From Rules to Strategies: An Interview with Pierre Bourdieu

Author(s): Pierre Lamaison and Pierre Bourdieu

Source: Cultural Anthropology , Feb., 1986, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Feb., 1986), pp. 110-120
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/656327

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110 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

authors
authorswho
whospearheaded
spearheadedit. it. Gans,
Gans, Herbert
Herbert
References Cited
1974
1974 Popular
PopularCulture
Cultureand
and
High
High
Cul-
Cul-
ture. New York: Basic.
Bourdieu, Pierre Lemert, Charles C.
1962 The Algerians. Alan C. M. 1981 Reading French Sociology. In
Ross, trans. Boston: Beacon Press. French Sociology, Rupture and Re-
(1958) newal since 1968. Charles C. Lemert,
1977 Outline of a Theory of Practice. ed. Pp. 3-32. New York: Columbia
Richard Nice, trans. Cambridge: University Press.
Cambridge University Press. (1972) Rabinow, Paul
1979 Algeria 1960. Richard Nice, 1982 Masked I Go Forward: Reflec-
trans. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- tions on the Modern Subject. In A
versity Press. (1977) Crack in the Mirror; Reflexive Per-
1984 Distinction, a Social Critique of spectives in Anthropology. Jay Ruby,
the Judgment of Taste. Richard Nice, ed. Pp. 173-185. Philadelphia: Uni-
trans. Cambridge: Harvard Univer- versity of Pennsylvania Press.
sity Press. (1979) Rabinow, Paul and William M. Sullivan
1984a Homo academicus. Paris: Les 1979 The Interpretive Turn. In In-
Editions de Minuit. terpretive Social Science. Paul Rabi-
Bourdieu, Pierre, A. Darbel, J. P. Rivet, now and William M. Sullivan, eds.
and C. Seibel Pp. 1-12. Berkeley: University of
1963 Travails et travailleurs en Al- California Press.
gerie. The Hague: Mouton.
Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean Claude Passeron
1967 Sociology and Philosophy in From Rules to Strategies:
France Since 1945. Death and Res- An Interview with
urrection of a Philosophy Without a Pierre Bourdieu
Subject. Social Research 34:1:162-
212. Pierre Lamaison
1977 Reproduction in Education, So- Terrain: Carnets du Patrimoine
ciety and Culture. Chicago: Univer- Ethnologique
sity of Chicago Press.
1979 The Inheritors: French Students P.L.-I would like for us to talk about the
and Their Relation to Culture. Chi-
interest you have shown, in your work
cago: University of Chicago Press. from "Bearne" and the "Trois 6tudes
Bourdieu, Pierre and A. Sayad d'ethnologie kabyle" through to "Homo
1964 Le deracinement. Paris: Les Edi- academicus," in questions of kinship and
tions de Minuit. inheritance. You were the first to address
Centre de Sociologie Europeene the question of the choosing of marriage
1972 Current Research. Paris: Ecole
partners in a French population (cf. "C6l-
Pratique des Hautes Etudes. ibat et condition paysanne," Etudes ru-
Certeau, Michel de rales, 1962, and "Les strat6gies matri-
1984 The Practice of Everyday Life.
moniales dans le systeme des strat6gies de
Steven F. Randall, trans. Berkeley:
reproduction," Annales, 1972) and to em-
University of California Press. phasize the correlation between modes of
Clifford, James and George E. Marcus, property inheritance-nonegalitarian in
eds. this case-and the logic of alliances. Each
1986 Writing Culture: The Poetics matrimonial transaction is to be under-
and Politics of Ethnography. Berke- stood, you said, as "the outcome of a
ley: University of California Press.strategy" and can be defined "as a mo-
Foster, Stephen William ment in a series of material and symbolic
1981 Interpretations of Interpreta-
exchanges . . . which depend largely on
tions. Anthropology and Humanism
the position that this exchange occupies in
Quarterly 6 f- 4 2-8. the matrimonial history of the family."

