LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar) C2022 I.

Civil Procedure 1

CIVIL PROCEDURE i. Change of name

j. Voluntary dissolution of corporations
III. CIVIL PROCEDURE k. Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural
A. Actions children
l. Constitution of family home
A.1. Meaning of ordinary civil actions m. Declaration of absence of death
Rule 3, Sec. 3 (a): A civil action is one by which a party sues n. Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong. A.5. Personal actions and real actions

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed

Real Action Personal Action Mixed Action
by the rules for ordinary actions, subject to the specific rules
prescribed for a special civil action. subject is the personal property is both real and
ownership or sought to be personal properties
possession of recovered or where are involved
A.2. Meaning of special civil actions
real property damages for breach
It is also civil action and governed by the rules for ordinary action but
of contract are
because of its peculiar nature, it is subject to the specific rules sought; basically, all
prescribed for them, particularly Rule 62 to Rule 71, depending on the other actions which
special civil action involved. are not real

The ff. are the special civil actions in ROC: founded on privity founded on privity founded on privity
of real estate of contract of real estate and
a. Interpleader
contract
b. Declaratory relief and similar remedies
c. Review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the filed in the court filed in the court rules on venue of
COMELEC and OCA where the property where the plaintiff or real actions shall
d. Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus or any part thereof is any of the govern
e. Quo warranto situated defendants reside at
f. Expropriation the option of the
plaintiff
g. Foreclosure of real estate mortgage
h. Partition
Example: Example: Example:
i. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer unlawful detainer, recovery of personal accion
j. Contempt forcible entry, accion property, reinvindicatoria with
publiciana, accion enforcement of a a claim for damages
A.3. Meaning of criminal actions reinvindicatoria, contract, recovery of
quieting of title, damages; action for
remove a cloud; a sum of money
Rule 3, Sec. 3 (b): A criminal action is one by which the State
prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law.
VYE: Can an action be in personam involving real property? YES.
● Real action is not necessarily an action in rem
A.4. Civil actions versus special proceedings ● Eg: eviction case → real action because it involves possession, but
Civil actions as a rule is governed by the ordinary rules, which is from it is in personam because it is binding only upon the parties to the
Rule 1 to 56. Special civil actions are likewise governed by the ordinary case.
rules but because of its peculiar nature, it is subject to the specific
rules under Rule 62 to 71 depending on the special civil action A.6. Local and transitory actions
involved.

Local Transitory
The ff. are the special proceedings in ROC:
a. Settlement of estate of deceased persons
must be brought in a particular dependent on the place where
b. Escheat
place where the subject the party resides regardless of
c. Guardianship and custody of children
property or a portion thereof is where the subject cause of
d. Trustees
located unless there is an action arose (Sec. 4, Rule 4).
e. Adoption
agreement to the contrary (Sec. Example: action to recover sum
f. Rescission and revocation of adoption
4, Rule 4). of money
g. Hospitalization of insane persons
h. Habeas corpus
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar) C2022 I. Civil Procedure 2

action for support or for annulment of contract, it is not

A.7. Actions in rem, in personam and quasi in rem capable of pecuniary estimation.
c. Mere Consequence Test – An action to compel defendant to
accept the goods and pay damages, rescission of contract
Action in rem Action In Personam Quasi In Rem
and reimbursement of contract price, and action for specific
performance of stipulation in a lease contract such as to
directed against the directed against the directed against
maintain the lessee in peaceful possession of the premises
thing itself particular person particular persons
were held to be incapable of pecuniary estimation as the
jurisdiction over the jurisdiction over the jurisdiction over the amounts to be collected are but a consequence of specific
person of the person of the person of the performance which fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC
defendant is not defendant is defendant is not regardless of amount sought to be recovered.
required a required required as long as
proceeding to jurisdiction over the
determine the state res is acquired [87] LUCAS v. LUCAS (2011)
or condition of a
thing FACTS: Jesse Lucas, claiming to be the son of respondent Jesus
Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion
a proceeding to an action to impose a proceeding to for Submission of Parties to DNA Testing). RTC initially dismissed
determine the state a responsibility or subject the interest the case for failure to establish a prima facie case considering that
or condition of a liability upon a of a named his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations
thing person directly defendant over a with respondent (hearsay), the birth certificate was not signed by
particular property respondent, and although Jesse used respondent’s surname, there
to an obligation or was no allegation that he was treated as the child by respondent or
lien burdening it his family. Upon MR, RTC reversed its initial order and dismissed
respondent’s arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA
judgment is binding judgment is binding judgment is binding test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of
on the whole world only upon the upon particular DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA Evidence allows
parties impleaded or persons the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the courts instance or upon
their successors in application of any person who has legal interest in the matter in
interest litigation. CA reversed RTC and held that petitioner failed to show
that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
example: example: example: paternity action had been met (according to Herrera v. Alba). The
probate proceeding; action for specific action for partition; CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the
cadastral performance; action for petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
proceeding; damages, injunction, accounting;
specific attachment; The Court ruled in favor of Jesse and affirmed RTC. It held that the
performance foreclosure of statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant
mortgage procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. The procedural aspects
are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial
Example of personal action but in rem: nullity of marriage stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish
filiation has been filed. Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
Tests to determine the nature of action: WON capable or incapable of merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. However, this does not
pecuniary estimation [question of jurisdiction]
mean that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
a. Ultimate Objective Test – If the relief demanded is one
during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
which may not be granted under the law, it does not
characterize or determine the nature of the action. The relief DOCTRINE: The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the
to which the plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in
him in his complaint although it is not the relief demanded is the judicial system. It provides the prescribed parameters on the
what determines the nature of the action. Thus, a prayer for requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper
procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the
annulment or rescission of the sale does not operate to
possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission
effect the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the
of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of
action, which is to recover real property and is thus a real DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence gathered, using
action. The annulment of the sale is only secondary. various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly,
b. Incidental Test – If it is primarily for recovery of a sum of [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly,
money, it is capable of pecuniary estimation. Where the shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a protects, rather than prejudice the public.
sum of money or is purely incidental to or as a consequence
of the principle relief sought like specific performance,
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
[88] DE PEDRO v. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORP (2014)
FACTS: Romasan filed in the RTC complaints against De Pedro for
nullification of free patent and original certicate of title. The sheriff
attempted to serve the summons against De Pedro twice, but the
summons against De Pedro was unserved for the reason that
according to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig there] is no
person in the said given address. Romasan filed a motion to serve
summons and the complaint by publication which was granted by
the RTC. Romasan moved to declare all defendants in default for
failure to file their answers and also moved to be allowed to present
evidence ex parte. The RTC granted the motion. The RTC issued an
order declaring as nullity the titles and free patents issued to all
defendants in respondent’s complaint, including the free patent
issued to De Pedro.
De Pedro filed for motion for new trial that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person due to improper service of
summons. When her motion for new trial was denied, she filed a
petition for certiorari, insisting that her motion for new trial should
have been granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her
person. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for her failure to
allege any ground for new trial. Petitioner then filed a petition for
annulment of judgment.
The SC held that there was no proper service of summons but when
petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for
certiorari instead of an action for annulment of judgment, she was
deemed to have voluntarily participated in the proceedings against
her title.
DOCTRINE: Action for annulment of judgment may not be invoked:
1. where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy
and lost; or
2. where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies
through his own fault or negligence.
A.8. Payment of Docket Fees
VYE: When does a court acquire jurisdiction over a case?
● Upon filing of the complaint AND UPON PAYMENT OF
DOCKET FEES
○ For the computation of docket fees, amount of
damages must be assessed (Manchester ruling)
○ If there is a mistake in the computation of docket
fees, the court will not lose jurisdiction, but shall
only require the complainant to pay the deficiency,
or have first lien on the monetary award.
[89] HEIRS OF THE LATE REINOSO, SR. v. CA (2011)
FACTS: The collision of a passenger jeepney and a truck killed
Reinoso, Sr. The heirs of Reinoso, Sr. filed a complaint for
damages against the owner of the passenger jeepney and the
truck, Tapales and Gaballa, respectively. RTC rendered a decision
in favor of the heirs. Respondents filed an appeal before the CA
which set aside and reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint on the ground of non-payment of docket fees pursuant
to the ruling in Manchester v. CA. The SC held in favor of the
petitioners and said that the strict application of the rule laid down in
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 3
the case of Manchester was relaxed in the case of Sun Insurance v.
Asuncion.
DOCTRINE: The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees
within the prescribed period is mandatory. In Manchester v.
Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The
strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years
after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein
the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but
in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period. This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees required. Thus, in the more recent case of
United Overseas Bank v. Ros, the Court explained that where the
party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in
payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide
by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the
court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,
and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply.
[90] GSIS v. HEIRS OF CABALLERO (2010)
FACTS: Fernando obtained a loan from GSIS for P20k evidenced by
a promissory note and executed a real estate mortgage over their 2-
storey building. Fernando defaulted and so the mortgage was
foreclosed. The property was scheduled for public bidding.
Fernando’s daughter, JOCELYN Caballero, submitted a bid (P350k)
but was outbidden by Carmelita Mercantile Trading Corporation
(CMTC) who submitted a bid of P450k. The Board of Trustees of
the GSIS issued Resolution No. 199 confirming the award of
property to CMTC. Fernando sought to annul the bid award, deed of
sale and TCT in favor of CMTC with RTC. Petitioner and its officers
filed their answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim. RTC
decided in favor of petitioner GSIS and dismissed the complaint.
Respondent filed a notice of appeal. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision but deleted the portion of the judgment ordering Fernando
to pay rentals.
DOCTRINE: To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
not, the Court has devised the following tests:
● Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by
the counterclaim largely the same?
● Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s
claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
● Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim?
and
● Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim?
A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
counterclaim is compulsory.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees.
RULE 1. General Provisions.
Section 1. Title of the Rules. — These Rules shall be known and
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar) C2022 I. Civil Procedure 4

cited as the Rules of Court. (1) retained earnings. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, and CA
reversed. Court held that cause of action was premature because
Section 2. In what courts applicable. — These Rules shall apply in respondent had no unrestricted retained earnings at the time of the
all the courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court. filing.
(n)
DOCTRINE: A cause of action is the act or omission by which a
Section 3. Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the party violates a right of another. Its essential elements are:
procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special 1. The existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;
proceedings. 2. A correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such
(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the right;
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or 3. An act or omission by such defendant in violation of the
redress of a wrong, (1a, R2) right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to
the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. (n) B.2. Right of action versus cause of action
An action is the suit filed in court whereas cause of action is the basis
(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a of the action filed.
person for an act or omission punishable by law. (n)
Elements of a Right of Action:
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks
a. The existence of a cause of action defined as the act or
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. (2a, R2)
omission by which a party violates a right of another
Section 4. In what case not applicable. — These Rules shall not b. The performance of all conditions precedent to the bringing
apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization of the action
and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided c. The right to bring and maintain the action must be in the
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever person instituting it
practicable and convenient. (R143a)
Conditions Precedent
Section 5. Commencement of action. — A civil action is
commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. If an a. exhaustion of administrative remedies
additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action is b. arbitration as a condition precedent for court action
commenced with regard to him on the dated of the filing of such i. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
later pleading, irrespective of whether the motion for its admission, (CIAC) – recourse may be availed of whenever the
if necessary, is denied by the court. (6a) contract contains a clause for the submission of a
future controversy to arbitration
Section 6. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally construed
ii. Rep. Act No. 9285 or Alternative Dispute
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (2a) Resolution Act of 2004
iii. Barangay Conciliation (Katarungang
Pambarangay)
Read Herrera, Remedial Law 1, pp. 367-409

Article 151, Family Code – If it is shown that no earnest efforts were in

B. Cause of Action fact made to settle the controversy among members of the same
B.1. Meaning of Cause of Action family, the case must be dismissed.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another. B.3. Failure to state a cause of action

Requisites of a right of action:

