3. DIOGENES LAERTIUS 7.

38-83: THE PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY

The textual base for any analysis of the Stoic division and exposition
of philosophy must be Diogenes Laertius. He is the only extensive source
on the subject, and he is reasonably faithful to his sources. It is only to be
regretted that these sources, so well preserved and so reliably reported,
are so third rate.
Diogenes Laertius includes within his L i f e of Zeno of Citium (DL
7.1-168) some haeresiographical accounts of Stoic philosophy (DL 7.38-160).
One of these accounts reports apparent internal debates over the nature
of the division and exposition of philosophy (DL 7.38-43), and this is
followed by expositions of logic (DL 7.43-83), ethics (DL 7.84-131) and
physics (DL 7.132-59).
DL 7.38-83 provides our best evidence for the Stoic division and
exposition of philosophy. The first part of his account, DL 7.38-43, purports
to deal with Stoic differences on the subject of division and exposition
(§3.1-§3.2.1), while the longer second part, DL 7.41-83, gives us the chance
to compare two different expositions of logic, one of the three major parts
of philosophy (§3.2.2). The comparison allows us to reconstruct to some
extent the development of Stoic views on the subject of the division and
exposition of logic (in particular, dialectic), as the original expositions
from which these accounts derive are demonstrably from different periods,
with one drawing in part from the other (§3.2.3-4).1
Diogenes' summary account of the differences between Stoic
philosophers over division and exposition is noticeably reticent regarding
the contribution of Antipater of Tarsus. In fact, he is not mentioned once,
as will be apparent by the end of §3.1. The comparison of the two expositions
of Stoic logic, therefore, as facilitating a partial reconstruction of the
development of the Stoic exposition of logic, is all the more important for
our understanding of Antipater's approach to the division and exposition
of philosophy as a whole. The discussion of the expositions, however, also
provides the opportunity for an analysis of a passage found in the longer
exposition which derives from Antipater (T26) and which is pertinent to

1
Diogenes Laertius' account of the two remaining parts of philosophy, ethics
and physics, is far less revealing, since he seems to have drawn on only one exposition
in each case (§3.2).
202

the whole issue of division (§3.3.1-2). It will then be possible to begin to

assess Antipater's importance in the development of the division of
philosophy (§3.3.3). The summary of Antipater's position is intended to be
a working hypothesis, and an orientation only (§3 Conclusion). The
subsequent analysis of Antipater's philosophical testimonia, the logical
testimonia in particular, will shed more light on Antipater's novel attitude
(§§4ff.).

3.1. DL 7.38-41: THE STOIC DIVISIONS

The haeresiographical account on the Stoic division of philosophy

portrays an internal Stoic debate. Whether there was a debate or not, the
account raises four interesting questions:1
1. What exactly was divided? (§3.1.1);
2. What was the nature of the parts of this division? (§3.1.2);
3. What do we learn from the similes provided? (§3.1.3);
4. What is the significance of the order of exposition? (§3.1.4).

3.1.1. DL 7.38-9 and 41: Philosophy or Philosophical Discourse?

That it was philosophy itself which the majority of Stoics divided

has recently been called into q u e s t i o n .2 Diogenes Laertius'
haeresiographical source would appear to be saying something rather
different:
39. (1) trimerh' fasi;n ei\nai to;n kata; filosofivan lovgon: ei\nai ga;r aujtou'
to; mevn ti fusikovn, to; de; hjqikovn, to; de; logikovn.
(2) ou{ t w de; prw' t o" diei' l e Zhv n wn oJ Kitieu; " ej n tw' / Peri; lov g ou kai;
Cruvsippo" ejn tw'/ aæ Peri; lovgou kai; ejn th'/ aæ tw'n Fusikw'n kai; •Apollovdwro"
kai; Suvllo" ejn tw'/ prwvtw/ tw'n Eij" ta; dovgmata eijsagwgw'n kai; Eu[dromo" ejn th'/

1
This section owes much to K. Ierodiakonou's article on DL 7.39-41 and the
Stoic division of philosophy,Æ°H diaivresh th'" filosofiva" kata; tou;" Stwikou;"Æ

in ° Ellhnistikh; Filosofiv a (ed. K. Boudouris), Athens 1994, 128-137. An earlier

English draft was also kindly made available to me. Her paper also discusses the
four subjects, if from a slightly different perspective. She contends that there was a
disagreement over the nature of the division of philosophy: I contend that there was
not.
2
See especially P. Hadot, 1979 and 1991; and K. Ierodiakonou.
Parts 3.1.1 - DL 7.38-9 203

•Hqikh'/ stoiceiwvsei kai; Diogevnh" oJ Babulwvnio" kai; Poseidwvnio". ...

...
41 (3) a[lloi d• ouj tou' lovgou tau'ta mevrh fasivn, ajll• aujth'" th'" filosofiva",
wJ" Zhvnwn oJ Tarseuv".
39. (1) They say that the logos kata ten philosophian is tripartite: for one
[part] of it is physical, one ethical, one logical.
(2) The first so to divide [the logos kata ten philosophian] was Zeno of Citium
in his On Logos; and Chrysippus in his On Logos, Book 1, and in the first book of his
P h y s i c s ; and Apollodorus; and Syllus in the first [book] of his Introductions to
Dogmata; and Eudromus in his Ethical Elementary [Treatise]; and Diogenes of Babylon;
and Posidonius…
…
41 (3) Others, however, say that these parts are not of the logos, but of
philosophy itself, as [for example] Zeno of Tarsus.

Only one Stoic is offered in this account as representing the view that the
division into logic, physics and ethics was a division of philosophy itself.
Every other Stoic mentioned here seems to have supported another, rival,
view, that the division was of the logos kata ten philosophian. What this
phrase actually means will be considered shortly. Before doing so, however,
the portrayal of an internal debate should be questioned.
There are two factors which militate against the idea of an internal
debate on this issue:
1. Zeno of Tarsus is the sole representative of one of the camps,
while the rival camp boasts not only Stoics as far flung as Zeno of Citium
and Posidonius, but even Zeno of Tarsus' own teacher, Chrysippus, and
Zeno of Tarsus' own pupil, Diogenes of Babylon. Even were it true that
Zeno of Tarsus disagreed with every other Stoic, this would hardly constitute
an internal Stoic debate. The disagreement is unlikely, however: not only
would Zeno need to disagree with his teacher, Chrysippus, but with his
apparently Chrysippean pupil, too. One would have to wonder if Diogenes
of Babylon learnt anything from Zeno of Tarsus, if not something as
basic as the division of philosophy.1

1
The claim that Zeno of Tarsus was a prolific teacher seems to have been an
attempt to raise the status of a Stoic diadochus who failed to publish huge quantities
of learned articles (DL 7.35 = SVF III Zeno T. 1). Note that it was because he was a
204

2. We are told that Zeno of Tarsus did not write very much.1 He may,
however, have managed to write a general work on philosophy which
included its divisions. The other Stoics mentioned certainly did write a
fair number of treatises each, and what is interesting is the type of works
chosen, out of all the works possible, to support the claim that it was the
logos kata ten philosophian which they divided. Zeno of Citium's book is
not on the general subject of philosophy, but on Logos. One of Chrysippus'
works is on Logos, too, while the other is on physics. This suggests that
the L o g o s under discussion is the cosmic rational force akin to god which
is the active aspect of the cosmic substance or ousia. It is this L o g o s
which acts upon hyle, the passive aspect of the ousia, to form everything
that there is. Since the o u s i a is the substrate of the whole sphere of the
universe, it follows that its two aspects, the Logos, its active aspect, and
hyle, its passive aspect, pervade everything and are everything. One
aspect of this physical L o g o s is logos, thought or language. The mechanical
distinction I make by using upper and lower case was not available to the
Stoics, but they seem to have been aware of the conceptual distinction.
The logos was an aspect of Logos, and there was a correspondence between
the two.2 In a discussion of Logos, a discussion of l o g o s would have had its
place. In particular, a discussion of the division of l o g o s according to
philosophy would have been quite in order. At the same time, a book on

diadochus (the link between Chrysippus and Diogenes of Babylon) that his status
needed to be raised by an interested party (Panaetius or Posidonius). On the diadoche,
see §1.3.2.
1
DL 7.35 = SVF III Zeno T. 1 .
2
Speech, reason and the all-pervading, active, matter-qualifying God may
all be called Logos, and may be more easily viewed as aspects of the same thing in
Greek than in Latin, which does not have one umbrella term to signify them all; cf.
Tertull. A p o l . 21= SVF I, 160c: Apud vestros quoque sapientes lovgon, id est sermonem

atque r a t i o n e m, constat a r t i f i c e m videri universitatis. Hunc enim Zeno determinat

factitatorem... Zeno wrote about Logos-God in his peri; oujsiva", DL 7.134= SVF I, 85;

cf. SVF I, 160a-d, but may have written about this aspect of Logos in his peri; lovgou

too. His Logos and god were identified with the active aspect of creative fire, but
Antipater would have identified them with the active aspect of the more complex
pneuma, which had replaced creative fire as the ousia of the cosmos probably at the
instigation of Chrysippus.
Parts 3.1.1 - DL 7.38-9 205

