MERIT AND RESPONSIBILITY A Study in Greek Values OxFoRD AT THE CLARENDON PRESSfr vip Pr, Amen Howe, anon Bg (© Oshnd Uvierty Press 190 bt PREFACE ‘Tux material here presented in book form vas submitted as a doctoral thesis the spring of 197. Ie then bore the tte “Fhe Development of the Concept af Moral Responsibility fom Homer to Aristotle’. ‘The argument and conclusions remain substantially those of the dhois; the intervening period, ia ‘which it has been prepared for publication, has been largely devoted to presenting the material in a form in which ¢ may be available to readers with no knowledge of Greek. The subject is suited to such treatment, frit consists essentially ofa dscus- son of a very limited range of Greck words. All these words have been transliterated, and all quotations teandated. No Greek type now remains in the text} and T have resained the ‘original Greek only in such footnotes as can be of no interest txcept to those readers with some knowledge of Greek. The ‘other customary impediment to communication, the unneces- sury technicalities and jargon with which the D.Phil. student is wont to cover his nakedness, Ihave attempted to eliminate by submitting the work tothe judgement of non-specialists, and removing or explaining anything which was held to be need Iesaly obscure, Doubtless obscuritis remain; bur the Greekess reader is asked to believe that without the asstance T have received his plight would have been much wore. ‘The work in its present form, i intended for three kinds of reader: forthe professional Greek scholar: forthe large and ever- Increasing number of students of Greek philosophy and eviina tion who possess no Greek; and for any students of morals and society in general who may find this study of Greek values in relation to Greek society interesting. In an effort to be com> prehensble to all Uhce groups, I have attempted to keep the Tine ofthe argument as clea as the subject permits by exchding fom the text what isnot immediately relevant. Accordingly, have relegated to the notes atthe end of the chapters much callateral material, argument which, while necessary 10. “scholarly prof, is not esential to the main argument of the text, and Some brief explanations of practices with which the non-specialist may be unfamiliar. I hope that many of the moredetailed notes wil, i fact, be of interes to others beside pro- fessional scholars; but, at east in intention, the argument complete without them. The methed adopted may occasionally {give the Impresion that certain inconvenient guestions are being quietly throttled in dask comers; but a til of alterna tives has convinced me that it the best available inthe cit Since Greek ethis and Greck vals have been 2 fequently lscusted by previous scholars, any aovelty which tis book may posses necesarily derives from the manner of treatment Adopted and it follows that reference to similar discussions of| ‘the same material could be almost continuous, As, however, the only fuiful method of examining nich a topic as this ist se fone complete discussion beside another, I have rarely given references to individual points treated in the works of other scholars, but have appended in the bibliography a list of similar studi which have influenced this one. Te will be ‘evident, however, thatthe manner of teatment owes mich to ‘Profesor Snell's Die Enuieng des Grises, which has greatly affected my thought on the subject of or Tegives me great pleasure tobe able wo thank here those who have helped in the production of cither thesis or book, Fst, Profesor E. R. Dodds, who has supervised and encouraged this ‘work throughout its long period of ineubation, To his views, both published and wnpublished, and to his broad and humane Scholarship in general, this book and T owe many debts, some jmmediatly obvious, others ofa Kind which only the author himself ean appreciate, Secondly, the Warden and Fellows of Merton College, Oxford, who, by electing me to.a Harmsworth Senior Scholarship, enabled ine to spend two postgraduate ‘years in the uninterrupted pormit ofan idea which, at least in its eanly sages, was cloudy and vague inthe extreme. T should like to express my thanks also to my examiners, Profesor G. Be Kerferd and Me. D. A. Rosell, and to Mr. J. Le Ackril sod Professor P.T. Stevens all of whom have ea the whole or part of the typesript of either theris or book, and have made suge sestons Which T have incorporated inthe text. My thanks are due also to my colleague Mr, P. T, Eden and to Mr. J. E. Garrod of the British Counell, who have given me such aisistance fn reading the proof, and toallatthe Clarendon ress who have borne with the vagaries ofan author completely ‘unused to the mechanics of book production; while both my Greekles readers and T have great reason to he grateful to my fiiend Dr. Ruth Roberts, who has read the whole typescript ia ther interest and pointed out numerous obscuritts, some of ‘which I have been abe to remove. AWA: Beaford College, London Jane 1959NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION A rew words are needed to explain my transiterations. These are direct: each Greek letter is represented by its equivalent in the Roman alphabet, whether or no the English pronunciation of that letter coincides with that ofthe Greek. This has resulted In a few apparent anomalies: for example, the word normally spel ‘peyene’ in English appears as dé, but as the Greck ‘word Ia implications quite different fom those of peyche, the distinction in spelling Seems to me 10 be an advantage. The iota subsri forms,» appear with the adept, and the Tong vowel marked: dy, an general, I have marked long. vowels on the fist occasion of a wort’s appearance where the ‘word vecus frequently; otherwise, on each orzasion. Where the speling of adjective and adverb difes only in the quantity of the final ‘o'—eg adie and afisr—T have always marked the long “0! of the adverb. For greater simpli, nouns and adjectives are quoted in the nominative, singular or plural, verbs in the infinitive. Pronunciation need prevent few dificulies, provide that it ig remembered that there are no unpronounced vowels in| Greek, i. that a word such 38 itis dylabie, Apart fom this, dhere no agreed pronunciation of Greek among scholars in Britain; for example diferent scholars pronounce *@ as in “threes as in ‘whey’ or (roughly) asin “bea. (The ' ofthe ota subscript forms 8” not usually prosounced at all) T have Imatked mo’ accents—except on p. 30, t0 distinguish hate, “badnes, from kaki, ‘bad; the Greekles reader will be well, advised to adopt a strest accent, and to place it om whatever fyllable his knowledge of Latin or Italian leads hima to believe plausible. This accent will be wrong, frequently in positon, Always kind, forthe Grecks ofthe clascal period employed 2 pitch accent; but as the resulting promunctation will bear a Close resemblance to that of the majority of classical scholars felocated in these sands, including the present writer, the non