● the existence of a legal right of the Plaintiff Failure to state Lack of cause of
● a correlative obligation of the defendant to respect plaintiff’s cause of action action
right; and
● an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the Definition complaint fails to may be ruled after
allege the cause of the judge has
plaintiff’s legal right
action, or that not all determined the truth
elements were and falsity of the
[91] TURNER v. LORENZO SHIPPING CORP. (2010) indicated allegations and has
found the evidence
FACTS: Petitioners wanted to get paid the value of shares based on wanting
a valuation by an appraisal committee. Respondents argued that it
can only do so when the company has sufficient unrestricted Basis Complaint Evidentiary matters
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
When Raised Motion to Dismiss: Demurrer to
before a responsive evidence: after the
pleading is filed plaintiff rested his
case
BUT in Dabuco v.
CA, SC held that it
may be raised
anytime
Where there is a defect or an insufficiency in the statement of the
cause of action, a complaint may be dismissed not because of an
absence or a lack of cause of action but because the complaint states
no cause of action. (Sec. 1 [g], Rule 16) The dismissal will therefore be
anchored on a failure to state a cause of action.
This does not mean that the plaintiff has no cause of action. It only
means that the plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient for the court to
know that the rights of the plaintiff were violated by the defendant.
B.4. Test of the sufficiency of a cause of action
The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint.
Note: It has been held that the court cannot consider other matters
aliunde (outside the pleading). But Riano says that it is NOT a hard and
fast rule, in some cases, the court considered the documents attached
to the complaint to truly determine the sufficiency of cause of action
(Agrarian Reform v. Nicolas). The reason is that such annexes are
considered parts of the complaint (Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. CA).
[92] BELLE CORPORATION v. DE LEON-BANKS (2012)
FACTS: Nelia Alleje is the sister of respondent; their late parents
placed the subject property in trust to Nelia, through Nelfred
(company whose principal stockholders are Nelia and her husband).
Sps Alleje, through Nelfred, sold the property to pet without
consulting Res. Res then filed before the RTC a complaint for
Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance of Property with Prayer
for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages
against the sps Alleje, Nelfred and Belle. Belle contends that there is
no cause of action against it in the complaint.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines cause of
action as the acts or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. In determining whether a complaint states a cause of
action, the RTC can consider all the pleadings filed, including
annexes, motions, and the evidence on record; focus is on the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. The
complaint does not have to establish facts proving the existence of
a cause of action at the outset; such will have to be done at the trial
on the merits of the case.
VYE: Can the Court receive evidence aliunde? - NO
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 5
● “Aliunde” means from another place or outside source. It is
often used to refer to evidence given aliunde when meaning
cannot be derived from a document or instrument itself.
[93] SANTOS v. SANTOS-GRAN (2014)
FACTS: Petitioner filed a case for an annulment of sale.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the
action has prescribed and the complaint failed to specify a cause of
action. The RTC granted the Motion to dismiss on the ground that it
failed to specify a cause of action. The CA affirmed the result of the
decision of the RTC insofar as dismissing the complaint is
concerned. HOWEVER, it decided that there was an insufficiency of
factual basis or a lack of a cause of action which justified such
dismissal. The SC sustained the dismissal of the complaint but
found that the CA erred in holding that the basis was lack of cause
of action in lieu of failure to specify a cause of action. The former
can only be determined after the resolution of questions of fact
while the latter may be raised at the earliest stages through a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16.
DOCTRINE: A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently
avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of
action, namely:
1. a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and
3. an act or omission on the part of the named defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.
A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of
action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions
of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is
valid or legal, or is just, fair, and reasonable, are mere conclusions
of law.
The elementary test in a motion to dismiss on such ground is
whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if true would
justify the relief demanded.
VYE: Way and means to abbreviate proceedings:
1. Motion to dismiss
2. Motion for summary judgment
3. Demurrer to evidence
VYE: demurrer to evidence must be raised only after the plaintiff has
rested its case.
[94] GUILLERMO v. PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY (2017)
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
alleging that the administration of Gloria Arroyo through the Acting
Secretary of the DPWH consulted with them on an advocacy
campaign to improve the perception of Arroyo. The petitioners
submitted letter proposal about ‘Joyride’, Secretary signed a note
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
on the letter proposal saying “Ok, proceed!” so they worked on the
product and finished the product which was aired on NBN-Channel
4. They worked on other projects and deliverables such as an
expanded version of Joyride with other government agencies. After
all the deliverables, no payments were made.
DOCTRINE: Thus, to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action
in a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint
should be considered, in relation to whether its prayer may be
granted. In Heirs of Maramag v. Maramag:
When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling
thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.
The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such
allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a
cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint. This is the general rule.
To sufficiently state a cause of action, the Complaint should have
alleged facts showing that the trial court could grant its prayer
based on the strength of its factual allegations.
B.5. Splitting a single cause of action and its effects
Splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
prayers, where the round of dismissal is litis pendentia or res judicata,
as the case may be (Marilag v. Martinez)
Splitting of a single cause of action – If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or
a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others (Sec 4, Rule 2)
● Filing of one – Rule 16, Section 1 (e) – that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same
cause (litis pendentia)
● Judgment upon the merits – Rule 16, Section 1 (f) – that the
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment (res judicata)
VYE: Filing of separate complaints based on one cause of action.
A party cannot split a single cause of action into parts and sue on each
part separately.
unti
A single act may sometimes violate several rights of a person.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff has only one cause of action regardless of
the number of rights violated.
VYE: Is it splitting of cause of action?
● Torts… (tbh di ko na maalala ano sinabi niya)
● Collection of rent and ejectment
○ Dismissal of ejectment on the ground of litis
pendencia?
3 alternative tests:
a. same evidence test
b. same defenses test
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 6
c. cause of action in the 2nd case existed at the time of the
filing of the 1st complaint
Example #1: car collision violates both personal right (to be safe in the
person of the car owner) and property right (over the car). Filing an
action to recover damages to his person and later for damages to his
car would be splitting a single cause of action. IF HOWEVER, a
passenger in the same car was also injured, said passenger has a
cause of action separate and distinct from those of the car owner. He
may sue separately.
Example #2: A bank cannot file a civil action against the debtor for the
collection of the debt and then subsequently file an action to foreclose
the mortgage = splitting a single cause of action.
Rules in actions ex-delicto:
● A single tort gives rise but to one cause of action no matter
how many items of damages may have been caused to one
person
● When by a single delict or wrong, several rights are violated
belonging to different persons, several causes arise on
behalf of such persons
● Where a person is guilty of two culpable transgressions on
the property rights of another, such as the ruination of the
agricultural fertility or utility of the soil of the property and for
the unauthorized use of said property as a dumpsite or
depot, he may be held liable to pay damages for both the
reasonable value of the use of the land and the occupation
of the premises
● When there are separate tortuous acts resulting in different
injuries, separate causes of action arise and several actions
may be maintained
● But if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts for
breach of contract of carriage and for quasi-delict, only one
cause of action arises even if the negligent act was
committed by several persons. Double recovery for the same
act or omission is prohibited.
[95] UMALE v. CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORP (2011)
FACTS: Petitioner leased a lot from Respondent. Respondent filed
(1) unlawful detainer in Case no. 8084 due to violation of the
stipulation in the lease contract. Subsequently respondent then filed
(2) unlawful detainer in Case no. 9210 due to expiration of the
lease contract. Petitioner claims litis pendentia.
DOCTRINE: At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment
complaint, the lease contract was still in effect. Only at the
expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action in the
second ejectment complaint accrued and made available as a
ground for ejecting therefore there is no identity of the cause of
action in the 2 cases.
[96] MALLION v. ALCANTARA (2006)
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
raising a question of law. Oscar P. Mallion filed two petitions with
the RTC of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara. The first one was based
on FC 36 (psychological incapacity) while the second was based on
FC 4 (that his marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage
license). When the 1st one was denied, Oscar filed the 2nd one.
Respondent wife then moved for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground of res judicata and multiplicity of suits. Petitioner, in his
defense, maintained that there is no res judicata since the causes of
action in each case was distinct. SC ruled that the action is barred
by res judicata and that petitioner is not allowed to split a single
cause of action. A party cannot evade or avoid the application of res
judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a
different method of presenting his case. A party cannot divide the
grounds for discovery. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal.
DOCTRINE: The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action
every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he
relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in
successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury. He is not
at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or
present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is
sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the
first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal
presentation is allowed.
[97] MARILAG v. MARTINEZ (2015)
FACTS: Respondent Martinez’ father was unable to settle a loan he
obtained from Marilag/ During the foreclosure proceeding, the RTC
declared the interest (5% per month) usurious and lowered the total
debt due to P229,200. Unaware of the lower court’s ruling, Martinez
agreed to pay his dad’s obligation pegged at the amount of
P689,000 based on the stipulated interest rate. He paid P400,000 in
cash and issued a PN for the balance. After learning amount the
lower court’s decision, Martinez refused to pay the amount due on
the PN, so Marilag sued him to collect on the PN. The RTC initially
dismissed Marilag’s complaint, ruling that the consideration for the
PN was Rafael’s debt to Marilag, which had already been
extinguished by the payment of P400,000 (overpaid actually). RTC
reversed its decision upon MR, but CA reinstated the earlier
decision.
SC said Marilag can no longer collect on the PN because the suit is
barred by litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity of
parties and singularity of the causes of action in the foreclosure
and collection cases, such that the prior foreclosure case barred
petitioner's recourse to the subsequent collection case.
DOCTRINE: Splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping
by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with
different prayers, where the ground of dismissal is litis pendentia or
res judicata, as the case may be.
Damages in Ejectment Cases
[98] PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. INC. v. COURT OF
APPEALS (1999)
FACTS: Respondent, Westin Seafood Market, Inc. executed a
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 7
contract of lease with petitioner for a commercial building was
terminated after its failure to pay rentals, and was forcibly removed
from the premises pursuant to the terms of their agreement.
Respondent then filed an action for forcible entry before the MeTC,
but while the action was pending an amended complaint for
damages was also filed by respondent before the RTC. SC ruled that
both complaints were only on the basis of one cause of action
which was the forceful taking of the property.
DOCTRINE: The unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession of
a piece of land by means of force and intimidation against the
rights of the party actually in possession thereof is a delict or wrong,
or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the
(1) recovery of possession and (2) recovery of damages arising
from the loss of possession, but only to one action. For obvious
reasons, both remedies cannot be the subject of two (2) separate
and independent actions, one for recovery of possession only, and
the other, for the recovery of damages.
VYE: The ruling in Progessive is inconsistent with Hualam and
Felisilda.
● But what is clear is that one cannot claim in the same action
for forcible entry/unlawful detainer damages other than
reasonable compensation. This is because they are covered
by different rules (see Rule 2, Sec. 5 governing joinder of
causes of action).
Read Herrera’s Critique on “damages and costs”
[99] HUALAM CONSTRUCTION v. COURT OF APPEALS (1992)
FACTS: Private respondent is the owner of State Centre Building
which a unit is being rented by petitioner. For petitioners' failure
and refusal to pay, despite repeated demands, the accumulated
downpayment, installments, utility charges and other assessments
mentioned in the Contract to Sell private respondent filed a
complaint for ejectment against the petitioners with the MTC of
Manila. On the scheduled pre-trial conference petitioner and his
counsel failed to appear. Upon motion of the private respondent, the
MTC declared the petitioners as in default and allowed the private
respondent to present its evidence ex-parte. MTC rendered a
decision in favor of private respondent. A writ of execution was
issued. Pursuant to the writ of execution, the sheriff levied upon the
personal properties of petitioners found in the premises to satisfy
the money judgment decreed in the decision. Petitioners filed with
the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari with injunction. RTC
granted the petition. Private respondent then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA. CA ruled in favor of private respondents.
CA declared that the petitioners’ remedy is not a petition for
certiorari but an ordinary appeal, and since they had already filed a
notice of appeal, they should have prosecuted it. Also, a petition for
certiorari may not be availed of as substitute for appeal.
DOCTRINE: The only way to stay execution is by perfecting an
appeal from the decision and filing a supersedeas bond, depositing
from time to time with the Regional Trial Court, during the pendency
of such appeal, the amounts of rent or the reasonable value for the
use and occupation of the property as fixed by the court of origin.
Exceptions to this rule, as (a) where delay in the deposit is due to
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar) C2022 I. Civil Procedure 8

fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, or (b) where ○ Because the only issue raised in ejectment
supervening events occurring subsequent to the judgment bring cases is that of rightful possession.
about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes
execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for
the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing [102] DYNAMIC BUILDERS & CONSTRUCTION CO. v. MAYOR
circumstances. PRESBITERIO, JR (2015)

