Co Kim Cham v.
Valdez Tan Keh, GR L-5 acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and
FACTS
Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the
Japanese occupation with the CFI of Manila. After the
liberation of the Manila and the American occupation,
respondent Judge Dizon refused to continue hearings, saying
that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had
invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments
of the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES
I. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made
under Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid
even after the American occupation.
II. Whether or not it was the intention of the Commander in
Chief of the American Forces to annul and void thereby all
judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.
III. Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have
jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending
in the courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied
or liberated by the American and Filipino forces
HELD
I principles of international law.
Yes. All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and
valid. If [the governments established in these Islands under
the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation or regime were de facto governments, the judicial
valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and
the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows
that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of
those governments, which are not of a political complexion,
were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle
of postliminy in international law, remained good and valid
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur.
II
No. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad
and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to
administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional,
processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the
Japanese occupation.
It should be presumed that it was not, and could not have
been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the
phrase “processes of any other government” in said
proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said
The legislative power of a commander in chief of military
forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has
been occupied by an enemy, during the military and before the
restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the
commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and
occupation, it is to be presumed that General Douglas
MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of
the Government and the President of the United States,
constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army,
did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations
asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the
early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the
United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions
of 1907.
III
Yes. Although in theory the authority the authority of the local
civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice
the invader does not usually take the administration of justice
into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or
tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is
enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect.
In the Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary
of War, “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually
abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they
were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far
as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.”
From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the
conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will
for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive
and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such
arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations
which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and
institution so far as military necessity will permit.