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 INTERVIEWS 111

through theoretical reflection alone-of

P.B.-My research on marriage in Bearne
was for me the crossover point and thethe gap between the theoretical aims of
link
between ethnology and sociology. From theoretical understanding and the directly
concerned,
the very first, I had thought of this work on practical aims of practical un-
derstanding,
my own country of origin as a sort of ep- which led me to speak of ma-
trimonial strategies or social uses of kin-
istemological experimentation. By analyz-
ship
ing, as an ethnologist in a familiar al-rather than rules of kinship. This
change of vocabulary is indicative of a
though socially distant world, the matri-
monial practices that I had studiedchangein a of viewpoint. It is a matter of not
grounding the practice of social agents in
much more remote social universe, Kabyle
society, I would be giving myself thethe theory that one has to construct in order
op-
to explain that practice.
portunity to objectify the act of objectifi-
cation and the objectifying subject I sought
to objectify the ethnologist not just as P.L.-But
a so- when Levi-Strauss talks about
cially situated individual but alsothe as rules
a or models one reconstructs in or-
der to explain it, he doesn't really take a
scholar whose work is to analyze the social
world, to conceptualize it, and who position
must opposed to yours on this point.
therefore withdraw from the game. This
P.B.-As a matter of fact, it seems to me
means either that he will observe a foreign
world, in which his interests are not in-the opposition is masked by the am-
that
vested, or he will observe his own world,
biguity of the word rule, which allows one
to conjure away the very problem that I
but while keeping to the sidelines, insofar
as this can be done. I wished, not so much
have tried to raise. One is never quite sure
whether by rule one means a juridical or
to observe the observer in his particularity,
which holds no great interest in itself,quasi-juridical
but type of principle that is
more
to observe the effects which the position of or less consciously produced and
observer produces on the observation, on
controlled by the agents, or a set of objec-
the description of the thing observed. tive Iregularities that must be followed by
everyone who enters a game. It is one or
wished also to discover all the presuppo-
the other of these two meanings that we re-
sitions inherent in this theoretical posture,
as a vision that is external, remote, distant,
fer to when we speak of the rules of the
or simply nonpractical, uncommitted,game.
dis- But one can also have in mind a
thirda meaning, that of a model, a principle
interested. It became apparent to me that
whole social philosophy, a thoroughly constructed by the social scientist in order
mistaken one, derived from the fact to that
account for the game. I think that by
the ethnologist has "nothing to do" dodging
with these distinctions one risks falling
into one of the most disastrous fallacies in
the people he studies, with their practices,
the human sciences, which consists in tak-
their representations, apart from studying
ing,
them. There is a gulf between trying to un-according to the old saying of Marx,
derstand matrimonial relations between "the things of logic for the logic of
two families in order to arrange the bestthings." In order to escape this danger,
marriage for one's son or daughter, with one needs to bring into the theory the real
importance equivalent to the concern principle
of of strategies, that is, a practical
sense of things, or, if one prefers, what
people in our milieu to select the best aca-
athletes call a feel for the game (le sens du
demic institution for their son or daughter,
and trying to understand these relationsjeu).'
in I refer here to practical mastery of
order to construct a theoretical model. the logic or immanent necessity of a game,
Thus, this theoretical analysis of the which is gained through experience of the
theoretical vision as an external vision game, and which functions this side of
consciousness and discourse (like the tech-
and, above all, as having nothing practical
at stake, was no doubt the source of my niques of the body, for example). Notions
"break" with what others would call the such as habitus (or system of dispositions),
structuralist "paradigm." It was the acute
practical sense, and strategy are tied to the
awareness-which I did not acquire effort to get away from objectivism with-

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112 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

out falling into subjectivism. That is Being

why aI prisoner, like so many others, of
do not see myself in what Levi-Strauss the alternatives of the individual and the
calls "domestic societies" ("societes a social, of freedom and necessity, etc., he
maison"), although I cannot help but feel cannot see in the attempts to break with the
concerned since I was instrumental in rein- structuralist "paradigm" anything but a
troducing into theoretical discussion in return to individualist subjectivism and
ethnology one of those societies in which hence to a type of irrationalism. In his
acts of exchange, matrimonial or other, view, "spontaneisme" replaces structure
seem to have for their "subject" the with "a statistical mean resulting from
household, la maison, the oustan; and also choices that are freely made, or at least not
in formulating the theory of marriage as a subject to any external determination."
strategy. How can one fail to recognize in this state-
ment the image or fantasy of the "spon-
P.L.-Would you like to comment on the taneisme" of May '68, which is evoked
lecture on Marc Bloch, "L'ethnologie et by-in addition to the concept used to des-
l'histoire," published by the Annales ignate this theoretical current-the allu-
E.S.C., in which Levi-Strauss criticizes sions to fashion and to the criticism "that
what he calls spontaneisme? just about everybody is mouthing"?
In short, because strategy is for him
P.B.-Yes. When he speaks of the criti- synonymous with choice, a conscious and
cism of structuralism "which just about individual choice guided by rational cal-
everybody is mouthing and which takes its culation or "ethical and affective" moti-
inspiration from a fashionable spontane- vations, and because this choice resists
ism and subjectivism" (not a very nice constraints and the collective norm, he is
thing to say), it is clear that Levi-Strauss is forced to reject as unscientific a theoretical
alluding in a way that shows very little un- project that in reality aims to reintroduce
derstanding, to say the least, to a body of the socialized agent-and not the sub-
work that appears to me to participate in aject-the more or less "automatic" strat-
different theoretical world than his. I will egies of practical sense-and not the proj-
pass over the mixing effect which consists ects or calculations of a consciousness.
in suggesting the existence of a relation be-
tween thought in terms of strategy and P.L.-But in your view what is the func-
what is designated in politics by the term tion of the notion of strategy?
"spontaneisme." One's choice of words,
especially in polemics, is not innocent and P.B.-The notion of strategy makes pos-
we are aware of the discredit that attaches, sible a break with the objectivist point of
even in politics, to the forms of belief in view and with the agentless action that
the spontaneity of the masses. Having said structuralism assumes (by appealing for
this, I might add, parenthetically, that example to the notion of the unconscious).
Levi-Strauss's political intuition is not But one can refuse to see strategy as the
completely misleading since, through the product of an unconscious program with-
notions of habitus, practical sense, and out making it the product of a conscious
strategy, the observer's proximity to the and rational calculation. It is the product of
agents and practice is reintroduced as well a practical sense, of a particular social
as his refusal of the distant gaze, factors game. This sense is acquired beginning in
which indeed are not unrelated to political childhood, through participation in social
dispositions and positions. Levi-Strauss is activities, and particularly-in the case of
confined as he has always been within the Kabylia, and no doubt elsewhere as well-
alternatives of subjectivism and objectiv- through participation in children's games.
ism (I am thinking of his remarks on phen- The good player, who is as it were the em-
omenology in the preface to Marcel bodiment of the game, is continually doing
Mauss). He cannot perceive the attempts to what needs to be done, what the game de-
transcend these alternatives as anything mands and requires. This presupposes a
but a regression towards subjectivism. constant invention, an improvisation that

