FACULTY OF LAW

ACADEMIC SESSION: 2021-22

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE

DOCTRINE OF AUTREFOIS ACQUIT AND AUTREFOIS CONVICT

Submitted To: Submitted By:

Dr. Mohammad Asad Malik Taiyaba Noor Fatima

B.A. LL.B(Hons.) 5th year

9th Semester

Roll No.-55

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 Acknowledgement

In this Ninth semester of B.A.LL.B.(Hons.) Course at Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia, I
have got the good fortune to learn ‘Criminal Procedure Code’. Here, the guidance of Dr.
Mohammad Asad Malik, Faculty of law, made me able to understand the concept and, thus, I
greatly owe to him. He had given a proper direction to my study of ‘Criminal Procedure Code’.
His unfettered support made me able to complete this project.

I am thankful to other faculty members of Jamia Millia Islamia for their co-operation.

I am also thankful to the librarians of Jamia Millia Islamia for their support.

I remain, of course, entirely responsible for any errors.

TAIYEBA NOOR FATIMA

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 Table of Contents

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….4

Doctrine of Autrefois Convict and Autrefois Acquit in relation to Cr.P.C…………….6

Analysis of Statutory Provision…………………………………………………………7

Exceptions to Basic Rule……………………………………………………………….9

Res Judicata and Relevancy with Protection against Double Jeopardy………………12

Article 20(2) vis-à-vis Section 300 of Cr.P.C………………………………………….14

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………..17

Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………..18

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 List of Cases
 Inguva Mallikarjuna Sharma v. State of AP

 Lal Bhanji v. State of Maharashtra

 Mohd. Safi v. State of WB

 Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab

 Ram Sharma v. Panki Sharma

 Rasul v. State of Mysore

 Sambusivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya

 State of Bombay v. S L Apte

 State of MP v. Bireshwar Rao

 State of TN v. Nalini

 Yusofalli Mulla Noorbohy v. R

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 Introduction
Autrefois Acquit and Autrefois Convict are the French terms literally meaning “previously
acquitted” and “previously convicted” respectively. These two terms have their origin in the
common law where they are accepted as the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict and
these pleas have the effect that the trial cannot go ahead due to the special circumstances that
these two pleas depict. Actually, a plea of autrefois acquit means that a person cannot be tried
again for an offense for the reason that he has previously been acquitted in the same offense and
such a plea can be taken or combined with plea of not guilty.
Similarly, a plea of autrefois convict means that a person cannot be tried for an offense for the
reason that he has been previously been convicted in an offense and the same can be combined
with the plea of not guilty. However, these two terms are jointly known as the Doctrine of
Autrefois Acquit and Doctrine of Autrefois Convict. In, Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy v. R1, the
court explained the common law plea of autrifois acquit and autrifois convict. It can only be
raised where the first trial was before a court competent to pass a valid order of acquittal or
conviction. Unless the earlier trial was lawful one which might have resulted in conviction the
accused was never in jeopardy. Actually, this doctrine in a way is the rule again double jeopardy.
Rule against double jeopardy means that a person cannot be tried for the same offense once again
if he has been either convicted or acquitted in the trial relating to the same offense.
Protection against double jeopardy has been provided by many countries as a constitutional right
India being one of them. The other countries include Canada, Israel, Mexico, and U.S. However
in this project we will analyze this Doctrine of Autrefois Acquit and Autrefois Convict in special
reference to Indian context in the light of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
Constitution of India and Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 2
The Constitution of India has provided this protection as a fundamental right under Article
20(2) which provides “No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offense more
than once”. The same principle has been enacted in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 and Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, these two provisions
mentioned later have formed the basis of the incorporation of the protection against double
jeopardy as a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of our country. However, this is
1
AIR 1949 PC 264
2
Annexure of Indian Evidence Act, available at: https://lawcommissionofindia.com (Last visited on November 10,
2021)

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to be emphasized and the same will be analyzed in the later part of this project that this doctrine
has not been a replicate of the forms that exist in the Common Law and the U.S constitution. In a
nutshell at this point, it can be just said that the ambit of this doctrine in Indian context quite
narrower as compared to other systems. 3
This project analyses the doctrine in the light of the constitutional provisions, the provisions of
the Cr.P.C., 1973, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and at the same time the difference in its ambit,
the applicability in the criminal justice system of India.