Logos, would have had no occasion to deal with the division of philosophy.
This would have been dealt with in other books, such as Chrysippus' book
on physics and Eudromus' book on ethics. They would have referred to
the logos kata ten philosophian, since ethics and physics are parts of this
division.
3. The haeresiographer appears to have taken the references for
the two apparently rival camps from two separate lists. In DL 7.39, he may
well have misrepresented a previous list which he probably found in
Posidonius; it is the haeresiographer who would have added his name to
the list. Posidonius' list would have contained the names of those Stoics
who had discussed the division of the logos kata ten philosophian, with a
few references to books as well. There is no indication from the list itself,
however, that these Stoics also opposed the division of philosophy. The
reference to Zeno of Tarsus occurs much later, after the discussion of
several other topics, indicating that it was found by the haeresiorgrapher
in another source. Again, there is no indication that Zeno of Tarsus opposed
the division of the logos kata ten philosophian. It is the haeresiographer
who opposed one list to the other, thereby misrepresenting the intent of
both.
If my reasoning has been correct, there is no firm evidence in DL
38-9 and 41 for an internal Stoic debate which implicitly assumed that
logic, physics and ethics were a division either of philosophy or of the
logos kata ten philosophian, but not of both.
The argument for rejecting the haeresiographical account of
exclusivity must address earlier proposals supporting the account's
assertion of a Stoic difference of opinion over the object of division. The
plausibility of my argument is weakened if it is possible to maintain, as
these proposals attempt to establish, that the majority of Stoics had to
deny by their own precepts the possibility of dividing philosophy, and
could allow only a division of the l o g o s kata ten philosophian.

Hadot is able to defend the account by making two preliminary

steps: he first notes that the Stoics regarded philosophy as an exercise
( a s k e s i s) 1; secondly, he interprets the logos kata ten philosophian as
philosophical discourse. Granted these two points, he concludes that the
parts of philosophy cannot be distinguished in their exercise, but that
1
P. Hadot: 1991, 218; cf. Aëtius 1, Prooem. 2=SVF II, 35.
206

they can be distinguished in speech about them.1 That is to say, philosophy

itself cannot be divided, but the logos kata ten philosophian can be. The
claim that the parts of philosophy cannot be distinguished in their exercise,
however, runs counter to Aëtius, the testimonium on which Hadot's
identification between philosophy and exercise is based.2
Ierodiakonou attempts to improve upon Hadot's proposal by
suggesting that philosophy, like wisdom or truth, is a disposition of the
ruling part of the soul, the h e g e m o n i k o n, and hence corporeal;3 many
Stoics, she argues, would have found it unacceptable to divide this corporeal
entity into logic, physics and ethics. At the same time, she continues,
there would be nothing to prevent a similar division of philosophical
discourse ("filosofiko; " lov g o""), defined as the aggregate of true
philosophical propositions (and hence incorporeal).4 Ierodiakonou's
suggestion that philosophy may have been regarded as a disposition (pw'"
e[ c on) of the h e g e m o n i k o n is interesting and plausible, but it is not an
argument against the division of philosophy into logical, physical and
ethical parts. It would have been quite feasible so to divide philosophy,
with each part being a relative disposition (prov" ti pw'" e[con). That is to
say, logic could have been regarded as a disposition of the ruling part of
the soul with respect to thought and language (for example); physics
would have been the ruling part of the soul with respect to observing the
outside world; ethics would have been the ruling part of the soul with
respect to the human agent's dealings with other humans.
One problem common to both proposals is their failure to account
for the behaviour of Stoics such as Zeno of Tarsus. If Stoic doctrine were
such that philosophy could not be regarded as divisible, how could such a
central (if shady) figure as Zeno of Tarsus have thought otherwise? One
solution would be to assume that Diogenes Laertius' report is false, and
that no Stoic divided philosophy itself. It would certainly make things
much neater if Zeno of Tarsus could be brought into line. There is, however,

1
"Logique, éthique et physique ne se distinguent donc que lorsqu'on p a r l e
de la philosophie, mais pas quand on la v i t ." P. Hadot: 1991, 212.
2
The passage from Aëtius will be discussed shortly.
3
K. Ierodiakonou, 130, referring to M.9.13; Sen., Ep. 89, 4-8; Philo, De
congr. erud. 79; Clem. Strom. 15 30,1.
4
K. Ierodiakonou, i b i d.
Parts 3.1.1 - DL 7.38-9 207

an alternative, and that is to accept that Stoics could and did entertain the
possibility of dividing both the logos kata ten philosophian and philosophy
itself, and that Diogenes Laertius' haeresiographical source is guilty of
misrepresentation of both sides.

Let us now turn to a piece of evidence used by Hadot, which seems to

me not only to be reporting that "the Stoics" did divide philosophy, but
even explaining how they could do so. The evidence is, unfortunately,
supplied by Aëtius, an unreliable doxographer; even if his source in this
case is reliable, we do not know to which period (or periods) of Stoicism
this view is attributable. Its value is enhanced because of the lack of
further evidence for or against the Stoic division of philosophy itself.
(Aëtius 1, Prooem. 2):
oiJ me;n ou\n Stwi£koi; e[fasan th;n me;n sofivan ei\nai qeivwn te kai; ajnqrwpivnwn
ejpisthvmhn, th;n de; filosofivan a[skhsin ejpithdeivou tevcnh": ejpithvdeion de;
ei\nai mivan kai; ajnwtavtw th;n ajrethvn, ajreta;" de; ta;" genikwtavta" trei'", fusikh;n
hjqikh;n logikhvn: di• h}n aijtivan kai; trimerhv" ejstin hJ filosofiva, h|" to; me;n
fusikovn, to; de; hjqikovn, to; de; logikovn: kai; fusiko;n me;n o{tan peri; kovsmou
zhtw'men kai; tw'n ejn kovsmw/, hjqiko;n de; to; kathscolhmevnon peri; to;n ajnqrwvpinon
bivon, logiko;n de; to; peri; to;n lovgon, o} kai; dialektiko;n kalou'sin.
"The Stoics said that wisdom is the e p i s t e m e of divine and human [things], and
that philosophy is the practice of the t e c h n e of the fitting.1 The fitting [thing] is
virtue, one at the highest level; and virtues, at their most generic, are three - the
physical one, the ethical one, and the logical one. For this reason, tripartite also is
1
L&S 26A translate ejpithvdeion as "utility", which is linguistically possible,

but may be too narrow here - "rightness" or "fittingness" is more appropriate:

p h i l o s o p h i a is defined elsewhere as the exercise of the logos of ojrqovth" ("rightness",

see below). Note also expressions such as oiJ ejpithdeivw" fuvnte" ajmeleiva/ gegovnasi

kakoiv ("those fittingly raised, by neglect become bad" - they are not "raised with

utility") Clem. Strom. I, p.336 Pott. = SVF III, 225. On a[skhsin ejpithdeivou tevcnh"

