The purpose of this course is to provide initial training to maintenance personnel with the

history, theoretical and practical elements of FTS/CDCCL in order to plan, perform, supervise,
inspect and certify the maintenance of aircraft and fuel system components.

 Major accidents
 FAA conclusion and what happens next
 SFAR 88, JAR and EASA
 Aviation turbine fuel types
 Ignition sources and ignition prevention
 Flammability reduction
 Tank inspections
 Tank safety
 Typical design changes (continuation/refresher training only)

In recent years the aviation industry has experienced a number of incidents or accidents involving fuel
 tank explosions. These experiences suggest that on some aircraft types, the fuel tank system
 installation does not provide as high a level of protection against explosion as had been
expected. .

The term CDCCL – Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations – actually refers to design
characteristics that have to be retained during maintenance or modification

88 (SFAR 88 -- Apr. 19, 2001 and as amended Sept. 10, 2002) that set higher safety standards
for Part 25 aircraft. These actions were aimed at eliminating sources of ignition in and near the
fuel tank.

Definition: Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL): As applied to Fuel

Tank safety policy, this term refers to a feature of the fuel system design the integrity of which
must be maintained to ensure that unsafe conditions do not develop.

A safety critical action that is needed to address unsafe conditions is an airworthiness

limitation item (ALI). ALIs are maintenance and inspection instructions that must be performed
at the listed intervals and are adopted using the Airworthiness Directive (AD) process

Fuel tank safety is gaining priority. ... As a result of the Flight 800 investigation and two
other fuel-system related incidents, the NTSB identified fuel tank safety as one of its top three
priorities. These priorities trickle down to impact not only aircraft design and products, but
also aircraft maintenance

After the TWA Flt 800 incident accident investigation the FAA issued Special Federal Aviation
Rulemaking (SFAR) 88, set up committees to investigate – ATRSAC – and issued a number of
advisory circulars. Both the FAA and EASA have mandated mandatory Fuel Tanks Safety
Training. Within the EU the JAA issued JAA INT/POL 25/12 and JAA TGL 47
Requirement. (Still a valid document within the EASA environment).
Fuel Tank Safety Training is a requirement of EASA Part 66, EASA Part-M and Part-145
regulations, which requires that personnel involved in Continued Airworthiness Management
and Maintenance of Aircraft Fuel Systems, are given suitable training appropriate to the job
junction either as a -phase 1- “once” only training or as a 1 day -phase 2 – 24 month recurrent
training.
IAW EASA Decision 2007/001/R/2007/002/R amended by ED Decision 2009/007/R
24/03/2009. requires Fuel Tank Safety Training to understand the requirement for In Service
Management of Fuel System Safety
Amongst the requirements identified organisations will be required to demonstrate:
Continued Airworthiness Management including maintenance program’s, modifications and
Service Bulletin assessments. The Quality Assurance Program will have to include appropriate
audit criteria to ensure compliance.
In addition the organisation will be required to develop effective Maintenance Procedures,
Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) management procedures.
Also to ensure training is provided in Inspection and Repair standards.

Trans World Airlines Flight 800 (TWA 800) was a Boeing 747-100 that exploded and
crashed into the Atlantic Ocean near East Moriches, New York, on July 17, 1996, at
about 8:31 p.m. EDT, 12 minutes after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International
Airport on a scheduled international passenger flight to Rome, with a stopover in Paris.
[1]:1
 All 230 people on board died in the crash; it is the third-deadliest aviation accident in
U.S. history. Accident investigators from the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) traveled to the scene, arriving the following morning [1]:313 amid speculation
that a terrorist attack was the cause of the crash.[2][3][4] Consequently, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and New York Police Department Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF) initiated a parallel criminal investigation. [5] Sixteen months later, the JTTF
announced that no evidence of a criminal act had been found and closed its active
investigation.[6]
The four-year NTSB investigation concluded with the approval of the Aircraft Accident
Report on August 23, 2000, ending the most extensive, complex and costly air disaster
investigation in U.S. history at that time.[7][8] The report's conclusion was that the
probable cause of the accident was explosion of flammable fuel vapors in the
center fuel tank. Although it could not be determined with certainty, the likely ignition
source was a short circuit.[1]:xvi Problems with the aircraft's wiring were found, including
evidence of arcing in the Fuel Quantity Indication System (FQIS) wiring that enters the
tank. The FQIS on Flight 800 is known to have been malfunctioning; the captain
remarked on "crazy" readings from the system approximately two minutes and thirty
seconds before the aircraft exploded. As a result of the investigation, new requirements
were developed for aircraft to prevent future fuel tank explosions.[9]