DOCTRINE OF AUTREFOIS ACQUIT AND AUTREFOIS CONVICT IN

RELATION TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which is the major procedural law with regard to the
criminal cases has incorporated this doctrine which has been provided in Section 300 of this
code.
“Section 300(1) : A person who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an
offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal
remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for
any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been
made under sub section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub
section (2) thereof.
(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with the consent of
State Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been against
him at a former trial under sub section (1) of section 220.
(3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which
together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may
be afterwards tried for such last mentioned offence, if the consequences had not happened, or
were not known to the court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted. 4
(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding
such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence

3
Double Jeopardy, available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu (Last visited on November 10,2021)
4
AIR 2017 SC 3389, available at: https://www.aironline.in (Last visited on November 10, 2021)

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constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the court by which he was first
tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged.
(5) A person discharged under section 258 shall not be tried again for the same offence except
with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any other Court to which the first
mentioned court is subordinate.
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 or of section 188 of this code.” 5

ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTORY PROVISION

The provision was previously mentioned in Section 403 of the old code. The section lays down
the principle that a person who has been previously acquitted or convicted in any offense cannot
be tried for the same offense again i.e. rule against double jeopardy however this protection is
not absolute in nature and this thing becomes clear from the detailed analysis of Section 300.
This rule is actually based on common law maxim “nemo debet bis vexari”, that means a
person shall not be brought into danger for one and the same offense more than once. The
application of this doctrine in the Indian context is different from that in Common Law and U.S
legal system. A detailed study of this section will bring out that the conditions necessary for the
application of this provision.
Section 300(1) lays down the proposition mentioned hereunder:
1. The accused has been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for the same offence of one for
which he might have been charged of convicted for the facts.
2. The accused has been convicted or acquitted at the trial.
3. That such conviction or acquittal is in force.6

At the same time, a person cannot be tried for an offense for which he has been convicted
previously. With regard to sub-section (1) of Section 300 the second trial of a person is barred
even if it is not for the same offense, but then if it is based on the same facts for any other
offense for which a charge might have been against him under Section 221(1) or for which he
5
Supra note 4 at Page 7.
6
Double Jeopardy : Concept and Analysis-Legal Service India, available at: www.legalservicesindia.com (Last
visited on November 10, 2021)

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might have been convicted under Section 221(2). Section 221(1) provides that where it is
doubtful on the basis of the facts of the case that what offense has been committed, the accused
can be charged with all such offenses or any of such offenses; or he may be in alternative
charged of having committed any one of the said offenses. Section 221(2) provides that if the
accused has been charged with one offense and it appears from the evidence that he committed a
different offense for which he might have been charged under the provisions of sub section (1),
he may be convicted with the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not
charged with it.
1. It was held in, Lal Bhanji v. State of Maharashtra7, that there must be the trial of the accused,
that is, hearing and determination on the merits] and for the purpose of the ban to subsequent
trial as contemplated by Section 300(1) there should have been the trial of the accused and on
previous occasion, he must have been convicted or acquitted. If there is no trial3 then the
subsequent trial for the same offence is not barred.
2. However the acquittal or the conviction, in order to be actual defence to the charge must be by
a court of competent jurisdiction. If the court which held the first trial was not competent to try
the charge put forward in the second trial, this section would have no application. A trial by a
court having no jurisdiction in the case is void ab initio and the accused if acquitted is liable to
be re-tried for the same offence.
3. It was held in, Ram Sharma v. Panki Sharma,8 that the person must have been either
acquitted or been convicted. It is only then that a person can take the plea of this section in order
to bar the second trial for the same offense. Mere discharge of the accused does not amount to an
acquittal. A person is said to be discharged when he is relieved from the legal proceeding by an
order which does not amount to a judgment. Judgment is the final order in a trial terminating
either in conviction or acquittal of the accused. A person who is in law only discharged may be
charged again for the same offense if some other testimony is discovered against him; however, a
person who is acquitted of a charge can never be put on the trial for the same offense. A
discharge leaves the matter at large for all purposes of judicial inquiry and there is nothing to
prevent a Magistrate discharging the accused from inquiring again into the case.
4. However in case where a judgment has been passed by a competent court either acquitting or
convicting the accused, there so long as the judgment remains in force the person so acquitted or
7
AIR 1979 SC 94
8
1989 Cr LJ 2153 (Pat)

