JUDICIAL NOTICE – WHEN DISCRETIONARY

EDUARDO BUGHAW, JR vs. TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 173151
March 28, 2008

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
March 1986, BUGHAW, JR was employed as production worker by TREASURE
ISLAND INDUSTRIAL. TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL was receiving information that
many of its employees were using prohibited drugs during working hours and within the
company premises.
 
On 5 June 2001, one of its employees, Erlito Loberanes was caught in flagrante
delicto by the police officers while in possession of shabu. Loberanes was arrested and sent to
jail. In the course of police investigation, Loberanes admitted the commission of the crime. He
implicated BUGHAW, JR in the crime by claiming that part of the money used for buying the
illegal drugs was given by the latter, and the illegal drugs purchased were for their consumption
for the rest of the month.
 
In view of Loberaness statement, TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL , served a Memo
for Explanation to BUGHAW, JR requiring him to explain within 120 hours why no disciplinary
action should be imposed against him for his alleged involvement in illegal drug
activities. BUGHAW, JR was further directed to appear at the office of TREASURE ISLAND
INDUSTRIAL’s legal counsel on the matter. For the meantime, BUGHAW, JR was placed
under preventive suspension for the period of 30 days effective upon receipt of the Notice.
 
Notwithstanding said Memo, BUGHAW, JR failed to appear before the TREASURE
ISLAND INDUSTRIAL’s legal counsel on the scheduled hearing date and to explain his side on
the matter.TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL sent a second letter to BUGHAW, JR directing
him to attend another administrative hearing but BUGHAW, JR once again failed to show up.
TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL, in a third letter addressed to BUGHAW, JR , terminated
the latter’s employment retroactive for using illegal drugs within company premises during
working hours, and for refusal to attend the administrative hearing and submit written
explanation on the charges hurled against him.

BUGHAW, JR filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against TREASURE ISLAND

INDUSTRIAL  and its President before the Labor Arbiter. BUGHAW, JR alleged that he had
been working for the TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL for 15 years and he was very
conscientious with his job. He was suspended for 30 days based on the unfounded allegation of
his co-worker that he used illegal drugs within company premises. When BUGHAW, JR
reported back to work after the expiration of his suspension, he was no longer allowed by
TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL to enter the work premises and was told not to report
back to work.
 
Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of BUGHAW, JR.
 JUDICIAL NOTICE – WHEN DISCRETIONARY

NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision in its Decision that TREASURE ISLAND
INDUSTRIAL failed to accord due process to BUGHAW, JR when it dismissed him from
employment. 

Court of Appeals reversed the Decisions of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on the grounds
of patent misappreciation of evidence and misapplication of law. The appellate court found that
BUGHAW, JR was afforded the opportunity to explain and defend himself from the accusations
against him when TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL s gave him notices of hearing, but
BUGHAW, JR repeatedly ignored them, opting instead to file an illegal dismissal case against
TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL before the Labor Arbiter. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is simply an opportunity to explain ones side or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Due process is not violated where one is
given the opportunity to be heard but he chooses not to explain his side.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment.

HELD:
NO. The charge of drug abuse inside the company’s premises and during working hours
against petitioner constitutes serious misconduct, which is one of the just causes for termination.
Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not merely an error in judgment. The misconduct to be serious within the
meaning of the Act must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or
unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless, in connection with the work
of the employee, constitute just cause for his separation. This Court took judicial notice of
scientific findings that drug abuse can damage the mental faculties of the user. It is beyond
question therefore that any employee under the influence of drugs cannot possibly continue
doing his duties without posing a serious threat to the lives and property of his co-workers and
even his employer.

Loberaness statements given to police during investigation is evidence which can be

considered by the respondent against the petitioner. Petitioner failed to controvert Loberanes
claim that he too was using illegal drugs. Records reveal that respondent gave petitioner a first
notice dated 11 June 2001, giving him 120 hours within which to explain and defend himself
from the charge against him and to attend the administrative hearing scheduled on 16 June
2001. There is no dispute that petitioner received said notice as evidenced by his signature
appearing on the lower left portion of a copy thereof together with the date and time of his
receipt. He also admitted receipt of the first notice in his Memorandum before this
Court. Despite his receipt of the notice, however, petitioner did not submit any written
explanation on the charge against him, even after the lapse of the 120-day period given
him. Neither did petitioner appear in the scheduled administrative hearing to personally present
his side. Thus, the respondent cannot be faulted for considering only the evidence at hand, which
was Loberanes statement, and conclude therefrom that there was just cause for petitioner’s
termination.
 JUDICIAL NOTICE – WHEN DISCRETIONARY

VDA. DE CATALAN vs. CATALAN-LEE
G. R. No. 183622
February 08, 2012

FACTS:

Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the

United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with
petitioner.

When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition
for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate. While the case was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of
Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases
were consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of
litis pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file the petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed
against petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to
Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.

However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the
marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action for
declaration of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It
considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er
for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.

The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration
filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case
No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid
and subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested
party who may file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction.

HELD:

Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact
of divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment
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is the judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) An official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

a) Accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic

or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and

b) Authenticated by the seal of his office.

Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and
the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for
further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.