L&S write, "The expression is awkward. We interpret ejpithdeivou as shorthand for

peri; tou' ej p ithdeiv o u. It is not clear to us why this adjective rather than the

familiar sumfevron or wjfevlimon is used." Note that the definition of p h i l o s o p h i a as

the exercise lovgou ojrqovthto" lacks peri; th'". It is not the exercise concerning

rightness, but the exercise of rightness; similarly, here, the exercise is not concerning
fittingness - it is the exercise of fittingness, i.e., doing what is right or appropriate.
208

philosophy, whose parts are: one physical, one ethical and one logical. The physical
part whenever we enquire about the cosmos and the things in the cosmos, the ethical
part is the being busily engaged with human life, and the logical part with the logos,
the part which they also call dialectic".1
Aëtius is clearly saying that the Stoics divided philosophy itself, but
is he to be trusted? The passage needs to be examined closely to see whether
it deviates from Stoic doctrine:
1. S o p h i a is the episteme of divine and human [things]. This seems
to be uncontroversially Stoic.2
2. P h i l o s o p h i a is the exercise of a t e c h n e . There are other testimonia
which indicate that the Stoics conceived of p h i l o s o p h i a as the exercise of
the body of knowledge itself,3 rather than of the t e c h n e , but this amounts
to the same thing. The body of knowledge - sophia, episteme, logos - is the
theoretical aspect of the t e c h n e , and p h i l o s o p h i a is the practical aspect of
the techne. Of relevance to the next point is that Clement and the author
of Papyrus 1020 define p h i l o s o p h i a as the exercise of lovgo" ojrqovthto",
the l o g o s of rightness.
3. P h i l o s o p h i a is the exercise ejpithdeivou tevcnh". The double genitive
makes the expression ambiguous. Does Aëtius mean "the exercise of what
is fitting, a t e c h n e", or "the exercise of the t e c h n e of what is fitting"? Is
"what is fitting" the subject of a t e c h n e , or itself a t e c h n e? A comparison
of Aëtius' definition with that of Clement and the author of Papyrus 1020
(see last paragraph) would suggest that we are to understand p h i l o s o p h i a

1
Aëtius 1, Prooem. 2=SVF II, 35= L&S 26A. Cf., e.g., Ammonius in Arist.
Anal. pr. p.8,20 Wal.=SVF II, 49, where Stoic philosophy appears to be a pragmateia
(business or occupation) with eudaimonia as its goal, and its parts are pragmateiai
in particular fields with particular types of eudaimonia as their goals. Only the
logical part, the main subject of the passage, is actually called a pragmateia. See also
next subsection.
2
Seneca Ep. 89.5 =L&S 26G; cf. SE M. 9.123 = SVF II, 1017.
3
Cf. SE M.9.13= SVF II, 36: th; n filosofiv a n fasi; n ej p ithv d eusin ei\ n ai

sofiva", th;n de; ejpisthvmhn qeivwn te kai; ajnqrwpivnwn pragmavtwn. Papyrus 1020=

SVF II, 131, p.41, 27-9: prw' t on me; n gav r ej s|tin (hJ ) filosofiv a , ei[ t e
ej(pi)|thvde≥u(si)" lovgou ojr(qov)|tht(o" ei[t•) ejpisthvm≥(h),| hJ (aujth; th'/) peri; lovgon

| p(ragm)ateiv a i. Clem. Paedag. I 13 p.159 Pott.= SVF III, 293: th;n filosofivan

ejpithvdeusin lovgou ojrqovthto" ajpodidovasin.

Parts 3.1.1 - DL 7.38-9 209

as "the exercise of the t e c h n e of what is fitting", and that "what is fitting"

is the subject of a techne. This leads to a serious problem, discussed in (4).
4. A r e t e is what is fitting, and is the subject of a t e c h n e. This claim
is problematic, and I shall argue here that it is a confusion of a Stoic
position, that arete is the t e c h n e of what is fitting. Stoic a r e t e is variously
defined in the sources as a d i a t h e s i s of the soul; as an aspect of l o g o s, i.e.,
e p i s t e m e ;1 and as a t e c h n e .2 Given that Stoic t e c h n e is a h e x i s ,3 there
seems at first sight to be confusion even without the contribution of
A ë t i u s. It should not be possible for a d i a t h e s i s, a consistent disposition, to
be a h e x i s , a less consistent disposition. Yet a r e t e was treated both as a
d i a t h e s i s (as e p i s t e m e) and as a h e x i s (as t e c h n e), as we may infer from
the several lists of definitions of individual a r e t a i which mix the two
t e r m s4, and from Stobaeus' explicit statement that all a r e t a i which are
epistemai and t e c h n a i share the same t h e o r e m a t a and telos, and are
consequently indivisible.5 The confusion, however, between d i a t h e s i s
and hexis is only apparent. The a r e t e in each case is the excellence of a
different aspect of the wise man: the excellence of a wise man may be
considered from the point of view of his knowledge, where an aspect of
his soul is in a particular permanent state; or from the point of view of
his application of that knowledge, where an aspect of his soul is in a
particular temporary state relative to something else.6 The major problem

1
E.g., (d i a t h e s i s - l o g o s) Plut., de virt. mor. c.3 p.441c= SVF I , 202, koinw' "

de; a{ p ante" ou| t oi (sc. Menedemus, Aristo, Zeno, Chrysippus) th;n ajreth;n tou'
hJgemonikou' th'" yuch'" diavqesivn tina kai; duvnamin gegenhmevnhn uJpo; lovgou,
ma'llon de; lovgon ou\san aujth;n oJmologouvmenon kai; bevbaion kai; ajmetavptwton
uJ p otiv q entai. (d i a t h e s i s - e p i s t e m e) Stob. e c l . II 59, 4 W=SVF III, 262; Clem. Strom.

II p.470 Pott.= SVF III, 275.

2
Anecdota graeca Paris. ed. Cramer Vol. I p.171= SVF III, 214. See below.
3
Zeno's definition, Ætev c nh ej s ti; n e{ x i" oJ d opoihtikhv Æ , Schol. ad Dion.

Thracis Gramm. ap. Bekk. Anecd. p.663, 16= SVF I, 72; cf. SVF I, 490 (Cleanthes).
4
See esp. SVF III, 262-76.
5
Stob. e c l . I I , 63,6 W: pav s a" de; ta; " aj r eta; " o{ s ai ej p isth' m aiv eij s i kai;
tev c nai koinav te qewrhv m ata e[ c ein kai; tev l o", wJ " ei[ r htai, to; auj t ov : dio; kai;
ajcwrivstou" ei\nai...
6
Compare the two Stoic definitions of tev c nh of which the first is more

probably Zeno's (SVF I, 72-3; on the latter, see T29 Comm. H1). While theoretical
210

with Aëtius' statement is the apparently un-Stoic definition of a r e t e , as

neither e p i s t e m e nor t e c h n e , but as "what is fitting", the subject of a
t e c h n e. Is this anomaly sufficient to prove that Aëtius' source is non-Stoic?
The general argument appears to be quite Stoic, leading me to suspect
that the anomaly is the result of a simple mistake.1 The Stoic argument of
the first lines may be reconstructed as follows. S o p h i a is the e p i s t e m e
(only) of things human and divine. It is the body of knowledge required
for the techne, arete. It is the theoretical aspect of the techne. By referring
to s o p h i a , one knows what actions are fitting. The practice of this t e c h n e
is p h i l o s o p h i a. That is, philosophia is the practical aspect of the t e c h n e .2
5. Arete may be divided into a physical, an ethical and a logical
a r e t e . This is also reported by Diogenes Laertius. The familiar Stoic division

p y
arete is a d i a t h e s i s , a permanent state of the wise man's soul, practical arete is a
h e x i s - a less permanent state of affairs dependent on external factors.
1
A scribal error may account for the identificaton of ejpithvdeion instead

of ej p ithdeiv o u tev c nh with arete. The text at this point, I believe, should have read

...ej p ithdeiv o u tev c nh" ej p ithdeiv o u de; tev c nhn... The word tev c nhn could easily

have dropped out, and the second ejpithdeivou would have been "corrected" to

ej p ithv d eion to supply the clause with a subject.

