403 CASE DIGESTS | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE ESTELA ALMA SINGCO | FIRST SEMESTER | 2020-2021

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I REVIEW INCORPORATION CLAUSE

Razon vs Tagitis G.R. No. 182498 (Dec. 3, 2009)
1 ST
BATCH OF CASE DIGESTS
PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVE NATIONALITY
Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala)
POLITICAL LAW
People v. Perfecto, 43 phil. 887
STATE IMMUNITY
Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993
WHEN TOOK EFFECT
[Vitug]
De Leon vs. Esguerra 153 SCRA 602, August 31, 1987
Santos v. Santos, 92 Phil. 281
Lambino v. Comelec, GR no. 174153, October 25, 2006
Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349
Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines,
THE AMENDATORY PROCESS
29 SCRA 598
Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774
Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28
SUITS AGAINST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Planas v. COMELEC, 59 SCRA 105
Republic v. Domingo, 657 SCRA 621
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
Sanders v. Veridiano G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees Association, 1
Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702
SCRA 340
Occena v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service,
Almario v. Alba, 127 SCRA 69
18SCRA 1120
Javellana v. Executive secretary, 50 SCRA 50
National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203
Air Transport Office v. Ramos, 664 SCRA 36
CONSTRUCTION & INTERPRETATION OF THE 1987
PNB v. CIR, 81 SCRA 314
CONSTITUTION
Rayo v.CFI Bulacan, 110 SCRA 460
Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, 267
SSS v. Court Appeals, 120 SCRA 707
SCRA 408
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, 195 SCRA 692
Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
SUITS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS
Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713
THE MARITIME BASELINES LAW (R.A. NO. 9522)
Sanders v. Veridiano G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357
G.R. No. 187167, 655 SCRA 476, August 16, 2011, En Banc [Carpio]
Lansang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 102667, February 23, 2000
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991]
BANGSAMORO JURIDICAL ENTITY CONCEPT
Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, March 19, 1993, En Banc
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP, G.R. NO. 183591
[Campos, Jr.]
OCTOBER 14 2008
IS THE RULE THAT THE STATE MAY NOT BE SUED AT ALL,
CITIZENSHIP – 1935 CONSTITUTION
ABSOLUTE?
Fermin Caram Provision; Chiongbian vs. De Leon (G.R. No. L-2007,
Merit v. Gov’t. of P.I., 34 Phil. 311
January 31, 1949
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping, G.R. No. L‑6060, September 30,
Rep. vs. Chule Lim, GR No. 153883, January 13, 2004
1950
Co vs. HRET (G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991)
Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993
In re: Vicente Ching, Bar Matter 914, October 1, 1999
[Vitug]
Dy Cuenco vs. Sec of Justice, May 26, 1962
EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar, 354 SCRA 566, March 16, 2001
Ma vs. Fernandez, July 26, 2010
Ministerio v. CFI, G.R. No. L-31635 August 31, 1971
Rep. vs. Sagun, Feb. 15. 2011
RESTRICTIVE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
JONES LAW OF 1916
Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993
Tecson vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.161434, March 3, 2004)
[Vitug]
Valles vs. COMELEC, GR No. 137000, August 9, 2000
United States of America v. Ruiz (136 SCRA 487)
U.S. vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
CITIZENSHIP - RES JUDICATA
Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil.,315
SCOPE OF PROHIBITION AGAINST SUING THE STATE
Alvarez v. Commonwealth of the Philippines, 65 Phil. 302, 313
NATURALIZATION
(1938)
Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Comsr. of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, 195 SCRA 692
So vs. Rep., GR No. 170603, January 29, 2007
UP v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, 679 SCRA 54, 23 August 2012, 1st
Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179120, April 1, 2009
Div. [Bersamin]
Burca vs. Republic (GR No. L-24252-Jan. 30, 1967)
Meritt vs. Government, 31 SCRA 311, 318; Republic vs. Villasor, 54
SCRA 84
LOSS OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Callano, 25 SCRA 890
SUABILITY V. LIABILITY
Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1
Republic v. NLRC G.R. No. 120385 October 17, 1996
Valles vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000
Municipality of Hagonoy Bulacan v. Dumdum G.R. No. 168289 March
Yu vs. Santiago, 169 SCRA 364
22, 2010
UP v. Dizon GR No. 171782, August 23, 2012
PD 725
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171
Holy See v. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524
Tabasa vs, CA, GR No. 125793, August 29, 2006
China National Machinery Equipment Corporation v. Sta. Maria, 665
Altarejos vs. COMELEC, Nov. 10, 2004
SCRA 189
JUSMAG v. NLRC, 239 SCRA 224
NATURALIZED CITIZENS CANNOT HAVE DUAL CITIZENSHIP
World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006
SEAFDEC v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 580
Lopez vs. COMELEC, GR No. 182701, July 23, 2008
Jacot vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179848, November 27, 2008
EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
Maquiling vs. COMELEC, GR No. 195649, April 16, 2013
Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 323
BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of Law,
Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation v. Pacana, 649 SCRA 196
Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007
Arasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Monte de Pieded,G.R. No. L-
EFFECT OF REPATRIATION
9959, December 13, 1916
Bengzon III vs. HRET, GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001
Republic v. Garcia, 679 SCRA 54
Arigo v. Swift, 735 SCRA 102 (2014)
ISSUES ON CITIZENSHIP
Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Lopez vs. COMELEC, GR No. 182701, July 23, 2008
Espina v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010
Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016
Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
Marcos vs Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995)
Imbong v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Cordora vs Comelec (Feb. 19, 2009)
Legaspi v. CSC, G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987
Japson vs Comelec (Jan. 19, 2009)
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997.
Jalosjos vs Comelec (Oct. 19, 2010)
Maquiling vs Comelec (April 16, 2013)
INCORPORATION CLAUSE
Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231
Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997
Pimentel vs. Ermita, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005
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Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949
Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005
Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016
The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic
of the Philippines Peace Panel, GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No.190582, April 8, 2010
Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002
Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]
Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
CIVILIAN SUPREMACY OVER THE MILITARY
People v. Lagman (G.R. No. L-45893, July 13, 1938)
Aquino v. Esperon (G.R. No. 174994, August 31, 2007)
Kapunan v. Quisumbing (G.R. Nos. 148213–17A, March 13, 2009)
1 People v. Perfecto, 43 phil. 887
Trillanes v. Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008)
Gudani and Balutan v. Senga (G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006)
IBP v. Zamora (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000)
SEPARATION OF THE CHURCH AND STATE
Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006
Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the Executive
Secretary, July 9, 2003
THE FILIPINO FIRST POLICY
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997) (Bellosillo)
Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves, et al.,
G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, En Banc (Carpio)
Board of Medicine v. Ota, G.R. No. 166097, July 14
THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE UNBORN FROM CONCEPTION
James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No.
204819, April 8, 2014, En Banc [Mendoza]
RIGHTS OF PARENTS IN THE REARING OF THEIR CHILDREN
SPARK vs. Quezon City, et al
BALANCED & HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY
Prov. of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications.
Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), et al., December 8,
2015
Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association,
Inc., et al., GR No. 189185, August 16, 2016
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon straits,
et al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., GR No.180771, April 21,
2016
LOCAL AUTONOMY
Basco vs. Pagcor G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991
Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No. 183591,
Oct. 14, 2008)
Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Santiago vs. COMELEC, 3/19/97
Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr. et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice, GR No.
203335, February 11, 2014
Garcia vs, Drilon, GR No. 179267, June 25, 2013
Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008
NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Abakada Guro Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005
Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533
Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No. 166498, June
11, 2009
Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 180046,
April 2, 2009
SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1777271, May 4, 2007
Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244, October 6,
2000;
Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC, March 15, 2006
BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203646, April 2, 2013
Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010
LEGISLATIVE PERKS
PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008
Trillanes vs. Marigomen, G.R. No. 179817, March 14, 2018
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
Avelino vs. Cruz
Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS
Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268
Baguilat vs. Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017
DISCIPLINING MEMBERS
Osmeña vs Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144
People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689
Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 89989
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
Vera vs. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543
LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras vs.
Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009
RONALD F. VILLANDO vs. HRET, Limkaichong, et al.
POLITICAL LAW
FACTS:
The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper
published an article, naturally in writing, which
may have had the tendency to impeach the
honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the
Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing
them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,
which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel
Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the
statement that a libel is indictable when
defaming a "body of persons definite and small
enough for individual members to be recognized
as such, in or by means of anything capable of
being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.)
But in the United States, while it may be proper
to prosecute criminally the author of a libel
charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms,
no matter how severe, on a legislature, are
within the range of the liberty of the press,
unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3
Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these
facts and legal principles in mind, recall that
article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . .
writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any
Minister of the Crown or other person in
authority," etc.
ISSUE: Is Art. 256 a political law that is
abrogated by the Treaty of Paris?
RULING: Yes. It is a general principle of the
public law that on acquisition of territory the
previous political relations of the ceded region
are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
(American Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1
Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific
Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542;
Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil.,
315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States
Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the
course of his opinion in the case of Chicago,
Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs.
McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course,
all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict
with the political character, institutions and
Constitution of the new government are at once
displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political
jurisdiction and legislative power — and the
latter is involved in the former — to the United
States, the laws of the country in support of an
established religion or abridging the freedom of
the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual
punishments, and he like, would at once cease
to be of obligatory force without any
declaration to that effect." To quote again from
the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be
admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty
or otherwise, impart to the United States any
of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it
be admitted that they have capacity to receive
or power to exercise them. Every nation
acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise,
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must hold it subject to the Constitution and
laws of its own government, and not according
to those of the government ceding it."
According to our view, article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the
Government of Spain to protect Spanish
officials who were the representatives of the
King. With the change of sovereignty, a new
government, and a new theory of government,
as set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense
a continuation of the old, although merely for
convenience certain of the existing institutions
and laws were continued. The demands which
the new government made, and makes, on the
individual citizen are likewise different. No
longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a
person in authority of such exalted position that
the citizen must speak of him only with bated
breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and
laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a
freeman, and has equal rights with every other
man. We have no rank or station, except that
of respectability and intelligence as opposed to
indecency and ignorance, and the door to this
rank stands open to every man to freely enter
and abide therein, if he is qualified, and
whether he is qualified or not depends upon the
life and character and attainments and conduct
of each person for himself. Every man may
lawfully do what he will, so long as it is not
malum in se or malum prohibitum or does not
infringe upon the qually sacred rights of
others."
WHEN TOOK EFFECT
2 De Leon vs. Esguerra 153 SCRA 602,
August 31, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioners are barangay officials elected for a
period of 6 years. The provisional constitution
of the Aquino gave the power of the OIC
governor to replace barangay officials within 1
year from promulgation. On Feb 8, 1987, the
governor issued a memo replacing petitioners.
Petitioner contends that by Feb 2, 1987, the
1987 constitution became effective and that
the OIC governor has lost the power to replace
them. In the Comment, respondents argue
that their power to replace is 1 year from their
appointment under Section 2, Article III of the
provisional constitution.
ISSUE: When did the 1987 constitution took
effect?
RULING: Feb. 2, 1987. But while February 8,
1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year
deadline, the aforequoted provision in the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to
have been overtaken by Section 27, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a
plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date,
therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be
deemed to have been superseded. Having
become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor
could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III,
thereof to designate respondents to the
elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired
security of tenure specially considering that
the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it
"a policy of the State to guarantee and
promote the autonomy of the barangays to
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.2 Similarly, the 1987
Constitution ensures the autonomy of local
governments and of political subdivisions of
which the barangays form a part, 3 and limits
the President's power to "general supervision"
over local governments.
REVISION VS AMENDMENT /
QUANTITATIVE & QUALITATIVE TEST
3 Lambino v. Comelec, GR no. 174153,
October 25, 2006
FACTS:
Lambino (an ally of President Arroyo) made a
proposal to change the 1987 constitution.He
proposed changing the form of government
from presidential to parliamentary and
bicameral legislature to unicameral legislature
and affecting 105 provisions through People’s
Initiative.
ISSUE:Can revisions be made with People’s
Initiative? (No) What is the difference between
revision and amendment? Is Lambino’s
proposal amendment or revision? (Revision)
RULING:
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three
modes of amending the Constitution. The first
mode is through Congress upon three-fourths
vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third
mode is through a people's initiative.
There can be no mistake about it. The framers
of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear
distinction between "amendment" and
"revision" of the Constitution. The framers
intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose
revisions to the Constitution. The framers
intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative
may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of
the Constitution clearly withhold from the
people the power to propose revisions to the
Constitution, the people cannot propose
revisions even as they are empowered to
propose amendments.
The qualitative test inquires into the
qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the constitution. The main inquiry is whether
the change will "accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a
revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in
the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework
or the fundamental powers of its Branches."38
A change in the nature of the basic
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governmental plan also includes changes that
"jeopardize the traditional form of government
and the system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative
tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment.
Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed
changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on
the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive
- affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution.40 Qualitatively, the
proposed changes alter substantially the basic
plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a
revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the
present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision
of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the
structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the
President as the locus of Executive Power
alters the separation of powers and thus
constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of
Congress alters the system of checks-and-
balances within the legislature and constitutes
a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a
shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving
the abolition of the Office of the President and
the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is
beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino
Group's proposed changes, it is readily
apparent that the changes will radically alter
the framework of government as set forth in
the Constitution
THE AMENDATORY PROCESS
4 Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774
FACTS:
The year is 1967 and the several amendments
to the 1935 constitution were proposed. There
are 3 resolutions and 1 law for a constitutional
convention - the chosen way of amending the
constitution. The constitutionality of these 3
resolutions and 1 law is questioned.
They are:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1,
proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so
as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as
provided in the present Constitution, to a
maximum of 180, to be apportioned among
the several provinces as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, although each province shall
have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to
propose amendments to said Constitution, the
convention to be composed of two (2) elective
delegates from each representative district, to
be "elected in the general elections to be held
on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;"
and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16,
Article VI, of the same Constitution, be
amended so as to authorize Senators and
members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without forfeiting
their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which,
upon approval by the President, on June 17,
1967, became Republic Act No. 4913,
providing that the amendments to the
Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
approval by the people, at the general
elections which shall be held on November 14,
1967.
ISSUE: Whether or not they are constitutional
insofar as they implement the amendatory
process?
RULING: Yes. Referring particularly to the
contested proposals for amendment, the
sufficiency or insufficiency, from a
constitutional angle, of the submission thereof
for ratification to the people on November 14,
1967, depends — in the view of those who
concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this
phase of the case, constitute the minority —
upon whether the provisions of Republic Act
No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the
people of the gist, the main idea or the
substance of said proposals, which is — under
R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum
number of seats in the House of
Representatives, from 120 to 180, and —
under R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to
the members of Congress to run for delegates
to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected
thereto, to discharge the duties of such
delegates, without forfeiting their seats in
Congress. We — who constitute the minority
— believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies
such requirement and that said Act is,
accordingly, constitutional.
It should be noted that the contested
Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967,
so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry
shall have had practically eight (8) months to
be informed on the amendments in question.
Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913
provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published
in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the
election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed
amendments shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in every municipality, city and provincial
office building and in every polling place not
later than October 14, 1967," and that said
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copy "shall remain posted therein until after
the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said
amendment shall be kept in each polling place,
to be made available for examination by the
qualified electors during election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the
principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Commission on Elections,
shall be kept in each polling place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall
make available copies of said amendments in
English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in
the principal native languages, for free
distributing:" and
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be
printed in full" on the back of the ballots which
shall be used on November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing
measures are palpably inadequate to comply
with the constitutional requirement that
proposals for amendment be "submitted to the
people for their ratification," and that said
measures are manifestly insufficient, from a
constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people
of the amendment sought to be made.
These were substantially the same means
availed of to inform the people of the
subject submitted to them for ratification,
from the original Constitution down to the
Parity Amendment.
5 Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28
FACTS:
The year is 1967. Petitioners are interested in
becoming delegates for the planned
constitutional convention to amend the 1987
constitution. Congress has passed two
resolutions and 1 law regarding the
appointment of delegates.
The following are the contested provision
which the petitioner claim is unconstitutional:
Petitioner asserts that Sec. 2 on the
apportionment of delegates is not in
accordance with proportional representation
and therefore violates the Constitution and the
intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any
specific provision of the Constitution with
which it collides.
Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground
that it is an undue deprivation of liberty
without due process of law and denies the
equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5
disqualifies any elected delegate from running
"for any public office in any election" or from
assuming "any appointive office or position in
any branch of the government government
until after the final adjournment of the
Constitutional Convention."
Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is
impugned by both petitioners as violative of
the constitutional guarantees of due process,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of
expressions, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association. This is a provision that
bans delegates representing political parties
and other organizations.
ISSUE: Are these disqualifications for
candidates for delegates of the constitutional
convention constitutional?.
RULING: Yes. Unlike in the apportionment of
representative districts, the Constitution does
not expressly or impliedly require such
apportionment of delegates to the convention
on the basis of population in each
congressional district. Congress, sitting as a
Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally
allocate one delegate for, each congressional
district or for each province, for reasons of
economy and to avoid having an unwieldy
convention. If the framers of the present
Constitution wanted the apportionment of
delegates to the convention to be based on the
number of inhabitants in each representative
district, they would have done so in so many
words as they did in relation to the
apportionment of the representative districts.
As observed by the Solicitor General in his
Answer, the overriding objective of the
challenged disqualification, temporary in
nature, is to compel the elected delegates to
serve in full their term as such and to devote
all their time to the convention, pursuant to
their representation and commitment to the
people; otherwise, his seat in the convention
will be vacant and his constituents will be
deprived of a voice in the convention. The
inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent
popular political figures from controlling
elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the
appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire
to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt
to control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in
L-32443.)
The ban against all political parties or
organized groups of whatever nature
contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined to
party or organization support or assistance,
whether material, moral, emotional or
otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in its provisos
permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign
the help of the members of his family within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not
more than one for every ten precincts in his
district. It allows the full exercise of his
freedom of expression and his right to peaceful
assembly, because he cannot be denied any
permit to hold a public meeting on the pretext
that the provision of said section may or will
be violated. The right of a member of any
political party or association to support him or
oppose his opponent is preserved as long as
such member acts individually. The very party
or organization to which he may belong or
which may be in sympathy with his cause or
program of reforms, is guaranteed the right to
disseminate information about, or to arouse
public interest in, or to advocate for
constitutional reforms, programs, policies or
constitutional proposals for amendments.
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It is therefore patent that the restriction
contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the
basic constitutional rights themselves remain
substantially intact and inviolate. And it is
therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid
constitutional guarantees invoked by
petitioners.
The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise
can easily pass the balancing-of-interest test.
19
In the apt words of the Solicitor General:
It is to be noted that right now the nation is on
the threshold of rewriting its Constitution in a
hopeful endeavor to find a solution to the
grave economic, social and political problems
besetting the country. Instead of directly
proposing the amendments Congress has
chosen to call a Constitutional Convention
which shall have the task of fashioning a
document that shall embody the aspirations
and ideals of the people. Because what is to be
amended is the fundamental law of the land, it
is indispensable that the Constitutional
Convention be composed of delegates truly
representative of the people's will. Public
welfare demands that the delegates should
speak for the entire nation, and their voices be
not those of a particular segment of the
citizenry, or of a particular class or group of
people, be they religious, political, civic or
professional in character. Senator Pelaez,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Codes
and Constitutional Amendments, eloquently
stated that "the function of a constitution is not
to represent anyone in interest or set of
interests, not to favor one group at the
expense or disadvantage of the candidates —
but to encompass all the interests that exist
within our society and to blend them into one
harmonious and balanced whole. For the
constitutional system means, not the
predominance of interests, but the harmonious
balancing thereof."
7 Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
So that the purpose for calling the
Constitutional Convention will not be deflated
or frustrated, it is necessary that the delegatee
thereto be independent, beholden to no one
but to God, country and conscience.
6 Planas v. COMELEC, 59 SCRA 105
FACTS:
In the middle of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, President Marcos declared Martial
Law. Thereafter he issued Presidential Decree
No. 73 which calls for the holding of the
plebiscite on January 15, 1973. Petitioners
question this decree as according to them, the
president does not have the power to schedule
the plebiscite and allocate funds therefor.
While the case is pending, President Marcos
delayed the date of the plebiscite.
ISSUE: is PD 73 constitutional?
RULING: Yes. The first question for Our
determination is whether We have authority to
pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree
No. 73, in view of the Solicitor General's
allegation to the effect that said question is a
political one. I am of the opinion — on which
the Members of the Court are unanimous —
that the contention of the Solicitor General is
untenable and that the issue aforementioned
is a justiciable one. Indeed, the contested
decree purports to have the force and effect of
a legislation, so that the issue on the validity
thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the
authority, not only of a long list of cases in
which the Court has passed upon the
constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the
Executive,1 but, also, of no less than that of
Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the
1935 Constitution,2 which expressly provides
for the authority of this Court to review cases
involving said issue.
As regards the authority of the President to
issue Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting
to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention and
appropriating funds therefor," I find it
unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon
such question, because the plebiscite ordained
in said Decree has been postponed. In any
event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be
held at any time later, the proper parties may
then file such action as the circumstances may
justify.
With respect to the question whether or not
martial law per se affects the validity of a
submission to the people for ratification of
specific proposals for amendment of the
Constitution, I consider this matter as one
intimately and necessarily related to the
validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the
President of the Philippines. This question has
not been explicitly raised, however, in any of
the cases under consideration
FACTS:
The year is 1976. The 1973 constitution
already took effect. Art. XVII on transitory
provisions provides that an interim National
Assembly (a legislative body) would be called
but it would be on the discretion of the
president based on peace and order when he
shall call that body. Until he calls the body, the
president exercises both executive and
legislative powers.
On that backdrop, the President made several
proposals to amend the constitution and called
citizen’s assemblies(barangays) to ratify them.
Hence, this is a petition to stop him from
amending the constitution. Petitioners argue
that the power to amend the constitution is a
normal legislative power and just because the
president has legislative power during martial
law does not mean that he has the power to
propose amendments to the constitution as
well.
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In particular, the amendments are in PD 991
and 1033 regarding the voting age and the
length of the effectivity of Martial Law.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the amendatory
process? Can President Marcos exercise the
amendatory process during Martial Law?
RULING: Yes. There are, therefore, two
periods contemplated in the constitutional life
of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normally, the
amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all
the Members of the National Assembly.
However the calling of a Constitutional
Convention may be submitted to the electorate
in an election voted upon by a majority vote of
all the members of the National Assembly. In
times of transition, amendments may be
proposed by a majority vote of all the Members
of the National Assembly upon special call by
the interim Prime Minister,.
This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already
settled that the incumbent President is vested
with that prerogative of discretion as to when
he shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly. Speaking for the majority opinion in
that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to
the President the determination of the time
when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly, consistent with the
prevailing conditions of peace and order in the
country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez,
himself a member of that Constitutional
Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates
to the Constitutional Convention voted on the
Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the
fact that under the same, the incumbent
President was given the discretion as to when
he could convene the interim National
Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the
sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact,
the proposal that it be convened 'immediately',
made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected.
The President's decision to defer the convening
of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the
plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the
ratification of the 1973 Constitution was
submitted, the people voted against the
convening of the interim National Assembly. In
the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens
Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their
sovereign will to withhold the convening of the
interim National Assembly. Again, in the
referendum of February 27, 1975, the
proposed question of whether the interim
National Assembly shall be initially convened
was eliminated, because some of the members
of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed
automatically members of the I interim
National Assembly, were against its inclusion
since in that referendum of January, 1973, the
people had already resolved against it.
In general, the governmental powers in
crisis government the Philippines is a
crisis government today are more or less
concentrated in the President. 20
According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of
government power in a democracy faced by an
emergency is a corrective to the crisis
inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the
separation of powers. In most free states it has
generally been regarded as imperative that the
total power of the government be parceled out
among three mutually independent branches
executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is
believed to be destructive of constitutionalism
if any one branch should exercise any two or
more types of power, and certainly a total
disregard of the separation of powers is, as
Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the
very definition of tyranny.' In normal times the
separation of powers forms a distinct
obstruction to arbitrary governmental action.
By this same token, in abnormal times it may
form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive
emergency action in behalf of the state and its
independent existence.
8 Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA
106
FACTS:
The year is 1997. The current constitution is
the 1987 constitution which allows People’s
Initiative as a method of proposing
amendments to the constitution. However,
there must be an enabling law. Hence, RA
6735 was passed. Santiago challenges this law
as insufficient as an enabling law.
The actual controversy is that Atty. Delfin is
gathering signatures to lift term limits of
elective officials by amending the constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 is a sufficient
enabling law?
RULING: No. There is undue delegation of
legislative powers.Although Congress may
delegate to another branch of the Government
the power to fill details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate — and (b)
to fix standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to
which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without
a statutory declaration of policy, which is the
essence of every law, and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted
within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also
— and this is worse — to unmake it, by
adopting measures inconsistent with the end
sought to be attained by the Act of Congress,
thus nullifying the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the
very foundation of our republican system.
The rule is that what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
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59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are
as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President
under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the
President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of
the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative
body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority under no. 5
above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the
law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes
a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable — to
which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be
effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements
in subordinate legislation. The delegation of
the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
9 Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702
FACTS:
The year is 1971. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention was inaugurated and they passed
Organic Resolution no. 1 - amending the 1935
constitution to set the voting to 18. COMELEC
set the plebiscite of the resolution on the same
date as the senatorial elections. Hence,
petitioners challenge the constitutionality of
Organic Resolution 1.
ISSUE: Is OR 1 constitutional?
RULING: No. The ultimate question, therefore
boils down to this: Is there any limitation or
condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution which is violated by the act of the
Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the
sole amendment contained in Organic
Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there
is, and it is the condition and limitation that all
the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in
a single "election" or plebiscite. It being
indisputable that the amendment now
proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only
the first amendment the Convention propose
We hold that the plebiscite being called for the
purpose of submitting the same for ratification
of the people on November 8, 1971 is not
authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention
and the respondent Comelec in that direction
are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the
following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision
aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says
distinctly that either Congress sitting as a
constituent assembly or a convention called for
the purpose "may propose amendments to this
Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the
number of amendments that Congress or the
Convention may propose. The same provision
also as definitely provides that "such
amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of
the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification," thus leaving no room for
doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites
may be held to ratify any amendment or
amendments proposed by the same
constituent assembly of Congress or
convention, and the provision unequivocably
says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone
to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of
this provision. As already stated, amending the
Constitution is as serious and important an
undertaking as constitution making itself.
Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is
as important as the whole of it if only because
the Constitution has to be an integrated and
harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as
the framework of the government it
establishes, on the one hand, and adequately
formidable and reliable as the succinct but
comprehensive articulation of the rights,
liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national
and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the
people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a
constitution worthy of any country or people
can have any part which is out of tune with its
other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its
drafters assembled by them for the purpose.
Once the original constitution is approved, the
part that the people play in its amendment
becomes harder, for when a whole constitution
is submitted to them, more or less they can
assumed its harmony as an integrated whole,
and they can either accept or reject it in its
entirety. At the very least, they can examine it
before casting their vote and determine for
themselves from a study of the whole
document the merits and demerits of all or any
of its parts and of the document as a whole.
And so also, when an amendment is submitted
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to them that is to form part of the existing
constitution, in like fashion they can study with
deliberation the proposed amendment in
relation to the whole existing constitution and
or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an
intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the
amendment in question. Prescinding already
from the fact that under Section 3 of the
questioned resolution, it is evident that no
fixed frame of reference is provided the voter,
as to what finally will be concomitant
qualifications that will be required by the final
draft of the constitution to be formulated by
the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy
the right of suffrage, there are other
considerations which make it impossible to
vote intelligently on the proposed amendment,
although it may already be observed that
under Section 3, if a voter would favor the
reduction of the voting age to eighteen under
conditions he feels are needed under the
circumstances, and he does not see those
conditions in the ballot nor is there any
possible indication whether they will ever be or
not, because Congress has reserved those for
future action, what kind of judgment can he
render on the proposal?
10 Occena v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A.
Gonzales, suing as taxpayers, challenged the
validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional
amendments and argued that the
amendments proposed are so extensive in
character that they go far beyond the limits of
the authority conferred on the Interim
Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the
Interim National Assembly. For them, what
was done was to revise and not to amend.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Interim Batasang
Pambansa has the power to propose
amendments and how may it be exercised.
RULING: Yes. The applicable provision in the
1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as
pertinent it reads thus: “The Interim Batasang
Pambansa shall have the same powers and its
Members shall have the same functions,
responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly
and the Members thereof.” One of such powers
is precisely that of proposing amendments.
The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime
Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the
Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of
the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.
Marcos, met as a constituent body its authority
to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and
did propose the amendments embodied in the
resolutions now being assailed.
Moreover, as ruled in Del Rosario v.
Commission on Elections, whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose
amendments to the Constitution or entirely
overhaul the present Constitution and propose
an entirely new Constitution, is of no moment;
because the same will be submitted to the
people for ratification. The fact that the
present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one is no argument
against the validity of the law because
‘amendment’ includes the ‘revision’ or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any
rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed
would become immaterial the moment the
same is ratified by the sovereign people.
Now, as to how this power to amend can be
exercised, the Constitution is clear. The
Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a
constituent body, can propose amendments.
In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed
and not three-fourth votes for that is not a
requirement as far as a constitutional
convention is concerned. It is not a
requirement either when, as in this case, the
Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its
constituent power to propose amendments.
As to the requisite standard for a proper
submission, the question may be viewed not
only from the standpoint of the period that
must elapse before the holding of the
plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such
amendments having been called to the
attention of the people so that it could not
plausibly be maintained that they were
properly informed as to the proposed changes.
As to the period, the Constitution indicates the
way the matter should be resolved. There is no
ambiguity to the applicable provision: “Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held
not later than three months after the approval
of such amendment or revision.” Here, the
three resolutions were approved by the
Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27,
1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the
date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It
is thus within the 90-day period provided by
the Constitution.
11 Almario v. Alba, 127 SCRA 69
FACTS:
As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643,
the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on
January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject
amendments to the Constitution proposed by
Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and
113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed
amendments are embodied in four (4)
separate questions to be answered by simple
YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek to
enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of
Question Nos. 3 (“grant” as an additional mode
of acquiring lands belonging to the public
domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the
government of a land reform program and a
social reform program), which cover
Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for
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ratification or rejection on the ground that
there has been no fair and proper submission
following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v.
COMELEC. The petitioners do not seek to
prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only
ask for more time for the people to study the
meaning and implications of Resolution Nos.
105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the
proposals are fairly and properly submitted to
the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can
be presented to the people on a later date.
RULING: No. The necessity, expediency, and
wisdom of the proposed amendments are
beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate.
Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land
and "urban land reform" are unwise or
improvident or whether or not the proposed
amendments are unnecessary is a matter
which only the people can decide. The
questions are presented for their
determination. Assuming that a member or
some members of this Court may find
undesirable any additional mode of disposing
of public land or an urban land reform
program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the
plebiscite but not to substitute his or their
aversion to the proposed amendments by
denying to the millions of voters an
opportunity to express their own likes or
dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do
with the wisdom of the proposed amendments,
their desirability, or the danger of the power
being abused. The issue is whether or not the
voters are aware of the wisdom, the
desirability, or the dangers of abuse. The
petitioners have failed to make out a case that
the average voter does not know the meaning
of "grant" of public land or of "urban land
reform.
12 Javellana v. Executive secretary, 50 SCRA
50
FACTS:
While the Convention was in session, President
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing
the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
Thereafter, the Convention approved its
“Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines”. And the next day, the President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 73,
“submitting to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, and
appropriating funds therefor,” as well as
setting the plebiscite for said ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution on
January 15, 1973.
Javellana through this petition asked the Court
to restrain petitioner from implementing any of
the provisions of the proposed Constitution not
found in the present 1935 Constitution. It
alleged that the President acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in calling for the
immediate implementation of the proposed
Constitution on the ground that he is without
power to approve the proposed Constitution
and without power to proclaim the ratification
by the Filipino people of the proposed
Constitution. Moreover, it alleged that that the
election held to ratify the proposed
Constitution was not a free election, hence null
and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proposed new or
revised Constitution has been ratified
conformably with Art. XV of the 1935
Constitution.
RULING: No. Under Section 1 of Art. XV of
said Constitution, three (3) steps are essential,
namely: (1) That the amendments to the
Constitution be proposed either by Congress or
by a convention called for that purpose, “by a
vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives
voting separately,” but “in joint session
assembled”; (2) That such amendments be
“submitted to the people for their ratification”
at an “election”; and (3) That such
amendments be “approved by a majority of
the votes cast” in said election.
Petitioner argued that the last two
requirements were not complied with.
As to the ratification, other provisions of the
1935 Constitution concerning “elections”
must, also, be taken into account, namely,
Section I of Art. V and Art. X of said
Constitution.
For the age requirement, Section I of Art. V of
the 1935 Constitution provides that “Suffrage
may be exercised by male citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are twenty-one years of age or over…”
Here, it is admitted that persons 15 years of
age or over, but below 21 years have allegedly
ratified the new or revised Constitution drafted
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention. In fact,
the number of people who allegedly voted at
the Citizens’ Assemblies exceeded the number
of registered voters under the Election Code in
force in January 1973. Moreover, Art. XV
envisages — with the term “votes cast” —
choices made on ballots — not orally or by
raising — by the persons taking part in
plebiscites. Hence, the viva voce voting in the
Citizens’ Assemblies was and is null and void
ab initio.
As to the procedure of ratification, Section 2 of
said Art. X ordains that “the Commission on
Elections shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections”. Moreover,
it shall decide, save those involving the right
to vote, all administrative questions affecting
election…”; and “all law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government,
when so required by the Commission, shall act
as its deputies for the purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, and honest elections.” Lastly,
“the decisions, orders, and ruling of the
Commission” shall not be subject to review,
except by the Supreme Court. Here, none of
the foregoing provisions was followed by the
so-called Barangays or Citizens’ Assemblies.
The election was held viva voce, thus depriving
the electorate of the right to vote secretly.
Moreover, such Barrio Assemblies took place
without the intervention of the Commission on
Elections, and without complying with the
provisions of the Election Code of 197. They
were held under the supervision of the very
officers and agencies of the Executive
Department sought to be excluded therefrom
by Art. X of the 1935 Constitution and the ones
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who would mostly benefit from the provisions
in the proposed Constitution. Also, there was
no reasonable means of checking the accuracy
of the returns files by the officers who
conducted said plebiscites. With the
aforementioned violations, it renders null and
void the contested proceedings or alleged
plebiscite in the Citizens’ Assemblies.