It is settled that although the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not FACTS: On December 28, 2005, the Municipality of Valladolid,
proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted Negros Occidental, through its Bids and Awards Committee (BAC),
where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, published an invitation to bid for the construction of a 1,050-lineal-
insufficient and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious meter rubble concrete seawall along the municipality's shoreline
effects of the order complained of or where appeal is inadequate (aka Construction Shoreline Protection Project). The Bids and
and ineffectual. Awards Committee conducted a pre-bid conference attended by six
(6) prospective contractors including Dynamic Builders. The BAC
issued Resolution No. 6 recommending the award in favor of HLJ
[100] FELISILDA v. VILLANUEVA (1985) Construction and Enterprise. On April 18, 2006, the Municipality of
Valladolid received its "NO OBJECTION" letter from World Bank
FACTS: asdasd through the LOGOFIND project director, advising the BAC to proceed
with the issuance of the notice of award, letter of acceptance,
DOCTRINE: The only damages that can be recovered in an signing of contract, and notice to proceed. BAC Chairperson Celina
ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the reasonable C. Segunla wrote Engr. Raul F. Balandra of Dynamic Builders and the
compensation for the use and occupation of the real property other participating losing bidders to inform them of the BAC's
(Sparrevohn vs. Fisher, 2 Phil. 676; Castueras vs. Bayona, 106 Phil. findings and decision. Dynamic Builders was informed that "its bid
340; 3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 327). proposal had been found to be 'not substantially responsive.'"
Other damages must be claimed in an ordinary action. Dynamic Builders lodged a formal protest with the head of the
procuring entity, Mayor Presbiterio, to set aside the BAC decision
declaring Dynamic Builders' bid as not substantially responsive.
VYE: In Hualam and Felisilda, damages in an ejectment suit are fixed. Mayor Presbiterio dismissed the protest. Pursuant to Article XVII,
Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act, Dynamic Builders thereafter
[101] TERAÑA v. DE SAGUN (2009)
filed the Petition for Certiorari before the RTC of Bago City, Negros
Occidental, assailing Mayor Presbitero's Decision and Resolution.
FACTS: Respondent owned a house and lot in Nasugbu, Batangas
Simultaneously, Dynamic Builders filed this Petition dated
which was leased to petitioner. Petitioner demolished the house
September 4, 2006 for prohibition with application for temporary
and erected a new one without the consent of the respondent. Thus,
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the
resp filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. MTC called for
SC. Dynamic Builders submits that Article XVII, Section 58 of
preliminary conference but both parties moved for an extension of
Republic Act No. 9184 implicitly allowed it to simultaneously file a
time to file necessary pleadings. MTC denied this and rendered its
Petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court assailing the
decision despite the failure of the parties to file their position
protest case on the merits, and another Petition before the SC for
papers. Petitioners filed a notice of Appeal then MR and/or MNT to
injunctive remedies.
RTC, which was it denied. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE: Rule 2, Sec 3 provides that "a party may not institute
Court ruled that Petitioner’s position paper and affidavits of her
more than one suit for a single cause of action." Moreover, Section
witnesses cannot be admitted as it was belatedly filed. SC ruled
4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of action in that "if two or
that the purpose of RSP is to achieve an expeditious and
more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
inexpensive determination of cases. The failure of one party to
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
submit his position paper does not bar at all the MTC from issuing a
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others." The splitting
judgment on the ejectment complaint.
of a cause of action "violates the policy against multiplicity of suits,
whose primary objective is to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of
DOCTRINE: Both parties seek damages other than rentals or
the courts."
reasonable compensation for the use of the property, which are the
only forms of damages that may be recovered in an unlawful
detainer case.
● Rule 70, Section 17 of the Rules of Court authorizes the
trial court to order the award of an amount representing
arrears of rent or reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the premises if it finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true.
● Rationale for limiting the kind of damages recoverable in
unlawful detainer:
○ Only damage that can be recovered is the fair
rental value or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the leased property.
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
B.6. Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action
Rule 2, Rules of Court.
Section 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of. — Every ordinary civil
action must be based on a cause of action.
Section 2. Cause of action, defined. — A cause of action is the act
or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. — A party may not
institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or
more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one
pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of
action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules
on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions
governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but
pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be
allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies
therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for
recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test
of jurisdiction.
Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. — Misjoinder of causes
of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined
cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the
court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
Read: Herrera, Remedial Law Vol. I, pp. 410-503
JOINDER – a party may in one pleading assert in the alternative or
otherwise as many causes of action as he may have against an
opposing party subject to the following conditions:
a) the part joining the causes of action shall comply with the
rules on joinder of parties
b) the joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions
governed by special rules
c) where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder
may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue
lies therein; and
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 9
d) where the claims in all the causes of action are principally
for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall
be the test of jurisdiction
VYE: The phrase “alternative or otherwise” in Section 5 means that the
plaintiff can allegation inconsistent claims.
Note: The absence of unity of problems is no longer a bar to joinder of
causes of action. The present rule removed the restriction of venue,
jurisdiction, and causes of action arising from money, the same nature
or character or similar transactions.
Grounds to refuse joinder of causes of action are:
1. The rules on joinder of parties which requires that
a. The claims arise from the same or series of
transactions, and
b. There is a common question of law or fact;
2. It must not be cognizable by different tribunals; and,
3. Joinder of ordinary and special civil actions.
The restriction on joinder of parties does not apply where the parties
are the same although the causes of action are separate and distinct
from one another. This question is only relevant when there are
multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants.
A claim on a promissory note against three defendants may not be
joined with a claim under another promissory note against two of the
defendants for there is a misjoinder of parties, the third defendant in
the first cause of action not having an interest in the second cause of
action.
Joinder of causes of action is NOT MANDATORY, merely
PERMISSIVE. It follows the totality test for purposes of jurisdiction.
When a party sues 2 or more defendants, it is necessary for the cause
of action to arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions
and that there should be a question of law or fact common to them.
● C is creditor of D and E, both debts have been contracted
separately. Joinder is not allowed.
● P is a passenger in a bus owned by O and driven by D.
Joinder is allowed, obligation arose out of same accident.
Special civil actions CANNOT be joined with ordinary civil actions
because of possible confusion in the application of procedural rules.
The ff. are not permitted:
● ejectment + money claims
● payment of loan + damages from QD + foreclosure
MISJOINDER – erroneously joined causes of action. It is NOT a ground
for dismissal (Sec. 6 Rule 2) but will result in the (remedy) severance
of the separate causes of action, upon motion or court‘s own initiative.
VYE: An owner wants the illegal settlers to vacate a parcel of land that
he owns. Realizing that filing a suit in court will take a long time, he
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
agreed to give money to the illegal settlers in exchange for them
vacating the property. However, after receiving the money, the illegal
settlers refused to leave. Thus, the owner wants to file a case for
accion publiciana and a case for the collection of the money that he
paid. Can you file a recovery of possession of property (accion
publiciana) together with recovery of sum of money? YES
If you file a joint complaint: (1) real suit (property located in Makati
City) and (2) a personal suit (you reside in Quezon city), can you file the
complaint in Quezon City?
- This is a question of venue, not jurisdiction
[103] UCPB v. BELUSO (2007)
FACTS: UCPB granted spouses Beluso a Promissory Notes Line
under a Credit Agreement whereby the latter could avail from the
former credit up to the maximum amount of P1.2 M, which was
amended to increase P2.35 M. They constituted a real estate
mortgage over parcels of land as additional security for the
obligation. Spouses Beluso have also executed a total of 5
promissory notes, the last two of which they claim to have never
been released to them. In any case, UCPB applied interest rates on
the different promissory notes ranging from 18% to 34%, and
thereafter continued to charge interest and penalties. UCPB
demanded that the Sps. Beluso pay their total obligation of P2,9M
plus 25% attorney’s fees, but they failed to comply therewith. UCPB
foreclosed their mortgaged properties. Respondents filed a petition
for annulment thereof. RTC ruled in favor of respondents and the CA
affirmed.
The RTC and CA imposed a fine of P26K for UCPB’s alleged
violation of the Truth in Lending Act. UCPB argues that the
complaint did not explicitly allege a violation of the ‘Truth in
Lending Act’ and no action to formally admit the amended petition
was made. Petitioner further posits that it is the Metropolitan Trial
Court which has jurisdiction to try the alleged violation of the Truth
in Lending Act.
SC ruled that petitioners are liable for violation of the Truth in
Lending Act. The allegation of the respondents that the promissory
notes grant UCPB the power to unilaterally fix the interest rates
certainly also means that the promissory notes do not contain a
“clear statement in writing” of “(6) the finance charge expressed in
terms of pesos and centavos; and (7) the percentage that the
finance charge bears to the amount to be financed expressed as a
simple annual rate on the outstanding unpaid balance of the
obligation.” which is in violation of Sec 4 of the Truth in Lending Act.
Furthermore, the action to recover penalty for said violation was
jointly instituted with (1) the action to declare the interests in the
promissory notes void, and (2) the action to declare the foreclosure
void. Thus the joinder may be allowed in the RTC.
DOCTRINE: The action to recover the penalty under Section 6(a) of
the Truth in Lending Act had been jointly instituted with (1) the
action to declare the interests in the promissory notes void, and (2)
the action to declare the foreclosure void.
Subsection (c) of the above-quoted Section 5 of the Rules of Court
on Joinder of Causes of Action provides:
c. Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 10
joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court
provided one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein.
C. Parties to Civil Actions
2 main parties:
1. Plaintiff – the claiming party, may also apply to a defendant
who files a counterclaim, cross-claim or a 3rd party
complaint
2. Defendant – the defending party, may also apply to a
plaintiff in a counterclaim, cross-claim or a 3rd party
complaint
The ff. may be parties to a civil action:
a. Natural persons
b. Juridical persons
c. Entities authorized by law
Effect when a party impleaded is not (a) to (c)
a. Plaintiff – MTD on the ground that the plaintiff has no legal
capacity to sue
b. Defendant – MTD on the ground that the pleading asserting
the claim fails to state a cause of action, because a
complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against
one who cannot be party to a civil action
C.1. Real parties in interest; indispensable parties; Representatives as
parties; necessary parties; indigent parties; alternative defendants
A. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
● The party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.
● Not the same as locus standi, because of its constitutional
underpinnings is very different from the private suits concept
of real party in interest
● Concepts to apply: relativity of contracts, stipulations pour
autrui, accion pauliana, agency
● Ground for dismissal: states no cause of action
B. INDISPENSABLE PARTY
● a real party in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action. The joinder of indispensable parties
is MANDATORY.
● Effect of non-inclusion: decision is VOID
● Remedy: indispensable party may be impleaded at any stage
of the action. Burden is on the plaintiff.
○ Note that an outright dismissal is not the
immediate remedy authorized by the Rules
because the non-joinder of parties is not a ground
for dismissal of an action.
● When the order of the court to implead an indispensable
party goes unheeded, case may be dismissed.
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
● In a joint obligation, the interest of 1 debtor is separate and
distinct from that of his codebtors and a suit against 1
debtor does NOT make the other an indispensable party.
● Solidarity does NOT make a solidary obligor
indispensable party in a suit against another solidary debtor
because relief may be had even against any one of the
solidary debtors.
Example #1: B bought a car from S on installment with a chattle
mortgage. B later sold the car to D who agreed to pay for the remaining
monthly installments. D failed to pay. May S sue D alone in the
foreclosure suit or replevin? NO. B is an indispensable party, UNLESS
the obligation of B to S was assigned to D with the consent of S
thereby novating the obligation by a change of debtor.
Example #2: A transferee of a property pendente lite is NOT an
indispensable party, as it would in any event be bound by the judgment
against his predecessor.
C. NECESSARY PARTY
● One who is not an indispensable party but who ought to be
joined if complete relief is to be accorded.
● Example: joint debtors
D. INDIGENT PARTY
● One who has no money or property sufficient and available
for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family.
● The application and hearing to litigate as an indigent litigant
is made ex parte
● Effect: exemption from docket fees, other lawful fees and
transcripts of stenographic notes (but not expenses for
summons), however, such amounts shall be lien on the
judgment rendered in case favorable to the indigent.
E. REPRESENTATIVE
● Someone acting in a fiduciary capacity like a trustee,
guardian, executor or administrator, or a party authorized by
law or by the Rules.
F. ALTERNATIVE DEFENDANTS
● Where the plaintiff cannot definitely identify who among 2 or
more persons should be impleaded as a defendant, he may
join all of them as defendants in the alternative, although a
right to relief against one may be inconsistent with a right of
relief against the other.
VYE:
G. PRO-FORMA PARTIES
Created by the SC, first mentioned in Navarro v Escobido.
For the court to grant complete relief, they (pro-forma parties) must be
joined.
● Those who are required to be joined as co-parties in suits by
or against another party as may be provided by the
applicable substantive law or procedural rule. An example is
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 11
provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
(Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman)
○ Non-joinder of pro forma parties who are neither
an indispensable nor necessary = NOT ground for
dismissal
○ If the pro forma party not joined in the complaint is
an indispensable party = ground for DISMISSAL
Ex. husband and wife <3
[104] EXCELLENT QUALITY APPAREL INC. v. WIN MULTI RICH
BUILDERS, INC. (2009)
FACTS: In 1996, petitioner Excellent Quality Apparel entered into a
contract with Multi-Rich Builders, a registered sole proprietorship,
for the construction of a garment factory. In 1997, herein
respondent Win Multi Rich Builders was incorporated with the SEC.
It then filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner. In a
hearing held, the counsel of respondent Win moved that that its
name in the case be changed to that of Multi Rich Builders.
Petitioner noticing the variance in the name moved to dismiss the
case asserting Win was not the contractor neither a party to the
contract, thus it cannot institute the case.
DOCTRINE: A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.
In order for a corporation to be able to file suit and claim the
receivables of its predecessor in business, in this case a sole
proprietorship, it must show proof that the corporation had
acquired the assets and liabilities of the sole proprietorship.
[105] ALLIANCE OF QUEZON CITY HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION,
INC. v. QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT (2018)
FACTS: Alliance questions the constitutionality and legality of a
Quezon City Ordinance increasing the fair market values of real
properties in Quezon City for purposes of real property taxation.
However, its petition was dismissed due to lack of legal capacity to
sue.
DOCTRINE: The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine
requires that before a party may seek intervention from the court, he
or she should have already exhausted all the remedies in the
administrative level. The LGC provides two (2) remedies in relation
to real property tax assessments or tax ordinances. These are: (1)
Sections 226 and 252 thereof which allow a taxpayer to question
the reasonableness of the amount assessed before the city
treasurer then appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals;
and (2) Section 187 thereof which allows an aggrieved taxpayer to
question the validity or legality of a tax ordinance by duly filing an
appeal before the Secretary of Justice before seeking judicial
intervention. However, the rule on administrative exhaustion admits
of exceptions, one of which is when strong public interest is
involved.
Meanwhile, the hierarchy of courts doctrine prohibits parties from
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before
the lower courts. Nevertheless, this doctrine is not an iron-clad rule;
it also admits of exceptions, such as when the case involves
matters of transcendental importance.
Jurisprudence provides that an unregistered association, having no
separate juridical personality, lacks the capacity to sue in its own
name.
[106] V-GENT INC. v. MORNING STAR TRAVEL AND TOURS (2015)
FACTS: After buying 26 two-way plane tickets from Morning Star
Travel and Tours, Inc., V-Gent Inc returned 15 unused tickets to the
respondent, who only refunded six tickets.Despite demand, Morning
Star refused to refund the nine remaining tickets, so V-Gent filed a
money claim against Morning Star. Morning Star questions the
personality of V- Gent to file the action as it is the passengers who
bought the tickets, who are the real parties in interest.
DOCTRINE: Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party- in-interest (party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit) In suits where an agent
represents a party, the principal is the real party-in-interest; an agent
cannot file a suit in his own name
Rule 3, Section 3 Rules of Court provides an exception when an
agent may sue or be sued without the principal; elements:
a. Agent acted in his own name during the transaction
b. Agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
c. Transaction did not involve the property of the principal
Only the first element is present
a. Purchase order and receipt were in the name of V-Gent
b. But V-gent disclosed the names of the passengers
c. Transaction paid by passenger’s money
As for claims that by making a partial refund, Morning Star was
estopped from refusing a full refund on the ground that V-Gent is
not a real party-in-interest. Morning Star’s recognition of V-Gent’s
authority to collect a refund is not equivalent to recognition of V-
Gent’s authority to initiate a suit on behalf of the passengers.
Morning Stars is not estopped from questioning legal standing to
inititate suit.
[107] NAVARRO v. ESCOBIDO (2009)
FACTS: Karen Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin
and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro for his failure
to comply with his obligation under the Lease Agreement with
Option to Purchase which he entered into with KARGO Enterprises
which was represented by its Manager, Glenn Go who is also the
husband of Karen. Navarro filed a motion to dismiss the case for
lack of cause of action since Karen was not a party in the Lease
Agreement. This motion was initially granted but the RTC reversed
its decision which was later affirmed by CA. SC held that Karen was
a real party-in-interest in the case.
DOCTRINE: There is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like
petitioner to bring suit in court. The law merely recognizes the
existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 12
organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires
the proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits,
register the business name, and pay taxes to the national
government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the
sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in
court.
In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in
interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any
kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore,
only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit
for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party
thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are
not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in
the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed
to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
[108] ARCELONA v. CA (1997)
FACTS: The petitioners are three out of six siblings which were co-
owners of a fishpond. The tenant of the fishpond filed a case for
possession of the fishpond against the siblings, but did not implead
the petitioners. The trial court ruled for the tenant, granting him
possession. This ruling was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate
Court and the SC. Now come the petitioners, seeking to annul that
judgment because they as co-owners of the property were not
impleaded, and that the case should be annulled for failure to
implead indispensable parties. The SC ruled for the petitioners,
holding that co-owners of a property are indispensable parties, and
that there can be no final determination of the case if there is no
jurisdiction over them.
DOCTRINE: Co-owners of property are indispensable parties in a
case filed by the tenant. There can be no final determination of the
case if the court does not acquire jurisdiction over them, since any
judgment regarding the property would affect their interests in the
property.
NB: There is an errata for the SCRA version of this case. The
statement “Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that
any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. It was
subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in
ejectment without joining all the other co-owners.“ (page 38)
should be replaced with
“In the past, a co-owner could not even maintain an action in
ejectment without joining all the other co-owners. . . While Article
487 of the Civil Code now provides that any one of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment, former Chief Justice Moran also
stressed that all of them are necessary and proper parties . . .”
Navarro v. Escobido, November 27, 2009 -- Under Article 108 of the
Family Code, the conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on
contract of partnership; being a co-owner the wife can file the
complaint for recovery of property without including the husband; the
husband is not an indispensable party and he only needs to be
impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit based on Section 4 of Rule
3.
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
NOTE: The statement of the court in the decision that non-joinder of
indispensable party is not a ground to dismiss action IS MISLEADING.
The effect of failure to include an indispensable party is found in
Section 7 under which there will be no final determination of the action.
Section 11 on effects of non-joinder of parties must be read in relation
to Section 7. When an indispensable party is not before the court, the
action should be dismissed (Arcelona v. CA, 280 SCRA 20)
[109] CARANDANG v. DE GUZMAN (2006)
FACTS: Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are
stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay
Broadcasting System (MBS). When MBS increased its capital stock,
the spouses Carandang subscribed to the newly issued capital
stock. De Guzman claims that part of the payment for these
subscriptions were paid by him, but the spouses Carandang
refused, contending that there is no indebtedness on their part
since a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between
Arcadio Carandang and de Guzman, whereby the latter promised to
pay for the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in
consideration for Arcadio Carandang’s technical expertise, his newly
purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading
radio/communication equipment.
DOCTRINE: A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.
An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action.
A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to
be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the
claim subject of the action.
“If a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in
interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action.” However, what dismissal on
this ground entails is an examination of whether the parties
presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, and
not whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually
pleaded.
Carandang v. De Guzman, November 29, 2006 – The wife in this case
was not an indispensable party in the action for recovery of money; as
such, she need not be impleaded in the suit.
VYE: Will the death of one of the parties after the suit has been filed
have an effect on the decision of the Court? NO.
● The heirs can be held bound by the decision.
● Note: The lawyer has an obligation to inform the court of the
death of one of the parties. There is a corresponding
sanction for the failure to do this.
Personality to sue; Estate of a decedent
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 13
Within the framework of the Constitution, the Estate should be
considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which include the exercise
during the judicial administration thereof the exercise of those rights
and fulfilment of those obligations of his Estate which survives after
his death. (Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, G.R. No. L-770, April 27,
1948)
Since an estate is a juridical person, the administrator may file the
complaint directly to court, without the same going to the Barangay
Lupon for arbitration. (Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217)
[110] VDA. DE BORROMEO v. POGOY (1983)
FACTS: The administrator of Vito de Borromeo filed an ejectment
suit vs petitioner for non payment of rental fees, but the petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with brgy conciliation
proceedings. The SC held that brgy proceedings can be dispensed
with because the real party in interest is the estate of the decedent.
DOCTRINE: While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued
without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or
defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil
Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration.
[111] VENTURA v. MILITANTE (1999)
FACTS: Uy filed a complaint for collection of money against the
estate of Ngo after the latter’s death. His wife Ventura moved to
dismiss for lack of capacity of the estate to be a party in a civil
complaint. The RTC ordered an amendment, naming Ventura as
party defendant instead. The SC held that the estate has no
capacity to be sued, and being a nullity, the amendment is not
allowed. Court GRANTED Ventura’s petition and Uy’s complaint was
DISMISSED.
DOCTRINE: Only natural or judicial persons, or entities authorized
by law may be parties in a civil action. Neither a dead person nor
his estate may be a party in a court action.
VYE: the filing of collection of money after death should be before
estate proceedings but if the complaint has already been filed before
death, then this is one of those actions which survive death.
What suit cannot survive death?
*sir mumbles something but does not answer* :(
● VYE: “swswswswswswswswsw”
● VYE: Suits that require the participation and presence of the
person; it is not limited to personal actions.
[112] SPOUSES RODOLFO BEROT AND LILIA BEROT v. SIAPNO
(2014)
FACTS: Macaria and petitioner spouses Rodolfo and Lilia Berot
obtained a P250, 000 loan from respondent Siapno. As security for
the loan, Macaria and spouses Berot mortgaged to Siapno a portion
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
of a parcel of land in Pangasinan. On June 23, 2003, Macaria died.
Because of the mortgagors’ default, Siapno filed an action for
foreclosure of mortgage and damages in the RTC. The complaint
was amended by substituting the estate of Macaria in her stead.
DOCTRINE: A deceased person does not have such legal entity as
is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute
cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a
decedent’s estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal
person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a
nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not, likewise, lie,
there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that
capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the
same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and
may not be named a party defendant in a court action.
VYE: An action for foreclosure of mortgage is an action that can
survive death. What if the mortgagors are spouses and one of them is
already dead? Who will the mortgagee sue?
● The mortgagee can sue the living spouse and the
representative of the estate of the deceased spouse as
enumerated in Rule 3, Sec. 3.
[113] BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES V. CA (2013)
FACTS: Spouses Toledo are solidarily liable for 1.4M pesos to
Boston Equity as evidenced by their contract which provides:
“FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally46 (in solemn)
promise to pay BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. x x x the sum of
PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED (₱1,400,000.00)] x x x.
(There was no mention of whether there was demand made by
Boston to the Toledos. The facts went straight to discuss the
procedure after the filing of complaint for sum of money by Boston.)
DOCTRINE: In addition, the dismissal of the case against Manuel is
further warranted by Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
states that: only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized
by law may be parties in a civil action." Applying this provision of
law, the Court, in the case of Ventura v. Militante,54 held:
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. x x x. In order to
maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an
actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in law
and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial
person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of
such a person.
The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent
upon a plaintiff, when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to name
the proper party defendant to his cause of action. In a suit or
proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can
acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment until a
party defendant who actually or legally exists and is legally capable
of being sued, is brought before it. It has even been held that the
question of the legal personality of a party defendant is a question
of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of
procedure.
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 14
The original complaint of petitioner named the "estate of Carlos Ngo
as represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura" as the
defendant.1âwphi1 Petitioner moved to dismiss the same on the
ground that the defendant as named in the complaint had no legal
personality. We agree.
x x x. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the
capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the
capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in a
court action.
On substitution: In this case, substitution is not proper because the
defendant had already died before the filing of the case. Under
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, substitution is only proper
where the party to be substituted died during the pendency of the
case.
On Estoppel (Note: VYE emphasized this in class): The concept of
jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over
the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property,
jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the
litigation.
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed
as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
In [previous] cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the
jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over the subject
matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that
parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent
posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they
submitted their cause voluntarily.
Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss
before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the person of
defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no
application in this case.
VYE: What then is the remedy of the plaintiff in case of the death of a
defendant prior to the filing of the case?
● It depends on whether the action can survive the death of
the defendant. If it can, determine who should be impleaded:
heirs of the defendant or his estate and amend the
complaint accordingly, if already filed.
VYE: What about in a money claim? Who should be sued if one of the
defendants is already dead?
● It depends on whether the obligation is joint or solidary.
● If it is solidary, the creditor can sue any of the surviving
debtors to recover the whole amount.
● If it is joint, it won’t proceed against the survivor.
VYE: Who can assail the court’s jurisdiction of a particular defendant?
● Only the defendant himself/herself because this is a
personal defense.
VYE: Can the party who died simply be dropped from the case?
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
● In the Boston case, because the inclusion of Manuel is not
considered a misjoinder, he cannot simply be dropped from
the case. Thus, Rule 3, Section 11 does not apply.
[114] HEIRS OF PACIANO LABAO v. VAND DER KOLK (2014)
FACTS: Heirs of Yabao alleged that they are the sole surviving heirs
of Sps. Yabao and prayed that they be declared co-owners and
possessors of the parcel of land declared in the name of late
Paciano Yabao which is also occupied and possessed by Van Der
Kolk. The SC ruled in favor of Van Der Kolk on the basis that the
petitioners did not present any proof, save a mere tax declaration
that was in the name of their putative ancestor, that they are actual
heirs of the late Paciano Yabao and to what degree and capacity.
DOCTRINE: Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that
facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity
must be averred in the complaint. The party bringing suit has the
burden of proving the sufficiency of the representative character
that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent
a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such
complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the complaint. It bears stressing that an
unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect.
[115] ANG v. ANG (2012)
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
seeking to annul the CA decision which ruled that the complaint
should have been filed in the RTC Bacolod where the respondents
reside and not in RTC QC where the attorney-in-fact of the
petitioners, who are residing in the US, resides. Respondents
asserted that since Atty. Aceron is merely a representative of the
petitioners, he is not a real party-in-interest. Hence, his residence
should not be considered in determining the proper venue of the
complaint. On the other hand, petitioners invoked Rule 3.3 and
maintained that as their representative, Atty. Aceron is deemed a
real party in interest in the case and can prosecute the same before
the RTC. The SC upheld the CA decision. The Rules state that the
plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the
action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.
However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the
complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of the place
where the defendant resides.
DOCTRINE: On the issue of who is a real party in interest, a real
party in interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the
right sought to be enforced. It means material interest or an interest
in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. Atty.
Aceron does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment
herein. He was merely for the limited purpose of filing and
prosecuting the complaint against the respondents and that does
not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and
ought to be considered as a real party in interest.
C.2. Compulsory and permissive joinder of parties
COMPULSORY – in cases of indispensable parties
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 15
PERMISSIVE – all others
Requisites for Permissive Joinder:
a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series
of transactions;
*Transactions are not necessarily contractual. They may be
incidents or events.
b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs
or defendants; and
c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of
the Rules on jurisdiction and venue (Pantranco North
Express v. Standard Insurance)
[116] SEPULVEDA JR. V. PELAEZ (2005)
FACTS: R filed an action for reconveyance and partition against
Pedro Sr, for 11 parcels of land which R’s mother should have
gotten from Dionisia Sepulveda’s estate but which Pedro deprived
her of. The SC dismissed the paction simply for failing to implead all
indispensable parties.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 1, Rule 69 of the ROC provides that in an action for
partition, all persons interested in the property shall be joined as
defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in
the property are indispensable parties, as such, an action for
partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
Without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial
court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of
the private respondent. The failure of the private respondent to
implead the other heirs as parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal
obstacle to the trial court and the appellate courts exercise of
judicial power over the said case, and rendered any orders or
judgments rendered therein a nullity.
[117] MOLDES V. VILLANUEVA (2005)
FACTS: A document denominated as Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Quitclaim covering Lot Nos. 589, 590 and 59.
Manuel Villanueva and his children, namely, Tiburio and Apolonio,
and Mariano Dullavin and his children, namely, Rolando and
Teodora, filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati against Celedonio, Rosita and Carolina Cedia, all surnamed
Moldes, to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Quitclaim.
DOCTRINE: Court held that the joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the
suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers
to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void, with no authority to act not only as to the
absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of
impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the
petitioner/plaintiff.
VYE: If an indispensable party does not appear in court, what
happens?
● The case will be dismissed.
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
● The judgment will be void.
[118] LIMOS V. SPOUSES ODONES (2010)
FACTS: Sps. Odones, owners of land in Camiling, Tarlac, belatedly
decided to register the document of conveyance therefor; when they
did, they found that the land’s OCT was cancelled and replaced by a
TCT in the name of petitioners, who secured such through a Deed of
Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Donata Lardizabal and her
husband Francisco Razalan on Apr. 18, 1972. Petitioners then
subdivided the lot among themselves. The first TCT was cancelled
and replaced by three new TCTs. Hence, this Complaint, on the
ground that the signatures in the Deed were forgeries because
Donata and Francisco were dead as of Apr. 18, 1972. The Court held
that the affirmative defense of non-joinder of indispensable parties
is not a ground for dismissal of action.
DOCTRINE:
An action for annulment of title goes into the issue of ownership of
the land covered by a Torrens title, hence, the relief generally prayed
for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the land’s true owner. Thus,
the real party-in-interest is the person claiming title or ownership
adverse to that of the registered owner.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, that the latter may dismiss the complaint.
[119] PACANA-CONTRERAS V. ROVILA WATER SUPPLY (2013)
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint against Rovila, Inc for
fraudulently operating a business under the name of their family
business (Rovila Water Supply), and in the process, Rovila, Inc.
fraudulently appropriated collections and payments. The family
business was owned by the parents (Lourdes and Luciano) of the
petitioners. Rovila, Inc alleges that petitioners are not the real
parties in interest in the case because it should have been their
parents. The parents died during the pendency of the case.
DOCTRINE: By virtue of hereditary rights, a decedent’s interest in a
case transmits to the heirs (Art. 774 and 777 Civil Code).
Jurisprudence on the procedural consequence of the inclusion or
non-inclusion of an indispensable party is divided in our jurisdiction.
● Mindful of the differing views of the Court as regards the
legal effects of the non-inclusion of indispensable parties,
the Court clarified in Republic of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., that the failure to implead
indispensable parties is a curable error.
● Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder
of indispensable parties in fact led to the dismissal of the
suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe
with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-
joinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the
judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties is
founded on equity.
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 16
● The operative act that would lead to the dismissal of the
case would be the refusal to comply with the directive of
the court for the joinder of an indispensable party to the
case.
● Obviously, in the present case, the deceased Pacañas can
no longer be included in the complaint as indispensable
parties because of their death during the pendency of the
case. Upon their death, however, their ownership and
rights over their properties were transmitted to their
heirs, including herein petitioners, pursuant to Article
774 in relation with Article 777 of the Civil Code.
VYE: The effect when one of the indispensable parties is not
impleaded:
● Curable; will not render the judgment null and void
● After the court has decided, the party not impleaded can no
longer be impleaded
● In some cases, the court may remand the case in order for
the indispensable party to be included and heard.
● Obligation to implead the indispensable party falls on the
plaintiff.
○ Failure on the part of the plaintiff to comply with
an order of the court to implead an indispensable
party may lead to the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of disobedience.
● Failure of the defendant to include indispensable party:
○ Can the Court dismiss? NO. Dismissal not a
ground. But dismissal because of failure to follow
court order. (cf. Rule 70)
VYE: It is different when it comes to a necessary party.
● If a necessary party is not impleaded, the Court may still
render valid judgment, but without prejudice to the necessary
party not included. (MAIN DIFFERENCE between non-
inclusion of an indispensable party and non-inclusion of a
necessary party)
● Failure to comply with an order of the court to implead a
necessary party, without justifiable cause, is deemed a
waiver of the claim against such party.
[120] CHINA BANKING CORP. V. OLIVER (2002)
FACTS: Pangan Lim and a certain Mercedes Oliver (Oliver One)
opened a joint account in Chinabank. They applied for a P17M loan,
with a parcel of land as a collateral. They also executed a
promissory note and a Real Estate Mortgage on the property. This
was duly registered and annotated on the original title. Thereafter,
respondent, claiming that she is Mercedes Oliver (Oliver Two) filed
an action for annulment of mortgage and cancellation of title with
damages. She claims that she was the registered and lawful owner
of the land subject of the real estate mortgage; TC denied motion.
CA then found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
for denying Chinabank’s motion to dismiss and, instead, suggested
that petitioner file an appropriate action against mortgagor Oliver
One. SC ruled that Oliver One is not an indispensable party.
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar) C2022 I. Civil Procedure 17

