Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Economics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/eneeco

How large is the effect of financial incentives on electric vehicle sales? – A

global review and European analysis
Christiane Münzel a, Patrick Plötz a,⁎, Frances Sprei b, Till Gnann a
a
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI, Breslauer Straße 48, 76139 Karlsruhe, Germany
b
Chalmers University of Technology, Department of Space, Earth and Environment, Hörsalsvägen 11, 412 96 Göteborg, Sweden

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Plug-in electric vehicles (PEV), both as battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid vehicles have noteworthy po-
Received 17 July 2018 tential to reduce global and local emissions. However, several barriers still hinder a fast market diffusion of this
Received in revised form 7 August 2019 new technology. Governments around the world have implemented monetary and non-monetary policies to ac-
Accepted 12 August 2019
celerate PEV market diffusion. Their effectiveness is established in the literature, yet the effect size has been only
Available online xxxx
scarcely estimated empirically and only for the US. Here, we review econometric studies on the effect size of pur-
Keywords:
chase incentives and analyse data on PEV sales from 32 European countries from 2010 to 2017 with respect to the
Electric vehicles effect of financial incentives. We apply panel data regressions and control for other factors such as income and
Incentives fuel prices. We find energy prices and financial incentives to influence PEV adoption positively. The range of
Electric vehicles point estimates for the effect of incentives is 5–7% relative sales share increase in different model specifications.
Tax credit Methodologically, the inclusion of a trend variable proved important to capture overall changes in the diffusion of
Technology adoption this new technology. Our findings indicate that financial incentives have an impact on PEV sales and thus can fa-
cilitate their diffusion.
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Plug-in electric vehicles (PEV), both battery electric vehicles (BEV)
and plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEV), can reduce global and local emis-
sions and contribute to CO2 mitigation and clean air targets. Yet, their
market diffusion is hindered by several obstacles (Egbue and Long,
2012). They are thus supported by governments worldwide through
monetary and non-monetary policies, both for supply and demand
(Sykes and Axsen, 2017). Design, scope, and magnitude of these incen-
tives vary notably between countries, as their resulting effect on con-
sumer behaviour remains unclear. Furthermore, carbon tax may be
less effective in the transport sector where price elasticities in vehicle
usage are relatively low (de Jong and Gunn, 2001).
Investigating the influence of government policies on the market
penetration of PEVs is a growing field of research. Several studies indi-
cate that monetary purchase incentives can stimulate the market diffu-
sion of PEVs. Hardman et al. (2017) provide a detailed review of the
effectiveness of purchase incentives for PEV. Their review mainly com-
prises market analyses and surveys. They recommend that incentives
should (1) be applied at purchase and (2) focus on BEVs and PHEVs
with high all-electric range. However, they only discuss the effective-
ness in general without specifying the effect size of incentives. In a
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: patrick.ploetz@isi.fraunhofer.de (P. Plötz).
second review, Hardman (2019) focuses on recurring and indirect in-
centives for PEVs. Here, parking incentives and high occupancy vehicle
(HOV) lane access are, among others, found to positively impact PEV
sales. However, the magnitude of the effect is not quantified. Thus, the
overall effectiveness of incentives for PEVs is established in the litera-
ture. Yet, the extent of the effect of direct subsidies on sales is unclear
and the overall effect of non-monetary incentives is still under debate.
A few econometric studies include PEV purchase incentives. Most
studies use cross-sectional data on the country level (Sierzchula et al.,
2014; Plötz et al., 2016 & 2017; Lieven, 2015), state level (Jin et al.,
2014; Vergis and Chen, 2015) or city level (Mersky et al., 2016; Wang
et al., 2017; Slowik and Lutsey, 2017; Hall and Lutsey, 2017). However,
a cross-sectional analysis does not allow to control for country-specific
factors and renders conclusions on the effect of policies difficult
(Wooldridge, 2013).
Econometric methods, such as regressions with fixed effects, that are
better suited for policy analyses have mainly been applied to the US.
Clinton and Steinberg (2019) apply panel data regression with time
and state fixed effects to quarterly US state-level data for 2010 to
2014. Their results reveal a significant effect for rebates but cannot de-
termine the level of effect for tax credits. Jenn et al. (2018) analyse
monthly US state-level data for 2010 to 2015 including fixed effects
for time varying, regional and vehicle model specific factors. They find
financial incentives to be significantly and positively correlated with
PEV sales.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104493
0140-9883/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
2 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
In summary, empirical studies on PEV purchase incentives either ne-
glect country fixed effects or focus only on the US. The aim of the present
paper is to fill this gap. Here, we use panel data regression of PEV regis-
trations from Europe including country fixed effects and purchase in-
centives. Our work differs from existing studies in at least two aspects.
First, we provide a review of the econometric studies on PEV incentives.
Second, we are – to the best of our knowledge – the first to use panel
data regression for PEV policy analysis for Europe.
The outline is as follows. In Section 2, we extensively review the
existing econometric studies on PEV purchase incentives and provide
a best estimate from previous studies on the effect size of PEV purchase
incentives. In Section 3, we describe the data for our analysis of
European PEV sales, the regression model used and the methodology
for the purchase incentive quantification. The following Section 4 con-
tains an overview of the incentives in place. Our results are presented
in Section 5 and we close with a discussion in Section 6 and conclusions
in Section 7.
2. Literature review
This review focuses on econometric analyses of empirical PEV mar-
ket data. However, due to the relatively recent introduction of PEVs
and the limited number of such studies, it also includes other alternative
fuel vehicles (AFVs), namely flex-fuel vehicles and hybrid electric vehi-
cles (HEV). HEVs, flex-fuel vehicles (FFV) and PEVs are similar regarding
market entry barriers (e.g. novelty to consumers and higher purchase
price than comparable internal combustion engine vehicles - ICEVs)
and support through incentives (cf. Diamond, 2009; Gallagher and
Muehlegger, 2011; Jenn et al., 2013; Sprei, 2013; Sprei, 2018). In the fol-
lowing, we discuss econometric studies on incentives for PEVs sorted by
the econometric methods applied, followed by studies on other AFVs.
2.1. Econometric studies
Sierzchula et al. (2014) were the first to analyse the impact of gov-
ernment policies on empirical PEV market data with regression
methods. They applied ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis
on national data taken from 30 countries for the year 2012. Their anal-
ysis found financial incentives, the presence of local production facili-
ties, and more importantly, the per capita number of charging stations
to be significantly correlated with PEV sales shares. They pointed out
that these factors might not suffice to predict market development
since there could be unobserved dynamics advancing PEV sales. Plötz
et al. (2016) and Plötz et al. (2017) based their results on annual PEV
sales shares from Europe and PEV stock per capita from the US for the
years of 2010 to 2014. They found financial and indirect incentives, as
well as gasoline prices to have a positive impact on PEV market develop-
ment. Furthermore, for European countries, they identified connections
between sales share and disposable income, while the availability of
charging infrastructure played a major role for the US market.
Stepwise linear regression is a widespread approach to select mean-
ingful indicators for building statistical models.1 Mersky et al. (2016)
applied this method to investigate regional differences in the BEV adop-
tion in Norway. For their analysis, they used disaggregated sales data
from Norwegian municipalities covering the time from 2000 to 2013.
They discovered that charging infrastructure is the most powerful pre-
dictor for BEV sales share. Still the authors pointed out that the causal
direction remains unclear, since the government could be expected to
provide higher numbers of charging stations in regions with the most
actual or expected PEVs. Financial incentives were excluded from their
analysis, since these were offered at national level and hence constant
across Norway. Wang et al. (2017) investigated the influence of
1
While these methods have generally been criticized as biased and over-confident
(Harrell, 2001), we include them here with this caveat in an effort to be inclusive with
our review of the literature.
promotion activities and further factors on the per capita sales of
PEVs, BEVs and PHEVs in China using data from 41 Chinese pilot cities
from 2013 to 2014. They discovered that purchase subsidies have no
significant impact on PEV sales, though this could be due to not enough
heterogeneity in the subsidy level in the cities included. Hall and Lutsey
(2017) focused on the role of charging infrastructure examining global
data from cities and metropolitan areas for 2016. Their results con-
firmed that number of both level 2 and DC fast charging stations per
capita as well as financial incentives are significantly positively corre-
lated with PEV market shares. Slowik and Lutsey (2017) identified
drivers of the US BEV and PHEV market. They analysed data from 200
US metropolitan areas for 2016. Their outcomes indicated that the
most important factors are financial incentives, charging infrastructure,
and the availability of PEV models. They also found a correlation be-
tween PEV sales and promotion activities, workplace charging and
HOV lane access. Similarly, Jin et al. (2014) found that financial incen-
tives play an important role for BEV adoption in the US. They based
their results on US state-level data from 2013, detecting that rebates,
HOV lane use, emission testing exemptions and annual fees all signifi-
cantly positively correlate with BEV sales shares. Vergis and Chen
(2015) investigated the impact of financial benefits and state-specific
properties on the market shares of BEVs and PHEVs conducting back-
ward stepwise linear regression on US state-level data for 2013. They
concluded that, apart from consumer, geographic and energy market at-
tributes, the availability of charging infrastructure impacts BEV adop-
tion, while for PHEVs incentives and model availability are more
decisive.
While none of the above tried to analyse temporal variance of PEV
markets, two more recent studies took advantage of the panel structure
of their data and conduct fixed effects panel data regression. Clinton and
Steinberg (2019) obtained quarterly US state-level data for 2010 to
2014. They applied time and state fixed effects to run regression analy-
ses on BEV sales per capita with varying aggregation levels of incentives.
Their results revealed a positive impact of rebates, but could not find a
significant effect for tax credits. Regarding charging infrastructure, the
authors found a significant correlation with BEV sales, but note that
the effect appears to be smaller than that of financial incentives. Jenn
et al. (2018) analysed monthly US state-level data for 2010 to 2015 ap-
plying fixed effects for time varying, regional and vehicle model specific
factors. They use a generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate
their regression. Furthermore, they added a lagged-dependent variable
to account for suspected endogeneity in their model, which might be
there due to a higher motivation for governments to incentivize PEVs
in states where the demand for them is already higher. They found fi-
nancial incentives to be highly correlated and HOV lane access to be cor-
related with PEV sales, whereas for charging infrastructure subsidies,
they do not detect any significant connection. Wee et al. (2018) analyse
semi-annual US state level EV sales and find that an added $1000 model
specific incentive increases sales with 5–11%. Li et al. (2017) studied the
effect of sales incentives, subsidies for the development of charging in-
frastructure, and the indirect network effect between the two. They
found that sales incentives have had a substantial effect on EV sales
but that the effect would be even larger if the subsidy had been directed
toward charging infrastructure instead.
2.2. Other alternative fuel vehicles
Beresteanu and Li (2011) performed OLS regression on HEV sales
data from selected US metropolitan areas for 1999 to 2006. The authors
found income, gasoline price, education and tax credits but not local in-
centives to be correlated with HEV sales shares. However, they ascribe
the latter to possible unobserved local factors.
Diamond (2009) conducted cross-sectional and panel regressions
on annual US state-level sales of three selected HEV models from 2001
to 2006. He found gasoline prices correlated to HEV sales shares, while
incentives did not have any impact. He suggested that the latter might
 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
be due to dealers factoring financial benefits into their pricing scheme or
the delayed receipt of payments. Sprei (2013, 2018) analysed the impact
of financial incentives on the market diffusion of flex-fuel vehicles in
Sweden. She collected national monthly sales data for 2002 to 2011 and
yearly municipality-level sales figures between 2006 and 2011 and per-
formed pooled OLS on the first and FE panel regression on the second
panel. Her results indicated that the most important factors advancing
FFV market diffusion are the ratio between gasoline and E85 price, finan-
cial incentives and at local level exemptions from congestion charges.
Chandra et al. (2010) performed panel regressions with varying
combinations of year, province and vehicle segment fixed effects and
different vehicle classes on Canadian province-level data from 1989 to
2006. Their results indicated a significant correlation between financial
incentives and HEV market shares. Yet the authors stated that rebate
structures in Canadian provinces are inefficient and not suitable to fos-
ter HEV adoption. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) analysed the im-
pact of gasoline prices, financial incentives and HOV lane access on
HEV sales in US states. They used quarterly sales figures of selected
HEV models from US states between 2000 and 2006 and applied panel
regressions with state-model and time-model fixed effects. Their results
showed a significant, positive correlation between HEV sales and annual
fuel savings, but not for incentives such as tax benefits and HOV lane ac-
cess. Jenn et al. (2013) conducted fixed effects panel regression on na-
tional monthly data for 2000 to 2010, aiming to assess the effect of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 on HEV sales shares in the US. They found
the scheme to be correlated with HEV sales when incentives were
high (above 1000 USD). Also, they use lagged dependent variables to ac-
count for S-shaped growth rates of technology adoption, demonstrating
that disregarding the impact of previous values of the dependent vari-
able may lead to biased results.
2.3. Comparison
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the studies introduced above. It
includes an overview of data sets, regression methods as well as incentive
types and the most frequently used control variables. The table includes
independent variables at a high level of aggregation and only covers con-
trols that are used four or more times across the studies investigated.
As the dependent variable in their regression models, most authors
choose PEV/HEV/FFV sales or registration shares, while total sales and
sales per capita are analysed less frequently. Most commonly studied in-
centives are monetary incentives (covered by all studies), access to HOV
lanes and the availability of charging infrastructure.
Seven studies (four for PEV and three for HEV/FFV) find consistent ev-
idence for monetary incentives to be significant at 5% or lower level. In ad-
dition, seven out of 16 studies take a closer look at different types of
monetary incentives, considering tax credits, rebates, waivers and other
subsidies at a disaggregated level. Among the 16 studies, some conduct
more than one analysis on differing data sets (e.g. for changing vehicle
technologies, spatial or temporal clusters) or include more than one in-
centive type and report inconsistent outcomes. However, most studies
find some indication that monetary incentives have a positive impact
on PEV market penetration even if not all of them find significant effects.
For the non-monetary incentives, 13 studies include them at some
level of aggregation, most of them focusing on HOV lane access (partic-
ularly studies for the US), finding ambiguous results. While free charg-
ing or parking does not seem to have any significant impact on PEV
sales, there is some evidence that the permission to use HOV lanes
does. The same applies to the extension of charging infrastructure: Six
studies find the number of charging stations in total, per capita or per
PEV stock to be clearly significant at 5% or lower level. Almost all authors
include at least one demographic or macroeconomic control in their
analysis. Those applied most frequently are income and gasoline price,
followed by electricity price.
In the existing literature, individual incentives are often classified
into groups (e.g., according to the kind of benefit they provide). This is
3
useful for two reasons: Firstly, it helps obtain a clear picture of the pol-
icies in place, their modes of action and magnitudes. Secondly, cluster-
ing enhances the informative value of the regression results. Due to
the diversity of available benefits across countries, there are various
ways to receive the same amount of financial benefit. For example, de-
pending on the country there are different purchase related taxes
(e.g., value added tax, registration tax, import tax). If there are any re-
ductions of these taxes for PEV buyers, we expect the magnitude of
available savings to define the effect on PEV registrations rather than
the specific tax used. Thus, allocating different financial benefits to a
common cluster helps quantify the payoff of support measures.
Among existing studies, we find several approaches to classify poli-
cies, depending on the incentives considered, their area of application
and the analysis' level of detail. Further, it is quite common to distin-
guish between monetary and non-monetary or direct and indirect in-
centives, which is largely congruent (Plötz et al., 2016). Monetary or
direct incentives usually include rebates on the purchase price, tax ben-
efits and further financial benefits such as toll waivers or parking fee ex-
emptions (Clinton and Steinberg, 2019; Hall and Lutsey, 2017; Slowik
and Lutsey, 2017). A second approach is grouping by the time of effect
differencing between incentives at the time of purchase and supportive
measures that come into effect later on (Vergis and Chen, 2015; Wang
et al., 2017). A third attempt of classifying policies is the level of govern-
ment they are provided by, i.e. national or regional authorities
(Gallagher and Muehlegger, 2011). Public charger availability is mostly
considered separately, either in total or by distinguishing between
levels of charging, i.e., level 2 and DC fast chargers (Hall and Lutsey,
2017; Slowik and Lutsey, 2017). Finally, some authors choose to sum
up all incentives (i.e. financial and non-financial) to only one variable
(Jin et al., 2014).
Among previous research, three studies present estimates for the
quantitative impact of financial incentives on PEV market diffusion.
Sierzchula et al. (2014) report a relative growth of 0.6% in registration
shares due to an additional incentive of 1000 USD (at an average ex-
change rate of 1.25 USD/Euro between 2010 and 2017: 0.75% due to
an incentive of 1000 EUR). Jenn et al. (2018) find 1000 USD of financial
incentive to increase total PEV sales by 2.6% (i.e. 3.25% for 1000 Euro).
Clinton and Steinberg (2019) estimate the influence of incentives of
1000 USD on per 1000 capita registrations and estimate a relative effect
of 9% (thus 11.25% for 1000 Euro). Weighted by sample size
(i.e., number of observations) we find an average best estimate of 3.3%
per 1000 USD (4.2% per 1000 Euro) for these three studies, i.e., a sales
share of 2.0% at 5000 Euro subsidy would have been (on average and
ceteris paribus) 1.67% without the subsidy.
In summary, existing studies on the effect size of PEV incentives
most commonly use sales shares as dependent variable and differenti-
ate between monetary and non-monetary incentives. The most fre-
quent control variables are fuel prices and household income. We will
use the methodological findings from this review for the design of our
own regression model below.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
To assess PEV market development and its determining factors, we
compiled a data set for registrations of new PEVs in Europe. It consists
of annual national-level information on vehicle markets, consumer in-
centives as well as socio- and macroeconomic figures from the 32
major European countries2 for eight years (2010–2017). The following
sections introduce the data obtained and report its sources. A detailed
2
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (UK).
 4
Table 1
Overview of econometric studies on the effect of incentives on AFV market penetration.

