“THE NDEBELE-SHONA RELATIONS WERE IN THE 19TH CENTURY FAR FROM

CORDIAL.” DISCUSS
Shone and Ndebele oral traditions as well as history textbooks abound with details of conflict
between the Ndebele and Shona. Every decade from the time of the Ndebele advent right up to
European colonization is full of stories of wars and Ndebele raids all of which paint a picture of
endemic strife and therefore far from cordial inter-ethnic relationships. While all this was
happening, the Ndebele still found time to trade, to form military alliances and cross-cultural
exchange with the Shona. All that could not have been possible if the atmosphere had been
completely poisoned by inter-ethnic strife as explicitly stated in the essay topic. This essay will
review Ndebele-Shona relations and attempt to demonstrate that the relations were in fact much
more complex and cannot be categorized in such simplistic terms.
Evidence of constant wars between the Ndebele and the Shona on one hand suggests far from
friendly relations between the two in the nineteenth century. During the 1850s the Ndebele under
Mzilikazi fought and defeated the Rozvi under Mambo Chirisamhuru. Consequently the Ndebele
usurped the Rozvi’s role of overlords of the Kalanga and other Shona groups in the western and
southern parts of Zimbabwe.
During the 1860s the Ndebele carried their war policy to north-western Shona groups such as the
Ngezi in the Rimuka area leading to the flight of the Mashayamombe and Chivero rulers. Even
Tohwechipi the son of the slain Mambo Chirisamhuru had to seek refuge in the Eastern Highlands.
There was no letting up during the 1870s when the Ndebele raided across a 70 kilometre radius
from the western Duma on the Mutirikwi and Popoteke confluences right up to the upper
Popoteke River. In the 1890s, Chivi, Gutu, Mupfure and Chishawasha all incurred the wrath of
Lobengula’s Ndebele. Tensions were also sufficiently high during the early days of European
settler occupation for Lobengula to send troops to punish Gomala’s people in present day
Masvingo. These Shona people had allegedly used Ndebele cattle to pay a fine to the settler
administration. Looked from a different perspective, those wars may be taken as evidence of
intermittent quarrels between two basically friendly ethnic groups. There is evidence of trade
conducted by the two groups and even military alliances. All of these could only thrive in
basically peaceful and friendly conditions. The Shona traded their grain and other agricultural
produce for Ndebele cattle. Relations were sufficiently friendly for both Mzilikazi and Lobengula
to entrust some Shona groups with their cattle. These Shona were accorded the right to milk the
cattle and even slaughter them for meat. This explains why Gomala’s Shona people in Masvingo
had Ndebele cattle which they subsequently expropriated to pay a fine after cutting European
telegraph wires. Trade was conducted with the Rozvi of the Mwanesi to the Munyati regions too.
The wars fought were never permanent and did not prevent reconciliation or co-operation. This
explains why Tohwechipi who had fled to the Eastern Highlands in the early 1850s could be
persuaded to come back and assume his position among his people with Ndebele assistance.
Important Rozvi families such as the Mutinhima, Svabasi and Lukuluba houses certainly co-
operated with the Ndebele. The likes of Chivi and Nemakonde were all important allies of the
Ndebele and only turned against them in the 1890s after the imposition of European rule. Even
when wars were fought, the Ndebele did not fight all the Shona at once and they actually allied
with some Shona groups while fighting others. The generic term Shona is misleading as it is
implies a single, united and homogenous political entity which certainly did not exist in the
nineteenth century. There were many scattered and independent Shona groups which were as
likely to fight each other as much as they could fight the Ndebele. This explains why the Ndebele
could fight against Chirisamhuru and Tohwechipi in the early 1850s and then became
Tohwechipi’s allies before the decade was up. Chizema was also assisted by the Ndebele in his
attempts to conquer southern Buhera. This also explains why Mzilikazi had the Chaminuka
medium killed while maintaining good relations with other Shona mediums such as Nyamuswa,
Wanewawa and Chikono. According to D.N. Beach, Mzilikazi even paid tribute to these mediums.
Furthermore, evidence of cultural exchange belies claims of frosty relations. The Ndebele
assimilated or incorporated Shona people into their society to the extent that the amaHole caste
became the largest within the Ndebele caste system. Although prejudice existed it was not a totally
bleak scenario as this caste could also provide chiefs and also enjoyed the same state protection
accorded the Zansi and Enhla. If assimilation was forced on amaHole, it certainly was not forced
on the Mutevaidzi of Mberengwa who voluntarily adopted the Ndebele language, forged alliances
with the Ndebele and even copied Nguni practices such as ear piercing. For their part, the Ndebele
adopted some of the Shona religious practices including the shrine at Matopos (Njelele).