Consequently, Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires compulsory joinder of indispensable parties in a
case, does not apply.
DOCTRINE:
Non-joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action.
Parties may be added by order of the court, either on its own
initiative or on motion of the parties.
A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the
defendant either on the basis of liability to himself or on the ground
of direct liability to the plaintiff.
Indispensable party v. Necessary party
were caused to be impleaded on the ground that they were
indispensable parties. SC held that no rights of the defendants were
to be safeguarded should the subsequent sale be declared an
actual sale or an equitable mortgage. However, being parties to the
instrument sought to be reformed, their presence is necessary in
order to settle all the possible issues of the controversy. NOT
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, as the trial court erroneously held.
DOCTRINE: Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in
the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence.
Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to
adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far
separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without
affecting them.

C.3. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

Indispensable Necessary MISJOINDER – when he is made a party to the action although he
should not be impleaded
WON Mandatory MANDATORY - must NOT MANDATORY -
be joined at all should be joined
NON-JOINDER – when he is supposed to be joined but is not
conditions whenever possible
impleaded in the action

WON final decree NO YES, because his

Note: Even of neither misjoinder nor non-joinder is a ground for
can be had in his interests are
dismissal of the action, the failure to obey the order of the court to
absence separable from the
drop or add a party is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint
interest litigated in
under Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff (Sec.3 Rule 17).
the case

Remedy in case of Plaintiff to implead State why such party [122] PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS V. STANDARD INSURANCE
absence at any stage is omitted (2005)

FACTS: Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by

Under Section 7, Rule 3, indispensable parties must always be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the court cannot proceed without
them. Necessary parties must be joined, under Section 8 of the same
Rule, in order to adjudicate the whole controversy and avoid
multiplicity of suits.
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so
that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Necessary
parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole
controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final
decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.
[121] SENO V. MANGUBAT (1987)
his mother respondent Martina Gicale. While driving north bound
along the National Highway in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, a passenger
bus owned by petitioner Pantranco North Express, Inc., driven by co-
petitioner Alexander Buncan, was trailing behind. The bus overtook
the jeepney and hit its left rear side and sped away. The total cost of
the repair was P21K, but jeepney’s insurer respondent Standard
Insurance Co., Inc. paid only P8K. Respondent Martina shouldered
the balance. Respondents demanded reimbursement from
petitioners but they refused prompting the former to file a complaint
for sum of money with the RTC Manila. Petitioners denied the
allegations in the complaint and averred that it is the MeTC, not the
RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.
RTC granted, affirmed by the CA, holding that Standard’s and
Martina’s claims fall under the jurisdiction of RTC because pursuant
to the Totality Rule provided for under Sec. 19, BP129, it is the sum
of the two claims that determines the jurisdictional amount.