2
The second definition of tev c nh attributed once to Zeno by a late source,

but frequently cited in connection with the Stoics generally, shows the distinction
between two aspects of every techne - the theoretical and the practical - being a
suvsthma ejk katalhvyewn suggegumnasmevnwn prov" ti tevlo" eu[crhston tw'n ejn
tw' / biv w / (SVF I, 73; for a translation, see T29, Def. H1); that the distinction was

applied to arete. cf. Anecdota graeca Paris. ed. Cramer Vol. I p.171= SVF III, 214.
•Aristotevlh" de; fuvsei kai; e[qei kai; lovgw/: ajmevlei kai; oiJ Stwi£koiv: tevcnh ga;r hJ
ajrethv. pa'sa de; tevcnh suvsthma ejk qewrhmavtwn suggegumnasmevnwn: kai; kata;
me;n ta; qewrhvmata oJ lovgo": kata; de; th;n suggumnasivan to; e[qo": "Aristotle [believes

men become good and bad] by nature, habit (e t h o s) and Logos; and of course so do the
Stoics. For arete is a t e c h n e , and every t e c h n e is a composite ("system") of "theorems"
co-exercised - with respect to (k a t a) the theorems, the Logos; with respect to (k a t a)
the co-exercising, the habit (e t h o s); ..." Logos and e t h o s have been used in this
description of the Stoic account to make it conform with Aristotle's account. Note
that the katalhvyei" have become qewrhv m ata, a word used by Chrysippus in a

similar context (Plut. St. rep. 1035A, see below).

Parts 3.1.1 - DL 7.38-9 211

of ajrethv into the four cardinal virtues,1 each further subdivided,2 is just
one of several possible divisions, again, not mutually exclusive as Diogenes
Laertius' source would have us believe.3 The four-fold division of a r e t e
pertains to the behaviour of the wise man in his environment; this is the
field of ethics. The three-fold division of a r e t e pertains to the relationship
between the wise man and the logos; this includes the field of ethics,
which is one of its parts. Diogenes emphasizes that a r e t e is not specific to
ethics, but is a very general word meaning "excellence". The passage
derives from Hecato's work on virtue.4
6. P h i l o s o p h i a, as the practice of arete , may also be divided into a
physical, an ethical and a logical part. Given that the a r e t e of the wise
man is a t e c h n e , a composite of e p i s t e m e and its practice, this is only to be
expected, and is not inconsistent with Stoic doctrine. The parts of philosophy
as described here by Aëtius will be considered in §3.1.2.
To conclude, Aëtius' account of the Stoic division of philosophy
requires one obvious and simple emendation in order to make sense at all
(step 4). For the sake of clarity, I shall present the emended text (Aëtius 1,
Prooem. 2):
oiJ me;n ou\n Stwi£koi; e[fasan th;n me;n sofivan ei\nai qeivwn te kai; ajnqrwpivnwn
ejpisthvmhn, th;n de; filosofivan a[skhsin ejpithdeivou tevcnh": ejpithdeivou de;
<tev c nhn> ei\nai mivan kai; ajnwtavtw th;n ajrethvn, ajreta;" de; ta;" genikwtavta"

1
See e.g., SVF III, 2 6 2 .
2
See e.g., SVF III, 264ff.
3
DL 7.92: Panaivtio" me;n ou\n duvo fhsi;n ajretav", qewrhtikh;n kai; praktikhvn:
a[lloi de; logikh;n kai; fusikh;n kai; hjqikhvn: tevttara" de; oiJ peri; Poseidwvnion
kai; pleivona" oiJ peri; Kleavnqhn kai; Cruvsippon kai; •Antivpatron. oJ me;n ga;r
•Apollofavnh" mivan levgei, th;n frovnhsin. Zeno also identifies aj r ethv with frovnhsi",

but each particular aj r ethv is an aspect of this frovnhsi" (SVF I, 200-1), just as later

Stoics regarded particular jajretaiv as aspects of ej p isthv m h.

4
Diogenes Laertius' long account of Stoic arete (7.89-104) contains the more
familiar description of arete as a d i a t h e s i s of the soul (7.89); but it is noted that
arete is "excellence" in general, and that the d i a t h e s i s in question in the ethical
section is specifically "theoretical" arete. Hecato's work "on virtue" is used to
underline this point in 7.90; virtues such as p h r o n e s i s and dikaiosune are
qewrhmatika;" ta;" ejcouvsa" th;n suvstasin ejk qewrhmavtwn. So defined, theoretical

arete corresponds to the theoretical aspect of t e c h n e, embodied in the agent.

212

trei'", fusikh;n hjqikh;n logikhvn: di• h}n aijtivan kai; trimerhv" ejstin hJ filosofiva,
h|" to; me;n fusikovn, to; de; hjqikovn, to; de; logikovn: kai; fusiko;n me;n o{tan peri;
kovsmou zhtw'men kai; tw'n ejn kovsmw/, hjqiko;n de; to; kathscolhmevnon peri; to;n
ajnqrwvpinon bivon, logiko;n de; to; peri; to;n lovgon, o} kai; dialektiko;n kalou'sin.
"The Stoics said that wisdom is the e p i s t e m e of divine and human [things], and
that philosophy is the practice of the t e c h n e of the fitting. The <t e c h n e > of the
fitting [thing] is virtue, one at the highest level; and virtues, at their most generic,
are three - the physical one, the ethical one, and the logical one. For this reason,
tripartite also is philosophy, whose parts are: one physical, one ethical and one
logical. The physical part whenever we enquire about the cosmos and the things in
the cosmos, the ethical part is the being busily engaged with human life, and the
logical part with the logos, the part which they also call dialectic".
The emended text conforms with Stoic doctrine, where we have
evidence. It is the only testimony for a division of philosophy itself, but I
have noted examples of other evidence which points in the same direction.
A diagram may be of use at this stage:

theoretical aspect techne practical aspect

episteme, theoremata askesis, epitedeusis

arete

sophia philosophia

Every techne (craft, applied knowledge) has a theoretical aspect

and a practical aspect. The theoretical aspect is known variously as
episteme, (knowledge), t h e o r e m a t a ([the body of] theorems), or s o p h i a
(wisdom). The practical aspect is known as "practice" (askesis, epitedeusis) .
A r e t e (virtue) is a t e c h n e . Its theoretical aspect may be known,
therefore, as episteme, theoremata, or s o p h i a , but s o p h i a is probably more
apposite to a r e t e than to other t e c h n a i . Similarly, the practice of a r e t e
may be identified by the general terms of a s k e s i s and e p i t e d e u s i s , but the
most suitable, and indeed the proper term for the practice of a r e t e , is
philosophia.
Aëtius refers to two sets of divisions. Having noted that the t e c h n e
of the fitting is a r e t e , he distinguishes three genera of aretai, the physical,
Parts 3.1.1 - DL 7.38-9 213

the ethical and the logical. That is, there is a physical, an ethical, and a
logical techne of the fitting. Hence his claim that philosophy, too, is
tripartite. Philosophy is the exercise of the t e c h n e of the fitting;
consequently, there is a physical, an ethical, and a logical exercise of the
t e c h n e of the fitting. Aëtius does not say, but it may be added, that there is
also a physical, an ethical, and a logical e p i s t e m e to correspond to these
p r a c t i c e s .1

Diogenes Laertius' haeresiographical source portrays the Stoics as

divided over what exactly is divided into three: the logos kata philosophian
(the majority view); or p h i l o s o p h i a itself (Zeno of Tarsus). We may now
see that this opposition is artificial. Chrysippus' "three genera of the
theorems of the philosopher"2 and Aëtius' "tripartite philosophy" are not
mutually incompatible, but complementary.
It would appear that the logos kata ten philosophian signifies
somewhat more than mere "philosophical discourse". The phrase expresses
a relationship between the theoretical aspect of the t e c h n e of virtue and
the practical aspect. Philosophy may be divided, and it is with respect to
the parts of philosophy that the logos, the t h e o r e m a t a , may be regarded
as divisible. Just how this is done will be investigated further in the next
section.
I suggest that the phrase is so formulated to emphasize that it is
with respect to the human condition that the l o g o s is divided into the
logical, the physical and the ethical. The L o g o s as such cannot be cut up
into bits; nor can the logos, that aspect of L o g o s which is "language" or
"thought". A human agent's application of logos, however, is with respect
to the three fields of human behaviour: thinking, observing, acting (i.e.,
1
Cf. Ammonius in Aristot. Anal. pr. p.8,20 Wal.=SVF II, 49. This testimonium
also indicates that philosophy is the practical aspect of arete, although the claim is
less explicit and more complicated than in Aëtius. Ammonius, describing a Stoic
argument proving logic to be one of the three parts of philosophy, and not merely a
part or a tool of ethics or physics, assigns different functions to the three parts:
ethics is the practical part, dealing with human affairs; physics is the theoretical
part, dealing with divine affairs, and logic is the epistemological part, dealing with
logoi. Thus, philosophy is partitioned into social behaviour, observing, and analysing
thought.
2
triva gevnh tw'n tou' filosovfou qewrhmavtwn, Plut. St. rep. 1035a.
214

logic, physics, ethics). It is in relation to these three fields of behaviour

that the l o g o s may be regarded as having these three aspects. Without
reference to these three fields of human behaviour, it would be meaningless
to say that l o g o s had logical, physical, and ethical parts.