professional may presumably be forgiven for using iCONTENTS i) The Nate ofthe Hamer Ge (G3) Tee io he Hee et (8) he aso Bet {IL HOMER: MISTAKE AND MORAL ERROR 1B The Mew tment ain The ga (3 The states of htt Standard (2) Wore ni he Homie era {i Mt nd te Copa alec (0) Reman Delian ae © Obes Teme Vale i) Te Chino Say ‘The ara he ant Hare Say ‘The as ofthe dees ‘ BV. JUSTICE" HOMER TO THE FIFTH CENTURY 2B Jose ae te Gate (i Senor Cate (3 Sout eat teen de (Homer an Hao(8) ati Later Wee 1B, The Orin ofthe Bet SephaInuenen (Chie Neal aes (@) Toe Barerelathip (i Pon (ip Gace Dat Agua (Dine Socios in Le (8) Senor ce Dea ‘0 stane (5) The dpteStndard (5) Toe Shel ad he Uy (aot tad Maal espeniiy Toe Sane (3) Soca aod Face (A Apis Kae “Vasu Se! i) TeNew tas D. Some Bisos X.THE GOOD CITIZEN AND THE JUST MAN: 2, he yt air 1 i ‘Tie Aacmtty %o (9 Teele conr = (} Succon a Paine . Afi aig 1D. The Dango Agee = The Ma Highly Vaed Nan “ ©The Tepe Sumdud of Beaver 3 PLATO: LOGIC AND BLENCHUS [A The Share of Sates 29 The jt of Saat = (Theale oa Teed = i) Rand te Ortinacy Non Pd (3 cated Tyan me 1% AChange f Appa sa Theta 25 edhe % (i) The Compute ve and Cle Haine 90 {i The Ren oe 1h Reaantn ftt 2 (5 The ee Sac os Tern Pa hay ihn 2 (GPs Aone 3Paste and Repos 1) he Try (i) Tee ) A Chang of mph (5) Bako Det Ran The atin ce see (he Mea Be () era nen ©) Toxo (8) The Copa ra i “Oniny re? to The baci Aste ee yn as i: ay an gh Ie {eens ow tha ipo be cant kes sf iy Raia PRO cea ed the near pola, ho roe kely wan't tule wort fhe hie dane, = By iow cn wean, ame ere et ah, et Sa Chechen cence tis dns dan wu maunee ‘eet la Slnce den Jno lc ie ‘a dasa i oe Ste ereMORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GREEK MORAL THOUGHT. “Tux reacarch from which this book has developed wat orginally ‘undertaken in the hope that it mighe make clear to me why 1 could not understand the moral philosophy of Plato snd Are Tolle; not, that is to say, the answers «0 individual question, ‘which frequently cemed clear enough; but the reason why Plato and Aristotle should have elected to aniwer these qc tons rather than others which seemed to me more interesting and more relevant. So far as Tam concerned, i has fled ‘purpose; and hope it may perform asmilar service for anyone se who, in beginning to study Greek ethics, finds himself ‘equally puzzled. ‘The result, however, s 2 book whose scope, conten, and method al require explanation, and posibly some Aefence! for all three may apparently be charged with some Aegree of irelevance or unimportance. The connecting thread fof the dscusion isthe development of the concept of moral "esponsibility in Greek; a concept which, ia the moral thought (of the period discussed, undeniably held a minor position. “The reader may well feel cht itia merely perverse to endow it with an importance which the Greeks themelves would not hnave recognized. Secondly, though the discussion does return at intervals to the pleas accepted or rejected by the Greeks at diferent period, even a cardal reading will reveal that much fof it snot a direct diseustion of moral raponsiility at al, bat 1 more general survey of Greck terms of valu, religious ideas, and social organization. Thirdly, though the moral philosophy of Plato and Arsvode provoked this research, the discussion ‘anges ftom Homer through the literary predcceeors of there Philosophers, who themeclves receive a comparatively small haze af the whole. Yet Plato and Aristotle undoubtedly hadavailable to them all the material surveyed here, and snuch sore besides; and they might well be held to have analysed, summed up, and improved upon their predecessors. Wool it ‘ot be sufficient 1 comider the problem of moral responsiblity ss they found i and the solutions which they offered? Afterall, ‘thi is by general consent a philosopher's topic; and the sur- viving predecesor of Plato and Aristotle are, on the whole, laymen. In answering these charges T shall endeavour to make clearer the purpose of this book. The frst charge is readily answered. The importance of building this discussion round the Greek concept of moral responsiblity les precisely in the relative unimportance of that oncept, a8 Compared with the status which we should allot it, for this radical difference of emphasis ie significant symp tom of thote basic differences in outlook. which sometimes rake Greek ethics to baffling to the modern reader; while 0 conduct the discusion in reference to 8 concept which he Iie values so differently mos readily enables the modem reader to sce the extent of the divergences between the two ‘moral systems. For any man brought up in a western demo- cratic society the related concepts of duty and responsibility are the central concepts of ethics} and we ae inclined to take it as an unquestionable truth, though there is abundant evidence to the contrary, thatthe same mast be true ofall societies. Tn this respect, atleast, we are all Kantians now. Surely, we assume in any society "What ie my duty in these circumstances? is the basic question which the agent must atk himself in any ‘matter which requires a moral decisions and since, as we all Jknow, ‘ought’ implica ‘can’, anyone who has to pass judgement fon any action must fist inquite, im considering whether the ‘agent did or didnot do is duty, whether he enuld or could not Ihave acted otherwise, and hence whether he may be held espoible fri cis oro, That there sould ext society 0 diferent from our own a¢ to render ie impossible to ‘alate ‘duty’ in the Kantian sene int its ethical terminology atall~imposible, that is to aay, to translate “duty” by a word not only of equivalent connotation but also of equivalent status ind emotive power—is, despite the evidence, a very dificult dea to accept. Even ifwe do accep it, we are only to0 inclined \o interpret it merely as an indication ofthe moral deficiency hove who are to unfortunate as not wo be Kantians; and we vre most unlikely to see the fall implications of the system of vhich this 'dficieney” is a symptom, ‘That this symptom is preset in Greek has long been retoguized by clssieal scholar, trac the fll implications of thi have, 20 frat Tam aware, cever been drawn out; nor, it seems to me, can they be brought ‘nu and the trae nature ofthe Greek moral sene thereby made lear to those with such different presuppositions ae ourselves, ‘xcept by some such discussion as the prevent one, which ap- roaches the subject from what, ftom the Greek point of view, 's the wrong angle altogether Irwe can discover wy the cow expt of moral responsiblity i 80 unimportant tothe Greek, we shall go far towards understanding the difference between our ‘moral systems, and dieovering the nature ofeach, THE onLigue arPRoacHE Since the concept of moral responsibility is the connecting thread rather than the jusificaion ofthe present discussion, the second charge falls the ground at once. The general survey fo Greek values has intrest in its vn right, But even were my purpose only to discuss this concept, a similar