FACTS: Seno mortgaged her property with Mangubat, but Mangubat
as security required her to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of him and a certain Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat.
Later on, the two other parties consolidated their share with
Mangubat, transferring the title to the property to the latter’s name
alone. When Seno failed to pay, Mangubat filed an ejectment case
against her. So Seno filed present case seeking reformation of the
Deed of Sale and the annulment of a subsequent sale made by
Mangubat. Upon order of the trial court, Evangelista and Bienvenido
SC held that there was a permissive joinder of parties because there
was a single transaction common to both respondents (Pantranco's
bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney), hence, they have the same
cause of action against petitioners; and there was a common
question of fact (W/N petitioner was negligent). Corollary, in joinder
of causes of action, where the claims in all the causes of action are
principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed
shall be the test of jurisdiction. The aggregate claim in this case
being more than P20K, jurisdiction lies with the RTC.
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
Note: R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan,
Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken effect
when case was filed.
DOCTRINE: Permissive joinder of parties requires that:
(a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions;
(b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or
defendants; and
(c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the
Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the
convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Corollarily, under Section 5(d), Rule 2, par. (d) provides that where
the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction.”This paragraph embodies the "totality rule" as
exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among
others, that "where there are several claims or causes of action
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes
of action arose out of the same or different transactions.”
Since respondents’ cause of action against petitioners arose out of
the same transaction, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims.
n
C.4. Class suit
CLASS SUIT – an action where one or more may sue for the benefit of
all, if the ff. requisites concur:
a. subject matter of the controversy must be common or
general interest to many persons
b. persons are so numerous that it is impracticable to join all
as parties
c. parties actually before the court are sufficiently numerous
and representative as to fully protect the interests of all
concerned
d. representatives sue or defend for the benefit of all
It is not a common question of law that sustains a class suit but a
common interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
Example #1: There is NO CLASS SUIT in an action filed 400 residents
initiated through the mayor to recover damages sustained due to their
exposure to toxic wastes because each of the plaintiffs has a separate
and distinct injury not shared by other members of the class. Each
supposed plaintiff has to prove his own injury. There is no common or
general interest in the injuries allegedly suffered.
Key: subject matter — injuries
Example #2: NO CLASS SUIT by a corporation to recover property of its
members in their personal capacities.
Note: A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court. In Adm. Matter No. 88-1-646, the SC took
occasion to distinguish the rules on permissive joinder of parties and
class suit. What is contemplated in a class suit is that (a) the subject
matter in controversy is of common or general interest to many
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 18
persons, and (b) those persons are so numerous as to make it
impractical to bring them all before the court to join them all as parties.
On the other hand, if there are many persons who have distinct,
separate rights against the same party or group parties, but those
rights arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and
there are common questions of fact or law resulting therefrom the
former may join as plaintiffs in one action against the same
defendants.
[123] ADM. MATTER NO. NO. 88-1-646: RE REQUEST OF THE
HEIRS OF THE PASSENGERS OF DONA PAZ TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER OF JUDGE B.V. CHINGCUANGCO (1988)
FACTS: The victims of the accident of Doña Paz filed a case suit
against Sulpicio lines for the recovery of damages. The plaintiffs
subsequently asked to file the case as a pauper litigant in order to
be exempted from paying docket fees. The Court ruled that the
proper rule should be on the permissive joinder of parties, since
there are individual rights sought, unlike in a class suit. The Court
also denied the petition to file the case as a pauper litigant as to the
20 named plaintiffs who did not provide proof that they could not
pay the necessary docket fees.
DOCTRINE: When there are separate rights asked for by the
plaintiffs, a class suit is not appropriate under Rule 3.12, instead the
rule on permissive joinder of parties must apply under rule 3.6
The rule is that for a class suit to be allowed, it is needful inter alia
that the parties be so numerous that it would be impracticable to
bring them all before the court. The case at bar not being a proper
one for a class suit, it follows that the action may not be maintained
by a representative few in behalf of all the others.
C.5. Suits against entities without juridical personality
Sec. 15, Rule 3 (Parties to Civil Action), Rules of Court.* Entity w/o
juridical personality as defendant -- Entity without juridical personality
as defendant. When two or more persons not organized as an entity
with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued
under the name by which they are generally or commonly known.
In the answer of such defendant, the names and addresses of the
persons composing said entity must all be revealed.
* Note: this rule only applies to defendants
Sec. 7, Rule 14 (Summons), Rules of Court. Service upon entity
without juridical personality. — When persons associated in an entity
without juridical personality are sued under the name by which they are
generally or commonly known, service may be effected upon all the
defendants by serving upon any one of them, or upon the person in
charge of the office or place of business maintained in such name. But
such service shall not bind individually any person whose connection
with the entity has, upon due notice, been severed before the action
was filed.
Sec. 6, Rule 36 (Judgments, Final Orders and Entry thereof), Rules of
Court. Judgment against entity without juridical personality. -- When
judgment is rendered against two or more persons sued as an entity
without juridical personality, the judgment shall set out their individual
or proper names, if known.
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
VYE: If it is an unregistered association, who will you sue?
● You may sue members (known to you) “doing business
under the name and style of [name of unregistered
association]”
● Service to such members may bind the other members,
except those no longer affiliated with the association at the
time of the filing of the complaint.
C.6. Effect of death of party litigant
1. extinguishes the attorney-client relationship
2. within 30 days after such death, it is the duty of counsel of
deceased party to inform the court; failure to do so is a
ground for disciplinary action
3. court shall determine WON the claim is extinguished by such
death; if the claim survives, there shall be substitution of
parties (no service of summons reqd, instead: court shall
order the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
be substituted for said deceased within 30 days from notice)
4. it is possible that the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for
the estate of the deceased in the ff. Situations:
a. counsel for the deceased does not name a legal
representative
b. there is a representative name but he fails to
appear [Sec. 16, Rule 3]
124 YADNO vs. ANCHALES (2012)
FACTS: No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city, having the
same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted
to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders
or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and
seriously hamper the administration of justice.
DOCTRINE: Sps. Anchales filed with the CFI of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan (now RTC Urdaneta) a complaint for ownership, delivery
of possession, damages with preliminary injunction, and attachment
against Sps. Yadno and Sps. Mat-an over a property under the name
of Orani Tacay. The RTC of Urdaneta subsequently granted the title
over the land to Sps. Anchales. Meanwhile, Sps. Mat-an filed an
action for injunction and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction with RTC Baguio City against Sps. Yadno, Sps. Anchales,
and the Provincial Sheriff of RTC Urdaneta, assailing the decision
rendered by the RTC of Urdaneta.
125 CARANDANG vs. DE GUZMAN (year)
FACTS: asdasd
DOCTRINE: asdas
126 HEIRS OF PACIANO YABAO vs. VANDER KOLK (2014)
FACTS: Respondent occupied, under protest by petitioners, lands
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 19
supposedly owned by plaintiffs. Respondent also applied for free
patent over the same land. Complaint for ownership and possession
in MTCC -> motion to dismiss -> denied -> ruled against Van der
Kolk upon his default -> appealed to RTC -> dismissed for failure to
file memorandum on time -> MR denied -> Petition for Review under
Rule 42 to CA -> granted -> petitioner for review on certiorari.
DOCTRINE: Ownership by the heirs cannot be established by mere
lip service and bare allegations in the complaint. As in all matters, a
party must establish his/her averments in the complaint by
sufficient evidence necessary to prove such claim. In the case at
bench, the respondents, as plaintiffs in the MTCC, merely alleged
that they are the heirs of Paciano Yabao without presenting any
proof why they are the latter’s heirs and in what degree or capacity.
C.7. Indigent Party
Sec. 21, Rule 3 (Parties to Civil Actions), Rules of Court. Indigent
party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and
hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for
himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and
other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the
court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and
other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall
be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time
before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should
determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact
a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and
other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court.
If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution
shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other
sanctions as the court may impose. (22a)
127 ALGURA vs. LGU OF CITY OF NAGA (2006)
FACTS: Petitioners filed a claim for damages against City of Naga
for lost income after the demolition of their home. They applied for
exemption from filing fees, but the RTC disqualified them as a
pauper litigant, since they haven’t met the requisites under Rule 141,
namely “(a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family
do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an
employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market
value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three
hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from
payment of legal fees.”
DOCTRINE: If the applicant for exemption meets the salary and
property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant
of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the
application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the
application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should
apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its
sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for
exemption.
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar) C2022 I. Civil Procedure 20

to summary procedure a motu proprio dismissal

Read: Herrera, Remedial Law Vol. 1, pp. 504-611

C.8. Transferee Pendente Lite

D.2. Venue of real actions

128 MEDRANO vs. DE VERA (2010)

FACTS: Flaviana died intestate, leaving her half-sisters, Hilaria and
Elena, as her compulsory heirs. The sisters, in turn, waived all their
rights to Flaviana’s land to Medrano due to the expenses she
incurred for Flaviana. This was contained in a private document,
which was signed by some of the sisters’ children, but others
refused to sign. So Medrano filed a Complaint in 2001 for quieting
of title, reconveyance, reformation of instrument, and/or partition
with damages against the heirs in the RTC. Summons were served
upon them. De Vera (not a named defendant) filed an Answer with
Counterclaim and presented himself as the real party-in-interest and
maintained that the private documents was executed by the
defendants predecessors in favor of Medrano was null and void for
want of consideration. Medrano argued that respondent De Vera
had no personality to answer the complaint since he was not
authorized by the named defendants to answer in their behalf.
DOCTRINE: De Vera is a transferee pendente lite of the named
defendants (by virtue of the Deed of Renunciation of Rights that was
executed in his favor during the pendency of Civil Case No. U-7316).
His rights were derived from the named defendants and, as
transferee pendente lite, he would be bound by any judgment
against his transferors under the rules of res judicata. Thus, De
Vera’s interest cannot be considered and tried separately from the
interest of the named defendants.
A transferee pendente lite is deemed joined in the pending action
from the moment when the transfer of interest is perfected. His
participation in the case should have been allowed by due process
considerations.
Sec. 1, Rule 4 (Venue), Rules of Court. Venue of real actions -- Actions
affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall
be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated. Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and
tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
129 VILLANUEVA vs. JUDGE MOSQUEDA (2012)
FACTS: Bonifacio leased his property to Villanueva. The contract
states: if Bonifacio, as lessor violates the contract he can be sued in
Manila and if the Villanueva, as lessee, violates the contract he can
be sued in Masantol, Pampanga. The heirs of Bonifacio filed an
ejectment suit against Villanueva in the municipal court of
Masantol, Pampanga pursuant to the lease contract. Villanueva
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The
motion was denied. Villanueva filed a petition for certiorari in the CFI
assailing the denial of his motion to dismiss. Said petition was also
dismissed. Hence this petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
DOCTRINE: SC held that the municipal court of Masantol,
Pampanga has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain an
ejectment suits like any other inferior court; that the rule in Section
1(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court refers to venue, not jurisdiction
over the subject matter; and that the written agreement of the
parties as to the venue is valid, binding and enforceable.

130 UNION BANK OF THE PH vs. MAUNLAD HOMES INC. (2012)

VYE: “transfer of interest” under Rule 3, Section 19 does not
necessarily mean transfer of property.
D. Venue
D.1. Venue versus jurisdiction
Venue
place where the case is to be
heard or tried
matter of procedural law
established a relation between
plaintiff and defendant, or
petitioner and respondent
FACTS: An action for unlawful detainer was instituted against
Maunlad Homes by Union Bank. Maunlad Homes questions the
propriety of the venue of Union Bank’s unlawful detainer action
which was filed in Makati City while the contested property is
located in Malolos, Bulacan. Citing Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Jurisdiction Court, Maunlad Homes claimed that the unlawful detainer action
should have been filed with the municipal trial court of the
authority to hear and municipality or city where the real property involved is situated.
determine a case Union Bank, on the other hand, justified the filing of the complaint
with the MeTC of Makati City on the venue stipulation in the contract
which states that “[t]he venue of all suits and actions arising out [of]
substantive
or in connection with this Contract to Sell shall be at Makati City.”
The Supreme Court held that Union Bank rightfully filed the
establishes a relation between
complaint with the MeTC of Makati City. SC ruled the validity of a
the court and the subject
stipulation in a contract providing for a venue for ejectment actions
matter other than that stated in the Rules of Court.