3.1.2. DL 7.39: The Division Over Division.

The last section began with Diogenes Laertius' haeresiographical

source listing Stoics who divided the logos kata ten philosophian. H e
continues immediately after the mention of Posidonius as follows:
tau'ta de; ta; mevrh oJ me;n •Apollovdwro" tovpou" kalei', oJ de; Cruvsippo" kai;
Eu[dromo" ei[dh, a[lloi gevnh.
These parts Apollodorus calls topics; Chrysippus and Eudromus, species;
others, genera.
We concluded in the last section that what at first sight appeared to
be differences of opinion between individual Stoics turned out to be
distinctions acceptable probably to any Stoic. The haeresiographer seemed
to have played off one list of Stoics cited for their discussions of the
division of the logos kata ten philosophian against a reference to another
Stoic cited somewhere else, and who happened to be dividing philosophy
itself. Neither list actually referred to a dispute, since there was none.
The Stoic differences over the parts may also be more apparent than real,
and because of the same tendency of the haeresiographer to view the
distinctions as exclusive. Stoic usage of these terms for the parts of
philosophy is confirmed by Latin texts,1 but only the Diogenes list portrays
individual Stoics advocating one or other of the terms.
M e r o s appears as the general, not necessarily Stoic, term for "part",
and Diogenes does not make it clear whether any Stoics used it as a technical
t e r m .2 Here it is the common term which the Stoics are portrayed as

1
Partes is the common, not necessarily Stoic, term for parts of philosophy,
equivalent to mevrh, but, as Ierodiakonou, 131, notes, a part of philosophy is sometimes

translated s p e c i e s (e.g., Apuleius, De interpr. 176, 1-4) or l o c u s (e.g., Seneca, Ep.

89, 11; 16), reflecting the use of ei\ d o" or tovpo" in the Greek source.
2
At least one Stoic used the term m e r o s ("part") to denote a part of philosophy,
as we learn from the detailed Stoic argument presented by Ammonius in Arist. Anal.
pr. p.9,1 Wal. = SVF II, 49, in which logic is proved to be a m e r o s of philosophy, and
not a morion (a "part of a part" i b i d . 8,34-5, not in SVF). Zeno and Cleanthes are
Parts 3.1.2 - DL 7.39 215

arguing over. Should m e r o s be called t o p o s or eidos or genos? The debate

is surely only a misrepresentation of distinctions shared by many of the
Stoics, but the distinctions are important, as Ierodiakonou has shown.1
In a list of definitions which appears later in Diogenes Laertius,
there are two definitions of particular interest to us here (DL 7.61 and
62):2
61 diaivresi" dev ejsti gevnou" hJ eij" ta; prosech' ei[dh tomhv, oi|on Ætw'n
zwv/wn ta; mevn ejsti logikav, ta; de; a[loga.Æ
…
6 2 merismo;" dev ejsti gevnou" eij" tovpou" katavtaxi", wJ" oJ Kri'ni": oi|on
Ætw'n ajgaqw'n ta; mevn ejsti peri; yuchvn, ta; de; peri; sw'ma.Æ
61 D i a i r e s i s (division) is the cutting of a genus into the adjoining e i d e
(species), such as "Of animals, some are rational, some are irrational."
…
62 Merismos (partition) is the arranging of a genus into topoi (places, locations,
topics), according to Crinis, such as "Of good things, some are pertaining to soul,
p p
reported to have referred to the parts of philosophy as mere (G. Verbeke suggests
they were criticized for this by later Stoics, "Ethics and logic in Stoicism", in M.J.
Oster (ed.), Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity, Cambridge 1991, 14). It is possible
that they did, but these reports derive from haeresiographical accounts where m e r o s
is a convenient general term in a discussion comparing all the haereseis; see, e.g. SE,
M. 7.2, where philosophy is said to have been thought of variously as monomerhv"(!),

dimerhv " , and trimerhv". Zeno and Cleanthes may have used more specific terms as

well to denote parts of philosophy, and, conversely, later Stoics may have used the
less specific meros.
1
Ierodiakonou, 131-4, argues that the list testifies to a Stoic dispute over
the character of the division of philosophical discourse. She suggests that d i a i r e s i s
(division) would emphasize that each e i d o s (species) of philosophical discourse
shares with the other species all the philosophical theorems but from different
perspectives, whereas merismos (partition) would emphasize that each topos (topic)
deals only with a portion of the philosophical theorems. While I agree with her
distinction between division into species (or aspects of an indivisible whole) and
partition into topics (like slices of a divided whole), I am not persuaded that
division and partition can both be applied to the logos.
2
These two definitions form part of T26, the whole of which will be dealt
with in §3.3, especially §3.3.2.
216

some pertaining to body."

The distinction is clearly made here between division, which is of a
genus into species, and partition, which is of a genus into topics. Topics
are distinguished by the use of p e r i + accusative ("pertaining to"). A
species is a p r o s e g o r i a , that part of speech denoting a qualified thing,
resembling in form a noun (e.g., "animal") or an adjective (e.g., "rational"),
or an adjectival phrase (e.g., "capable of knowledge").
To return to DL 7.39, only Apollodorus is said to have called the parts
topics. The others are said to have called the parts g e n e or eide. F a s h i o n s
change, however, and by the time of Diogenes Laertius, the main parts of
Stoic philosophy are referred to not as g e n e or eide, but as topoi (DL 7.83;
160; 189), or as m e r e (7.41; 84); and topoi is the preferred term for
subdivisions (t o p o i 43, 44, 55, 63, 84, 132; e i d e 41, 132). The preponderance
of topoi, however, does not indicate a preference for partition. No
distinction is made between the two types of division at 7.84 or 132, where
we find a diairesis into topoi.1 The predominance of t o p o i may suggest
that at least some of the earlier Stoics who are said to have called the
main parts g e n e actually partitioned these into topoi. It seems more than
likely that the confusion between division and partition, species and topics,
was less prevalent at a certain stage in the development of Stoic philosophy,
and that this stage was earlier than the first century A.D.
Chrysippus, who, according to Diogenes Laertius' source, calls the
main parts of philosophy e i d e, we have already seen calls the main parts
of the theoremata of the philosopher g e n e.2 Chrysippus is not being
inconsistent. The parts are genera with respect to their subdivisions, and
species with respect to their genus. The list's distinction, therefore, between

1
DL 7.132: to;n de; fusiko;n lovgon diairou' s in ei[" te to;n peri; swmavtwn
tovpon kai; peri; ajrcw'n kai; stoiceivwn kai; qew'n kai; peravtwn kai; tovpou kai;
kenou'. kai; ou{tw me;n eijdikw'", genikw' " d• eij" trei'" tovpou", tovn te peri; kovsmou
kai; to; n peri; tw' n stoiceiv w n kai; triv t on to; n aij t iologikov n . DL 7.84 to; de;
hjqiko;n mevro" th'" filosofiva" diairou' s in ei[" te to;n peri; oJrmh'"... tovpon. Cf.

the similar lack of distinction at, e.g., SE M. 7.11 (diairou'sin eij" to;n peri; tw'n

aiJ r etw' n kai; feuktw' n <tovpon>). M. 7 begins with a haeresiographical account of

the divisions of philosophy in which the subdivisions are regularly topoi, and the
divisions of philosophy are m e r e, until 7.24 (logiko;" tovpo") .
2
Plut., St. rep. 1035A=SVF II, 42. See §3.1.1.
Parts 3.1.2 - DL 7.39 217

Chrysippus with his e i d e and those who call the main parts g e n e is as
misleading as the distinction between Apollodorus with his t o p o i and those
who call the main parts g e n e. Those who called the main parts g e n e (and
this should have included all of the major Stoics) could have divided or
partitioned as they saw fit.
While it is clear that the haeresiographer has overstated his case
regarding a difference of opinion between Chrysippus and those who
called the main parts gene, and between Apollodorus and those who called
the main parts gene, it is less obvious that there was no real difference
of opinion between Chrysippus with his species and Apollodorus with his
topics. That there was no real difference of opinion requires demonstration.
We examined in the previous section a passage of Aëtius which stated
explicitly that philosophy itself was tripartite. Here again is the last part
of the passage:1
"For this reason tripartite also is philosophy, whose parts are: one physical,
one ethical and one logical. The physical part whenever we enquire about the cosmos
and the things in the cosmos ( peri; kovsmou kai; tw'n ejn kovsmw/) , the ethical part is

the being busily engaged with human life (peri; to; n aj n qrwv p inon biv o n), and the

logical part with the logos (peri; to;n lovgon), the part which they also call dialectic."