Lastly, as to the question on the authority of
the President to proclaim the ratification of the
proposed Constitution, the Court held that he
has no authority to do so. Art. X of the 1935
Constitution was precisely inserted to place
beyond the Executive the power to supervise
or even exercise any authority whatsoever
over “all laws relative to the conduct of
elections”. Here, the alleged total results
tabulated by the Department of Local
Governments and Community Development
was turned over to the acting President of the
National Association or Federation who in turn
reported such results to the President who
proclaimed the said ratification. However, the
Solicitor General has submitted no copy of any
report of the alleged results. Moreover, there
is even no certification by the COMELEC in
support of the alleged results of the citizens’
and no certification from the alleged Barangay
Assemblies were presented. The questions in
the plebiscite were also not proper. In sum,
the new or revised Constitution proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not
ratified in accordance with the provisions of
the 1935 Constitution.
CONSTRUCTION & INTERPRETATION OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
13 Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government
Service Insurance System, 267 SCRA 408
FACTS:
A petition for prohibition and mandamus was
filed by Manila Prince Hotel against GSIS. The
controversy arose when respondent
Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program
of the Philippine Government, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning
bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will
provide management expertise or an
international marketing/reservation system,
and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.
In a close only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51%
14
of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and
sent a manager’s check as bid security, which
GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale
may be consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
RULING: Yes. It is a self-executing provision.
Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution, that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by
the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void
and without any force and effect. Thus, since
the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and
contract. A provision that lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if
the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred
to the legislature for action. Unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing.
Section 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory positive
command, which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words, the
provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates
that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos; it means just that –
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. In other
words, when the Constitution speaks of
“patrimony” it simply means “heritage.” Thus,
when we speak of “national patrimony”, we
refer not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines but as well as the cultural heritage
of the Filipino people.
Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476
FACTS:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides,
among others, the demarcation lines of the
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago.
This is in consonance with UNCLOS I. RA 5446
amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical
errors and included Section 2 in which the
government reserved the drawing of baselines
in Sabah in North Borneo.
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RA 9522 took effect in March 2009 amending
RA 5446. The amendments, which are in
compliance with UNCLOS III in which the
Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening
one baseline while optimizing the other and
classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and
Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.
Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer,
citizen and legislator assailed the
constitutionality of RA 9522. It argued among
others, that RA 9522, "converts "internal
waters into archipelagic waters, hence
subjecting these waters to the right of
innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS
III, including overflight. Petitioners
extrapolate that these passage rights
indubitably expose Philippine internal waters
to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in
violation of Article II, Section 7, Section 8, and
Section 16 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article II, Section 7,
Section 8, and Section 16 of the Constitution
can be invoked to assail the constitutionality of
RA 9522.
RULING: No. The Court emphasized that the
Philippines exercises sovereignty over the
body of water lying landward of the baselines,
including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath, regardless
whether internal or archipelagic waters.
However, sovereignty will not bar the
Philippines from complying with its obligation
in maintaining freedom of navigation and the
generally accepted principles of international
law. It can be either passed by legislature as a
municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is
deemed incorporated in the Philippines law
since the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law, thus
automatically incorporated thereto.
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory
constitutional provisions in Article II
(Declaration of Principles and State Policies)
must also fail. Our present state of
jurisprudence considers the provisions in
Article II as mere legislative guides, which,
absent enabling legislation, "do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x
x." Article II provisions serve as guides in
formulating and interpreting implementing
legislation, as well as in interpreting executory
provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa
v. Factoran treated the right to a healthful and
balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II
as an exception, the present petition lacks
factual basis to substantiate the claimed
constitutional violation. The other provisions
petitioners cite, relating to the protection of
marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2,
paragraph 2) and subsistence fishermen
(Article XIII, Section 7), are not violated by
RA9522.
15 Marbury v. Madison (1803)
FACTS:
Before the inauguration of President Jefferson,
outgoing President Adams nominated 42 new
justices of the peace for the District, which
were confirmed by the Senate the day before
President Jefferson’s inauguration.
William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term
appointee of President John Adams (President
Adams) to a justice of the peace position in the
District of Columbia, brought suit against
President Thomas Jefferson’s (President
Jefferson) Secretary of State, James Madison,
seeking delivery of his commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicant has a vested right
in the commission he demands?
RULING: No, the Court has no jurisdiction to
do so. Although the Court determined that the
applicant had a vested legal right in his
appointment because his commission had
been signed by the President, sealed by the
Secretary of State, and the appointment was
not revocable and that Section 13 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that such writs
might be issued by the Supreme Court to cases
including this present case. Still, SC held that
Article III of the Constitution provides that
such power to issue the said writ applies only
to cases "affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls" and to cases "in which
the state shall be party. In all other cases, the
supreme court shall have appellate
jurisdiction."
Thus, § 13 of the Act of 1789, giving the Court
authority to issue writs of mandamus to an
officer, was contrary to the Constitution as an
act of original jurisdiction, and therefore void.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases
must necessarily expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
courts must decide on the operation of each.
The constitution is superior to any ordinary act
of the legislature and here by extending the
Court's original jurisdiction to include cases
like Marbury's, Congress had exceeded its
authority. And when an act of Congress is in
conflict with the Constitution, it is the
obligation of the Court to uphold the
Constitution because, by Article VI, it is the
"supreme law of the land.
15 THE MARITIME BASELINES LAW (R.A. NO.
9522)
16 Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v.
Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No.
187167, 655 SCRA 476, August 16, 2011,
En Banc [Carpio]
FACTS:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides,
among others, the demarcation lines of the
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago.
This is in consonance with UNCLOS I. RA 5446
amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical
errors and included Section 2 in which the
government reserved the drawing of baselines
in Sabah in North Borneo.
RA 9522 took effect in March 2009 amending
RA 5446. The amendments, which are in
compliance with UNCLOS III in which the
Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening
one baseline while optimizing the other and
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classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and
Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.
Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer,
citizen and legislator assailed the
constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the
territory of the Philippines in violation to the
Constitution and it opens the country to
maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of
other states to the detriment of the economy,
sovereignty, national security and of the
Constitution as well. They added that the
classification of Regime of Islands would be
prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9522 is
unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes. First, RA 9522 did not delineate
the territory of the Philippines but is merely a
statutory tool to demarcate the country’s
maritime zone and continental shelf under
UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III
is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory
as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS
III is a multilateral treaty that is a result of a
long-time negotiation to establish a uniform
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles
from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves. In order to measure said
distances, it is a must for the state parties to
have their archipelagic doctrines measured in
accordance to the treaty—the role played by
RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that
RA 9522 resulted in the loss of 15,000 square
nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is,
RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base
points, increased the Philippines total maritime
space of 145,216 square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and
Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is
consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty.
Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of
the archipelago, the country would be violating
UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that
the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125
nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to
carefully analyze the situation: the country, for
decades, had been claiming sovereignty over
KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and
on the other hand they had to consider that
these are located at non-appreciable distance
from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago. So, the classification is in
accordance with the Philippines sovereignty
and State’s responsible observance of its pacta
sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522
is without prejudice with delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo,
over which the Republic of the Philippines has
acquired dominion and sovereignty.
Lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not
incompatible with the Constitution’s
delineation of internal waters. Petitioners
contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal
waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters
hence subjecting these waters to the right of
innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the
Philippine internal waters to nuclear and
maritime pollution hazards. The Court
emphasized that the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air
space over it and the submarine areas
underneath, regardless whether internal or
archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will
not bar the Philippines from complying with its
obligation in maintaining freedom of
navigation and the generally accepted
principles of international law. It can be either
passed by legislature as a municipal law or in
the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated
in the Philippines law since the right of
innocent passage is a customary international
law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed
in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession
of archipelagic states in exchange for their
right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In
fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables
the Philippines to make maritime delineation
which binds the international community.
17 BANGSAMORO JURIDICAL ENTITY
CONCEPT
18 PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS.
GRP, G.R. NO. 183591 OCTOBER 14 2008
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of a number of cases
regarding the issues, mostly in relation to its
constitutionality, surrounding the
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) between the Government
of the Philippines (GPR) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) and the issue
regarding the extent of the powers of the
President in pursuing the peace process.
The MO-AD provides, among others, ¬-- (1)
the “Bangsamoro Homeland” – the ownership
of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation; (2) Bangsamoro people
have a right to self-governance; (3) its
territory includes the land mass, maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial, alluvial including aerial
domain and atmospheric space embracing
Mindanao- Sulu-Palawan geographic region;
(4) that the Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE)
shall have jurisdiction over all natural
resources within its internal waters and
territorial waters from beyond this up to
baselines of RP – South East and South West
of mainland Mindanao; and within territorial
waters, there is joint jurisdiction with the
Philippine government and sharing of minerals
therein. Moreover, (5) BJE is free to enter into
any economic cooperation/ trade relations with
foreign countries and can establish foreign
trade missions to other countries although the
external defense remains the duty and
obligation of the Philippine government. It also
(6) defines the relationship of the Central
Government and BJE as “associative”
characterized by shared authority and
responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not MOA-AD is
constitutional.
RULING: No. The concept of association is not
recognized under the present constitution. No
province, city, or municipality, not even the
ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an “associative” relationship with the national
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government. Indeed, the concept implies
powers that go beyond anything ever granted
by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. Association implies that the
associative entity is a state, and that it is in
the position to become independent. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for
a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of Philippine territory for independence.
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it
meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government,
and a capacity to enter into relations with
other states. The defining concept underlying
the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary
to the present Constitution, the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the
Constitution and the laws.
MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws for it exceed those granted to any
Local Government Unit (LGU). Even if BJE is
considered as an autonomous region, the
MOA-AD would require a constitutional
amendment in order to vest BJE with treaty
making power. While Article X Section 20
provides that the organic acts of the
autonomous regions shall provide legislative
powers over such other matters authorized by
law for the promotion of the general welfare of
the people, the same must be subject to the
provisions of the Constitution. And since under
our constitutional system, only the President
has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states as regards treaty-making, then a
constitutional amendment is needed to grant a
similar power to BJE. Lastly, it is not in
consonance with a number of statutes. Thus,
it is unconstitutional.
CITIZENSHIP – 1935 CONSTITUTION
19 Fermin Caram Provision; Chiongbian vs.
De Leon (G.R. No. L-2007, January 31,
1949
FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to permanently
prohibit respondent Customs Officials from
cancelling the registration certificates of
petitioner's vessels, and respondent Philippine
Shipping Administration from rescinding the
sale of three vessels to petitioner.
The primary basis for respondents' and
intervenor's acts is the allegation that
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and therefore
not qualified by law to operate and own vessels
of Philippine registry. The Philippine Shipping
Administration also alleges that petitioner
violated the contract of sale of three vessels
executed between them, on the ground of
misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in
said contract that his father was a naturalized
Filipino citizen. The Philippine Shipowners'
Association was later allowed to intervene and
it filed its answer against the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner William
Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that
he is a Filipino Citizen. By virtue of Article IV
of the Constitution which provides: SECTION
1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of
foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
In the case at bar, Victoriano Chiongbian,
father of herein petitioner, having been elected
to a public office in the Philippines before the
adoption of the Constitution, became a Filipino
citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1,
subsection 2 of the Constitution. William
Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was
then a minor, also became a Filipino citizen by
reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the
Constitution, his father having become a
Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said
Constitution. This is also in conformity with the
settled rule of our jurisprudence that a
legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of
his father.
As to the first argument of the respondent:
subsection was adopted by the Constitutional
Convention merely to grant Filipino citizenship
to Delegate Caram is that members of the
Constitutional Convention could not have
dedicated a provision of our Constitution
merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others.
Also, they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision
should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone,
but in conjunction with all other provisions of
that great document.
Secondly, respondents argued that the original
draft of said subsection 2 contained the phrase
— "and their descendants," — which was
deleted from the final draft, thus showing that
this privilege of citizenship was intended to be
strictly personal to the one who had been
elected to public office and did not extend to
his descendants. However SC ruled that mere
deletion of the phrase — "and their
descendants," — is not determinative of any
conclusion. It could have been done because
the learned framers of our Constitution
considered it superfluous, knowing full well
that the meaning of such a phrase was
adequately covered by subsection 3.
Lastly, Respondents' allegation that the
petitioner violated the contract of sale with the
Philippine Shipping Administration on the
ground of misrepresentation is without merit
and that such was not a deliberate
misrepresentation but an error and in which
any person not versed in the law is prone to
commit. It is clear that petitioner merely
meant that his father was a Filipino citizen by
operation of law and not by birth.
Petition for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition is hereby granted.
20 Rep. vs. Chule Lim, GR No. 153883,
January 13, 2004
FACTS:
Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of
entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del
Norte. She claimed that she was born on 29
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October 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth
was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan
transferred her record of birth to Iligan City.
During the hearing, Lim claims that her
nationality was entered as Chinese when it
should have been Filipino considering that her
father and mother never got married. Only her
deceased father was Chinese, while her
mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a
registered voter attests to the fact that she is
a Filipino citizen.
The Republic opposes, claiming that
respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirement of electing Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the
1935 Constitution, which provides that the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching
the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the
provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 625, that legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention “in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized
to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.”
ISSUES:
Whether or not Lim is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory
requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
apply only to legitimate children. These do not
apply in the case of respondent who was
concededly an illegitimate child, considering
that her Chinese father and Filipino mother
were never married. As such, she was not
required to comply with said constitutional and
statutory requirements to become a Filipino
citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a
Filipino mother, respondent automatically
became a Filipino upon birth. Stated
differently, she is a Filipino since birth without
having to elect Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority.
This notwithstanding, the records show that
respondent elected Filipino citizenship when
she reached the age of majority. She
registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when
she was 18 years old. The exercise of the right
of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election
of Philippine citizenship.
21 Co vs. HRET (G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30,
1991)
FACTS:
Among the candidates who vied for the
position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and
the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against
the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong Jr. is not a resident of the second
district of the Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6,
1989, found for the private respondent.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines
RULING:
YES, Jose Ong Jr. is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. The records show that in the
year 1895, Ong Te (respondent’s grandfather),
arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of
Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from
the fruits of hard work. Ong Te was able to
obtain a certificate of residence from then
Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong
Chuan was born in China in 1905 and was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the
province of Samar. As Jose Ong Chuan grew
older in the rural and seaside community of
Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values
and practices. He was baptized into
Christianity.
As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a
natural-born Filipino, Agripina Lao and the two
fell in love. They got married in 1932 according
to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore
eight children, one of whom is the private
respondent who was born in 1948. In the
meantime, the father of the private
respondent, unsure of his legal status and in
an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his
life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for
naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April
28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial,
declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance
of Samar issued an order declaring the
decision of April 28, 1955 as final and
executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution
found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the
Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973,
of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
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4. Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3
above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987
but also to those who, having been born of
Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before
that date. The provision in question was
enacted to correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically granted the status
of a natural-born citizen while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still
have to elect Philippine citizenship.
22 In re: Vicente Ching, Bar Matter 914,
October 1, 1999
FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino
mother and an alien Chinese father, was born
on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the
1935 Constitution.
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in
Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to
take the 1998 Bar
Examination. On April 5, 1999, Ching was one
of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony
was scheduled on May 5, 1999. Because of his
questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he
was not allowed to take oath. He was required
to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General commented
that Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was
a Chinese citizen and continues to be so,
unless upon reaching the age of majority he
elected Philippine citizenship, under the
compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 265. He pointed out
the Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship, and if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time"
allowed by the present jurisprudence.
24
ISSUE:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine
citizenship within a reasonable time.
RULING:
Ching, despite the special circumstances,
failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a
reasonable time. The reasonable time means
that the election should be made within 3
years from "upon reaching the age of
majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he
elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after
reaching the age of majority which the court
considered not within the reasonable time.
Ching offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure
in electing Philippine citizenship is not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required is an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship filed with the nearest civil registry.
23 Dy Cuenco vs. Sec of Justice, May 26,
1962
FACTS:
Alfonso Dy Cuenco wrote to the Commissioner
of Immigration requesting the cancellation of
his alien certificate of registration, upon the
ground that he had exercised the right to elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Article IV,
section I(4) of the Constitution and
Commonwealth Act No. 625. Said election
appears in an affidavit dated May 15, 1951,
stating that petitioner was born in Dapa,
Surigao, on February 16, 1923; that his
parents are "Benito Dy Cuenco, Chinese (now
deceased)" and "Julita Duyapit, Filipina, a
native of Surigao, Philippines"; that he is
"married to Rosalinda Villanueva, a Filipino,"
by whom he has four (4) legitimate children;
that he renounces all allegiance to the Republic
of China; that he recognizes and accepts the
supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that he will obey,
support and defend the Constitution and laws
of the Philippines. On the same date,
petitioner, likewise, took the corresponding
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
The Commissioner of Immigration referred the
matter to the Secretary of Justice who,
rendered an opinion (No. 129) holding that the
alleged Philippine citizenship of petitioner's
mother had not been sufficiently established,
that said election of Philippine citizenship by
petitioner herein was legally ineffectual and
that he did not thereby become a Filipino
citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the election of Philippine
Citizenship of the petitioner is valid.
RULING:
No. Election must be made within a reasonable
period after reaching the age of majority.
Three years is a reasonable period, however,
this may be extended under certain
circumstances as when the person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino
citizen. In the case at bar, the petitioner
reached the age of majority in 1944, but he
made his election of Filipino citizenship 1951
when he was 28 years old, 7 years after he
reached the age of majority.
Ma vs. Fernandez, July 26, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano
were all born under aegis of the 1935
Philippine Constitution in the years 1948,
1951, and 1957, respectively.
They were all raised in the Philippines and have
resided in this country for almost sixty (60)
years; they spent their whole lives, studied
and received their primary and secondary
education in the country; they do not speak
nor understand the Chinese language, have
not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any
relative of their father; they have not even
traveled abroad; and they have already raised
their respective families in the Philippines.
During their age of minority, they secured
from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien
Certificates of Registration (ACRs).
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-
one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the
1935 Constitution. All three took their oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Later on, a certain Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral),
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alleged that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven
(7) children are undesirable and overstaying
aliens. Hence, the Legal Department of the
Bureau of Immigration charged them for
violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are Filipino citizens.
Ruling:
The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of
the Philippines those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The mandate states:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) xxx;... x x x x
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was
enacted. It laid down the manner of electing
Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with subsection (4),
Section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall
be expressed in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and
shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath
of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a
serious undertaking. It was commitment and
fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to
renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance"
to any other state. This was unqualified
acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and
the complete disavowal of any other
nationality.
Petitioners have passed decades of their lives
in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present
status having been formed by their past,
petitioners can no longer have any national
identity except that which they chose upon
reaching the age of reason.
25 Rep. vs. Sagun, Feb. 15. 2011
FACTS:
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert
S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on
August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after
getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed
an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Said document was notarized but
was not recorded and registered with the Local
Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
In 2005, Sagun applied for a Philippine
passport. Her application was denied due to
the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has
elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently,
she sought a judicial declaration of her election
of Philippine citizenship averring that she was
raised as a Filipino and she is a registered
voter in Baguio City and had voted in local and
national elections as shown in the Voter
Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her
positive acts, she has effectively elected
Philippine citizenship and such fact should be
annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle
her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
The OSG opposed, pointing out that while
Sagun executed an oath of allegiance before a
notary public, there was no affidavit of her
election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally,
her oath of allegiance which was not registered
with the nearest local civil registry was
executed when she was already 33 years old
or 12 years after she reached the age of
majority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Norma has complied with the
procedural requirements in the election of
Philippine citizenship.
RULING:
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959,
the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution, which declares as citizens of the
Philippines those whose mothers are citizens
of the Philippines and elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the
child elected Philippine citizenship.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted
pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that
should be followed in order to make a valid
election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with subsection (4),
Section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall
be expressed in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and
shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.
Based on the foregoing, the statutory
formalities of electing Philippine citizenship
are: (1) a statement of election under oath;
(2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and of
the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine
citizenship shall be accepted for registration
under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising
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the right of election has complied with the
requirements of the Alien Registration Act of
1950. In other words, he should first be
required to register as an alien. Pertinently,
the person electing Philippine citizenship is
required to file a petition with the Commission
of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau
of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien
certificate of registration based on his
aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and
said Office will initially decide, based on the
evidence presented the validity or invalidity of
said election. Afterwards, the same is elevated
to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for
final determination and review.
The trial court’s conclusion that respondent
duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous
since the records indisputably show that
respondent failed to comply with the legal
requirements for a valid election. Specifically,
respondent had not executed a sworn
statement of her election of Philippine
citizenship. The only documentary evidence
submitted by respondent in support of her
claim of alleged election was her oath of
allegiance, executed 12 years after she
reached the age of majority, which was
unregistered.
JONES LAW OF 1916
26 Tecson vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.161434,
March 3, 2004)
FACTS:
The petitions at bar seek the disqualification of
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr.’s COC filed last
December 31, 2003.
On January 9, 2004, petitioner in G.R. No.
161824, Victorino X. Fornier, filed with the
COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification.
Petitioner argues that marriage of FPJ’s
parents [Allan Fernando(Spanish) Poe &
Bessie Kelley(American)] was void, due to his
father’s first marriage with one Paulita Gomez.
This means that FPJ is an illegitimate child and
should follow his
mother’s nationality (American).
ISSUES:
Whether or not FPJ is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the
prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s
birth, provided that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his
grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the
latter’s death certificate was identified as a
Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn
from the presumption that having died in 1954
at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been
born in 1870. In the absence of any other
evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon
his death in 1954 was presumed to be the
place of residence prior his death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
"en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s
citizenship would have extended to his son,
Allan---respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as
Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American
citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of
paternal filiation as evidenced by the
respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935
Constitution on citizenship did not make a
distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of
the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous
marriage and the allegation that respondent
was born only before the assailed marriage
had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in
view of the established paternal filiation
evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in
his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation
to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
27 Valles vs. COMELEC, GR No. 137000,
August 9, 2000
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16,
1934 in Australia to an Australian mother and
a Filipino father. On June 27 1952 she married
Leopoldo Lopez a Filipino citizen and has been
actively participating in the electoral process.
In 1992 she ran for governor of Davao oriental,
which was contested by her opponent on the
ground of her Australian citizenship. The case
was dismissed because she was able to
produce enough documentary evidence to
support the Filipino citizenship of her late
father therefore proving her own citizenship
through Jus Sanguinis.
In 1998 the issue was raised again when she
ran for re-election as governor and the
Comelec again dismissed the case stating that
no new evidence was presented. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied. on same date
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is a Filipino
Citizen and is allowed to run for public office.
RULING:
By virtue of the principle of Jus Sanguinis, the
private respondent is a Filipino Citizen because
her father was a Filipino Citizen by virtue of the
Jones Law and the Philippine Bill of 1902. The
fact that she is born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine
Citizenship.
CITIZENSHIP - RES JUDICATA
28 Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil.,315
FACTS:
Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town of
Luculan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on July
6, 1889. His father was Basilio Roa Uy Tiong
Co, a native of China, and his mother was
Basilia Rodriguez, a native of this country. His
parents were legally married in the Philippine
Islands at the time of his birth.
The father of the appellant went to China about
the year 1895, and died there about 1900.
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Subsequent to the death of his father, in May,
1901, the appellant was sent to China by his
mother for the sole purpose of studying (and
always with the intention of returning) and
returned to the Philippine Islands on the
steamship Kaifong, arriving at the port of Cebu
October 1, 1910, from Amoy, China, and
sought admission to the Philippine Islands. At
this time the appellant was a few days under
21 years and 3 months of age.
The Board of Special Inquiry found that the
appellant was a Chinese person and a subject
of the Emperor of China and not entitled to
land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Roa is a citizen of the
Philippines.
RULING:
YES. By section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902
the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place
of birth which prevails in the United States was
extended to the Philippine Islands, but with
limitations. In the United States every person,
with certain specific exceptions, born in the
United States is a citizen of that country.
Under section 4 every person born after the
11th of April, 1899, of parents who were
Spanish subjects on that date and who
continued to reside in this country are at the
moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the
Philippine Islands. From the reading of section
4 and taking into consideration the Act of
March 23, 1912, it is clear that Congress
realized that there were inhabitants in the
Philippine Islands who did not come within the
provisions of said section, and also that
Congress did not then by express legislation
determine the political status of such persons.
NATURALIZATION
29 Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Comsr. of
Immigration, 41 SCRA 292
Facts:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8
February 1961. In the interrogation made in
connection with her application for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
would visit the Philippines to visit her uncle.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines
on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung
was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of
the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for
injunction. At the hearing, it was admitted that
Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak
either English or Tagalog, except for a few
words. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. The Court of
First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau
Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto
became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to
a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act
473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same
law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an
alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under
said Section 4. Whether the alien woman
requires to undergo the naturalization
proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision
to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who
dies during the proceedings, is not required to
go through a naturalization proceedings, in
order to be considered as a Filipino citizen
hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is
absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently. As the laws
of our country, both substantive and
procedural, stand today, there is no such
procedure (a substitute for naturalization
proceeding to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own
citizenship settled and established so that she
may not have to be called upon to prove it
everytime she has to perform an act or enter
into a transaction or business or exercise a
right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no
proof that the citizenship is not vested as of
the date of marriage or the husband's
acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be,
for the truth is that the situation obtains even
as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case. Whatever the
corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship
is generally not considered as res judicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen
Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino
citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to
Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim,
a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
30 So vs. Rep., GR No. 170603, January 29,
2007
Facts:
So filed a petition for Naturalization under
Commonwealth Act 473. In the proceedings,
he contends that he was born in the
Philippines, a man of good moral character and
had been studying in one of the schools in the
country namely UST where he graduated Cum
Laude in Pharmacy and was then taking
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Medicine. He also complied with the
requirements of publication with no contest.
He also presented 2 witnesses:
Atty Artemio Adasa JR and Mark Salcedo. RTC
granted the petition in 2003. However, it was
contested by the Solicitor General claiming
that the witnesses presented are not credible
as is required by the naturalization process.
Issue:
Whether or not Edison So did meet all the
qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino
citizen.
Ruling:
No. Naturalization signifies the act of formally
adopting a foreigner into the political body of
a nation by clothing him or her with the
privileges of a citizen. Under current and
existing laws, there are three ways by which
an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative
naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b)
judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No.
473, as amended; and (c) legislative
naturalization in the form of a law enacted by
Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to
an alien.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are
separate and distinct laws – the former covers
all aliens regardless of class while the latter
covers native-born aliens who lived here in the
Philippines all their lives, who never saw any
other country and all along thought that they
were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love
and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the
customs and traditions. To reiterate, the
intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No.
9139 was to make the process of acquiring
Philippine citizenship less tedious, less
technical and more encouraging which is
administrative rather than judicial in nature.
Thus, although the legislature believes that
there is a need to liberalize the naturalization
law of the Philippines, there is nothing from
which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was
intended to be amended or repealed by R.A.
No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind
was merely to prescribe another mode of
acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be
availed of by native born aliens. The only
implication is that a native-born alien has
the choice to apply for judicial or
administrative naturalization, subject to
the prescribed qualifications and
disqualifications.
In this case, petitioner applied for
naturalization by judicial act, though at the
time of the filing of his petition, administrative
naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was
already available. Consequently, his
application should be governed by C.A. No.
473. Thus, absent a specific provision
expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law
stands and the qualifications and
disqualifications set forth therein are
maintained.
In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the
witnesses he presented were competent to
vouch for his good moral character and are
themselves possessed of good moral
character. Petitioner’s witnesses did not testify
on his specific acts; they did not elaborate on
his traits. Their testimonies do not convince
the Court that they personally know petitioner
well and are therefore in a position to vouch
for his qualifications. Petitioner’s witnesses
clearly did not personally know him well
enough; their testimonies do not satisfactorily
establish that petitioner has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
prescribed by law.
31 Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, GR No.
179120, April 1, 2009
Facts:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue
about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong
to run for, be elected to, and assume and
discharge the position as Representative of the
1st District of Negros Oriental. The contention
of the parties who sought her disqualification
is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence,
she lacks the citizenship requirement in
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In the election that ensued, she was voted for
by the constituents of Negros Oriental and
garnered the highest votes. She was
eventually proclaimed as the winner and has
since performed her duties and responsibilities
as Member of the House of Representatives.
The proponents against Limkaichong's
qualification stated that she is not a natural-
born citizen because her parents were Chinese
citizens at the time of her birth. They went on
to claim that the proceedings for the
naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father,
never attained finality due to procedural and
substantial defects.
Issue:
Whether or not the citizenship of
Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in
an election case.
Ruling:
No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the
naturalization certificate of one person should
be in accordance with Section 18 of CA No.
473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence,
it is the State, through the Solicitor General or
the representative designated by statute, that
may question in the appropriate
denaturalization proceeding.
32 Burca vs. Republic (GR No. L-24252-Jan.
30, 1967)
Facts:
On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known
as Zita Ngo Burca — "as possessing all
qualifications and none of the
[dis]qualifications for naturalization under
Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of
cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau
of Immigration". She avers that she is of legal
age, married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino
citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City;
that before her marriage, she was a Chinese
citizen, subject of Nationalist China, with ACR
No. A-148054; that she was born on March 30,
1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao, and holder of Native
Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333. The
Solicitor General opposed and moved to
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dismiss the petition on two main grounds, viz:
(1) that "there is no proceeding established by
law, or the rules for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual"; and (2) that
as an application for Philippine citizenship, "the
petition is fatally defective for failure to contain
or mention the essential allegations required
under Section 7 of the Naturalization Law",
such as, among others, petitioner's former
places of residence, and the absence of the
affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not Burca is deemed as a Filipino
Citizen in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Naturalization Law vis-à-vis the
Philippine Constitution
Ruling:
No. Petitioner did not meet the requirements
specified in the Revised Naturalization Law.
The petition is fatally defective for failure to
contain or mention the essential allegations
required Under Sec. 7 of the Naturalization
33
Law, such as, among others, petitioner’s
former places of residence, and the absence of
the affidavits of at least 2 supporting
witnesses.
The court ruled that: (1) An alien woman
married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen
of this country must apply therefor by filing a
petition for citizenship reciting that she
possesses all the qualifications set forth in
Section 2, and none of the disqualifications
under Sec. 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization law; (2) Said petition must be
filed in the CFI where petitioner had resided at
least one year immediately preceding the filing
of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other
office, agency, board or official, administrative
or otherwise – other than the judgement of a
competent court of justice – certifying or
declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino
citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby
declared null and void.
The petition avers that petitioner was born in
Gigaquit, Surigao that her former residence
was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she
is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In court,
however, she testified that she also resided in
Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a
course in home economics, for one year.
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law
requires that a petition for naturalization
should state petitioner's "present and
former places of residence". Residence
encompasses all places where petitioner
actually and physically resided. Cebu,
where she studied for one year, perforce
comes within the term residence. The reason
for exacting recital in the petition of present
and former places of residence is that
"information regarding petitioner and
objection to his application are apt to be
provided by people in his actual, physical
surrounding". 14 And the State is deprived of
full opportunity to make inquiries as to
petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all
the places of residence do not appear in the
petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former
place of residence is fatal.
Said petition is not supported by the affidavit
of at least two credible persons, "stating that
they are citizens of the Philippines and
personally know the petitioner to be a resident
of the Philippines for the period of time
required by this Act and a person of good
repute and morally irreproachable, and that
said petitioner has in their opinion all the
qualifications necessary to become a citizen of
the Philippines and is not in any way
disqualified under the provisions of this Act".
Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the
names and post-office addresses of such
witnesses as the petitioner may desire to
introduce at the hearing of the case". The
necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses
cannot be overlooked. It is important to know
who those witnesses are. The State should not
be denied the opportunity to check on their
background to ascertain whether they are of
good standing in the community, whose word
may be taken on its face value, and who could
serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of
the petitioner".
LOSS OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
Board of Immigration Commissioners vs.
Callano, 25 SCRA 890
Facts:
On July 13, 1962, the Department of Foreign
Affairs informed the Commissioner of
Immigration that, on the basis of the findings
made by the National Bureau of Investigation,
the signatures of former Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Felixberto M. Serrano, on certain
documents, amongst them authorizing the
documentation of Beato Go Callano and
others, were not authentic. The Commissioner
of Immigration issued a warrant of exclusion
commanding the deportation officer "to carry
out the exclusion of the above-named
applicants (the Go Callano brothers) on the
first available transportation and on the same
class of accommodation in which they arrived
to the port whence they came or to the country
of which they are nationals."
Months later, the Court of First Instance issued
a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
respondents in the case from deporting the
petitioners. After trial, the Court rendered
judgment finding that, according to
petitioners' undisputed evidence, "the
petitioners herein are the illegitimate children
of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, with her
common-law husband — a Chinese citizen,"
and concluding that "until the petitioners left
for China in 1947, they must be considered as
citizens of the Philippines as they were born of
a Filipino mother and an alien father who,
however, was not married to their mother."
Notwithstanding the above finding and
conclusion, however, the Court dismissed the
case holding that the petitioners are citizens
of the Republic of China and not being properly
documented for entry into the Philippines as
found by the Immigration Commissioner.
The grounds upon which the Court based its
decision were:
(1) because petitioners stayed in
China for a period of fifteen years
before returning to the Philippines,
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they must be considered as citizens of
the Chinese Republic;
(2) as petitioners were recognized by
their alien father as his children, they
became Chinese citizens under the
Chinese law of nationality.
While the Court also found that the cable
authorization mentioned heretofore was a
forgery, it held that, for the purpose of the
petition before it, "it was immaterial to
determine the genuineness or falsity of the
cable authorization. For if the petitioners are
Filipino citizens, they are entitled to remain
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic
in whatever way they might have entered."
Like the court of origin, the Court of Appeals
found that herein respondents were the
illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese
citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen.