conferred by the act or agreement
of the parties
not a ground for a motu proprio
dismissal (except in cases subject
fixed by law and cannot be
conferred by agreement of the
parties
lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter is a ground for
DOCTRINE: While Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court states that
ejectment actions shall be filed in “the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved x x x is
situated[,]” Section 4 of the same Rule provides that the rule shall
not apply “[w]here the parties have validly agreed in writing before
the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.” Precisely, in
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
this case, the parties provided for a different venue. In Villanueva v.
Judge Mosqueda, etc., et al., 115 SCRA 904 (1982), the Court upheld
the validity of a stipulation in a contract providing for a venue for
ejectment actions other than that stated in the Rules of Court. Since
the unlawful detainer action is connected with the contract, Union
Bank rightfully filed the complaint with the MeTC of Makati City.
D.3. Venue of personal actions
Sec. 2, Rule 4 (Venue), Rules of Court. Venue of personal actions -- All
other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
131 MARCOS-ARANETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2008)
FACTS: Petitioner Marcos-Araneta sought the reconveyance of
shares of stock. Respondent Benedicto Group refused to oblige.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on five grounds (important for
us is improper venue). Allegedly, the complaint is one of a real
action. Thus, Irene, allegedly not being a resident of Ilocos Norte
cannot file the suit there but must go to Makati instead.
DOCTRINE: Venue of personal actions: the court where the plaintiff
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff. When there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action
case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for
determining proper venue. (Sec 2, Rule 4 RoC).
VYE: “Plaintiff or principal plaintiffs” - the residence of the principal
plaintiff is determinative of the proper venue.
132 LATORRE vs. LATORRE (2010)
FACTS: Luis Latorre and Ifzal entered into a contract of lease
involving a parcel of land which both petitioner and respondent
allegedly owned. Ifzal refused to pay Generosa Latorre her share in
the rentals and respondent Luis continued to assert that he was the
sole owner of the lot, thus causing petitioner to file the action for
Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with
application for Injunction against her own son, respondent Luis
Esteban Lattore and one Ifzal Ali. Respondent filed motion to
dismiss for improper venue averring that since action was a real
action, case should have been filed before the RTC of Makati and
not RTC of Muntinlupa. RTC dismissed the motion. SC reversed
decision of RTC and ruled that venue was improper.
DOCTRINE: Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provide an answer to the issue of venue. Actions
affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein
(real actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that
has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is
situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions)
shall be commenced and tried in the proper courts where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 21
VYE : Answer ad cautelam means “with caution” or “for safety's sake.”
It's normally used in pleadings by lawyers for documents they claim
are not needed, but which they submit anyway, just to be on the safe
side and without waiving their original position that they're not
necessary.
VYE: Can the Court rule on the merits of the case and at the same time
say that the venue where the case was filed was improper?
● Can be argued that venue is a procedural issue and for as
long as the Court has jurisdiction, it may rule on the merits
of the case.
● Also, it can be argued that the issue of improper venue can
be waived; and is thus waived when the parties participated
in the proceedings.
133 HYATT ELEVATORS AND ESCALATORS CORP. vs. GOLDSTAR
ELEVATORS PHILS.
FACTS: HYATT sued LG and Goldstar for unfair trade practices with
RTC Mandaluyong. Goldstar filed Motion to Dismiss due to improper
venue as none of the parties reside in Mandaluyong according to
the principal place of business indicated in their Articles of
Incorporation. RTC denied the MTD which was reversed by the CA.
The SC affirmed the CA’s decision and ruled that the residence or
domicile of a juridical person is fixed by "the law creating or
recognizing" it.
DOCTRINE: For practical purposes, a corporation is in a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal office
is located as stated in the articles of incorporation. Since the
principal place of business of a corporation determines its
residence or domicile, then the place indicated in its articles of
incorporation becomes controlling in determining the venue for this
case.
134 GOLDEN ARCHES DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. ST. FRANCIS
SQUARE HOLDING INC
FACTS: In June 1991, petitioner Golden Arches Development
Corporation entered into a lease contract over a property owned by
Prince City Realty, Inc. located at the corner of Julia Vargas Avenue
and Bank Drive, Ortigas Center, Mandaluyong City, which
commenced on June 27, 1991 and was to terminate on February 27,
2008. On November 2, 2006, however, petitioner informed
respondent St. Francis Square Holdings, Inc., successor-in-interest
of ASB Holdings, Inc. (formerly Prince Realty, Inc.) of its intention to
discontinue the lease. Amicable negotiations between the parties
having failed, respondent filed on May 4, 2007 an action for breach
of contract and damages against petitioner before the RTC of
Mandaluyong.
DOCTRINE: Venue, in essence, concerns a rule of procedure. In
personal actions, it is fixed for the greatest possible convenience of
the plaintiff and his witnesses, and to promote the ends of justice.
VYE: How long is residence established?
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
● No specific period because venue is established for the
convenience of the parties.
See Rule on Venue in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC
and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC
● Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of voidable marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC):
○ venue is where petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least 6 months prior to the
date of the filing, or in the case of non-resident
respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner
● Rule on Legal Separation (A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC), Sec. 2(c):
○ provides for a similar rule on venue as AM 02-11-
10-SC
● Rule on Adoption of Minors (A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC), Sec. 6:
○ venue is where the prospective adoptive parents
reside
○ The petition for adoption shall be filed with the
Family Court of the province or city where the
prospective adoptive parents reside.
D.4. Venue of actions against non-residents
Sec. 3, Rule 4 (Venue), Rules of Court. Venue of actions against
nonresidents. — If any of the defendants does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, AND the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff, OR any property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the
place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion
thereof is situated or found.
135 ANG vs. ANG (2012)
FACTS: Spouses Theodore and Nancy Ang (residents of LA) sued
the spouse Alan and Em Ang (residents of Bacolod) for their failure
to pay the loan they obtained from the former. The suit was filed in
the RTC of Quezon City. The respondents moved to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue, contending that the case should have
been filed in Bacolod where they reside. SC agreed with them.
DOCTRINE: A complaint for collection of money can be filed in the
place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The
plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the
action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.
VYE: No choice if personal action as opposed to real action (where the
plaintiff resides or where the property is situated).
● Also, Sec. 3 Rule 4 does not apply if it is the plaintiff who is a
non-resident.
D.5. When the rules on venue do not apply
Sec. 4, Rule 4 (Venue), Rules of Court. When Rule not applicable -- This
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 22
Rule shall not apply.
a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of
the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
136 GUMABON vs. LARIN (2001)
FACTS: M filed a complaint against N seeking the return of the
certificate of title from N who refused to hand over the certificate
despite the fill payment, nearly 7 times the original amount of their
loan. Judge Salvador dismissed the complaint on the ground that,
being a real action, the case should have been filed before the RTC
of Pampanga (where the property is located), not RTC of QC. It was
issued motu propio.
DOCTRINE: A court may moot prop dismiss a case upon the
grounds of no jurisdiction over the subject matter, limits pendent,
res judicator and prescription. Outside of these instances, any motu
propio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the
plaintiff to be heard. Improper venue not being included in the
enumeration, it should follow that motto prop dismissal on said
ground would not be allowed. Improper venue not having been
raised by N as a ground to dismiss, he must be deemed to have
waived the same.
VYE: Court may motu propio dismiss a case for improper venue as it is
merely procedural, which may be waived.
137 BRIONES vs. CA (2015)
FACTS: Briones filed a Complaint in the City of Manila for Nullity of
Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note, Loan Agreement, Foreclosure
of Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT against Cash Asia alleging that he
is the owner of the subject property that had been foreclosed due to
non-payment in Cash Asia’s favor. He claims that his signatures
were forged because he never issued the promissory note, loan
agreement, real estate mortgage, purportedly executed by him to
loan for P3.5M. Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of improper venue because the subject contracts specifically
indicate that legal actions arising therefrom shall only be submitted
to the court of Makati City. Briones filed in his opposition that he
should not be covered by the venue stipulation in the subject
contracts as he was never a party therein. Briones filed a petition for
certiorari because the CA held that his case must be dismissed for
improper venue.
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the
court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of
personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the
plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As
an exception, jurisprudence instructs that the parties, through a
written instrument, may either (1) introduce another venue where
actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or (2) restrict the
filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
In cases where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions,
and/or coverage of a written instrument, the exclusive venue
stipulation contained therein shall still be binding on the parties and
the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of improper
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
venue. However, when a complaint directly assails the validity of the
written instrument itself, parties should not be bound by the
exclusive venue stipulation contained and should be filed in
accordance with the general rules on venue.
138 LEY CONSTRUCTION vs. SEDANO (2017)
FACTS: Petitioner subleased a parcel of land which it leased from
PNCC to the respondents. When the respondents failed to pay rent
from August 2011 to December 2011, despite demand, Petitioner
filed the present complaint against respondents. The respondents,
on a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleged that venue was
improperly laid since Section 21 of the lease contract provides that
"[a]ll actions or case[s] filed in connection with this case shall be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all
others."Hence, the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
improper venue. RTC granted the respondents motion and
dismissed the case.
DOCTRINE: Venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie
with the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception,
parties may, through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said
actions in a certain exclusive venue.
D.6. Effects of stipulations on venue
Guidelines on stipulations on venue:
1. the agreement on venue shall, in the first instance, be
normally considered as merely permissive
2. to be restrictive, the language or terminology employed in
the stipulation must be unequivocal and admit of no contrary
or doubtful interpretation
3. in case of irreconcilable doubt, the venue provision shall be
deemed to be permissive;
4. in ascertaining the intent in that provision which reasonably
admits of more than one meaning, the construction should
be adopted which most conduces to the convenience of the
parties [J. Regalado‘s Separate opinion in Unimasters
Conglomeration Inc]
139 UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION INC. vs. CA (1997)
FACTS: KUBOTA and UNOMASTERS entered into a Dealership
Agreement for Sales and Servies of the former’s products in Samar
and Leyte. The contract contained a stipulation saying that “All suits
arising out of this Agreement shall be filed within the proper courts
of Quezon City. 5 years later, UNIMASTERS filed an action in RTC
Tacloban for damages for breach of contract, and injunction with
prayer for temporary restraining order.
SC held that the stipulation did not effectively eliminated Tacloban
as an optional venue and limiting the venue only and exclusively to
Quezon City as it was not clearly stated that the parties intended to
this effect.
DOCTRINE: Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the
sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or
merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 23
the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law.
Of the essence is the ascertainment of the parties’ intention in their
agreement governing the venue of actions between them. That
ascertainment must be done keeping in mind that convenience is
the foundation of venue regulations, and that construction should
be adopted which most conduces thereto.
Unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and
suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions
between them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and
to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are
not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely
permissive, or complementary of said rule.
The fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of the
venues mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions different
from those specified by said rule, does not, without more, suffice to
characterize the agreement as a restrictive one.
● There must be accompanying language clearly and
categorically expressing their purpose and design that
actions between them be litigated only at the place
named by them, regardless of the general precepts of
Rule 4.
D.7. Doctrine of forum non-conveniens
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency
may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
1. that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to;
2. that the Philippine court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
3. that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision.
140 HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. vs. SHERMAN
(1989)
FACTS: The company where Private Respondents were directors
(which is based on Singapore) borrowed money from the Singapore
branch of Petitioner bank. There was a guarantee that all rights and
obligations are enforceable in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of Singapore. When the company failed to pay,
nevertheless petitioner filed an action in the Philippines. Eventually
SC held that PH courts had jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE: One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in
International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence
of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings
are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the
jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case
if it is not authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is
so authorized, it may still refuse to entertain the case by applying
the principle of forum non conveniens
● However, whether a suit should be entertained or
dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum non
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar) C2022 I. Civil Procedure 24

conveniens depends largely upon the facts of the Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in
particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real
of the trial court property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. (1[a], 2[a]a)

Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be

commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
141 PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP. vs. CITIBANK, N.A.
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
AND BANK OF AMERICA S.T. & N.A. (2012)
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. (2[b]a)
FACTS: PDIC, a government instrumentality created under RA 3591,
conducted an examination of the books of account of respondent
Sec. 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. — If any of the
Citibank and discovered that Citibank received amounts (a total of
defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the
P11B in dollars, from its head office and other foreign branches)
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of
which were not reported to PDIC as deposit liabilities subject to
said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be
assessment for insurance. Thus, PDIC sent Citibank a letter of
commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff
assessment for the deficiency in the sum of P1M. Similarly, PDIC
resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or
examined the books of account of respondent Bank of America, S.T.
found. (2[c]a)
& N.A. (BA), a national banking association, and found that BA
likewise received P600M in dollars which BA excluded from its
Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable. — This Rule shall not apply.
deposit liabilities. PDIC then sent a letter to BA asking for the
remittance of P100K as deficiency premium assessments for the
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
dollar deposits.
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of
the action on the exclusive venue thereof. (3a, 5a)
Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief before the CFI
Rizal stating that the money placements they received from their
head office and other foreign branches were not deposits and did Read Herrera, Remedial Law Vol. 1, pp. 612-651
not give rise to insurable deposit liabilities under Sections 3 and 4 of
R.A. No. 3591 (the PDIC Charter). Thus, the deficiency assessments
made by PDIC were improper and erroneous. RTC ruled in favor of
respondents, holding that the money placements were deposits
made outside of the Philippines and, under the PDIC Rules and
Regulations, are excluded from the computation of deposit
liabilities. CA Affirmed, ruling that no bank deposit could have arisen
from the transactions between the Philippine branch and the head
office because there did not exist two separate contracting parties
to act as depositor and depositary—the head office and the
Philippine branch were considered the same entity. SC held that
money placements are not insurable deposits. The respondents did
not incorporate a separate domestic corporation. Thus, being one
and the same, funds placed by the respondents in their respective
branches in the Philippines should not be treated as deposits made
by third parties subject to deposit insurance under the PDIC Charter.

DOCTRINE: In this case, the Court held that since PDIC did not
dispute the findings of the RTC and CA, the determination of facts
of the lower courts are to be accepted at face value, following the
well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court,
when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive
on this Court, and will generally not be reviewed on appeal.

For lack of judicial precedents on this issue, the Court seeks

guidance from American jurisprudence (specifically from Sokoloff v.
The National City Bank of New York,where the Supreme Court of
New York, which held that bank branches are not independent
agencies when considered in relation to the parent bank.

Rule 4 (Venue of Actions), Rules of Court.