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convicted cannot be tried again for the same offense, but where such an order or judgment has
been set aside by a Court either on appeal or revision then such a person can again be tried for
the same offense because the previous trial is annulled thereby.

5. The conviction or the acquittal in the previous case cannot be a bar in the trial of the same
person for a different offense based on different facts but on the same evidence. In the case of
State of Tamil Nadu v. Nalini9, there was criminal trial for certain offenses under TADA (now
POTA), along with the other offenses under IPC. The subsequent trial for the offenses under
TADA based on the same facts was held to be barred and the conviction of the accused in the
subsequent trial was set aside.

EXCEPTIONS TO BASIC RULE

EXCEPTION 1:
Section 300(2) contemplates a situation where a person might have been charged with and tried
in accordance with Section 220(1) of Cr.PC, 1973. In this case, the person who can be so
charged may be tried once again even after the order of the conviction or acquittal in the
previous case, however with the prior consent of the state government. Section 220(1) provides
that if in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offenses
than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with and tried at one trial for,
every such offense.
Where a person has been convicted of any offense and a separate charge for another offense
could have been made but was not made against him in the formal trial, he should not be liable to
be tried again for the other offense as a matter of course because this might lend itself to abuse.
For this reason, the later part of this section envisages the provision that such kind of the second
trial can be made only with the prior consent of the State Government. In, Inguva Mallikarjuna
Sharma v. State of Andhra Pradesh10, the court held that, the State Government also is supposed
to give its consent after the due consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case and
with the main intendment of the law viz. promotion of justice.

9
AIR 1999 SC 2640
10
1978 Cr LJ 392

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EXCEPTION 2:
Section 300(3) envisages a situation where a person is convicted of any offense by an act
causing such consequences, that the act together with the consequences constituted a different
offense from the one for which he was convicted. In such a situation if the consequences had not
happened or were not known to the court at the time when such person was convicted then he
may be afterward tried for such an offense.
However, it must be noted in Section 300(3) that the words used are “a person convicted” and
does not include acquitted as in the former sub-sections. Therefore this rule does not apply where
he has been acquitted. In order to have a better understanding of this point let us take an example
where ‘A’ is tried for causing grievous hurt to a person and is convicted. Later it is found that the
person to whom grievous hurt was done he died.
Here in this case, ‘A’ may be tried once again separately for the offense of culpable homicide.
However let us presume in the same example that ‘A’ was acquitted of the charge of grievous
hurt, and then, in this case, he cannot be tried once again if the person later dies, for the offense
of culpable homicide under this section. The reason for keeping the acquittal out of the purview
of this section can be logically ascertained in the sense that the section provides that later offense
for which the person may be tried, is an offense because of the consequences of the former act
and the offense constituted by the former act, being taken together. However when a person is
acquitted of the former charge then it is quite clear that he is exonerated from the liability of
committing that offense, therefore how and why should a person be tried once again for the
consequences that have ensued from the act from the liability of which he has been exonerated.
This is the possible logical explanation behind the contemplation of this section by the
legislature.