Dependent variable Incentives Controls

Monetary incentives

Environmentalism
Stock per capita

Electricity price
Sales per capita

Non-monetary

Gasoline price
Absolute sales

infrastructure
Sales share

incentives

Education
Charging

Income
Vehicle
Author (year) Observations Time resolution type N Method 4 10 4 1 18 13 12 12 5 12 6 5
Clinton & Steinberg
US states 2010–2014, quarterly BEV 2461 FE panel data regression ✔ +/− − +/− + + + − +
(2016)
FE panel data
Jenn et al. (2018) US states 2010–2015, monthly PEV 18644 regression/LDV with GMM ✔ +/− +/− 0
estimator
Jin et al. (2014) US states 2013, yearly BEV 50 Stepwise linear regression ✔ 0 0 0 +

C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

PEV,
Global metropolitan
Hall & Lutsey (2017) 2016, yearly PHEV, 350 Stepwise linear regression ✔ 0 0
areas
BEV
Li et al (2017) US metro areas 2011–2013, yearly PEV 14,563 OLS and GMM regression ✔ + + + + +
Norwegian
Mersky et al. (2016) 2000–2013, yearly BEV 163/20 Stepwise linear regression ✔ 0 + + +/−
municipalities
European countries/
Plötz et al. (2016) 2010–2014, yearly PEV 35/125 Pooled OLS regression ✔ ✔ +/− + + +/− + −
US states
Sierzchula et al.
Global countries 2012, yearly PEV 30 Pooled OLS regression ✔ + + − + − − +
(2014)
Slowik & Lutsey BEV,
US metropolitan areas 2016, yearly 200/50 Stepwise linear regression ✔ 0 0 0
(2017) PHEV
Vergis & Chen BEV,
US states 2013, yearly 50 Stepwise linear regression ✔ + + + + + − +
(2015) PHEV
PEV, BEV,
Wang et al. (2017) Chinese cities 2013–2014, yearly 41 Stepwise linear regression ✔ 0 0 + 0
PHEV
PEV, BEV, 1952– Multi-level FE regression
Wee et al. (2018) US states 2010–2015, yearly ✔ + − − + + −
PHEV 4287 (reghdfe)
Beresteanu & Li
US metropolitan areas 1999–2006, yearly HEV 172 Pooled OLS regression ✔ + + + + +
(2008)
Chandra et al. (2010) Canadian provinces 1989–2006, yearly HEV 38110 FE panel data regression ✔ +
Pooled OLS/FE panel
Diamond (2009) US states 2001–2006, yearly HEV 297 ✔ +/− − + + +
regression
Gallagher &
US states 2000–2006, quarterly HEV 4781 FE panel data regression ✔ + − + +/− +
Muehlegger (2011)
FE panel data
Jenn et al. (2013) US national data 2000–2010, monthly HEV 20787 regression/LDV with GMM ✔ +/− +/−
estimator
Swedish 2006–2011,
120/174 Pooled OLS/FE panel
Sprei (2013, 2018) municipalities/national yearly/2002–2011, FFV ✔ + +/− +/− + + −
0 regression
data monthly
Notes: Signs connote the direction of the relationship reported by the study: “+”: positive relationship, “−”: negative relationship, “+/−”: inconclusive relationship, “0”: direction not reported.
Colours indicate significance of respective coefficient: dark grey: significant at the 5% or lower level, light grey: significant at 5% in some models of the publication; no shading: never significant.
 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
list of sources and summary statistics (cf. Table 5) are provided in
Appendix B.
3.1.1. Dependent variable: PEV sales shares
Registration figures of new BEVs and PHEVs are collected separately
from the European Alternative Fuel Observatory (EAFO) website (www.
eafo.eu). EAFO receives data directly from involved ministries, national
statistics, and other sources. Registration figures are chosen above
sales data, because eligibility for purchase incentives is usually based
on the location where a vehicle is registered rather than where it has
been sold (Clinton and Steinberg, 2016; ACEA (2017c)). Total new vehi-
cle registration figures are collected from the website of the European
Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA, http://www.acea.be)
and cross-checked with registration figures published by Eurostat. For
those countries tracked neither by ACEA nor by Eurostat (Cyprus,
Malta and Turkey) registration numbers are collected directly from na-
tional statistics offices. We aggregate registration figures of BEVs and
PHEVs to yearly PEV registrations and determine PEV registration
shares as the share of PEV registrations of the total number of new vehi-
cle registrations in a year and country. The data set is almost balanced,
meaning that there is only one missing value in all years and countries.
However, the PEV sales share is greater than zero for only 17 countries
in 2010, 23 in 2011, 29 in 2012 and 2013 and is positive for all 32 coun-
tries from 2014 onwards. This leads to missing values in the dependent
variable log of PEV sales shares (cf. Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the available PEV sales data grouped
by European regions. While most sales are rising over the whole period,
in some countries they dropped from 2015 to 2016. For the Netherlands,
PEV incentives were reduced in 2014 and again in 2016 (Gibbs, 2015).
For Denmark, existing incentives were reduced at the beginning of
2016 leading to increased sales at the end of 2015. Slovakia announced
tax reliefs for 2017, which may have led to planned purchases being de-
layed to 2017.
3.1.2. Incentives classification
Consumer incentives are implemented to drive PEV market diffusion
and to help overcome cost and convenience barriers (Slowik and Lutsey,
2017). Across European countries, there has been a large number of
benefits available, reaching from beneficial access regulations over tax
reductions and depreciation allowances to direct payments. This section
introduces incentives in place and their classification.
We classify incentives according to the kind of benefit they pro-
vide and their timing, as summarised in Table 2. Monetary incentives
aim at reducing the vehicle's ownership cost. We divide them into
three groups: One-time benefits received upon purchase, one-time
benefits received later on and recurring benefits. Non-monetary in-
centives are meant to increase the non-financial benefit created by
a vehicle, i.e. convenience and flexibility, and thus provide recurring
benefit. Given the large variety of incentive types identified, we
choose this multi-level classification to provide as much clarity as
possible. This classification is well-defined and much clearer than
the frequently used direct/indirect classification. Our distinction fur-
thermore offers the opportunity to investigate differences among the
impact of incentive groups and helps to answer questions such as
whether financial support is more effective at the time of the pur-
chase or as a recurring payment.
Information on financial incentives were collected primarily from
different ACEA sources. The organization publishes annual reports on
motor vehicle taxation compiled with the help of its member associa-
tions that cover countries within EU, EFTA and some further nations in-
cluding Turkey. Beyond that, ACEA provides annual overviews of CO2
based motor vehicle taxes and tax incentives. ACEA documents provide
comprehensive information about vehicle purchase subsidies and tax
benefits. For incentives not covered by ACEA, i.e. non-monetary and
local-level benefits, data from different sources, including EAFO, na-
tional government statements, e-mobility platforms and newspapers,
5
was collected and cross checked. Since websites are regularly updated
and present only incentives currently in place, the Internet Archive is
consulted to access outdated information about previous years. From
2010 to 2017, we identify 13 different incentive types across European
countries.
For local-level benefits, including non-monetary incentives (access
to bus lanes and restricted traffic zones) and local-level monetary incen-
tives (waivers on parking and toll fees as well as electricity supply sub-
sidies) no consistent source is found, making it difficult to determine
whether the set of incentives detected is complete. Furthermore, since
they are naturally effective on a regional or local level, their impact can-
not readily be evaluated on a national level. Therefore, these incentives
and all non-monetary incentives are not included in the regression anal-
ysis below.
Incentive quantification in terms of Euro is straightforward in many
cases, e.g. for rebates. However, for some cases such as income tax re-
ductions special care has to be taken. For flat and price-based incentives,
the cost difference between a PEV and a comparable ICEV model is used,
e.g. the difference in circulation tax between Nissan Leaf and VW Golf. In
order to determine differences between PEV and ICEV, each tax, fee or
rebate whose value showed deviations between technologies, is calcu-
lated for both models. The cost savings a policy generates for a BEV
(or PHEV respectively) is determined as the difference in the tax value
between BEV (PHEV) and ICEV. The overall benefit provided by a certain
policy is then determined as the mean value between savings for BEV
and PHEV. See Appendix A for more details.
3.1.3. Socio-economic control variables
To control for differing living conditions and economic frameworks,
the data set includes macro- and socioeconomic variables. Energy car-
rier prices have a direct impact on travel costs and thus a vehicle's
total cost of ownership. As presented in our literature review, they
have been found to strongly affect alternative fuel vehicles sales in the
past (Plötz et al., 2016; Vergis and Chen, 2015; Gallagher and
Muehlegger, 2011; Diamond, 2009; Jenn et al., 2013; Sprei, 2013,
2018) and are hence included in our data set. Electricity prices are gath-
ered from Eurostat's Energy statistics. For this paper, annual electricity
prices are calculated as averages of semi-annual prices for medium-
sized households with an annual consumption between 2500 and
5000 kWh. For Switzerland, electrical energy prices are gathered from
the website of the Federal Electricity Commission. Fuel prices in Euro/l
are collected from Energy statistical pocketbooks and complemented
with further national and international sources. Specification of further
control variables are discussed in Appendix B.
3.2. Methodology
We use panel data regression to analyse the effect of direct and
indirect incentives on PEV sales shares. Panel data matches the
clear panel structure of the data and the country fixed effects panel
data model captures unobserved country specific factors. The gen-
eral model used reads
 