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 INTERVIEWS 113

applied
is absolutely necessary in order for one to to marriage. As I have shown in
adapt to situations that are infinitelythe case of Bearn and Kabylia, matrimon-
var-
ied. This cannot be achieved by mechani-
ial strategies are the product not of com-
cal obedience to explicit, codified pliance
rules with rules but of a sense of the
game
(when they exist). I have described for ex-that leads one to "choose" the best
ample the strategies of a double game possible match, in view of the hand that
one to
which consists in playing according has been dealt-the trump cards and
rule, in being legitimate, in acting inthe con-bad cards (the girls in particular)-and
formity with one's interests while giving the skill with which one is able to play. The
the appearance of obeying the rules.explicit This rules of the game-for example
sense of the game is not infallible; it istheun-kinship preferences or the successional
evenly distributed, in society as well laws-define
as on the value of the cards (the
a team. It is sometimes in short supply, boys es-and girls, the older siblings and
pecially in tragic situations, when one younger
ap- siblings). The regularities that one
peals to wise men, who in Kabyliacan are
observe, with the help of statistics, are
often poets too. They know how tothe take
aggregate product of individual actions
liberty with the official rule and thereby oriented by the same constraints. Again,
save the essential part of what the rulethesewas may involve the necessities inscribed
meant to guarantee. in the structure of the game or partially ob-
But this freedom of invention and im- jectified in rules or the actors' sense of the
provisation, which enables one to produce game, which is itself unevenly distributed,
the infinity of moves made possible by the because there are always, in all groups, de-
game (as in chess) has the same limits as grees of excellence.
the game. Strategies appropriate for play-
ing the game of Kabyle marriage, which P.L.-But who makes the rules of the
does not involve the land and the threat of game which you are talking about? Are
partition would not be suitable for playing they different from the operational rules of
the game of B6arnese marriage where it is societies whose description by ethnolo-
mainly a question of saving the house and gists results precisely in the construction of
the land. models? What distinguishes the rules of
It is clear that the problem does not the game from rules of kinship?
have to be posed in terms of spontaneity
and constraint, of freedom and necessity, P.B.-The game image is probably the
of the individual and the social. Habitus as least inadequate for evoking social things.
a sense of the game is the social game in- However, it does carry dangers. As a mat-
carnate, become nature. Nothing is freer or ter of fact, to speak of a game suggests that
more constrained at the same time than the there was, at the beginning, an inventor of
action of the good player. He manages the game, who made the rules, who drew
quite naturally to be at the place where the up the social contract. More seriously, it
ball will come down, as if the ball con- suggests that there exist rules of the game,
trolled him. Yet at the same time, he con- or explicit norms, etc.; whereas in reality
trols the ball. Habitus, as the social in- things are much more complicated. One
scribed in the body of the biological indi- can speak of a game in order to say that a
vidual, makes it possible to produce the group of people participate in a regulated
infinite acts that are inscribed in the game, activity, an activity which, without neces-
in the form of possibilities and objective sarily being the product of obedience to
requirements. The constraints and require- rules, obeys certain regularities. A game is
ments of the game, although they are not the locus of an immanent necessity, which
locked within a code of rules, are impera- is at the same time an immanent logic. In
tive for those, and only those, who, be- a game one doesn't do just anything with
cause they have a sense of the game's im- impunity. One's sense of the game, which
manent necessity, are equipped to perceive contributes to that necessity and logic, is a
them and carry them out. form of knowledge of that necessity and
This can easily be brought over and logic.

