Gonzales v. Court of Appeals CASE DIGEST

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GREGORIO GONZALES, petitioner , vs. THE HON.

COURT OF
APPEALS, MAR EVANGELISTA, LUCIANO and ROSITA SESE
and ESTRELLA BAUTISTA, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner owns an apartment located in Caloocan and were leases to the private
respondents. On Oct. 1, 1079, the petitioner filed 3 separate complaints for ejectment
against private respondents in the City Court of Caloocan. He said that he needs the
premises for his married children who do not allegedly have residences of their own,
which is a ground for ejectment under the provisions of Batas Bldg. 25.
The City Court rendered judgment ejecting the private respondents. The case was
appealed to CFI of Rizal but was denied hence the case was elevated to CA. private
respondents alleged that the Court of First Instance erred in sustaining the jurisdiction of
the City Court "notwithstanding the admitted fact that there was no compliance in the
cases with the mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508.
CA dismissed the ejectment cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the City Court
for failure of the parties to undergo a confrontation at the barangay level.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the failure to undergo confrontation at the barangay level is a valid ground for
dismissal of the case.
RULING:
While in Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court , we ruled that "non compliance with
the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity," we held in the same case that "the same would
not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication
over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such
exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo."
In the case at bar, there is no allegation in the private respondents answers that the
petitioner failed to invoke the authority of the lupon tagapayapa before going to court.
They also took part in the trial, argued their case and adduced their evidence. These
actions on the part of the respondents have been considered by the Supreme Court as
tantamount to waiver.
SC reinstated the MeTC decision.
BRIOSO VS. RILI-MARIANO et al
FACTS:
Sps. Salvadora Rili-Mariano and Leonardo Mariano (Sps. Mariano) through Land Bank
repurchase the property (Riceland in Camarines Sur) that they previously sold to
Glicerio within the period specified in the pacto de retro sale. Despite repeated
demands, however, Glicerio refused to deliver the entire property to the sps.
Mariano.
Sps. Mariano then filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property
against Glicerio, Ernesto, Conception, Eusebio and Salvador.
Defendants asserted that the Sps. Mariano had no cause of action against Glicerio
because the latter had already lost interest in the land. They added that Glicerio
installed his son Ernest, daughter Conception and his employee Eusebio as
tenants of the property before the repurchase, therefore they were bona fide
cultivators-possessor of the land.
Spouses Mariano amended their complaint to implead Land Bank and Concepcion
spouse, Marcos Nolasco

In 1987, Glicerio dies and Atty. Pardalis filed a Notice of Death of Glicerio Brioso.
The Sps. Mariano’s counsel filed a Motion for Substitution of Deceased
Defendant. The trial court issued an Order admitting the motion for substation.
The trial continued and the Court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs.

Dissatisfied with the adverse decision, Marcos and Glicerio's heirs, namely,
Felicidad Z. Brioso ("Felicidad" for brevity), Bener Z. Brioso ("Bener" for brevity),
Julito Z. Brioso ("Julito" for brevity), Glicerio Z. Brioso, Jr. ("Glicerio, Jr." for
brevity), Ernesto, Concepcion and Salvador filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals.

One of the issues presented in the CA is whether there was a valid substitution of the
deceased party.

CA sustained the ruling of the trial court stating that there was a valid substitution

ISSUE:

W/N there was a valid substitution of deceased Glicerio in the case at bar.

CLAIM OF PETITIONERS: The trial court failed to comply with the clear language
of Section 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court. the trial court should have ordered
the heirs to appear personally before it and manifest whether they were willing to
substitute Glicerio.

RULING:
Under the express terms of Section 17 of the old Rules, in case of the death of a party
and due notice is given to the trial court, it is the duty of the court to order the
deceased's legal representative or heir to appear for the deceased. Otherwise, "the
trial held by the court without appearance of the deceased's legal representative or
substitution of heirs and the judgment rendered after trial, are null and void."

Non-compliance with the rule on substitution of a deceased party renders the


proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquired no
jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom
the trial and the judgment would be binding.

In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving a notice of
Glicerio's death, failed to order the appearance of his legal representative or
heirs. Instead, the trial court issued an Order merely admitting respondents'
motion for substitution.

There was no court order for Glicerio's legal representative to appear, nor did any such
legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for Glicerio. Neither did the
respondents ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor did
Glicerio's heirs ever ask to be substituted for Glicerio. Clearly, the trial court failed to
observe the proper procedure in substituting Glicerio. As a result, contrary to the
Court of Appeals' decision, no valid substitution transpired in the present case.

Thus, we rule that the proceedings and judgment of the trial court are void as to
Felicidad, Glicerio, Jr ., Bener and Julito. Given these facts, the trial court clearly
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Such being the case, these heirs
cannot be bound by the judgment of the trial court.

However, despite the trial court's failure to adhere to the rule on substitution of a
deceased party, its judgment remains valid and binding on the following heirs,
namely, Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto. Formal substitution of heirs is not
necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, shared in the case
and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant.

This is precisely because, despite the court's non-compliance with the rule on
substitution, the heirs' right to due process was obviously not impaired. In other
words, the purpose of the rule on substitution of a deceased party was already
achieved. The following facts indicate plainly that there was active participation of these
heirs in the defense of Glicerio after his death.
First, Salvador and Concepcion were among the original defendants in the case.
Second, the lengthy testimonies of Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto show that they
defended their deceased father. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly
GRANTED.

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