ElecPrice
logðPEV sales shareÞit ¼ β1 Incentiveit þ β2 log
DieselPrice it
þ β3 Trendt þ δControlsit þ α i þ εit
The natural logarithm of PEV sales shares is used as dependent var-
iable, i denotes the country and t the year. Incentives are monetary
national-level incentives measured in thousands of Euros. We include
the (log of the) ratio of electricity price (measured in Euro/kWh) to die-
sel price (in Euro/l) since only the ratio of the fuel prices is relevant of
the operational cost savings of PEVs compared to conventional vehicles.
Furthermore, only the diesel price is included since diesel and gasoline
price are highly correlated (potential collinearity) and it is plausible
that PEVs as energy efficient vehicles compete rather with diesel cars
6 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

Eastern Northern

Norway
10.00 Iceland
Sweden
Hungary
Slovenia Finland
1.00 Latvia
Slovakia Denmark
Romania
Czechia Lithuania
Poland Estonia
0.10
Bulgaria
Croatia
PEV registration share in %

0.01

Southern Western
Belgium
Switzerland
Netherlands
10.00

Portugal Austria
Cyprus UK
1.00 Malta
Spain France
Italy
Germany
0.10 Greece Luxembourg
Ireland
Turkey
0.01

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year

Fig. 1. Overview of PEV sales shares data over time. Note the logarithmic y-axis.

in Europe.3 Furthermore, the use of the ratio saves one degree of free-
dom in the estimation. We use the log of the year as trend variable,
Trendt = log (t), to account for global changes over time such as increas-
ing PEV model availability and sinking battery prices. The various addi-
tional control variables have been summarised as one variable Controls.
Finally, αi denotes the country specific effects and εit the error term.
As described above, savings provided by a particular government
policy are either flat or based on vehicle specifications or price. To eval-
uate their quantitative impact on PEV registration shares, the magni-
tude of available savings is determined following the method
proposed by Sierzchula et al. (2014). We identify the BEV and PHEV
models with highest market shares across Europe from 2010 to 2017,
which are Nissan Leaf (best-selling in 69 of 256 observations) and
Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV (41 of 256). For both PEV models, an ICEV
model with comparable specifications regarding vehicle class and en-
gine power is selected: VW Golf VII 1.2 TSI and VW Tiguan 2.0 TSI are
chosen due to their high market shares across Europe and the availabil-
ity of reliable vehicle and price data.
A data set of estimated vehicle prices for European countries is com-
piled to assess the value of price-based incentives, accounting for na-
tional net price differences. To do so, German net purchase prices for
each model are retrieved from manufacturer's price lists of former
years and averaged over the analysis period. Based on German prices,
a mean net price for each country and model is calculated as follows:
Vehicle price indices of the VW Golf 1.2 TSI from 2007 to 2011 provided
by the European Commission are collected and used to compute an av-
erage price index for each country (European Commission, 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011). The VW Golf index is chosen due to its availability for
most countries and the model's high market shares across Europe, sug-
gesting representativeness for considered models and markets. Average
national net prices are calculated for each model, and supplemented
and cross checked with price figures from national manufacturer's
websites, which are accessed at different points in time via the Internet
Archive website. With this complete set of technical specification and
estimated vehicle prices on hand, the different tax types payable for
each country, year and vehicle model are determined. Further details
of the incentive quantification are given in the Appendix A.
Both fixed effects (FE) and first difference (FD) estimation are used
to determine the parameters in our model. We use both estimators to
enable comparison of their outcomes and to conduct residual diagnos-
tics subsequently to determine which model provides better estimators
(cf. Wooldridge, 2013). All statistical calculations are performed in the
statistical software R (R Core Team, 2017) using the plm package for es-
timation (Croissant and Millo, 2008; Millo, 2017). Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the country level are employed to address potential
within-country serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error
terms (Arellano, 1987; White, 1980). The R-package ggplot2
(Wickham, 2009) is used for graphical displays.
4. Overview of incentives in place

3
Empirical evidence of this is hard to find but surveys with PEV owners in Sweden and
Incentives offered in Europe between 2010 and 2017 differ from
Norway give indication that this is the case at least for PHEV (Granström et al., 2017; country to country, over time, in some cases based on geographical
Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, 2016). level (regional or local), and between target groups (private or
 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
Table 2
Incentive classification.
Monetary
One time
Upon purchase After purchase
- Rebate - Income tax reduction
- Home charger subsidy - Special depreciation
- POS tax reduction
- VAT reduction
corporate buyers). Incentives in place are summarised in Fig. 2. The
graphic includes the incentives described above and one panel of eight
rows (one per year for 2010 to 2017) for each country. For non-
monetary incentives, the marking indicates the availability in a country
and year. For financial incentives, the colour shade represents the calcu-
lated incentive value.
In 2010, 16 European states offered monetary incentives to PEV
buyers; in another seven states, they were favoured by implicit tax ben-
efits. In 2017, Poland was the only European country where we did not
find reference of any incentive. The number of monetary incentives pro-
vided has been growing all over Europe from an average of 1.5 different
incentives per country in 2010 to 3.3 incentives in 2017. Norway started
its efforts to support PEV adoption in the early 1990s and has been offer-
ing a comprehensive set of incentives since then (Ryghaug and Toftaker,
2016; Figenbaum, 2017; Zhang et al., 2016). Austria, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK followed this example each offering
six to seven different monetary incentives by 2017. All these countries
provide a mix of one-time and recurring incentives. The first occurrence
of non-monetary incentives after Norway was in Germany in 2015. In
2017, twelve countries added such benefits to their incentive schemes.
The most common monetary incentives are reductions or exemp-
tions from circulation tax (in 25 countries4) and POS taxes (in 20 coun-
tries). The latter have been significantly high in Denmark, Norway and
Greece. Denmark used to levy a registration tax of up to 1.8 times the ve-
hicle purchase price, which BEVs were completely exempted from until
2015. Since 2016, however, registration tax for BEVs has been gradually
phased in. In Norway, new vehicles are subject to an import tax based
on weight, GHG emissions and engine power, which is reduced for
PHEVs and remitted for BEVs. Greece levies not only an engine-based
registration tax at a maximum rate of 50% of the vehicle price, but also
a luxury tax on the wholesale price of vehicles costing N20,000 Euro,
which can account for an additional 40%. PHEVs were exempted from
both until 2016, while BEVs still are. Concerning circulation tax, the
most remarkable savings were limited to company cars in Hungary
and France. France levies a CO2 based tax at a maximum of 19 Euro/g,
which is naturally lower or zero for PEVs, while Hungary exempts
them from its engine power-based company car tax of up to 145 Euro
per kW. On average, calculated savings through reduced circulation
tax are however rather low at a medium rate of 234 Euro/year and
often implicit, which might explain their frequent appearance.
In the following, the individual incentive types are analysed in more
detail.
Monetary one-time incentives received upon purchase aim to re-
duce the expenses related to the purchase of a PEV. These can be direct
discounts on the vehicle purchase price or on the purchase of home
charging infrastructure, and tax reductions connected to the purchase.
Purchase subsidies or rebates are reductions of the purchase price
granted by national or regional governments. They are either flat or a
function of the vehicle purchase price and, in most cases, directly ad-
dress PEVs. Rebates can however be part of a more extensive bonus
malus scheme that rewards low and punishes high CO2 emissions of
4
Spain and Switzerland are missing in the figure, since corresponding values have not
been quantified due to local level of decision-making (see incentives quantification in Ap-
pendix A).
7
Non-monetary
Recurring Recurring
- Circulation tax reduction - HOV lane access
- Company car tax reduction - Access to restricted traffic zones
- Electricity supply subsidy - Charging infrastructure
- Waiver on fees
new registered vehicles. During the analysis period, rebates ranged
from 683 Euro (Cyprus, 2010–2011) to 7500 Euro (Slovenia,
2016–2017). Home charger subsidies aim at reducing the cost for instal-
lation of domestic charging stations, enabling consumers to make use of
potential benefits PEVs provide. In Europe, they are rare. Ireland and the
Netherlands have offered subsidies amounting to a maximum of 600
and 1450 Euro respectively in 2017, while Luxembourg made rebates
of 375 Euro available in 2010. All tax types that are due on acquisition
of a new vehicle, except for VAT, are summed up as point of sales
(POS) taxes. Most countries levy a registration tax, which is based on
vehicle's CO2 emissions, fuel consumption, engine capacity or a percent-
age of the purchase price. Thus, in many countries registration tax is ei-
ther naturally lower for PEVs or they are exempted explicitly. POS taxes
lifted for PEVs furthermore include a luxury tax in Greece, a property ac-
quisition fee in Hungary and a commodity tax levied on the purchase of
expensive goods in Iceland, as well as import taxes in Norway and
Switzerland. Although these tax types differ in kind and function, their
reduction or exemption reduces the purchase price for the customer.
Since the net benefit for the customer is determined by the saving's
magnitude rather than the nature of respective tax type, we expect
POS benefits to have a uniform effect on PEV sales. Therefore, we aggre-
gate them for the regression analysis. Value added tax (VAT) is generally
levied on the purchase of consumer goods in all European countries;
hence it increases the vehicle purchase price. Clearly VAT exemptions
could have been allocated to our group of POS tax benefits as argued
above. However, since VAT is the only tax type considered that is levied
in all European countries, VAT benefits are exempted from the cluster to
display their effects separately. PEVs are exempted from VAT in Iceland
and Norway. Furthermore, in Portugal companies are allowed to deduct
VAT of electric business cars from corporate input tax.
Monetary one-time incentives received after purchase affect per-
sonal or corporate income tax. Personal income tax deductions can ei-
ther be flat or a function of the vehicle purchase price. In Portugal,
private PEV buyers are permitted to subtract a fixed amount of 803
Euro in the year of purchase. In Luxembourg, private customers were
granted an income tax allowance of 5000 Euro in 2017 while in
Belgium, they were allowed to deduct 30% of the purchase price from
their income tax from 2010 to 2012. In 2013 however, the scheme
was repealed and replaced by a number of regional incentives. Special
depreciation of company cars has so far only been offered in the UK.
Business cars are usually written off at 8 to 20% per year, depending
on CO2 emissions and year. Vehicles with exceptionally low emissions,
including PEVs, are subject to a 100% first year depreciation, resulting
in considerable corporate income tax savings.
Recurring monetary incentives concern annual taxes like circula-
tion and personal income tax, and electricity prices and fees. They are
often lower than one-time payments but provide benefit recurring ei-
ther annually or continuously. The most common incentives granted
to PEV buyers are reductions or exemptions from circulation tax,
which are in place in 25 out of 32 countries. Circulation tax is payable
in fixed intervals (e.g. monthly or annually) by car owners and is usually
a function of different vehicle parameters, including CO2 emissions, en-
gine power or displacement, weight and age. PEVs can be favoured im-
plicitly due to their low emissions or explicitly through reductions of the
imputed parameters (e.g. weight, which is above average for most
8 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)
Fig. 2. Overview of PEV purchase incentives in Europe. Non-existing incentives are shown in white and existing incentives are colour-coded according to their financial value (in increasing
order from orange over purple to blue). Missing values (due to lack of information) is grey and non-monetary incentives are in light orange if existing. Note that scale ranges differ across
panels. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