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114 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Anyone who wishes to win at this action by considering it through

of ritual
game, to claim the stakes, to catch the
analogy with our way of using the opposi-
ball-for example, the good marriage tion between right and left in order to eval-
uate and
catch and the profits that go with it-has to classify political views or per-
have a sense of the game. They must
sons. have

a sense of the necessity and logic of the

P.L.-There
game. Is it necessary to speak of rules? Yes again, you cross the line be
and no. One can do so provided onetween
drawsethnology and sociology.
a clear distinction between rule and regu-
P.B.-Yes,
larity. The social game is a locus of regu- the distinction between soci-
larities. Things happen in a regular way
ology and ethnology prevents the ethnol
within it; rich heirs regularly marry
gistrich
from subjecting his own experience
the
younger daughters. I can say that this is analysis
the which he applies to his objec
To do
starting point for all my thinking: how can so would oblige him to discover th
behaviors be regulated without beingwhatthe he describes as mythological thinkin
product of obedience to rules? But it is notoften nothing but the logic of three
is quite
enough to break with the legalism fourths
(as the of our actions. For example, ou
judgments
Anglo-Saxons say) that comes so natural to of what are considered the su
preme
anthropologists. They are always ready to accomplishments of refined cu
ture-historically formed judgments
listen to the lesson-givers and rule-givers
taste-are
that informants become when they speak to based entirely on pairs of adjec
tives.
the ethnologist, that is, to someone who
knows nothing and to whom they must But to return to the possible principles
of the
speak as one speaks to a child. In order to production of regulated practices
one
construct a model of the game which has to take into account, along with th
is nei-
ther simply a reproduction of explicit
habitus, the explicit, clearly stated rul
which
norms nor a statement of regularities, butmay be preserved by being tran
mitted orally or in written form. The
which integrates these norms and regular-
ities, one must reflect on the different
rules may even be formed into a coheren
modes of existence of the principles system,
of reg- one that manifests an intentiona
ulation and regularity of practices. deliberate consistency, arrived at throug
a labor of codification which is the task of
There is also, of course, the habitus,
the regulated tendency to generateprofessional
regu- formulators and rationalizers,
e.g., jurists.
lated behaviors apart from any reference to
rules in societies in which the process of
codification is not very advanced, P.L.-In
the ha- other words, the distinction you
madeAs
bitus is the source of most practices. at the
I outset between the things of
have shown in the Sens pratique, ritual
logic and the logic of things is what makes
practices are the product of the implemen-
it possible to raise, in clear terms, the ques-
tation of practical taxonomies, or,tion more
of the relation between the regularity
of practices
precisely, of classificatory schemes han- that is based on dispositions,
dled in a practical, pre-reflectiveonstate,
a sense of the game, and the explicit
with all the effects we know that entails. rule, the code.
Rituals and myths are logical, but only up
to a certain point. Their logic is practical, P.B.-Exactly. Earlier, I spoke of the reg-
in the sense that a piece of clothing is said ularity as the rules of the game to which
to be practical, necessary, and sufficient one's sense of the game conforms sponta-
for practice. Too much logic would often neously and what one "recognizes" in a
be incompatible with practice, or even in practical way when one agrees, as we say,
conflict with practical ends. to "play the game." The rule as a simple
The same is true of the classifications regularity that can be captured statistically
that we produce relative to the social or po- does not necessarily derive from the rule
litical world. I arrived at what I believe to qua rule of law or "pre-law," a custom,
be the right intuition of the practical logic maxim, proverb, or formula stating a reg-

