to non-human entities, and so OR.
The information contained in such <;l code is said 10 be
 22
of two sorts: practical guidelines for professional
behavi.our and ideal or utopian professional norms
(Luegenbiehl, 1983; Hennessey and Gert, 1985).
In accordance with the ethical' theories outlined
above, codes, as well as related, work in professional
ethics, have been said to conform to cOll6equential (for
example utilitarian; Starr, 1983) and deontological (for
example duty/rights-based; Martin, 1981) perspectives.
I believe that there are four specific aspects of codes
to which these theories may be seen as being relevant.
They are:
justifying importance or role of codes in general;
defining purpose of a given code;
developing a process to formulate, revise and
apply a code; and
arriving at a suitable set of principles which ought
to form the bulk of a given code.
Justifying codes in general
A justification for the mere existence of professional
codes must be cefltred on the importance of having a
set of rules or principles to which one must adhere.
The nature of the role of a code must be address~d.
Again, my purpose here is not to construct an argu­
ment as to the nature of professions and the impor­
tance (or lack thereof) of their codes. Rather, I am
assuming that ethical codes play a significant role in
professions and that, when one talks of 'professional
ethics'. one typically refers to codes as a point of focus
in such conversations.
First, utilitarians would argue that the benefits of
having a code should outweigh the disbenefits or costs
of not having one. These benefits may include
enhanced professional efficiency in dealing with ethical
problems (Kernaghan, 1974). Codes also may advo­
cate" a 'binding ideal' for a profession which defines
and enhances that profession's status in society (Starr,
1983), and codes may better enable self-regulation
(Luegenbiehl, 1983). Further, the availability of pre­
sumably appropriate and legitimate 'rules' for given
professionals should better enable good normative
decisions to be made, resulting in greater utility for all
concerned (Sinclair et al., 1987). Negative aspects of
codes figuring in the utilitarian calculus include such
things as limitations imposed upon a professional's
autonomy (MacNiven et al., 1986).
Conversely, a duty or rights-based advocate of
codes may hold that codes are prima facie sets of obli­
gations in the public interest and/or contracts protect­
ing the rights of actors performing on the professional
stage (Le. individual professionals and colleagues,
clients and employers, the public, etc.). The first of
these reflects the view that professionals often consid­
er their values to be of the prima facie sort; that is, they
are fundamental duties rather than instrumental or utili­
'.
Environments 20(3)
tarian principles (Howe and Kaufman, 1983; Kaufman,
'1985; Lang and Hendler, 1989).[5] A second rights­
based approach to justify codes refers to the contractu­
al nature of professional relationships. Here, a code
may be seen as a voluntary contract between a profes­
sional and his/her profession, a client or employer, or
the appropriate publics. The purpose of the contract is
to make explicit the expectations of non-professionals
and the 'promises' of the members of a profession.
This particular viewpoint regarding the importance of
contractual relationships grounded in a deontological
framework generally follows Rawls (1971 )[6]
It would appear, then, that the justification of codes
differs significantly according to underlying moral per­
spectives. I turn now to the question of whether the
rationales for particular codes do the same.
Rationales for particular codes
Rationales for given professional codes do not typically'
refer to the largely philosophical justifications given
above: Instead, more pragmatic support for a code is
offered and may include the following.
There are a number of utilitarian reasons given to
support the development or revision of a code. Orga­
nizations may wish to approach more closely a licens- .
ing scheme for professionals and a code may be seen
to be useful in this regard as a tool for self-regulation.
Second, a new professional body may develop a code
so as to establish itself as a moral entity; the code in
this manner functions as a hurdle to -be overcome
before asserting that a given association is profession­
ally 'legitimate'. Third, and in a very practical sense,
there may be 'organizational' (for lack of a better word)
reasons for having a code. In Canada, for example, the
Canadian Institute of Planners requires a code to:
present minimum standards for affiliate (provincial)
members;
act in a quasi-judicial capacity in the event that a
disciplinary hearing or decision at the affiliate level
is appealed; and
provide guidance for members acting outside the
jurisdiction of their own affiliate code (Sherwood,
1986, personal communication).
Many affiliates at the provincial level such as the
Ontario Professional Planning Institute (OPPI), have
avoided'formulating their own code and have adopted
the national organization's code. All of these sorts of
practical rationales may be linked to the notion of get­
ting a professional organization 'off the ground' in an '
efficient manner.
Rationales for a given code stemming from duty/
rights-based premises arise largely from the more con­
ceptual reasons given above. That is, a particular pro­
fessional society may feel that it is its duty to provide
its members and others with the guidance and moral