models due to high battery weight) or the calculated tax value. The pri-
vate use of company cars is considered a benefit in kind and therefore
subject to annual personal income tax in many European countries.
The governments of Austria, Germany, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and
the UK reduced benefit in kind for PEVs. Moreover, for eight coun-
tries reference to different models of electricity supply subsidies
was found. These include free charging at public charging stations
and local electricity price discounts. Those incentives are however
usually restricted to local areas, e.g. major cities. The same applies
to waivers on fees, which, within the observation period, were
granted in different schemes in countries all over Europe. The most
common payments remitted are parking fees in metropolitan areas.
Furthermore, there are waivers on road or ferry tolls in Norway
and Spain, and waivers on congestion zone charges in the UK. PEV
drivers in Austria and Bulgaria are released from the obligation of
purchasing a highway vignette.
 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx 9

Non-monetary incentives grant PEV users further non-financial ben-
efits, e.g. access to restricted traffic lanes or zones such as bus lanes or
high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes. Furthermore, on a local level, cities
can decide to provide access to restricted traffic zones for vehicles with
very low tailpipe emissions, enabling their drivers to benefit from high
degrees of flexibility and convenience. Exemptions from such bans are
currently offered to PEVs in French, German, Hungarian and Dutch cities.
However, HOV lanes and low emission access zones are fit to be evaluated
on a local rather than a national level since they appear to be used in some
cities only (e.g. in Germany, they are nation-wide possible but hardly any
city uses them). Please note that non-monetary incentives have not been
included in the econometric results due to limited data availability.
Overall, significant temporal, spatial and incentive-type differences
imply large variations providing ideal conditions for an econometric
analysis.
5. Results
5.1. Panel regression on PEV sales shares
We performed panel data regression with the quantified incentives
to estimate their effect on PEV sale shares. Methodologically, we follow
the best practice as derived from the review in Section 2. Table 3 dis-
plays our primary regression results for country fixed effects estimation
(odd columns) and estimation in first differences (even columns) for
two scenarios: Columns (1) to (4) contain results for aggregated finan-
cial incentives, whereas columns (5) to (8) show results for distinct in-
centive groups (one-time and recurring incentives). Additional
regression results are presented in Appendix C and discussed below.
All F-statistics of our models are significant. The goodness of fit mea-
sures reveal a remarkably high explanatory value of FE estimation of our
model (adjusted R2 ≥ 0.75, F statistic N 180). We run a second analysis
with disaggregate incentives to evaluate the impact of distinct incentive
types, whose results are displayed in Appendix C. The absence of collin-
earity has been established by variance inflation factors (VIF). All VIFs
take values below 2.0, indicating independence of our explanatory var-
iables. To check for exogeneity of idiosyncratic errors, Ramsey's RESET
tests for explanatory values of powers 2 and 3 of regressors and depen-
dent variable were employed, indicating that the additional explanatory
power is not high (p N 0.1), thus the exogeneity assumption holds. To
test for homoskedasticity, residuals were plotted against fitted values
and Breusch-Pagan test statistics were computed for FE and FD
estimators. The residual plots indicate homogeneity of variance for
both estimation methods. Yet a studentized Breusch-Pagan test for the
FE and FD estimators rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity
at a 5% confidence level. The presence of serial correlation in the idio-
syncratic errors is checked following Wooldridge (2010). The p-values
obtained deliver evidence of autocorrelation in differenced (p b 0.01)
rather than in original errors (p N 0.1). Given the comparably small
data set observed in this analysis, this finding supports the assumption
that FE is likely to provide more accurate estimates than FD regression
(Wooldridge, 2013). However, the clustered SEs employed in the
models are robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
and ensure efficiency of all estimators and unbiasedness of the SEs
and test statistics.
The effect of the monetary incentives is most interesting here: 1000
Euro higher subsidy increases the PEV sales share by about 5.4% (with
90% confidence band 0.3–10.5%) according to the country-fixed effects
model (model (1) in Table 3), e.g. from 1% PEV sales share without incen-
tive to 1.05% with 1000 Euro incentive (keeping all other factors fixed).
The regression on disaggregated incentives aims to assess whether con-
sumers respond differently to recurring tax savings than to one-time incen-
tives. For FE regression, the estimated coefficient for recurring incentives
(0.336) is approximately six times larger than for one-time incentives
(0.049). Interpreting the coefficient and the effect of recurring incentives
is not always straight forward, since the total savings generated depend
on the holding time of the vehicle. In our regression, we only use one
year of saving while the actual saving will probably be much larger. But
at the same time consumer tend to discount future savings and this will
also affect the impact of the incentive (Greene et al., 2005).
The trend variable is found highly significant for all specifications
and estimation methods, revealing the vital importance of accounting
for overall time-varying factors. Furthermore, inclusion of the trend var-
iable changes the effect of incentives and is thus important for the ro-
bustness of our findings. The trend covers important changes in the
overall background such as decreasing battery prices and higher avail-
ability of PEV models. Our findings highlight the methodological impor-
tance of using a trend variable when estimating the effect of incentives
for PEV. We compared the inclusion of year dummies instead of a trend
which led to similar findings.
Further socioeconomic controls were included to ensure reliability of
the basic model specification and quality of the choice of explanatory var-
iables. Additional controls considered are the Gini coefficient, income
quintile share ratio, home ownership rate, dwelling type and motorization

Table 3
Regression results for PEV sales shares (estimate with standard errors in parentheses).

Model Aggregated Incentives Incentives by Recurrence

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

0.054⁎ 0.068⁎⁎ 0.051 0.068⁎⁎

Financial incentive (in 1000 Euro) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.028)
0.049 0.068⁎⁎ 0.045⁎ 0.068⁎⁎
One-time incentive (in 1000 Euro) (0.031) (0.029) (0.025) (0.035)
0.336⁎⁎⁎ 0.054 0.344⁎⁎ 0.074
Recurring incentive (in 1000 Euro)
(0.087) (0.108) (0.174) (0.223)
−0.196 −0.737 −0.270 −0.859 −0.224 −0.735 −0.303 −0.860
Log(electricity price/diesel price) (0.569) (0.689) (0.548) (0.738) (0.576) (0.692) (0.445) (0.604)
2.224⁎⁎⁎ 1.976⁎⁎⁎ 2.320⁎⁎⁎ 2.098⁎⁎⁎ 2.202⁎⁎⁎ 1.1974⁎⁎⁎ 2.294⁎⁎⁎ 2.099⁎⁎⁎
Trend (0.113) (0.411) (0.164) (0.417) (0.113) (0.123) (0.137) (0.289)

Additional controls ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Country fixed effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
First differencing ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Observations 226 194 220 189 226 194 220 189
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.16 0.78 0.22 0.75 0.16 0.784 0.21
F statistic 237.7⁎⁎⁎ 13.5⁎⁎⁎ 91.5⁎⁎⁎ 6.7⁎⁎⁎ 180.161⁎⁎⁎ 13.407⁎⁎⁎ 83.5⁎⁎⁎ 6.0⁎⁎⁎

Notes: Clustered SEs in parenthesis.

⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
10 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

rate (see Table 6 in Appendix C for results, and models 3, 4, 7, and 8 in
Table 3 for a summary). For both FE and FD estimation, only minor
changes in coefficients are found. For FE estimation, all additional controls
show small and insignificant coefficients while for FD estimation, Gini co-
efficient and dwelling type show significant (p b 0.05 and p b 0.01) coef-
ficients. Including them increases the goodness of fit statistics only slightly
and has no remarkable effect on any of the other point estimate. An F-test
to compare the overall performance of the more complex models led to
mixed results: For the country fixed effects regression, the models with
all controls (models 3 and 7 in Table 3) are not better (p N 0.05) than
the simple models (1 and 5 in Table 3) whereas for the first difference
models (4 or 8 compared to 2 or 6 in Table 3), they are (p b 0.05). For
transparency and robustness, all models are presented in Table 3. Overall,
the coefficients for incentives are stable against the inclusion of additional
controls (models 3, 4, 7, and 8 in Table 3 as well as Appendix C).
5.2. Differentiation by incentive type
We test the effect of individual one-time incentives on PEV sales
shares (cf. Table 4). Rebates and benefits in VAT or other POS taxes are
easy to understand and effective at the time of purchase. In contrast, in-
come tax credits are cleared with income tax debt, hence they reduce
the purchase price retroactively. Also, they depend on individual in-
come tax liability as to whether the full incentive value is available for
a particular customer (Gallagher and Muehlegger, 2011). Furthermore,
upfront incentive types may be perceived differently. Rebates are of-
fered explicitly and are easily comprehensible, whereas tax savings
are often available implicitly and may have a more complex structure.
Thus, consumer awareness of the former is possibly higher. Specifica-
tion (III) in Table 4 addresses these differences and isolates the efficacy
of individual incentive types.
The FE estimator (column (5)) produces positive and significant point
estimates for rebate, POS tax benefits or exemptions and recurring incen-
tives. Rebate and POS tax benefit do not differ considerably with esti-
mates of 0.081 and 0.127 respectively. Accordingly, 1000 Euro of either
of these entails an average relative increase of approximately 10% in
PEV registration shares. The point estimate for recurring incentives
changes only slightly in comparison to specification (II). It attains a
value of 0.35 and remains highly significant, demonstrating stability
against the change in model specification. Thus, regarding these incentive
types, no significant difference is found in consumer response. Contrary
to expectation, remaining incentive estimates exhibit negative relation-
ships. However, both estimates are based upon small numbers of obser-
vations (20 in the case of VAT, 16 for income tax), since these
incentives were rarely available across Europe for the observed period.
Thus, the reliability of obtained estimates can be considered rather lim-
ited. Additionally, all countries that provide VAT or income tax benefits
offer them along with further incentives, such as rebates or circulation
tax reductions. Hence, it seems likely that a positive effect is mistakenly
attributed to other incentive types.
Results from FD regression reported in column (6) largely support the
findings from FE estimation. Estimates for rebate (0.097), VAT benefit
(−0.082), POS tax benefit (0.081) and recurring incentive (0.091) are
mostly close to those obtained from FE regression with overlapping 95%
(or smaller) confidence bands. Solely for income tax (0.102), different
point estimates are produced, supporting the deduction of their lack of
reliability.
5.3. Robustness checks and additional controls
In addition to data testing and residual diagnostics, we apply several
robustness checks to the models to validate their reliability and robust-
ness against changes in the data set and the choice of variables. The fol-
lowing adjustments beyond the already stated inclusion of further
controls were employed to our models. Firstly, countries with potential
outliers in PEV registration shares are excluded from the analysis to ex-
clude potentially biased estimation results (Table 7 in Appendix C). Sec-
ondly, small vehicle markets are excluded from the analysis to prevent
leverage of small markets on the estimator for the average impact of in-
centives (Table 8 in Appendix C). Thirdly, we excluded the most recent

Table 4
Regression results for all specifications of the trend model.