Sec. 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or possession

of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in
the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
E. Uniformity of Rules
Rule 5, Rules of Court
Sec. 1, Rule V (Uniform Procedure in Trial
Courts)
Sec. 1 Uniform procedure. — The procedure in the Municipal Trial
Courts shall be the same as in the Regional Trial Courts, EXCEPT (a)
where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to
either of said courts, or (b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
II. Civil Cases
Sec. 3. Pleadings. —
A. Pleadings allowed. — The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the
complaints, compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims' pleaded in
the answer, and the answers thereto.
B. Verifications. — All pleadings shall be verified.
Sec. 4. Duty of court. — After the court determines that the case falls
under summary procedure, it may, from an examination of the
allegations therein and such evidence as may be attached thereto,
dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent therefrom for
the dismissal of a civil action. If no ground for dismissal is found it
shall forthwith issue summons which shall state that the summary
procedure under this Rule shall apply. d-c chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy
thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded
therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not
asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10)
days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded.chanrobles
virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to
answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu
proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein: Provided, however, that the court may in its
discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed
for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without
prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
if there are two or more defendants.
Sec. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. — Not later
than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary
conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall
be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with
the provisions of this Rule.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles
virtual law library
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall
be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who
appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on
his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims
shall be dismissed.
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 25
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not
apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common
cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at
the preliminary conference.
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. — Within five (5) days after
the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an
order stating the matters taken up therein, including but not limited to:
(a) Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if
so, the terms thereof;
(b) The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;.
(c) Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and
admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without
the need of further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be
rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;
(d) A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted;
and chanrobles virtual law library
(e) Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the
case.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. — Within ten
(10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and
other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with
their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by
them.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment. — Within thirty (30) days after receipt
of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period
for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material
facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the
matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or
other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of
said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after
the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the
period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for
the rendition of the judgment.
Revised Rule on Small Claims Court
SEC. 2. Scope.– These Rules shall govern the procedure in actions
before the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities (MTCCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (MCTCs) for payment of money where the value of the
claim does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00)
exclusive of interest and costs.
SEC. 3. Objectives
(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of persons to a
speedy disposition of their cases;
(b) To provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
disposition of small claims cases; and,
(c) To introduce innovations and best practices for the benefit of the
underprivileged.
SEC. 5. Applicability.– The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall apply this Rule in all actions that are purely civil in nature
where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment
or reimbursement of sum of money. The claim or demand may be:
(a) For money owed under any of the following:
1. Contract of Lease;
2. Contract of Loan;
3. Contract of Services;
4. Contract of Sale; or
5. Contract of Mortgage;
(b) For liquidated damages arising from contracts;
(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an
arbitration award involving a money claim covered by this Rule
pursuant to Sec. 417 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as The
Local Government Code of 1991.
SEC. 6. Commencement of Small Claims Action.– A small claims
action is commenced by filing with the court an accomplished and
verified Statement of Claim (Form 1-SCC) in duplicate, accompanied by
a Certification Against Forum Shopping, Splitting a Single Cause of
Action, and Multiplicity of Suits (Form 1-A-SCC), and two (2) duly
certified photocopies of the actionable document/s subject of the
claim, as well as the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence to
support the claim. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing
which was not attached to or submitted together with the Statement of
Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional
evidence.The plaintiff must state in the Statement of Claim if he/she/it
is engaged in the business of lending, banking and similar activities,
and the number of small claims cases filed within the calendar year
regardless of judicial station. No formal pleading, other than the
Statement of Claim/s described in this Rule, is necessary to initiate a
small claims action.
SEC. 7. Venue.– The regular rules on venue shall apply. However, if the
plaintiff is engaged in the business of lending, banking and similar
activities, and has a branch within the municipality or city where the
defendant resides, the Statement of Claim/s shall be filed where that
branch is located.
SEC. 8. Joinder of Claims.– Plaintiff may join in a single statement of
claim one or more separate small claims against a defendant provided
that the total amount claimed, exclusive of interest and costs, does not
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
SEC. 9. Affidavits.– The affidavits submitted under this Rule shall
state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants or based
on authentic records, which are admissible in evidence. A violation of
this requirement shall subject the party, and the counsel who assisted
the party in the preparation of the affidavits, if any, to appropriate
disciplinary action. The inadmissible affidavit(s) or portion(s) thereof
shall be expunged from the record. The non-submission of the required
affidavits will cause the immediate dismissal of the claim or
counterclaim.
F. Pleadings
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 26
Concept: These are written statements of the respective claims and
defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate
judgment.
Liberal construction: All pleadings shall be liberally construed so as to
do substantial justice – the intention of the pleader is the controlling
factor in construing a pleading and should be read in accordance with
its substance, not its form. BUT, it is also a rule that a party is strictly
bound by the allegations, statements or admissions made in his
pleadings and cannot be permitted to take a contradictory position.
Construction of ambiguous allegations in pleadings: since it is the
pleader who elects the language used, such ambiguities must be at the
pleader‘s peril.
Allowed pleadings: complaint, answer, counterclaim, crossclaim, third
(fourth, etc.)-party complaint, complaint-inintervention and reply.
F.1. Kinds of pleadings
F.1.a. Complaint
Rule 6, Sec. 3: Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading alleging the
plaintiff's cause or causes of action. The names and residences of the
plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint. (3a)
F.1.b. Answer
Rule 6, Sec. 4: Answer. — An answer is a pleading in which a defending
party sets forth his defenses. (4a)
(i) Negative defenses
Rule 6, Sec. 5 (a): A negative defense is the specific denial of the
material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential
to his cause or causes of action.
(ii) Negative pregnant
A negative pregrant is a form of negative expression which carries with
it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003)
(iii) Affirmative defenses
Rule 6, Sec. 5 (b): An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new
matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations
in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar
recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of
limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel,
former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way
of confession and avoidance. (5a)
F.1.c. Counterclaims
Rule 6, Sec. 6: Counterclaim. — A counterclaim is any claim which a
defending party may have against an opposing party. (6a)
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
(i) Compulsory counterclaim
Rule 6, Sec. 7: Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of
justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a
counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to
the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action
before the Regional Trial Court, the counter-claim may be considered
compulsory regardless of the amount. (n)
Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if (Spouses Mendiola v.
Court of Appeals):
(a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim;
(b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and
(c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its
amount and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC,
the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the
amount.
A compulsory counterclaim that a defending party has at the time he
files his answer shall be contained therein. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule
9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a compulsory counterclaim not
set up shall be barred.
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
not are the following, to wit:
(a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the
counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims,
absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s
claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective
claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort
and time by the parties and the court?
Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical
relation between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the
counterclaim. Such relationship exists when conducting separate trials
of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial
duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the
multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the
claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the
parties. If these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim is
compulsory.
The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was
concerned. The Makati case had the logical relation to the Manila case
because both arose out of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage constituted to secure the payment of petitioners’
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 27
credit purchases under the distributorship agreement with Shell.
Specifically, the right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated
on the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure, such that there would
not have been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case had Shell
not validly foreclosed the mortgage. As earlier shown, Ramon’s cause
of action for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure was a true
compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. Thus, the Makati RTC
could not have missed the logical relation between the two actions.
(ii) Permissive counterclaim
Banco de Oro v. Court of Appeals, 468 SCRA 166 (August 25, 2005) –
The counterclaim must be existing at the time of filing the answer,
though not at the commencement of the action for under Section 3 of
the former Rule 10, the counterclaim or cross-claim which a party may
aver in his answer must be one which he may have "at the time"
against the opposing party. That phrase can only have reference to the
time of the answer. Certainly a premature counterclaim cannot be set
up in the answer. This construction is not only explicit from the
language of the aforecited provisions but also serves to harmonize the
aforecited sections of Rule 10, with section 4 of the same rule which
provides that "a counterclaim…which either matured or was acquired
by a party after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the
court, be presented as a counterclaim…by supplemental pleading
before judgment." Thus a party who fails to interpose a counterclaim
although arising out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction
or occurrence of the plaintiff’s suit but which did not exist or mature at
the time said party files his answer is not thereby barred from
interposing such claim in a future litigation.
While BDO could have, after the Locsins filed on March 26, 1999 a
Supplemental Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-35337, set up, in its
Supplemental Answer, its claim subject of Civil Case No. MC-99-935,
again assuming arguendo that it is a Compulsory Counterclaim, the
setting up of such "after-acquired counterclaim," is merely permissive,
not compulsory.
(iii) Effect on the counterclaim when the complaint is
dismissed
Rule 17, Sec. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. – Except as
provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed
at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be
limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to
the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate
action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he
manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the
same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court.
Rule 17, Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no
justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the
presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim
in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by
the court.
VYE’s comment: The right to prosecute the counterclaim is available if
the dismissal is upon motion of the plaintiff or due to the fault of the
plaintiff. In both instances, the dismissal of the complaint shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action unless…he manifests his preference
to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action
F.1.d. Cross-claims
Rule 6, Sec. 8: Cross-claim. – A cross-claim is any claim by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein. Such crossclaim may include a claim that the party against
whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
May a plaintiff file a cross-claim against his co-plaintiff? Yes, the
rules simply refer to a party against a co-party.
May a third-party defendant file a crossclaim against the plaintiff?
Yes, under Sec. 13, Rule 6, ―In proper cases, he (third-party defendant)
may also assert a counterclaim against the original plaintiff in respect
of the latter’s claim against the third-party plaintiff.
F.1.e. Third (fourth, etc.) party complaints
Requisites for a 3rd party action are (Philtranco Service Enterprises
Inc. v. Paras):
(a) that the party to be impleaded must not yet be a party to the action;
(b) that the claim against the 3rd party defendant must belong to the
original defendant;
(c) the claim of the original defendant against the 3rd party defendant
must be based upon the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant;
and,
(d) the defendant is attempting to transfer to the 3rd party defendant
the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.
In Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Tempongko
the SC emphasized the nature of a third-party complaint, particularly its
independence from the main case:
“The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby
a "third party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed
complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with
leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to
enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff’s
claim. The third-party complaint is actually independent of and
separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. Were it not for this
provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed independently
and separately from the original complaint by the defendant against
the third-party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-party
defendant or so to speak, to litigate his separate cause of action in
respect of plaintiff’s claim against a third party in the original and
principal case with the object of avoiding circuitry of action and
unnecessary proliferation of lawsuits and of disposing expeditiously in
one litigation the entire subject matter arising from one particular set
of facts. … When leave to file the third-party complaint is properly
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 28
granted, the Court renders in effect two judgments in the same case,
one on the plaintiff’s complaint and the other on the third-party
complaint. When he finds favorably on both complaints, as in this case,
he renders judgment on the principal complaint in favor of plaintiff
against defendant and renders another judgment on the third-party
complaint in favor of defendant as third-party plaintiff, ordering the
third-party defendant to reimburse the defendant whatever amount
said defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff in the case. Failure of any of
said parties in such a case to appeal the judgment as against him
makes such judgment final and executory….”
It follows then that the plaintiff in the main action may not be regarded
as a party to the third-party complaint; nor may the third-party
defendant be regarded as a party to the main action. As for the
defendant, he is party to both the main action and the third-party
complaint but in different capacities – in the main action, he is the
defendant; in the thirdparty complaint, he is the plaintiff.
F.1.f. Complaint-in-intervention
Rule 19, Section 1: Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or
not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's
rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Rule 19, Sec. 3: Pleadings-in-intervention. – The intervenor shall file a
complaint-in-intervention if he asserts a claim against either or all of
the original parties, or an answer-in-intervention if he unites with the
defending party in resisting a claim against the latter.
To warrant intervention, two requisites must concur:
(a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, and
(b) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the parties nor should the claim of the intervenor be
capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. (Mabayo
Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 386 SCRA 110)
The interest, which entitles a person to intervene in a suit, must involve
the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and
effect of the judgment. (Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279 (1939)
In Bon-Mar Realty and Sport Corp. v. Spouses de Guzman: Bon-Mar
was allowed to intervene in Civil Case No. 56393 since he is not a mere
stranger to the litigation but a necessary party who must be joined in
the suit if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties,
or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of
the action.
F.1.g. Reply
Rule 6, Sec. 10: Reply. – A reply is a pleading, the office or function of
which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters
alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue
as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new
matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted. If the plaintiff
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so
alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an amended or supplemental
complaint.
The rule is, if a party does not file a reply, all the new matters alleged in
the answer are deemed controverted.
When is a reply necessary? Herrera cites 3 instances:
(a) where the answer alleges the defense of usury in which case a
reply under oath should be made; otherwise, the allegation of usurious
interest shall be deemed admitted (Sun Bros. Appliances Inc. v.
Caluntad, 16 SCRA 895 (1966); See also last sentence of Sec. 11, Rule
8 which reads: ―Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover interest
are deemed admitted if not denied under oath.‖ In Sun Bros, the SC
held if it is alleged that defendant entered into a contract of loan with
plaintiff in which the latter collected a usurious interest there is need to
deny the transaction under oath, and if no oath is taken the only thing
admitted is the allegation that the interest is usurious and not that the
contract entered into is a loan. The nature of the transaction is not
admitted. The fact that what is alleged is that the transaction was a
loan under the guise of a conditional contract of sale and that by
increasing its price by 150% the consideration became usurious, such
is not deemed admitted by the mere failure to deny the answer under
oath. This transaction must still be proven before usury can be
invoked.
(b) where the defense in the answer is based on an actionable
document, a reply under oath pursuant to Sec. 8, Rule 8 must be made;
otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document shall
be deemed admitted (Toribio v. Bidin, 134 SCRA 162 (1985). In Toribio,
the SC observed that the situation obtaining is not a common one. The
usual case is between plaintiff and defendant where, the latter, as his
defense, would present a document to which both parties are parties
and which states that the former relinquishes his rights to the
defendant. In the case at bar, we have a situation where the defendant
presented a document in his defense, a document to which the plaintiff
is a party but to which defendant is not. Thus, the question arises as to
whether or not the document is included as a necessary part of the
defense so as to make it actionable. The SC then noted that the deed
of sale executed by the petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio is
an essential and indispensable part of their defense to the allegation
that the petitioners had never disposed of their property. Thus,
Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 8 apply and the proper procedure was for the
petitioners to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the questioned deeds of sale and to set forth what they
claim to be the facts. However, the oversight or negligence of
petitioners' counsel in not properly drafting a reply to the answer and
an answer to the counterclaim is not necessarily fatal to their cause.
(c) Reply is necessary when the defense in the answer is based upon
an actionable document.
VYE:
GR: A reply is not necessary because allegations are deemed
controverted?
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 29
Rule 6, Rules of Court
RULE 6: Kinds Of Pleadings
Section 1. Pleadings defined. — Pleadings are the written statements
of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the
court for appropriate judgment. (1a)
Section 2. Pleadings allowed. — The claims of a party are asserted in a
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party
complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.
The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the pleading
asserting a claim against him.
An answer may be responded to by a reply. (n)
Section 3. Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading alleging the
plaintiff's cause or causes of action. The names and residences of the
plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint. (3a)
Section 4. Answer. — An answer is a pleading in which a defending
party sets forth his defenses. (4a)
Section 5. Defenses. — Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or
facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or
causes of action.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while
hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the
claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The
affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release,
payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery,
discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession
and avoidance. (5a)
Section 6. Counterclaim. — A counterclaim is any claim which a
defending party may have against an opposing party. (6a)
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory counterclaim is
one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out
of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the
jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof,
except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the
counter-claim may be considered compulsory regardless of the
amount. (n)
Section 8. Cross-claim. — A cross-claim is any claim by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party against
whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. (7)
Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims. — A
counter-claim may be asserted against an original counter-claimant.
A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant. (n)
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
Section 10. Reply. — A reply is a pleading, the office or function of
which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters
alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue
as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new
matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted.
If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new
matters so alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an amended or
supplemental complaint. (11)
Section 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)—party complaint. — A third (fourth,
etc.) — party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with
leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the
third (fourth, etc.) — party defendant for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.
(12a)
Section 12. Bringing new parties. — When the presence of parties
other than those to the original action is required for the granting of
complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim,
the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction
over them can be obtained. (14)
Section 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)—party complaint. — A third
(fourth, etc.) — party defendant may allege in his answer his defenses,
counterclaims or cross-claims, including such defenses that the third
(fourth, etc.) — party plaintiff may have against the original plaintiff's
claim. In proper cases, he may also assert a counterclaim against the
original plaintiff in respect of the latter's claim against the third-party
plaintiff. (n)
Note the amendments in the following sections of Rule 6: Sec. 2; Sec.
5; Sec. 7; Sec. 8; Sec. 10; Sec. 11
Section 2. Pleadings allowed. - The claims of a party are asserted in a
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party
complaint, or complaint-in-intervention. The defenses of a party are
alleged in the answer to the pleading asserting a claim against him or
her. An answer may be responded to by a reply only if the defending
party attaches an actionable document to the answer. (2a)
Section 5. Defenses. — Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or
facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his or her
cause or causes of action.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which,
while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading
of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him or
her. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations,
release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, Page 2 of 52 estoppel,
former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way
of confession and avoidance.
Affirmative defenses may also include grounds for the dismissal of a
complaint, specifically, that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment. (5a)
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory counterclaim is
one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out
of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 30
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within
the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature
thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial
Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless
of the amount. A compulsory counterclaim not raised in the same
action is barred, unless otherwise allowed by these Rules. (7a)
Section 8.Cross-claim. - A cross-claim is any claim by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein. Such cross-claim may cover all or part of the original claim.
(8a)
Section 10. Reply. —All new matters alleged in the answer are
deemed controverted. If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims
arising out of the new matters so alleged, such claims shall be set
forth in an amended or supplemental complaint. However, the
plaintiff may file a reply only if the defending party attaches an
actionable document to his or her answer.
A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege
facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged in, or relating
to, said actionable document.
In the event of an actionable document attached to the reply, the
defendant may file a rejoinder if the same is based solely on an
actionable document. (10a)
Section 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. — A third (fourth,
etc.)-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave
of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third
(fourth, etc.)-party defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation
or any other relief, in respect of his or her opponent's claim.
The third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint shall be denied admission, and
the court shall require the defendant to institute a separate action,
where: (a) the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant cannot be located
within thirty (30) calendar days from the grant of such leave; (b)
matters extraneous to the issue in the principal case are raised; or (c)
the effect would be to introduce a new and separate controversy into
the action. (11a)
VYE: Consider Rule 22 in interpreting the period.
Answer Ex Abudanti Cautela? See Rosete v. Lim
[142] ROSETE V. LIM (2006)
FACTS: RTC denied PETs’ motion to admit answers ex abudanti
cautela (lit.: “out of an abundance of caution”) in relation to
Respondents’ complaint for annulment of Deed of Sale and Specific
Performance to execute documents to restore RESPs’ ownership
and title. RESP then filed notice to take deposition upon oral
examination, which PETs opposed. Mapalo and Rosete refused to
be sworn because of the pendency of two criminal cases against
them for BP 22 and estafa. After being denied their petition with the
CA on certiorari and prohibition against the RTC orders, the PETs
elevate the case to the SC on the grounds of violations of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination as well as the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
DOCTRINE: Ex abudanti cautela means "out of abundant caution" or
"to be on the safe side." An answer ex abudanti cautela does not
make their answer less of an answer. A cursory look at the answers
filed by petitioners shows that they contain their respective
defenses. An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets
forth his defenses, and the failure to file one within the time allowed
herefore may cause a defending party to be declared in default.
Filing fees for compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims: See Korea
Technologies Co. Inc. v. Judge Lerma
[143] KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO. INC. V. JUDGE LERMA (2008)
FACTS: Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. [Korea Tech], a Korean
corporation, entered into a contract with Pacific General Steel
Manufacturing Corporation [Pacific General], a domestic
corporation, whereby Korea Tech undertook to ship and install in
Pacific General’s site in Carmona, Cavite the machinery and
facilities necessary for manufacturing LPG cylinders, and to initially
operate the plant after it is installed. The plant, after completion of
installation, could not be operated by Pacific General due to its
financial difficulties affecting the supply of materials. The last
payments made by Pacific General to Korea Tech consisted of
postdated checks which were dishonored upon presentment.
According to Pacific General, it stopped payment because Korea
Tech had delivered a hydraulic press which was different in kind and
of lower quality than that agreed upon. Korea Tech also failed to
deliver equipment parts already paid for by it. It threatened to cancel
the contract with Korea Tech and dismantle the Carmona plant.
Korea Tech initiated arbitration before the Korea Commercial
Arbitration Board [KCAB] in Seoul, Korea and, at the same time,
commenced a civil action before the Regional Trial Court [the “trial
court”] where it prayed that Pacific General be restrained from
dismantling the plant and equipment. Pacific General opposed the
application and argued that the arbitration clause was null and void,
being contrary to public policy as it ousts the local court of
jurisdiction. It also alleged that Korea Tech was not entitled to the
payment of the amount covered by the two checks, and that Korea
Tech was liable for damages.
DOCTRINE: On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer
incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to
pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature.
However, effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as
amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to
be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.
[144] SPOUSES MENDIOLA V. COURT OF APPEALS (2012)
FACTS: When Pacific defaulted in its obligations, Shell
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage, wherein petitioners were
not able to participate. Since there was still a deficiency, Shell
commenced a suit to recover the same in the Manila RTC. However,
petitioner commenced an action to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure in the Makati RTC. Manila RTC ruled in favor of Shell.
Despite this decision becoming final and executory, the Makati RTC
still resolved the Makati case and ruled in favor of petitioner. The SC
held that the Makati case should have been dismissed on the
ground of litis pendentia, subsequently evolving into res judicata.
The counterclaim set up in the Manila case should have then be
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 31
controlling, it being of a compulsory in nature.
DOCTRINE: A counterclaim is considered compulsory when such a
logical relationship can be found between the cause of action in a
complaint and a counter-claim. Such relationship exists -when
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties
and the court; -when the multiple claims involve the same factual
and legal issues; or -when the claims are offshoots of the same
basic controversy between the parties. If these tests result in
affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.
[145] BUNGCAYAO SR. V. FORT ILOCANDIA PROPERTY HOLDINGS
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. (2010)
FACTS: In 1978, Manuel Sr. introduced improvements to Calayab
beach together with other entrepreneurs which later on formed
themselves as DSierto beach resort owners Assoc. In 1980,
pursuant to PD 1704, the Calayab beach was transferred and ceded
to Philippine Tourism Authority and Fort Ilocandia Resort Hotel was
erected on the area. DSierto members applied for a lease but was
denied. In a luncheon meeting between DSierto Members and Fort
Ilocandia (mediated by wife Bongbong Marcos, Atty. Liza), the
former agreed to 400k settlement in favor of the latter, including the
sons of Manuel Sr who attended in his behalf. Deeds of Assignment,
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim were executed in favor of
respondent. Petitioner alleged that his son who attended the
meeting that he still had to consult his parents about the offer but
upon the undue pressure exerted by Atty. Marcos, he accepted
payments and signed the Deeds of Assignment, Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim. Manuel Sr filed an action for declaration of nullity of
contract and alleged that his sons had no authority to represent
him and that the deed was void and not binding upon him. As a
counterclaim, respondent prayed that petitioner be required to
return the amount of P400,000 from respondent, to vacate the
portion of the respondents property he was occupying, and to pay
damages because his continued refusal to vacate the property
caused tremendous delay in the planned implementation of Fort
Ilocandias expansion projects. Trial court confirmed the agreement
of the parties. Petitioner and respondent agreed to consider the
case submitted for resolution on summary judgment. TC rendered a
Summary Judgment, ruling that the only issue raised by petitioner
was his claim for damages while respondents issue was only his
claim for possession of the property occupied by petitioner. CA
affirmed the RTC. SC held that Respondent’s counterclaim for
recovery of possession of the subject property is NOT compulsory
in nature (PERMISSIVE). SC DISMISS respondent’s permissive
counterclaim without prejudice to filing a separate action against
petitioner.
DOCTRINE: A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or
any relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing
party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily
connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the
sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if
not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any
other counterclaim is permissive.
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive are as follows:
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim,
absent the compulsory rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs
claim as well as defendants counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the
counterclaim?
A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
counterclaim is compulsory.
[146] FIRAZA SR. V. UGAY
FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint for quieting of petitioners’
title, alleging that they are the registered owners of a lot. Petitioner
responded with counterclaim. RTC prohibited the petitioner from
propounding questions pertaining to the petitioner’s counterclaim
which in turn was adjudged as a direct attack to the validity of the
respondents’ title. CA affirmed the RTC Order.
DOCTRINE: A counterclaim is a permissible direct attack on the
Torrens title upon which the complaint for quieting of title is
premise and stands on the same footing as an independent action.
As the plaintiff in his own counterclaim, the petitioner is equally
entitled to the opportunity granted the plaintiff in the original
complaint, to establish his cause of action and to prove the right he
asserts.
[147] SAPUGAY V. CA (2004)
FACTS: Mobil filed a complaint for replevin against Sapugay for
return of properties it loaned to them as part of the dealership
agreement. Sapugay filed a counterclaim, impleading Cardenas (the
manager), as well, praying that judgment be rendered holding
specifically Mobil and Cardenas jointly and severally liable. CFI
rendered judgement against both Mobil and Cardenas.
DOCTRINE: General rule is that a defendant cannot by a
counterclaim bring into the action any claim against persons other
than the plaintiff.
Exception is under Section 12, Rule 6: "when the presence of parties
other than those to the original action is required for the granting of
complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-
claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if
jurisdiction over them can be obtained."
[148]LAFARGE CEMENT PHIL. INC. V. CONTINENTAL CEMENT
CORP. (2004)
FACTS: Petitioner Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. (Lafarge)—on
behalf of its affiliates and other qualified entities, including
Petitioner Luzon Continental Land Corporation (LCLC)-- agreed to
purchase the cement business of Respondent Continental Cement
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 32
Corporation (CCC). In anticipation of the liability that the High
Tribunal might adjudge against CCC in a case pending with the
Supreme Court titled Asset Privatization Trust (APT) v. Court of
Appeals and Continental Cement Corporation, the parties, under
Clause 2 (c) of the Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA), allegedly
agreed to retain from the purchase price a portion of the contract
price in the amount of P117,020,846.84 (US$2,799,140) which was
to be deposited in an interest-bearing account in the First National
City Bank of New York (Citibank) for payment to APT. Petitioners
allegedly refused to apply the sum to the payment to APT, despite
the subsequent finality of the Decision in favor of the latter and the
repeated instructions of Respondent CCC
DOCTRINE: A counterclaim may either be permissive or
compulsory. It is permissive “if it does not arise out of or is not
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing
party’s claim.” A permissive counterclaim is essentially an
independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.
Unlike permissive counterclaims, compulsory counterclaims should
be set up in the same action; otherwise, they would be barred
forever.
NAMARCO v. Federation of United Namarco Distributors laid down the
following criteria to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory
or permissive:
1) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same?
2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim,
absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s
claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim?
4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim?
[149] SY-VARGAS V. ESTATE OF ROLANDO OGSOS, SR. (2016)
FACTS: Respondents are lessees of an agricultural land owned by
the predecessors of the petitioner. Petitioner filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages, claiming that the lease rentals
were not paid. When summons were served to respondent, Osgos
Jr. filed a motion to admit answer and answer to complaint. When
respondents’ moved to dismiss the complaint, the RTC dismissed
the case without prejudice. Subsequently, respondents moved for
hearing of their counterclaim. RTC granted the counterclaim of
respondents, and this is currently a petition for review on certiorari
of the said decision.
DOCTRINE: The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or not are the following, to wit: (a) Are the issues of fact
or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims,
absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the
defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation
between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court? If these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar)
is compulsory.
[150] PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES INC. V. PARAS (2012)
FACTS: Paras was onboard a bus owned and operated by Inland
Trailways when said bus was bumped at the rear by another bus
owned and operated by Philtranco. As a result, the Inland bus was
pushed forward and smashed into a cargo truck parked on the
shoulder of the highway, and Paras sustained injuries causing him
to undergo 2 operations. Paras filed a complaint based on breach
of contract against Inland. RTC: Philtranco and driver liable, ordered
to pay actual and moral damages to Paras. CA: affirmed, but
Philtranco was ordered to pay temperate damages to both Paras
and Inland as well. SC held that impleading Philtranco and its driver
through the third-party complaint filed on March 2, 1990 was
correct. The device of the third-party action, also known as
impleader, was in accord with Section 12, Rule 6 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Section 12 of Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court
authorizes a defendant to bring into a lawsuit any person “not a
party to the action . . . for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief in respect of his opponent’s claim.” From its explicit
language it does not compel the defendant to bring the third-parties
into the litigation, rather it simply permits the inclusion of anyone
who meets the standard set forth in the rule. The secondary or
derivative liability of the third-party is central—whether the basis is
indemnity, subrogation, contribution, express or implied warranty or
some other theory.
DOCTRINE: The substantive law on which the right of Inland to seek
such other relief through its third-party complaint rested were
Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paras’ cause of
action against Inland (breach of contract of carriage) did not need
to be the same as the cause of action of Inland against Philtranco
and its driver (tort or quasi-delict) in the impleader. It is settled that
a defendant in a contract action may join as third-party defendants
those who may be liable to him in tort for the plaintiff’s claim
against him, or even directly to the plaintiff. Nor was it a pre-
requisite for attachment of the liability to Philtranco and its driver
that Inland be first declared and found liable to Paras for the breach
of its contract of carriage with him.
The requisites for a third-party action are:
● firstly, that the party to be impleaded must not yet be a
party to the action;
● secondly, that the claim against the third-party defendant
must belong to the original defendant;
● thirdly, the claim of the original defendant against the
third-party defendant must be based upon the plaintiff’s
claim against the original defendant; and,
● fourthly, the defendant is attempting to transfer to the
third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by
the original plaintiff.
[151] PARAMOUNT LIFE & GENERAL INSURANCE V. CASTRO
(2016)
FACTS: Virgilio Castro, after obtaining a housing loan from PPSBI,
was required by the latter to apply for a mortgage redemption
insurance policy from Paramount to cover the loan granted. After
C2022 I. Civil Procedure 33
Virgilio’s death, the application to claim his death benefits was
denied on the ground of misrepresentation. The Castros then filed a
third party complaint to include PPSBI as indispensable party-
defendant for the reason that upon death, PPSBI steps into the
shoes of the Castros in order to claim the balance of the loan from
its insurance policy with Paramount. CA allowed the motion which
the SC affirmed.
DOCTRINE: The soundness of admitting a third-party complaint
hinges on causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his
complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of
the defendant against the third-party defendant.
[152] VILLANUEVA-ONG V. ENRILE (2017)
FACTS: A complaint for damages was filed by Enrile against
Villanueva-Ong based on the libelous article written by the petitioner
which was published in the Opinion Section of the Philippine Star.
Petitioner filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims. A
motion to dismiss was filed by Enrile which argued that the
counterclaims filed by the petitioner are permissive in nature and
must have complied with the payment of docket fees. The SC ruled
that the counterclaims are compulsory in character, hence, should
be resolved without the necessity of complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings.
DOCTRINE: Determination of the nature of counterclaim is relevant
for purposes of compliance to the requirements of initiatory
pleadings. In order for the court to acquire jurisdiction, permissive
counterclaims require payment of docket fees, while compulsory
counterclaims do not.
Tests to determine the nature of a counterclaim:
(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants' claims,
absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs'
claim as well as the defendants' counterclaim? and
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim?
A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
counterclaim is compulsory.
When counterclaim exceeds court jurisdiction
[153] PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES INC. V. PARAS (2012),
SUPRA
DOCTRINE: Apart from the requirement that the third-party
complainant should assert a derivative or secondary claim for relief
from the third-party defendant there arc other limitations on said
party's ability to implead. The rule requires that the third-party
defendant is "not a party to the action" for otherwise the proper
procedure for asserting a claim against one who is already a party
to the suit is by means of counterclaim or cross-claim under
sections 6 and 7 of Rule 6. In addition to the aforecited
requirement, the claim against the third-party defendant must be
based upon plaintiffs claim against the original defendant (third-
party claimant). The crucial characteristic of a claim under section
12 of Rule 6, is that the original "defendant is attempting to transfer
to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by the
LAW 125: Civil Procedure (Prof. Elezar) C2022 I. Civil Procedure 34