approsch would Fill be necessary. ‘This point illustrates even more clearly the manner in whick the diseuson ofthe concept of moral response bility wil be-wsefil, and farther, explains the method of ap- proach I have adopted in subsequent chapters. It would indeed hhepostble to asembleall che instaneesin extant Greck iterature ‘ofa man’s being explicitly held responsible or not responsible Jor his actions; and an analysis of theve would doubiles reveal the extent to which the Greek eoneept of moral resposibility ‘resembles or differs from our own. But this would be a singulary barren exercise, for it could never supply any reasons for the uliferences which would immediately become apparent Further ‘more, it would be logical, forthe nature ofthe subject-matter Alemands an oblique approach. Is possible to elevate ‘duty to te mest important positon in a maral system; itis posible to ‘ensure that Was the agent responsible for his actions or not?4 MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND is the most important question which can be asked of any faction to which reward and punishment may be eelevant; butt is not posible to make (hs question logically primary, for i heceserily depends om the answers, implicit or explicit given toa large number of others. Accordingly, the concept of moral ‘sponsibility anno take logieal priority in any moral sytem. That isto ay, it cannot aasame some form to which all other concepts must adapt themselves. Quite the contrary: itis in Virtue of other belie, whether moral, of value in general, or {apparently faetual, thatthe concept of moral responsibility takes the form which, in any society, it does take, No one tnaking a moral judgement on an action can decide from what the sees with hit eyes alone whether the agent should be held responsible for that action oF not. It ison his belils about that ction, about action in general, about society in genera, about the universe and its gods, or lak of them, tha his judgement will depend; more of less logically according to the degree of Togicalty ofthe individual or his society Tis only inthe ight of| ‘these belief that the action takes the shape it docs take, or Jndeed any shape at all; fr itis ony in she light ofthese beliefs that the peson judging ableto abstract rom the circumstances surrounding aa action, otherwite only a collection of physical ‘events among other physical events, those circumstances which fre held by him, or by his society, toe relevant The question ‘Of responsibility nay sil be the most impartant question which tan be razed, but only fehe answers given implicitly or exe Dlieiy to these other questions allow this Tt follows from thie that no simple catalogue of examples isteeting this concept will throw light on anything. Any ‘change ina society's view ofthis concept any change, thats, in| the group of actions or types of action held by that society to be responsible actions will rut from a change in other belie fom en increase in knowledge, of ftom an improvement— or change—in the cicamstances or organization of that society. ‘The change in the atripton of responsibilty may not fllow immediately; belie which involve reward and punishment are necesarily very dificult to adapt, for powerfal emotions are involved; but this i the sequence in which the change must take place, and hence an ablique method of approach alone has ny chance of success. Otherwise, one can only be inritated by what seem to be the absurdities of those whose belie differ komm one’s own; wheres, properly considered, such differences cay well be realy explicable, together with any developments fnges which take place. Evidently, then, cosmological, theological, and psychological cclies (0 go no further) must be discused in any adequate restment of moral responsibility. These will be found mest ef in considering the pleas offoce mare or af nevitabiiy, pychologially, mechanically, or thestically determined, 2¢- epted by any socety. Peas of mistake or accident, however, ‘ven more evidently demand an oblique approach, particu” ely im a soiey far distant in space or tne. Iti the funetion Whe category of mistake to distinguish from moral error those fa of types of action which fall under i. "The manner in i performs this function depends on the manner in notil error and mistake are viewed by any given society: {nd this iust be discovered not only by a general consideration ‘if both types of action in che society, but also by an examina- tion of the uie in these dnd similar stations ofthe key terms ‘value, together with their impleation. To make this point ‘learer, tomething must be said ofthe use of sueh terms in all, Tanguages. Tn the fist place, any word of general commendation will, in any society, be applied not at random but t persons of| ‘vents powsesting certain characteristics. Aeordingly, any stat ‘nent of the fora “Xie (some general adjetive of eommenda- Vion) may be glomed with serien of statements “Y posteses the characteristics By ¢ 8"3 and, at all events wen values are able, any such commendation of X, or any other member of the clage to sehich belong, wil be employed in vite of is postesson of the characteristics o, b,, &e. The word of general ‘Commendation cannot be translated into these other statements, frit possesses another element—whose nature itis unneces sary to diem here—which is pecliar co itself but the fact, that the applicability ofthese other statements is a necessary ‘condition of applying the word of more general commendation provides a means of estimating the peculiar Ravour ofthat word find, in the present inquiry, of establishing hove thi affects ‘ncriptions of moral responsiblity. A word may remain the highest word of commendation while the circumstances towhich tis applied change radically; and its this typeof change in Greck which provides the clue fo this arpect ofthe investiga tion in hand, For it i inevitable that 2 word of general com- rmendstion which is applied to a number of diferent types of situation should be so applied asthe result of a general world view, whether consciously ot unconsciously formulated. Ac- cordingly, the range of application of such a term must be dit covered, since itis on the general world-view, as has been sad, that depends the form which the concept of moral responsibility takes, ‘Secondly, iti reasonable to inquite whether, in any given language, one particular term or complex of terms possesses a higher value than any other; that to say, whether there exis some word or words which, iTproduced in ethical argument to characterize any pesson or action, ends the argument, i iti fgreed by both parties that the characterization is correct, imply because there fro word of greater value inthe language ‘which might be brought agaiast this one. If, for example, we Yalue justice in our fellow men more highly than their success, itis poinles, if man is unjut, co mention his succes or any other atibute he posseses in an attempt to make his injustice ‘seem unimportant; for