Historians such as Ranger have asserted that the cult priests of Njelele had sufficient authority
among the Ndebele to organize resistance to European rule in 1896.
The final perhaps more accurate picture of the nineteenth century Ndebele-Shona relations is a
complex one where trade, alliances, cross-cultural exchanges all interchanged with wars. Given
this scenario, it would be a gross distortion to present Ndebele-Shona relations as frosty for that
was only one facet to a multi-dimensional story. Finally it ought to be remembered that the Shona
consisted of many groups that were independent of each other hence it frequently happened that
one group enjoyed a cordial relationship while another was at war with the Ndebele.
“THEY PAVED WAY FOR THE BRITISH COLONISATION OF ZIMBABWE.” HOW FAR
DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS COMMENT ON THE ROLES OF MISSIONARIES, HUNTERS
AND TRADERS IN 19TH CENTURY ZIMBABWE?
Commenting on colonialism, Tewodros II a nineteenth century Ethiopian emperor said that “I
know their game. First it’s traders and missionaries. Then it’s ambassadors. After that, they
bring the guns.” His sentiments would be echoed by Jomo Kenyatta who also pointed out the
close connection between the bible of the missionaries and the flag of imperialism. The
colonisation of Zimbabwe was no exception and this essay shall demonstrate that to a large extent
it followed the classic pattern of missionary, hunter and trader activity before the imperial power
came in.
British-born missionaries were first onto the nineteenth century Zimbabwean scene and not
surprisingly British imperialism followed. Robert Moffat was permitted by Mzilikazi to set up the
first mission station at Inyathi in 1859. Little did Mzilikazi and Lobengula know that Moffat and
his son John would be sending out treacherous reports regarding the Ndebele as a “miserable
people” and “it will be a blessing to the world when they are broken up.”
John Moffat went beyond mere rhetoric and rendered practical assistance to the cause of
colonialism by entering the paid service of Cecil Rhodes and negotiating treaties which laid the
basis of colonialism. To this end, he fully exploited old ‘family ties’ with Ndebele royalty and
got Lobengula to assent to the Moffat Treaty and Rudd Concession both in 1888. The first
circumscribed Lobengula’s power in foreign policy issues while the second gave Rhodes’
agents complete mineral rights and full powers to procure them in Lobengula’s territory. It was
on the basis of the Rudd Concession that the British government granted Rhodes a charter for the
colonisation of Zimbabwe. Considering the fact that Lobengula virtually surrendered his territory
and independence for negligible returns, it is most likely that he was misinformed with (Moffat’s
connivance) as to the actual written terms of those treaties.
Lobengula followed Mzilikazi’s example and permitted the London Missionary Society (L.M.S)
to open a second mission under Charles Helm at Hope Fountain in 1870 and that too was a
mistake which paved the way for colonialism. Like the Moffats, Helm was firmly convinced that
no substantial conversion of the Ndebele to Christianity was possible without the undermining of
Lobengula’s power and the destruction of the Ndebele traditional structure. Just like John
Moffat, Helm abused the trust Lobengula had in him by potraying Rhodes as a trustworthy and
reliable man. Helm persuaded Lobengula to sign the Rudd Concession on which the colonisation
of Zimbabwe was based.
The desire to colonise Zimbabwe was also touched off by the glowing and times exaggerated
reports that the country abounded with mineral wealth and natural resources and these can be
attributed to hunters and traders who visited the country. Thomas Baines was one such trader-
prospector-cum artist and he was given a concession by Lobengula to exploit gold reserves but
failed owing to lack of capital. His legacy mainly lies in the vivid but highly romantic paintings
that potrayed a land awash with elephants and other natural resources only waiting for Europeans
to exploit.