EXCEPTION 3:
Section 300(4) provides that where a person has been acquitted or convicted of any offense
constituted by any acts, he may be charged with and tried again for any offence based on the
same facts notwithstanding his acquittal or conviction, if the court by which he was previously
tried was not competent to try the offense with which he is subsequently charged. To provide a
better explanation to the section let us take an example where ‘A’ is tried for robbery by a
Judicial Magistrate of the first class. However, he is later charged for the offense of dacoity

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based on the same facts. In this case, since the subsequent charge of the offense of dacoity is not
triable by a Judicial Magistrate of first class and is triable only by the Court of Session, therefore
the second trial of such a person irrespective of the fact that whether he has been acquitted or
convicted, will not be barred.
In Mohd. Safi v. State of West Bengal11 the SC held that, a trial by a court not having a
jurisdiction is void ab initio, and the accused, if acquitted, is liable to be retried. Further, the
court held that not only the court trying the case should have the jurisdiction but it should also
believe to have it. An order of acquittal passed by a court which believes (though erroneously)
that it have no jurisdiction to try the case, is a nullity and the subsequent trial for the same
offence is not barred

EXCEPTION 4:
Section 300(5) contemplates a situation where a person has been discharged under Section 258
of the Cr.PC, 1973. Section 258 provides that “in any summons-case instituted otherwise than
upon complaint, a Magistrate of the first class or, with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, any other Judicial Magistrate, may, for the reason to be recorded by him, stop the
proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage is made
after the evidence of the principal witness has been recorded, pronounce a judgement of
acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of
discharge.”
The Section 300(5) provides that where a person has been so discharged under the Section 258
he cannot be tried once again for the same offense without the previous consent of the Court
which gave such order of discharge or of any other Court to which the former court is sub
ordinate. This provision is in order to provide a check against abuse of power of fresh
prosecution especially in respect of discharge under the said provisions thus treating it differently
from discharges under other provisions of law.
It should be noted that this section does not apply in case of discharge made in the cases which
have been instituted on a complaint. More so an order of discharge under Section 258 can never
be regarded as an acquittal for the purpose of Section 300(5)8. It can be very well be visualized

11
AIR 1966 SC 69

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in the explanation appended to Section 300 which specifically provides that dismissal of a
complaint or discharge of the accused in not an acquittal for the purpose of this section.

EXCEPTION 5:
Section 300(6) in clear terms provides that “nothing in Section 300 shall affect the provisions of
Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or of Section 188 of this code.” Section 26 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 provides: “Where an act or omission constitutes an offense under
two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under
either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same
offense.” In Rasul v. State of Mysore12, it was held that, if the accused was acquitted during the
first trial on a specific charge such acquittal will not prohibit a second trial on a separate charge
for an offense constituted by the same facts under a different enactment. It was held in the case
of, State of M.P v. Bireshwar Rao13 that there cannot be any prohibition to a trial and conviction
under Section 409 of the IPC in a case where the accused had been tried and acquitted of an
offense under Section 52 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 constituted on identical
facts.

RES JUDICATA AND RELEVANCY WITH PROTECTION AGAINST

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The principle of res judicata or in other words principle of issue estoppel does not bar a trial
rather it is a rule of evidence according to which, where an issue of fact has been tried by a
competent Court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of the accused,
such finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to
trial and conviction of the accused for a distinct offence, but as precluding the reception of an
evidence to disturb the finding of the fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a
different offense which might be permitted by law.14
The maxim “Res Judicata Pro Veritate Accipitur” signifies that when a matter has been finally
resolved by a competent court, the same matter cannot be relitigated once again. This is to be
12
AIR 1959 Mys 136
13
AIR 1957 SC 592
14
Kelkar,R.V, Criminal Procedure, 4th edn, p.505