Like the court of origin, the Court of Appeals
found that herein respondents were the
illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese
citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners lose their Philippine
citizenship upon the performance of certain
acts or the happening of certain events in
China
Ruling:
No. The petitioners are admittedly Filipino
citizens at birth, and their status must be
governed by Philippine law wherever they may
be, in conformity with Article 15 of the Civil
Code. Under Article IV, Section 2, of the
Philippine Constitution, "Philippine citizenship
may be lost or reacquired in the manner
provided by law," which implies that the
question of whether a Filipino has lost his
Philippine citizenship shall be determined by
no other than the Philippine law.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
amended by Republic Act No. 106, provides
that a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
by naturalization in a foreign country; express
renunciation of citizenship; subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to support the constitution
or laws of a foreign country; rendering service
to, or accepting a commission in, the armed
forces of a foreign country; cancellation of the
certificate of naturalization; declaration by
competent authority that he is a deserter of
the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in
the case of a woman by marriage to a foreigner
if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's
country, she acquires his nationality.
Recognition of the petitioners by their
alien father is not among the ground for
losing Philippine citizenship under
Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the
petitioners lost their former status by reason
of such recognition. About the only mode of
losing Philippine citizenship which closely
bears on the petitioners is renunciation. But
even renunciation cannot be cited in support
of the conclusion that petition lost their
Philippine citizenship because the law requires
an express renunciation which means a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or
implication; a renunciation manifested by
direct and appropriate language, as
distinguished from that which is inferred from
conduct.
Moreover, petitioners were all minors
when they where brought to China in
1446. They were without legal capacity to
renounce their status. Upon their return to the
Philippines only Beato Go Callano had attained
the age of majority, but even as to him there
could not have been renunciation because he
did not manifest by direct and appropriate
language that he was disclaiming Philippine
citizenship. On the contrary, after he has
attained the age of majority, he applied for
registration as a Philippine citizen and sought
entry into this country, which are clear indicia
of his intent to continue his former status. The
foregoing shows that the petitioners have not
lost their Philippine citizenship.
34 Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1
Facts:
Petitioner Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of
Baguio City. Private respondent Lardizabal, the
losing candidate, filed a petition for quo
warranto questioning petitioner’s citizenship.
The latter claims that petitioner is a
naturalized Australian citizen, having married
an Australian citizen. Records also showed
petitioner’s oath and affirmation of allegiance
to the Queen of Australia. These were not
denied; petitioner however claimed that his
naturalization in Australia made him at worst
only a dual national and did not divest him of
his Philippine citizenship and that his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it
was found that his marriage to the Australian
citizen was bigamous.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is a Filipino Citizen
Ruling:
NO. CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
Among these are: (1) naturalization in a
foreign country; (2) express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws
of a foreign country. All of which are applicable
to the petitioner. In connection with this,
Article IV, Section 5, of the present
Constitution provides that, “Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law.”
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner
asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage
to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that
circumstance alone did not automatically
restore his Philippine citizenship. His
divestiture of Australian citizenship does not
concern us here. That is a matter between him
and his adopted country. What we must
consider is the fact that he voluntarily and
freely rejected Philippine citizenship and
willingly and knowingly embraced the
citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility
that he may have been subsequently rejected
by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that
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he has been automatically reinstated as a
citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. It does not appear in the record,
nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of
these methods. He does not point to any
judicial decree of naturalization as to any
statute directly conferring Philippine
citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown
that he has complied with PD No. 725,
providing that:
… (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying
with the Special Committee on Naturalization
created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and,
if their applications are approved, taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, after which they shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. The Commission on Immigration
and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
certificate of registration.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity
that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the
returning renegade makes a formal act of re-
dedication to the country he has abjured and
he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. This may not be accomplished by
election to public office.
35 Valles vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August
9, 2000
Facts:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16,
1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of
fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in
the Philippines, where she later married a
Filipino and has since then participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a
candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections,
she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition
for her disqualification as candidate on the
ground that she is an Australian.
Issue:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a
Filipino
Ruling
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of
the parents regardless of the place of his/her
birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before
the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at
that time, what served as the Constitution of
the Philippines were the principal organic acts
by which the United States governed the
country. These were the Philippine Bill of July
1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April
11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco,
was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of
the same laws, which were the laws in force at
the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter,
herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution has established the principle of
jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship, xxx So also, the
principle of jus sanguinis, which confers
citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a
Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino
father. The fact of her being born in Australia
is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of
jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to
her possession of dual citizenship.
36 Yu vs. Santiago, 169 SCRA 364
Facts:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a
Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10,
1978, he was naturalized as a Philippine
citizen. Despite his naturalization, he applied
for and was issued Portuguese Passport by the
Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy
in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office
certifies that his Portuguese passport expired
on 20 July 1986. He also declared his
nationality as Portuguese in commercial
documents he signed, specifically, the
Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd.
filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980. The
CID detained Yu pending his deportation case.
Yu, in turn, filed a petition for habeas corpus.
An internal resolution of 7 November 1988
referred the case to the Court en banc. The
Court en banc denied the petition. When his
Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship
Ruling:
Express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge,
and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as
a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his
prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for
a renewal of his Portuguese passport and
represented himself as such in official
documents even after he had become a
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naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption
or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is
grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.
While normally the question of whether or not
a person has renounced his Philippine
citizenship should be heard before a trial court
of law in adversary proceedings, this has
become unnecessary as this Court, no less,
upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look
into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or
not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine
citizenship is meritorious. Philippine
citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a
commodity or were to be displayed when
required and suppressed when convenient.
PD 725
37 Frivaldo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120295
June 28, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed
governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on
January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due
time. On October 27, 1988. the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter,
League), represented by its President,
Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the Commission
on Elections a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo
In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo
admitted that he was naturalized in the United
States as alleged but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he had sought
American citizenship only to protect himself
against President Marcos.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on
his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its
Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for
hearing on the merits. His motion for
reconsideration was denied in another Order
dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this
Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition
to ask that the said orders be set aside on the
ground that they had been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution
of the petition, we issued a temporary order
against the hearing on the merits scheduled by
the COMELEC and at the same time required
comments from the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen
of the Philippines at the time of his election on
January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of
Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this
petition are merely secondary to this basic
question.
Ruling:
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in
Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that
all public officials and employees owe the State
and the Constitution "allegiance at all times"
and the specific requirement in Section 42 of
the Local Government Code that a candidate
for local elective office must be inter alia a
citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter
of the constituency where he is running.
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines,
this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on
November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described
himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any
subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United States
District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P.
Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in
Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that
all public officials and employees owe the State
and the Constitution "allegiance at all times"
and the specific requirement in Section 42 of
the Local Government Code that a candidate
for local elective office must be inter alia a
citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter
of the constituency where he is running.
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines,
this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on
November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described
himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any
subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United States
District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P.
Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
If he really wanted to disavow his American
citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so
in accordance with the laws of our country.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken
these categorical acts. He contends that by
simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had,
without more, already effectively recovered
Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the
formal declaration the law envisions — surely,
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is
not that cheaply recovered. If the Special
Committee had not yet been convened, what
that meant simply was that the petitioner had
to wait until this was done, or seek
naturalization by legislative or judicial
proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the
Commission on Elections should be dismissed
for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein
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private respondents are seeking to prevent
Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office
of governor because he is disqualified from
doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer's entire tenure.
Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say,
a female legislator were to marry a foreigner
during her term and by her act or omission
acquires his nationality, would she have a right
to remain in office simply because the
challenge to her title may no longer be made
within ten days from her proclamation? It has
been established, and not even denied, that
the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was
discovered only eight months after his
proclamation and his title was challenged
shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a
person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to
another country. The fact that he was elected
by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting
public office and employment only to the
citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased
by the electorate alone. The will of the people
as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency
is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve
in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe
his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring
and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the
status of the natural-born citizen is favored by
the Constitution and our laws, which is all the
more reason why it should be treasured like a
pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered
and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be
lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its
difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and
possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not
quick to welcome back with eager arms its
prodigal if repentant children. The returning
renegade must show, by an express and
unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and
love.
38 Tabasa vs, CA, GR No. 125793, August 29,
2006
FACTS:
Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was 7
years old, his father Rodolfo Tabasa, became
a naturalized citizen of the United States. By
derivative naturalization, Joevani Tabasa
acquired the citizenship of his father.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines in August
1995 and was admitted as “balikbayan” for
one year. Petitioner was arrested and detained
by agent Wilson Soluren of BID on May 23,
1996 in Aklan and was brought to BID
Detention Center, Manila.
Petitioner was investigated by Special
Prosecutor Atty. Donato and on the same day,
petitioner was accused of violating Section 8,
Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987
Administrative Code. Petitioner’s passport was
revoked by the US Department of State.
Hence, respondent (petitioner Tabasa) is now
an undocumented and undesirable alien and
may be summarily deported pursuant to Law
and Intelligence Instructions No. 53.
Petitioner’s passport was revoked due to
federal charges filed against him. Federal
charges are as follows:
In possession of a firearm and one count of
sexual battery (all in violation of the California
Penal Code)
Upon revocation of petitioner’s passport, he
loses the privilege to remain in the country.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for
habeas corpus. That he was not afforded due
process; that no warrant of arrest for
deportation may be issued by immigration
authorities before a final order of deportation
is made; that no notice of the cancellation of
his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy;
that he is entitled to admission or to a change
of his immigration status as a non-quota
immigrant because he is married to a Filipino
citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph
(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940;
and that he was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization
when he was seven years old due to the
naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in
1968. At the time Tabasa filed the petition, he
was 35 years old.
Tabasa then filed a supplementary petition
alleging that he has acquired Filipino
citizenship by repatriation in accordance with
RA 8171 and because he is now a Filipino
citizen, he can no longer be deported.
CA denied the petition on the grounds that he
had only acquired citizenship to escape from
the federal charges filed against him by the US
and that he has not successfully acquired
citizenship because he does not fall under any
of the requirements under RA 8171.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner has the privilege reacquire
Filipino citizenship through RA 8171.
RULING:
Petition is not meritorious.
RA 8171 provides repatriation to two classes
of persons:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-
born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
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citizenship, including their minor children, on
account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner does not fall under RA 8171 because
what is referred in the second class of persons
privileged with repatriation refers to his father.
Even if the Court would concede that petitioner
can avail the benefit of RA 8171, he failed to
follow procedure for reacquisition.
Procedure for reacquisition through
repatriation is as follows:
SECTION 1. Composition. — The composition
of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as
Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director-General of the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as
members, shall remain as constituted.
SECTION 2. Procedure. — Any person desirous
of repatriating or reacquiring
Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 8171
shall file a petition with the
Special Committee on Naturalization which
shall process the same. If their applications are
approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
after which they shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation
shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration (emphasis supplied).
SECTION 3. Implementing Rules. — The
Special Committee is hereby authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations and
prescribe the appropriate forms and the
required fees for the processing of petitions.
SECTION 4. Effectivity . — This Administrative
Order shall take effect immediately.
Petitioner only took the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines then executed
an affidavit of repatriation which he registered
together with his birth certificate with the
office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The
said office issued him a certificate of such
registration.
39 Altarejos vs. COMELEC, Nov. 10, 2004
FACTS:
Private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and
Vernon Versoza filed to the COMELEC a
petition to disqualify and to deny due course
or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
petitioner on the ground that he is not a
Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy
that he was not a permanent resident of or
immigrant to a foreign country.
Petitioner object that he did not commit false
representation in his application for candidacy
as mayor because he was already issued a
Certificate of Repatriation by the Special
Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a
petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic
Act No. 8171.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were
required to submit their Memoranda within
three days. Private respondents filed their
Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one
within the required period. Petitioner,
however, filed a Reply Memorandum
subsequently.
Atty. Zaragoza, Jr hearing officer of this case
recommended that petitioner Altarejos be
disqualified from being a candidate for the
position of mayor.
Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran
and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues
that if there was delay in the registration of his
Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of
Immigration and with the proper civil registry,
the same was brought about by the inaction on
the part of said offices since the records of the
Special Committee on Naturalization show that
his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of
Allegiance have long been transmitted to said
offices.
ISSUE:
When does the citizenship qualification of a
candidate for an elective office apply?
RULING:
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the
Court ruled that the citizenship qualification
must be construed as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term. The Court, through Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code,
(a)n elective local official must be:
a citizen of the Philippines;
a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province x x x where he
intends to be elected;
a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election;
able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.
In addition, candidates for the position of
governor x x x must be at least twenty-three
(23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law
does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist
of at least one year’s residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least
twenty-three years of age on election day).
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Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that
the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to
the date of the filing of his application. In said
case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 725, which took
effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein
declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was
a curative statute, which is retroactive in
nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldos
repatriation to the date of filing of his
application was justified by the Court, thus:
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this
case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past
events i.e., situations and transactions
existing even before the law came into being
in order to benefit the greatest number of
former Filipinos possible thereby enabling
them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally
guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest
effect and expression, then there is all the
more reason to have the law apply in a
retroactive or retrospective manner to
situations, events and transactions
subsequent to the passage of such law. That
is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x
can and should be made to take effect as of
date of his application. As earlier mentioned,
there is nothing in the law that would bar this
or would show a contrary intention on the part
of the legislative authority; and there is no
showing that damage or prejudice to anyone,
or anything unjust or injurious would result
from giving retroactivity to his repatriation.
Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of
some constitutional guaranty.
Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date
he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was,
therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty
position in the government in the May 10,
2004 elections.
41
NATURALIZED CITIZENS CANNOT HAVE
DUAL CITIZENSHIP
40 Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners are successful applicants for
recognition of Philippine citizenship under
Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of
2003 (R.A. 9225). The Citizenship Retention
and Re‑Acquisition Act accords to such
applicants the right of suffrage, among others.
Long before the May 10, 2004 national and
local elections, petitioners sought registration
and certification as "overseas absentee voter"
under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003 (R.A. 9189). The COMELEC advised that
the applicants do not have the right to vote in
such elections because they lack the one-year
residence requirement prescribed by the
Constitution for regular voters. The COMELEC
argued that dual citizens under the Citizenship
Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act must first
establish their domicile in the Philippines
through positive acts before they can avail of
themselves of the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners and others who
retained and / or reacquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as
absentee voter under the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act.
RULING:
The Court granted the petition that those who
retain or re‑acquire Philippine citizenship under
the Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition
Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225), may
exercise the right to vote under the system of
absentee voting according to the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (Republic Act No.
9189).
Section 5, Paragraph 1 of the R.A. 9225 states
that “Those intending to exercise their right of
suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
"The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003"
and other existing laws.
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law
requiring dual citizens to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines
first before they can exercise their right to
vote. On the contrary, the law acknowledged
that dual citizens are most likely non-residents
and granted them the same right of suffrage
as that granted an absentee voter under the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act. The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act, in essence, aims to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas
Filipinos who, save for the residency
requirements, are qualified to vote as an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions.
Lopez vs. COMELEC, GR No. 182701, July
23, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a
candidate for the position of Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City
held on October 29, 2007. He was eventually
declared the winner.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva
filed a petition before the Provincial Election
Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for
the disqualification of Lopez because he was
ineligible from running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by
virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003. He said, he possessed
all the qualifications to run for Barangay
Chairman.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the
Resolution granting the petition for
disqualification of Lopez from running as
Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able
to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez
should have made a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, Lopez resorted to petition for
certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion
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on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The
him from running and assuming the office of Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an
Barangay Chairman. Order of Approval of petitioner’s request, and
on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of
ISSUE: Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
Whether or not there was grave abuse of before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27
discretion on the part of the COMELEC for September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration
disqualifying petitioner. issued and Identification Certificate,
recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the
RULING: Philippines.
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the
petition. The COMELEC committed no grave Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner
abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
elections of 2007. Catarman, Camiguin.
Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately
sought American citizenship and renounced his In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National
Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual and Local Elections were held. Petitioner
citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship. garnered the highest number of votes for the
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the position of Vice Mayor.
conditions before those who re-acquired
Filipino citizenship may run for a public office
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second
in the Philippines.
Division finally issued its Resolution11
Section 5 of the said law states:
disqualifying the petitioner from running for
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire
Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
renunciation of his US citizenship
full civil and political rights and be subject to
all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the ISSUE:
Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Whether or not petitioner has validly complied
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time the citizenship requirement as required by law
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, for persons seeking public office.
make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Lopez was able to regain his Filipino RULING:
Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship
Law when he took his oath of allegiance before
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner,
the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
General’s Office in Los Angeles, California; the
Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG
same is not enough to allow him to run for a
and his Certificate of Candidacy do not
public office.
substantially comply with the requirement
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American
of a personal and sworn renunciation of
citizenship as proven by the absence of an
foreign citizenship, because these are distinct
affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this
requirements to be complied with for different
Commission to believe that he failed to comply
purposes.
with the positive mandate of law.

42 Jacot vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179848, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires
November 27, 2008 that natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
who are already naturalized citizens of a
foreign country, must take the following oath
FACTS:
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
to reacquire or retain their Philippine
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the citizenship.
Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the ,
affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted
the COMELEC Second Division, disqualifying
provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the
him from running for the position of Vice-
Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his
Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
2007 National and Local Elections, on the
ground that he failed to make a personal
renouncement of his US citizenship. The law categorically requires persons seeking
elective public office, who either retained their
Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the
it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation
Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen
of any and all foreign citizenship before a
of the US on 13 December 1989. Petitioner
public officer authorized to administer an oath
sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
simultaneous with or before the filing of the
under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known
certificate of candidacy.
as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225
compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
He filed a request for the administration of his
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines with the Philippine Consulate
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who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section
3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in
the Philippines,
to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates
of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections.
43 Maquiling vs. COMELEC, GR No. 195649,
April 16, 2013
FACTS:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent on May
10, 2013 and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of
the local officials elected in the May 2010
elections has already ended on June 30, 2010.
Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his
term of office. While the relief sought can no
longer be granted, ruling on the motion for
reconsideration is important as it will either
affirm the validity of Arnados election or affirm
that Arnado never qualified to run for public
office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to
support his plea for the reversal of this Courts
Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he
presented his accomplishments as the Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated
that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not
only twice but six times. It must be stressed,
however, that the relevant question is the
efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign
citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Neither do his accomplishments as mayor
affect the question before this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen can run for a
local elective position?
RULING:
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
dual citizens are ineligible for local public office
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for local
elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a
passport is a positive declaration that one is a
citizen of the country which issued the
passport, or that a passport proves that the
country which issued it recognizes the person
named therein as its national.
It must be emphasized that COMELEC First
Division found that Arnado used his U.S.
Passport at least six times after he renounced
his American citizenship. This was debunked
by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that
Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times,
and which agreed with Arnados claim that he
only used his U.S. passport on those occasions
because his Philippine passport was not yet
issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that
Arnado was able to prove that he used his
Philippine passport for his travels on the
following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January
2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May
2010, and 4 June 2010.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use
of the US passport was because to his
knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet
issued to him for his use."This conclusion,
however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado
claims that his Philippine passport was issued
on 18 June 2009. The records show that he
continued to use his U.S. passport even after
he already received his Philippine passport.
Arnados travel records show that he presented
his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21
January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These
facts were never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is
based on a misapprehension of the facts that
the use of the U.S. passport was discontinued
when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport.
Arnados continued use of his U.S. passport
cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary
to what the dissent wants us to believe.
It must be stressed that what is at stake here
is the principle that only those who are
exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for
public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish
to run for public office to renounce their
foreign citizenship and afterwards continue
using their foreign passports, we are creating
a special privilege for these dual citizens,
thereby effectively junking the prohibition in
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
44 BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to
Resume the Practice of Law, Benjamin M.
Dacanay, December 17, 2007
FACTS:
Benjamin M. Dacanay was admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1960. He migrated to Canada
to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
renounced his Philippine citizenship and
applied for Canadian citizenship to avail its free
medical program. Two years after, pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003) petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship and
intended to resume his law practice. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine
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bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship EFFECT OF REPATRIATION

in May 2004.
45 Bengzon III vs. HRET, GR No. 142840,
May 7, 2001

RULING: FACTS:

No. Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue
Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: in this case, in view of the constitutional
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for requirement that “no person shall be a
admission to the bar. – Every applicant for Member of the House of Representatives
admission as a member of the bar must be a unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
resident of the Philippines; and must produce
Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
before the Supreme Court satisfactory
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz
evidence of good moral character, and that no
enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without
charges against him, involving moral
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a
any court in the Philippines.
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be
Confidant opines that, by virtue of his Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
petitioner has again met all the qualifications among other, “rendering service to or
and has none of the disqualifications for accepting commission in the armed forces of a
membership in the bar. It recommends that he foreign country.”
be allowed to resume the practice of law in the
Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his
lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in
bar.
connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
The Constitution provides that the practice of
all professions in the Philippines shall be
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
prescribed by law. The practice of law is a
[(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost
when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
naturalization as a citizen of another country
Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of
but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA
the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was
9225. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to
elected as the Representative of the 2nd
practice the legal profession in the Philippines
District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship
won over petitioner Bengson who was then
pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with
running for reelection.
the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice." Stated otherwise,
before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
his law practice, he must first secure from this claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become
Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
(a) the updating and payment in full of the
annual membership dues in the IBP;
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the
petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz
(b) the payment of professional tax;
the duly elected Representative in the said
election.
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours
of mandatory continuing legal education; this
is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments ISSUE:
and
WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will an American citizen, can still be considered a
not only remind him of his duties and natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of Philippine citizenship.
the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
RULING:
Compliance with these conditions will restore
his good standing as a member of the Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship
Philippine bar. may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63
enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine

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citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;
and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will
be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of
the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of
allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-
born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
ISSUES ON CITIZENSHIP
46 Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private
Respondent Eduardo Manzano were
candidates for Vice Mayor in Makati on the May
11 1998 Elections. Manzano won on the count
of 103,853 votes while Ernesto Mercado placed
second on the vote count of 100,894.
However, the proclamation of winner was
suspended in lieu of a pending petition who
alleged the Private Respondent to be a US
Citizen and not of the Philippines.
Division of Comelec granted the petition and
ordered the cancellation of Private
Respondent’s candidacy on the grounds that
he has dual citizenship, and that under section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, those
holding dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.
Private respondent was a son of both Filipino
citizens who were residing in San Francisco,
California, on which the United States follow
Jus Soli or Citizenship on the basis of the birth
place. On filing his candidacy on April 27 1998,
Private Respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration no. B-31632 and alleged that he
is a Filipino Citizen because he was born on
1955 of a Fil Father and Fil Mother on San
Francisco, California.
ISSUE:
Is the Private Respondent a dual citizen and
thus, makes him incapable to run for public
office?
RULING:
He was a Natural Born Filipino citizen by
operation of the 1935 Constitution as his
mother and father were Filipinos at time of his
birth. At the age of 6 Private Respondent, was
brought to the PH by his parents using a US
passport as traveling document and registered
him an alien with the PH Bureau of
Immigration. However, this did not cause him
the loss of his PH citizenship because he did
not sworn allegiance to the US nor did he
renounce his Filipino Citizenship.
Private Respondent registered himself as a
voter on his age of majority and voted on the
1992, 1995, and 1998 elections. Which
effectively renounced his US citizenship under
American law. Under PH law, he was no longer
an American citizen.
The question was not of dual citizenship but of
DUAL ALLEGIANCE, wherein dual allegiance
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refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While Dual
Citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual volition.
Thus, by registering himself to vote and by
filing and signing a certificate of candidacy,
wherein every certificate contains an oath of
allegiance Private Respondent renounced his
US Citizenship.
47 Lopez vs. COMELEC, GR No. 182701, July
23, 2008
Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a
candidate for the position of Barangay
Chairman of Brgy. Bagacay, San Dionisio,
Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on
October 29, 2007 without first making a
personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. He was eventually declared the
winner.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva
filed a petition before the Provincial Election
Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for
the disqualification of Lopez because he was
ineligible from running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by
virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003. He said he possessed
all the qualifications to run for Barangay
Chairman.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the
Resolution granting the petition for
disqualification of Lopez from running as
Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able
to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez
should have made a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
48
His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, Lopez resorted to petition for
certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying
him from running and assuming the office of
Barangay Chairman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC for
disqualifying petitioner.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioner as
candidate for Chairman in the Barangay
elections of 2007. Lopez was born a Filipino but
he deliberately sought American citizenship
and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later
on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring
Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the
conditions before those who re-acquired
Filipino citizenship may run for a public office
in the Philippines.
Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
full civil and political rights and be subject to
all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Lopez was able to regain his Filipino
Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship
Law when he took his oath of allegiance before
the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General’s Office in Los Angeles, California; the
same is not enough to allow him to run for a
public office.
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American
citizenship as proven by the absence of an
affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this
Commission to believe that he failed to comply
with the positive mandate of law.
While it is true that the petitioner won the
elections, took his oath and began to discharge
the functions of Barangay Chairman, his
victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy.
Garnering the most number of votes does not
validate the election of a disqualified candidate
because the application of the constitutional
and statutory provisions on disqualification is
not a matter of popularity.
Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
221697, March 8, 2016
Facts:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016
elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that
her residence up to day before May 9, 2016
would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as
newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally
adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ)
and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in
1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after
her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who
was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in
2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the
Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating
medical condition, who then eventually demice
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on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job
in the US to be with her grieving mother and
finally went home for good to the Philippines
on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as
a voter and obtained a new Philippine
Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as
appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy
the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion
of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to
deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be
considered a natural born Filipino citizen since
she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical
parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The
Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on
the ground that she is in want of citizenship
and residence requirements and that she
committed misrepresentation in her COC.
ISSUE: 1) WON GRACE POE IS A NATURAL
BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES
HELD : )
1) Presumptions regarding paternity is neither
unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law.
The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole
chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said,
there is more than sufficient evidence that
petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore
a natural-born Filipino. The Solicitor General
offered official statistics from the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA that from 1965 to
1975, the total number of foreigners born in
the Philippines was 15,986 while the total
number of Filipinos born in the country was
10,558,278. The statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines in that decade is
natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. Other
circumstantial evidence of the nationality of
the petitioner's parents are the fact that she
was abandoned as an infant in a Roman
Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has
typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal
bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped
eyes and an oval face.
1) As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings
either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there
is a need to examine the intent of the framers.
All exhort the State to render social justice. Of
special consideration are several provisions in
the present charter:
Article II, Section 11 which provides that the
"State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human
rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates
Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3
which requires the State to defend the "right
of children to assistance, including proper care
and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their
development." Certainly, these provisions
contradict an intent to discriminate against
foundlings on account of their unfortunate
status.
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043
entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to
Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise
known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the
Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No.
02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all
expressly refer to "Filipino children" and
include foundlings as among Filipino children
who may be adopted.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under
international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become
part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation
1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court
as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State.
2) The Philippines has also ratified the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)
3) In 1986, the country also ratified the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and
ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child
is stateless. This grant of nationality must be
at the time of birth, and it cannot be
accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of
which require the applicant to be at least
eighteen (18) years old.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness does not
mean that their principles are not binding.
While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. This
Court noted that the Philippines had not signed
or ratified the "International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearances
in the said convention was nonetheless binding
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as a "generally accepted principle of
international law." Another case where the
number of ratifying countries was not
determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, where only
four countries had "either ratified or acceded
to" the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters" when the case was
decided in 2005. In sum, all of the
international law conventions and instruments
on the matter of nationality of foundlings were
designed to address the plight of a defenseless
class which suffers from a misfortune not of
their own making. We cannot be restrictive as
to their application if we are a country which
calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations
49 Marcos vs Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995)
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in
1995, providing that her residence in the place
was seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District
of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging
Marcos as she did not comply with the
constitutional requirement for residency as she
lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of
Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven
months to since childhood under residency.
Thus, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a
Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number
of votes in the congressional elections in the
First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed
itself and issued a second Resolution directing
that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the
highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995,
Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on
the canvass completed by the Provincial Board
of Canvassers.
Issues:
Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes,
of the First District of Leyte for a period of one
year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
Held:
1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of
Leyte for election purposes, and therefore
possessed the necessary residence
qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for
a seat in the House of Representatives for the
following reasons:
a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As
domicile, once acquired is retained until a new
one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact
of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban,
Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation
of law. This domicile was established when her
father brought his family back to Leyte.
b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof
based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a
change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have
two legal residences at the same time.
Petitioner held various residences for different
purposes during the last four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte.
c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner
lost her domicile of origin by operation of law
as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not
automatically gain the husband’s domicile.
What petitioner gained upon marriage was
actual residence. She did not lose her domicile
of origin. The term residence may mean one
thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and
quite another thing in political law. What
stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations
of husband and wife — the term residence
should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner
married the former President in 1954, she kept
her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium.
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d. Even assuming for the sake of argument
that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after
her marriage and only acquired a right to
choose a new one after her husband died,
petitioner's acts following her return to the
country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of
origin (assuming this was lost by operation of
law) as her domicile. This "choice" was
unequivocally expressed in her letters to the
Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought
the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our)
ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot,
Leyte ... to make them livable for the Marcos
family to have a home in our homeland."
Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while
living in her brother's house, an act which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to
50 Cordora vs Comelec (Feb. 19, 2009)
FACTS: In his complaint affidavit filed
before the COMELEC Law Department,
Cordora asserted that Tambunting made
false assertions. Cordora stated that
Tambunting was not eligible to run for
local public office because Tambunting
lacked the required citizenship and
residency requirements.
To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being
a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora
presented a certification from the Bureau
of Immigration which stated that, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is
an American: upon arrival in the
Philippines on 16 December 2000 and
upon departure from the Philippines on
17 June 2001. According to Cordora,
these travel dates confirmed that
Tambunting acquired American
citizenship through naturalization in
Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.
Cordora concluded:
The COMELEC Law Department
recommended the dismissal of Cordora’s
complaint against Tambunting because
Cordora failed to substantiate his charges
against Tambunting. Cordora’s reliance
on the certification of the Bureau of
Immigration that Tambunting traveled on
an American passport is not sufficient to
prove that Tambunting is an American
citizen.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
findings and the resolution of the
COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC
En Banc was convinced that Cordora
failed to support his accusation against
Tambunting by sufficient and convincing
evidence.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration
which raised the same grounds and the
same arguments in his complaint. In its
Resolution promulgated on 20 February
2007, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed
Cordora’s motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
ISSUE : WON there is Probable Cause to
Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having
Committed an Election Offense
HELD : Probable cause constitutes those
facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been
committed. Determining probable cause
is an intellectual activity premised on the
prior physical presentation or submission
of documentary or testimonial proofs
either confirming, negating or qualifying
the allegations in the complain
Tambunting does not deny that he is born
of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Neither does he deny that he
underwent the process involved in INS
Form I-130 (Petition for Relative)
because of his father’s citizenship.
Tambunting claims that because of his
parents’ differing citizenships, he is both
Filipino and American by birth. Cordora,
on the other hand, insists that
Tambunting is a naturalized American
citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s
observation that Tambunting possesses
dual citizenship. Because of the
circumstances of his birth, it was no
longer necessary for Tambunting to
undergo the naturalization process to
acquire American citizenship. The process
involved in INS Form I-130 only served to
confirm the American citizenship which
Tambunting acquired at birth. The
certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which Cordora presented
contained two trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is an American. However,
the same certification showed nine other
trips where Tambunting claimed that he
is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed
dual citizenship prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy before the 2001
elections. The fact that Tambunting had
dual citizenship did not disqualify him
from running for public office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states.
For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens
of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers
to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.
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In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the
framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization.12 Section
5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that
naturalized citizens who reacquire
Filipino citizenship and desire to run for
elective public office in the Philippines
shall "meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of filing the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to
administer an oath" aside from the oath
of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of
swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and
executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship served as the bases for our
recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and
COMELEC,13 Velasco v. COMELEC,14 and
Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which
involve natural-born Filipinos who later
became naturalized citizens of another
country and thereafter ran for elective
office in the Philippines. In the present
case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino,
did not subsequently become a Republic of the Philippines, he continued to
naturalized citizen of another country.
Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No.
9225 do not apply to him.
Cordora concluded that Tambunting
failed to meet the residency requirement
because of Tambunting’s naturalization
as an American. Cordora’s reasoning fails
because Tambunting is not a naturalized
American. Moreover, residency, for the
purpose of election laws, includes the
twin elements of the fact of residing in a
fixed place and the intention to return
there permanently,16 and is not
dependent upon citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that
Cordora failed to establish that
Tambunting indeed willfully made false
entries in his certificates of candidacy. On
the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently
proved his innocence of the charge filed
against him. Tambunting is eligible for
the office which he sought to be elected
and fulfilled the citizenship and residency
requirements prescribed by law.
51 Japson vs Comelec (Jan. 19, 2009)
Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing
before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify
and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground of material misrepresentation.
Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a
former natural-born Filipino, having been born
on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan
Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter
Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese)
and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
Ty eventually migrated to the United States of
America (USA) and became a citizen thereof.
Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25
years. When Ty filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely
represented therein that he was a resident of
Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May
2007, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.
While Ty may have applied for the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he
never actually resided in Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
for a period of one year immediately preceding
the date of election as required under Section
39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991
Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine
citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the
USA, the most recent of which was on 31
October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the
comport himself as an American citizen as
proven by his travel records. He had also failed
to renounce his foreign citizenship as required
by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as
the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
of 2003, or related laws.
Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the
COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from
running for public office and the cancellation of
the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino
who went to the USA to work and subsequently
became a naturalized American citizen. Ty
claimed, however, that prior to filing his
Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor
of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already
performed the following acts:
(1) with the enactment of Republic Act No.
9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate
General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an
application for the reacquisition of his
Philippine citizenship;
(2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles,
California, USA;
(3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport
indicating in his application that his residence
in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St.,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar. Ty's application was approved
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and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a
Philippine passport;
(4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured
and signed his Community Tax Certificate
(CTC) from the Municipality of General
Macarthur, in which he stated that his address
was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar;
(5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was
registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar;
(6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January
2007 again stating therein his address as
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on
19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship.
He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship
and renounced his American citizenship, and
he had been a resident of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more
than one year prior to the 14 May 2007
elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal
of Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and
was declared Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May
2007.
The COMELEC First Division found that Ty
complied with the requirements of Sections 3
and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired
his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public
office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that
no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to
another nation, shall govern our people and
our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Pieces of evidence revealed that Ty executed
an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz,
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on
October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in
compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover,
neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying
public office nor is in active service as
commissioned or non-commissioned officer in
the armed forces in the country of which he
was naturalized citizen
Ty did not commit material misrepresentation
in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that
he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least
one year before the elections on 14 May 2007.