Traders such as George Westbeech and Karl Mauch spread rumours about the abundance of gold
leading to suggestions that there could actually be a ‘second rand’ in Zimbabwe. Mauch was
even granted the Tati Concession in 1870 and this was bought from him by Cecil Rhodes in his
relentless drive towards colonizing Zimbabwe. Leask, Fairbairn, Philips and Tainton were some of
the traders at Lobengula’s court prior to the Rudd Concession and they aided colonialism by
selling their own concessions to Rhodes and persuaded Lobengula to sign with Rudd
Lobengula’s tactics of playing off one group of Europeans against the others therefore, came to
nothing as Rhodes’ financial muscle not only enabled him to buy concessions from his rivals, it
also enabled him to get them to work for him in persuading Lobengula to deal with him. This was
true of the traders and the missionaries and it was equally true of the hunters too.
Hunters like Henry Hartley and Frederick Selous also played their part in advertising Zimbabwe
as a land full of minerals and big game. Hartley spoke favourably of the mineral prospectus after
discovering gold 70 miles south-west of present day Harare while Selous even cut a road between
Mashonaland and Matebeleland (Hunters’ Road) to facilitate the transportation of ivory. His
biggest contribution to colonialism was to be in the guiding of the ‘Pioneer Column’ in 1890 as
it trekked in from South Africa to assume control of Mashonaland on behalf Britain.
In the final analysis, it is evident that the colonisation of Zimbabwe owed to beliefs of abundant
economic resources and the various concessions obtained from the African rulers. It is also evident
that in all such beliefs and concessions obtained, there was the hand of missionaries, traders and
hunters.
EXPLAIN THE MOTIVE BEHIND RHODES' COLONISATION OF ZIMBABWE AND
EXAMINE THE ROLE PLAYED BY HIS AGENTS IN FACILITATING THE COLONISATION
OF THE COUNTRY.
The second half of the 19th century witnessed intense competition among the European states to
acquire colonies in Africa. Economics, strategic, prestige, supremacist and racism were some of
the key considerations that influenced the proponents of colonialism such as Cecil Rhodes. This
essay aims at discussing in detail these motives of Rhodes and also to show that his agents
employed every possible tactic including the unscrupulous to achieve their aims.
Economic considerations were a significant motive for Rhodes who was first and foremost a
businessman. The numerous reports and rumors of the possibility of an Eldorado or Second Rand
in Zimbabwe could not have failed to have an effect on a man who already had huge interests in
the gold and diamond mining industries in South Africa. Traders, hunters and prospectors such as
George Westbeech, Thomas Baines, Karl Mauch and Henry Hartley sent out reports which
exaggerated Zimbabwe's mineral wealth. Rhodes' imagination was fired up by the occassional
gold finds such as that of Tati in 1870 and by Hartley some 70 miles southwest of present day
Harare. It is therefore not a surprise that he formed the British South Africa Company (BSAC), a
commercial company to facilitate the colonisation of Zimbabwe.Neither is it a surprise that he
bought all the mineral claims from his rivals. It is also worth noting that the Rudd concession of
1888 which formed the basis for colonisation was a mineral treaty.
Like many other capitalists of his era Rhodes also envisaged a colony like Zimbabwe fulfilling a
vital socio-economic function for the imperial country. The following quotation best illustrates this
particular aim of Rhodes:
"I was in London and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches which
were just a cry for 'bread' My idea is a solution for the social problem i.e. in order to save
40million inhabitants of the UK from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesman must acquire new
lands to settle surplus population, to provide new markets for goods produced by them. I have
always maintained that the British Empire is a matter of bread and butter. If you wish to avoid
civil war then you must become an imperialist."
Rhodes was therefore motivated by the need to redress Britain’s' socio-economic problems of
poverty, unemployment, over-production and overpopulation which he regarded as a sure recipe
for social or civil strife. To his way of thinking, the solution lay in the acquisition of colonies that
would provide markets thus boosting worker incomes and also providing living space for
redundant excess population.
Rhodes was also a dreamy racist whose fervent belief in European and especially British racial
superiority convinced him that colonisation was a vehicle for spreading British culture,
Christianity and civilization. The air of the nineteenth century was highly charged with the racist
theories of Social Darwinism where Europeans made themselves out to be a superior race whose
mission was to rule and therefore advance the Africans who they consigned to the bottom rungs of
human development. Rhodes was especially inspired by John Ruskin who gave a British
interpretation to those racist-supremacist ideas. Ruskin had found in him a devoted disciple who
took literal view of his teachings about racial superiority of the British over other races especially
the Africans. He believed that British culture was the epitome of civilization and that it would be a
blessing for the world if more of it was brought under British rule. This fervent belief was aptly
captured in the following remark he made to his close friend Starr Jameson:
“Have you ever thought how lucky we are to belong to the British race, the finest flower of
civilization?”