q
i
Hendler
support contained in a professional code. Further, and
in an often overlooked positive sense, a code may
make explicit the rights of professionals, as well as
their obligations. The quest in both of these perspec­
tives is to be effective, rather than only efficient.
While the differences between utilitarian and rights­
based rationales for particular codes seem quite
apparent, the bounds of each may be somewhat hazy.
For example, a professional adhering to a rights-based
moral theory may regard the issue of licensing (identi­
fied above as a utilitarian concern) as one pertaining to
a legitimate Gontractual obligation in that the licensing
~prc,-c_essmighLbetteLenable-professionals-to-meet--the~-Gontent-of-eodes-----------.. ----.~·.-·~--··~··--~··--··~~---·
publics' expectations. Similarly, needing to provide
minimum standards in addition to ideal principles of
professionalism may also be associated with a con­
tractual, as well as a utilitarian, basis. Rationales for
particular codes are therefore apparently not as closely
tied to individual moral theories as are justifications for
codes in general.
The process of developing codes
It seems appropriate that different codes, arising from
different' perceptions as to their fundamental purposes,
may be associated with differing approaches on hciw to
formulate them. A contractually-based code may best
illustrate this point in that the reference to a code as a
contract renders self-evident the fact that all actors '
involved in a contract should be party to its develop­
ment. In the present case then, potential clients and
employers, planners and representatives of the 'rele­
vant publics should be involved in the formulation of a
planning code.[7]
Codes rooted in a utilitarian framework' however,
may be more difficult to pin down. In congruence with
the 'means' orientation of deontological thought, the
processes used to develop a duty-based code take on
a certain degree of ~mportance. A utilitarian, or ends­
oriented code on the other hand, is generally con­
cerned more with the outcome of the process as
opposed to the process itself. In this regard, particular
ways of formulating codes with a utilitarian slant are
less obvious than are those rooted in deontological
thought. It is probable that the sort of general proce­
dure currently followed (i.e. formulation of suggested
principles 'in house', circulation of a proposed code,
voting on the code as part of by-laws at an annual gen­
eral meeting) would be favoured in that it is efficient
and relatively simple.
The same holds true in terms of revising extant
codes; a duty-based code would need to undergo the
same sort of process used to develop the original doc­
ument while one founded in utilitarianism would most
likely pursue the revise-circulate-vote route, with only a
few interested individuals participating actively in the
23
process.[8]
It is difficult to test the hypotheses which arise out 0'1
this discussion. The processes followed in the pursuit
of acceptable professional codes are rarely available,
except via disparate anecdote.! accounts of the formu­
lation of some specific codes (for an exception see
Kernaghan, 1987). this kind of information, even when
available, is often not sufficiently rigorous to allow for
analysis. Until the development of codes is aocorded
. the importance it deserves, this state is not likely to
change.
The content of a given code would at first appear to be
the most obvious facet of a profession which could be
attributed to, or demonstrate the effects of, one's
choice of moral theory. Principles such as 'serving the
public interest' are sometimes seen as ends-oriented,
while honesty, integrity and fairness are often regarded
as means-oriented (Howe and Kaufman, 1983). How­
ever, it has been recognized that statements such as
those concerning the public interest may have both
utilitarian and duty or rights-based interpretations
(Howe and Kaufman, 1983). The former pertains to
"the outcome of a utilitarian calculus that determines ...
the greatest balance of good over bad" (p. 12), while
the latter to a duty binding us to serve a common good.
A second complicating factor here has to do with
the incongruence of one's stated preference of a moral
theory and his or her subsequent evaluation of moral
behaviours. One would expect that ethical choices
grounded in deontological thought would differ from
those based in a consequentialist perspective. Cer.­
tainly, thought-experiments in introductory philosophy
courses would have us think that this is the case! How­
ever, this may not be an accurate depiction of the
effects of moral theories on our decision-making.
In order to explore this premise, I administered a
survey to urban and regional planning students and
practitioners in Ontario. Canada.[9] A total of 277 cod­
able surveys were collected and amidst questions
regarding specific planning issues, I asked respon­
dents to identify the moral theory which came closest
to representing their views of ethics. I asked:
Which of the following comes closest to expressing
your view of ethics?
- An act or behaviour is right or wrong in itself, without
regard to the consequences.
- The rightness or wrongness of an act should be
judged solely by ,Its consequences.
I then analysed the resulting data and attempted to
correlate a respondent's adherence to a given moral
theory to that person's subsequent' answers to
planning-related (,luestions that usually involved weigh­
ing ends versus means {see Table 1).
 Environments 20(3)