It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost his
domicile in [the] Philippines when he was
naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and
subsequent acts thereof proved that he has
been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least
one (1) year before the elections held on 14
May 2007 as he represented in his certificate
of candidacy.
The petition was denied and COMELEC was in
favor of the defendant failing to obtain a
favorable resolution from the COMELEC,
Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for
Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed
grave abuse of discretion and lack of discretion
for dismissing the petition.
Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set
aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and
28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First
Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a
new resolution denying due course to or
canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to
declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar.
Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition.
According to Ty, the COMELEC already found
sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a
resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to
the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court
cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of
evidence without violating the well-entrenched
rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are
binding on the Court.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to
meet the one-year residency requirement set
by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty
candidate in the 14 May 2007 local
elections.The Court finds no merit in the
Petition at bar.
On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a
notary public. By the time he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor
of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had
already effectively renounced his American
citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine
citizenship.
The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed
orders of the COMELEC and the Court of
Appeals and annulled the election of the
respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's
immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile
and residence in the Philippines. Being a green
card holder, which was proof that he was a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United
States, and in the absence of any waiver of his
status as such before he ran for election on
January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be
disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with
the residency requirement for elective
positions.
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RULING:
Yes, the defendant solely complied the
residency requirements for elective position.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225
governs the manner in which a natural-born
Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine
citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and
liabilities under such circumstances. A close
scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it
does not at all touch on the matter of residence
of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage
of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225
imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of
such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly,
Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical
and consistent with the general intent of the
law to allow for dual citizenship.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to
stay in and never leave at all the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the
full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007
local elections so that he could be considered
a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court
has previously ruled that absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected, does not
constitute loss of residence. The Court also
notes, that even with his trips to other
countries, Ty was actually present in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12
months preceding the 14 May 2007 local
elections. Even if length of actual stay in a
place is not necessarily determinative of the
fact of residence therein, it does strongly
support and is only consistent with Ty's
avowed intent in the instant case to establish
residence/domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of
this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May
2006 only to comply with the one-year
residency requirement, so Ty could run as a
mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007
elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC, the Court did
not find anything wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an
elective post, for as long as he is able to prove
with reasonable certainty that he has effected
a change of residence for election law
purposes for the period required by law. As this
Court already found in the present case, Ty has
proven by substantial evidence that he had
established residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior
to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he
ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor
and in which he garnered the most number of
votes.
To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification,
Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving
effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions
that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this case, Japzon
failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is
ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the
instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.
52 Jalosjos vs Comelec (Oct. 19, 2010)
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in
Quezon City. He migrated to Australia when
he was eight years old and acquired Australian
citizenship. In 2008, he returned to the
Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an
oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was
issued a certificate of reacquisition of
citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and
he renounced his Australian citizenship.
Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private
Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain,
opposed the registration. COMELEC approved
the application and included Jalosjos in the
voter's list. This decision was affirmed at the
MCTC and at the RTC.
Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy
(COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for
the 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to
cancel the COC on the ground of failure to
comply with the one year residency
requirement of the Local Government Code
(LGC).
COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present
ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back
to the Philippines, he was merely a guest or
transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for
this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his
domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the
elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in
holding that petitioner did not present ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish
domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
HELD:
NO. The COMELEC is incorrect. Jalosjos has
successfully proven by his acts of renouncing
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his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil,
that he has changed his domicile to
Zamboanga Sibugay.
53
The LGC requires that a gubernatorial
candidate be a resident of the province for at
least one year before the elections. For the
purposes of election laws, the requirement of
residence is synonymous with domicile: i.e. he
must have an intention to reside in a
particulaar place, but must also have personal
presence coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
The question of residence is a question of
intention. To determine compliance with the
residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence
has laid down the following guideline:
(a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere
(b) where once established, that domicile
remains until he acquires a new one; and
(c) a person can have but one domicile at a
time.
The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin
was Quezon city. When he acquired Australian
citizenship, Australia became his domicile by
operation of law and by choice. On the other
hand, when he came to the Philippines in
November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos
did so with intent to change his domicile for
good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian
citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to
that country and reacquired his old citizenship
by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his
legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving
that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new
domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the
loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and
his domicile of choice and by operation of law
(Australia) would violate the settled maxim
that a man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere.
Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos
did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since
he has merely been staying at his brother's
house. A candidate is not required to have a
house in order to establish his residence or
domicile in that place. It is enough that he
should live there even if it be in a rented house
or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist
that the candidate own the house where he
lives would make property a qualification for
public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in
Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door
neighbors who testified that he was physically
present in Ipil, he presented correspondence
with political leaders and local and national
party mates, furthermore, he is a registered
voter by final judgement of the RTC. The court
also noted that Jalosjos has since acquired a
lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga,
Zamboanga Sibugay. This, without a doubt is
sufficient to establish his intent to set his
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Maquiling vs Comelec (April 16, 2013)
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of USA,
he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied
for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA and took the Oath of
Allegianceto the Republic of the Philippines on
10 July 2008. On the same day an order of
approval of his citizenship retention and re-
acquisition was issued in his favour.
In 2009, Arnado again took his Oath of
Allegiance to RP and executed an affidavit of
renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30
November 2009, Arnado filed his certificate of
candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del
Norte. Respondent Linog Balua, another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and presented a record
indicating that Arnado has been using his US
Passport in entering and departing the
Philippines.
COMELEC issued an order requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer. After
Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua
moved to declare him in default. In 2010
election, Arnado garnered the highest number
of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as
the winning candidate for Mayor. It was only
after his proclamation that Arnado filed his
answer. COMELEC first division ruled for his
disqualification. Petitioner Maquiling, another
candidate for mayor of Kausawagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes,
intervened in the case and filed before the
COMELEC En Banc a motion for
reconsideration claiming that the cancellation
of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of
his proclamation, him, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest lawful
votes should be proclaimed as the winner.
COMELEC En Banc held that it shall continue
with the trial and hearing. However, it
reversed and set aside the ruling of first
division and granted Arnado’s MR. Maquiling
filed the instant petition questioning the
propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run
for public office despite his continued use of a
US passport, and praying that he be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010
mayoralty race.
Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amount to undoing a renunciation earlier
made.
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Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the
use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary
act of representation as to one’s nationality
and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of Renunciation required to
qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition
Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
xxx
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to
qualify to run for a public office. He took the
Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign
citizenship. There is no question that after
performing these twin requirements required
under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003, he became eligible to run for public
office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation
under the laws of the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption does not
operate permanently and is open to attack
when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship,
the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his
citizenship to attack when, after renouncing
his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his
US passport to travel in and out of the country
before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to
determine is whether he was solely and
exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed
his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering
him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced
his foreign citizenship, and 30 November
2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his
US passport four times, actions that run
counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had
earlier executed. By using his foreign passport,
Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American, in effect declaring
before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with
all attendant rights and privileges granted by
the United States of America. The renunciation
of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that
can simply be professed at any time, only to
be violated the next day. It requires an
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship. While
the act of using a foreign passport is not one
of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also
a citizen of another country to be qualified to
run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April
2009, or just eleven days after he renounced
his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath
of Renunciation that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and
fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"
and that he "divest(s) himself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such
act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to
his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the
instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport. This
act of using a foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position.
The citizenship requirement for elective public
office is a continuing one. It must be possessed
not just at the time of the renunciation of the
foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens
the citizenship issue to attack.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It
is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant civil and political rights accorded by
the state to its citizens. It likewise demands
the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to
one’s flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded
the right of suffrage, those who seek election
or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be
deserving of the public trust. Holding public
office demands full and undivided allegiance to
the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US
passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code applies to his
situation. He is disqualified not only from
holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010
elections.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming
a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
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rendered void from the beginning. It could not
have produced any other legal effect except
that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because
he filed his answer to the petition when the
elections were conducted already and he was
already proclaimed the winner.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast
in his favor should not have been counted. This
leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes.
Therefore, the rule on succession under the
Local Government Code will not apply.
54 Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA
231
Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., (petitioner) and Ephraim
Tungol (respondent) were rival mayoralty
candidates in the Municipality of Albuquerque,
Province of Bohol in the May 14, 2007
elections. Both filed their respective
Certificates of Candidacy (COC).
On April 11, 2007, Tungol filed a Petition to
Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., contending
that Ugdoracion's declaration of eligibility for
Mayor constituted material misrepresentation
because Ugdoracion is actually a "green card"
holder or a permanent resident of the United
States of America (USA). Specifically,
Ugdoracion stated in his COC that he had
resided in Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines for
forty-one years before May 14, 2007 and he is
not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a
foreign country.
Tungol’s contention: In our jurisdiction,
domicile is equivalent to residence, and he
retained his domicile of origin (Albuquerque,
Bohol) notwithstanding his ostensible
acquisition of permanent residency in the USA.
Also, his status as a “green card” holder was
not of his own making but a mere offshoot of
a petition filed by his sister.He admitted his
intermittent travels to the USA, but only to
visit his siblings, and short working stint
thereat to cover his subsistence for the
duration of his stay.
On May 8, 2007, the COMELEC First Division
promulgated ruled to cancel Ugdoracion's COC
and remove his name from the certified list of
candidates for the position of Mayor of
Albuquerque, Bohol.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in cancelling Ugdoracion's
COC for material misrepresentation.
Ruling:
No.
The dust had long settled over the implications
of a “green card” holder status on an elective
official's qualification for public office. We ruled
in Caasi v. Court of Appeals that a Filipino
citizen's acquisition of a permanent resident
status abroad constitutes an abandonment of
his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
In short, the “green card” status in the USA is
a renunciation of one's status as a resident of
the Philippines. x x x x
Domicile is classified into
(1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by
every person at birth;
(2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon
abandonment ofthe domicile of origin; and
(3) domicile by operation of law, which the law
attributes to a person independently of his
residence or intention. x x x x
The general rule is that the domicile of origin
is not easily lost; it is lost only when there is
an actual removal or change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts
which correspond with such purpose. In the
instant case, however, Ugdoracion's
acquisition of a lawful permanent resident
status in the United States amounted to an
abandonment and renunciation of his status as
a resident of the Philippines; it constituted a
change from his domicile of origin, which was
Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of
choice, which is the USA.
The contention that Ugdoracion’s USA resident
status was acquired involuntarily, as it was
simply the result of his sister's beneficence,
does not persuade. Although immigration to
the USA through a petition filed by a family
member (sponsor) is allowed by USA
immigration laws, the petitioned party is very
much free to accept or reject the grant of
resident status. Permanent residency in the
USA is not conferred upon the unwilling; unlike
citizenship, it is not bestowed by operation of
law. To reiterate, a person can have only one
residence or domicile at any given time. x x x
x
We are not unmindful of the fact that
Ugdoracion appears to have won the election
as Mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. Sadly,
winning the election does not substitute for the
specific requirements of law on a person’s
eligibility for public office which he lacked, and
does not cure his material misrepresentation
which is a valid ground for the cancellation of
his COC.
Any false representation of material fact stated
in the certificate of candidacy shall be a ground
for cancellation thereof. Section 74, in relation
to Section 78 of the Code requires that the
facts stated in the certificate of candidacy must
be true and any false representation therein of
a material fact shall be a ground for
cancellation thereof. The false representation
contemplated by Section 78 of the Code
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pertains to material fact, and is not simply an
innocuous mistake.
The candidate’s misrepresentation in his/her
certificate of candidacy must not only refer to
a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for
elective office) but should evince a deliberate
intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. A candidate’s disqualification to run
for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation as a sole ground
for the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy. It must be made with an intention
to deceive the electorate as to one’ s
qualifications to run for public office. Winning
the elections does not substitute for the
specific requirements of law on a person’s
eligibility for public office which he lacked.
Getting the plurality of votes needed does not
cure his/her material misrepresentation. Such
misrepresentation may be used as a valid
ground for the cancellation of certificate of
candidacy.
INCORPORATION CLAUSE
55 Razon vs Tagitis G.R. No. 182498 (Dec. 3,
2009)
Razon vs. Tagitis
GR No. 182498 December 3, 2009
Facts: Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank
and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme, was last seen in Jolo,
Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong
(Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in
Jolo by boat in the early morning of October
31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga
City. They immediately checked-in at ASY
Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy
him a boat ticket for his return trip the
following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong
returned from this errand, Tagitis was no
longer around. The receptionist related that
Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30
in the afternoon and even left his room key
with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and
even sent a text message to the latter’s
Manila-based secretary who did not know of
Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she
advised Kunnong to simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and
Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP
professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow
student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On
November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn
affidavit attesting to what he knew of the
circumstances surrounding Tagitis’
disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28,
2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the
Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through
her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P.
Arcilla. The petition was directed against Lt.
Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief,
Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo
M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo
A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao,
Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force
Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners].
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA
immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set
the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and
directed the petitioners to file their verified
return within seventy-two (72) hours from
service of the writ.
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision
confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis
was an “enforced disappearance” under the
United Nations (UN) Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for writ of
amparo is proper in this case
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the
affirmative.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never
intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every
detail in stating the threatened or actual
violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other
initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course
state the ultimate facts constituting the cause
of action, omitting the evidentiary details.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on
pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition
should be to determine whether it contains the
details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of
action showing a violation of the victim’s rights
to life, liberty and security through State or
private party action. The petition should
likewise be read in its totality, rather than in
terms of its isolated component parts, to
determine if the required elements – namely,
of the disappearance, the State or private
action, and the actual or threatened violations
of the rights to life, liberty or security – are
present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites
in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances
under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of
sight after engaging in normal activities, and
thereafter was nowhere to be found despite
efforts to locate him. The petition alleged,
too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to
paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to
reliable information, police operatives were
the perpetrators of the abduction. It also
clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty
and security were violated when he was
“forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle
by a couple of burly men believed to be police
intelligence operatives,” and then taken “into
custody by the respondents’ police intelligence
operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically
by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the
police to involve and connect [him] with
different terrorist groups.”
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These allegations, in our view, properly As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings
pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s and enforced disappearances in this
knowledge about Tagitis’ disappearance, the jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
participation by agents of the State in this separately from the component criminal acts
disappearance, the failure of the State to undertaken to carry out these killings and
release Tagitis or to provide sufficient enforced disappearances and are now
information about his whereabouts, as well as penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
the actual violation of his right to special laws.
liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted
for any failure in its statement of a cause of Even without the benefit of directly applicable
action. substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances, however, the
If a defect can at all be attributed to the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under
petition, this defect is its lack of supporting its own constitutional mandate to
affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the promulgate “rules concerning the protection
Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature and enforcement of constitutional rights,
of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,”
the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule
incorporated the requirement for supporting Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood,
affidavits, with the annotation that these can we clarify once again that we do not rule on
be used as the affiant’s direct testimony. This any issue of criminal culpability for the
requirement, however, should not be read as extrajudicial killing or enforced
an absolute one that necessarily leads to the disappearance. This is an issue that requires
dismissal of the petition if not strictly criminal action before our criminal courts
followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner based on our existing penal laws. Our
has substantially complied with the intervention is in determining whether an
requirement by submitting a verified petition enforced disappearance has taken place and
sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the who is responsible or accountable for this
strict need for the sworn statement that an disappearance, and to define and impose the
affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We appropriate remedies to address it. The
note that the failure to attach the required burden for the public authorities to discharge
affidavits was fully cured when the respondent in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ
and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure
testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 that all efforts
and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and at disclosure andinvestigation are undertaken
flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, under pain of indirect contempt from this Court
even on this point, the petition cannot be when governmental efforts are less than what
faulted. the individual situations
require. The second is to address the
We reject the petitioners’ argument that the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is
respondent’s petition did not comply with the preserved and his or her liberty and security
Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule restored.
(that a prior investigation must have been
made), as the petition specifies in its Article 2 of the International Convention for
paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
companions immediately reported Tagitis’ Disappearance defined enforced
disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, disappearance as follows:
Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain
that he indeed had disappeared. The police, For the purposes of this
however, gave them the “ready answer” that Convention, “enforced
Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu disappearance” is considered
Sayyaf group or other anti-government to be the arrest, detention,
groups. The respondent also alleged in abduction or any other form
paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she of deprivation of liberty by
filed a “complaint” with the PNP Police Station agents of the State or by
in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of “an persons or groups of persons
intriguing tale” by the police that her husband acting with the authorization,
was having “a good time with another support or acquiescence of
woman.” The disappearance was alleged to the State, followed by a
have been reported, too, to no less than the refusal to acknowledge the
Governor of the ARMM, followed by the deprivation of liberty or by
respondent’s personal inquiries that yielded concealment of the fate or
the factual bases for her petition. whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which
Based on these considerations, we rule that place such a person outside
the respondent’s petition for the Writ the protection of the law.
of Amparo is sufficient in form and substance
and that the Court of Appeals had every reason
to proceed with its consideration of the case. The Convention is the first universal human
rights instrument to assert that there is a right
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the not to be subject to enforced
“writ shall cover extralegal killings and disappearance and that this right is non-
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.” derogable.
We note that although the writ specifically
covers “enforced disappearances,” this To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor
concept is neither defined nor penalized in this ratified the Convention, so that the country is
jurisdiction. not yet committed to enact any law penalizing
enforced disappearance as a crime. The
absence of a specific penal law, however, is not
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a stumbling block for action from this Court, as
heretofore mentioned; underlying every
enforced disappearance is a violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security
that the Supreme Court is mandated by the
Constitution to protect through its rule-making
powers.
As a matter of human right and fundamental
freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN
Declaration, the ban on enforced
disappearance cannot but have its effects on
the country, given our own adherence
to “generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the
land.”
We characterized “generally accepted
principles of international law” as norms of
general or customary international law that are
binding on all states. We held further:
[G]enerally accepted principles of international
law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in
international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the
combination [of] two elements: the
established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and
apsychological element known as the opinion
juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is
a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it.
57
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound
by the terms of the Convention on enforced
disappearance (or by the specific terms of the
Rome Statute) and has not formally declared
enforced disappearance as a specific crime,
the above recital shows that enforced
disappearance as a State practice has been
repudiated by the international community, so
that the ban on it is now a generally accepted
principle of international law, which we should
consider a part of the law of the land, and
which we should act upon to the extent already
allowed under our laws and the international
conventions that bind us.
PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVE NATIONALITY
56 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v.
Guatemala)
Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein vs
Guatemala)
Facts: Nottebohn (P), a German by birth, lived
in Guatemala (D) for 34 years, retaining his
German citizenship and family and business
ties with it. He however applied for
Liechtenstein (P) citizenship a month after the
outbreak of World War II. Nottebohm (P) had
no ties with Liechtenstein but intended to
remain in Guatemala. The naturalization
application was approved by Liechtenstein and
impliedly waived its three-year. After this
approval, Nottebohm (P) travelled to
Liechtenstein and upon his return to
Guatemala (D), he was refused entry because
he was deemed to be a German citizen. His
Liechtenstein citizenship was not honored.
Liechtenstein (P) thereby filed a suit before the
International Court to compel Guatemala (D)
to recognize him as one of its national.
Guatemala (D) challenged the validity of
Nottebohm’s (P) citizenship, the right of
Liechtenstein (P) to bring the action and
alleged its belief that Nottebohm (P) remained
a German national.
Issue: Must nationality be disregarded by
other states where it is clear that it was a mere
device since the nationality conferred on a
party is normally the concerns of that nation?
Ruling: NO. issues relating to citizenship are
solely the concern of the granting nation. This
is the general rule. But it does not mean that
other states will automatically accept the
conferring state’s designation unless it has
acted in conformity with the general aim of
forging a genuine bond between it and its
national aim. In this case, there was no
relationship between Liechtenstein (P) and
Nottebohm (P). the change of nationality was
merely a subterfuge mandated by the war.
Under this circumstance, Guatemala (D) was
not forced to recognize it. Dismissed.
A state putting forth a claim must establish a
locus standi for that purpose. Without
interruption and continuously from the time of
the injury to the making of an award been a
national of the state making the claim and
must not have been a national of the state
against whom the claim has been filed.
STATE IMMUNITY
Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227
SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug]
Facts: The Department of Agriculture
(petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency
entered into a contract for security services to
be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity. Pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by
Sultan Agency in the various premises of the
petitioner.
Subsequently, several guards of the Sultan
Security Agency 􏰂led a complaint for
underpayment of wages against the petitioner
and Sultan Security Agency.
Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
finding herein petitioner jointly and severally
liable with sultan Security Agency for the
payment of the money claims.
The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution,
commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and
execute the judgment against the property of
the two respondents.
A petition for injunction was filed by petitioner
before the NLRC alleging that the attachment
or seizure of its property is invalid.
Issue: WON the petitioner, a government
entity, waived its immunity from suit
Ruling:
The state may not be sued without its consent.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for
it does not say that the state may not be sued
under any circumstance. the doctrine only
conveys, "the state may not be sued without
its consent;" its clear import then is that the
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State may at times be sued. The States'
consent may be given either expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be made
through a general law or a special law.
In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the
immunity of the state from suit is found in Act
No. 3083, where the Philippine government
"consents and submits to be sued upon any
money claim involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve
as a basis of civil action between private
parties." Implied consent, on the other hand,
is conceded when the State itself commences
litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim
or when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting
party and to have divested itself of its
sovereign immunity.
Not all contracts entered into by the
government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made
between one which is executed in the exercise
of its sovereign functions and another which is
done in its proprietary capacity. The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts.
In the instant case, the petitioner has not
pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it
entered into the questioned contract; nor that
it could have, in fact, performed any act
proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private
respondents, i.e., for underpayment of wages,
holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other
items, arising from the Contract for Security
Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act
No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the
State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, . . ." Pursuant, however, to
Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as
amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No.
1445, the money claim should 􏰂first be
brought to the Commission on Audit.
58 Santos v. Santos, 92 Phil. 281
Facts: Teodora Santos and her nieces
complain that from 1945 to 1949 Leoncio
Santos collected from the Army of the USA
rentals for the use and occupation of a parcel
of land belonging to them and Leoncio Santos
in common by inheritance from their ancestor.
They also complain that they made a demand
upon Leoncio Santos to have the lot
partitioned among them but the latter refused
to do so, he having sold the lot to the
Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration who is now in possession
thereof and that the sale of the lot made by
Leoncio Santos to the Administrator of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration insofar as their
shares in the lot are concerned is null and void.
The Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration moved to dismiss the case
invoking the state’s immunity from suit.
This motion was granted on the ground that
the Civil Aeronautics Administration not being
a juridical person has no capacity to sue and
be sued and for that reason it cannot come
under the jurisdiction of the court.
Issue: WON the Civil Aeronautics
Administration waived its immunity from suit
Ruling: In the case of National Airports
Corporation v. Teodoro, the SC held that the
Civil Aeronautics Administration may be sued
and that the principle of state immunity from
suit does not apply to it.
An obligation or liability of the state created by
statute is enforceable against the officer or
agent charged with the duty to execute the
law. If there should be anything demandable
which had been paid or delivered to or
collected by officers or agents of the state
without the authority of law, the action would
not be against the state but against the
responsible officers or agents who received
what was not due the state or made the
unauthorized collection. Punishable acts or
omissions committed by officers or agents of
the state are crimes and violations of law
perpetrated by such officers or agents and not
by the state. The same postulate may be
applied to torts committed by officers or
agents of the state. Nevertheless, if, where
and when the state or its government enters
into a contract, through its officers or agents,
in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose
and pursuant to constitutional legislative
authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal
benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise
therefrom, and if the law granting the
authority to enter into such contract does not
provide for or name the officer against whom
action may be brought in the event of a breach
thereof, the state itself may be sued even
without its consent, because by entering into a
contract the sovereign state has descended to
the level of the citizen and its consent to be
sued is implied from the very act of entering
into such contract. If the dignity of the state,
the sacredness of the institution, the respect
for the government are to be preserved and
the dragging of its name in a suit to be
prevented, the legislative department should
name the officer or agent against whom the
action may be brought in the event of breach
of the contract entered into under its name
and authority. And the omission or failure of
the legislative department to do so is no
obstacle or impediment for an individual or
citizen, who is aggrieved by the breach of the
contract, to bring an action against the state
itself for the reasons already adverted to, to
wit: the descent of the sovereign state to the
level of the individual or citizen with whom it
entered into a contract and its consent to be
sued implied from the act of entering into such
contract.
59 Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349
Facts: Polyblank executed a mortgate to the
appellee, sister Albertina Kawananokoa.
Polyblank pleaded that, after execution of the
mortgage, a part of the mortgaged land had
been conveyed to them to one Damon, and by
Damon to the Territory of Hawaii, and was now
part of a public street.
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The bill originally made the territory of Hawaii
a party, but the territory demurred and the
plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before the
above plea was argued.
Polyblank’s plea was overruled, and after
answer and hearing, the decree of foreclosure
was made. The decree excepted from the sale
the land conveyed to the territory, and
directed a judgment for the sum remaining
due in case the proceeds of the sale were
insufficient to pay the debt.
Polyblank appealed from the decree and
contended that the owners of the equity of
redemption (Kawanakoa and the territory of
Hawaii) in all parts of the mortgage must be
joined, and that no deficiency judgment should
be entered until all the mortgage properties
have been sold. In aid of their contention they
argue that the territory of Hawaii is liable to
suit like a municipal corporation, irrespective
of the permission given by its statues, which
does not extend to this case.
Issue: WON the territory of Hawaii is liable for
suit.
Ruling: No. The territory could waive its
exemption and take no objection to the
proceedings. But, in the case at bar, the
territory of Hawaii did object, and the question
raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to
yield. Some doubts have been expressed as to
the source of the immunity of a sovereign
power from suit without its own permission,
but the answer has been public property since
before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan. A
sovereign is exempt from suit not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but
on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right
depends.
60 Providence Washington Insurance Co. v.
Republic of the Philippines, 29 SCRA 598
Facts: Petitioner filed appealed an order of the
lower court dismissing its suit for the non-
delivery of thirty cases of steel 􏰂les, which
cargo was insured by it against loss and
damage, naming as defendants the Republic of
the Philippines and the Bureau of Customs as
the operator of the arrastre service.
Issue: WON the Bureau of Customs is immune
from suit
Ruling: In Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc.
v. Customs Arrastre Service, the SC ruled that
The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the
machinery of the national government in the
operation of the arrastre service,. pursuant to
express legislative mandate and as a
necessary incident of its prime governmental
function, is immune from suit, there being no
statute to the contrary.
The doctrine of non-suability thus holds
undisputed sway. Its primacy appears to be
undeniable. For a suit of this character to
prosper, there must be a showing of consent
either in express terms or by implication
through the use of statutory language too plain
to be misinterpreted.
SUITS AGAINST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
61 Republic v. Domingo, 657 SCRA 621
Facts: Respondent filed 􏰂filed a Complaint for
Speci􏰂c Performance against the DPWH.
Domingo averred that he entered into seven
contracts with the DPWH Region III for the
lease of his construction equipment to said
government agency. Despite repeated
demands, Domingo asserted that the DPWH
Region III failed to pay its obligations.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondent. Thereafter, a writ of execution
was issued against DPWH.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the OSG filed a petition for annulment of
judgment of the RTC’s decision before the RTC
and averred that under the law, the statutory
representatives of the government for
purposes of litigation are either the Solicitor
General or the Legal Service Branch of the
Executive Department concerned. Since no
summons was issued to either of said
representatives, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the Republic. However, the CA
dismissed the petition.
The republic filed a petition before the SC
arguing that the service of summons upon the
DPWH Region III alone was insufficient.
According to the Republic, the applicable rule
of procedure in this case is Section 13, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court, which mandates that
when the defendant is the Republic of the
Philippines, the service of summons may be
effected on the O􏰂SG.
Issue: WON the trial court properly acquired
jurisdiction over the Republic of the Philippines
Ruling: Under Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997
Rules of Procedure, where the defendant is the
Republic of the Philippines, service of
summons must be made on the Solicitor
General.
the Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages 􏰂led by Domingo specifically named
as defendant the DPWH Region III. the DPWH
and its regional office are merely the agents of
the former (the Republic), which is the real
party in interest. Thus, as mandated by
Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the
summons in this case should have been served
on the OSG.
62 Sanders v. Veridiano G.R. No. L-46930
June 10, 1988
Facts: Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the
incident in question occurred, the special
services director of the U.S. Naval Station.
Petitioner Moreau was the commanding
officer. Private respondents were American
Citizens and both employed as gameroom
attendants in the special services department
of the base.
The private respondents were advised that
their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time.
Their reaction was to protest this conversion
and to institute grievance proceedings
conformably to the pertinent rules and
regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense.
The result was a recommendation from the
hearing officer who conducted the proceedings
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for the reinstatement of the private
respondents to permanent full-time.
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau,
Sanders disagreed with the hearing o􏰂fficer's
report and asked for the rejection of the
abovestated recommendation. Another
different letter coming from Moreau was sent
to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the
change of the private respondent's
employment status and requesting
concurrence therewith.
The private respondent 􏰂led in the CFI a
complaint for damages against the herein
petitioners claiming that letters contained
libelous imputations that had exposed them to
ridicule and caused them mental anguish.
Issue: Whether the petitioners were acting
officially or only in their private capacities
when they did the acts for which the private
respondents have sued them for damages.
Ruling: Petitioners were performing official
duties. The mere allegation that a government
functionary is being sued in his personal
capacity will not automatically remove him
from the protection of the law of public
o􏰂fficers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of
state immunity. By the same token, the mere
invocation of o􏰂fficial character will not suffice
to insulate him from suability and liability for
an act imputed to him as a personal tort
committed without or in excess of his
authority. These well-settled principles are
applicable not only to the o􏰂fficers of the local
state but also where the person sued in its
courts pertains to the government of a foreign
state, as in the present case.
The acts for which the petitioners are being
called to account were performed by them in
the discharge of their official duties. Sanders,
as director of the special services department
of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over
its personnel, including the private
respondents, and had a hand in their
employment, work assignments, discipline,
dismissal and other related matters. It is not
disputed that the letter he had written was in
fact a reply to a request from his superior, the
other petitioner, for more information
regarding the case of the private respondents.
As for Moreau, he was the immediate superior
of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval
Personnel matters involving the special
services department of the base.
63 Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing
Employees Association, 1 SCRA 340
Facts: Respondents filed a complaint against
petitioners Bureau of Printing, Salvador and
Ledesma. The complaint alleged that Salvador
and Ledesma have been engaging in unfair
labor practice by interfering with, or coercing
the employees of the Bureau of Printing,
particularly the members of the complaining
association, in the exercise of their right to
self-organization and discriminating in regard
to hire and tenure of their employment in order
to discourage them from pursuing their union
activities.
Petitioners answered that the Bureau of
Printing has no juridical personality to sue and
be sued. That said Bureau of Printing is not an
industrial concern engaged for the purpose of
gain but is an agency of the Republic
performing governmental functions.
Issue: WON the Bureau of Printing may be
sued
Ruling: The Bureau of Printing is an o􏰂ffice of
the Government. As such instrumentality of
the Government, it operates under the direct
supervision of the Executive Secretary,
O􏰂ffice of the President, and is charged with
the execution of all printing and binding,
including work incidental to those processes. It
has no corporate existence, and its
appropriations are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the
printing needs of the Government, it is
primarily a service bureau and is obviously,
not engaged in business or occupation for
pecuniary profit.
The additional work it executes for private
parties is merely incidental to its function, and
although such work may be deemed
proprietary in character, there is no showing
that the employees performing said
proprietary function are separate and distinct
from those employed in its general
governmental functions.
64 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v.
Customs Arrastre Service, 18SCRA 1120
Facts: Four cases of rotary drill parts were
shipped from abroad consigned to petitioner.
The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila and
was discharged to the custody of the Customs
Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of
Customs then handling arrastre operations
therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later
delivered to the broker of the consignee three
cases only of the shipment.
Petitioner filed a suit against the Customs
Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to
recover the value of the undelivered case.
The defendants 􏰂led a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that not being
persons under the law, defendants cannot be
sued.They also contended that not all
government entities are immune from suit;
that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator
of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is
discharging proprietary functions and as such
can be sued by private individuals.
Issue: WON the Customs Arrastre Service and
Bureau of Customs are suable
Ruling: NO. The fact that a non-corporate
government entity performs a function
proprietary in nature does not necessarily
result in its being suable. If said non-
governmental function is undertaken as an
incident to its governmental function, there is
no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity
from suit extended to such government entity.
The Bureau of Customs, is part of the
Department of Finance, with no personality of
its own apart from that of the national
government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting
lawful revenues from imported articles and all
other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges,
􏰂fines and penalties.
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Although said arrastre function may be
deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident
of the primary and governmental function of
the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the
same does not necessarily render said Bureau
liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not
perform its governmental function without
necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign
immunity, granted as to the end, should not
be denied as to the necessary means to that
end.
65 National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro,
91 Phil. 203
Corporation Law was made applicable to
National Airports Corporation. PAL paid landing
and parking fees to NAC for the use of one of
its airports. The fees were rentals due to
Capitol Subdiv, the owner of the land used by
NAC as airports. NAC was abolished and
replaced by Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Capitol Subdiv was not paid so it sued PAL
who, in turn, filed a third party complaint
against CAA. PAL argued that it paid NAC on
the belief that it was the lessee of the lands
and that its successor, CAA, should be the one
to pay Capitol Subdiv.
Solgen moved to dismiss on the ground of non-
suability
Ruling:
CAA has the general power to execute
contracts of any kind, to purchase property,
and to grant concession rights, and to charge
landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of
aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies,
and rentals for the use of any property under
its management.
The power to sue and be sued is implied from
the power to transact private business. And if
it has the power to sue and be sued on its
behalf, the CAA with greater reason should
have the power to prosecute and defend suits
for and against the NAC, having acquired all
the properties, funds and choses in action and
assumed all the liabilities of the latter.
Not all government entities, whether corporate
or non-corporate, are immune to suits.
Immunity from suits is determined by the
character of the objects for which the entity
was organized. "Suits against state agencies
with relation to matters in which they have
assumed to act in a private or non-
governmental capacity, and various suits
against certain corporations created by the
state for public purposes, but to engage in
matters partaking more of the nature of
ordinary business rather than functions of a
governmental or political character, are not
regarded as suits against the state.