In colonizing Zimbabwe Cecil Rhodes was evidently motivated by his fervent belief in the
supremacy of British culture and civilization and his desire to spread that same culture to the
Africans.
Rhodes had agents like the former missionary John Moffat who played an important role in
facilitating the colonisation of Zimbabwe. Moffat was trusted by the Ndebele king Lobengula as a
family friend and he used his influence to secure for Rhodes the Moffat Treaty in March 1888.
This was the treaty which laid the basis for the British colonization of Zimbabwe. It was through
this treaty that the British were able to cancel out the Grobler Treaty that Lobengula had signed
with the Boers of the Transvaal. Moffat induced Lobengula to give up his freedom of action in
foreign affairs by agreeing not to enter into any treaty with any other ruler without the knowledge
and consent of the British queen.
Another missionary-turned-agent who played a crucial role in advancing Rhodes’ plans for the
colonisation of Zimbabwe was Charles Helm. After being allowed to open the second mission
station at Hope Fountain in 1870, Helm soon gained a reputation among the Ndebele for honesty
and trustworthiness which he used to influence Lobengula to sign both the Moffat Treaty and the
Rudd Concession. He abused Lobengula’s trust in him by falsely portraying Rhodes as an
honourable and reliable man. He gave his support to the Moffat Treaty and the Rudd Concession
which became the basis for the colonisation of Zimbabwe.
Rochfort Maguire’s legal skills proved highly significant in facilitating Rhodes’ colonisation
project. Trained as a lawyer at Oxford alongside Cecil Rhodes, Maguire was ultimately
responsible for drafting the legal documents (namely the Moffat Treaty and Rudd Concession) on
which the British queen based her decision to grant Cecil Rhodes the Charter for the colonisation
of the country.
Also of great importance was the part played by Francis Thompson as a translator for Rhodes’
representatives during the negotiations for both the Moffat Treaty and Rudd Concession.
Nicknamed the “white Zulu” or “Matabele Thompson”, Francis Thompson had achieved a
considerable degree of fluency in the Zulu language which enabled him to enter Cecil Rhodes’
payroll as a translator. He took full advantage of Lobengula’s illiteracy to mislead him about the
actual contents of the Moffat Treaty and Rudd Concession. He told Lobengula that the Moffat
Treaty was a friendship treaty and the Rudd Concession was only a mineral concession to not
more than ten Europeans who would abide by Ndebele rules as they carried out their mining
operations. There was a clause in the Moffat Treaty where Lobengula supposedly gave up his
independence in foreign affairs by agreeing not to enter into any treaty with any foreign rulers
without the knowledge and consent of the British queen. Likewise, he supposedly gave the British
a blank cheque to do anything they felt necessary to procure gold and other minerals in his
kingdom. Such misinformation by Francis Thompson played a significant role in swaying
Lobengula to grant concessions that ultimately facilitated the colonisation of this country by Cecil
Rhodes.
Hunters such as Henry Hartley and Frederick Selous also played a highly significant role as paid
agents of Cecil Rhodes in facilitating the colonisation of the country. Henry Hartley played his
part in stimulating and sustaining British interest in Zimbabwe by sending out exaggerated reports
about the country’s mineral wealth. Frederick Selous began his career in Zimbabwe as a big
game hunter who earned Lobengula’s permission to cut a road linking Matabeleland and
Mashonaland (Hunters’ Road) to facilitate the transportation of ivory. Colonialists often turned
to the hunters whose intimate knowledge of the country due to their hunting operations made them
ideal guides. Frederick Selous’ biggest contribution to the colonisation of Zimbabwe was
through his role as the guide for Cecil Rhodes’ so-called Pioneer Column which trekked into the
country to colonise it in September 1890.
Traders like Leask, Fairbairn, Phillips and Tainton all played complimentary but very significant
roles too. These were just some of the many traders already at Lobengula’s court prior to the
Rudd Concession who were pressuring Lobengula for trading and land concessions. They
facilitated Rhodes’ colonisation project by selling him the concessions they had been granted by
the Ndebele king.
It can thus be concluded by re-stating that Rhodes’ motives for colonizing the country included
the desire to acquire its mineral wealth, spread British culture and civilization and also establish a
British Empire stretching from Cape to Cairo. His many agents all played a crucial role to assist
the colonisation project especially by obtaining from the African rulers the treaties on which
colonisation was based.