"

TABLE 1

the following questionnaire was distributed to planning students in classes and to planning practitioners via publi­
~ation in the Ontario Planning Journal. Respondents were asked to rank each of the following practices as ethical,
probably ethical, probably unethical, unethical or undecided: .

1. Assisting, on your own time, a citizens' group to prepare a position counter to one taken by your employer.

2. Threatening a developer with costly delay in order to secure concessions you believe to be in public interest.

3. Distorting information to facilitate acceptance of a development proposal you feel meets a public need.

4. Leaking information to the media on a matter you feel strongly about and on which you believe your employer
or client is being unduly secretive.

5. Organizing support among community groups and lobbying for your planning proposal without your planning
director's approval. . .

6. Accepting a loan from a peveloper with whom your employer or client regularly does business.

7. Writing a letter to the editor, signing only your name and home address, criticizing the municipal council for
approving a development against the recommendations of the planning department, of which you are an
employee.

8. Downplaying the value. judgements in a forecast or analysis, thereby making it appear more objective than it
really is.

9. Openly taking a position on an issue, within the planning department, which you know to be contrary to the
declared position of your employer or client.

10. Submitting a report on a by-law that affects a property owned by a member of your family, without declaring a
possible conflict of interest. .

11. Not providing members of the public with the full range of information al(ailable to you as a planner working
on a planning proposal.

12. Seeking to avoid responsibility for giving full consideration to the environmental impacts of a planning propos­
al or project.

13. Presenting an opinion that you know is the only one that your client/employer will find acceptable, even
though it does not represent the view held by you as a professional.

14. Planning for the needs of disadvantaged groups, and working to alter policies and decisions which oppose
such needs, whether this is part of your mandate or not.

15. Knowing that another planner is behaving unethically but not informing your superiors or the professional
organization.

Other questions regarding student status, professional experience, etc. were also included in the questionnaire.
Hendler 25

TABLE 2

ETHICS IN PLANNING: DEONTOLOGISTS VERSUS CONSEQUENTIALlSTS*

GROUP ETHICAL UNETHICAL QUESTION

0 51 49
C 42 58

0 44 56 2
C 46 54

0 2 98 3
C 7 93

0 34 66 4
C 32 68

0 '32 68 5
C 40 60

0 16 84 6
C 13 87

0 52 48 7
C 56 44

0 17 83 8
C 22 78

0 85 15 9
C 80 20

0 5 95 10
C 6 94

0 18 82 11+
C 29 71

0 4 96 12
C 3 97

0 18 82 13
C 23 77

0 77 23 14
C 69 31

0 10 90 15+
C 20 80

* Results are expressed as percentages of each group of respondents; totals may not be 100 due to rounding.
There are no significant differences between the two populations at the standard p<0.05 level of significance using
the chi-square statistic. Results reported here are significant at the p:-s.0.06 level of significance; the possibility that
I have overstated the significance of the difference between the two populations merely strengthens my argument.

o DeontoTogiSlS

C Consequentialis~

(+) Indicates wnere the chi-square statistic for that question indicates significant differences at p:-s.O.06.