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 INTERVIEWS 115

ularity, thus formed into a "normativenecessary in each case to return to the real-
fact." I have in mind for example ity of practices instead of relying on cus-
tauto-
tom, whether it is codified, i.e., written, or
logies like the one that consists in saying
about a man that "there's a man," mean-
not. Being based essentially on the record-
ing a real man, really a man. Yet thising ofisexemplary "moves" or penalties
placed on exemplary infractions (and
sometimes the case, particularly in official
thereby
situations, formal situations as one says in converted into norms), custom
English. This distinction being clearly
gives a very inaccurate idea of the ordinary
drawn, one sees that it is not enough routine
just toof ordinary marriages. It forms the
record the explicit rules on the one object
hand, of all sorts of manipulations, on the
and to establish the regularities on the of marriages in particular. If the
occasion
other. One needs to construct a theoryBearnese
of have managed to keep their
the work of formulation and codification,
successional traditions alive in spite of two
of the properly symbolic effect which centuries
the of civil code, this is because they
learned a long time ago to play with the
codification produces. There is a connec-
tion between juridical formulas and rules
math-of the game. This being said, we
ematical formulas. Law, as formalmust not underestimate the effect of codi-
logic,
considers the form of operations without fication or simply officialization (which is
regard to the material to which they what are ap-the effect of so-called preferential
plied. The juridical formula is valid marriagefor all comes down to). The succes-
the values ofx. It is because the code exists sional channels that are designated by cus-
that different agents agree on universal for- tom are laid down as "natural" and they
mulas-universal because they are formal tend to orient-it would still be necessary
(in the double meaning of the Englishfor- to understand how-matrimonial strate-
mal, i.e., official, public, and the French gies, which explains why one observes in
formel, i.e., relating only to form). But I European societies a rather close corre-
will stop there. I merely wanted to show all spondence between the geography of
that is covered by the word rule, the am- modes of property inheritance and the ge-
biguity of which makes it possible to con- ography of representations of kinship ties.
fuse, again and again, the logic of things
and the things of logic. As a matter of fact, P.L.-Actually, you also differ from the
the same error haunts the entire history of "structuralists" in the way you conceive
linguistics, which, from Saussure to of the action of juridical or economic
Chomsky, tends to confuse generative "constraints."
schemes functioning in a practical state
and an explicit model, a grammar con- P.B.-Right. The famous articulation of
structed in order to explain utterances. "instances" which the structuralists, es-
pecially the Neo-Marxist ones, sought in
P.L.-So, among the constraints that de- the objectivity of structures is achieved in
fine the social game, there can be more or every responsible act, in the sense of the
less strict rules governing alliance and de- English word responsible, that is, an act
fining kinship ties. objectively adjusted to the necessity of the
game because it is oriented by a sense of
P.B.-The strongest of these constraints, the game. The good "player" takes into
at least in the traditions that I have studied account, in each matrimonial choice, the
directly, are those which result from the whole set of relevant properties in view of
successional custom. It is through them the structure that is to be reproduced. In
that the necessities of the economy are im- Bearn, these include sex, i.e., the custom-
posed and it is with them that the strategies ary representations of male precedence;
of reproduction must reckon, matrimonial rank by birth, i.e., the precedence of the
strategies first of all. But customs, even older brothers and, through them, the pri-
highly codified ones, which is rarely the macy of the land which, as Marx said, in-
case in present societies, themselves form herits the heir who inherits it; the family's
the object of all sorts of strategies. So it is social standing which must be maintained,

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116 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

etc. One's sense of the game in this more case

prestigious her lineage is. The strug-
is, roughly speaking, one's sense ofglehonor.
between the husband and the wife may
be pursued through an intermediary
But the B6arnese sense of honor, notwith-
standing the analogies, is not exactly the
mother-in-law or the husband may find it
same as the Kabyle sense of honor advantageous
which, to strengthen the cohesion of
being more sensitive to symbolic the capital,
lineage by means of an internal mar-
reputation, renown (gloire, as people
riage.said
In short, it is via such synchronic re-
lationsto
in the 17th century) pays less attention of power between the members of
economic capital and to land in particular.
the family that the history of lineages, and
particularly the history of previous mar-
P.L.-Matrimonial strategies are riages,
there- intervenes on the occasion of every
new
fore an integral part of the system of marriage.
strat-
egies of reproduction. ... This theoretical model has a very gen-
eral value and it is absolutely necessary in
P.B.-Let me say, by way of anecdote,
order to understand the educative strate-
that it was a preoccupation with stylistic
gies of el-
families, for example, or, in a com-
egance on the part of the editors of pletely
the An- different domain, their strategies of
nales that resulted in my article's
investment
being or saving. Monique de Saint
called "Les strat6gies matrimoniales dans
Martin has observed in the French high ar-
le systeme de reproduction" (which
istocracy matrimonial strategies quite sim-
ilar and
doesn't make a great deal of sense), to those I observed among the
not, as I wanted, "dans le systeme des peasants. Marriage is not that
Bearnese
punctual,
strategies de reproduction." My point here abstract operation based solely
on rulesbe
is that matrimonial strategies cannot of filiation and alliance, which the
dissociated from the whole set of strate- structuralist tradition describes. It is rather
gies. I am thinking of, for example, strat-an act integrating all the necessities inher-
egies of procreation, educative strategiesent in a position in the social structure, that
as strategies of cultural placement, or eco-is, in a state of the social game, by virtue
nomic strategies, investments, savings, of the "negotiators" synthetic sense of the
and so forth-by which the family aims togame. The relations between families that
reproduce itself biologically and above allare entered into on the occasion of mar-
socially. It attempts to reproduce those ofriages are as difficult and as important as
its attributes that enable it to keep its po-the negotiations of our most refined diplo-
sition, its standing in the social worldmats. Reading Saint-Simon or Proust no
being considered. doubt prepares one better to understand the
subtle diplomacy of Kabyle or Bearnese
P.L.-By talking about the family and itspeasants than does reading Notes and
strategies, aren't you postulating the hom-Queries on Anthropology. But not all read-
ogeneity of this group and its interests.ers of Proust or Saint-Simon are equally
And aren't you ignoring the tensions and prepared to recognize a Monsieur de Nor-
conflicts that are inherent in, for example, pois or a Duc de Berry in a peasant with
domestic life? coarse features and a crude accent or in a
montagnard who, when the grids of eth-
P.B.-Not at all. Matrimonial strategies nology are applied to him, is treated,
are often the result of relations of force whether we like it or not, as truly alien,
within the domestic group. These relationsthat is, as a barbarian.
can be understood only by appealing to the
history of this group and, in particular, toP.L.-Ethnology no longer treats peasants
the history of previous marriages within it.or anyone else as "barbarians," I believe.
For example, in Kabylia when the womanIn fact, its studies dealing with France and
comes from outside, she tends to Europe probably contributed a good deal to
strengthen her position by looking for this a
evolution!'
marriage partner in her lineage. Her
chances of succeeding will be greaterP.B.-I
the realize I am overstating things