Dependent variable: log(PEV registration shares)

Model (I) Aggregated Incentives (II) Incentives by Recurrence (III) Incentives by Recurrence and Type

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Financial incentive (in 1000 Euro) 0.054⁎ 0.066⁎⁎

(0.031) (0.029)
One-time incentive (in 1000 Euro) 0.049 0.066⁎⁎
(0.031) (0.029)
Rebate (in 1000 Euro) 0.081⁎⁎⁎ 0.097⁎⁎⁎
(0.028) (0.032)
VAT (in 1000 Euro) −0.011 −0.082⁎⁎
(0.035) (0.033)
0.127⁎⁎ 0.081
POS tax (in 1000 Euro) (0.053) (0.096)
−0.132⁎⁎⁎ 0.102⁎⁎
Income tax (in 1000 Euro)
(0.04) (0.043)
Recurring incentive (in 1000 Euro) 0.336⁎⁎⁎ 0.069 0.35⁎⁎⁎ 0.091
(0.087) (0.105) (0.084) (0.116)
Log(electricity price/diesel price) −0.196 −0.606 −0.224 −0.607 −0.099 −0.552
(0.569) (0.611) (0.576) (0.619) (0.584) (0.617)
Trend 2.224⁎⁎⁎ 2.177⁎⁎⁎ 2.202⁎⁎⁎ 2.177⁎⁎⁎ 2.138⁎⁎⁎ 2.187⁎⁎⁎
(0.113) (0.134) (0.113) (0.134) (0.1) (0.138)

Country fixed effects ✔ ✔ ✔

First differencing ✔ ✔ ✔
Observations 226 194 226 194 226 194
Adjusted R2 0.751 0.167 0.753 0.163 0.756 0.159
F statistic 237.745⁎⁎⁎ 20.216⁎⁎⁎ 180.161⁎⁎⁎ 13.407 ⁎⁎⁎ 104.937⁎⁎⁎ 7.047⁎⁎⁎

Notes: Clustered SEs in parenthesis.

⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
years 2016 and 2017 to focus on the early market phase with innovators
only (Table 9 in Appendix C). Fourthly, charging infrastructure has been
included (Table 10 in Appendix C). Lastly, we checked the common
trend assumption.
5.3.1. Outliers removed
We observe potential outliers of sales share for individual years in
Croatia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Turkey, which could not
be explained by changing conditions or special effects (such as change
in incentives or availability of important makes and models for the indi-
vidual countries). These markets were hence excluded from the data set
before running a robustness check. The test was conducted on all sub-
specifications of the basic model and for both estimation methods. The
coefficient estimates obtained show only slight changes (see Table 7).
A single noticeable finding again concerns energy price ratio, which
for FE estimation changes direction and obtains larger p-values between
0.39 and 0.72 while for FD estimation the coefficients keep their signs
but become insignificant (p N 0.6). Furthermore, for all sub-
specifications, overall goodness of fit measures, namely adjusted R2
and F statistics increase as expected when removing potential outliers.
5.3.2. Common trend in PEV sales shares
We tested the assumption of an overall linear trend by linear regres-
sion of the PEV sales shares on time with and without log-transform of
the PEV sales shares and the year. There is a statistically significant (p b
0.05) growth in sales shares over time in 26 out of 32 countries. Addition-
ally, we added yearly dummies to the main model with country fixed ef-
fects. All yearly dummies are positive and highly significant (p b 0.01) and
the estimates for the monetary incentive and the energy price ratio
change only slightly and keep their level of significance. The yearly
dummy estimates grow over time, exactly as expected from an overall
trend toward PEV. Accordingly, the inclusion of a linear trend is justified.
In summary, the observed effect of incentives on PEV sales shares is
highly robust.
5.3.3. Small vehicle markets removed
For a second robustness check, small vehicle markets were omitted.
Panel regression weights all cross-sections equally, thus a coefficient esti-
mated for all cross-sectional units responds uniformly to observations
from any country. To eliminate a potential leverage of small markets on
overall European PEV market analysis, passenger car markets with
b40,000 new vehicle registrations per year were excluded (Croatia,
Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Turkey). Respective estimation results
do not show noteworthy changes in any coefficients (see Table 8). Hence,
we conclude that leverage of small markets is not an issue with our data.
5.3.4. Charging infrastructure
Charging infrastructure is included in several of the studied papers
and is found to have a positive impact on PEV sales (see e.g. Clinton and
Steinberg, 2019; Hall and Lutsey, 2017; Sierzchula et al., 2014). However,
charging station data has not been included in our primary analysis for
three reasons: Firstly, the number of charging stations (per capita, PEV
stock or area) can vary significantly between different regions and is con-
sequently difficult to assess on a national level. Secondly, charging infra-
structure is difficult to evaluate isolated from other factors, since the
need for public charging depends on the availability of home or work-
place charging opportunities (Tal et al., 2013). Thirdly, the evaluation of
charging infrastructure could be subject to endogeneity, since govern-
ments may be more interested in focussing promotion activities on re-
gions with higher (expected or actual) PEV market shares (Mersky
et al., 2016; Li et al., 2017). We believe this issue to be minor since the es-
tablishment of charging stations does not follow a market logic yet and is
rather driven by subsidies and regulations (Serradilla et al., 2017; Jochem
et al., 2016; European Parliament, 2014). We therefore include charging
infrastructure as a control variable in our robustness checks. We distin-
guish between slow and fast charging stations (see Table 10 in
11
Appendix C). The inclusion of charging infrastructure does not change
the coefficients for the incentives, implying that it does not alter our con-
clusion on the effect of incentives.
In line with the results of preceding research, we find the number of
fast chargers per capita positive and highly significant. However, coeffi-
cients for level 2 chargers are inconclusive, supporting the assumption
that their number is fit to be evaluated on a regional rather than the na-
tional level. However, the sign of the coefficient for slow charging is neg-
ative which is not to be expected. One possible reason for this is that
installation of slow charging is driven by local initiatives and subsidies
which are not well captured when aggregating at national level since
local effects and cities of various size as well home charging matter.
Charging stations might also have different impact of time and be im-
portant up to a certain level and thereafter not have any effect (Sprei,
2018; Gnann et al., 2012). While being an important subject the exact
role and impact of charging stations is beyond the scope of this paper,
but merits further and more in-depth analysis.
6. Discussion
The results found in this study are robust, reliable and accord with for-
mer research. Furthermore, they are transferable to other data sets, i.e. dif-
ferent countries, time periods, and spatial or temporal scope.
Transferability is ensured through fixed effects and a trend variable. Yet
our results come with some uncertainty. Firstly, the aggregation of sales
data to national levels ignores variances at the city or regional level. In
many cases, several major cities have introduced additional incentives
for PEV users, which have not been accounted for here and might under-
state the actual level of incentives. This can introduce a bias in our results.
However, consistent data sets both on sales and incentives at levels below
national are difficult to obtain. An analysis on municipal and regional levels
would presumably be rather qualitative and render the quantitative anal-
ysis by regression applied here difficult, since it might be hard to generalize
and quantify all the incentives and initiatives taken at the local level.
The model's dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual na-
tional new PEV registration shares. Here, registration shares are chosen in-
stead of sales shares since the eligibility for purchase incentives is usually
based on registration rather than sales location (Clinton and Steinberg,
2019). Furthermore, shares are chosen over total registrations because
the current focus is on the development of the shares of PEVs within total
new vehicle registrations. Due to significant differences of PEV markets
across countries, total numbers would have blurred this effect (Mersky
et al., 2016). Finally, the logarithmic form is strongly recommended in
econometric literature when the dependent variable is a percentage since
it is useful to ensure normality of residuals (Kennedy, 2008; Sprei, 2018;
Wooldridge, 2013). The existence of normality after taking the logarithm
is confirmed through visual checks of data and regression outputs.
Our analysis builds on a number of assumptions. (1) The value calcu-
lated as savings depends on the choice of reference vehicles, their specifi-
cations, and prices. The large market shares of the selected vehicles allow
us to assume that they are appropriate representatives of the European
market. Still, the incentive a consumer receives depends on the vehicle
choice and can therefore deviate from the amount calculated here. The
actual impact on bias of consumer preference is hard to capture since
the counterfactual, i.e. what vehicle would the consumer have chosen in-
stead of a PEV is hard to establish. (2) For the matter of consistency, all in-
centive values are determined as savings of a PEV in comparison to an
equivalent ICEV. The savings of a PEV, compared to its original purchase
price, may however differ. The choice of vehicle is also conservative re-
garding price in order not to bias results upwards. (3) Incentives are
weighted equally, irrespective of their recipients (private, corporate or
all customers), even if the incentive structures might be different for
these groups and that for some countries company provided vehicles
constitute a large share of new car sales. Thus, in markets where one con-
sumer group predominates, incentives addressing the other may be
overrated. The directional impact of this will differ from country to
12 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

country depending on the specific incentive structure and sales distribu-
tion between groups. The aggregated effect is thus hard to establish.
(4) Incentives for different electric vehicle technologies are weighted
equally, each at one half of the national incentive value. This implicitly as-
sumes equally strong national BEV and PHEV markets, hence potential
differences in consumer preference are not addressed. The direction of
the impact of this assumption will also be country specific (e.g., in
Sweden PHEV sales have dominated over BEV, while in Norway the oppo-
site is true) and hard to estimate at an aggregated level.
Methodologically, three potential sources of bias remain beyond as-
sumptions and robustness checks. On the one hand, as noted by
Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011), policy selection may be endogenous,
thus a country chooses benefits considered most effective to foster PEV
market penetration. For example, Denmark has notably high taxes on
new vehicles registrations, thus exempting PEVs from registration tax
results in considerable benefits for consumers. Endogenous choice of in-
centives might lead to overestimation of the efficacy of particular incen-
tive types. Secondly, calculated incentive values are based on the
assumptions that all customers act rationally, thus they claim available
incentives, and that dealers furthermore pass the whole promotion
value to customers (Clinton and Steinberg, 2019). These simplifications
might lead to an overestimation of incentives efficacy. However, Sallee
(2011) investigates this matter for the HEV market and finds evidence
that the full promotion value was passed and the same can be expected
to hold for here (Clinton and Steinberg, 2019). Thirdly, if a buyer's pri-
vate income tax liability does not exceed the tax credit available with
PEV purchase, it can be claimed only partially (Clinton and Steinberg,
2019). Yet, we assume that the average PEV buyer (or employee offered
a business car) is assumed an above-average earner, hence partial in-
centive eligibility is not expected to be an issue in our sample. Other fac-
tors that will influence the sales of PEVs that are not included in our
study are consumer awareness about PEV in general and subsidies in
particular. For example, Jenn et al. (2018) include a variable about con-
sumer awareness of incentives and find it important in explaining the
difference in efficacy of the incentive between states. Kurani and
Hardman (2017) find in a survey that even in California, one of the larg-
est markets for PEVs, knowledge about these is low and is not increas-
ing. On the other hand, incentives might be given to consumers that
would have purchased a PEV anyway, so called free-riders, reducing
the actual efficiency of the incentive. Model availability is indirectly in-
cluded in our trend variable and is also an important factor for adoption.
Finally, our study focusses on the demand side, thus a number of reg-
ulations and incentives that can push the supply side as well are only
considered implicitly in our regression analysis. The presence of car in-
dustry and OEM promotion actions that are time-invariant are captured
by country fixed effects. Notably Zero Emission Vehicle Mandates might
be just as important (Sykes and Axsen, 2017). Our model does not cap-
ture country specific shocks to EV adoption that are not time-invariant
(e.g. advertising incentives or model-specific releases). Further studies
may thus be warranted both on supply side regulations as well as
more time dependent country specific shocks.
7. Conclusions
We analyse the quantitative effect of financial incentives and certain
control variables on PEV adoption in Europe measured as PEV registration
shares. We exploit the panel structure of the examined data accounting for
country-level heterogeneity and obtain a robust and positive relationship
between PEV registration shares and financial incentives. Evidence is
found that not only the availability of incentives in general, but also the
magnitude of monetary benefits affects market diffusion. Furthermore, it
is shown that overall time-varying factors captured by our trend variable
are more critical to PEV adoption than country-specific macro- and socio-
economic parameters. These results contribute to the ongoing discussion
on the effectiveness of incentivising policies that address PEV adoption.
As the existing literature predominantly studies the US market, results of
the present study enrich the discussion by providing evidence from Europe.
From a policy perspective, financial incentives foster PEV market dif-
fusion. The range of point estimates for the effect of incentives is 5–7%
in different model specifications. This result is robust in the sense that
all point estimates of total incentive effect with all tested controls fall in
this range (even if the coefficient is not significant in some models).
This implies, given no other changes, that an incentive of 1000 Euro
would increase PEV sales shares on average by about 5–7% relative in-
crease of a given sales share, e.g. from 2% to 2.10–2.14% sales share. This
result is also consistent with other studies in the literature. Besides the in-
centives a trend variable is significant indicating that effects such as more
PEVs available on the market also have a positive effect on sales shares.
Furthermore, taking a more in-depth perspective on distinct financial in-
centive types suggests some significant differences in consumer response
but their full evaluation is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Despite the high explanatory power of our regression model and its
robustness against variation in parameters and data, further validation
would be desirable. The limited number of available observations ren-
ders this analysis explorative to a certain degree. Thus, validation with
a larger data set can substantiate its value (both larger N and T would in-
crease sample size and is likely to reduce standard errors such that
higher significance levels of the findings can be expected). This would
furthermore enable a more accurate assessment of the impact of distinct
incentive types, which this study finds only partially conclusive results
for. Moreover, previous research suggests that not only national-level fi-
nancial incentives but also other supportive measures are likely to be
significant drivers of PEV market diffusion. On a regional or local level,
principal factors (e.g. public charging infrastructure and toll charge
waivers), which this study is not able to observe from its national
point of view, can be identified. Further factors that should be analysed
in future work include non-monetary incentives, garage ownership,
public charging infrastructure, and the interaction between supply
and demand side policies. Consequently, future analysis should take a
more in-depth perspective to enable their evaluation and investigate
whether they are significant drivers of PEV diffusion.
Acknowledgments
The authors like to acknowledge fruitful discussions with Joachim
Schleich and highly fruitful comments from the reviewers.
This publication was written in the framework of the Profilregion
Mobilitätssysteme Karlsruhe, which is funded by the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Labour and Housing in Baden-Württemberg and as a na-
tional High Performance Center by the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft.
Funding for Frances Sprei was also provided through the Area of Ad-
vance Transportation and Mistra Carbon Exit.

