Answer the following briefly:   
 
            (a) What elements should concur for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
for conviction?
 
            (b) When is bail a matter of judicial discretion?
 
            (c) Give at least two instances when a peace officer or a private person may
make a valid warrantless arrest.
 
            (d) What is a tender of excluded evidence?
 
            SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
 
            The following elements should concur for circumstantial evidence to be
sufficient for conviction:
 
            a) There is more than one circumstance.
 
            b)  The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
 
            c)  The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.   [S4 R133]
 
(b)
 
            Bail is a matter of judicial discretion:
 
            (1)   Before conviction by the RTC of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. 
 
            (2)    After conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. [S4 & 5 R114]
 
(c)
 
            The following are the instances when a peace officer or a private person may
make a valid warrantless arrest:
            (1)  When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
            (2)  When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it (jpp); and
            (3)  When the person to be arrested is an escaped prisoner.   [S5 R113]
 
(d)
          Tender of excluded evidence is the remedy of a party when the evidence he
has offered is excluded by the court.
 
            If documentary or object evidence is excluded by the court, the offeror may
have the same attached to or made part of the record.  If the evidence excluded is
oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances
of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.  (S40 R132).
 
 
Police officers arrested Mr. Druggie in a buy-bust operation and confiscated from him
10 sachets of shabu  and several marked genuine peso bills worth P5,000.00 used as
the buy-bust money during the buy-bust operation.
 
            At the trial of Mr. Druggie for violation of R.A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drug Act of  2002), the Prosecution offered in evidence, among others,
photocopies of the confiscated marked genuine peso bills. The photocopies were
offered to prove that Mr. Druggie had engaged at the time of his arrest in the illegal
selling of dangerous drugs.
 
            Invoking the Best Evidence Rule,  Atty. Maya Bang, the defense counsel,
objected to the admissibility of the photocopies of the confiscated marked genuine
peso bills.
 
            Should the trial judge sustain the objection of the defense counsel? Briefly
explain your answer.
 
            SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 
            No, the trial judge should not sustain the objection that invokes the best
evidence rule.
 
            The Supreme Court has held that the best evidence rule applies only to
documentary evidence, not to object or testimonial evidence.
 
            Here the marked money is object not documentary evidence since it is being
offered to prove not its contents but its existence and use in the buy-bust operation.
[People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28 (1990)]
 
XIV.
            Immediately before he died of gunshot wounds to his chest, Venancio told
the attending physician, in a very feeble voice, that it was Arnulfo, his co-worker, who
had shot him. Venancio added that it was also Arnulfo who had shot Vicente, the man
whose cadaver was lying on the bed beside him.
 
            In the prosecution of Arnulfo for the criminal killing of Venancio and Vicente,
are all the statements of Venancio admissible as dying declarations?  Explain your
answer.
            SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 
            No, not all the statements of Venancio are admissible as dying declarations.
 
            Under the Rules on Evidence, a dying declaration is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule provided that such declaration relates to the cause of
the declarant’s death.
 
            Venancio’s statement that it was Arnulfo who shot him is admissible as a
dying declaration.  The same related to Venancio’s own demise. It may be inferred
that Venancio had consciousness of his impending death since he suffered gunshot
wounds to his chest which would necessarily be mortal wounds.    
 
            However, Venancio’s statement that it was Arnulfo who shot Vicente is not
admissible as a dying declaration since it did not relate to the cause of the declarant’s
death but to the death of another person.  Court,  Boy Maton, as the accused, should have assailed the validity of the arrest
 
XV.
            In an attempt to discredit and impeach a Prosecution witness in a homicide
case, the defense counsel called to the stand a person who had been the boyhood
friend and next-door neighbor of the Prosecution witness for 30 years. One question
that the defense counsel asked of the impeaching witness was: "Can you tell this
Honorable Court about the general reputation of the prosecution witness in your
community for aggressiveness and violent tendencies?"
            Would you, as the trial prosecutor, interpose your objection to the question
of the defense counsel?  Explain your answer.
 
            SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 
            Yes, I as the trial prosecutor, would interpose my objection to defense
counsel’s question on the ground of improper impeachment.  ground of illegal arrest which is subsumed under lack of personal jurisdiction.
            Under the Law on Evidence, an adverse party’s witness may be properly
impeached by reputation evidence provided that it is to the effect that the witness’s
general reputation for honesty, truth, or integrity was bad. [S11 R132] The reputation
must only be on character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.  [Cordial v. People, 166
SCRA 17]
 
            Here the evidence is not on the Prosecution witness’s general reputation for
honesty, truth, or integrity but on his aggressive and violent tendencies. The
evidence had nothing to do with the witness’s character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness. Hence the impeachment was improper.
 
XIX.
 
            Boy Maton, a neighborhood tough guy, was arrested by a police officer on
suspicion that he was keeping prohibited drugs in his clutch bag. When Boy Maton
was searched immediately after the arrest, the officer found and recovered 10
sachets of shabu  neatly tucked in the inner linings of the clutch bag. At the time of
his arrest, Boy Maton was watching a basketball game being played in the town
plaza, and he was cheering for his favorite team. He was subsequently charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, and he entered a plea of not guilty  when he
was arraigned.
 
            During the trial, Boy Maton moved for the dismissal of the information on the
ground that the facts revealed that he had been illegally arrested. He further moved
for the suppression of the evidence confiscated from him as being the consequence
of the illegal arrest, hence, the fruit of the poisonous tree.
 
            The trial court, in denying the motions of Boy Maton, explained that at the
time the motions were filed Boy Maton had already waived the right to raise the issue
of the legality of the arrest. The trial court observed that, pursuant to the Rules of
before entering his plea to the information. Hence, the trial court opined that any
adverse consequence of the alleged illegal arrest had also been equally waived.
            Comment on the ruling of the trial court. (5%)
 
            SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 
            The ruling of the court denying the motion for dismissal of the information on
the ground of illegal arrest is proper. 
            Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused’s failure to file a motion
to quash before plea is a waiver of the objection to lack of personal jurisdiction or of
the objection to an illegal arrest. [S9 R117]
 
            Here Boy Maton entered a plea without filing a motion to quash on the
ground of lack of personal jurisdiction. Hence he is deemed to have waived the
            However, the ruling denying the motion to suppress evidence is not correct. 
 
            The Supreme Court has held that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest. [People v. Racho, 3 Aug 2010]. A waiver of an illegal arrest 
is not a waiver of an illegal search. [Villanueva v. People, 17 Nov 2014, Sereno, C.J.] 
The Constitution provides that evidence seized in violation of the right against illegal
search is inadmissible in evidence.  
 
            Hence the evidence seized was by virtue of an illegal search since the arrest
was illegal.  Hence such evidence may be suppressed. 
 
-oOo-