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noted that this principle has no statutory basis rather it is the creation of judicial interpretation
and decisions. The rule is different from the rule against double jeopardy in the sense that res
judicata only refers to the admissibility of evidence in a subsequent trial aimed to upset the
finding of a fact reached at, by a competent Court in a previous trial. The facts and decision in,
Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab15, could be taken as good illustration of the application of the
principle of Res Judicata. In this case the accused was charged under section 19(f), Indian Arms
Act, 1878 for possessing a revolver without license, and was acquitted as the prosecution could
not prove that he was in possession of the revolver. In the subsequent trial of the accused on the
charge of murder, it was held that the fact of the possession of the revolver cannot be proved
against the accused person as the prosecution was bound by the earlier decision on the point and
was estopped from giving the evidence to prove the contrary. While discussing the principle of
res judicata i.e. issue-estoppel the Supreme Court has relied on the famous observations of Lord
Mac Dermott in the case of, Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya16 in
which he said:
“The effect of the verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent lawful charge and a lawful trial
is not completely stated by saying that the person accused cannot be tried again for the same
offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent
proceedings between the parties for adjudication.”
The importance of this statement by Lord Mac Dermott lies in the fact that when an acquittal is
ordered by a competent Court then it not only acts as bar to the further trial of the person so
acquitted for the same offence, at the same time the findings of the Court during the trial in
which the person was acquitted on the basis of the evidence adduced, are binding and no
evidence can be given to upset the finding of such court in any subsequent trial of the same
person, however for a different offense. The conditions for the applicability for the rule of issue
estoppel are mentioned hereunder:
1. The parties in the two trials must be the same

2. The fact in issue proved or not proved must be identical with the one in the previous case

15
AIR 1956 SC 415, 422
16
1950 AC 458(PC)

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However it should be seen that the rule of issue estoppel has not got any direct statutory
recognition in connection with the Section 300 of Cr.PC, 1973 but still, it is quite significant and
relevant for the reason that this principle is related with the evidentiary aspect of the aforesaid
section. A blend of doctrine of res judicata and doctrine of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict
has been provided in Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
“The existence of any judgment, order or decree which law prevents any court from taking the
cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether such court
ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.” In view of the relation of this section
to the doctrine of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict it can be emphasized that where a person
is tried for an offense wherein he is either convicted or acquitted, in case of his being tried
subsequently for the same offense, the evidence of the previous trial will be admissible under
Section 40 to prevent such person from being so tried.
However, regarding the benefit of the doctrine of res judicata a point to be pondered over is that
it is only the accused who has been given the benefit that he can use the findings of the
competent Court as an estoppel in his further trial. The prosecution has not been given any such
freedom where a fact found by a court against the accused in the former trial may be established
by the rule of res judicata or issue estoppel in the subsequent trial.

ARTICLE 20(2) vis-à-vis SECTION 300 of Cr.PC, 1973

The Constitution of India incorporates protection against double jeopardy by including as a
fundamental right under the Article 20(2) which provides, “No person shall be prosecuted and
punished for the same offense more than once”. This article in clear terms incorporates the rule
against double jeopardy. It should be noted that the existence of this law in India was prior to the
enactment of our Constitution in form of enactment under Section 26 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897. However, after incorporation in the constitution, this protection has become a
Constitutional guarantee in form of a fundamental right rather than just being a statutory right.
This is to be emphasized that the rule against double jeopardy is an import from the common law
system which recognizes a legal maxim “Nemo debet bis vexari” meaning thereby a person
cannot be put in peril twice for the same offense.