“HAVE YOU EVER SEEN A CHAMELEON CATCH A FLY? IT STEADILY ADVANCES
TOWARDS THE FLY AND WITHIN REACH, IT DARTS OUT ITS TONGUE AND THE FLY
DISAPPEARS. BRITAIN IS THE CHAMELEON AND I AM THE FLY.” HOW ACCURATE
IS THIS ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LOBENGULA AND THE BRITISH
BETWEEN 1880 AND 1890
THE FIRST STEP IS TO UNDERSTAND WHY LOBENGULA CHOSE THE CHAMELEON
AND FLY ANALOGY OR METAPHOR.
A chameleon is a sly creature which moves slowly as it stalks its prey. In the process it uses its
camouflage to disguise itself and its intentions.
Its slowness is very deceptive and is meant to allow it time to get into the right position.
When it has found the right moment and position, it strikes swiftly, suddenly and accurately to
destroy its unsuspecting prey.
A fly is the insect that is preyed upon. Its small stature makes it weak and vulnerable to many
other creatures.
Although it is swift and fast of movement, it often falls victim to its predators because it never
sees them coming until it is too late.
Lobengula therefore meant that Britain (the chameleon) was very sly, moved with slow calculated
steps and camouflaged its real intentions to destroy Lobengula and his kingdom.
They only revealed their true purpose when it was already too late for Lobengula to do anything to
save himself. Britain was therefore a deadly monster that preyed on smaller and weaker kingdoms
like the Ndebele.
If Britain was the deadly chameleon then Lobengula and the Ndebele was the weak, vulnerable
and doomed fly whose destruction was inevitable.
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS THEN ARISE FROM LOBENGULA’S OBSERVATIONS:
1. Was there ever a calculated British plan to destroy Lobengula’s power and turn his kingdom
into their colony?
2. If so, did the British ever hide their true intentions only to suddenly spring upon the
unsuspecting Lobengula and Ndebele?
3. Were the Ndebele and Lobengula naïve and unsuspecting victims of the British deception as
implied by the fly analogy?
4. If so or if not, were the British the only ones who took steps to destroy Lobengula’s power
and kingdom?
THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARISE FOR CONSIDERATION:
1. By 1880 there was already an assortment of British people operating in the Ndebele kingdom
pursuing different interests like the missionaries, traders, hunters and concession seekers.
2. Missionaries like Charles Helm and John Moffat were abusing Lobengula’s trust, pretending
to be friends while they were actively and secretly encouraging the British government to destroy
his kingdom and bring it under British rule.
3. Men like Henry Hartley, Thomas Baines and Frederick Selous gave Lobengula the impression
of being innocent hunters, prospectors and concession seekers yet they took an active part in the
colonisation process. Selous even acted as the guide for Britain’s invading so-called “pioneer
column” in 1890.
4. Missionaries like John Moffat and Charles Helm betrayed Lobengula by misrepresenting the
actual terms of the Moffat treaty and Rudd Concession they negotiated on behalf of Britain and
Cecil Rhodes in March and October 1888.
5. The British government played a double game with Lobengula- at first the British queen
seemed to side with Lobengula and advised him not to give “a stranger…a whole herd.” She
was referring to his negotiations with Cecil Rhodes and advising him not to give away to too
much to the British mining tycoon.
6. The queen subsequently made a u-turn by advising Lobengula to deal only with “one approved
body” and by this she meant Rhodes and his representatives.
7. The queen completed her betrayal of Lobengula by granting the charter (1889) that allowed
Rhodes’ British South Africa Company (B.S.A.C) to colonise Mashonaland on behalf of Britain.
8. The British government allowed Rhodes to assemble a 200-strong “pioneer column” backed
by a military force for the colonisation of Mashonaland that was officially accomplished on
September 12, 1890.
9. Even though there was no blueprint for the British colonisation, Britain certainly had a vague
notion of Lobengula’s kingdom and Zimbabwe as their sphere of influence. They certainly
regarded it as their gateway into the interior of Africa which had to be brought under their control
someday.
10. Besides acquiring the mineral wealth, Rhodes had definite plans about colonizing
Lobengula’s kingdom as part of his grand scheme to paint the map of Africa red with British
territories stretching from Cape to Cairo.