though other qualities or services might bie mentioned ar mitigating circumstances, they cannot, i jut tices most highly valued, override its claims altogether. in such fan inquiry ab this, itis esemtial to discover which isthe most {important term of value or eomplex of such ters, together with its implications; for term of vale have widely difering criteria of application, and the criteria of application of the most im porta term clearly both reflect and mould 2 sciety’s view of life ae a whole, and hence ts ascriptions of moral responsiblity. “Thirdly, itis necesary forthe present purpose to distinguish two groups of values. In any society there are aetvities in ‘which sucess of paramount importance; in these, commenda~ tion or the reverse i reserved for those who in act succeed oF fail In such activites, what a man intended to do is of litle sccount in eatimating his performance. On the other hand, in ‘any society there are also thote activies, such ae contracts ot parmershipe in which men co-operate with one another for a ‘common end. Since the only bats for co-operation is faimess, however interpreted, iti i terms of faimes, or some similar OREEK MORAL THOVGHT 7 word, thatthe relations of men who co-operate will be esti- mated. Fairness raises questions quite different from those of| saceast oF flute. Tis perfectly reasonable wo inquire whether vay encroachment was deliberate or not, and to expect that liferent treatment will be given to the encroacher according to he answer; and further that this will be the most important ‘question which ean be asked about the encroachment. ‘Terms of value must of necesity be frequently applied fo both roups of activises Since the activities are so diferent in kind, it'may well be found that they sre commended by different terms, withthe result that there may well exist two (or more) complexes of terms of value. Both compleses evaluate action, both are relevant to this work, and both have some claim to be termed ‘mora since competition requires such virtues as cour age and endurance. To avoid confusion, the (wo will be dite tinguished hereafter a ‘competitive’ values or excellences and "couoperatve’ or ‘quiet vals ar excellences “The distinction between the two complexes of values i very much simplified here; but, taken with the second point above, it sufices to show the importance to a discussion of moral responsibility of the consideration of Key terms of value, The ‘vary different attude to intentions necewarily found in each of these groups makes it imperative to discover which is the more ‘powerful for this i bound to be the most important clue tothe Sutlook on life as a whole ofthe men who use them, simply because the more powerful words do override theless power in ‘any situation where both are relevant. “The dicussion of the concept of moral responsiblity, then, is of value in introducing Gree ethics to the moder reader not ‘only beenute it sapplies him with an approach to the subject from a direction with which he i failian, but also because the discussion necessarily entails a survey of the whole Greck moral scene from thie direction, ‘The third charge, however, seems more serious. There is an Abundance of moral phileophy in the writings of Plato and Avstotle, and it might well appear that iP cis necessary 10 survey Greek cerms of value there i an abundance of them ‘0° MORAL. RESPONSIDILITY AND bbe found there, without going any farther, Before anewering this charge, we may readily aggravate it. Not only are the cthical works of Plato and Aristotle abundant: Avstote, all events, farnishes an analysis of moral responsibility inthe third book of the Nicomacean Edis which seems flly adequate:™ Since aah is concered with pasons and ations, ad since rai and blame are bestowed upon suchas are voluntary, while ‘ich a are involuntary pardon i granted, and sometins pity, [presumably neceaary for thone who ae enquiring about a ‘singuish the voluntary and the invluntarys and iti sel (0 ‘hose who have to make laws, witha view to determining rewards nd puntment, ‘To any reader of the present day, this must seem admirably sane, indeed the only‘ reasonable atitde. Certainly anyone ‘who has to reward oF punish ought to make clear to himself the circumstances in which he is prepared to regard an act a8 pon-voluntary, and hence outside the realm of reward. and ponishment: for by 20 doing he delimits the spre in which he fntends to operate, The only problem, one might suppose, the interpretation ofthe terms "Voluntary" nd involuntary that is to say, the criteria which are allowed to be relevant: and in fact Aristotle immediately goes on to consider such entra “Here, thea, sa quotation which seems to make nonsense of| the defence offered tothe two previous charges. We fnd here a Greek moral philosopher offering what, in its full context, i an extremely subtle analysis of moral responsibilty, inhibited ap- parently nether by the alleged relative unimportance ofthat eoncept, nor by his socety’s key terms of value. "Thi, however, is not enough. If we examine Aristotle's ‘moral psition as awhole, we are not on such familiar ground 36 might at frst appear. Anstotl's concept of moral responsibility {s not identical with our oven; for this to be eo would require not only a subtle analysis of voluntary and involuntary action, Dat ako a system of ethies which should enable the application ofthis analis in all cass fn which we should consider thie relevant, Artotle does not and cannot furnish such a systems and the apparent familiarity ofthis analysis merely blinds us to the disimilarity ofthe whole. The reasons fr this dissimilarity Tie in the presupposions party of Homeric, parly of later SBA noPyeM 8 Thiet wie cased below pe 99 Greek, social organization and habits of thought; presuppos tions which, commended by the key terms of value, Pato and Aristode never challenged and never analysed, since they were for them part of the data of etic. Since Platoand Aristotle were not fully concious ofthe nature ‘of these presuppositions, there is no reason why they should farnish better material for thee study than do earlier writers. deed, the material is les readily studied in their works than clsewhere, for there the presuppositions are overlaid with pilo- fophizing: and though the presuppositions natwrally condition this philsophizing, they are less easy to discover than Tee sophisticated serite. Further, some at least of there presupy positions are survivals no longer eclevan, from an earlier state ‘ot society to which they were strictly relevant: and ii no 3 prising tha ie should be more intersting and more fruitful (0 onsider these in their proper context, for only in this way can they be fully understood, Thus inorder to determine ss far a8 posible why Plato and Aristotle approached moral philosophy 2s they didi is necessary to examine eatirsitations, prob- Jems and solutions; for these throw considerable light which could not be derived from sny other sourceI HOMER: FREE