Appendix A. Incentive quantification

ACEA Tax Guides provide detailed descriptions of taxes and fees related to acquisition and ownership of motor vehicles in European countries. Tax
Guides for the years of 2010 to 2017 are used to compute potential savings for PEVs through explicit or implicit policy incentives. For flat and price-
based incentives, there are two possible approaches to determine financial values, depending on a consumer's understanding of the benefit provided.
The first method assumes that a potential buyer is interested in the cost saved compared to the original purchase price, which is the price of the same vehicle
without any policy incentive. The second one is based on the understanding that for making a purchase decision, consumers rather consider the cost differ-
ence between a PEV and a comparable ICEV model, e.g. the difference in circulation tax between Nissan Leaf and VW Golf. This study follows the second
 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx 13

approach for reasons of consistency. Incentives based on technical data are impossible to quantify without a reference value. For example, to understand the
cost savings for a zero-emission vehicle provided by a CO2-based registration tax, the tax value for a vehicle that actually shows tailpipe emissions is needed.
Thus, the first method would not be appropriate for specification-based benefits. To make sure all incentive types considered remain comparable and con-
sistent, the cost savings or payments for all incentive types are calculated based on the difference between a new PEV and its reference ICEV.
There are some differences in taxation between new and second-hand vehicles. However, all vehicles for both PEV and ICEV models are assumed to be
new. This is reasonable, since PEV models have only been introduced to consumer markets within the period of examination. Thus, especially shortly after
their market introductions, the models considered are not expected to be widely available on the second-hand market.
In order to determine differences between PEV and ICEV, each tax, fee or rebate whose value showed deviations between technologies, is calcu-
lated for both models. The cost savings a policy generates for a BEV (or PHEV respectively) is determined as the difference in the tax value between
BEV (PHEV) and ICEV. The overall benefit provided by a certain policy is then determined as the mean value between savings for BEV and PHEV.
Recurring incentives are treated as one-time saving, i.e. only the year of the purchase is considered, while later payments are neglected. This ap-
proach prevents the need for further assumptions considering holding period. The holding time varies depending on consumer groups (private or
corporate buyers). Neither average holding periods, nor consistent information on the share of consumer group are available for this analysis.
Thus, in order to estimate an average holding period, corresponding assumptions would be necessary. Treating recurring incentives as one-time sav-
ing enables the regression to estimate a consistent coefficient.
In a number of countries, vehicle taxation is partly or completely within the area of responsibility of regional administrations. For France and Belgium, it
is possible to determine proportionate values of benefits provided. In France, there is an engine power-based registration tax, which was reduced or re-
mitted for PEVs in 8 to 16 (depending on the year) of the formerly 27 French regions within the analysis period. Thus, tax liability for PEVs in France is
estimated as the share of tax levied in regions where no reduction was offered. In Belgium, motor vehicle taxation is mostly an issue of the highly auton-
omous regional administrations. There are, however, only three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region), for which tax savings and
subsidies are calculated and summed up, weighted each by one third. In Italy, there is an engine power-based registration tax, which can be remitted for
PEVs on a provincial level. This tax accounts for approximately 250 Euro for an engine of 80 kW. However, since there are 107 Italian provinces with dif-
ferent taxation rules, this amount can be considered sufficiently low to justify being omitted. In Switzerland, there is a circulation tax based on fiscal or
actual horsepower, cylinder capacity or weight, which is levied by the 26 cantons. Thus, federal states decide whether it is levied on PEVs. Since there is
no consistent source providing information on neither its calculation nor existing PEV exemptions, this incentive will not be included in our analysis of
Switzerland, either. An analogous situation is found in the Netherlands, where a weight-based annual motor vehicle tax is levied by the twelve provinces.
This tax was reduced by 50% for PHEVs and exempted for BEVs, resulting in average savings of approximately 220 Euro for 2018 tax rates. However, since
past rates and detailed information on province-level taxation are not accessible, circulation tax in the Netherlands is not included in the analysis. Circu-
lation tax in Spain, which is based on fiscal engine ratings and can amount to 20 to 224 Euro per year for passenger cars, could be reduced for fuel-efficient
vehicles at city councils' discretion. Due to the local scope of this scheme it is omitted as well. Finally, in Turkey, reductions of a purchase price-based special
consumption tax, which is levied upon first registration, are available. However, neither actual prices nor vehicle price indices are available for the reference
vehicle models, thus incentive quantification for Turkey is not possible.
In addition to regional characteristics, in some countries, there are differences concerning consumer groups. In several cases, incentives are effective
only for either private or corporate buyers. During the period of investigation, such differentiations were applied explicitly for purchase subsidies in
Belgium and Sweden, for VAT deductions in Austria and Portugal, and for circulation tax in Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, and Hungary. Further-
more, home charger subsidies and deductions on personal income tax are naturally restricted to private consumers, while special depreciation as well as
taxation of the private use of company cars can only be applied to corporate vehicles. Despite these differentiations, all calculated savings are weighted
equally for two reasons. Firstly, there is no information available about the share of company cars per year and country, hence any attempt to determine
its weight would be arbitrary to a certain degree. Secondly, in a functioning market, second-hand buyers are expected to factor initial buyers' financial
benefits into their own willingness to pay. Hence, it can be assumed that corporate car buyers, who resell the vehicle after a certain time, pass on a pro-
portion of the incentive they receive. Thus, an incentive granted to only one group of customers spreads to the other eventually, blurring this clear dis-
tinction. Therefore, to determine potential savings of an incentive type for a data record, private and corporate vehicle incentives are simply combined.
Following the instructions given by ACEA guides, most incentive types are calculated solely based on vehicle specifications and national net prices
as described above. For some tax types, however, further information is required to quantify financial benefits. For evaluating savings through VAT
exemptions or reductions and incentives based on gross rather than net list prices, past and current VAT rates are extracted from the Trading Eco-
nomics website (https://tradingeconomics.com/). Trading Economics is a platform that compiles and cross checks data on economic indicators
from official sources. For Norway, VAT rates are not available on this website, thus they are collected directly from the Norwegian tax administration
website (https://www.skatteetaten.no/en/Rates/).
As described above, when taxing the benefit provided by the private use of company cars, PEVs often receive some special treatment. The benefit
in kind recorded for the private use is commonly a function of vehicle price or tailpipe emissions and has been artificially lowered for PEVs in some
countries. To assess the value of respective tax savings, personal income tax rates are gathered. Tax rates for 2016 are obtained from an annual OECD
study on international taxation of wages (OECD, 2017). To select appropriate rates, this study follows Harding (2014), who uses them to evaluate
personal tax treatment of company cars. Marginal tax rates (including employee contribution for social security and excluding cash benefits) of a sin-
gle income earner at 167% of the average wage are chosen, assuming that company cars are more likely to be offered to employees with higher in-
come (Harding, 2014). As the obtained 2016 rates generally match Harding's for 2011 or differ only slightly, fixed income tax rates are assumed for
each country over the analysis period. Based on these considerations, potential tax savings through reduced benefits in kind are determined.

Appendix B. Specification of control variables

The conventional fuel prices are determined as follows. The statistical pocketbooks of 2014 and 2017 (European Commission, 2014, 2017) each
offer gasoline and diesel prices as of 15 January of the previous four years, covering the analysis period from 2010 to 2017. For non-EU-countries
(Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey), price data is collected from national statistics offices and the World Bank's world development indicators
(see reference list). In a few cases, there is no reliable data available. This applies mostly to data for most recent years but also to some other occa-
sional cases: gas and diesel prices for Croatia (2010–2012), Iceland and Turkey (2011, 2013, 2015–2017), Norway (2016–2017). To achieve a com-
plete data set nonetheless, the missing values are calculated using the Microsoft Excel trend function. This function uses the least square method to fit
a linear trend function based on existing values and to compute missing ones.
14 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

Access to a garage or private parking lot enables the installation of domestic charging stations, thus it is a precondition for home charging of PEVs. Home
charging provides convenience for the vehicle owner and reduces the dependence on the extension of the infrastructure of public electric vehicle supply
equipment (EVSE). Therefore, garage ownership is expected to have a positive effect on new PEV registrations. Since comprehensive and consistent data on
garage ownership is quite difficult to come up with, two potential proxies are identified: dwelling type and home ownership rate, which are obtained from
the EU-SILC survey. Dwelling type is categorised into house (detached or semi-detached), flat (in a building with more or less than ten dwellings) and
others. In a detached or semi-detached house, residents most likely have access to a garage or parking lot on the property. Therefore, the share of popu-
lation living in a detached house is probably correlated to that having access to a garage. In addition, studies indicate a noticeably high home ownership
rate among PEV adopters (Tal and Nicholas, 2013; Swanson et al., 2011; Plötz et al., 2014). Home ownership rate represents the share of population whose
tenure status is owner. Reasons for possible correlations are financial and non-financial security provided to the household on one hand and the ability to
install home chargers on the other hand (Tahoe Regional Planning Agency and Truckee Donner Public Utility District, 2017).
Median net income is an indicator for a country's purchasing power, which is expected to directly affect the number of new vehicle registrations in
a medium and high price segment including most PEV models. Data on socioeconomic figures, including net income, are gathered from the Statistics
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The EU-SILC survey is carried out annually by the EU member states' statistical institutes and its results
are compiled and published by Eurostat. For this study, yearly median equivalised net income, measured in Euro per household, is obtained. Eurostat
calculates a household's total disposable income as the sum of private income from work, investment and property, transfers between households
and social transfers received by all persons living in the same private dwelling and sharing expenditure.
Additional variables concerning income distribution and motorization are added. Income distribution characterises how disposable income is dis-
tributed across households or population. Thus, it is an indicator for the share of population having the necessary means to purchase a PEV. The Gini
coefficient of equivalised disposable income measures the level of inequality of a country's income distribution (Human Development Report Office,
2013). The income quintile share ratio is the ratio of total annual income of the top income quintile to that of the lowest quintile (Eurostat, 2014b).
Both variables are obtained from the EU-SILC survey. Motorisation rate is the share of permanent residents owning a vehicle, thus it is calculated as
the quotient of vehicle stock and population in a year and country (Eurostat, 2014a). It represents the population's tendency to own a vehicle and is
hence an indicator of the potential market size. A country's vehicle stock is the number of vehicles registered at a certain time. Respective numbers
are obtained from the Eurostat website, which compiles them from the Common Questionnaire for Inland Transport Statistics regularly carried out by
national authorities from nearly 60 countries covering EU member states and members of the European Free Trade Association.
Summary statistics of all variables are shown in Table 5.