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 INTERVIEWS 117

somewhat. Yet I maintain that there is free market hides necessities from view. I
something unhealthy in the existence showedof this in the case of B6arn by ana-
ethnology as a separate science and that lyzing the transition from a planned type of
because of this separation one risks ac- matrimonial system to the free market
which is embodied in the bal. [A bal is a
cepting all that was inscribed in the initial
division that gave rise to it and whichscheduled
is event for dancing and socializ-
perpetuated-as I believe I have shown- ing. Participation is open to the public on
in its methods (for example, why the re- payment of an individual entrance free, or
sistance to statistics?) and above all in reserved
its for private groups (bals selects).
modes of thought. The refusal of ethno- (Translator's note).] The appeal to the no-
centrism which forbids the ethnologisttion to of habitus is called for in this case
relate what he observes to his own experi-more than ever: in fact, how else does one
ences-as I did earlier by comparing the explain the homogamy that is maintained
classificatory operations deployed in a rit-
in spite of everything? There are of course
all the social techniques aimed at limiting
ual act with those we deploy in our percep-
tion of the social world-leads him, underthe field of possible choices, through a
kind of protectionism: car rallies, bals se-
pretence of respect, to establish a distance
from the population under study that can-lects, parties, etc. But the surest guarantee
not be crossed. As in the heyday of "pri-of homogamy, and hence of social repro-
mitive mentality," this is the case evenduction,
if is the spontaneous affinity (expe-
they happen to be peasants or workers rienced
in as kindred feeling) that brings to-
our societies. gether agents endowed with a similar ha-
bitus or similar tastes, hence products of
P.L.-To come back to the logic of matri-
similar social conditions and condition-
monial strategies, you mean to say that the ings. There is additional effect of closure
whole structure and history of the game is that is linked to the existence of socially
present, given the habitus of the actors andand culturally homogeneous groups, such
their sense of the game, in each marriageas groups of fellow students, secondary
that results from the confrontation of their
school classes, university faculties, which
strategies? are responsible nowadays for a large per-
centage of marriages or intimate relation-
P.B.-Exactly. I have shown how, in the
ships and therefore owe a good deal to the
case of Kabylia, the most difficult mar-
effect of the affinity of habitus (particularly
riages, hence the most prestigious ones,
mobilize almost all the members of the two in the operations of co-optation and selec-
tion). I showed at length, in La Distinc-
groups involved, along with the history of
tion, that love can also be described as a
their past dealings, matrimonial or other-
form of amorfati. When one loves, there
wise, so that one can understand them only
if one knows the balance sheet of these ex- is always an element of loving in another
person a different realization of one's own
changes at the time being considered and
social destiny. There is something I had
also, of course, everything that defines the
learned by studying Bearnese marriages.
position of the two groups in the distribu-
tion of economic and symbolic capital.
P.L.-Defending the structuralist para-
The great negotiators are those who know
how to make the most of all that. But this digm, Levi-Strauss says that "to doubt that
structural analysis can be applied to some
holds true, it would seem, only so long as
[societies] means that one must question
the marriage is the concern of the families.
whether it can be applied to any society."
P.L.-Yes. It may be asked whether theCouldn't the same thing be said, in your
same can be said of societies like ours opinion, of the paradigm of strategy?
where the "choosing of marriage part-
ners" is left to the individuals concerned P.B.-I think it would be rather rash to
as a matter of free choice. propose a universal paradigm and I have
been careful not to do so on the basis of the
P.B.-In reality, the laissez-faire of the two cases-rather similar ones after all-