The CAA comes under the category of a private
entity. Although not a body corporate it was
created, like the NAC, not to maintain a
necessary function of government, but to run
what is essentially a business, even if revenues
be not its prime objective but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the
travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise
which, far from being the exclusive prerogative
of state, may, more than the construction of
public roads, be undertaken by private
concerns.
66 Air Transport Office v. Ramos, 664 SCRA
36
Ramos discovered that a portion of his land
was being used as part of the runway of Air
Transport Office. The parties agreed to sell the
affected portion. ATO failed to pay so Ramos
filed a collection case.
ATO moved to dismiss arguing that it cannot
be sued without the State’s consent; and the
sale was entered into in the performance of its
governmental functions.
Ruling:
In Teodoro, the Court declared as proprietary
in nature the management and maintenance
of airport operations, among others. ATO as an
agency of the Government was not performing
a purely governmental or sovereign function,
but was instead involved in the management
and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an
activity that was not the exclusive prerogative
of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence,
the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity
from suit.
Suits against State agencies with relation to
matters in which they have assumed to act in
private or non-governmental capacity, and
various suits against certain corporations
created by the state for public purposes, but
to engage in matters partaking more of the
nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political
character, are not regarded as suits against
the state. The latter is true, although the state
may own stock or property of such a
corporation for by engaging in business
operations through a corporation, the state
divests itself so far of its sovereign character,
and by implication consents to suits against
the corporation
67 PNB v. CIR, 81 SCRA 314
A notice of garnishment was served on PNB.
What was sought to be garnished was the
money of the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in
Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of
respondent Court which had become final and
executory.
PNB moved to quash on the ground that the
funds subject of the garnishment "may be
public in character.”
Is PNB’s allegation that the funds “may be
public in character” enough to prevent
garnishment?
Ruling:
There was not even a categorical assertion to
that effect. It is only the possibility of its being
"public in character." The premise that the
funds could be spoken of as public in character
may be accepted in the sense that the People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation was a
government-owned entity but it does not
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follow though that they were exempt from
garnishment.
In Natl Shipyard vs CIR, a case with similar
facts, it was held that: “The allegation to the
effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public
funds of the government, and that, as such,
the same may not be garnished, attached or
levied upon, is untenable for, as a government
owned and controlled corporation. the
NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct
and separate from that of the Government.”
It is well settled that when the government
enters into commercial business, it abandons
its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other corporation. By engaging in a
particular business thru the instrumentality of
a corporation, the government divests itself
pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as
to render the corporation subject to the rules
of law governing private corporations.
68 Rayo v.CFI Bulacan, 110 SCRA 460
During a typhoon, NPC, through Chavez,
simultaneously opened all three floodgates of
the Angat Dam which resulted in the
inundation of several towns, damage to
property, and deaths.
Complaints for damage were filed. NPC
answered that it was performing a purely
governmental function in the operation of
Angat Dam, hence, it can’t be sued without the
express consent of the State.
Ruling:
NPC can be sued because its charter says so.
It is not necessary to write an extended
dissertation on whether or not the NPC
performs a governmental function with respect
to the management and operation of the Angat
Dam.
It is sufficient to say that the government has
organized a private corporation, put money in
it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any
court under its charter. As a government
owned and controlled corporation, it has a
personality of its own, distinct and separate
from that of the Government. Moreover, the
charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be
sued in any court" is without qualification on
the cause of action and accordingly it can
include a tort claim such as the one instituted
by the petitioners.
69 SSS v. Court Appeals, 120 SCRA 707
The Cruz spouses sued SSS for damages and
attorney’s fees alleging, among other things,
that SSS foreclosed the mortgage on their land
despite the fact that they had fully and
religiously paid their monthly amortizations
and had not defaulted in any payment.
Issues:
1. Is SSS immune from suit? No. Its
Charter says it can be sued.
2. May SSS be liable for torts? Yes, but
not in this case. No malice
Ruling:
SSS' charter specifically provides that it can
sue and be sued in Court. These words "sue
and be sued" embrace all civil process incident
to a legal action. So that, even assuming that
the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from
suit as an entity performing governmental
functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of
the aforecited enabling law, the Government
must be deemed to have waived immunity in
respect of the SSS, although it does not
thereby concede its liability.
In so far as it is argued that to hold the SSS
liable for damages would be to deplete the
benefit funds available for its covered
members, suffice it to say, that expenditures
of the System are not confined to the payment
of social security benefits.
In this case however, SSS should not be liable
for damages because it did not act maliciously
in foreclosing the mortgage.
The SSS was of the belief that it was acting in
the legitimate exercise of its right under the
mortgage contract in the face of irregular
payments made by private respondents, and
placed reliance on the automatic acceleration
clause in the contract.
SSS is only liable for nominal damages and
atty’s fees as there was clear negligence on the
part of SSS when they mistook the loan
account of Socorro J. Cruz for that of private
respondent Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was
called to the error, but it adamantly refused to
acknowledge its mistake.
70 Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v.
Firme, 195 SCRA 692
A dump truck owned by the Municipality of San
Fernando got into a 3-way vehicular accident
with a truck and a jeepney resulting in
injuries/deaths of some passengers. A
complaint for damages was filed against the
driver and owner of the jeepney. Jeepney then
filed a third party complaint against the
Municipality of SF and the driver of the dump
truck.
Is the Municipality liable for the tort caused
by its employee?
Ruling:
Suability depends on the consent of the state
to be sued, liability on the applicable law and
the established facts. The circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that
it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be
held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact
that the state has allowed itself to be sued.
When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant
is liable.
Municipal corporations are suable because
their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by
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them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such
entities to be sued, the State merely gives the
claimant the right to show that the defendant
was not acting in its governmental capacity
when the injury was committed or that the
case comes under the exceptions recognized
by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.
The municipality cannot be held liable for
the torts committed by its regular employee,
who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions.Hence, the death
of the passenger imposed on the municipality
no duty to pay monetary compensation.
Shauf v. CA
Petitioner Shauf a Filipino by origin and
married to an American who is a member of
the USAF applied for the vacant position of
Guidance Counselor at Clark Air Base, for
which she is eminently qualified.
She was not hired despite her credentials.
Petitioner Shauf filed a complaint for damages
against respondents Don Detwiler and
Anthony Persi for the alleged discriminatory
acts in maliciously denying her application for
the position because of her nationality and sex.
Respondents moved to dismiss on the ground
that as officers of the United States Armed
Forces performing official functions in
accordance with the powers vested in them
under the Philippine-American Military Bases
Agreement, they are immune from suit.
Ruling:
Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance
Counselor by the respondents on account of
her sex, color and origin.
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not
apply where the public official is being sued in
his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are
sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts
without authority or in excess of the powers
vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of
law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage
he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of
his authority or jurisdiction.
The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine
of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
SUITS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS
71 Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713
72 Sanders v. Veridiano G.R. No. L-46930
June 10, 1988
Respondents are American citizens employed
as gameroom attendants in the special
services department of the NAVSTA. Their
employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time.
They protested this conversion and instituted
grievance proceedings conformably to the
pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. The
hearing officer recommended reinstatement of
their full-time status plus backwages but
petitioners, who were the director and
commanding officer of the Naval base,
rejected the recommendation.
A letter purportedly corning from petitioner
Moreau as the commanding general was sent
to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the
change of the respondent's employment
status.
Respondents claimed that the letters
contained libelous imputations and filed a
complaint for damages against Petitioners.
They made it clear the petitioners were being
sued in their private capacity. Nevertheless,
petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground of
state immunity.
Ruling:
If the enforcement of the decision rendered
against the public officer will require an
affirmative act from the state, then it is a suit
against the sate.
Petitioners were performing their official
duties. As public officers, they cannot be sued
without the consent of the US who is ultimately
liable.
The acts for which the petitioners are being
called to account were performed by them in
the discharge of their official duties. Sanders,
as director of the special services department,
had supervision over its personnel, including
the respondents, and had a hand in their
employment, work assignments, discipline,
dismissal and other related matters. It is not
disputed that the letter he had written was in
fact a reply to a request from his superior, the
other petitioner, for more information
regarding the case of the respondents.
The letter dealt with the financial and
budgetary problems of the department and
contained recommendations for their solution,
including the re-designation of the
respondents There was nothing personal or
private about it. Given the official character of
the above-described letters, the petitioners
were, legally speaking, being sued as officers
of the United States government. As they have
acted on behalf of that government, and within
the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners
personally, that is responsible for their acts.
73 Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357
M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant
administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station
supervised the publication of the POD was
published daily by the US Naval Base station.
One of the regular features of the POD was the
"action line inquiry."
One article mentions a certain "Auring", herein
respondent, as a disgrace to her division and
to the Office of the Provost Marshal." The same
article explicitly implies that Auring was
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consuming and appropriating for herself
confiscated items like cigarettes and
foodstuffs. As a result of this article, Aurora
was investigated by her supervisor. Before the
article came out, respondent had been the
recipient of commendations by her superiors
for honesty in the performance of her duties.
MH Wylie wrote a letter of apology to Aurora
for the ‘inadvertent’ publication.
Aurora filed a complaint for damages.
Petitioner moved to dismiss: 1) they acted in
the performance of their official functions as
officers of the US Navy and are immune from
suit; 2) the US Naval Base is an
instrumentality of the US govt and cannot be
sued without its consent
Ruling:
Indeed, the imputation of theft in the article is
a defamation against the character and
reputation of Aurora.
Petitioners are liable in their personal
capacities. The libelous publication was ultra
vires; hence, beyond the scope of state
immunity.
The petitioners, however, were negligent
because under their direction they issued the
publication without deleting the name
"Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires
and cannot be part of official duty. It was
a tortious act which ridiculed the private
respondent. As a result of the petitioners' act,
Aurora according to the record, suffered
besmirched reputation, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation,
specially so, since the article was baseless and
false. The petitioners, alone, in their personal
capacities are liable for the damages they
caused her.
74 Lansang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 102667,
February 23, 2000
FACTS: Private respondents were allegedly
awarded a “verbal contract of lease” in 1970
by the National Parks Development Committee
(NPDC), a government initiated civic body
engaged in the development of national parks,
including Rizal Park, which are outside the
commerce of man.With the change of
government after the EDSA Revolution, the
new Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner,
sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written
notice petitioner terminated the so-called
verbal agreement with the General Assembly
of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and demanded that
the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks
it ran privately within the public park.
GABI filed an action for damages and
injunction in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
against petitioner, Villanueva, and “all persons
acting on their behalf”. The RTC later
dismissed the case because it is actually one
directed against the state which cannot be
sued without its consent. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Can there be a valid cause of action
against the petitioner for his order to terminate
the accommodation extended to GABI?
HELD: NO.
The doctrine of state immunity from suit
applies to complaints filed against public
officials for acts done in the performance of
their duties. The rule is that the suit must be
regarded as one against the state where
satisfaction of the judgment against the public
official concerned will require the state itself to
perform a positive act, such as appropriation
of the amount necessary to pay the damages
awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not
apply where the public official is charged in his
official capacity for acts that are unlawful and
injurious to the rights of others. Public officials
are not exempt, in their personal capacity,
from liability arising from acts committed in
bad faith.
We find, however, no evidence of such abuse
of authority on record. As earlier stated, Rizal
Park is beyond the commerce of man and,
thus, could not be the subject of a lease
contract. Admittedly, there was no written
contract. That private respondents were
allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in
the park was only a matter of accommodation
by the previous administrator. This being so,
also admittedly, petitioner may validly
discontinue the accommodation extended to
private respondents, who may be ejected from
the park when necessary. Private respondents
cannot and does not claim a vested right to
continue to occupy Rizal Park.
75 Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282
[1991]
FACTS:
The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated
June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 of the
Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No. 0033
which granted the motion of private
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, one of the
defendants in the civil case, to implead the
petitioner as additional party defendant in
Enrile's counterclaim in the same civil case and
denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
with the assistance of Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent
Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil
Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for
reconveyance, reversion and accounting,
restitution and damages.
After the denial of his motion to dismiss,
respondent Enrile filed his answer with
compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with
damages.
The Republic filed its reply to the answer and
motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The
motion was opposed by respondent Enrile.
On January 30, 1989, respondent
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, to wit:
"The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the
Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government
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is deferred until after trial, the grounds relied
upon not appearing to be indubitable.
On The matter of the additional parties
(Solicitor General Chavez, Ex-PCGG Chairman
Diaz, former Commissioners Doromal,
Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista), the propriety
of impleading them either under Sec. 14, Rule
6 or even under Sec. 12 as third-party
defendant requires leave of Court to determine
the propriety thereof. No such leave has been
sought. Consideration thereof cannot be
entertained at this time nor may therefore, the
Motion to Dismiss the same be considered."
(Rollo, p. 329; Annex "H", Petition)
Respondent Enrile then requested leave from
the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner
and the PCGG officials as party defendants for
lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against
him.
The motion was granted in a resolution dated
June 8, 1989, to wit:
"In respect to defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's
Manifestation and Motion dated February 23,
1989, praying for leave to implead additional
parties to his counterclaim, the Court, finding
reason in the aforesaid Manifestation and
Motion, grants leave to implead the
defendants named in the counterclaim and
admits defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's answer
with counterclaim.
This is without prejudice to the defenses which
said defendants may put forth individually or
in common, in their personal capacities or
otherwise." (Rollo, p. 27)
In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989,
respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to
reconsider the June 8, 1989 resolution. The
dispositive portion of the resolution states:
"WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration
of the Solicitor General and former PCGG
officials Ramon Diaz, Quintin Doromal,
Orlando Romero, Ramon Rodrigo and Mary
Concepcion Bautista are denied, but,
considering these motions as in the nature of
motions to dismiss counterclaim/answers,
resolution of these motions is held in abeyance
pending trial on the merits." (Rollo, p. 31)
Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their
answer to the counterclaims invoking their
immunity from suits as provided in Section 4
of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an
answer, the petitioner comes to this Court
assailing the resolutions as rendered with
grave abuse discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON impleading the petitioner as
additional party defendant in the counterclaim
filed by respondent is tenable?
HELD: Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena
correctly observed that there is no general
immunity arising solely from occupying a
public office.
The general rule is that public officials can be
held personally accountable for acts claimed to
have been performed in connection with
official duties where they have acted ultra
vires or where there is a showing of bad faith.
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the
immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is
not well-taken. A mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in
the charges being automatically dropped.
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize
irresponsibility and non-accountability nor
grant a privileged status not claimed by any
other official of the Republic.
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as
Solicitor General, acts in bad faith, or, as
contended by the private respondent,
"maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG
commissioners in persecuting respondent
Enrile by filing against him an evidently
baseless suit in derogation of the latter's
constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p.
417), there can be no question that a
complaint for damages may be filed against
him. High position in government does not
confer a license to persecute or recklessly
injure another. The actions governed by
Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on
Human Relations may be taken against public
officers or private citizens alike. The issue is
not the right of respondent Enrile to file an
action for damages. He has the right. The
issue is whether or not that action must be
filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case
filed against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we rule
that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile
for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
arising from the filing of an alleged harassment
suit with malice and evident bad faith do not
constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To
vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a
separate and distinct civil action for damages
against the Solicitor General.
76 Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124,
March 19, 1993, En Banc [Campos, Jr.]
FACTS: Farmer-rallyists(KMP), led by its
national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented
their problems and demands, among which
were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b)
zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c)
stop amortizations of land payments; There
was a marchers-police confrontation which
resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores
were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino
issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola
Commission for the purpose of conducting an
investigation. The most significant
recommendation of the Commission was for
the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims
to be compensated by the government. Based
on such recommendation, the victims of
Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages
against the Republic and the military/police
officers involved in the incident.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not there is a valid
waiver of immunity(2) Whether or not the
State is liable for damages
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HELD: The Court held that there was no valid
waiver of immunity as claimed by the
petitioners. The recommendation made by the
Commission to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased and the victims does not in any way
mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11
merely states the purpose of the creation of
the Commission and, therefore, whatever is
the finding of the Commission only serves as
the basis for a cause of action in the event any
party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the
recommendation of the Commission does not
in any way bind the State. The State cannot be
made liable because the military/police officers
who allegedly were responsible for the death
and injuries suffered by the marchers acted
beyond the scope of their authority. It is a
settled rule that the State as a person can
commit no wrong. The military and police
officers who were responsible for the atrocities
can be held personally liable for damages as
they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts
cannot be considered official.
IS THE RULE THAT THE STATE MAY NOT
BE SUED AT ALL, ABSOLUTE?
77 Merit v. Gov’t. of P.I., 34 Phil. 311
FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along
Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by
the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit
sustained severe injuries rendering him unable
to return to work. The legislature later enacted
Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit
against the Government in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After
trial, the lower court held that the collision was
due to the negligence of the driver of the
ambulance. It then determined the amount of
damages and ordered the government to pay
the same.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act
2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or
did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent
act of the driver of the ambulance?
HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or
create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself
to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its
right to interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when
it acts through a special agent, but not when
the damage should have been caused by the
official to whom properly it pertained to do the
act performed. A special agent is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office if he is a special official. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent
who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office
and which are regulated by law and the
regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not a special agent; thus
the Government is not liable
78 Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping, G.R. No.
L‑6060, September 30, 1950
FACTS: For various reasons, among them the
non-payment of installments the Shipping
Commission cancelled its contract of sale with
Fernando Froilan, took possession of the
vessel FS-197 then chartered and delivered
the vessel in question to defendant-appellant
Pan Oriental Shipping Company.
ISSUE: WON the lowe court erred in dismission
the counterclaim on the ground of alleged lack
of jurisdiction over the intervenor Republic of
the Philippines
HELD: Yes. By filing its complaint in
intervention, the Government in effect waived
its right to non-suability.
79 Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227
SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug]
FACTS:
On April 1, 1989, the Department of
Agriculture (DoA) office in Cagayan de Oro and
Sultan Security Agency (SSA) entered into a
contract where the latter was to provide
security services to the former. On September
13, 1990, several guards from SSA filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, non-
payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday
pay, as well as for damages, against DoA and
SSA. Both the DoA and SSA were subsequently
found guilty by the Executive Labor Arbiter,
which also held both of them liable for the
payment of money claims amounting to
P266,483.91.
On July 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a
writ of execution. As a response, the DoA filed
a petition for injunction, prohibition, and
mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of
injunction, before the NLRC. The DoA's petition
was dismissed.
Following the dismissal of its petition before
the NLRC, DoA filed a petition before the SC
arguing that: (a) it was COA, not NLRC, that
was supposed to have jurisdiction over money
claims against the Government pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 327 as amended by PD
No. 1445; and (b) that NLRC had disregarded
the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the
State.
ISSUES:
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1. Whether or not it was COA that has
exclusive jurisdiction over money claims
80
against the Government.
2. Whether or not DoA, as an agency of the
State, is covered by the principle of the non-
suability of the State.
HELD:
1. Yes, the Court ruled that money claims
against the Government should be filed before
the Commission on Audit pursuant to CA Act
No. 327 as amended by PD No. 1445. In the
instant case, underpayment of wages, holiday
pay, overtime pay, and other similar items
arising from the Contract for Service clearly
constitute money claims. As such, the writ of
execution issued by the Labor Arbiter and the
resolution issued by NLRC were reversed by
the Court in favor of DoA.
2. No, DoA cannot use the principle of non-
suability of the State as an excuse not to be
sued.
Section 3, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution
states that "the State may not be sued without
its consent." This principle reflects a
recognition of the sovereign character of the
State and an express affirmation of the
unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of the courts. As per Justice
Holmes, a sovereign State is exempt from
suits "not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends."
However, this privilege is not absolute; with its
consent, the State can be sued.
The Court clarifies that there are two kinds of
consent: (1) express consent, which may be
made either through a general law or a special
law; and (2) implied consent, which is
conceded when the State either commences
litigation or enters into a contract.
But entering into a contract does not
automatically mean the State can be sued.
Once again, the Court clarifies that contracts
or agreements that constitute sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) cannot be the
subject of any lawsuit, while private,
commercial, and proprietary acts (jure
gestionisis) can be made the subject of
litigation.
In the instant case, express consent was
provided for by Act No. 3083, which states that
"the Philippine government consents and
submits to be sued upon any money claims
involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil action between private parties."
And as cited earlier, money claims against the
Government should be filed before the
Commission on Audit.
At the same time, it is inarguable that DoA's
contract with SSA was clearly a proprietary
act, which essentially means that DoA cannot
invoke the principle of the non-suability of the
State.
EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar, 354
SCRA 566, March 16, 2001
FACTS:
In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement
(MHS), through the BLISS Development
Corporation, intiated a housing project on a
government property along the east bank of
Manggahan Floodway in Pasig.
The MHS entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public
Works and Highways (MPWH) where the latter
undertook to develop the housing site and
construct thereon 145 housing units.
By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual
contracts with petitioners EPG, Ciper, Septa,
Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction, World
Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders,
and De Leon Araneta Construction for the
construction of the housing units. Under the
contracts, the scope of construction and
funding covered only around "2/3 of each
housing unit". Petitioners agreed to undertake
and perform "additional constructions" for the
completion of the housing units despite the
fact that there was only a verbal promise, and
not a written contract, by the MPWH
Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional
funds will be available and forthcoming.
Unpaid balance for the additional constructions
amounted to P5,918,315.63. Upon a demand
letter from the petitioners, on November 14,
1988, DPWH Asst. Secretary Madamba opined
that payment of petitioners' money claims
should be based on quantum meruit (what one
has earned) and should be forwarded to the
Commission on Audit (COA).
In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget
and Management dated December 20, 1994,
the amount of P5,819,316.00 was then
released for the payment of the petitioners'
money claims under Advise of Allotment No.
A4-1303-04-41-303. In an indorsement dated
December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew
the money claims to the DPWH. In a letter
dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary
Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money
claims.
Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch
226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the
respondent to pay petitioners their money
claims plus damages and attorney's fees. In
addition the lower court denied the petition on
February 18, 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts
between the petitioners and then
Undersecretary Canlas should be upheld?
Whether or not the State is immune from suit?
HOLDING:
While the court agrees with the respondent
that the implied contracts are void, in view of
violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and
lack of legal requirements, it still finds merit in
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the instant petition. The illegality of the
implied contracts proceeds from an express
declaration or prohibition by law, not from any
intrinsic illegality. “Iin the interest of
substantial justice," petitioners-contractors'
right to be compensated is upheld, applying
the principle of quantum meruit. Even the
DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends
their compensation; even the DPWH Auditor
did not object to the payment of the money
claims
The respondent may not conveniently hide
under the State's cloak of invincibility against
suit, considering that this principle yields to
certain settled exceptions. The State's
immunity cannot serve as an instrument
perpetrating injustice.
81 Ministerio v. CFI, G.R. No. L-31635 August
31, 1971
FACTS:
Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April
13, 1966, sought the payment of just
compensation for a registered lot, containing
an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that
in 1927 the National Government through its
authorized representatives took physical and
material possession of it and used it for the
widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national
road, Cebu City, without paying just
compensation and without any agreement,
either written or verbal. There was an
allegation of repeated demands for the
payment of its price or return of its possession,
but defendants Public Highway Commissioner
and the Auditor General refused to restore its
possession. It was further alleged that on
August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of
the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90,
appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot
No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a
total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the
complaint was amended on June 30, 1966 in
the sense that the remedy prayed for was in
the alternative, either the restoration of
possession or the payment of the just
compensation.
In the answer filed by defendants, now
respondents, through the then Solicitor
General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P.
Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was
that the suit in reality was one against the
government and therefore should be
dismissed, no consent having been shown.
Then on July 11, 1969, the parties submitted
a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the
plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 647-
B of the Banilad estate described in the Survey
plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more
particularly described in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045
square meters; That the National Government
in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad
estate, and used the same for the widening of
Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal
Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution
No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot
No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That
Lot No. 647-B is still in the possession of the
National Government the same being utilized
as part of the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and
that the National Government has not as yet
paid the value of the land which is being
utilized for public use."
The lower court dismissed the complaint on
January 30, 1969 stating that the case is
undoubtedly against the National Government
and there is now showing that the Government
has not consented to be sued in this case. The
petitioners appealed by certiorari to review the
decision and contended that they are entitled
for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1
(2) of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of Cebu
to dismiss the complaint by reason
Government immunity from suit correct?
HELD:
NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit cannot be an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. If there
were an observance of procedural regularity,
petitioners would not be in sad plaint they are
now. It is unthinkable then that precisely there
was a failure on what the law requires and the
petitioners has the right to demand from the
Government what is due to them. The
Supreme Court decided that the lower court’s
decision of dismissing the complaint is
reversed and the case remanded to the lower
court for proceedings in accordance with law.
RESTRICTIVE DOCTRINE OF STATE
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
82 Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227
SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug]
"The traditional rule of immunity exempts a
State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule
is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States.
However, the rules of International Law are
not petrified; they are constantly developing
and evolving. And because the activities of
states havemultiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them - between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis) The result is that State immunity
now extends only to acts jure imperii. The
restrictive application of State immunity is now
the rule in the United States, the United
Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.
The restrictive application of State immunity is
proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of
an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when
it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contracts relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
the projects are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both
the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of
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the highest order; they are not utilized for nor In this case, the projects are an integral part
dedicated to commercial or business of the naval base which is devoted to the
purposes." defense of the USA and Philippines which is,
indisputably, a function of the government. As
In the instant case, the Department of such, by virtue of state immunity, the courts
Agriculture has not pretended to have of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the
assumed a capacity apart from its being a case for the US government has not given
governmental entity when it entered into the consent to the filing of this suit.
questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in 84 U.S. vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
character.
FACTS:
But, be that as it may, the claims of private
The cases have been consolidated because
respondents, i.e., for underpayment of wages,
they all involve the doctrine of state immunity.
holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other
In GR No. 76607, private respondents
items, arising from the Contract for Security
regarding suing several officers of the US Air
Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act
Force in connection with the bidding for
No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the
barbering services in Clark Air Base. In GR No.
State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim
80018, Luis Bautista was arrested following a
involving liability arising from contract,
buy-bust operation for a violation of the
express or implied, x x x" Pursuant, however,
Dangerous Drugs Act. Bautista then filed a
to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as
complaint for damages claiming that because
amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No.
of the acts of the respondents, he lost his job.
1445, the money claim should first be brought
In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a
to the Commission on Audit.
complaint for damages against petitioner for
his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force. In GR
No. 80258, complaint for damage was filed by
83 United States of America v. Ruiz (136 the respondents against petitioners for injuries
SCRA 487) allegedly sustained by plaintiffs. All cases
invoke the doctrine of state immunity as a
FACTS: ground to dismiss the same.
Sometime in May 1972, the United States
invited the submission of bids for certain naval
projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc.
responded to the invitation and submitted ISSUE:
bids. Subsequently, the company received two
telegrams requesting it to confirm its price. In Are the petitioners immune from suit?
June 1972, the company received a letter
which said that the company did not qualify to
receive an award for the projects. The
company then sued the United States of RULING:
America and individual petitioners demanding
It is clear that the petitioners in GR No. 80018
that the company perform the work on the
were acting in the exercise of their official
projects, or for the petitioners to pay damages
functions. They cannot be directly impleaded
and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to
for the US government has not given its
restrain the petitioners from entering into
consent to be sued. In GR No. 79470,
contracts with third parties concerning the
petitioners are not immune because
project.
restaurants are commercial enterprises,
however, the claim of damages by Genove
ISSUE:
cannot be allowed on the strength of the
Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
evidence presented. Barber shops are also
commercial enterprises operated by private
RULING:
persons, thus, petitioners in GR No. 76607
No, the court has no jurisdiction over the case.
cannot plead any immunity from the complaint
The rule of State immunity exempts a State
filed. In GR No. 80258, the respondent court
from being sued in the courts of another state
will have to receive the evidence of the alleged
without its consent or waiver. This is a
irregularity in the grant of the barbershop
necessary consequence of the principles of
concessions before it can be known in what
independence and equality of states. However,
capacity the petitioners were acting at the time
state immunity now extends only to
of the incident.
governmental acts of the state. It has been
necessary to distinguish them-between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure There is no question that the United States of
imperii) and private, commercial and America, like any other state, will be deemed
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it
that State immunity now extends only to acts has entered into a contract in its proprietary or
jure imperil. The restrictive application of private capacity. It is only when the contract
State immunity is proper only when the involves its sovereign or governmental
proceedings arise out of commercial capacity that no such waiver may be implied.
transactions of the foreign sovereign. Stated The restrictive application of State immunity is
differently, a State may be said to have proper only when the proceedings arise out of
descended to the level of an individual and can commercial transactions of the foreign
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its sovereign, its commercial activities or
consent to be sued only when it enters into economic affairs.
business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions.

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SCOPE OF PROHIBITION AGAINST SUING
THE STATE
85 Alvarez v. Commonwealth of the
Philippines, 65 Phil. 302, 313 (1938)
FACTS:
Plaintiff commenced a complaint of
interpleader alleging that they are in
possession and cultivated agricultural lands
within San Pedro Tunasan, and they will pay
rents as the court may determine to the
following parties that would be adjudged as
owner of the subject property: to
Commonwealth of the Philippines by Virtue of
Escheat, Provincial of Laguna may have
interest of the Hacienda, to Municipality of San
pedro by virtue of escheat, to the Colegio de
san Jose also claims to be the owner of the
land and Carlos young also claims to be the
owner of the land. Plaintiffs conclude by asking
that the court order the defendants or
interpleaders to litigate among themselves
over the ownership or dominion of the
hacienda and thereafter determine by
judgment who is the rightful owner thereof
entitled to collect the rental from them
Issue
May the Commonwealth of the Philippines be
impleaded as defendant in a case of
interpleader?
Ruling:
No, it cannot be impleaded as a defendant.
Speaking of the intervention of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, there is little
to be said. The question raised is already
settled in this jurisdiction. It is a fundamental
principle that the Government of the
Philippines, now the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, as the supreme authority which
represents in this country the existing
sovereignty, cannot be sued without its
consent. The prohibition holds true both in
case where it is joined as a defendant as well
as in that where, as in the present, it is being
compelled to litigate against other persons
without its consent. There is no substantial
difference between making it defend itself
against it will in a case where it is a defendant
and compelling it, without its consent, to
interplead in an action commenced by another
person. In one and the other case it is
compelled, without its consent, to maintain a
suit or litigation, and this is what the legal
principal prohibits.
86 Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v.
Firme, 195 SCRA 692
FACTS:
A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a
dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the
impact, several passengers of the jeepney
including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs
of Baniña filed a complaint for damages
against the owner and driver of the jeepney,
who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint
against the Municipality and its dump truck
driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its
answer and raised the defense of non-suability
of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor
of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and
Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Baniña.
ISSUES:
Is the municipal corporation Liable?
RULING:
The petitioner cannot be held liable. It has
already been remarked that municipal
corporations are suable because their charters
grant them the competence to sue and be
sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not
liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can
be held answerable only if it can be shown that
they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State
merely gives the claimant the right to show
that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was
committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the
claimant cannot recover. The circumstance
that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can
never be held liable if it does not first consent
to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the
defendant is liable.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck
of the municipality insists that "he was on his
way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand
and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's
municipal streets." In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed
pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that
the driver of the dump truck was performing
duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
87 UP v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, 679 SCRA
54, 23 August 2012, 1st Div. [Bersamin]
FACTS:
University of the Philippines (UP) entered into
a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern
Builders) for the construction and renovation
of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los
Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second
billing. However, the third billing worth
P273,729.47 was not paid due to its
disallowance by the Commission on Audit
(COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to
collect the unpaid balance. The RTC rendered
its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders.
Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for
execution. Consequently, the sheriff served
notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary
banks and the RTC ordered the release of the
funds.
ISSUE
May the funds of UP be validly garnished?
RULING:
No, UP's funds, being government funds, are
not subject to garnishment. UP is a
government instrumentality, performing the
States constitutional mandate of promoting
quality and accessible education. As a
government instrumentality, the UP
administers special funds sourced from the
fees and income enumerated under Act No.
1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No.
714, and from the yearly appropriations, to
achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of
Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No.
9500.. All the funds going into the possession
of the UP, including any interest accruing from
the deposit of such funds in any banking
institution, constitute a "special trust fund,"
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the disbursement of which should always be
aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and
should always be subject to auditing by the
COA. The funds of the UP are government
funds that are public in character. They include
the income accruing from the use of real
property ceded to the UP that may be spent
only for the attainment of its institutional
objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this
action could not be validly made the subject of
writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse
judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to
which it had impliedly consented was not
immediately enforceable by execution against
the UP, because suability of the State did not
necessarily mean its liability.
88 Meritt vs. Government, 31 SCRA 311, 318;
Republic vs. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84
FACTS:
Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre
Faura Street when he was bumped by the
ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit
sustained severe injuries rendering him unable
to return to work. The legislature later enacted
Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit
against the Government in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After
trial, the lower court held that the collision was
due to the negligence of the driver of the
ambulance. It then determined the amount of
damages and ordered the government to pay
the same.
ISSUES:
Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457,
simply waive its immunity from suit or did it
also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
HELD:
No, the government did not waive its liability
upon enacting 2457. As to the scope of
legislative enactments permitting individuals
to sue the state where the cause of action
arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is
“By consenting to be sued a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or
create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself
to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its
right to interpose any lawful defense”
In the case at bar, The plaintiff was authorized
to bring this action against the Government "in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of
the General Hospital and to determine the
amount of the damages. The government did
not extends its liability under 2457. Hence, the
government is not liable
SUABILITY V. LIABILITY
89 Republic v. NLRC G.R. No. 120385 October
17, 1996
FACTS
Some time in January, 1988, the sequestration
order against PNEI was lifted to give way to
the sale of its sale by the Asset Privatization
Trust which, in the meanwhile, had taken over
the management of the company. Yet, PNEI
was still continuing to suffer deterioration of its
financial condition. As a cost saving measure,
the management committee recommended for
retrenchment .This resulted to various labor
complaints filed against PNEI. NLRC rendered
a decision holding PNEI and APT liable. In an
alias writ of execution, it served a notice of
garnishment on the Land bank of the
Philippines upon all credits, interest, bank
deposits belonging to APT. The land bank
responded that since the funds of Apt, a
government owned and controlled agency,
were considered public in nature, they could
not be subject to garnishment.
ISSUE:
Can the Apt be liable for the obligations of the
PNEI?