The definition of partition into t o p o i (T26) uses in its example the

construction "pertaining to" (periv + acc.), and this is the construction
used twice here (and once, periv + gen.). The t o p o i emphasize the different
relationships of the human agent with his environment. The three fields
demand three utterly different generic modes of behaviour. Division, on
the other hand, emphasizes that species or aspects are of one and the
same thing. The distinction between partition and division may best be
appreciated in the way they are applied to virtue. To take physics as an
example:
1. The physical topic of virtue pertains to contemplating the cosmos.
This is the one mode of conduct available to the agent with regard to the
cosmos qua cosmos. Going about one's own business within the c o s m o s is
something else - the t o p o s of ethics. Wondering how the c o s m o s is knowable
is also something else - the topos of logic. It is not logically possible to be
in more than one t o p o s at any one time, although one may be able to
oscillate very quickly between them.

1
Aëtius 1, Prooem. 2=SVF II, 35= L&S 26A. See §3.1.1.
218

2. The physical species of virtue, on the other hand, is the whole

system of the theorems of virtue applied to observing the c o s m o s. The
same system of theorems are applicable to thinking and to social behaviour,
although they are applied differently in each case.

To sum up this section. P h i l o s o p h i a is partitioned into three, since

the three t o p o i (of thought/language, cosmos, and social conduct in the
c o s m o s) entail three distinct modes of behaviour. The l o g o s - the system
of t h e o r e m e t a - is applied entire in each topos, so it is said not to be
partitioned into topoi, but divided into eide, with respect to the various
t o p o i of behaviour.1

3.1.3. DL 7.40: The Four Similes

We have seen that Diogenes Laertius' source distinguishes

misleadingly between Stoic advocates of topics, species and genera; he
continues immediately with four apparently Stoic similes of philosophy,
without attributing any of them to individual Stoics (DL 7.40):
eijkavzousi de; zwv/w th;n filosofivan, ojstoi'" me;n kai; neuvroi" to; logiko;n
prosomoiou'nte", toi'" de; sarkwdestevroi" to; hjqikovn, th'/ de; yuch'/ to; fusikovn:
h] pavlin wj/w'/: ta; me;n ga;r ejkto;" ei\nai to; logikovn, ta; de; meta; tau'ta to;
hjqikovn, ta; d• ejswtavtw to; fusikovn:
h] ajgrw'/ pamfovrw/: ou| to;n me;n peribeblhmevnon fragmo;n to; logikovn, to;n
de; karpo;n to; hjqikovn, th;n de; gh'n h] ta; devndra to; fusikovn:
h] povlei kalw'" teteicismevnh/ kai; kata; lovgon dioikoumevnh/.
They compare philosophy:
with an animal, likening the logikon to the bones and sinews {= nerves}, the
e t h i k o n to the fleshier [parts], the p h y s i k o n to the p s y c h e ;
or again, with an egg: for, [they say,] the outside [parts] are the logikon, the
[parts] after those the e t h i k o n, and the innermost [parts] the p h y s i k o n ;
or with an all-bearing field, of which the surrounding fence is the logikon,
the fruit is the e t h i k o n , and the land or trees the p h y s i k o n ;
or with a city well-walled, and governed according to logos.

1
Cf. Plotinus, V.9.8: kai; o{lo" me;n oJ nou'" ta; pavnta ei[dh, e{kaston de;
ei\do" nou'" e{kasto", wJ" hJ o{lh ejpisthvmh ta; pavnta qewrhvmata, e{kaston de;
mevro" th'" o{lh" oujc wJ" diakekrimevnon tovpw/, e[con de; duvnamin e{kaston ejn tw'/
o{lw/. ktl.
Parts 3.1.3 - DL 7.40 219

Sextus Empiricus (M . 7.16-9) is a little more specific in his

haeresiographical account of the division of philosophy. Plato, he says,
was the "potential" initiator of the division of philosophy into three parts,
since he discussed many things physical and ethical, and not a few logical.
Xenocrates and the Peripatetics were most explicit, and furthermore, he
continues, those from the Stoa maintain this division (M . 7.16). There
follow the "orchard"1 (Sextus' source seems to have confused the organic
"orchard" simile with the inorganic "field" simile it replaced), "egg" and
"animal" similes, the "animal" simile being attributed to Posidonius as an
improvement on the "orchard" (i.e., "field") simile. The first three similes
in Diogenes and Sextus may derive from a common haeresiographical
source, despite differences in vocabulary. The "city" simile is not mentioned
at all by Sextus, and is sketchy in Diogenes Laertius' account; it seems to
have been added later to one branch of the haeresiographical tradition,
but this does not in itself indicate a late date for its origin. Posidonius'
"animal" simile is stated to have been intended to improve upon the
"orchard" (i.e., "field") simile, for the reason that the parts of philosophy
are inseparable (M. 7.19); all the similes appear to be organic apart from
the "field" simile, which leaves us to infer that only the "field" simile is
earlier than Posidonius.
Ierodiakonou suggests that Sextus' passage reads as if the "orchard"
simile were Xenocratean or Peripatetic, the "egg" were the standard Stoic
simile, and Posidonius invented the "animal" simile. That Posidonius
invented the "animal" simile is attested by Sextus, but he was reacting to
the "orchard" simile, as if there were no organic simile already in use,
such as the "egg" simile. The evidence for a pre-Stoic origin for the
"orchard"/"field" simile is weak. Xenocrates and the Peripatetics are
advanced by Sextus' source as the first to divide philosophy into three

1
aJlwhv cannot, in the context, be a vineyard. The alternative translations,

"garden" or "orchard", are more suitable, given the presence of trees, and "orchard"
seems most fitting here. Origen's ajmpelwvn (SVF II, 40) "vineyard", seems to be

derived from this simile. The organic "orchard" simile may have been an improvement
on the inorganic "field" simile influenced by Posidonius' organic "animal" simile,
suggesting that Posidonius reacted not to the "orchard" simile, but to the "field"
simile.
220