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More so the 5th amendment of the American Constitution declares that no person shall be put
twice in the jeopardy of life or limb. The background for the recognition of this rule as a
fundamental right was created by the already prevailing statues in India such as the Section 300
of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (section 403 of the old code) and as already mentioned
Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. However at this point is must be emphasized at
this point of time that this provision in the Indian context is in distinction with that provided in
the other statutes such as Section 300 of Cr.PC, 1973, and General Clauses Act, and at the same
time with that prevailing in the common law countries and U.S.
As per the judicial interpretation in our country Article 20(2) incorporates only the rule of
autrefois convict and not autrefois acquit. It provides that if a person has been prosecuted and
punished then he cannot be prosecuted for the same offense once again. The rule is in distinction
with the American provision in the sense that there irrespective of the consequence of
prosecution whether it results in the conviction or acquittal, a person cannot be tried again for the
same offense. The common law principle is also the same. However, the Article 20(2) is
different in the sense that in order to bring a case under the 20(2) to bar a second trial it must be
shown that the person has been prosecuted before a court and has been punished by it for the
same offense. Both punishment and prosecution should co-exist for Art.20 (2) to be operative. A
prosecution without punishment would not bring the case within the Article 20 (2). If a person
has been prosecuted for an offense but acquitted, then he can be prosecuted by the same offense
once again and punished. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. S.L Apte has
explained the legal position of the Article 20 (2):
“To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the consequential punishment thereunder, must
be for the ‘same offence’. The crucial requirement therefore for attracting the Article is that the
offences are the same, i.e. they should be identical. If however the two offences are distinct then
notwithstanding that the allegation of facts in the two complaints might be substantially similar,
the benefit of the ban cannot be invoked. It is therefore, necessary to analyze and compare not
the allegations in the two complaints but the ingredients of the two offences and see whether the
identity is made out….”
Another important ingredient of Article 20 (2) is ‘prosecution’. Though not mentioned
specifically, it has been read that the prosecution must be before a court of law, or a judicial
tribunal required by law to decide matters in controversy judicially on evidence and on oath

15
which it must be authorized by the law to administer, and not before a tribunal which entertains a
departmental or administrative inquiry, even though set up by a statute, but not required to
proceed on legal evidence given on oath.
However, from the analysis of the constitutional provisions, it is quite clear that Article 20 (2)
contemplates only the doctrine of autrefois convict. Now when Section 300 of the Cr.PC is read
in light of the Constitutional provision under Article 20 (2) prima facie it appears to us that both
the provisions stand, though not completely but partially in contradiction with each other. Where
on one hand Article 20 (2) provides a bar to the second trial only in case of previous conviction,
Section 300 of Cr.PC prima facie contemplates a situation where the second trial of a person will
be barred for the same offense for either reason i.e. convicted or acquitted. All the subsections of
Section 300 except sub section 3 specifically lay down that both conviction and acquittal act as
a bar to the subsequent trial of the same person in various circumstances. In such a situation I
find the statutory provision of Cr.PC and the Constitutional mandate in conflict with each other.
However, this is known that in any circumstance any Constitutional provision will prevail over
other statutes. More so a possible reason that I am able to figure out is the time gap between the
enactments of the statutory provision of Cr.PC and that of the Constitutional provision. No doubt
the principles of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict which were pre-existing in the old Cr.PC
as well as the General Clauses Act, 1897 formed the basis for incorporation of this as a
fundamental right when the Constitution was enacted in India, though with some reservations
which limit the ambit and scope of the doctrines.

CONCLUSION
The doctrine of Autrefois acquit and Autrefois convict has been included as a fundamental right
in our Constitution, though the purview of the doctrine is narrower than in other statutes like

16
Cr.PC, General Clauses Act, and that in other countries like U.K, U.S. However it is clear that
in such circumstances the Constitution shall prevail. To conclude it can be said that this doctrine
is a safeguard and acts as a valve against the unlawful prosecution of a person for the same
offense for the second time. The pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict are one of the
preliminary pleas to bar any trial. As we have already analyzed in the whole project that the rule
of issue estoppel is also related to the doctrine but even then this rule has not been incorporated
in the code as it was thought to be not advisable to do so at present. According to the law
commission our Supreme Court and High Court have not had proper opportunity yet of
considering all the implications of the rule and any hasty legislation may by its rigidity create
difficulties.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Websites

 www.legalservicesindia.com
 https://law.cornell.edu
 www.lawoctopus.com
 www.blog.ipleaders.in
 https://lawcommissionofindia.com
 www.scconline.com

Acts and Statues

 The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
 Constitution of India
 Indian Penal Code, 1860

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