WILL AND COMPULSION I discussing moral responsibilty it will be convenient 10 divide porsible pleas, claims that one should not be held re- sponsible, into two clases that of mistake, “T meant to do tnd in fact did 2", and that of compulsion or external inter ference, ‘I war compelled to do 3 by some power or powers exterior t9 mel’. For the present purpose, mistake 8 10 be taken a including madnes, drunkenness and all smalar forms of ‘not knowing In this chapter T shall discuss the plea of compulsion a8 it appears in Homer, leaving tht of mistake wo Chapter 11. This plea may become relevant xt more than one level in the poems; for the Homeric world contains not only human beings inter- fering with one anothe’s designs, but alto active and Guarzel some gods, and moira,* which seems somelimes to co-operate ‘with, snd tometimes to thwart, chose gods, and like them to interfere with human actions, The effet of all dhese forms of compulsion must be considered. ‘The compulsion of other human beings clearly gives rise to valid defence. Even in the promiscuous slaughter inthe Hall, ff Odysseus, Phemius the minstrel pleads, and says that Tel ‘machus vill confirm, that he did not come of his own free will Ain, to sing atthe suitors feasts; the suitors were more humerous, and stronger than he, and they compelled him by force.' True, Phemivs prefaces bis plea with a reminder that good minstrels are hard to come by, and that Odysveus will eget it ihe ils him, but isos guilds, anata, chat Tele Sem > osuay xi 5 HOMER: FREE WILL AND COMPULSION x rachis defends him: and Odysseus does not bill him. Again, in the Mad,» at a critical moment in the bat, Porson threatens that any man who ceascs from fighting Aetow will ‘become foe forthe dag, Helon is clearly significant. Utered in 2 threat, it must exclude fom the threat anyone who ceases from fighting akan: and in this context clon must mean ‘a6 a result of forecs beyond his contra’, presumably as a result of Deing wounded. Tn the Homeric poem then, i scems that a man isnot held responsible for actions which he performs, or fails to perform, ‘lain the sense of “under compulsion’, tall events when that ‘compulsion i exercited by other human beings. Thi struc in uch case ar thee: but, as will be shown below! there are SGreumstances in which no defence ie acepted (i) The Nate of the Homer Gods We may now conser the satus of actions controlled or influenced on the nonchuman level; and as preface 0 this i ray be said that if any society believes that all human actions are controlled by the gods in such a manner that no man ean _Mfct the predetermined coure of events in any way, iti to be expected that this belief will not afectascriptions of moral responsibility in that society: for no society ean accept as valid any plea which would exempt from punishment all wrong - fctlons without exception. Itt clearly imposible for a society fot to punish any offenecs at all; and equally cleasly such & belief cannot be used to distinguish one action from another, Since all are affeted. The adoption ofa belie in psychological feterminiem might lead to.a change in the maner of pumishe rent, since the eause of action i "within each"; but this docs ‘ot apply to theistic determinism. ‘Ata sight it might appear that Homer held chat all events in the work! of men are supernaturally determined.* Both poets sem to assert this in thelr opening line" In the Mad I is said chat through the wrath of Achilles the plan of Zeus ‘was fallled; and the return of Odysseus came about when the Sisk aah, ah Ma 55 Obs 7 ad of‘gods granted to him that he should come home to Ithaca. Bach ‘work, then, scms to be set by the poet ina framework of divine Planning, Further, within the poems, characters are able 40 rake forecasts of whole stretches of action: Zeus is able to predict the ation up to and including the death of Patrocus, find Tiresias to prophesy the course of Odysseus future tal, for which purpate indeed he is called up from the dead. If Zeus, or any other non-human power, controls all human, actions, judgements of mara responsibility, as has been said, are likely to remain unaffected. But no reading of the poems, however canta, ives the impreson that the Homeric Zeus, however favoured his postion, i omnipotent in the sense dn ‘which a modern reader understande the word, To go no further than the haf line of the iad mentioned above: the plan of Zeus wos fale’ in that the wrath of Achilles caused great ‘woe to the Grecia; and Zeus hampered the Greeks with the texprest purpore of causing this woe: but ici not presented by Homer as a divine masterplan laid up in heaven bore Agae smemoon angered Achilles by taking his prize Briss ftom him. Zeus resolves to hamper the Grecks because Achilles’ mother, the sea-nymph Thetis, aka him to do so on Achilles” behalf and Achilles tells Thetis to reinforce her pleas by reminding ‘Zeus of the tne when she helped him againss the other gods, ‘who would have fettered him, had she not roused the hundred hhanded Brisreut (9 help hie” In neither instance docs Zeus Appear ae an omnipotent governor ofthe universe. ‘The episode of Briaren ie clealy a very primitive tale; but the plainet statement of Zeus" powers, which oecurs at the Deginning of led vi, only serves to confirm that those powers are limited, Zeus threstent that he will smite or cast into ‘Tantarue any god or goddess who sists either Trojans oF Greeks, Then that god will realize the extent to which Zeus i the most powerful f the gods The proof this: if Zeus were tosurpend a golden chain feom the heavens, even ifall the gods and goddess were to pull with all their might, they eould not pill Zeus from Heaven; whereas, ifhe wished, he could draw up farth and sea a well. Te may be sad that the poet, with the Inadequate concepts at his csposal, is trying’ t assert the Leh 7 Ob. 0 ms HOMER; PREE WILL AND COMPULSION 1g omnipotence of Zeus; but we are concerned here with the ‘fleets of the belief which he is able to form with these ine “idequate concepts: and these are far different ffom those ofa ‘Dhilosophieal bei in omnipotence, The other gods are not mere limbs or tools of Zeus, as they would be, were he Fully ‘omnipotent; they want to go down to help the side they favour; they eoold go down to help, in th sense that their wills are not bound; they are simply afraid of Zeus, and were his attention dliverted, ar Hern’ deception of Zeus in Iliad xiv shows to be ‘posible; they would go down to help, Zeus has no perlections: fre merely posses the qualities he does possess in a superlative degree. ‘This point i expresed forcibly by Poscidon,* when Zeus claims superiority both as fint born and as stronger god? “Zeus shold remember that he i only one of Crom’ sons; that ‘Zeus, Poidon, and Hades cat los each receiving a sphere— earth se, and nether world-in which he was to rule: and that » in attempting to curb Poseidon he is overstepping the mark, ‘This a serious Limitation of Zeus’ powers. Ia Homeric bei however, Possidon