'Undecid.eds'. whic" averaged approximately 5%, were not included so as to facilitate analysis.

 26
Results of this analysis are as follows. Approximate­
ly 67% of respondents favoured a deontological per­
spective; the remaining 33% preferred the consequen­
tialist alternative. What is important here is that, of the
fifteen practices included in the survey, only two were
associated with a statistically significant difference
ootween these two populations. These practices were
(K)nowing . that another planner is behaving
unethically but not informing your superiors or
the professional organization; and
(N)ot providing members of the public with the
full range of information available to you as a
planner working on a planning proposal.
Compared with deontologists, consequentialists were
forming to the contractual obligation as originally con­
more apt to classify both of these practices as more
ceived. While this might be at least somewhat in line
ethical. That is, while the two groups of respondents
with an ends-oriented approach to profeSSionalism
agreed that 'not whistle-blowing' and withholding infor­
. mation were wrong, consequentialists did not hold this
lengths of ensuring his or her place in the bureaucracy,
position with the same conviction as did deontologists.
suppressing one's professional judgment in this way
Again, these are the only two practices which were
could not, I think be as easily supported in deontologi­
associated with any significant difference between the
cal terms.
individuals having what are usually seen as competing
Conversely, one might defend a principle regarding
moral perspectives (see Table 2)[10]
One might have expected for instance, that deontol­
ogists would have been less disposed than conse­
quentialists to hypothetically bribe developers in order
to gain concessions thought to be in the public good.
However, this proved not to be the case. These data
seem to indicate that, for Ontario planners at least,
particular principles in professional codes may not eas­
ily be attributed to a given moral theory.
An example of a principle often found .in codes may
serve to further illustrate the fact that more than one
ethical theory may lie at the root of a given behavioural
guideline. The example of public interest has been giv­
en above (see also Howe and Kaufman, 1983); consid­
er also the more concrete instance of the notion of,pro­
fessional integrity via the planner's providing only what
has been spoken of as 'independent professional
judgment/opinion' (see American Institute of Certified
Planners (AICP), 1981; Canadian Institute of Planners
(CIP), 1986; Royal Town Planning Institute, 1986)
Most oodes make reference to this sentiment which
typically refers to the importance of a planner's .stead­
fast adherence' to his or her professional decisions,
even in the event of adversity often in the form of politi­
. cal pressure or attempted influence by a client or
employer.
This principle may. be supported with reference to
one, or both, of the moral frameworks discussed here.
Professional integrity may be valued in and of itself,
without reference to the consequences it brings about.
If individuals are seen as autonomous thinking beings
Environments 20(3)
with inherent value, and if such individuals participate
in an educational process which enables them to con­
ceive of and develop ideas which are of social value
(as demonstrated by the accordance of a particular
status to professionals), it makes sense that the pro­
fessional judgment of these persons ought to be val­
ued in a similar fashion. Otherwise, it would seem
paradoxical to engage someone in work if that work is
not to be taken seriously.
A second deontologically-based source of support
for the principle of professi9nal integrity comes from
the contractual argument presented above. That is,
when one is hired as a planner one is expected to offer
professional planning advice. If the planner provides
only what is expected in light of known biases on the
part of the employer or client,. the planner is not con­
where the planner might want to go to extraordinary
professional integrity on teleological grounds in that the
consequences of accepting a profeSSional's bona fide
judgments may ,be more desirable than not accepting
them. Accepting, say, a planning report on the nega­
tive ramifications of a waterfront development as
opposed to maintaining the lot as a natural area may
lead to better consequences than if the report and its
recommendations were overturned by City Council.
This has nothing to do with the intrinsic value of the
planning decision or the decision-maker; it is the con­
sequences which determine whether the act or princi­
ple is a moral one.
Thus the individual principles making up a profes­
sional code may be difficult to attribute to a given moral
theory. Whether a code in its entirety could be classi­
fied in this way remains a question and would have to
take into account whether the hierarchical ordering of