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118 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

that I have studied. Yet I believe constructing

it likely a statistically grounded
model-whereas one can establish in one
that matrimonial strategies are universally
integrated into the system of strategies afternoon of a genealogy comprising a
social reproduction. As a matter hundred of fact, marriages and in two days a list of
before concluding in favor of monism terms of or address and reference. I am in-
pluralism, one would have to make clined to think that, in the social sciences,
sure
that the structural vision that has been the language of rules is often the refuge of
dominant in the analysis of societies with-ignorance.
out writing is not the effect of the relation
to the object and of the theory of practiceP.L.-In the Sens pratique, and on the
that are encouraged by the ethnologist's subject of ritual in particular, you suggest
position of exteriority. Certain studies ofthat it is the ethnologist who creates an ar-
typically "cold" societies seem to show tificial distance, a foreignness, because he
that matrimonial exchanges are the occa- is incapable of reappropriating his own re-
sion of complex strategies, and that ge- lation to practice.
nealogies themselves, far from controlling
economic and social relations, are the ob- P.B.-I had not read the merciless criti-
ject of manipulations designed to promote cism which Wittgenstein addresses to Fra-
or prohibit economic or social relations, to
zer and which applies to most ethnologists,
legitimate them or condemn them. This when is I described what appears to me to be
evident provided that one goes into the de- the real logic of mythological or ritual
tails, instead of being content to draw up thought. What some people have seen as
nomenclatures of kinship terms and ab- an algebra, I believe should be seen as a
stract genealogies and to reduce relations
dance or a gymnastics. The intellectualism
between husband and wife to genealogical
of ethnologists, which is increased by their
distance alone. More generally, all mate-
concern with giving their work a scientific
rial or symbolic exchanges, such as theappearance, prevents them from seeing
that their own practice-whether they kick
handing down of first names, can be under-
stood in these terms as well. One thinks of
the rock that makes them stumble, accord-
the work of Bateson who prepared the ing to Wittgenstein's example, or classify
ground in Naven by talking about the stra- professions or politicians-obeys a logic
tegic manipulations to which the names of very similar to that of "primitives" who
places or lineages can be subjected. Or of classify objects in terms of dry and wet,
Alban Bensa's quite recent studies on New hot and cold, high and low, right and left,
Caledonia. As soon as the ethnologist pro- etc. Our perception and our practice, es-
vides himself with the means to grasp in pecially our perception of the social world,
their subtlety the social uses of kinship- are guided by practical taxonomies, oppo-
by combining, as Bensa does, linguistic sitions between high and low, masculine
analysis of place names, economic analy- (or manly) and feminine, etc. The classi-
sis of the circulation of land holdings, fications which these practical taxonomies
methodological inquiry into the most quo-produce owe their value to the fact that
they are "practical," that they make it
tidian political strategies, etc.-he discov-
ers that marriages are complex operations, possible to bring in just enough logic for
involving a host of parameters which the the needs of practice, neither too much-
genealogical abstraction that reduces fuzziness is often indispensable, particu-
everything to the kinship relation dis- larly in negotiations-nor too little, be-
misses without even knowing it. One of cause life would become impossible.
the sources of the division between the two
"paradigms" may be in the fact that one P.L.-But could it not be the case that
has to spend hours and hours with infor- there exist objective differences between
mants who are well informed and fully pre- societies such that certain of them, in par-
pared to gather the information necessary ticular the most differentiated and the most
for understanding a single marriage-or at complex, lend themselves more readily to
least to reveal the pertinent parameters for the games of strategy?