and Hades have suffered from the encroach iments of Zeus: only Zeus can promote his plans from 3 dis tance, and only Zeus plans, However his attention may be Gistracted in the meantime, tiumpl i the en. Ie the chief ofthe gods, being most powerful but not omni- ‘potent, i imited, much more so are the leer god. They can Only aifect the course of a battle if they are there in person; fnd even when they are there, they may fail to notice vital facts, Te line ‘and some hero} would have perished, had not (his proteeting god) noticed” frequent.» When not present, theee gods may readily be deceived: the other gods decide t0 bring Odysseus lime at a time when Poreidon, being far away mong the Ethiopian, will not know anything about its "The Homeric gods, then, make isolated irruptions into human affair; not all human actions are eased in whole or in part, by them. (i) The fit ofthe Homeric Bel Tm chose circumstances we should expect those eases in which the Homeric gods are operative as external causes to be treated Mad 189 eg. la. ge Bre of Za ii g014 HOMER: FREE WILL AND COMPULSION difereuly from cases in which they are not operative, particu: larly as the characters themtelves Belive that one rey dive tinguish empirically between a state of affairs which is cused by some god, and an otherwite similar state ofalluts wich i not so caused, So Nestor suggest to Agamemnon’ tactical arrangements by means of which he may discover whether is failure to take Troy is the consequence o's divine deere or of his men’s cowardice and ignorance of war. Either may be the cause; but for the later the gods are not responsible. Even ‘when the gods are expres said to ‘put might (ot feat) int! 4 man, he remains responsible for his actions Presumably if despite all efforts, he fil to attain his end, the Homeric hero assumes that the gods are aot propitious ‘but no matter what may happen, he must not relax his efforts Tn liad xii Ldomeneus attempts to excuse the present failure of the Greeks: no man can be the cause, ci since all are skilled warsios, and none has diaplayed fear or hesitation. No; it must be the will of Zeus that the Greeks should perish n= ‘loriosy far fom home. To this Poseidon makes the reply already discussed that anyone who ceases to ight of his wa accord will become fod forthe dogs. The tide against them ‘ut a man must keep swimming while he has the strength." ‘Thus the general influence of Zeus on a train of evens is not treated a8 an excuse for failure No fighting nation could allow such an excuse—in life; fort supplies nothing but justifiation| for cowardice Certain transactions between other gods and mortals, how ‘ver, are diferenly weated, In Homeric bei, as has been sid, ‘only’ Zeus can promote his plans fom a distance. The lester gods must be present in person: and accordingly they go down, from time to time into the battle to help their particular favourites and hamper their opponents. The combination of god and hero is formidable; and evidently anyone who is defeated by it may offer this Fact ae an excuse, or 28a attempt to lesen the glory of his human antagonist, So, in iad xvi Apollo comes down to help Hector, and knocks off Patrochue hhelmet, dazing him to auch an extent at to make hitman easy prey. Then, says the poet, Zeus granted Hector possesion of LiMfdaenem vice Cop a Noey, tal om HOMER: FREE WILL AND COMPULSION 5 the helmet; and subsequently Euphorbus asisted Hector by’ striking Patroctus in the back with a spear. The dying Patro- cl se ‘Well may you bat ove, Hector for Zeus and Apia have given your victory, and have easly overcome me Left to himself he could kil «wenty men ike Hector. ‘But baneful mir and Apollo have klled ne, and of tort men uphorbus: you are merely the third who hae shar iy death, ‘But death and mighty mate are near you; you wil perish at he hd of Achilles, This pasage shows the difference, fom the point of view of| responsibilty, between Zen general influence on the battle, and Apollo's particular interference, Zeus granted possesion of Patrochus’ helmet to Hector, and Zeus, at well ax Apolo, gave Hector vietory. Bue when Patrocus calculates the number of his opponents, only Apollo i mentioned: the infence of Zeus i ‘uietly forgotten, (That mere and Apollo, a8 x evdent fom the Arithmetic, only count as one agent, i interesting at the die cussion of moira will show, only Apollo's influence here affect the question of responsibility.) Evidendly Apollo's presence lessens the disgrace of Patrocis’ defeat; and fo lesen this, 28 will appear, is of the utmost importance. ‘When interfering in person, the lewer gods naturally cause the defeat, not the moral errr, of thore with whom they inter fere;* and defeat so caused is evaluated quite diferently from defeat resulting from the influence of Zens The reason. for this dlference seems clear. Patrocls’ defence docs not raise any problems for a fighting nation, for it i not drwwa from life In an actual battle a Patrocis could not know, even if he believed such a thing posible, that Apollo was opposing hiza in person, and hence could not offer such a defence, Only the fmniscient epie poet can allow him to know that Apollo present; whereas anyone in Tdomencus’ position might always pat forward Idomeneus defence. Literature may admit what ‘would be inadmissible in lif We must not suppose that any distinction between ‘Lif? and “Literature? was ia Homer’ minds itis merely that in some passages, describing events which only poet could claim (0 seme or * Op Made obFinow, he has more opportunity for re composition than when Jin denerbing evens ot ind with which all men are fama ‘Recording, nce tne dtinction i not comacouay made, there SGeGpelie danger that Literatar wl infect ‘Lit a seems to'have happened wien Pare ny to Helen in Tad it ‘Wort de not tut se, On this ozasion Mena has de fete th Atenas, boom anor ocasion Tal dest i for we to have our god “Tis defence ders fom that fed by Idomeneas and re Fries ty Poseidon, and resembles the defence of Patch Smo athe rene not gover parte a nc epece however tisenitely dierent the poet allowing Furs ofera dence which motto’ the sense in which Pll diene tr Athens hatin fact ten no diet Pain'Far dacomfitare she dd not intro in his stugee Gi Anco in any way whats coding, ari Trerey Woking fora extunaa aman might i Teal “Tie hs bon comtainated by “Literature Godt may alo ineriseprycholgiealy with individual Hance ty npie tem wih nil lou or ity {Tab nterrenc w neve lowed o afc the her's response Silty or actions. A poe of Id ni indicates he Feason Eiri The Trojans would have ured a reverse iad ot Zeus rues on Sapna the Grek, ke 2 ton agen ces Ate iil, the passage ett tho ‘Su id opi hme urge Sarpedon sh agit he wal nd breath he atest he caus chan, trough »“sommon-sense cseesinen’ of ‘pe fequest in Homes, ino lager pursued beyond Sa ‘BBs dr and actions to which man impelled by Bi Thane ate pons actions? "Tu though is ge inter only spasmodic in hams aie, Women sey doer not normally allow plex