principles and the general moral tone they might reflect
could make a significant difference in this regard.[11]
Ttlis sort of ordering has been given as one of the
marks of a good code, in addition to such things as
clarity, conSistency and adequate coverage (Chalk et
al., 1980). I. comment further on this possibility.
Q: Do ethical theories affect professional codes?
A: Sometimes
Some ambiguities regarding the moral Significance
of the content of codes notwithstanding. it wbuld
appear that the factors most clearly associated with
ethical theories are their justification and formulation
from the outset. The question 'Why have professional
Hendler
codes?' seems to be more affected by one's choice of
moral theory than does 'What should codes contain?'.
A duty or rights-based view would focus here on the
prima facie value of such a code, as well as rationales
from contractarianism. Utilitarians, most notably rule­
vtilitarians, would hold that the utility of a code out­
weighs any foreseeable 'costs'. At this level, as well as
that of developing a process to formulate codes, the
differences between moral theories are apparent.
Other factors, however, seem to be less influenced,
at least outwardly, by an adherence to a moral theory.
The specific principles included in a code and ratio­
nales for particular codes are included here. A reason
for this, from the planning realm, may be the fact that
those who formulate professional .codes rarely self­
consciously adhere to any particular moral theory. Fur­
ther, the principles the codes contain are typically
vague and insubstantial (see Lucy, 1988) which
enables professionals to have much in the way of free­
dom' but little with regard to moral guidance. Perhaps a
code grounded from the outset in a particular ethical·
perspective and representing a consistent application
of these principles would in the end be able to be
attributed clearly to the appropriate moral base.
In this regard, it be helpful both from an academic
and pragmatic standpoint if a professional body would
agree to act as a test case. A moral perspective could
be identified and agreed upon; a professional code
could then be grounded in this framework. Further, the
process used to develop the code would follow from
the ethical standpoint selected and then, perhaps, the
resulting code might be dissimilar from that arising
from some other perspective. Given,however, the tur­
bulent state of, for example, planning, and of moral
philosophy, this seems unlikely to occur in the foresee­
able future. Rather, one could, at the very least,. expect
a coherent and thoughtful ethical rationale for one's
endeavours; this could be part of the preamble to a
given code (see the 1981 AICP code for an effort con­
sistent with this perspective).
This result, from a discussion of what has been
termed 'applied ethics', is interesting from the point of
view of professionals. such as planners as well as
philosophers. The former may gain a better under­
standing of the normative issues underlying their field,
while the latter may begin to recognize intricacies and
deficiencies in their moral theories. Interdisciplinary
endeavours such as this may contribute to a resolution
of disputes in appropriate directions. The present dis­
cussion, ·for example, has indicated that the most often
cited aspect of codes (i.e. content) is that which
appears to least reflect the effects of moral theories.
Whether it and related efforts could or should lead to
the development of 'mixed' deontological or conse­
quentialist mainstream ethical theories {see Frankena.
1973) or moral pluralism (Stone, 1988) remains to be
27
seen. It seems certain, however, that this sort of exer­
cise in clarification and explication could gradually
facilitate the integration of ethics and professions such
as planning, as well as contribute to the maturation of
both. .
Examples of future research which appear to be
warranted as a result of this study follow. Clearly, fur­
ther analysis of extant professional codes and mea­
sures of their effectiveness would be useful. This fits in
with an increasing appreciation of· research in profes­
sional planning practice, as made evident in numerous
recent professional meetings.[12) In this regard, one
might hypothesize that codes arising from participatory
exercises would be more appreciated and respected
than would codes. arising out of a non-participatory pro­
cess. Further, interdisciplinary work in the area of pro­
fessional ethics is desirable so as to enhance the abili- .
. ty of professionals and ethicists to better understand
the language and concepts of each discipline. Without
such cooperative endeavours, it would seem that we
will be forever 'preaching to the converted' and will
continue to allow our work to remain pigeon-holed in
narrowly-viewed disciplines which are incapable of
addressing the complex problems encountered in con­
temporary society. .
Empirical analyses of the moral language used by