11. Even if in the beginning, interest in Lobengula’s kingdom came from a British individual,
Lobengula’s assessment was probably accurate because Britain’s colonial interests ultimately
followed on the work its individuals just like any other colonial power. Thus there was no reason
for Lobengula to distinguish between the earlier initiative of individuals and the subsequent
British role in destroying his kingdom.
12. Lobengula was certainly right about a British government which initially seemed to side with
him only to throw its full weight behind its agents led by Cecil Rhodes.
THE STUDENT’S RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION WILL ALSO BENEFIT FROM THE
FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:
1. There was never a concerted, clear-cut programme of action by the British to deceive
Lobengula- the changing behavior of the queen and the eventual colonisation were all due to the
changing circumstances in European relations rather than to any long-drawn out and carefully laid
out plans by the British.
2. The 1880s commenced without any specific British policy regarding Lobengula. There were
only individual initiatives that were often ignored by an uninterested British government that kept
on refusing to commit itself to any action to colonise Lobengula’s kingdom.
3. The British probably would have continued to do nothing had it not been for the Boers from the
Transvaal government of Paul Kruger who negotiated the Grobler treaty of 1887 which sought to
turn the Ndebele kingdom into a Boer dependency and colony.
4. The British seemed to be content with the situation so long as no European power tried to
colonise Lobengula’s kingdom.
5. Even when the Boers moved in to obtain the Grobler treaty, the British response came from one
individual Cecil Rhodes who did not even live in Britain. He pushed for the signing of the Moffat
treaty, Rudd concession and the eventual occupation of Mashonaland in 1890.
6. Finally it would be grossly inaccurate to view Lobengula and the Ndebele as naïve, ignorant
and unsuspecting victims of a British colonial onslaught. They were certainly well aware of the
events happening all around them where one African kingdom after the other was succumbing to
European rule. Lobengula was definitely aware of the British gaining control of the Ngwato, Lozi
and even Zulu kingdoms and he should have known that Europeans would try to gain control of
his kingdom too.
“THE PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVE OCCUPATION ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN
POWERS AT THE BERLIN CONFERENCE (1884-5) AND NOT THE RUDD CONCESSION
(1888) MADE THE OCCUPATION OF ZIMBABWE INEVITABLE.” DO YOU AGREE?
1. Before choosing to agree or disagree, it is necessary to clearly articulate the major issues
concerning the Berlin Conference and define what is meant by the principle of Effective
Occupation.
2. It is also important to clearly establish the link between Effective Occupation and the
colonisation of Zimbabwe.
3. It is also important to outline the major issues surrounding the Rudd Concession and then
establish its link with the colonisation of Zimbabwe.
4. There is also a need to define the meaning of “inevitable”.
SOME KEY ISSUES INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:
1. The Berlin Conference was convened essentially to avoid a general European war by finding
peaceful solutions to the problematic issue of the European partition of Africa that had gained
momentum from c.1876 and threatened to cause conflict among European nations
2. The main decisions of the Berlin Conference included:
- the establishment of guidelines for the future annexation of African territory
- one guideline was the establishment of “Spheres of Influence” for the major European powers
in Africa
- another was the doctrine of “Effective Occupation” which compelled a European country to
prove that it had effectively occupied an African territory before claiming it as its own
3. The doctrine of effective occupation’s main result was the acceleration of the partition of
Africa as the European countries tried to protect their spheres of influence by establishing
effective occupation prior to annexing new territory.
4. Within 20 years most African states had lost their independence and were under harsh European
rule.
5. The colonisation process was carried out in an arbitrary manner and the boundaries of the new
colonies were drawn up without any input and consideration of the Africans. The boundaries
reflected the bargaining and agreements among the European powers whose main interest was to
share Africa among them without conflict.
6. The Rudd Concession was concluded in October 1888 between Lobengula and Charles Rudd in
his capacity as Cecil Rhodes’s chief agent. Charles Rudd was assisted by Rochfort Maguire,
Charles Helm and Francis Thompson.
7. The agreement was a mineral concession which purportedly gave Rudd the exclusive right to
exploit all the minerals in Lobengula’s kingdom (taken to mean all of present-day Zimbabwe)
and the full power to do anything necessary to obtain them.
8. The Rudd Concession was the basis of Rhodes’ successful application for a Royal Charter to
colonise Zimbabwe on behalf Britain.