parts explicitly, in contrast with Plato who did so implicitly. "Those from
the Stoa" are then mentioned as also holding to this division of philosophy,
and they are the most natural subject for what follows, not Arcesilaus and
the Peripatetics. Those who liken philosophy to an all-fruitful orchard
must be the Stoics. Philo and Origen,1 adduced in support of Ierodiakonou's
argument, are not evidence for a non-Stoic origin. Origen does not mention
the Stoics, it is true; but his account of the "vineyard" simile appears to be
a condensed version of Philo's "field" simile and subsequent argument.2
Philo attributes the argument to the ancients (oiJ palaioiv) ; but these
need not be pre-Stoic. There appear to be one and a half arguments one
might offer in support of a Stoic origin for this simile. The weaker argument
would be the fact that "the Stoics" did in fact avail themselves of this
simile, and that it was first challenged only by Posidonius. Most non-Stoic
ideas did not enjoy such long-lived acceptance. The stronger argument
for a Stoic origin is the fact that Philo reports the "field" simile as used by
"the ancients" to illustrate the division not of philosophy, which one
would have expected were the simile already in use before the Stoics
adopted it, but of the logos kata ten philosophian, a peculiarly Stoic concept.3
To conclude this section, "the Stoics" down to Posidonius used the
"field" simile to illustrate the division of the l o g o s according to philosophy.
Posidonius objected to this simile since it did not show clearly enough
that the parts were of one organic whole. He replaced the "field" simile
with the "animal" simile, which he felt met his objection. Once attention
1
Philo, de agricultura, §14 vol. II p.97,24 Wendl. = SVF I I , 39; Origen,
comment. in Matthaeum Vol. III p.778 Delarue = SVF I I , 40.
2
The similarity of vocabulary suggests that Origen's condensed account
derives from that of Philo or a common source. Philo, however, is in the "field"
tradition followed by Diogenes. Origen's "vineyard" suggests some contamination
with the "orchard" tradition followed by Sextus.
3
Philo, at this point comparing husbandry proper with the husbandry of the
soul, has no occasion to mention the egg or the animal similes. Since, however, both
he and his source are careful enough to maintain the distinction between philosophy
and the logos kata ten philosophian (not maintained by Diogenes at 7.40, or Sextus),
it is probable that other details in Philo's account of the "field" simile are closer to
the original than those in Diogenes' similar account, or Sextus' dissimilar account.
It would appear that the "orchard" simile in Sextus, with its ornate style, is a
rhetorical elaboration of the original "field" simile.
Parts 3.1.4 - DL 7.41 221

had been drawn to the problem, other organic similes were now suggested
by Stoics unhappy with the "animal" simile - the "egg", the "polis", and,
perhaps, the "orchard". Why these Stoics were unhappy with Posidonius'
"animal" simile will be discussed in the following section.

3.1.4. DL 7.41: The Order of the Parts

The haeresiographical source in Diogenes Laertius, after listing the

similes, finds further apparent controversy in the ordering of the parts
of philosophy. We may present the list schematically as follows:1
Logikon Physikon Ethikon Zeno (On Logos)
Logikon Physikon Ethikon Chrysippus
Logikon Physikon Ethikon Archedemus
Logikon Physikon Ethikon Eudromus
Ethika ? ? Diogenes of Ptolemaïs
? Ethika ? Apollodorus
Physika ? ? Panaetius
Physika ? ? Posidonius
Sextus also follows his list of similes with an account of the ordering
of the parts of philosophy, but he is not always dealing specifically with
Stoics. This is unfortunate, since he provides explanations for particular
orders (M. 7.20-23): some put physics first, both because it came first in
time, and because it is fitting to study the whole before studying it species
by species; some put ethics first due to its importance for e u d a i m o n i a ; the
Epicureans began with logic; the Stoics also began with logic, placing
ethics second, and physics third.2 The reasons Sextus gives for the Stoic
order are as follows: first dialectic, which enables the n o u s to receive
instruction (in ethics and physics) and to stand firm (against attempts at

1
DL 7.40-1. Phanias, a pupil of Posidonius, is cited as the source for the
information on (at least) Posidonius. It will be apparent by the end of this section
that the parts in the singular must refer to species, while the parts in the plural
refer to theoremata. In either case, the division is of the logos kata ten philosophian,
and not of philosophy itself.
2
Only Apollodorus in Diogenes' list could fit this pattern, but Plutarch, St.
rep. 1035A-F, quotes Chrysippus advocating not only the order logic, physics,
ethics, but also this order; logic, ethics, physics - with the logos about the gods as
the culmination of the mysteries (1035A = SVF II, 4 2 ) .
222

refutation); an outline of ethical theory is next for improving character;

physical theory is last since it is more divine and requires deeper attention
or respect.1
Sextus mentions t h e o r i a , and the Chrysippus quote in Plutarch
concerns the order of t h e o r e m a t a . Clearly, the order of the parts concerns
not the parts of philosophy, but the parts of the l o g o s according to
philosophy. Emphasis on the order of the t h e o r e m a t a suggests that the
question at issue is the order of the exposition of Stoic doctrine.2 It is not
clear to me, however, that this always concerns the order in which
t h e o r e m a t a should be studied by the student. One can, of course, supply
evidence for this view: the pedagogical passage at M . 7.22-3 advocates a
thorough grounding in dialectic, followed by an outline of ethical theory,
and finally induction into physical theory, necessarily in that order;3
furthermore, one could argue that most Stoics agreed, at least, to begin
with logic (dialectic) for the reason that it provides the conceptual and
verbal tools required to handle ethics and physics.4 This argument faces
several difficulties: 1. Panaetius and Posidonius do not begin with logic,
which is extremely puzzling if the order pertains to the teaching of the
t h e o r e m a t a . 2. There was in practice a tendency to mix the various parts
in the course of instruction, which one would not expect from people
who argued over the proper order of instruction.5 3. The similes are of a
composite whole, while any course of instruction is necessarily incomplete.
That described by Sextus, for example, explicitly gives only an outline of
1
SE M. 7.23 = SVF II, 44: prw'ton ga;r dei'n kathsfalivsqai to;n nou'n eij"
dusevkkrouston tw'n paradidomevnwn fulakhvn, ojcurwtiko;n de; ei\nai th;" dianoiva"
to;n dialektiko;n tovpon: deuvteron de; uJpogravfein th;n hjqikh;n qewrivan pro;"
beltivwsin tw'n hjqw'n: ajkivnduno" ga;r hJ paradoch; tauvth" ejpi; prou>pokeimevnh/
th'/ logikh'/ dunavmei: teleutaivan de; ejpavgein th;n fusikh;n qewrivan: qeiotevra
gavr ejsti kai; baqutevra" dei'tai th'" ejpistavsew".
2
As suggested, e.g., by Hadot 1991: 212-3; Ierodiakonou, 134-5.
3
Cf. Plut. St. rep. 1035A= SVF II, 42.
4
We have seen that Zeno of Citium, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus
choose the order logic, physics, ethics (DL 7.40). Cf. the importance attached to
dialectic by the sources of Ammonius = SVF II, 49; Alexander = 49a; Plutarch = 53;
Epictetus = 54 (which adds Cleanthes to the list).
5
DL 7.40 kai; th;n paravdosin mikth;n ejpoivoun ; Plut. St. rep. 1035E-F. Cf.,

e.g., dialectic, which begins with a physical exposition of phantasiai.

Parts 3.1.4 - DL 7.41 223

ethical theory.
It seems to me that two different concepts have been conflated during
the transmission of Stoic doxography, and it is difficult to disentangle
them. The logos kata ten philosophian, i.e., a particular aspect of the one
Logos, may have become confused with the doctrinal exposition of
philosophy - l o g o s as argument - especially since the logos kata ten
p h i l o s o p h i a n is the very body of the t h e o r e m a t a of virtue comprising the
subject of study.1 The process of confusion between the two concepts may
be discerned in the similes.
Sextus says that Posidonius introduced the "animal" simile to illustrate
the inseparability of the parts (i.e., of the logos kata ten philosophian) as
the "orchard" (i.e., "field") simile fails to do. The wall, trees and fruit are
not each the whole field in a particular aspect, and any of the parts may
be removed without affecting the existence of the field. The parts of
Posidonius' simile are each an aspect of the whole animal.2 The whole
animal in one aspect is blood and fleshy matter, in another aspect, bones
and sinews, and in a third aspect, soul.3 Each aspect is necessary for the
existence of the living animal. His simile, then, is more apt than the
"field" simile, since the parts are inseparable (all the aspects are required
for a living animal), are each an aspect of the whole, and are so naturally
(unlike the wall which is artificial).
It has been suggested that Posidonius objected to the order of the
"field" simile.4 The "field" simile has an outer wall (logic), trees (physics),
and finally, fruit (ethics), while the "animal" simile begins with blood/flesh
(physics), follows with bones/sinews (logic), and ends with a soul (ethics).5
As Diogenes Laertius reports, Posidonius believed that physics should be