professionals, in conjunction with studies on the con­
gruence of professional behaviour and prescriptions
found ih related codes, would also be of interest. Such
work would recognize the constraints and opportunities
faced by professionals in attempting to 'live right in an
amoral world' (Stein, 1982). Ught would thus be shed
on the interplay between what professionals·believe
they should do, and how they in fact behave. It has, for
example, been observed that most planners do not
conform to many of the idealistic principles expressed
in their codes (AICP, 1981 ; Davidoff, 1982).
Thus, we find ourselves in the position of imple­
menting codes which are ethically unsophisticated and
impossible to adhere to or enforce. Clearly, it is the
responsibility of a' given professional organization to
articulate its reasons for having a code, justify the pro­
cess used in developing the code and defend its con­
tent accordingly. The argument presented here points
to the conceptual and practical need for such discus­
sions, as well as areas which may present difficulties.
The usefulness of inter-disciplinary/professional collab­
oration in such endeavours is apparent.[1 3]
28
ENDNOTES
(1] 'Persons' here need not refer only or necessarily to
human beings. Instead, the term may be applied to
any organism exhibiting morally relevant character­
. istics enabling us to say that it has .inherent!
intrinsic value.
[2] Alternatives to these 'liberal' views are also attract­
ing attention. Some philosophers (and planners)
have begun to regard 'communitarian' perspectives
as viable options to individualistic moral theories
(see for example Sandel, 1984; Mandelbaum,
1987).
[3] What a 'working knowledge' of ethics involves
would be difficult to define and assess. However,
this recommendation was made following a pre­
sentation by Reg Lang and myself on planning
ethics at the 1987 conference of the Canadian
Institute of Planners (CIP). The importance of
emphasizing normative concerns in planning edu­
cation has also been recognized (Lang et al.,
1986; Kaufman, 1987).
[4] There is also the case of ethical principles arising
existentially from planning practice (see Bolan,
1983).
[5] These norms may also be seen as universal. Con­
sider the example of the World Psychiatric Associ­
ationexpelling the Soviet Union from its ranks
when it was found that many of the individuals
housed in Soviet psychiatric hospitals were, infact,
sane (Satter, 1987). Moral principles and related
tenets in professional ethics may, in this way, be
seen as potentially trans-cultural.
. Alternatively, planning norms have traditionally
been linked to utilitarian principles, as opposed to
deontological ones (see Kaufman, 1985; Hodge,
1986).
[6J Rawls' theory of justice as fairness has had a sig­
nificant impact on planning; many authors have
based their normative perspectives on his princi­
ples (see for example Klosterman, 1978; Beatley,
1984; McConnell, 1981; Marlin, 1989).
[7] This would be facilitated by establishing organiza­
tions such as the American Planning Association
which is meant to attract individuals interested in
planning but who need not be recognized as plan­
ners per se. These sorts of bodies would provide
an obvious source of representatives of the publics
interested in planning issues.
Itnvironments 20(3)
[8] As it stands, the development and revision of
codes is shrouded by apathy and ignorance. This
may be at least partly due to the processes used to
formulate them.
[9) I would like to take this opportunity to thank Reg·
Lang for his help in developing, administering and
analyzing the survey and resulting data. Thanks
are also due to the many respondents of the sur­
vey and those who aided in its administration.
[10] See Hendler (1990b) for a descriptive and com­
'parative analysis of the views on ethics of plan­
ning students and practitioners. See also Lang
and Hendler (1990).
[11] For example, I recently witnessed arguments
regarding the American Institute of Certified Plan­
ners code as to whether it adhered more to a
deGlntological or consequential perspective. There
was no consensus.
[12] Two recent meetings which cOJTle to mind are the
1988 and 1989 annual conferences of the Associ­
ation of Collegiate Schools of Planning and a
workshop on planning values, ethics and skills
which was located in Newcastle-on-Tyne, Eng­
land in October 1988. The content of these ses­
sions indicated that the study of planning practice
was becoming increasingly important, particularly
in the quest for practical theory.
[13] An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the annual conference of the Association of Colle­
giate Schools of Planning in'Buffalo, New York on
October 27, 1988. The paper has benefited from
comments made by J. Copas, M. Fox, J. Middle­
ton and A. Ormiston, as well as those people par­
ticipating in that meeting and Environments refer­
ees. Any errors are my own.
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