original plaintiff. petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief with a prayer for TRO
against the Secretary of Finance. They wanted to nullify RA 9334,
which increased the excise tax rates on alcohol and tobacco. Judge
VYE: What should the first level court do if the amount of the
Caguioa granted their petition, and RP filed a petition for certiorari
counterclaim exceeds its jurisdiction?
and prohibition to annul the judge’s orders. Without acting on the
● The counterclaim will not be treated as compulsory, even if,
Republic’s motion to suspend the proceedings, the respondent
assuming, is intimately connected with the subject matter of
judge granted the private respondents’ motions and complaints-in-
the complaint.
intervention. The RP moved to reconsider the respondent judge’s
● Even if the case is meritorious, the court will not grant relief
August 11, 2005 order. They argue that it had been denied due
on the ground that the defendant has a bigger credit.
process because it never received copies of the private
● It is submitted that if the defendant desires to have his
respondents’ motions and complaints-in-intervention. The Court
affirmative relief, he can waive the amount in excess of the
rules for the Republic of the Philippines.
jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE: A motion for intervention, like any other motion, has to
Intervention: comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing, as
well as proof of its service, save only for those that the courts can
[154] BON-MAR REALTY AND SPORT CORP. V. SPOUSES DE
act upon without prejudice to the rights of the other parties. A
GUZMAN (2008)
motion which fails to comply with these requirements is a worthless
piece of paper that cannot and should not be acted upon.
FACTS: The DE GUZMANS owned two lots in Greenhills, San Juan.
Since they needed money for Nicanor’s candidacy, they borrowed
money from the SIOCHIS and executed a deed of sale in their favor
over the lots as collateral. The SIOCHIS caused the issuance of new
titles in their name and then sold the lots to the UYS who then
entered into a lease agreement with Salapantan. When the DE
GUZMANS learned of the transfers, they instituted an action against
them. The RTC ruled in their favor; when the decision against the
SIOCHIS became final and the UYS’ appeal was pending, the DE
GUZMANS sold the lots to the GARCIAS who then sold them to
BON-MAR. SC eventually ruled against the UYS; the DE GUZMANS
moved for execution which was granted but not implemented bc
BON-MAR filed an Omnibus Motion asking for leave to intervene,
saying that the DE GUZMANS no longer has any right to move for
execution bc it has already been satisfied (when new titles were
issued in their name after the SIOCHIS’ case was decided in their
favor). However, BON-MAR’s motion for intervention was denied,
saying that it is a stranger to the subject litigation

DOCTRINE: To warrant intervention, two requisites must concur: (a)

the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, and (b)
intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the parties nor should the claim of the intervenor be
capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The
interest, which entitles a person to intervene in a suit, must involve
the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character
that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment.
HERE, the decision in Civil Case No. 67315 declared BON-MAR as
successor-in-interest of the DE GUZMANS; thus, BON-MAR is not a
mere stranger to the litigation in Civil Case No. 56393 and its
intervention is necessary to put an end to Civil Case No. 56393
because if it were established that BON-MAR obtained its title from
the GARCIAS who in turn obtained the same from the DE GUZMANS,
then there is nothing left for the DE GUZMANS to execute, because
their claim in Civil Case No. 56393 has been fully satisfied and there
would be no further reason for the proceedings in Civil Case No.
56393 to continue.

[155] REPUBLIC V. CA (2013)

FACTS: Indigo Distribution Corporation and thirteen other