of Shane inererence nla the divine agent present ina orm CaaS, in Homer eyes vst hit nteeence a dierence Mei BST ind fom tna of human agent nthe same adh ats ae situation; andthe passages in which this is found smell of Literature, not Life and are excuses for fle, not moral (@) The Nate of the Begg In addition to thee belief in the gods, Homer's characters believe in a power Yefered to as ‘mat’ (and by a number of ther terms, ass, mors, &c, which behave, for the present ppurpot, in the same manner 3s mira) in which there seems to be some measure of inevitability. ‘The extent ofthis power and its relation to gode and men evidently may affect the question | of moral esponsibility ‘The clearest asertion that ‘Pate in Homer is something ‘over against and superior tothe god occurs at the beginning of ‘iad vii Zevs, having banidhed the other gods fom the feld| ‘of bate, takes up his golden scales and places in them two fates, fe, of deat, one fr the Trojans and one for the Greeks; and the “ated day” of the Gredls sinks down. The scales are something ditint from Zeary the weight of the kre is ine dependent of Zeus, for otherwise there would be no point in weighing them: and ao there apparently exiss a poster over Which Zeus has no contrl, and to which he bows.10 We need fot, however, assume more than is said. The ‘ites’ are ‘tes of dleath’, not “ates in general: point which is made clearer in the Ody.» Athena, to hearten Telemachus, wha has sui that Ihe does not believe that Odysseus could now return home even | swith the help ofthe gods, asures him thata go, ihe wished to 4o 30, could bring home a man even from far away; but she ‘admis, witha side glance atthe unhappy fate of Azamemnen, that the gods themselves canaot Keep death even fom thelr fiends when the moira of death comes upon them. Death, then, seems to be peculiar in being out of the control of the gods. Tt is eany to sce why such a working philosophy thould be adopted. While thee i life thee is hope, and even the humblest may rise fom hie misery. Accordingly, while there i life it is possible that the gods may help: there is no reaton to sappote that they cannot dos, for Homer maathas ot the requisite bli, wether about nate, mankind, or the gods, to produce any af the common frm of determin. Daathy howe eal; over death the gods cam have no con Ul, sace even ngs, whom the gods mus lve, since they prosper, dey and may die at miserably ae Agememnon died Fence ther must be something which can override the gods, something which cannot be prope Th git ata Duh hr no eto 6 mp Tom these passages that he sphere of mre exend further Ta cea, other pasiages make clea that such the case In the Osh," when Polyiemas has been blinded by Ody seus, he pray in pain and rage to it father Poxidon that Giiyeeus may never reach home: But if be moira for him to se hi frends again and come to hi home an his naive land, ay he come hose late aad in srry plight. ‘This pastoge ilutrates the nature of the belief in moira, 1 Polyphemus can pray in these terms, he must believe chat even | iit ts mara for Odysseus to return, i need not be mars for him to return at a particlar time or ina particular condition. Suppere om the other hand itis not the moira of Odysseus that he should return home eaely: leary, Polyphemss i praying to Porcidom at all he docs not believe that it must therfore be the | moira of Odyeres that something else definite should happen to fim; that, for example, he should perish miserably ina ship- ‘wovek, If his homecoming it wot guaranteed, then Poseidon has 2 free hand; but unless Poseidon usea his opportunity, Odysseus ‘may reach home all the same Tn fact the situation ie what Polyphems fears: when Poseidon fret notices Odyseeue after the gods have commanded his home- ‘coming, he ie already near Phaeacia," where i is cise for him to expe the great doom of sorrow which in hie Bue all Tthiek I shal pencute him wn ar had his fll of wee, ‘1eor when—Odysscus reaches Phacaca, ici ose that he i safe, That i determined ; but when Odysseus is to exch Phaea> ia isnot determined. So Poseidon, having fee hand in the 1 oi 20 6p v2 Ov ABH a 64 HOMER: FREE WILL AND COMPULSION tg inate, ates a sora and wrecks Odysteu ris and even thong ti that Odes safe where rashes Phase, Lcwcthes hs to ive hin 2 ebuoy to preven his owning onthe wa veld unde the influence of mia, ait 89 mich like» piece of clckrk sit ikea game of clea saes tnd latrs. Mt anoves ae fe; but Should one slight the iso fone ow parla adder, rat the head a nc own Pros sake he next move s dtm ‘Thr sen clearcut enough but there anor group of page which deer noes. Heto, ting ht leave of ndromache? sys tat noone cam Hl him unit be ie But tll you tat no one, brave man or coma scapes mite wie ont be bo ‘This, for a man who belo in Danny, isan impeceable statement But in Tid rt eth Hector should be ile yet Zeum propre ong he god that notwitanding this Hector ie shall besaveds Aten replies’ athe Zeus, what a thing to ay Wl you sath om death oral a, ng jes fs? Do the wether ge wal soap $0 Zeus ca, it seems overt Fate, and save Hector, though Hector doce wo death bt it share hing fh 0 Goo Similar men may ovemet Fie ort may be eared that ‘hey wl do. When Zo, lind send he lee god back into the bate to help hom hey wil, he doesn fear that Aces may sack the Trojan wel though i nt moar fr him to-do s, apr morn and Inter inthe sme book Psion reaeues Aeneas Som danger lot Zs shold be sary iF Achille lle him, since in Aca’ destiny to cape? ‘To thee may be aed a panage fom Ody Zen com plas ofthe sccomtioon wich en bring agaist the god “heyy ha work, ome om Shey thence er pan pr bene of to oie Aegis, he contnoes, wooed Chtemnesea and dew Agae ‘erion ier muon, There wat 0 need for it to do Govan » Medi “Bats vt 1 fer ied! iat Oba afact Herve was et from heave to tell him not todos, Yet Ihe did i-iaper moron “The lat example i clearly atheodicy. Someone has sd that evils come to men through the ageney ofthe gods intending ‘hereby to avid responsi for hi actions, Te wl be die ciszedbelow* whether this plea i allowed in Homers hee it ‘nay be noted that this solution tothe problem of ell nay be flee without ie appearing to gia ‘The other passages are est explained by he nature ofthe pars of the poom in which they occur ‘Ths lines are all Spoken by gods: which isto sy that Gy are drawn from the Poet's imagination, not from if. In Ife, one docs ot know What ones fe maybe, and 20 cannot reasonably ela to be ting in despite of is ony the poct who i prvleged to see sword fom more han one love fre has crested tT iy 2 bale in mar serves no purpose at all ules what mare ‘oust happen. This then, iv more Literature’ This Literatare, however x help Iti if what is mina smut happen, so ar as individual evens are coneeredy the ‘modern reader i tempted to lend tthe word ideas ran ffom centuries of pilope reatoning on determinism. 