1
Cf., again, Plut. St. rep. 1035A= SVF II, 42.
2
The simile is not perfect, since the "aspects" of the whole animal are still
to some extent physically distinct, particularly in the case of flesh and bones. Soul
and body would have been a better example of aspects of the same thing, but
Posidonius requires three aspects.
3
Soul is body (soma, i.e., something material) permeating the whole animal,
e.g., SVF II, 785.
4
Ierodiakonou, 136.
5
So Sextus. Diogenes' attribution, bones (logic), flesh (ethics), soul (physics),
makes little sense. Note that all the similes in Diogenes Laertius follow the order:
logic, ethics, physics; a copyist may have sacrificed accuracy for conformity.
224

first, and this simile appears to be an attempt to justify that order. My

problem with this interpretation is that the "animal" simile does not
illustrate the relative positions of the parts of the whole as the "field"
simile appears to do. Both similes illustrate the different functions of the
p a r t s ,1 with the "animal" simile, in addition, emphasizing, as we have just
seen, the essential unity of the three aspects.
The "field" simile and the "animal" simile were not invented to
illustrate simple l o g o s - exposition - but rather the parts of the l o g o s k a t a
ten philosophian, all mutually interconnected and inseparable, with no
positional order.2 Posidonius' animal simile stresses completeness and unity
of the various aspects. At some point, however, the similes seem to have
become misconstrued as illustrating the order of exposition. The encircling
of the wall (emphasized in Philo and Diogenes Laertius) may have been
taken to illustrate position rather than function, in which case, physics
would be clearly seen to be second, and ethics, the fruit, third. Posidonius'
rival simile would have been seen as suggesting not only an organic
whole with inseparable parts, but parts in a different order - physics,
logic, ethics.3 Those Stoics who preferred to teach in the more traditional
order would be expected to have offered organic similes retaining the old
order - and this is what we find.4 The "egg" simile, clearly organic since
the egg ceases to be an egg with the loss of one of its parts, reverts to the
apparent order of the "field" simile: logic as the outer wall (the shell),
physics as the fruit's provider (the white of the egg), and ethics as the
fruit (the yolk). In Diogenes' account, the order and position of the parts

1
Logic is the defence (wall) or the backbone (and more!) of the system.
Ethics is the fruit or the agent (soul) of the system. Physics is illustrated more
lamely by whatever else is required to complete the picture (trees to hold up the
fruit; fleshy matter).
2
Cf. DL 7.40: kai; ouj q e; n mev r o" tou' eJ t ev r ou aj p okekriv s qai, kaqav tine"
aujtw'n fasin, ajlla; memivcqai aujtav.
3
This should only suggest itself to someone who regards flesh and blood as
the outer layer of the animal, bones and sinews as the middle layer, and the soul as
the inner core. Phanias, Posidonius' pupil and biographer, reports that Posidonius
and Panaetius began with physics, which may have encouraged an interpretation of
Posidonius' animal in this way.
4
As we have already noted, however, even dialectic begins with a physical
exposition of phantasiai. See §3.2.
Parts 3.1 - DL 7.38-41 Summary 225

is emphasized. The egg is also a natural composite. The "field" simile itself
may have been converted deliberately into the "orchard" simile in an
attempt to respond to Posidonius' objection: the wall, trees and fruit are
not organic parts of a field, but they are of an orchard.1 Posidonius'
objection is not met, however, since the parts are not inseparable. The
"egg" simile would have been considered far more satisfactory. Not enough
of the "polis" simile has survived to understand it: an outer wall is
mentioned, but it does not represent logic. In this simile, logic is that
which governs the polis.

3.1. DL 7. 38-41: THE STOIC DIVISIONS (S U M M A R Y )

A . A coherent position regarding the Stoic parts of philosophy may

be reconstructed from DL 7.38-41 with some auxiliary testimonia, notably
Aëtius 1, Prooem. 2=SVF II, 35= L&S 26A; DL 7.61-2 = T26.
1. The t e c h n e of virtue consists of theory and practice.
2. The practice of virtue is philosophy. This may be partitioned into
three topics, the logical, physical and ethical, corresponding to the wise
human agent's three possible modes of behaviour: thinking and speaking
correctly (language is the object); observing reality (the c o s m o s and its
contents are the object); acting appropriately (social behaviour is the
object).
3. In its perfect form, the theory of virtue is wisdom, and is identifiable
with the Logos in its aspect as l o g o s (thought, language). The theory is
divided into three species corresponding to the three topics of philosophy.
The three parts are species since they are each an aspect of the whole
theory which is applied entire in each topic of philosophy. It is only with
respect to philosophy that the l o g o s is tripartite.
4. There is ambiguity not only in the word logos, but also in the
status of its tripartition. The wise man and the logos manifested as language
are inextricably bound together, and the tripartition of the l o g o s with

1
Admittedly, the wall is not natural in the way that trees and fruit are, but
the orchard itself is not natural in the way a field may be. An orchard is necessarily
artificial, with its fruit normally grown for monetary gain. The wall (or other
defensive perimeter) may be justifiably considered to be an integral part of the
orchard.
226

respect to philosophy is simply a matter of aspect. For the student of

wisdom, however, the whole l o g o s according to philosophy is something
still to be acquired. He studies the logos in order to acquire it, but the
l o g o s is manifested in the form of doctrinal exposition.
The human agent cannot acquire an understanding of the l o g o s
kata ten philosophian all in one go. It is for this reason that the order in
which the l o g o s is studied appears to matter so much to some, but not all,
Stoics. We have Stoic arguments to show why the logical species of the
theory should necessarily be studied first, and several Stoics are reported
to have placed logic first (Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus,
Apollodorus, Eudromus). Panaetius and Posidonius are reported by Phanias
to have put physics first, but Posidonius' pupil may have been unduly
impressed by the physical account of the p h a n t a s i a i which regularly
1
prefaced introductions to dialectic.
5. The "field" simile and Posidonius' improvement upon it - the
"animal" simile - were designed to illustrate the nature of the l o g o s k a t a
ten philosophian. The "field" simile illustrated the functions of the three
species of the l o g o s kata ten philosophian; the "animal" simile illustrated
not only the functions but also the unity and inseparability of the different
aspects.

B. The Stoic account of the division of philosophy became confused,

perhaps already before, but certainly after, the time of Posidonius.
1. The distinction between division into species and partition into
topics was lost, with increasing talk of division into topics. By the time of
Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius, the various sections and
subsections of the philosophical account are generally termed topoi. T h e
confusion may have been encouraged by the usual Greek (including Stoic)

1
Note that not only eminent Stoics before, but also unknown Stoic inventors
of similes after Panaetius and Posidonius, advocated the order logic, physics, ethics.
Kidd, comm. on F91 (DL 7.40-1), argues that even if Posidonius did begin with
physics, which is arguable, this would have been only for certain teaching purposes,
and would not indicate that Posidonius regarded physics as the most important part
of philosophy in value. Kidd, Posidonius II, on F88 (SE M. 7.16-9), argues that the
animal simile elevates the function of logic to more than mere defence of dogmata,
but on the other hand, emphasizes the equal importance of all the parts.
Parts 3.1 - DL 7.38-41 Summary 227

tendency to write works "about" Y (periv + Gen.). Topoi originally

emphasized a relationship between two entities, using the same preposition
in a different way: X "pertaining to" Y (periv + Acc.).
2. The metaphysical l o g o s kata ten philosophian was misinterpreted
as an account or exposition (l o g o s) of philosophy. The division into three
aspects was a conceptual distinction which was required to show that the
wise man applied the entire l o g o s in his different activities. Human
limitations, however, meant that the comprehension of this l o g o s was a
piecemeal process, and, as we have already remarked, many if not all
Stoics realized the need to begin with logic. It is easy to see how the
division of the logos into three species could become misconstrued by
non-Stoics as a convenient method of splitting up what needed to be
learnt. Stoics themselves knew that studying any part of the l o g o s would
involve references to all its aspects, hence the notion that "they made
their instruction mixed".1
3. The "field" and "animal" similes, which were intended to illustrate
the l o g o s kata ten philosophian were misconstrued as illustrating the
order of the exposition of philosophy. In reaction to Posidonius' "animal"
simile, which was mistakenly believed to exemplify the order physics,
logic, ethics, further organic similes were advanced to illustrate the order
logic, physics, ethics.

1
DL 7.40 kai; th;n paravdosin mikth;n ejpoivoun ; Plut. St. rep. 1035E-F. Cf.,

e.g., dialectic, which begins with a physical exposition of phantasiai.