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 INTERVIEWS 119

P.B.-I am distrustful of great dualist of alliance-which

op- themselves sanction
positions, hot societies/cold societies, affinities
his- of life style-can carry more
torical societies/societies without weight history. than purely economic determinants
Yet I would suggest that as societies be- And more generally, it is cer-
or reasons.
come more differentiated and as those rel- tain that the dominant groups, and in par-
atively autonomous "worlds" which I call ticular the great families-great in both
fields develop within them, the chances of senses of the word-ensure their perpetua-
true events appearing, that is, encounters tion by means of strategies-foremost
between independent causal series, stead- among which are the educative strate-
ily increase and, consequently, so does the gies-which are not so different in princi-
freedom that is granted to the complex ple from those which Kabyle or B6arnese
strategies of the habitus, integrating ne- peasants bring into play in order to perpet-
cessities of different types. It is in this way uate their material or symbolic capital.
that, for example, as the economic field In short, all my work over the past 20
becomes established as such, instituting years has been aimed at abolishing the op-
the necessity that characterizes it, that of position between ethnology and sociology.
business, of economic calculation, of the This residual, vestigial division prevents
maximizing of material profit ("business ethnologists and sociologists alike from
is business," "one can't let feelings inter- adequately framing the most fundamental
fere with business") and as the more or of the problems that all societies pose, the
less explicit principles which govern rela- problems of the specific logic of the strat-
tions between relatives cease to apply be- egies which groups, especially families,
yond the boundaries of the family, only the bring into play in order to produce and re-
complex strategies of a habitus shaped by produce themselves, that is, in order to
various necessities can integrate the differ- create and preserve their unity, hence their
ent necessities into coherent courses of ac- existence as a group, which is almost al-
tion. Bearnese marriage or, in a com- ways, in every society, the precondition
pletely different universe, aristocratic mar- for maintaining their position in the social
riages, are examples of this sort of space.
integration of diverse, relatively irreduci-
ble necessities, those of kinship, those of P.L.-The theory of strategies of repro-
the economy, and those of politics. Per- duction is therefore inseparable from the
haps in societies less differentiated into au- genetic theory of groups, which aims to ac-
tonomous spheres, the necessities of kin- count for the logic according to which
ship, not having to reckon with any prin- groups, or classes, form and break up.
ciple from a competing sphere, can assert
themselves in an undivided way. But this P.B.-Exactly. This was so evident, and
would require verification. important, for me that I went so far as to
place the chapter dealing with classes,
P.L.-So you think that, provided they are which I had intended to make the conclu-
rethought and redefined, studies of kinship sion of La Distinction, at the end of the
have a role to play in the interpretation of first, theoretical part of Sens pratique.
our societies? There I tried to show that groups, and par-
ticularly units with a genealogical basis,
P.B.-A major role. I have shown, for ex- existed both in the objective reality of in-
ample, in the work that I did with Monique stituted regularities and constraints, and in
de Saint Martin on French employers, that their representations and all the strategies
the affinities that are connected with alli- of bargaining, negotiation, bluff, etc.,
ance are the source of certain of the soli- whose purpose is to modify reality by
darities that unite those perfect embodi-modifying the representations. I hoped in
ments of homo oeconomicus, the greatthis way to show that the logic which I had
heads of corporations, and that in certain discerned in connection with groups hav-
economic decisions of the greatest impor- ing a genealogical basis, families, clans,
tance, such as company mergers, relations tribes, etc., also operated in the most typ-

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120 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

tradition.
ical groupings of our societies, those des- In some societies, such as ours,
ignated by the term classes. Just as the the- are measured in amounts of cap-
distances
oretical units which genealogical analysis
ital, just as, in other societies, genealogical
carves out, on paper, do not necessarily
space defines distances, proximities and
correspond to real, practical units, so the
affinities, aversions and incompatibilities,
theoretical classes that sociological sci- probabilities of entering into truly
in short,
ence carved out in order to account for unified groups, families, clubs, or mobi-
practices are not necessarily mobilized
lized classes. It is in the struggle over clas-
classes. In both cases, one is dealing withsifications, a struggle aimed at imposing
paper groups. I had always regarded with such and such a way of carving up this
space, at unifying or dividing, etc., that
suspicion the delimitations of ethnologists,
because I knew from experience that the real rapprochements are defined. The class
groups of "neighbors," lou bestiat, which is never given in things; it is also represen-
certain traditional works made into a typi-tation and volition, but which has a chance
cal, rigidly hierarchized and limited, unitof being embodied in things only if it
of Bearnese society, were actually com- brings near that which is objectively near
pletely different. They were subject to theand keeps its distance from that which is
objectively distant.
hazard of conflicts or, on the contrary, de-
pendent on exchanges calculated to main-
tain relations. In short, ethnology teaches Notes
us that groups-familial or other-are
Acknowledgments. This interview,
things which people do, at the cost of a
conducted by Pierre Lamaison, was origi-
constant labor of maintenance, of which
nally published in Terrain No. 4, Carnets
marriage constitutes one moment. And the
du Patrimoine Ethnologique. Mars 1985.
same is true of classes, when they exist in
Permission to reprint it is gratefully ac-
any significant way (after all, what does it
knowledged. (Translation by Robert Hur-
mean for a group to exist?). Membership
ley.)
is constructed, negotiated, bargained over,
ventured. Here again, one must transcend 'Hereafter this term is translated as "sense
the opposition between the voluntaristic of the game," which better conveys Bour-
subjectivism and the scientistic and realis-
dieu's emphasis on the cognitive dimen-
sion of the habitus.
tic objectivism that coexist in the Marxist

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