1 ‘vient fom what hs already been said that such ides are not felevanc here; ut ie snot Yet lear what Wess are relevant Tae pangs of terre que ove help 0 nae th lar, for they indiente the relationship. of thie apparent specialized we of mave w other uses. = ‘A welltablithed tse ofa that inthe sate of ‘har’ ih no metaphyseal overtones.” Even when personified, th rai may be imply sharers inthe Hae" ‘Theme! gave neering pe oa. ‘They gave an enduring sprit to man a his ‘share’ or ‘allot- meat’. Wemay consider too the frequently exprested commenda- tion ‘jou have spoken fatz mein” This we must trazslate ‘you have spoken asi right, for ‘you have spoken according {© your share’ means nothing: but 'as is ight cannot indie cate the extct favour of moire, "You have spoken with due ‘reference othe prewnt situation andar to your place in society “Tilia qoicp Acca, ie 39 ee Jsimplied; and here we have nota ‘must but an ‘ought. It has already been said that Homeric belie do not warrant any Theory of detersinisn: Homerie man knows nothing ofa “lock- ‘work universe ot an omnipotent god. Accordingly, the favour (of moira cannot be draven from any such source. The only tystem which i foreed upon the notice of Homeric nan isthe foelal system, in which he has an appointed place, an allotted fue, according to which he ayght to comport himself, and ‘whore burdens he must bea. He has been allotted a staton in| Iie to which in a tense he mont keep (for a beggar cannot ‘Become a king, particularly in Homeric society) though he may behave in manner out of tune with i, Since dis the nly system Homeric man knows, he cannot contrast it with “any offer, or draw concepts fom any other. Accordingly, this is the nearest approach to inevitability which meire ean posses for him, when viewed asa system, This the manner in which ‘Zeus inay be presumed toe it He knows what is mora for each Iman and what i nota statement which, of course, does not imply that everything which happens to a man is subject to nvint—and hence what Ss to" happen to him: but since Ie only sto" happen to him in the sense that itis his share, Zeus, when treated ava character in an epic, need not let it happen. Just, {sin an earthly council one may ot may not speak ot act kata toiran, £9 in the Grand Counell of Heaven. In both cases it is shamefal not to speak or acti such a manner: but in both ‘canes it clearly posable ‘The human agen finds himself in a different postion in tif. I is clearly inevitable that he should die some days if any- thing infact happens to him, twas cleasly his oe thac it was to! Bappen to him; and given this belief, any individual event fnvisaged beforehand may be his “lot. He is, however, only likely to regard as hie Tot” events which seem important to ‘im for there fs nothing in these beliefs to encourage the human agent to construct sytem to apply overtly to all actions and rents; sd such a system could not be a rigidly deterministic fone, for Homeric man has not the concepts with which to ‘onstract such a system 'T, however, the human agent considers any individual event ‘to be his mara, he must, at has been sid, regard it as inevitable. * guy = 158But this ‘share’ may involve very much o wery lite t may be his death; his death at the hand of @ particular person; the assurance that something will bippen, with no guarantee how or when it will happens the promive that if he performs some definite action, something ele will happen; or any other ine dividual sake or ladder. But these are jndvidual: there is 00 feeling ofa system, (i) The fies of the Bai Since moizais not concerned with all human actions, we right expect those with which mare is concemmed to receive special treatment. Ths, however, i not normal Homer prac tice, Death is the clas instance of an event which, in dating tion fom the generality of actions and events is always subject to moira; but there is no feling at all that, since moira i the ‘extemal eauseof every death, the reponsibilty of any human agent for that death iin any’ way diminished, logical ws this ‘may be in theory, it is precisely what is to’ be expected in practice: it seems inconceivable that any eocety should make zo distnetion between death ftom nataral eases and homicide of every kind. Again, when a general prophecy covering & long series of events, such as Zeus" prophecy of the crucial ‘events up to the death of Patocka ir utered, the experiences related must surely be the mira ofthe persons mentioned in the prophecy; but this in no way affects the treatment of these tvents on the human level as regards responsibilty, The events ate simply described on two levels which do not intersect, ‘To treat a series of events in this manner tems quite natural in practice; but when a single event is emphatically stated to be subject to mara, we might expecta diffrent attitude. Homer's treatment of the adultery of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra proves the contrary. Agamemnon had let a minstrel behind to protect and watch his wife Clytemnestra; and Clytemnestra a¢ fist ‘would not accept Aegsthus asa lover, forthe was a virtuous But when dhe muita of the god feteed er (hm) so that she he) was overcome, den Aesth tol the tinsel to a deserted ‘Mand and left hi thee to became the prey of binds, Whereupon ‘cn fore, Baton wich has no fle in paces"? #6 HOMER: FREE WILL AND COMPULSION 3 ths of his own free will wok Clytemnestea of her own free > hes own hoe Unfortunately, the fst line of this quotation eontains a very ‘aque pronoun.» This could in theory refer to any ofthe three: but the general nun of the passage confines the choice to CClytemnestra of (less probably) Aegisthus.© In either case, nora said to cause an action which » mere Once line later [auld to be performed voluntarily by the agent. ‘This seem very odd indeed; and the passage indicates the reason forthe other oddities which have been notied already Some of the earlier parages mentionel state merely that it someone's mire that something should happen to itm: a state- ‘nent which might permit the (rather sophie) argument that {ohave anything alloted to one ax one's share doesnot cause is tccurrence, and chat Homer, unspilt by philosophy, realized this, T have said that this i true from the point of view of Zeus. Tis not, however, true forthe human agent: and here i eould not be stated more strongly that moa caused the event Yet the characters ail act “of thelr own ffee will, for the incom patibility of the two statements docs not occur to the poet ‘Common-rense carelessness aguin preserves individual respons- bility. Toy on ommonaente caren i ange, Thre is alway teva tha someone may seat who lec than flloyss and the pica fhe language commonly toed in Home of gdh and mie alike woul, Hf drawn out Fini a dence vad in pactally say station, One i Stance was owed aboyey but the poems contain one Dassge ‘hich much more sigieane ‘When Fle foc ashamed on meting Priam, to whom her proencein'Toy has caused sch woe, Beam execs hee fr Feponbity forthe wan saying "You are nc the cm i ny ee the gare si who haved op nite the wos wa wih the Gree * alge Sa. Hor ee, inte