RULING:
No, the APT cannot be liable for the obligations
of PNEI. Under our jurisdiction, he State may
not be sued without its consent is not really
absolute for it does not say that the state may
not be sued under any circumstance. In this
case, the law creating APT provides that it may
“sue or be sued”.
Nonetheless, we have likewise since explained
that suability does not necessarily mean
liability on the part of the particular
instrumentality or agency of the government;
hence When the State gives its consent to be
sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent
to an unrestrained execution against it.
Tersely put, when the State waives its
immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the
other party an opportunity to prove, if it can,
that the State has a liability. The universal rule
that where the State gives its consent to be
sued by private parties either by general law
or special law, it may limit claimant's action
only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution' and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment
is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations
of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the correspondent
appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.
90 Municipality of Hagonoy Bulacan v.
Dumdum G.R. No. 168289 March 22, 2010
Facts
It was alleged that sometime in the middle of
the year 2000, respondent, doing business as
KD Surplus was contacted by petitioner Ople.
Respondent had entered into an agreement
with petitioner municipality through Ople for
the delivery of motor vehicles, which were
supposedly needed to carry out certain
developments for the delivery of the Motor
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Vehicles. Respondent agreed to deliver from
her principal place of business in Cebu City
twenty-one motor vehicles. However, despite
having made several deliveries, Ople allegedly
did not heed respondent’s claim for payment.
The trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment directing the sheriff "to attach the
estate, real and personal properties" of
petitioners. Petitioners also filed a Motion to
Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment Already Issued,
invoking immunity of the state from suit.
ISSUE
May the writ of preliminary Attachment be
discharged?
RULING
Yes, the writ of preliminary attachment may be
discharged.
Be that as it may, a difference lies between
suability and liability. As held in City of
Caloocan v. Allarde, where the suability of the
state is conceded and by which liability is
ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to
determine for itself whether to satisfy the
judgment or not. Execution may not issue
upon such judgment, because statutes waiving
non-suability do not authorize the seizure of
property to satisfy judgments recovered from
the action. These statutes only convey an
implication that the legislature will recognize
such judgment as final and make provisions for
its full satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be
sued is given by general or special law, the
implication thereof is limited only to the
resultant verdict on the action before
execution of the judgment. The universal rule
that where the State gives its consent to be
sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant’s action "only
up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
the stage of execution" and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations
of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the corresponding
appropriations as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects.
91 UP v. Dizon GR No. 171782, August 23,
2012
FACTS:
University of the Philippines (UP) entered into
a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern
Builders) for the construction and renovation
of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los
Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second
billing. However, the third billing worth
P273,729.47 was not paid due to its
disallowance by the Commission on Audit
(COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to
collect the unpaid balance. The RTC rendered
its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders.
Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for
execution. Consequently, the sheriff served
notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary
banks and the RTC ordered the release of the
funds.
ISSUE
May the funds of UP be validly garnished?
RULING
The funds of the UP are government funds that
are public in character. They include the
income accruing from the use of real property
ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the
attainment of its institutional objectives.
Hence, the funds subject of this action could
not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s
writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse
judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to
which it had impliedly consented was not
immediately enforceable by execution against
the UP, because suability of the State did not
necessarily mean its liability. A marked
distinction exists between suability of the
State and its liability.
A distinction should first be made between
suability and liability. "Suability depends on
the consent of the state to be sued, liability on
the applicable law and the established facts.
The circumstance that a state is suable does
not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does
not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does
waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving
the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that
the defendant is liable.
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
92 Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, January
28, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Jeffrey Liang, an economist working
with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) , was
charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong with
two counts of grave oral defamation for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against a
fellow ADB worker. Liang was arrested but
later released. The next day, the judge
received an "office of protocol" from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating
that Liang is covered by immunity from legal
process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine
Government. Based on the said protocol
communication, the judge, without notice to
the prosecution, dismissed the two criminal
cases. The RTC set aside the MeTC ruling and
ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant
of arrest it earlier issued. Liang appealed
arguing that he is covered by immunity under
the Agreement.
ISSUE:
Is Liang covered with immunity from legal
process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine
Government? - NO
RULING:
The petitioner’s case is not covered by the
immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the
petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has
no binding effect in courts. The court needs to
protect the right to due process not only of the
accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly,
the immunity under Section 45 of the
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Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts must be done in
“official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person
could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as defamation, in
the name of official duty.
Moreover, under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity
from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state
except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised
by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions. As already
mentioned above, the commission of a crime
is not part of official duty.
93 Holy See v. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524
FACTS:
Lot 5-A is registered under the name of the
petitioner The Holy See. This lot is contiguous
to lots 5-B and 5-D registered in the name of
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). These
three lots were sold through an agent Msgr.
Domingo Cirilos Jr. to Ramon Licup. Licup
assigned his rights to private respondent
Starbright Sales Ent. Inc. (SSEI).
Due to refusal of the squatters to vacate the
lots, a dispute arose as to who of the parties
has the responsibility of eviction and clearing
the land. SSEI insists that petitioner should
clear the property of the squatters. Petitioner
refused and proposed that either SSEI
undertake the eviction or that the earnest
money be returned. Msgr. Cirilos returned the
P100,000.00 earnest money, and the property
was sold to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana). SSEI
filed suit for annulment of sale, specific
performance and damages against Msgr.
Cirilos, PRC, and Tropicana. The petitioner and
Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from
suit. It was denied on the ground that
petitioner ―shed off its sovereign immunity by
entering into the business contract in question.
ISSUE:
WON the Holy See can invoke its right to
Sovereign Immunity to suit. - YES
RULING:
In the case at bar, lot 5-A was acquired as a
donation from the archdiocese of Manila for the
site of its mission or the Apostolic Nuniciature
in the Philippines. The subsequent disposal
was made because the squatters living thereon
made it impossible for petitioner to use it for
the purpose of the donation. Petitioner did not
sell lot 5-A for profit or gain.
Generally, there are two accepted concepts of
sovereignty: a) classical or absolute theory,
wherein a sovereign cannot be made as
respondent to courts of another sovereign
without its consent and; b) restrictive theory,
which puts conditions on when to recognize
immunity.
Under the restrictive theory, sovereign
immunity is only recognized with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii (or those in
pursuant to governmental functions) . If the
act is private or acts jure gestionis (those that
are for profit), then immunity cannot be
invoked.
This Court has considered the following
transactions by a foreign state with private
parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a
foreign government of apartment buildings for
use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84
Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public
bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United
States Naval Station (United States of America
v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of
employment status of base employees
(Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
On the other hand, this Court has considered
the following transactions by a foreign state
with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1)
the hiring of a cook in the recreation center,
consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a
bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop
at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to
cater to American servicemen and the general
public (United States of America v. Rodrigo,
182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for
the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base
in Angeles City (United States of America v.
Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation
of the restaurants and other facilities open to
the general public is undoubtedly for profit as
a commercial and not a governmental activity.
By entering into the employment contract with
the cook in the discharge of its proprietary
function, the United States government
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity from suit.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by
a foreign state with a private party cannot be
the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the
start of the inquiry. The logical question is
whether the foreign state is engaged in the
activity in the regular course of business. If the
foreign state is not engaged regularly in a
business or trade, the particular act or
transaction must then be tested by its nature.
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity,
or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken
for gain or profit.
In this case, the petitioner had denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of the Lot
5-A were made for profit. It claimed that it
acquired the property for its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The lot,
allegedly, was acquired by donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila for the purpose of
building official residence of Papal Nuncio.
However, when the informal settlers refused to
leave the property, the petitioner decided to
dispose the property, not for commercial
purposes. The DFA intervened as they
established in a Memorandum and Certification
the privilege of sovereign immunity of the
petitioner, stating that they are a duly
accredited diplomatic mission to the
Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and
has title to all rights, privileges and immunities
of a diplomatic mission or embassy in the
country. When the plea of immunity has been
recognized by the executive department, such
shall be conclusive to courts
94 China National Machinery Equipment
Corporation v. Sta. Maria, 665 SCRA 189
FACTS:
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In September 2002, petitioner CNMEG entered
into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
with North Luzon Railways Corp (Northrail) to
conduct a feasibility study on the construction
of a railway line from Manila to La Union
(Northrail Project). Subsequently, Export
Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and
Department of Finance entered into a MOU
whereby China will extend a preferred buyer’s
credit to the Philippines to finance the Northrail
Project. EXIM is to loan DOF $400 million
payable in 20 years with a 5-year grace period
at the rate of 3% per annum. In December
2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a
contract for the construction of Phase I of the
Northrail Project. The contract price was
pegged at $421,050,0003. The Philippine
Government then obtained a loan from EXIM
for $400,000 to finance the project.
Respondents filed a complaint for annulment
of contract, alleging that the contract was void
for being contrary to the Constitution,
Government Procurement Reform Act (RA
9184), Government Auditing Code (PD 1445),
and the Administrative Code. CNMEG filed a
Motion to Dismiss dated 12 April 2006, arguing
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction
over (a) its person, as it was an agent of the
Chinese government, making it immune from
suit.
ISSUE:
WON CNMEG is entitled to immunity - NO
RULING:
It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking,
and not the Chinese government. The
Feasibility Study was conducted not because of
any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of
sovereign functions by the Chinese
government but was plainly a business
strategy employed by CNMEG with a view to
securing this commercial enterprise.
The use of the term “state corporation” to refer
to CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as
a government-owned and/or -controlled
corporation, and its assignment as the Primary
Contractor did not imply that it was acting on
behalf of China in the performance of the
latter’s sovereign functions. To imply
otherwise would result in an absurd situation,
in which all Chinese corporations owned by the
state would be automatically considered as
performing governmental activities, even if
they are clearly engaged in commercial or
proprietary pursuits.
Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG
performs governmental functions, such claim
does not automatically vest it with immunity.
This view finds support in Malong v. Philippine
National Railways, in which this Court held that
“immunity from suit is determined by the
character of the objects for which the entity
was organized.”
In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that
CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even
if it contends that it performs governmental
functions. Its designation as the Primary
Contractor does not automatically grant it
immunity, just as the term “implementing
agency” has no precise definition for purposes
of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from
suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a
government-owned corporation, it failed to
adduce evidence that it has not consented to
be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following
this Court’s ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary,
CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-
owned and -controlled corporation without an
original charter. As a result, it has the capacity
to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the
Corporation Code.
95 JUSMAG v. NLRC, 239 SCRA 224
FACTS:
Florento Sacramento (private respondent) was
one of the 74 security assistance
supportpersonnel (SASP) working at the Joint
United States Military Assistance Group to
thePhilippines (JUSMAG- Phils.). He had been
with JUSMAG from 1969- 1992. When
dismissed, he held the position of illustrator 2
and incumbent Pres. of JUSMAG Phils.-Filipino
Civilian Employees Association, a labor org.
duly registered with DOLE. His services were
terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his
position. Sacramento filed a complaint with
DOLE on the ground that he was illegally
suspended and dismissed from service by
JUSMAG. He asked for reinstatement. JUSMAG
filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking immunity
from suit. The Labor Arbiter in an Order,
dismissed the complaint for want of
jurisdiction. Sacramento appealed to the NLRC
which reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and held that the petitioner had lost his
right not to be sued because (1) the principle
of estoppel- JUSMAG failed to refute the
existence of employer- employee relationship
(2) Jusmag has waived its right to immunity
from suit when it hired the services to private
respondent. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON JUSMAG has immunity from suit. - YES
RULING:
When JUSMAG took the services of the private
respondent, it was performing agovernmental
function in behalf of the United States
pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement
between the Phils. and the US. JUSMAG
consists of Air, Naval and Army groupand its
primary task was to advise and assist the Phils.
on air force, army and navalmatters. A suit
against JUSMAG is one against the United
States government, and in the absence of any
waiver or consent of the latter to the suit, the
complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper.
Immunity of State from suitis one of these
universally recognized principles. In
international law, "immunity" is commonly
understood as an exemption of the state and
its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of
another state. This is anchored on the principle
of the sovereign equality of states under which
one state cannot assert jurisdiction over
another in violation of the maxim par in parem
non habet imperium(an equal has no power
over an equal). As it stands now, the
application of the doctrine of immunity from
suit has been restricted to sovereign or
governmental activities and does not extend to
commercial, private and proprietary acts.
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96 World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48
SCRA 242
FACTS:
Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to
its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services. His personal
effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were
allowed free entry from duties and taxes.
Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC)
suspected that the crates “contain large
quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the
official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of
the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a
search warrant for the search and seizure of
the personal effects of Verstuyft.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo
advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is
entitled to immunity from search in respect for
his personal baggage as accorded to members
of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host
Agreement and requested that the search
warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General
accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of
the search warrant but respondent judge
nevertheless summarily denied the quashal.
Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the SC. WHO joined
Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.
ISSUE:
WON the personal effects of Verstuyft can be
exempted from search and seizure under the
diplomatic immunity. - YES
RULING:
The executive branch of the Phils has expressly
recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the
provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA
formally advised respondent judge of the
Philippine Government's official position. The
Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the
gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said
petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and
asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law
and under our system of separation of powers
that diplomatic immunity is essentially a
political question and courts should refuse to
look beyond a determination by the executive
branch of the government, and where the plea
of diplomatic immunity is recognized and
affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government, the
Solicitor General in this case, or other officer
acting under his discretion. Courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and
detention of property, as to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in
conducting foreign relations.
97 SEAFDEC v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 580
FACTS:
Two labor cases were filed by the herein
private respondents against the petitioner,
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center
(SEAFDEC), before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional
Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases,
the private respondents claim having been
wrongfully terminated from their employment
by the petitioner.
The petitioner, who claims to be an
international inter-government organization
composed of various Southeast Asian
countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged
the jurisdiction of the public respondent in
taking cognizance of the above cases.
The private respondents, as well as
respondent labor arbiter, allege that the
petitioner is not immune from suit and
assuming that if, indeed, it is an international
organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not
expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly
raising the issue of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is immune from suit. - YES
RULING:
It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC
is an international agency enjoying diplomatic
immunity. It has already been held in
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National
Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773,
206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center-
Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is
an international agency beyond the jurisdiction
of public respondent NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization,
SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD),
enjoys functional independence and freedom
from control of the state in whose territory its
office is located. One of the basic immunities
of an international organization is immunity
from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune
from the legal writs and processes issued by
the tribunals of the country where it is found.
The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations
or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such
objection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its
member-states.
EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
98 Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 323
FACTS:
The President issued EO 22 - prohibiting the
use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the EO 66
and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a
response for the general clamor among the
majority of people living in the coastal towns
of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of
the area are in danger of major depletion
because of the effects of trawl fishing.
A group of Otter trawl operators took the
matter to the court by filing a complaint for
injunction and/or declaratory relief with
preliminary injunction with the Court of First
Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No.
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24867, praying that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Director of Fisheries from enforcing said
executive order; to declare the same null and
void, and for such other relief as may be just
and equitable in the premises.
ISSUE: Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66
and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was
not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly
delegated to the President.
RULING:
Yes. As already held by this Court, the true
distinction between delegation of the power to
legislate and the conferring of authority or
discretion as to the execution of law consists
in that the former necessary involves a
discretion as to what the law shall be, while in
the latter the authority or discretion as to its
execution has to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made.
In the case of U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil.
1, We also held, the power to delegate - the
Legislature cannot delegate legislative power
to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto
itself, and it does nothing more than to
authorize the Governor-General to make rules
and regulations to carry it into effect, then the
Legislature created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid. On the
other hand, if the act within itself does not
define a crime and is not complete, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it a
law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in
the Governor-General, the act is delegation of
legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that
a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish
eggs in the waters of the Philippines and b.) it
authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions
as may be deemed necessary. The Act was
complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to
carry into effect its legislative intent. The
President did nothing but show an anxious
regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and
dispose of issues of general concern which
were in consonance and strict conformity with
law.
99 Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation v.
Pacana, 649 SCRA 196
FACTS:
On August 29, 1995, the DXWG personnel filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal, ULP, and
reimbursement of unpaid CBA benefits against
IBC and BBC. The Labor Arbiter rendered his
decision in favor of the employees and an
appeal was filed with the NLRC. The NLRC
ordered BBC to post the required appeal bond
within 10 days from receipt of said Order, with
a warning that noncompliance will cause the
dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection.
Instead of complying with the Order to post
the required bond, BBC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, alleging this time that since it
is wholly owned by the Republic of the
Philippines, it need not post an appeal bond.
The NLRC denied the motion. BBC appealed to
the CA who ruled that BBC, though owned by
the government, is a corporation with a
personality distinct from the Republic or any of
its agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore
do not partake in the latter's exemption from
the posting of appeal bonds.
ISSUE:
WON BBC is exempt from posting an appeal
bond - NO
RULING:
As a general rule, the government and.all the
attached agencies with no legal personality
distinct from the former are exempt from
posting appeal bonds, whereas government-
owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs)
are not similarly exempted. This distinction is
brought about by the very reason of the appeal
bond itself: to protect the presumptive
judgment creditor against the insolvency of
the presumptive judgment debtor. When the
State litigates, it is not required to put up an
appeal bond because it is presumed to be
always solvent.
This exemption, however, does not, as a
general rule, apply to GOCCs for the reason
that the latter has a personality distinct from
its shareholders. Thus, while a GOCCs majority
stockholder, the State, will always be
presumed solvent, the presumption does not
necessarily extend to the GOCC itself.
However, when a' GOCC becomes a
"government machinery to carry out a
declared government policy," it becomes
similarly situated as its majority stockholder as
there is the assurance that the government
will necessarily fund its primary functions.
Thus, a GOCC that is sued in relation to its
governmental functions may be, under
appropriate circumstances, exempted from
the payment of appeal fees.
In the case at bar, BBC was organized as a
private corporation, sequestered in the 1980's
and the ownership of which was subsequently
transferred to the government in a
compromise agreement. Further, it is stated in
its Amended Articles of Incorporation that BBC
has the following primary function:
To engage in commercial radio and television
broadcasting, and for this purpose, to
establish, operate and maintain such stations,
both terrestrial and satellite or interplanetary,
as may be necessary for broadcasting on a
network wide or international basis.
It is therefore crystal clear that BBC's function
is purely commercial or proprietary and not
governmental. As such, BBC cannot be
deemed entitled to an exemption from the
posting of an appeal bond.
100 Sarasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252
FACTS:
Gregorio Sarasola filed a complaint for
injunction to restrain Wenceslao Trinidad, the
Collector of Internal Revenue from the alleged
illegal collection of taxes. CIR interposed a
demurrer to the complaint stating that under
Section 1578 of the Administrative Code,
injunction is not available to restrain collection
of tax. CIR also alleged the complaint did not
entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded as
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under Section 1579, it disallows interest on the
internal revenue taxes in the sum alleged to
have been illegally collected. The judge of CFI
Manila sustained the demurrer, basing his
decision from the case of Churchill v Rafferty.
Sarasola argued that the provisions under Sec
1578-1579 are unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
102
WON interest can be imposed against the
State in cases of recovery of taxes illegally
collected - YES
103
RULING:
It is well settled both on principle and authority
that interest is not to be awarded against a
sovereign government unless its consent has
been manifested by an Act of its Legislature or
by a lawful contract of its executive officers. If
there be doubt upon the subject, that doubt
must be resolved in favor of the State. The
State never pays interest unless she expressly
engages to do so.
Taxes only draw interest as do sums of money
when expressly authorized. Interest cannot be
recovered on an abatement unless the statute
provides for it. The only contrary dictum is that
where an illegal tax has been collected, the
citizen who has paid and is obliged to bring suit
against the collector is entitled to interest from
the time of the illegal exaction. The distinction
undoubtedly arises through the fiction that the
suit is against the collector and not against the
State, although the judgment is not to be paid
by the collector but directly from the treasury.
The state is not amenable to judgments for
damages or costs without its consent. Our own
statute not only does not authorize interest but
negatives the payment of interest. The law is
valid, or that the plaintiff has not proven such
a case of irreparable injury as would warrant
the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
execution.
101 Government of the Philippine Islands v.
Monte de Pieded,G.R. No. L-9959,
December 13, 1916
Facts:
Spain paid $400,000 into the treasury of the
Philippine Islands for the relief of those
damaged by an earthquake. Upon the petition
of Monte de Piedad, an institution under the
control of the church, the Philippine
Government directed its treasurer to give
$80,000 of the relief fund in Four (4)4
installments. As a result, various petitions
were filed, including the heirs of those entitled
to the allotments. All prayed for the State to
bring suit against Monte de Piedad, and for it
to pay with interest. The Defendant appealed
since all its funds have been exhausted already
on various jewelry loans.
Issue:
Whether the government is the proper
authority to the cause of action
Ruling:
Yes. The Philippine government, as a trustee
towards the funds could maintain the action
since there has been no change of sovereignty.
The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae
of the people. These principles are based upon
public policy. The Philippine Government is not
a mere nominal party because it was
exercising its sovereign functions or powers
and was merely seeking to carry out a trust
developed upon it when the Philippine Islands
was ceded to the United States. Finally, if said
loan was for ecclesiastical pious work, then
Spain would not exercise its civil capacities
Republic v. Garcia, 679 SCRA 54
The case cannot be found both in CD Asia
and in the Syllabus
Arigo v. Swift, 735 SCRA 102 (2014)
Facts:
In 2013, the USS Guardian, a US ship, was on
its way to Indonesia when it ran aground the
northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs. Vice Admiral Scott Swift, US
7th Fleet Commander expressed regret for the
incident in a press statement. Three months
later, the US Navy-led salvage team had
finished removing the last piece of the
grounded ship from the coral reef. The
petitioners then filed this petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan against Swift
and other officials, claiming that the grounding
and salvaging operations caused and continue
to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect several provinces in the
Visayas and Mindanao. They also seek a
directive from this Court for the institution of
civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws
and regulations in connection with the
grounding incident. Only the Philippine
respondents filed a comment to the petition
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the US respondents who did
not submit any pleading or manifestation in
the case
Ruling:
No. Under the Constitution, the State may not
be sued without its consent. While the doctrine
appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of
the amount needed to pay the damages
awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself although it
has not been formally impleaded. In such a
situation, the state may move to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has been filed
without its consent. In this case, the US
respondents were sued in their official capacity
as commanding officers of the US Navy who
had control and supervision over the USS
Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the unfortunate
grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP
was committed while they were performing
official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials
will require remedial actions and appropriation
of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself. The
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principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the
persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND
STATE POLICIES
104 Espina v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143855,
September 21, 2010
Facts:
On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada
signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also
known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of
2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which
absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from
engaging in the retail trade business. R.A.
8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens,
who had lost their citizenship and now reside
in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade
business with the same rights as Filipino
citizens. On October 11, 2000 petitioners
Magtanggol T. Gunigundo I, Michael T.
Defensor, Gerardo S. Espina, Benjamin S. Lim,
Orlando Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong, Sergio
Apostol, Robert Ace S. Barbers, Enrique
Garcia, Jr., Raul M. Gonzales, Jaime Jacob,
Apolinario Lozada, Jr., Leonardo Montemayor,
Ma. Elena Palma-Gil, Prospero Pichay, Juan
Miguel Zubiri and Franklin Bautista, all
members of the House of Representatives,
Filled the present petition, assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the
legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762
Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Legal standing or locus standi refers to the
right of a party to come to a court of justice
and make such a challenge. More particularly,
standing refers to his personal and substantial
interest in that he has suffered or will suffer
direct injury as a result of the passage of that
law. To put it another way, he must show that
he has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled
or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the law he
complains of. Here, there is no clear showing
that the implementation of the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or
inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers
or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the
question they raise since the rule on standing
can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when as in this case the public interest so
requires or the matter is of transcendental
105
importance, of overarching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.
Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762
violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution
for the State to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the
provisions of the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies under Article II of the 1987
Constitution But, as the Court explained in
Tañada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II
of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of
principles and state policies, are not self-
executing. Legislative failure to pursue such
policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in
the courts. While Section 19, Article II of the
1987 Constitution requires the development of
a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipino
entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of
Filipino monopoly of the economic
environment. The objective is simply to
prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure
that Filipinos are given preference in all areas
of development. the 1987 Constitution does
not rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods, and services. While it does not
encourage their unlimited entry into the
country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as
in all economies in the world, is to strike a
balance between protecting local businesses
and allowing the entry of foreign investments
and services
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
gives Congress the discretion to reserve to
Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the NEDA and when the
national interest requires. Thus, Congress can
determine what policy to pass and when to
pass it depending on the economic exigencies.
It can enact laws allowing the entry of
foreigners into certain industries not reserved
by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this
case, Congress has decided to open certain
areas of the retail trade business to foreign
investments instead of reserving them
exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has
not opposed such policy. To the extent that
R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act,
lessens the restraint on the foreigners' right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful
business, it cannot be said that the law
amounts to a denial of the Filipinos' right to
property and to due process of law. Filipinos
continue to have the right to engage in the
kinds of retail business to which the law in
question has permitted the entry of foreign
investors. Certainly, it is not within the
province of the Court to inquire into the
wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly
violates the Constitution. But as the Court has
said, there is no showing that the law has
contravened any constitutional mandate. The
Court is not convinced that the implementation
of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien
control of the retail trade business. Petitioners
have not mustered any concrete and strong
argument to support its thesis. The law itself
has provided strict safeguards on foreign
participation in that business
Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July
30, 1993
Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is
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the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI),
a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter
alia, engaging in concerted action geared for
the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The petitioners alleged the
respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
continued approval of the Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial
logging companies to cut and deforest the
remaining forests of the country. Petitioners
request the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:
Cancel all existing timber license agreements
in the country;
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and
detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
act of defendant constitutes a that right for the generations to come.
misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all
administrative remedies with the defendant’s
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all
logging permits in the country. Defendant,
however, fails and refuses to cancel the
existing TLA’s to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right
to bring action to the judicial power of the
Court.
Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege
in their complaint a specific legal right violated
by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law.
Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have
all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without
the requisite hearing violates the requirements
of due process.
Ruling:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held
that:
The petitioners have the right to bring action
to the judicial power of the Court.The case at
bar is subject to judicial review by the Court.
Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his
opinion the requisites for a case to be
subjected for the judicial review by the Court.
According to him, the subject matter of the
complaint is of common interest, making this
civil case a class suit and proving the existence
of an actual controversy. He strengthens this
conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1,
Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners can file a class suit because
they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. Their personality to
sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature.” Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future
generations.
Every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’
assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance
of their obligation to ensure the protection of
The Court does not agree with the trial court’s
conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege
with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed,
and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data.
The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation’s constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which
is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote
the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the
Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation —
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners
— the advancement of which may even be said
to predate all governments and constitutions.
As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. The Court are not persuaded by
the trial court’s pronouncement. The
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respondent Secretary did not invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause.
If he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have
acted with utmost infidelity to the Government
by providing undue and unwarranted benefits
and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and
the demands of public interest and welfare. He
was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code
(P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the
national interest so requires, the President
may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any
other form of privilege granted herein. All
licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protested by the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Hence, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing
Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The
petitioners amend their complaint to implead
as defendants the holders or grantees of the
questioned timber license agreements.
106 Imbong v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
204819, April 8, 2014
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the
Reproductive Health Law (RH Law), because,
among others, it violates the right to life of the
unborn. Notwithstanding its declared policy
against abortion, the implementation of the RH
Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from
conception
Issue:
Whether or RH Law violates the right to life of
the unborn. (NO)
Ruling:
The Framers of the Constitution did not intend
to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. Contraceptives that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed
an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union
of the male sperm and the female ovum, and
those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed nonabortive,
and thus, constitutionally permissible. The
clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of
the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of
the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. A reading of the RH Law would show
that it is in line with this intent and actually
proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted
not to make any determination, at this stage,
when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself
clearly mandates that protection be afforded
from the moment of fertilization. However, the
section of the RH-IRR allows “contraceptives”
and recognizes as “abortifacient” only those
that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb. This cannot be done. Evidently, with
the addition of the word “primarily,” in Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra
vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH
Law and should, therefore, be declared
invalid.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution
provides: The State shall protect and promote
the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them. Contrary
to the OSG’s position, these provisions are
self-executing. At this point, the Court is of the
strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine
devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The
provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices, injectables, and other safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There
must first be a determination by the FDA that
they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and
supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are
"safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination.
107 Legaspi v. CSC, G.R. No. L-72119, May 29,
1987
Facts:
The fundamental right of the people to
information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for
Mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission.
The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's
request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu
City. These government employees, Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians. Claiming that his
right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas is guaranteed
by the Constitution, and that he has no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire
the information, petitioner prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of
Mandamus to compel the respondent
Commission to disclose said information.
Issue:
Whether Writ of Mandamus will lie
Ruling:
To be given due course, a Petition for
Mandamus must have been instituted by a
party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any
tribunal, corporation, board or person which
unlawfully excludes said party from the
enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in
every case must therefore be an "aggrieved
party" in the sense that he possesses a clear
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legal right to be enforced and a direct interest
in the duty or act to be performed. In the case
before Us, the respondent takes issue on the
personality of the petitioner to bring this suit.
It is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft
of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in
the civil service eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas. At most there
is a vague reference to an unnamed client in
whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he
made inquiries on the subject but what is clear
upon the face of the Petition is that the
petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon
the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern, which, by its very
nature, is a public right. It has been held thatil
when the question is one of public right and
the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws.
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that
when a Mandamus proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact
that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore,
part of the general "public" which possesses
the right. "Public" is a comprehensive, all-
inclusive term. Properly construed, it
embraces every person. To say that only those
who have a present and existing interest of a
pecuniary character in the particular
information sought are given the right of
inspection is to make an unwarranted
distinction The petitioner, being a citizen who,
as such is clothed with personality to seek
redress for the alleged obstruction of the
exercise of the public right.
We find no cogent reason to deny his standing
to bring the present suit. The incorporation in
the Constitution of a guarantee of access to
information of public concern is a recognition
of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and
information in a democracy But the
constitutional guarantee to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. It
does not open every door to any and all
information. Under the Constitution, access to
official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art.
III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information
from public scrutiny, such as those affecting
national security of the desired information.
However, as already discussed, this does not
give the agency concerned any discretion to
grant or deny access. In case of denial of
access, the government agency has the
burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of
public concern, that the same has been
exempted by law from the operation of the
guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to
dilute the constitutional right.
In determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern there is no
rigid test which can be applied. "Public
concern" like "public interest" is a term that
eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a
broad spectrum of subjects which the public
may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because
such matters naturally arouse the interest of
an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is
for the courts to determine in a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest
or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public. The information sought by the
petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim
of certain government employees that they are
civil service eligibles for the positions to which
they were appointed concern of citizens to
ensure that government positions requiring
civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at
all times accountable to the people even as to
their eligibilities for their respective positions.
But then, it is not enough that the information
sought is of public interest. For Mandamus to
lie in a given case, the information must not
be among the species exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm
or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent
has failed to cite any provision in the Civil
Service Law which would limit the petitioner's
right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the
fact that the names of those who pass the civil
service examinations, as in bar examinations
and licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence,
there is nothing secret about one's civil service
eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's
request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
government employees concerned claim to be
civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being
of public concern, and in the absence of
express limitations under the law upon access
to the register of civil service eligibles for said
position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position
becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore
lies.
108 Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No.
122156, February 3, 1997.
Facts:
GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government decided to sell
through public bidding issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC). Two bidders participated: Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy the shares at P41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share. Pending the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, Manila Prince matched the bid price
of P44.00 per share. Perhaps apprehensive
that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid, Manila Prince came to the
Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue:
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Whether GSIS is mandated to abide the
dictates of the Constitution on National
Economy and Patrimony.
Ruling:
YES. It should be stressed that while the
Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not
yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall
only be declared the winning bidder after it has
negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals.
Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is
not an assurance that the highest bidder will
be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award
yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing
the awardee, respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution
the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written
in the bidding rules issued by respondent
GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for
being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic
principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental
law of the land. Those which violate the
Constitution lose their reason for being.
Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is
reason enough not to award the block of
shares immediately to the foreign bidder
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot
conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
INCORPORATION CLAUSE
109 Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on
constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of
the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the
prohibition of its implementation and
enforcement through the release and
utilization of public funds, the assignment of
public officials and employees, as well as the
use of government properties and resources
by respondent-heads of various executive
offices concerned therewith.
They contended that WTO agreement violates
the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
“develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified
Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use
of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the
Philippines “to place nationals and products of
member-countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the
WTO “intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the
constitutional powers of both Congress and the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization
unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine
sovereignty specifically the legislative power
which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine
Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the
Philippines
Ruling:
No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit,
restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty,
particularly the legislative power granted by
the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was
acting in the proper manner when it concurred
with the President’s ratification of the
agreement.
While sovereignty has traditionally been
deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to
restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed
to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as
a member of the family of nations.
Unquestionably, the Constitution did not
envision a hermit-type isolation of the country
from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, the Constitution
“adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land,
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with
all nations.”
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws. One of the
oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servanda —
international agreements must be performed
in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state
which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations
such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken.”
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or
restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By
their voluntary act, nations may surrender
some aspects of their state power in exchange
for greater benefits granted by or derived from
a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit
of mutually covenanted objectives and
benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the
exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.
Thus, treaties have been used to record
agreements between States concerning such
widely diverse matters as, for example, the
lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of
territory, the termination of war, the
regulation of conduct of hostilities, the
formation of alliances, the regulation of
commercial relations, the settling of claims,
the laying down of rules governing conduct in
peace and the establishment of international
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organizations. The sovereignty of a state It should be emphasized that under our

therefore cannot in fact and in reality be Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in
considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter the President, subject to the concurrence of
into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the the Senate. The role of the Senate, however,
very nature of membership in the family of is limited only to giving or withholding its
nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, Hence, it is within the authority of the
“Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. Senate or, having secured its consent for its
The age of interdependence is here.” ratification, refuse to ratify it.|||
111 Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons G.R. No. L-
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,”
4254 September 26, 1951
“national treatment,” and “trade without
discrimination” cannot be struck down as
Facts.
unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of
The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of
equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
Russian descent who was brought to the
members. Aside from envisioning a trade
Philippines as a secret operative by the
policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the
Japanese forces during the latter's regime in
fundamental law encourages industries that
these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested
are “competitive in both domestic and foreign
as a Japanese spy. Later he was handed to the
markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy
Commonwealth Government for disposition.
against a sheltered domestic trade
Thereafter the People's Court ordered his
environment, but one in favor of the gradual
release. But the Deportation Board taking his
development of robust industries that can
case up, found that having no travel
compete with the best in the foreign markets.
documents Mejoff was illegally in this country,
Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
and consequently referred the matter to the
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity
immigration authorities. Years later however
to compete internationally. And given a free
he was not yet deported because no ship or
trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and
country would take the petitioner.|
managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against
Issue.
the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Whether or not Mejoff, a foreign national who
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for
is not an enemy, may be indefinitely kept in
lack of merit.
detention.