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE BERLIN CONFERENCE SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE
FOLLOWING ISSUES:
1. The conference laid down guidelines on the establishment of spheres of influence and the
doctrine of effective occupation. These were two important concepts in the peaceful occupation of
Africa and its partition among European powers. (Peaceful among European powers. It is
important to note that Africans were sometimes violently brought under European rule)
2. The Conference made the occupation of Zimbabwe inevitable or unavoidable as it laid down
rules for the general partition of Africa as a whole. Once there were clear guidelines for the
occupation of the entire continent it was always going to be just a matter of time before Zimbabwe
or any other part of it would be occupied by a European power.
3. The Rudd Concession which led directly to the occupation of Zimbabwe was itself a product of
the Berlin Conference’s resolution that spheres of influence and effective occupation ought to be
carried out in order to demonstrate that an African colony was indeed the possession of a
European power. Therefore the Rudd Concession cannot be divorced from the Berlin Conference
that had been held three years earlier.
4. All that the Rudd Concession did was to simply establish the identity of the European power
that would colonise Zimbabwe but the matter of the occupation had already been established as a
future and inevitable fact by the Berlin Conference.
CONCLUSIONS IN FAVOUR OF THE RUDD CONCESSION MAY INCLUDE SOME OR
ALL OF THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
1. The Rudd Concession clearly established the identity of the European power (i.e. Britain) that
would occupy Zimbabwe and it was the definite document that le directly to the granting of the
Royal Charter that facilitated the occupation of Zimbabwe in 1890
2. On the other hand the Berlin Conference simply established the possibility or probability of the
colonisation of Zimbabwe or any other African territory at some future date but it did not make
that a definite and inescapable fact.
3. The argument in favour of the Berlin Conference is further weakened by the fact that Ethiopia
was never colonised as would have been the case if the Conference had made it an unavoidable
fact that all of Africa would be occupied.
4. In any case the Berlin Conference did not even lead to a scramble to occupy Zimbabwe- for
three years after the Conference there was no significant interest until 1887 when Paul Kruger’s
Transvaal state showed its interest by negotiating the Grobler Treaty. This was a local state which
was ruled by whites from the African rather than the European continent. It was only then that
individuals of British origin (i.e. Cecil Rhodes) made definite steps to occupy Zimbabwe via the
Rudd Concession.
“THE DESIRE TO ENCIRCLE THE TRANSVAAL PLAYED A PIVOTAL ROLE IN THE
COLONISATION OF ZIMBABWE.”DISCUSS
1. The question requires a knowledge of the factors that led to the colonisation of Zimbabwe and
these include the desire by Cecil Rhodes (and the British government ) to encircle the Transvaal
government in order to prevent it from extending its rule further north into the interior of the
continent
2. The next step would be to situate the issue of the Transvaal and weigh it against other factors in
order to show whether it was the more or less important factor in the colonisation of Zimbabwe
3. The colonisation of Zimbabwe should be seen as the outcome of Rhodes and the British
government’s struggle with the Transvaal government. The British government colonised
Zimbabwe to prevent the Transvaal from colonizing it and spreading its power northwards. The
Transvaal had to be contained because the alternative would have been that the British Cape
Colony in the south would be cut off from British colonies further north in Africa
4. It was a race that pitted the British against the Transvaal to dominate the interior of Africa and
whoever would be first to colonise Zimbabwe would encircle the other.
5. The British were envious of the Transvaal’s vast mineral wealth(diamonds and gold) and they
hoped to gain control of it by encircling and isolating the Transvaal
6. The timing of the British colonisation in 1888 came after the Transvaal’s moves to colonise
Zimbabwe in 1887 as evidenced by the Grobler Treaty. This clearly suggested a British desire to
encircle the Transvaal.
OTHER IMPORTANT REASONS FOR COLONIZING ZIMBABWE APART FROM THE
DESIRE TO ENCIRCLE THE TRANSVAAL INCLUDE:
1. The mistaken belief that Zimbabwe was the home of vast gold deposits (a second rand) much
greater than those found in the Transvaal
2. Zimbabwe was also occupied because it was strategic to Cecil Rhodes’ grand vision of
creating an unbroken chain of British colonies stretching from Cape to Cairo
3. It was also occupied in response to the missionaries’ long standing calls to crush the Ndebele
power and facilitate the spread of Christianity which had failed to make headway despite the
opening of the Inyathi and Hope Fountain mission stations in 1859 and 1870
4. It was occupied in response to the prevailing European world outlook which was colonialist.
Territorial expansion added to the power and prestige of the European countries