Table 5
Summary statistics of variables.

Variable Unit N Mean St. Dev. Min Max

Dependent variable
PEV sales share – 256 0.01 0.037 0 0.392
Vehicle market variables
Car stock – 256 8,315,044 11,637,038 204,736 45,474,851
Motorisation rate % 256 47.139 11.758 10.398 72.322
Car registrations – 256 451,978 753,306 3106 3,441,262
Car registrations per 1000 inhabitants – 256 23.522 17.597 2.108 99.043
BEV registrations – 256 1705 4602 0 33,025
PHEV registrations – 256 1743 5513 0 41,280
Energy price variables
Electricity price ct/kWh 256 17.13 4.97 8.215 30.86
Gasoline price €/litre 256 1.395 0.197 0.98 2.018
Diesel price €/litre 256 1.301 0.186 0.92 1.809
Electricity and diesel price ratio – 256 0.133 0.04 0.066 0.275
Socio-economic variables
Population million 256 18.634 24.208 0.318 82.8
Net income mean € 256 17,595 11,514 2327 52,297
Net income median € 256 15,576 10,415 2018 45,275
VAT % 256 20.988 3.483 7.6 27
Dwelling type house % 248 59.1 16 33.0 95.6
Home ownership rate % 256 74.61 11.61 42.5 97.6
Gini coefficient % 256 30.0 4.445 22.5 43.5
80-20-income ratio – 256 4.933 1.349 3.1 9.9
Unemployment rate % 256 9.5 4.9 2.4 27.5
Modal share cars % 255 81.557 5.738 59.2 91.9
Incentives
Rebate 1000 € 256 1.262 2.223 0 7.038
EVSE incentive 1000 € 256 0.016 0.117 0 1.45
Point of sales tax 1000 € 256 2.2 4.0 0 21
VAT incentive 1000 € 256 0.342 1.259 0 6.486
Purchase incentive 1000 € 256 3.789 4.882 0 20.951
Income tax incentive 1000 € 256 0.141 0.651 0 4.755
One time incentive 1000 € 256 3.929 4.972 0 20.951
Circulation tax incentive 1000 € 256 0.123 0.271 0 2.652
Company car tax 1000 € 256 0.204 0.599 0 3.159
Recurring Incentive 1000 € 256 0.327 0.69 0 3.44
Monetary Incentive 1000 € 256 4.256 5.242 0 20.951
No. of slow chargers – 256 1413 3811 0 31,120
No. of fast chargers – 256 160 429 0 3027
Slow chargers per million inhabitants – 256 105 249 0 1822
Fast chargers per million inhabitants – 256 17 43 0 388
Appendix C. Results of regressions with additional control variables and robustness checks

Table 6
Sensitivity of regression results for model specification (I) against variation in the regressors.

FE estimation FD estimation

Base Net Motorization Gini Income Home Dwelling All Base Net Motorization Gini Income Home Dwelling All control
results income rate coefficient quintile share ownership type house control results income rate coefficient quintile share ownership type house variables
ratio rate variables ratio rate

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)

Financial 0.054⁎ 0.053⁎ 0.054⁎ 0.055⁎ 0.054⁎ 0.053 0.051 0.051 0.066⁎⁎ 0.064⁎⁎ 0.066⁎⁎ 0.069⁎⁎ 0.067⁎⁎ 0.066⁎⁎ 0.064⁎⁎ 0.068⁎⁎
incentive (in (0.031) (0.031) (0.03) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.03) (0.028)
1000 Euro)

C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

Log(electricity −0.196 −0.224 −0.08 −0.201 −0.216 −0.23 −0.357 −0.27 −0.606 −0.624 −0.588 −0.628 −0.637 −0.606 −0.783 −0.765
price/diesel (0.569) (0.582) (0.515) (0.565) (0.553) (0.563) (0.603) (0.548) (0.611) (0.617) (0.614) (0.6) (0.6) (0.618) (0.642) (0.658)
price)
Trend 2.224⁎⁎⁎ 2.264⁎⁎⁎ 2.305⁎⁎⁎ 2.217⁎⁎⁎ 2.217⁎⁎⁎ 2.201⁎⁎⁎ 2.206⁎⁎⁎ 2.32⁎⁎⁎ 2.177 2.223⁎⁎⁎ 2.189⁎⁎⁎ 2.158⁎⁎⁎ 2.148⁎⁎⁎ 2.177⁎⁎⁎ 2.167⁎⁎⁎ 2.228⁎⁎⁎
(0.113) (0.133) (0.119) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.135) (0.164) (0.134) (0.151) (0.131) (0.135) (0.141) (0.141) (0.143) (0.166)
Net income (in −0.022 −0.024 −0.031 −0.025
1000 Euro) (0.04) (0.045) (0.031) (0.033)
Motorization rate −0.048 −0.046 −0.008 −0.001
(in %) (0.047) (0.045) (0.013) (0.012)
Gini coefficient 0.024 0.029 0.089⁎⁎ 0.153
(in %) (0.053) (0.099) (0.038) (0.106)
Income quintile 0.076 −0.135 0.287 −0.349
share ratio (0.176) (0.362) (0.214) (0.365)
Home ownership −0.032 −0.028 −0.001 0.026
rate (in %) (0.040) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047)
Dwelling type −0.040 −0.03 −0.099 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.103⁎⁎⁎
house (in %) (0.067) (0.07) (0.037) (0.036)
Country fixed ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
effects
First differencing ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Observations 226 226 226 226 226 226 220 220 194 194 194 194 194 194 189 189
Adjusted R2 0.751 0.75 0.754 0.75 0.75 0.751 0.783 0.782 0.167 0.164 0.163 0.168 0.169 0.163 0.231 0.219
F statistic 177.71⁎⁎⁎ 177.71⁎⁎⁎ 180.889⁎⁎⁎ 177.574⁎⁎⁎ 177.585⁎⁎⁎ 178.039⁎⁎⁎ 206.067⁎⁎⁎ 91.512⁎⁎⁎ 20.216⁎⁎ 13.498⁎⁎⁎ 13.427⁎⁎⁎ 13.97⁎⁎⁎ 14.023⁎⁎⁎ 13.41⁎⁎⁎ 19.772⁎⁎⁎ 7.562⁎⁎⁎

Notes: Clustered SEs in parenthesis. Dependent variable: log(PEV registration share).

⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.

15
16 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

Table 7
Sensitivity of regression results against exclusion of potential outliers.

FE estimation FD estimation

(I) Aggregated (II) Incentives by (III) incentives by (I) Aggregated (II) Incentives by (III) Incentives by
incentives recurrence recurrence and type incentives recurrence recurrence and type

Base Potential Base Potential Base Potential Base Potential Base Potential Base Potential
results outliers results outliers results outliers results outliers results outliers results outliers

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)

Financial incentive 0.054⁎ 0.058⁎ 0.064⁎⁎ 0.084⁎⁎⁎

(in 1000 Euro) (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.03)
One-time incentive 0.048 0.054⁎ 0.064⁎⁎ 0.085⁎⁎⁎
(in 1000 Euro) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.03)
Rebate (in 1000 Euro) 0.081⁎⁎⁎ 0.088⁎⁎⁎ 0.099⁎⁎⁎ 0.115⁎⁎⁎
(0.028) (0.023) (0.033) (0.031)
VAT (in 1000 Euro) −0.011 −0.056⁎⁎ −0.080⁎⁎ −0.108⁎⁎⁎
(0.035) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033)
POS tax (in 1000 0.127⁎⁎ 0.157⁎⁎⁎ 0.086 0.146⁎
Euro) (0.053) (0.047) (0.096) (0.086)
Income tax (in 1000 −0.132⁎⁎⁎ −0.104⁎⁎⁎ 0.101⁎⁎ 0.096⁎⁎
Euro) (0.040) (0.024) (0.041) (0.041)
Recurring incentive 0.331⁎⁎⁎ 0.295⁎⁎⁎ 0.350⁎⁎⁎ 0.300⁎⁎⁎ 0.074 0.033 0.076 0.065
(in 1000 Euro) (0.083) (0.078) (0.084) (0.068) (0.109) (0.113) (0.118) (0.131)
Log(electricity −0.196 0.217 −0.249 0.189 −0.099 0.387 −0.624 −0.488 −0.627 −0.482 −0.681 −0.424
price/diesel price) (0.569) (0.446) (0.589) (0.452) (0.584) (0.415) (0.617) (0.580) (0.625) (0.580) (0.695) (0.565)
Trend 2.224⁎⁎⁎ 2.297⁎⁎⁎ 2.237⁎⁎⁎ 2.276⁎⁎⁎ 2.138⁎⁎⁎ 2.220⁎⁎⁎ 2.223⁎⁎⁎ 1.927⁎⁎⁎ 2.223⁎⁎⁎ 1.919⁎⁎⁎ 1.981⁎⁎⁎ 1.913⁎⁎⁎
(0.113) (0.103) (0.131) (0.102) (0.100) (0.081) (0.151) (0.438) (0.151) (0.446) (0.404) (0.428)

Country fixed effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

First differencing ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Observations 226 190 226 190 226 190 194 164 194 164 194 164
Adjusted R2 0. 75 0.856 0.752 0.857 0.756 0.865 0.164 0.251 0.159 0.247 0.155 0.259
F statistic 177.71⁎⁎⁎ 383.1⁎⁎⁎ 143.576⁎⁎⁎ 291.0⁎⁎⁎ 104.95⁎⁎⁎ 177.89⁎⁎⁎ 13.498⁎⁎⁎ 19.214⁎⁎⁎ 10.071⁎⁎⁎ 14.342⁎⁎⁎ 6.06⁎⁎⁎ 9.123⁎⁎⁎

Notes: Clustered SEs in parenthesis. Dependent variable: log(PEV registration share).

Excluded countries are: Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Turkey.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.

Table 8
Sensitivity of regression results against exclusion of small markets.

FE estimation FD estimation

(I) Aggregated (II) Incentives by (III) incentives by (I) Aggregated (II) Incentives by (III) Incentives by
incentives recurrence recurrence and type incentives recurrence RECURRENCE AND TYPe

Base Small Base Small Base Small Base Small Base Small Base Small
results markets results markets results markets results markets results markets results markets

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)

Financial incentive (in 0.054⁎ 0.052⁎ 0.064⁎⁎ 0.089⁎⁎⁎

1000 Euro) (0. 031) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029)
One-time incentive (in 0.048 0.047 0.064⁎⁎ 0.089⁎⁎⁎
1000 Euro) (0.031) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029)
Rebate (in 1000 Euro) 0.081⁎⁎⁎ 0.074⁎⁎ 0.099⁎⁎⁎ 0.100⁎⁎⁎
(0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.036)
VAT (in 1000 Euro) −0.011 −0.045 −0.080⁎⁎ −0.067⁎⁎⁎
(0.035) (0.028) (0.033) (0.013)
POS tax (in 1000 Euro) 0.127⁎⁎ 0.140⁎⁎⁎ 0.086 0.149⁎
(0.053) (0.055) (0.096) (0.090)
Income tax (in 1000 −0.132⁎⁎⁎ −0.105⁎⁎⁎ 0.101⁎⁎ 0.104⁎⁎
Euro) (0.040) (0.070) (0.041) (0.050)
Recurring incentive (in 0.331⁎⁎⁎ 0.316⁎⁎⁎ 0.350⁎⁎⁎ 0.322⁎⁎⁎ 0.074 0.055 0.076 0.072
1000 Euro) (0.083) (0.081) (0.084) (0.070) (0.109) (0.117) (0.118) (0.129)
Log(electricity −0. 196 0.476 −0.249 0.460 −0.099 0.623 −0.624 0.182 −0.627 0.185 −0.681 0.240
price/diesel price) (0. 569) (0.447) (0.589) (0.455) (0.584) (0.433) (0.617) (0.617) (0.625) (0.621) (0.695) (0.625)
Trend 2.224⁎⁎⁎ 2.218⁎⁎⁎ 2.237⁎⁎⁎ 2.194⁎⁎⁎ 0.081⁎⁎⁎ 2.135⁎⁎⁎ 2.223⁎⁎⁎ 2.426⁎⁎⁎ 2.223⁎⁎⁎ 2.419⁎⁎⁎ 0.099⁎⁎⁎ 2.382⁎⁎⁎
(0.133) (0.106) (0.131) (0.106) (0.028) (0.088) (0.151) (0.418) (0.151) (0.427) (0.033) (0.442)

Country fixed effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

First differencing ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Observations 226 186 226 186 226 186 194 161 194 161 194 161
Adjusted R2 0. 75 0.810 0.752 0.812 0.756 0.817 0.164 0.196 0.159 0.191 0.155 0.187
F statistic 177.71⁎⁎⁎ 272.5⁎⁎⁎ 143.576⁎⁎⁎ 206.9⁎⁎⁎ 104.95⁎⁎⁎ 122.7⁎⁎⁎ 13.498⁎⁎⁎ 14.04⁎⁎⁎ 10.071⁎⁎⁎ 10.47⁎⁎⁎ 6.034⁎⁎⁎ 6.27⁎⁎⁎

Notes: Clustered SEs in parenthesis. Dependent variable: log(PEV registration share).

Excluded countries are those with total new passenger car registrations of b40,000 per year, which are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Malta.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx 17

Table 9
Sensitivity of regression results against exclusion of early adopters.

FE estimation FD estimation

(I) Aggregated (II) Incentives by (III) Incentives by (I) Aggregated (II) Incentives by (III) Incentives by
incentives recurrence recurrence and type incentives recurrence recurrence and type

Base Early Base Early Base Early Base Early Base Early Base Early
results adopters results adopters results adopters results adopters results adopters results adopters

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)

Financial incentive (in 0.053⁎ 0.048 0.064⁎⁎ 0.077⁎⁎

1000 Euro) (0. 031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032)
One-time incentive (in 0.048 0.045 0.064⁎⁎ 0.075⁎⁎
1000 Euro) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032)
Rebate (in 1000 Euro) 0.08⁎⁎⁎ 0.083⁎ 0.099⁎⁎⁎ 0.109⁎⁎
(0.028) (0.050) (0.033) (0.048)
VAT (in 1000 Euro) −0.012 −0.094⁎ −0.080⁎⁎ −0.097⁎⁎
(0.035) (0.055) (0.033) (0.041)
POS tax (in 1000 Euro) 0.126⁎⁎ 0.217 0.086 0.141
(0.052) (0.139) (0.096) (0.134)
Income tax (in 1000 −0.131⁎⁎⁎ −0.061 0.101⁎⁎ 0.088⁎
Euro) (0.039) (0.049) (0.041) (0.050)
Recurring incentive (in 0.331⁎⁎⁎ 0.450⁎⁎⁎ 0.345⁎⁎⁎ 0.182 0.074 −0.633⁎⁎⁎ 0.076 −0.544⁎⁎
1000 Euro) (0.083) (0.108) (0.081) (0.296) (0.109) (0.175) (0.118) (0.244)
Log(electricity −0. 224 −0.359 −0.249 −0.397 −0.121 −0.214 −0.624 −1.445 −0.627 −1.502 −0.681 −1.469
price/diesel price) (0. 582) (0.794) (0.589) (0.798) (0.6) (0.776) (0.617) (1.197) (0.625) (1.204) (0.695) (1.229)
Trend 2.264⁎⁎⁎ 2.276⁎⁎⁎ 2.237⁎⁎⁎ 2.262⁎⁎⁎ 2.169⁎⁎⁎ 2.184⁎⁎⁎ 2.223⁎⁎⁎ 1.329⁎⁎ 2.223⁎⁎⁎ 1.257⁎⁎ 0.099⁎⁎⁎ 1.206⁎⁎
(0.133) (0.111) (0.131) (0.110) (0.117) (0.1119) (0.151) (0.577) (0.151) (0.566) (0.033) (0.586)

Country fixed effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

First differencing ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Observations 226 162 226 162 226 162 194 130 194 130 194 130
Adjusted R2 0. 75 0.718 0.752 0.718 0.755 0.72 0.164 0.124 0.132 0.133 0.155 0.125
F statistic 177.71⁎⁎⁎ 148.2⁎⁎⁎ 143.576⁎⁎⁎ 111.2⁎⁎⁎ 91.435⁎⁎⁎ 65.2⁎⁎⁎ 13.498⁎⁎⁎ 6.789⁎⁎⁎ 7.5⁎⁎⁎ 5.95⁎⁎⁎ 6.034⁎⁎⁎ 3.6⁎⁎⁎

Notes: Clustered SEs in parenthesis. Dependent variable: log(PEV registration share).

Excluded years are 2016 and 2017, following the assumption that innovators dominate the market during the first years (2010–2015) after a new technology's introduction.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.

Table 10
Regression results including charging infrastructure.

FE estimation FD estimation

(I) Aggregated (II) Incentives by (III) Incentives by (I) Aggregated (II) Incentives by (III) Incentives by
incentives recurrence recurrence and type incentives recurrence recurrence and type

Base Charging Base Charging Base Charging Base Charging Base Charging Base Charging
results infrastr. results infrastr. results infrastr. results infrastr. results infrastr. results infrastr.

(1) (3) (5) (7) (9) (11)

Financial incentive (in 0.053⁎ 0.07⁎⁎ 0.064⁎⁎ 0.067

1000 Euro) (0. 031) (0.035) (0.029) (0.046)
One-time incentive (in 0.048 0.051 0.064⁎⁎ 0.064
1000 Euro) (0.031) (0.038) (0.029) (0.046)
Rebate (in 1000 Euro) 0.08⁎⁎⁎ 0.96⁎⁎ 0.095⁎⁎⁎ 0.121⁎⁎
(0.028) (0.042) (0.032) (0.055)
VAT (in 1000 Euro) −0.012 −0.057 −0.081⁎⁎ −0.065⁎⁎
(0.035) (0.053) (0.033) (0.028)
POS tax (in 1000 Euro) 0.126⁎⁎ 0.064 0.077 0.035
(0.052) (0.077) (0.097) (0.127)
Income tax (in 1000 −0.131⁎⁎⁎ 0.611⁎⁎⁎ 0.101⁎⁎ 0.753⁎⁎⁎
Euro) (0.039) (0.128) (0.044) (0.197)
Recurring incentive (in 0.331⁎⁎⁎ 0.451⁎⁎⁎ 0.345⁎⁎⁎ 0.402⁎⁎⁎ 0.074 0.116 0.095 0.039
1000 Euro) (0.083) (0.095) (0.081) (0.064) (0.109) (0.154) (0.119) (0.113)
Log(electricity −0. 224 0.768 −0.249 0.804 −0.121 1.023 −0.624 −0.37 −0.627 −0.379 −0.569 −0.181
price/diesel price) (0. 582) (0.803) (0.589) (0.759) (0.6) (0.803) (0.617) (0.647) (0.625) (0.643) (0.624) (0.623)
Net income (in 1000 −0. 022 0.043 −0.019 0.049 −0.016 0.035 −0.031 −0.003 −0.031 −0.004 −0.025 −0.009
Euro) (0. 04) (0.041) (0.04) (0.038) (0.04) (0.039) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031)
Log(no. of slow −0.405⁎⁎ −0.418⁎⁎ −0.481⁎⁎ −0.275 −0.276 −0.301⁎
chargers per capita) (0.172) (0.169) (0.189) (0.174) (0.175) (0.179)
log(no. of DC fast 0.344⁎⁎⁎ 0.333⁎⁎⁎ 0.313⁎⁎⁎ 0.310⁎⁎⁎ 0.312⁎⁎⁎ 0.313⁎⁎⁎

(continued on next page)

18 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

Table 10 (continued)

FE estimation FD estimation

(I) Aggregated (II) Incentives by (III) Incentives by (I) Aggregated (II) Incentives by (III) Incentives by
incentives recurrence recurrence and type incentives recurrence recurrence and type

Base Charging Base Charging Base Charging Base Charging Base Charging Base Charging
results infrastr. results infrastr. results infrastr. results infrastr. results infrastr. results infrastr.

(1) (3) (5) (7) (9) (11)

chargers per capita) (0.122) (0.117) (0.116) (0.098) (0.099) (0.095)

Trend 2.264⁎⁎⁎ 1.049⁎⁎ 2.237⁎⁎⁎ 1.028⁎⁎ 2.169⁎⁎⁎ 1.239⁎⁎ 2.223⁎⁎⁎ 1.348⁎⁎ 2.223⁎⁎⁎ 1.335⁎⁎ 2.223⁎⁎⁎ 1.373⁎⁎⁎
(0.133) (0.481) (0.131) (0.467) (0.117) (0.482) (0.151) (0.532) (0.151) (0.540) (0.153) (0.514)

Country fixed effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

First differencing ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Observations 226 145 226 145 226 145 194 115 194 115 194 115
Adjusted R2 0. 75 0.647 0.752 0.667 0.755 0.670 0.164 0.125 0.159 0.117 0.155 0.128
F statistic 177.71⁎⁎⁎ 49.734⁎⁎⁎ 143.576⁎⁎⁎ 46.321⁎⁎⁎ 91.435⁎⁎⁎ 33.086⁎⁎⁎ 13.498⁎⁎⁎ 4.191⁎⁎⁎ 10.071⁎⁎⁎ 3.477⁎⁎⁎ 6.034⁎⁎⁎ 2.840⁎⁎⁎

Notes: Clustered SEs in parenthesis. Dependent variable: log(PEV registration share).

⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.

C.1. Source overview

Table 11
Overview of sources.

Variable Country (if Source

divergent)

PEV registrations European Commission, 2018

Total registrations ACEA, 2018; Eurostat, 2018a
Cyprus Republic of Cyprus, Statistical Service, 2018
Malta National Statistics Office Malta, 2013, 2016, 2018
Turkey TurkStat, 2018
Charging stations European Commission, 2018
Financial incentives ACEA, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c,
2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; CESifo, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a,
2012b
Further incentive sources (cross-checks and details for financial, Austrian Mobile Power, 2017; Ayre, 2016; Administration Francaise, 2018; Carte-Grise.org,
non-monetary and local-level incentives) 2018; Croatia Week, 2015; Eltis - The urban mobility observatory, 2011; European
Commission, 2018; Human Development Report Office, 2013; IEA, 2016a; Mcgeever, 2013;
Norsk elbilforening, ÖAMTC, 2017b, 2017a; Office for Low Emission Vehicles, 2015; Ollick,
2014; Parliament of Iceland, 2012; Pressman, 2017; Saldo Positivo, 2014; Shafiei et al.,
2018; Skok, 2015; Trafi, 2017a, 2017b; Transport Malta, 2014, 2016; Wikipedia, 2018;
Wodraschke, 2016; Wayback Machine
Electricity prices Eurostat, 2017
Switzerland EICom, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015, 2016, 2017
Fuel prices European Commission, 2014, 2017
Iceland The World Bank Group, 2018a, 2018b
Norway Statistics Norway, 2018
Switzerland Bundesamt für Statistik, 2018
Turkey IEA, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b; The World Bank Group, 2018a,
2018b
Median net income Eurostat, 2018f
Dwelling type Eurostat, 2018c
Home ownership rate Eurostat, 2018d
Gini coefficient Eurostat, 2018e
Income quintile share ratio Eurostat, 2018h
Vehicle stock Eurostat, 2018b
Iceland Statistics Iceland, 2017
Population Eurostat, 2018g
VAT Trading Economics
Norway The Norwegian Tax Administration, n.d.-a, n.d.-b
Personal income tax rates OECD, 2017

Appendix D. Supplementary data and code

Supplementary data and source code to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104493.
 C. Münzel et al. / Energy Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
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