Ruling.
110 Pimentel vs. Ermita, 462 SCRA 622, July
No.
6, 2005
By its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the
Facts.
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
The petitioners filed the case to compel the
principles of international law as part of the law
respondents to transmit the signed text of the
of Nation." And in a resolution entitled
Rome Statute to the Senate for ratification.
"Universal Declaration Of Human Rights" and
The Rome Statute established the
approved by the General Assembly of the
International Criminal Court which "shall have
United Nations of which the Philippines is a
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
member, at its plenary meeting on December
persons for the most serious crimes of
10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all
international concern . . . and shall be
other fundamental rights as applied to all
complementary to the national criminal
human beings were proclaimed. These rights
jurisdictions." Its jurisdiction covers the crime
are available to him.
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and the crime of aggression as defined
112 Kuroda vs. Jalandoni G.R. No. L-2662
in the Statute.
March 26, 1949
Issue.
Facts.
Whether or not the respondents may be Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda was charged
compelled to transmit the case to the Senate before the Philippine Military Commission of
for ratification war crimes. He questioned the
Ruling. constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created
the National War Crimes Office and prescribed
No. There is no legal obligation to ratify a rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He
treaty. contended the Philippines is not a signatory to
the Hague Convention on Rules and
The signing of the treaty and the ratification
Regulations covering Land Warfare and
are two separate and distinct steps in the
therefore he is charged of crimes not based on
treaty-making process. As earlier discussed,
law, national and international.
the signature is primarily intended as a means
of authenticating the instrument and as a
Issue.
symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is
Whether or not EO 68 is valid and
usually performed by the state's authorized
constitutional.
representative in the diplomatic mission.
Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal
Ruling.
act by which a state confirms and accepts the
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
provisions of a treaty concluded by its
representative. It is generally held to be an
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its
executive act, undertaken by the head of the
section 3, that –
state or of the government.
The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy and adopts the
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generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted
principle of international law -- Hague
Convention, the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international
jurisprudence- all those person military or
civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and
of the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto in
violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable
therefor. Consequently in the promulgation
and enforcement of EO No. 68 the President of
the Philippines has acted in conformity with the
generally accepted and policies of international
law which are part of our Constitution.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military
Commission has no jurisdiction to try
petitioner for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention
because the Philippines is not a signatory to
the first and signed the second only in 1947.
Yet, these rules and principles were accepted
by the two belligerent nations the United State
and Japan who were signatories to the two
Convention. Such rule and principles therefore
form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them since the
Constitution has been deliberately general and
extensive in its scope and is not confined to
the recognition of rule and principle of
international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall
be a signatory.
113 Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12,
2005
Facts.
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners
Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human
rights violations during the Marcos era,
obtained a Final Judgment in their favor
against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos
amounting to roughly 1.9 Billion U.S. Dollars
in compensatory and exemplary damages for
tortuous violations of international law in the
US District Court of Hawaii. This Final
Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of
Appeals.
Issue.
Whether or not such foreign judgment may be
enforced under the law
Ruling.
Yes.
There is no obligatory rule derived from
treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or
allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof.
However, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those
customary rules accepted as binding result
from the combination two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion
juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a
belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.
There is a widespread practice among states
accepting in principle the need for such
recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to
limitations of varying degrees. The fact that
there is no binding universal treaty governing
the practice is not indicative of a widespread
rejection of the principle, but only a
disagreement as to the imposable specific
rules governing the procedure for recognition
and enforcement.||| Aside from the
widespread practice, it is indubitable that the
procedure for recognition and enforcement is
embodied in the rules of law, whether
statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various
foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is
evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which has existed in its
current form since the early 1900s.
There may be distinctions as to the rules
adopted by each particular state, but they all
prescind from the premise that there is a rule
of law obliging states to allow for, however
generally, the recognition and enforcement of
a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our
mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in
international practice.
Rules of procedure are promulgated by the
Supreme Court, and could very well be
abrogated or revised by the high court itself.
Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all
State components, to obey the laws of the
land, including generally accepted principles of
international law which form part thereof, such
as those ensuring the qualified recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.
114 Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
221697, March 8, 2016
Facts.
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro,
Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the
parental care and custody over petitioner by
Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his wife,
she has been reported and registered as a
foundling and issued a Foundling Certificate
and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was given the
name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.
She was then adopted by Fernando Poe Jr. and
Susan Roces.
Issue.
Whether or not she is considered as a natural
born-citizen of the Philippines, pursuant to
international law.
Ruling.
Yes.
Foundlings are citizens under international
law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. On the
other hand, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the
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incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations. Generally
accepted principles of international law include
international custom as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law, and general
principles of law recognized by civilized
nations. International customary rules are
accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the
part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates
(opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and
ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child
is stateless.
The principles found in two conventions, while
yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness does not
mean that their principles are not binding.
While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article
15 (1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of
the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the
1961 "United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives
effect" to Article 15 (1) of the UDHR.|
||
115 The Province of North Cotabato v. The
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel, GR No. 183591,
October 14, 2008
Facts.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with
the government‘s policy of pursuing peace
negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue
negotiating with the government. MILF,
thereafter, convened its Central Committee
and decided to meet with the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal
peace talks were held in Libya which resulted
to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
which consists of three (3) aspects: a.)
security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and
c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various
negotiations were held which led to the
finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said
memorandum was set to be signed last August
5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority
and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter,
in addition, has the freedom to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relation with
foreign countries. ―The sharing between the
Central Government and the BJE of total
production pertaining to natural resources is to
be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD
further provides for the extent of the territory
of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the
land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial,
fluvial and alluvial domains, including the
aerial domain and the atmospheric space
above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-
Palawan geographic region. With regard to
governance, on the other hand, a shared
responsibility and authority between the
Central Government and BJE was provided.
The relationship was described as
―associative. With the formulation of the
MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation
and finalization of the MOA-AD violates
constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation, as mandated by Executive
Order No. 3, and right to information. They
further contend that it violates the Constitution
and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.
Issue.
Whether or not the right to self-determination
is a generally accepted principle of
international law.
Ruling.
Yes.
International law has long recognized the right
to self-determination of "peoples", understood
not merely as the entire population of a State
but also a portion thereof. "the right of a
people to self-determination is now so widely
recognized in international conventions that
the principle has acquired a status beyond
'convention' and is considered a general
principle of international law".
Among the conventions referred to are the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 161 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 162
which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that
all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-
determination, "freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development".
The people's right to self-determination should
not, however, be understood as extending to a
unilateral right of secession. The UN General
Assembly adopted the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly
Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the
Philippines being included among those in
favor. The Declaration clearly recognized the
right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination, encompassing the right to
autonomy or self-government.
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, must now be
regarded as embodying customary
international law, the obligations enumerated
therein do not strictly require the Republic to
grant the Bangsamoro people, through the
instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights
and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even
the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are
general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its
application by the different States.
Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the
right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does
not obligate States to grant indigenous
peoples the near-independent status of an
associated state.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part
of the law of the land pursuant to Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not
suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so
as to render its compliance with other laws
unnecessary.
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It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD
contains numerous provisions that cannot be
reconciled with the Constitution and the laws
as presently worded.
116 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR
No.190582, April 8, 2010
Facts.
Petitioner is a national organization which
represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for
accreditation as a party-list organization to
public respondent. However, due to moral
grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision.
It also stated that since their ways are immoral
and contrary to public policy, they are
considered nuisance. In fact, their acts are
even punishable under the Revised Penal Code
in its Article 201.
Issue.
Whether or not the Yogyakarta Principles (the
Application of International Human Rights Law
In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity) are considered as generally accepted
principles of international law.
Ruling.
No.
The court is not prepared to declare that these
Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are
declarations and obligations outlined in said
Principles which are not reflective of the
current state of international law, and do not
find basis in any of the sources of international
law enumerated under Article 38 (1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.
These Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international
law professors, are — at best — de lege
ferenda — and do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much
of contemporary international law is
characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature,
i.e., international law is full of principles that
promote international cooperation, harmony,
and respect for human rights, most of which
amount to no more than well-meaning desires,
without the support of either State practice or
opinio juris.
117 Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002
Facts.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the
armed forces of the United States of America
started arriving in Mindanao to take partin
"Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The
Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the
simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a
bilateral defense agreement entered into by
the Philippines and the United States in 1951.
The exercise is rooted from the international
anti-terrorism campaign declared by President
George W. Bush in reaction to the 3
commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed
into twin towers of the World Trade Center in
New York City and the Pentagon building in
Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda
headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred
on September 11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and
Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition attacking the constitutionality of
the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and
Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of
Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the
operations filed a petition-in-intervention.
Issue.
Whether or not the State may take into
cognizance the validity of the VFA
Ruling.
Yes.
From the perspective of public international
law, a treaty is favored over municipal law
pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt
servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." Further, a
party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for
its failure to perform a treaty." Our
Constitution espouses the opposing view.
Witness our jurisdiction as stated in Section 5
of Article VIII, In Ichong v. Hernandez, we
ruled that the provisions of a treaty are always
subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law, or that it is subject to the
police power of the State. The foregoing
premises leave us no doubt that US forces are
prohibited from engaging in an offensive war
on Philippine territory.
118 Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]
Facts.
Petitioner Inchong, for and in his own behalf
and on behalf of other alien resident
corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.
1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all
other persons acting under him, particularly
city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing
its provisions. Inchong attacks the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law
; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission
by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring
100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation
or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5,
Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.
Issue.
Whether the RA No. 1180 violates international
law
Ruling.
No.
The law does not violate international treaties
and obligations. The United Nations Charter
imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding
the rights and freedom of their subjects (Jans
Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951
ed., pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human
Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation, or a common standard of
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achievement for all peoples and all nations. private respondents due process rights,
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of although not guaranteed by statute or by
the Philippines and the Republic of China of treaty, are protected by constitutional
April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of guarantees. We would not be true to the
treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the organic law of the land if we choose strict
same terms as the nationals of any other construction over guarantees against the
country". But the nationals of China are not deprivation of liberty. That would not be in
discriminated against because nationals of all keeping with the principles of democracy on
other countries, except those of the United which our Constitution is premised.
States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all Prohibited from engaging
in the retail trade. But even supposing that the
CIVILIAN SUPREMACY OVER THE
law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty
MILITARY
is always subject to qualification or
120 People v. Lagman (G.R. No. L-45893, July
amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs.
13, 1938)
Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same
FACTS:
may never curtail or restrict the scope of the
Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo
police power of the State (Palston vs.
de Sosa are charged with a violation of section
Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).
60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the
National Defense Law. It is alleged that these
119 Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion G.R. No.
two appellants, being Filipinos and having
139465 January 18, 2000
reached the age of twenty years in 1936,
willfully and unlawfully refused to register in
FACTS:
the military service between the 1st and 7th of
The Department of Justice received from the
April of said year, even though they had been
Department of Foreign Affairs a request from
required to do so. The two appellants were
the United States for the extradition of Mark
duly notified to appear before the Acceptance
Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD
Board in order to register for military service
No. 1609 prescribing the procedure for
but still did not register up to the date of the
extradition of persons who have committed a
filing of the information. Appellants argue that
crime in a foreign country. Jimenez requested
they did not register because de Sosa is
for copies of the request and that he be given
fatherless and has a mother and a brother
ample time to comment on the said request.
eight years old to support, and Lagman also
The petitioners denied the request pursuant to
has a father to support, has no military
the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
The Court of First Instance sentenced them
ISSUE:
both to one month and one day of
Whether or not treaty stipulations must take
imprisonment, with the costs.
precedence over an individual’s due process
rights
ISSUE:
WON the National Defense Law was
HELD:
constitutional by virtue of Section 2, Article II
No. The human rights of person and the rights
of the Constitution
of the accused guaranteed in the Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights
claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal
HELD:
tribunals are confronted with a situation where
Yes. Decision of CFI affirmed. The National
there is a conflict between a rule of the
Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
international law and the constitution. Efforts
compulsory military service, does not go
must first be made in order to harmonize the
against this constitutional provision but is, on
provisions so as to give effect to both but, if
the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith.
the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal law
The duty of the Government to defend the
must be upheld. The fact that international law
State cannot be performed except through an
has been made part of the law of the land does
army. To leave the organization of an army to
not pertain to or imply the primacy of
the will of the citizens would be to make this
international law over municipal law in the
duty of the Government excusable should
municipal sphere. In states where the
there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
constitution is the highest law of the land, both
enlist therein. The right of the government to
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they
require compulsory military services is a
are in conflict with the constitution.
consequence of its duty to defend the state
and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the
In the case at bar, private respondent does not
life, liberty, and property of its citizens.
only face a clear and present danger of loss of
Republic Act No. 9163 establishing a National
property or employment but of liberty itself,
Service Training Program amends RA 7077
which may eventually lead to his forcible
and institutionalizes citizen training to
banishment to a foreign land. The convergence
encompass not just military preparedness but
of petitioners favorable action on the
also literacy and civic welfare.
extradition request and the deprivation of
private respondents liberty is easily
comprehensible. In US cases, it was stated that the right of the
Government to require compulsory military
We have ruled time and again that this Courts service is a consequence of its duty to defend
equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as the State; and, that a person may be
"justice outside legality," may be availed of compelled by force to take his place in the
only in the absence of, and never against, ranks of the army of his country, and risk the
statutory law or judicial pronouncements. The chance of being shot down in its defense. What
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not justifies compulsory military service is the
even call for "justice outside legality," since defense of the State, whether actual or
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whether in preparation to make it more
effective, in case of need. The circumstances
of the appellants do not excuse them from
their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because they can obtain the
proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these
family responsibilities.
121 Aquino v. Esperon (G.R. No. 174994,
August 31, 2007)
FACTS:
Major Aquino, along with several military men,
allegedly met at the rest house of Captain
Aldomovar near Camp Tecson, San Miguel,
Bulacan to plot a breach of the Camp Defense
Plan of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo and to
take over Camp Aquinaldo, as well as the
Headquarters of the Philippine Army. In the
wake of the group’s alleged withdrawal of
support from the AFP chain of command and
the administration of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Major Aquino was ordered
arrested and confined at the Intelligence
Service Group of the Philippine Army in Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig, upon the order of Lt. Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, who was then the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
On the same day, Lt. Gen. Esperon ordered the
Army Inspector General to conduct an
investigation on the matter. For this purpose,
a panel of investigators was formed. During
the investigation, Major Aquino denied the
accusations hurled against him. The panel of
investigators, found that the troop movement
by some military personnel from their
respective stations to Manila was illegal,
implicating Major Aquino.
The panel recommended that all implicated
officers therein mentioned be immediately
relieved from their respective posts; and
appropriate charges be filed before the
General Court Martial against Major Aquino,
among other military officers/personnel, for
violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or
Create Mutiny); and Article 97 (Disorders and
Neglects Prejudicial to Good Order and Military
Discipline) of the Articles of War.
The Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO)
found the existence of probable cause against
Major Aquino, among other military officers.
Lt. Gen. Esperon issued an Order to the
Commanding Officer to exercise custodial
responsibility of Major Aquino, together with
the other implicated military personnel, and to
place them in confinement at the Philippine
Army Detention Center, Camp Capinpin,
Tanay, Rizal. The same Order also designated
the aforementioned Commanding Officer to
exercise direct supervision and control over
the concerned detainees.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
with the CA, praying that the AFP Chief of Staff
and the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, or whoever are acting in their place and
stead, be directed to immediately produce the
body of Major Aquino and explain forthwith
why he should not be set at liberty without
delay. The CA denied the petition, ruling that
the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is
futile because charges had already been
preferred against Major Aquino. Petitioner’s
MR was denied as well.
ISSUE:
Whether or not habeas corpus is not the proper
mode to question conditions of confinement
HELD:
Article 70 of the Articles of War grants
discretion to military authorities over the
imposition of arrest or confinement of persons
subject to military law charged with crime or
with serious offense.
While it is true that the extraordinary writ of
habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to
inquire into questions of violations of
constitutional right, this Court, however, does
not find the conditions of Major Aquino’s
confinement to be a proper subject of inquiry
in the instant Petition.
As a rule, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus
does not extend into questions of conditions of
confinement; but only to the fact and duration
of confinement. The high prerogative writ of
habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to
inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and
if found illegal, to order the release of the
detainee. It is not a means for the redress of
grievances or to seek injunctive relief or
damages. We reiterate the pronouncement of
this Court in Alejano v. Cabuay
The ruling in this case, however, does not
foreclose the right of detainees and convicted
prisoners from petitioning the courts for the
redress of grievances. Regulations and
conditions in detention and prison facilities
that violate the Constitutional rights of the
detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by
the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts
could afford injunctive relief or damages to the
detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary
and inhumane conditions. However, habeas
corpus is not the proper mode to question
conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas
corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the
fact or duration of confinement.
122 Kapunan v. Quisumbing (G.R. Nos.
148213–17A, March 13, 2009)
FACTS:
The petitioners, Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar
Legaspi charges with the killing of KMU
Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver Leonor
Alay-ay. On June 1986 Olalia and Alay-ay dead
body was found. The murder case of Olalia is
a controversial case during that time, Oliala is
a profile individual being the Chairman of the
KMU at the time of his death.
On Nov. 1998, private respondents Feliciano
Olalia and Perlina Alay-ay, filed a complaint
letter to Department of Justice for the alleged
complex kidnapping and killing of Olalia and
Alay-ay against Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar
Legaspi and other men and officers of Phil.
National Police and the AFP.
Sec. Serafin Cuevas, the Secretary of
Department of Justice, created a Panel that
were tasked to conduct a preliminary
investigation of Olalia case. The petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss in Department of Justice
on the ground that the Amnesty granted to
them by the National Amnesty Commission
extinguishes their criminal liability under
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Proclamation 347 issued by Pres. Fidel V.
Ramos entitled, “Granting of Amnesty to the
rebels, insurgents and all other persons, who
may or may be committed crimes against
public order and crimes committed in
furtherance of political ends.
The petitioners filed a motion for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the amnesty granted to
Kapunan and Legaspi, extinguishes their
criminal liability in Olalia case?
HELD:
The Panel created by the Department of
Justice refused to consider the defense of
Amnesty of the petitioners on the ground that
the document presented pertaining to the
Amnesty failed to show that the Olalia murder
case was one of the crimes for which the
amnesty was applied for. The Court of Appeals
also dismissed the petition, finding no grave of
abuse of discretion on the Panel created by the
DOJ, The Appellate Court refused to rule on the
applicability of Amnesty issued to Kapunan
and Legapi.
Finally the Supreme court dismissed the
petition for certiorari on the ground that the
Amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi
pertains only to the crimes against rebellion
and not covered crime of murder Olalia and
Alay-ay case.
General grant of amnesty exonerates the
accused (former military personnel) for their
participation in the 1987 and 1989 coup
124
attempts, but not for murder (in this case, the
murder of Kilusang Mayo Uno leader Rolando
Olalia and his driver Leonor Alay-ay).
123 Trillanes v. Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817,
June 27, 2008)
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily
armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed
into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national
officials. After a series of negotiations, military
soldiers surrendered that evening. In the
aftermath of such event dubbed as the
Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four
years later, Trillanes remained in detention
and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting
his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to
Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend
senate sessions and fulfill his functions as
senator. The RTC however denied his motion.
Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator
provides legal justification to allow him to work
and serve his mandate as senator.
HELD:
It is uncontroverted that petitioner’s
application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination
that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for
bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment
of conviction, justifies the detention of an
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in
such cases is “regardless of the stage of the
criminal action.” Such justification for
confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense applies equally to detention
prisoners like Trillanes. The Court in People v.
Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether
under preventive detention or serving final
sentence can not practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold
office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of
arrest and detention.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative
in nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak
of.
In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically
held that the doctrine of condonation does not
apply to criminal cases. Election, or more
precisely, re-election to office, does not
obliterate a criminal charge. The performance
of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison.
Gudani and Balutan v. Senga (G.R. No.
170165, August 15, 2006)
FACTS:
Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior
officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing
before the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security to shed light on the
“Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan
were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not
testify before the Committee. On the very day
of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464
enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from
appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
approval. However, the two testified before
the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an
order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear
before the Office of the Provost Marshal
General for investigation. The following day,
Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from
military service. After investigation, the OPMG
recommended that the two be charged with
violation of Article of War 65, on willfully
disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and
Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking that the order of President
Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; and the
charges against them be quashed; and Gen.
Senga and their successors-in-interest or
persons acting for and on their behalf or
orders, be permanently enjoined from
proceeding against them, as a consequence of
their having testified before the Senate.
ISSUE:
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May the President prevent a member of the
armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry?
HELD:
Yes. The President has constitutional authority
to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such
an injunction is liable under military justice.
Our ruling that the President could, as a
general rule, require military officers to seek
presidential approval before appearing before
Congress is based foremost on the notion that
a contrary rule unduly diminishes the
prerogatives of the President as commander-
in-chief. Congress holds significant control
over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the
President that the Constitution vests the title
as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions pertaining to the
position. Again, the exigencies of military
discipline and the chain of command mandate
that the President's ability to control the
individual members of the armed forces be
accorded the utmost respect. Where a military
officer is torn between obeying the President
and obeying the Senate, the Court will without
hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose
the President. After all, the Constitution
prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces.
125 IBP v. Zamora (G.R. No. 141284, August
15, 2000)
FACTS:
The President ordered the PNP and the Marines
to conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed the instant
petition to declare the deployment of
Philippines Marines unconstitutional, thus null
and void alleging that no emergency situation
would justify the employment of soldiers for
law enforcement work and that the same is in
derogation of Article II Section 3 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint visibility patrols
violate the Constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military
HELD:
Civilian authority (Section 3, Article II) is not
defeated in a joint task force between the PNP
and the Philippine Marines for the enforcement
of law and order in Metro Manila as long as
control is left to the PNP. The calling of the
Marines, in this case, constitutes permissible
use of military assets for civilian enforcement
and that it does not contravene Section 3,
Article II of the Constitution. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the
Letter of Instruction which sufficiently provides
the metes and bounds of the Marines’
authority. The deployment of the Marines to
assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority
in these operations is lodged with the head of
a civilian institution and not with the military.
What is in here is mutual support and
cooperation between the military and the
civilian authorities, not a derogation of civilian
supremacy. Wherefore, the petition is hereby
dismissed.
SEPARATION OF THE CHURCH AND STATE
126 Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006
FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since
1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has
been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her
husband, for more than twenty-five years and
had a son with him as well. Respondent’s
husband died a year before she entered into
the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of
said RTC to investigate respondent. According
to complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed therein for it will
appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal
arrangement is permitted by her religion—the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a
‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the
approval of their congregation. Such a
declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple
to legalize their union.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State could penalize
respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
No. The State could not penalize respondent
for she is exercising her right to freedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is
specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. The
State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition
cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order
to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State
has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
against respondent or her partner. Thus the
State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic
preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and
secular morality and religious morality should
be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution
adheres the benevolent neutrality approach
that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo
that the OSG has proved a compelling state
interest, it has to further demonstrate that the
state has used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve
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the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for
it constitutes an exemption to the law based
on her right to freedom of religion.
127 Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines
vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, July
9, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-governmental organization
internationally accredited to issue halal
certifications in the Philippines. To carry out its
functions, it formulated internal rules and
procedures based on the Qur’an and Sunnah
for food analysis and inspection, and began to
issue certifications to qualified products and
food manufacturers for a fee.
Later, respondent Office issued Executive
Order 46 which created the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme. Such order vested
exclusive authority on the Office on Muslim
Affairs (OMA) to issue halal certificates and
perform other related regulatory activities.
OMA then warned Muslim consumers to buy
only products with its official halal certification
since those without said certification had not
been subjected to careful analysis and
therefore could contain pork. It also began to
send letters to food manufacturers asking
them to secure the halal certification only from
OMA lest they violate the order. As a result,
the IDCP lost revenues after food
manufacturers stopped securing certifications
from it. Hence, petitioner filed a petition to
nullify EO 46, contending that it is
unconstitutional for the government to
formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
certification scheme because it is a function
that only religious organizations can lawfully &
validly perform for the Muslims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 46 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. Classifying a food product as halal is a
religious function because the standards used
are drawn from the Qur’an & Islamic beliefs.
By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify
food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on
the religious freedom of Muslim organizations
to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption; by
arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced
Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur’an & Sunnah on halal food.
Only the prevention of an immediate & grave
danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to
show the seriousness & immediacy of the
threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize
its interference with the affairs of its citizens
and instead allow them to exercise reasonable
freedom of personal and religious activity.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no
compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein
petitioner, of their religious right to classify a
product as halal, even on the premise that the
health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively
protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive
power to issue halal certifications. The
protection and promotion of the Muslim
Filipinos right to health are already provided
for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring
that food products released in the market are
fit for human consumption, properly labeled
and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not
encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.
THE FILIPINO FIRST POLICY
128 Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA
408 (1997) (Bellosillo)
Facts:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public
auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme
Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match
the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the
Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.”
Issues:
1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing
legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is
self-executing, whether the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of
our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term
“State,” hence, mandated to implement §10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution;
and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State,
whether it should give preference to the
petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of
the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation.
Ruling:
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the
petition.]
1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into
effect.
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Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in
such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not
precluded from enacting further laws to
enforce the constitutional provision so long as
the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions.
xxx xxx
xxx
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-
executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of
Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first
and third paragraphs of the same section
which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The
argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the
first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a
fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in
order to give preference to qualified Filipinos
in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony. A constitutional provision may
be self-executing in one part and non-self-
executing in another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just
that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a
right exists in certain specified circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must
take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx xxx
xxx
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel
has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos;
its existence is impressed with public interest;
its own historicity associated with our struggle
for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become
part of our national economy and patrimony.
For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns
the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance,
51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot
sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino
First Policy provision is not applicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the
Hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term
“State,” hence, it is mandated to
implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the
MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through
respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his
fact alone makes the sale of the assets of
respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.”
In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are
considered “state action” covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in
is a “public function;” (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with
the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent
GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third
categories of “state action.” Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered
into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject
to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it
refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After
all, government is composed of three (3)
divisions of power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate
directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case
the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its
authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to
the petitioner in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian
firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the
winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
provide that the highest bidder shall only be
declared the winning bidder after it has
negotiated and executed the necessary
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contracts, and secured the requisite approvals.
Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is
not an assurance that the highest bidder will
be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award
yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing
the awardee respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution
the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.
xxx xxx
xxx
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides
that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS
may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share.
Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is
reason enough not to award the block of
shares immediately to the foreign bidder
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot
conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm
submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the
bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.
129 Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary
Margarito B. Teves, et al., G.R. No.
176579, June 28, 2011, En Banc (Carpio)
Facts:
In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics
Corporation (GTE), sold 26 percent of the
outstanding common shares of PLDT to
Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corporation (PTIC). In 1977, Prime Holdings,
Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 111,415
shares of stock of PTIC. In 1986, the 111,415
shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were
sequestered by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415
PTIC shares, which represent about 46.125
percent of the outstanding capital stock of
PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be
owned by the Republic of the Philippines.
In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered
acquired the remaining 54 percent of the
outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On 20
November 2006, the Inter-Agency
Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine
Government through a public bidding sold the
same shares to Parallax Venture who won with
a bid of P25.6 billion or US$510 million.
Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it
would exercise its right of first refusal as a
PTIC stockholder and buy the 111,415 PTIC
shares by matching the bid price of Parallax.
On 14 February 2007, First Pacific, through its
subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional
Sale and Purchase Agreement of the 111,415
PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the
outstanding capital stock of PTIC, with the
Philippine Government for the price of
P25,217,556,000 or US$510,580,189. The
sale was completed on 28 February 2007.
Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale
by the Philippine Government of 46.125
percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect
sale of 12 million shares or about 6.3 percent
of the outstanding common shares of PLDT.
With the sale, First Pacific common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7
percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the
common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT
to about 81.47 percent. This, according to
petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits
foreign ownership of the capital of a public
utility to not more than 40 percent.
On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the
instant petition for prohibition, injunction,
declaratory relief, and declaration of nullity of
sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares.
ISSUE: Does the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refer to the total
common shares only or to the total
outstanding capital stock of PLDT, a public
utility?
HELD: Section 11, Article XII (National
Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987
Constitution mandates the Filipinization
of public utilities, to wit:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of
a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall
such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period
than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires.
The State shall encourage equity participation
in public utilities by the general public. The
participation of foreign investors in the
governing body of any public utility enterprise
shall be limited to their proportionate share in
its capital, and all the executive and managing
officers of such corporation or association
must be citizens of the Philippines.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution in
imposing limitations and restrictions on fully
nationalized and partially nationalized
activities is for Filipino nationals to be always
in control of the corporation undertaking said
activities. Otherwise, if the Trial Court ruling
upholding respondent's arguments were to be
given credence, it would be possible for the
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ownership structure of a public utility
corporation to be divided into one percent
(1%) common stocks and ninety-nine percent
(99%) preferred stocks. Following the Trial
Court ruling adopting respondent's arguments,
the common shares can be owned entirely by
foreigners thus creating an absurd situation
wherein foreigners, who are supposed to be
minority shareholders, control the public utility
corporation.
The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refers only to shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of directors, and
thus in the present case only to common
shares, and not to the total outstanding capital
stock comprising both common and non-voting
preferred shares.
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder
is the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation. This is
exercised through his vote in the election of
directors because it is the board of directors
that controls or manages the corporation. In
the absence of provisions in the articles of
incorporation denying voting rights to
preferred shares, preferred shares have the
same voting rights as common shares.
However, preferred shareholders are often
excluded from any control, that is, deprived of
the right to vote in the election of directors and
on other matters, on the theory that the
preferred shareholders are merely investors in
the corporation for income in the same manner
as bondholders. In fact, under the Corporation
Code only preferred or redeemable shares can
be deprived of the right to vote. Common
shares cannot be deprived of the right to vote
in any corporate meeting, and any provision in
the articles of incorporation restricting the
right of common shareholders to vote is
invalid.
Considering that common shares have voting
rights which translate to control, as opposed to
preferred shares which usually have no voting
rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution refers only to common
shares. However, if the preferred shares also
have the right to vote in the election of
directors, then the term "capital" shall include
such preferred shares because the right to
participate in the control or management of
the corporation is exercised through the right
to vote in the election of directors. In short,
the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refers only to shares of stock
that can vote in the election of directors.
This interpretation is consistent with the intent
of the framers of the Constitution to place in
the hands of Filipino citizens the control and
management of public utilities. Thus, 60
percent of the "capital" assumes, or should
result in, "controlling interest" in the
corporation and thus in the present case, only
to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock (common and non-
voting preferred shares).
130 Board of Medicine v. Ota, G.R. No.
166097, July 14
Facts:
Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC, in a
letter dated March 8, 1993, denied
respondent's request for a license to practice
medicine in the Philippines on the ground that
the Board "believes that no genuine reciprocity
can be found in the law of Japan... as there is
no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly
practice there." [9]
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus against the Board before the
RTC of Manila on June 24, 1993, which petition
was amended on February 14, 1994 to implead
the PRC through its Chairman.
On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its
Decision finding that respondent had
adequately proved that the medical laws of
Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to be
granted license and be admitted into the
practice of medicine under the principle of
reciprocity; and that the
Board had a ministerial duty of issuing the
Certificate of Registration and license to
respondent, as it was shown that he had
substantially complied with the requirements
under the law.[12] The RTC then ordered the
Board to issue in favor of... respondent the
corresponding Certificate of Registration
and/or license to practice medicine in the
Philippines.[13]
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed
the case to the CA, stating that while
respondent submitted documents showing
that foreigners are allowed to practice
medicine in Japan, it was not shown that the
conditions for the practice of medicine there
are practical and... attainable by a foreign
applicant, hence, reciprocity was not
established; also, the power of the PRC and
the Board to regulate and control the practice
of medicine is discretionary and not
ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of
mandamus.[14]
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.[15]
Hence, herein petition
Issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAD
ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF
RECIPROCITY IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN.
Ruling:
The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.
R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be
candidates for the medical board
examinations, merely requires a foreign citizen
to submit competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing
that his country's existing laws... permit
citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine
under the same rules and regulations
governing citizens thereof.
Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the
extent of PRC's power to grant licenses, i.e., it
may, upon recommendation of the board,
approve the registration and authorize the
issuance of a certificate of registration with or
without examination to a foreigner who is...
registered under the laws of his country,
provided the following conditions are met: (1)
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that the requirement for the registration or
licensing in said foreign state or country are
substantially the same as those required and
contemplated by the laws of the Philippines;
(2) that... the laws of such foreign state or
country allow the citizens of the Philippines to
practice the profession on the same basis and
grant the same privileges as the subject or
citizens of such foreign state or country; and
(3) that the applicant shall submit competent
and... conclusive documentary evidence,
confirmed by the DFA, showing that his
country's existing laws permit citizens of the
Philippines to practice the profession under the
rules and regulations governing citizens
thereof.
The said provision further states that the PRC
is authorized to prescribe additional
requirements or grant certain privileges to
foreigners seeking registration in the
Philippines if the same privileges are granted
to or some additional requirements are
required of... citizens of the Philippines in
acquiring the same certificates in his country.
Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the
foreign applicant must show that the
conditions for the practice of medicine in said
country are practical and attainable by
Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first
be proven that a Filipino has been... granted
license and allowed to practice his profession
in said country before a foreign applicant may
be given license to practice in the Philippines.
THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE UNBORN
FROM CONCEPTION
131 James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April
8, 2014, En Banc [Mendoza]
FACTS:
Shortly after the President placed his
imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors
of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword
that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that
its decision may produce, the Court now faces
the controversy, as presented in fourteen (14)
petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that
the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and
contentions of the parties, the Court has
synthesized and refined them to the following
principal issues:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court may exercise its power
of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
2. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
Right to Life
Right to Health
Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free
Speech
The Family
Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
Due Process
Equal Protection
Involuntary Servitude
Delegation of Authority to the FDA
Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
RULING:
Before delving into the constitutionality of the
RH Law and its implementing rules, it
behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.
The petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. “The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once
a controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court
is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and
the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the
definition and maintenance of the boundaries
of authority and control between them.” To
him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation – or instrument
of intervention – of the judiciary in that
balancing operation. Lest it be misunderstood,
it bears emphasizing that the Court does not
have the unbridled authority to rule on just any
and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the
power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners
must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty. In this case, the Court is of the view that
an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the
law have already been passed, it is evident
that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. When an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it not only becomes a right,
but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
The Court is not persuaded. In United States
(US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also
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known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one
that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech,
but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.
After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful
assembly are but component rights of the right
to one’s freedom of expression, as they are
modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines
originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While this Court has withheld the application
of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not
only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary,
ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
The transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that we set aside
the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have
potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially
the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. Considering that it is the
right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not
wait for a life to be taken away before taking
action.
Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may
consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one
subject/one bill rule. It is well-settled that the
“one title-one subject” rule does not require
the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or
impede legislation.” In this case, a textual
analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control
the population growth.
AS TO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory
advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation. According to him, “fertilization
and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are
not identical and synonymous.” Citing a letter
of the WHO, he wrote that medical authorities
confirm that the implantation of the fertilized
ovum is the commencement of conception and
it is only after implantation that pregnancy can
be medically detected. This theory of
implantation as the beginning of life is devoid
of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not
pertain to the beginning of life but to the
viability of the fetus. The fertilized
ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it is
a living human being complete with DNA and
46 chromosomes. Implantation has been
conceptualized only for convenience by those
who had population control in mind. To adopt
it would constitute textual infidelity not only to
the RH Law but also to the Constitution. It is
the Court’s position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall,
its viability is sustained but that instance of
implantation is not the point of beginning of
life.
A component to the right to life is the
constitutional right to health. In this regard,
the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health.
These provisions are self-executing. Unless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.
In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now
is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is,
as it has always been, that –… in case of doubt,
the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing. . . .
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.
It is not within the province of the Court to
determine whether the use of contraceptives
or one’s participation in the support of modern
reproductive health measures is moral from a
religious standpoint or whether the same is
right or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of
a church … are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in
the case at bench should be understood only
in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without
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authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have
authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious
freedom. Consequently, the petitioners are
misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program
through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to
their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the
policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse
to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his
conscience. The demarcation line between
Church and State demands that one render
unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and
unto God the things that are God’s. The Court
is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner,
against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modern reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods,
his conscience is immediately burdened as he
has been compelled to perform an act against
his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the
basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The Court is of the strong view that the
religious freedom of health providers, whether
public or private, should be accorded primacy.
Accordingly, a conscientious objector should
be exempt from compliance with the mandates
of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act
contrary to his religious belief and conviction,
it would be violative of “the principle of non-
coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right
to free exercise of religion.
The same holds true with respect to non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers. Considering that
Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such
institutions should they fail or refuse to comply
with their duty to refer under Section 7 and
Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must
be struck down for being violative of the
freedom of religion.
The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and
(a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering
that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health
procedures, the religious freedom of health
care service providers should be respected.
The punishment of a healthcare service
provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform
reproductive health procedure on a patient
because incompatible religious beliefs, is a
clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee
which the Court cannot allow.
The State cannot, without a compelling state
interest, take over the role of parents in the
care and custody of a minor child, whether or
not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest
can justify a state substitution of their parental
authority.
Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the
RH Law is premature because the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to
formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium
of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict
the religious beliefs of the petitioners and
validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on
its constitutionality or validity.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice
of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle. Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a
statute are vague, words must not only be
taken in accordance with their plain meaning
alone, but also in relation to other parts of the
statute. It is a rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, that is, every part of it must be
construed together with the other parts and
kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.
To provide that the poor are to be given
priority in the government’s reproductive
health care program is not a violation of the
equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant
to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution
which recognizes the distinct necessity to
address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the
people. Thus: Section 11. The State shall
adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people
at affordable cost. There shall be priority for
the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers. It should be noted that Section 7 of
the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
couples who are suffering from fertility issues
and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the
RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce
their number. While the RH Law admits the use
of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated
above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the “promotion and/or stabilization
of the population growth rate is incidental to
the advancement of reproductive health.”
The notion of involuntary servitude connotes
the presence of force, threats, intimidation or
other similar means of coercion and
compulsion. A reading of the assailed
provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government
reproductive healthcare service providers to
render pro bono service. Other than non-
accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is
imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive
healthcare service providers also enjoy the
liberty to choose which kind of health service
they wish to provide, when, where and how to
provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly,
therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is
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made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will. While the rendering of such
service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does
not consider the same to be an unreasonable
burden, but rather, a necessary incentive
imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a
perceived legitimate state interest. Consistent
with what the Court had earlier discussed,
however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this
provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render
reproductive health service, pro bona or
otherwise.
The Court finds nothing wrong with the
delegation. The FDA does not only have the
power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and
methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood
that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what
is ordinarily understood as “health products.”
Being the country’s premiere and sole agency
that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped
with the necessary powers and functions to
make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of
necessary implication, the mandate by
Congress to the FDA to ensure public health
and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes “service” and
“methods.” From the declared policy of the RH
Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the
public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the
permitted delegation was explained in
Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the
task of the government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention.
The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence, let alone the
interest and the time, to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say specific
solutions.
A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that
whether it pertains to the establishment of
health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health
professionals, or the training of barangay
health workers, it will be the national
government that will provide for the funding of
its implementation. Local autonomy is not
absolute. The national government still has the
say when it comes to national priority
programs which the local government is called
upon to implement like the RH Law.
RIGHTS OF PARENTS IN THE REARING OF
THEIR CHILDREN
132 SPARK vs. Quezon City, et al
FACTS:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew
for minors, several local governments in Metro
Manila started to strictly implement their
curfew ordinances on minors through police
operations which were publicly known as part
of "Oplan Rody."
Petitioners,spearheaded by the Samahan ng
mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an
association of young adults and minors that
aims to forward a free and just society, in
particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors[10] - filed this
present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they:
(a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for
vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing
legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty
and the right to travel without substantive due
process; and (d) deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in rearing the youth
without substantive due process. In addition,
petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance
contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA
10630.
More specifically, petitioners posit that the
Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement as there are no
clear provisions or detailed standards on how
law enforcers should apprehend and properly
determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators.[13] They further argue that the law
enforcer's apprehension depends only on his
physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and
based only on the law enforcer's visual
assessment of the alleged curfew violator.
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew
Ordinances contain provisions indicating the
activities exempted from the operation of the
imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working
students or students with evening class, they
contend that the lists of exemptions do not
cover the range and breadth of legitimate
activities or reasons as to why minors would
be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair
the legitimate activities of minors during
curfew hours.
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew
Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due
process; and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny
test, for not being narrowly tailored and for
employing means that bear no reasonable
relation to their purpose. They argue that the
prohibition of minors on streets during curfew
hours will not per se protect and promote the
social and moral welfare of children of the
community.
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila
Ordinance, particularly Section 4 thereof,
contravenes Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, given that the cited curfew provision
imposes on minors the penalties of
imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition.
They contend that the imposition of penalties
contravenes RA 9344's express command that
no penalty shall be imposed on minors for
curfew violations.
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Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no
compelling State interest to impose curfews
contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose
them in the exercise of their natural and
primary right in the rearing of the youth, and
that even if a compelling interest exists, less
restrictive means are available to achieve the
same. In this regard, they suggest massive
street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs
(closed-circuit televisions) in public streets,
and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as
other viable means of protecting children and
preventing crimes at night. They further opine
that the government can impose more
reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental
counseling and education seminars informing
the parents of the reasons behind the curfew,
and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty
for parents who allowed their children to be out
during curfew hours.
Issue:
Whether it violates the Right of Parents to Rear
their Children. (Answering this issue only as it
falls in this particular topic)
Ruling:
Petitioners are NOT CORRECT that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they
deprive parents of their natural and primary
right in the rearing of the youth without
substantive due process. In this regard, they
assert that this right includes the right to
determine whether minors will be required to
go home at a certain time or will be allowed to
stay late outdoors. Given that the right to
impose curfews is primarily with parents and
not with the State, the latter's interest in
imposing curfews cannot logically be
compelling.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
articulates the State's policy relative to the
rights of parents in the rearing of their
children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the
rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the
"youth") for civic efficiency and the
development of their moral character are
characterized not only as parental rights, but
also as parental duties. This means that
parents are not only given the privilege of
exercising their authority over their children;
they are equally obliged to exercise this
authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of
this provision is a reflection of the State's
independent interest to ensure that the youth
would eventually grow into free, independent,
and well-developed citizens of this nation. For
indeed, it is during childhood that minors are
prepared for additional obligations to society.
"[T]he duty to prepare the child for these
[obligations] must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious
beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."
"This affirmative process of teaching, guiding,
and inspiring by precept and example is
essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens."
While parents have the primary role in child-
rearing, it should be stressed that "when
actions concerning the child have a relation to
the public welfare or the well-being of the
child, the [S]tate may act to promote these
legitimate interests." Thus, "[i]n cases in
which harm to the physical or mental health of
the child or to public safety, peace, order, or
welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate
state interests may override the parents'
qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children."
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as
parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
protecting the rights of persons or individual
who because of age or incapacity are in an
unfavorable position, vis-a- vis other parties.
Unable as they are to take due care of what
concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare. This
obligation the state must live up to. It cannot
be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in
an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State,
x x x."(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of
legal restrictions designed to aid parents in
their role of promoting their children's well-
being.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that
the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the
minors are not - whether actually or
constructively (as will be later discussed) -
accompanied by their parents. This serves as
an explicit recognition of the State's deference
to the primary nature of parental authority and
the importance of parents' role in child-
rearing. Parents are effectively given
unfettered authority over their children's
conduct during curfew hours when they are
able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality,
the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew
Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative
to allow minors to remain in public places
without parental accompaniment during the
curfew hours.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the
Curfew Ordinances positively influence
children to spend more time at home.
Consequently, this situation provides parents
with better opportunities to take a more active
role in their children's upbringing.
BALANCED & HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY
133 Prov. of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13,
2005
Facts:
This is a petition filed by the Province of
Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and
various concerned citizens for review on
certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, denying, for lack of cause of action,
the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction
assailing the legality and constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 635.
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At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing
Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation were set
aside by the Office of the President [President
Ramos], through Proclamation No. 635, for
use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste
disposal applications.
The petitioners opposed the implementation
of said order since the creation of dump site
under the territorial jurisdiction would
compromise the health of their constituents.
Moreso, the the dump site is to be constructed
in Watershed reservation.
Through their concerted efforts of the
officials and residents of Province of Rizal and
Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was
closed. However, during the term of President
Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was reopened.
A temporary restraining order was then
filed. Although petitioners did not raised the
question that the project was not consulted
and approved by their appropriate
Sanggunian, the court take it into
consideration since a mere MOA does not
guarantee the dump site’s permanent closure.
Issue:
Whether or not the consultation and
approval of the Province of Rizal and
municipality of San Mateo is needed before the
implementation of the project..
Ruling:
The court reiterated again that "the earth
belongs in usufruct to the living."
Yes, as lucidly explained by the court:
contrary to the averment of the respondents,
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28
August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the
Local Government Code, which was approved
four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it
is the policy of the state- "to require all
national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultation with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and
people's organization, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective
jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires
prior consultations before a program shall be
implemented by government authorities and
the prior approval of the Sanggunian is
obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v.
Paño, Section 2 (c), requiring consultations
with the appropriate local government units,
should apply to national government projects
affecting the environmental or ecological
balance of the particular community
implementing the project.
Relative to the case, during the oral
arguments at the hearing for the temporary
restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA
Solid Waste Management Task Force declared
before the Court of Appeals that they had
conducted the required consultations.
However, the ambivalence of his reply was
brought to the fore when at the height of the
protest rally and barricade made by the
residents of petitioners to stop dump trucks
from reaching the site, all the municipal
mayors of the province of Rizal openly
declared their full support for the rally and
notified the MMDA that they would oppose any
further attempt to dump garbage in their
province.
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates
the powers, duties and functions of the
municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan
the power to, among other things, “enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant
to Section 16 of th(e) Code.” These include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing
resolutions to protect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment, such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing,
illegal logging and smuggling of logs,
smuggling of natural resources products and
of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash
and burn farming, and such other activities
which result in pollution, acceleration of
eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of
ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints
on the use of property within the jurisdiction
of the municipality, adopting a comprehensive
land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying
land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject
to the pertinent provisions of this Code,
enacting integrated zoning ordinances in
consonance with the approved comprehensive
land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules
and regulations; establishing fire limits or
zones, particularly in populous centers; and
regulating the construction, repair or
modification of buildings within said fire limits
or zones in accordance with the provisions of
this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure
the efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under
Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities, …providing for the
establishment, maintenance, protection, and
conservation of communal forests and
watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts,
mangroves, and other similar forest
development projects ….and, subject to
existing laws, establishing and providing for
the maintenance, repair and operation of an
efficient waterworks system to supply water
for the inhabitants and purifying the source of
the water supply; regulating the construction,
maintenance, repair and use of hydrants,
pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the
purity and quantity of the water supply of the
municipality and, for this purpose, extending
the coverage of appropriate ordinances over
all territory within the drainage area of said
water supply and within one hundred (100)
meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal,
aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used
in connection with the water service; and
regulating the consumption, use or wastage of
water.”[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]
Briefly stated, under the Local Government
Code, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental
and ecological balance of local communities
can be implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected
local communities, and
(2)prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian.
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Absent either of these mandatory
requirements, the project’s implementation is
illegal.
134 International Service for the Acquisition
of Agri-Biotech Applications. Inc. v.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines),
et al., December 8, 2015
Facts:
From 2007 to 2009, petitioner University of the
Philippines Los Baiios (UPLB), the
implementing institution of the field trials,
conducted a contained experiment on Bt
talong under the supervision of the National
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines
(NCBP)
The NCBP, created under Executive Order No.
(EO) 430,... is the regulatory body tasked to:
(a) "identify and evaluate potential hazards
involved in initiating genetic engineering
experiments or the introduction of new species
and genetically engineered organisms and
recommend measures to minimize risks"; and
(b) "formulate and review national policies and
guidelines on biosafety, such as the safe
conduct of work on genetic engineering, pests
and their genetic materials for the protection
of public health, environment[,] and
personnel^] and supervise the
implementation thereof."
Upon the completion of the contained
experiment, the NCBP issued a Certificate...
therefor stating that all biosafety measures
were complied with, and no untoward incident
had occurred
On March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, the
Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued two
(2)-year Biosafety Permits... for field testing of
Bt talong
Consequently, field testing proceeded in
approved trial sites in North Cotabato,
Pangasinan, Camarines Sur, Davao City, and
Laguna.
On April 26, 2012, respondents Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines) (Greenpeace),
Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng
Agrikultura (MASIPAG), and others
(respondents) filed before the Court a Petition
for Writ of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of
Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO)
(petition for Writ of Kalikasan) against herein
petitioners... alleging that the Bt talong field
trials violated their constitutional right to
health and a balanced ecology considering,
among others, that: (a) the Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC), as required by
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151,... was not
secured prior to the field trials;... b) the
required public consultations under the Local
Government Code (LGC) were not complied
with;... and (c) as a regulated article under
DAO 08-2002, Bt talong is presumed harmful
to human health and the environment, and
that there is no independent, peer-reviewed
study showing its safety for human
consumption and the environment
Further, they contended that since the
scientific evidence as to the safety of Bt talong
remained insufficient or uncertain, and that
preliminary scientific evaluation shows
reasonable grounds for concern, the
precautionary principle should be applied and,
thereby, the field trials be enjoined.
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued... a Writ of
Kalikasan against petitioners (except UPLB
May 17, 2013, the CA ruled in favor of
respondents and directed petitioners to
permanently cease and desist from conducting
the Bt talong field trials.
Issues:
the case should have been dismissed for
mootness in view of the completion and
termination of the Bt talong field trials and the
expiration of the Biosafety Permits;... b) the
Court should not have ruled on the validity of
DAO 08-2002 as it was not raised as an issue
Ruling:
The Proceedings Before the Court
Agreeing with the CA, the Court held that the
precautionary principle applies in this case
since the risk of harm from the field trials of Bt
talong remains uncertain and there exists a
possibility of serious and irreversible harm.
The Court observed that eggplants are a staple
vegetable in the country that is mostly grown
by small-scale farmers who are poor and
marginalized; thus, given the country's rich
biodiversity, the consequences of
contamination and genetic pollution would be
disastrous and irreversible.
The Court likewise agreed with the CA in not
dismissing the case for being moot and
academic despite the completion and
tennination of the Bt talong field trials, on
account of the following exceptions to the
mootness principle: (a) the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; and (b) the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
Thus, the Court permanently enjoined the field
testing of Bt talong. In addition, it declared
DAO 08-2002 null and void for failure to
consider the provisions of the NBF. The Court
also temporarily enjoined any application for
contained use, field testing, propagation,
commercialization, and importation of
genetically modified organisms until a new
administrative order is promulgated in
accordance with law.
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants the motions for
reconsideration on the ground of mootness.
As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate
actual, ongoing controversies.
Accordingly, the Court is not empowered to
decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules
of law which cannot affect the result as to the
thing in issue in the case before it. In other
words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-
justiciable
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An action is considered "moot" when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence,
one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is nothing for the
court to resolve as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by subsequent events
Nevertheless, case law states that the Court
will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first,
there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest are
involved; third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review
Thus, jurisprudence recognizes these four
instances as exceptions to the mootness
principle.
In the December 8, 2015 Decision of the
Court, it was held that (a) the present case is
of exceptional character and paramount public
interest is involved, and (b) it is likewise
capable of repetition yet evading review.
Hence, it was excepted from the mootness
principle
However, upon a closer scrutiny of the parties'
arguments, the Court reconsiders its ruling
and now finds merit in petitioners' assertion
that the case should have been dismissed for
being moot and academic, and that the
aforesaid exceptions to the said rule should not
have been applied.
I. On the paramount public interest exception.
However, a survey of cases would show that,
as a common guidepost for application, there
should be some perceivable benefit to the
public which demands the Court to proceed
with the resolution of otherwise moot
questions.
no perceivable benefit to the public - whether
rational or practical - may be gained by
resolving respondents' petition for Writ of
Kalikasan on the merits.
To recount, these cases, which stemmed from
herein respondents petition for Writ of
Kalikasan, were mooted by the undisputed
expiration of the Biosafety Permits issued by
the BPI and the completion and tennination of
the Bt talong field trials subject of the same
These incidents effectively negated the
necessity for the reliefs sought by respondents
in their petition for Writ of Kalikasan as there
was no longer any field test to enjoin. Hence,
at the time the CA rendered its Decision dated
May 17, 2013, the reliefs petitioner sought and
granted by the CA were no longer capable of
execution.
As the matter never went beyond the field
testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks
related to propagation were pursued or the
requirements therefor complied with. Thus,
there are no guaranteed after-effects to the
already concluded Bt talong field trials that
demand an adjudication from which the public
may perceivably benefit. Any future threat to
the right of herein respondents or the public in
general to a healthful and balanced ecology is
therefore more imagined than real
In fact, it would appear to be more beneficial
to the public to stay a verdict on the safeness
of Bt talong - or GMOs, for that matter - until
an actual and justiciable case properly
presents itself before the Court
II. The case is not one capable of repetition vet
evading review.Likewise, contrary to the
Court's earlier ruling... these cases do not fall
under the "capable of repetition yet evading
review" exception.
Under DAO 08-2002, no specific guidelines
were used in the conduct of risk assessment,
and the DA was allowed to consider the expert
advice of, and guidelines developed by,
relevant international organizations and
regulatory authorities of countries with
significant experience in the regulatory
supervision of the regulated article.
However, under JDC 01-2016, the CODEX
Alimentarius Guidelines was adopted to govern
the risk assessment of activities involving the
research, development, handling and use,
transboundary movement, release into the
environment, and management of genetically
modified plant and plant products derived from
the use of modern biotechnology.
Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the
regulatory framework now applicable in
conducting risk assessment in matters
involving the research, development,
handling, movement, and release into the
environment of genetically modified plant and
plant products derived from the use of modern
biotechnology is substantially different from
that which was applied to the subject field
trials. In this regard, it cannot be said that the
present case is one capable of repetition yet
evading review.
the Court discerns that there are two (2)
factors to be considered before a case is
deemed one capable of repetition yet evading
review: (1) the challenged action was in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to
its cessation or expiration; and (2) there was
a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subjected to the
same action.
Here, respondents cannot claim that the
duration of the subject field tests was too short
to be fully litigated. It must be emphasized
that the Biosafety Permits for the subject field
tests were issued on March 16, 2010 and June
28, 2010, and were valid for two (2) years.
However, as aptly pointed out by Justice
Leonen, respondents filed their petition for
Writ of Kalikasan only on April 26, 2012 -just
a few months before the Biosafety Permits
expired and when the field testing activities
were already over.[108] Obviously, therefore,
the cessation of the subject field tests before
the case could be resolved was due to
respondents' own inaction.
Moreover, the situation respondents complain
of is not susceptible to repetition. As discussed
above, DAO 08-2002 has already been
superseded by JDC 01-2016. Hence, future
applications for field testing will be governed
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by JDC 01-2016 which, as illustrated, adopts a
regulatory framework that is substantially
different from that of DAO 08-2002.
In fact, in relation to the latter, it is observed
that the Court should not have even delved
into the constitutionality of DAO 08-2002 as it
was merely collaterally challenged by
respondents, based on the constitutional
precepts of the people's rights to information
on matters of public concern, to public
participation, to a balanced and healthful
ecology, and to health.
All told, with respondents' petition for Writ of
Kalikasan already mooted by the expiration of
the Biosafety Permits and the completion of
the field trials subject of these cases, and with
none of the exceptions to the mootness
principle properly attending, the Court grants
the instant motions for reconsideration and
hereby dismisses the aforesaid petition. With
this pronouncement, no discussion on the
substantive merits of the same should be
made.
Principles:
At this point, the Court discerns that there are
two (2) factors to be considered before a case
is deemed one capable of repetition yet
evading review: (1) the challenged action was
in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2)
there was a reasonable expectation that the
same complaining party would be subjected to
the same action.
135 Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et
al., GR No. 189185, August 16, 2016
Facts:
After several committee hearings and
consultations with various stakeholders, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007,
to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice by all agricultural entities
within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its
members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation
and Lapanday Agricultural and Development
Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition
in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of
the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified
the unreasonable exercise of police power;
violated the equal protection clause;
amounted to the confiscation of property
without due process of law; and lacked
publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of
Republic Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC
rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No.
0309-07 valid and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had
validly exercised police power[13] under the
General Welfare Clause of the Local
Government Code;[14] that the ordinance,
being based on a valid classification, was
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause;
that aerial spraying was distinct from other
methods of pesticides application because it
exposed the residents to a higher degree of
health risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and that
the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality, and could be invalidated only
upon a clear showing that it had violated the
Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its
assailed decision reversing the judgment of
the RTC.[22] It declared Section 5 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and
unconstitutional for being unreasonable and
oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation
between the purpose of protecting the public
and the environment against the harmful
effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the
imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of
all forms of substances, on the other.
Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is
unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable and
oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police
power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao
City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-
month transition-period to shift to other
modes of pesticide application under Section
5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the
30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof
in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City enacted
Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate
powers... the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology under Section 16 is an issue of
transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. It is under this
milieu that the questioned ordinance should be
appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who
are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due
to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the
motivation behind the enactment of the
ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority
to enact pieces of legislation that will promote
the general welfare, specifically the health of
its constituents. Such authority should not be
construed, however, as a valid license for the
City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems
fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-
defined line separates authority to enact
legislations from the method of accomplishing
the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due
Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted
within the corporate powers of the local
government and passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to
declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it
must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must
not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3)
it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
it must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) it must not be
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unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of
police power, the property rights of individuals
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the
Government.[110] A local government unit is
considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require the interference of
the State; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement
refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution; the second, to the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive
due process requires that a valid ordinance
must have a sufficient justification for the
Government's action.[113] This means that in
exercising police power the local government
unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or
despotically enact the ordinance regardless of
its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance
realistically serves a legitimate public purpose,
and it employs means that are reasonably
necessary to achieve that purpose without
unduly oppressing the individuals regulated,
the ordinance must survive a due process
challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to
truck-mounted boom spraying alone will
consume considerable time and financial
resources given the topography and
geographical features of the plantations.[117]
As such, the conversion could not be
completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other
affected individuals to comply with the
consequences of the ban within the three-
month period under pain of penalty like fine,
imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits would definitely be
oppressive as to constitute abuse of police
power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of
maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of
the ordinance violates due process for being
confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly
deprives all agricultural landowners within
Davao City of the beneficial use of their
property that amounts to taking without just
compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have
thoroughly explained that taking only becomes
confiscatory if it substantially divests the
owner of the beneficial use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal
Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection
requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The guaranty equal protection
secures every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the State's duly constituted
authorities. The concept of equal justice under
the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that
are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental
objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal
application of laws to all persons or things
without distinction,[120] nor intends to
prohibit legislation by limiting the object to
which it is directed or by the territory in which
it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal
protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid
classification.[122] If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from
another.[123] In other word, a valid
classification must be: (1) based on
substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to
all members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue
that the rational basis approach appropriately
applies herein. Under the rational basis test,
we shall: (1) discern the reasonable
relationship between the means and the
purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine
whether the means or the prohibition against
aerial spraying is based on a substantial or
reasonable distinction. A reasonable
classification includes all persons or things
similarly situated with respect to the purpose
of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against
aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence
of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the
residents and degrades the environment.
Given this justification, does the ordinance
satisfy the requirement that the classification
must rest on substantial distinction?We
answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited
to aerial spraying but results from the conduct
of any mode of pesticide application. Even
manual spraying or truck-mounted boom
spraying produces drift that may bring about
the same inconvenience, discomfort and
alleged health risks to the community and to
the environment.[141] A ban against aerial
spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the
process, the ordinance suffers from being
"underinclusive" because the classification
does not include all individuals tainted with the
same mischief that the law seeks to
eliminate.[143] A classification that is
drastically underinclusive with respect to the
purpose or end appears as an irrational means
to the legislative end because it poorly serves
the intended purpose of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the
consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No.
0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
Principles:
Constitutional Law... the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an
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issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications.
Political Law... taking only becomes
confiscatory if it substantially divests the
owner of the beneficial use of its property.
136 Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape Tanon straits, et al. v.
Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., GR
No.180771, April 21, 2016
FACTS:
On 13 June 2002, the Government of the
Philippines, acting through the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical
Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-
102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co.,
Ltd. (JAPEX).
The studies included surface geology, sample
analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and
magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite
surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in
Tañon Strait was conducted.
On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX
converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No.
46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development,
and production of petroleum resources in a
block covering approximately 2,850 sqm.
offshore the Tañon Strait.
From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted
seismic surveys in and around Tañon Strait,
including a multi-channel sub-bottom
profiling covering approximately 751 kms.
to determine the area’s underwater
composition.
During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX
committed to drill one exploration well. Since
the same was to be drilled in the marine
waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan where
the Tañon Strait was declared a protected
seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply
with the Environmental Impact
Assessment requirements under
Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586),
entitled “Establishing an Environmental
Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures
and For Other Purposes.”
On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area
Management Board (PAMB) of the Tañon Strait
issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it
adopted the Initial Environmental Examination
commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably
recommended the approval of the latter’s
application for an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC).
On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII
granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in
Tañon Strait.
From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008,
JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a depth
of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town.
On 17 December 2007, two separate original
petitions were filed commonly seeking that the
implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for
violation of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the
“Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit the
waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined
by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos and
Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal
guardians and friends seeking their protection.
Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are
the Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock,
non-profit, non-governmental organization
established for the welfare of the marginal
fisherfolk in Region VII and
representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk
of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Their contentions are:
A study made after the seismic survey showed
that there is a drastic reduce in fish catch by
50-70% attributable to the destruction of the
“payao” or the artificial reef.
The ECC obtained by the respondents
is invalid because there is no public
consultations and discussions prior to its
issuance.
SC-46 is null and void for having violated
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
considering that there is no general law
prescribing the standard or uniform terms,
conditions, and requirements for service
contracts involving oil exploration and
extraction
FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering
and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from
the point where the oilrig was located, an area
grated than the 1.5-kilometer radius exclusion
zone stated in the Initial Environmental
Examination
The respondents in both petitions are: the late
Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo
Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and
Chairman of Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a
Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield
Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine
agent of JAPEX. Their counter-allegations
are:The “Resident Marine Mammals” and
“Stewards” have no legal standing to file the
petition. SC-46 is constitutional. The ECC was
legally issued. The case is moot and academic
since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June
2008.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON Petitioners have a legal standing
3. WON SC-46 is unconstitutional
RULING
1. No. The Court makes clear that the “moot
and academic” principle is not a magic formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Despite the termination of
SC-46, the Court deems it necessary to resolve
the consolidated petitions as it falls within the
exceptions. Both petitioners allege that SC-46
is violative of the Constitution, the
environmental and livelihood issues raised
undoubtedly affect the public’s interest, and
the respondents’ contested actions are capable
of repetition.
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2. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in
environmental cases has been given a
more liberalized approach. The Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases allow
for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino
citizen to file an action before our courts
for violation of our environmental laws on the
principle that humans are stewards of nature:
“Section 5. Citizen suit. –
Any Filipino citizen in representation of
others, including minors or generations yet
unborn, may file an action
to enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws.
Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall
issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the
reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested
parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case
within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.
The plaintiff may publish the order once in
a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines or furnish all affected
barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749
and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by
their respective provisions. (Emphasis
supplied)”
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years
before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it
has been consistently held that rules of
procedure may be retroactively applied to
actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage and will not violate
any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there
is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases became effective, the
SC had already taken a permissive position on
the issue of
locus standi in environmental cases.
In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be
brought in the name of generations yet unborn
“based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned.” It is also
worth noting that the Stewards in the present
case are joined as real parties in the Petition
and not just in representation of the named
cetacean species.
3. Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution provides in part:
“ The President may enter into
agreement with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to
the general terms and conditions provided
by law, based on real contributions to
the
economic growth and general welfare of
the country.
In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources. The
President shall notify the Congress of every
contract entered into in accordance with
this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.” (Emphases supplied)
The disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by
Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972.
Although the Court finds that PD 87 is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a
general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory to
SC-46, and that the Congress be notified of
such contract, renders it null and void. SC-46
appears to have been entered into and signed
by the DOE through its then Secretary Vicente
S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents
have neither shown nor alleged that Congress
was subsequently notified of the execution of
such contract.
Service contracts involving the exploitation,
development, and utilization of our natural
resources are of paramount interest to the
present and future generations. Hence,
safeguards were out in place to insure that the
guidelines set by law are meticulously
observed and likewise eradicate the corruption
that may easily penetrate departments and
agencies by ensuring that the President
has authorized or approved of the
service
contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is
required that the Petroleum Board, now the
DOE, obtain the President’s approval for the
execution of any contract under said statute.
The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46
vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to serve as a
guide for the Government when executing
service contracts. Under Proclamation No.
2146, the Tañon Strait is an
environmentally critical
area, having been declared as a protected area
in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the
scope of its management plan may only be
implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after
undergoing an Environment Impact
Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of
such activity on its ecological system.
Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only
started to secure an ECC prior to the 2nd sub-
phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of
the exploration well. This means that no
environmental impact evaluation was done
when the seismic surveys were conducted.
Unless the seismic surveys are part of the
management plan of the Tañon
Strait, such surveys were done in violation of
Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1586.
While PD 87 may serve as the general law
upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized,
the exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in the present case may be allowed
only through a law passed by Congress, since
the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there
is no such law specifically allowing oil
exploration and/or extraction in the
Tañon Strait, no energy resource
exploitation and utilization may be done in said
protected seascape.
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LOCAL AUTONOMY
137 Basco vs. Pagcor G.R. No. 91649 May 14,
1991
FACTS: The PH Amusement and Gaming Corp.
was created by PD 1067-A and granted a
franchise under PD 1067-B. Subsequently,
under PD 1869, the Government enabled it to
regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted
by law, under declared policy. But the
petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they
filed the instant petition seeking to annul the
PAGCOR Charter — PD 1869, because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and
order, and because of the following issues:
ISSUES:
(1) WON it waived the Manila City gov't's right
to impose taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law.
(2) WON it has intruded into the LGUs' right to
impose local taxes and license fees, and thus
contrary to the principle of local autonomy
enshrined in the Constitution.
(3) WON it violates the equal protection
clause as it allows some gambling acts but also
prohibits other gaming acts.
(4) WON it violates the Cory gov't's policy of
being away from monopolistic and crony
economy, and toward free enterprise and
privatization.
HELD:
(1) No. The fact that PAGCOR, under its
charter, is exempt from paying tax of any kind
is not violative of the principle of local
autonomy. LGUs' have no inherent right to
impose taxes. LGUs' power to tax must always
yield to a legislative act which is superior
having been passed by the state itself which
has the inherent power to tax. The charter of
LGUs is subject to control by Congress as they
are mere creatures of Congress. Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over LGUs.
And if Congress can grant the City of Manila
the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back the
power.
(2) No. LGUs' right to impose license fees on
"gambling", has long been revoked. As early
as 1975, the power of local governments to
regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise,
licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No.
771 and was vested exclusively on the
National Government. Furthermore, LGUs'
have no power to tax instrumentalities of the
gov't such as PAGCOR which exercises
governmental functions of regulating gambling
activities.
(3) No. The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as
long as the classification is not unreasonable
or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in
equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution. The Constitution does not require
situations which are different in fact or opinion
to be treated in law as though they were the
same.
(4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy
issues. The Court can only declare what the
law is and not what the law should be. Under
our system of government, policy issues are
within the domain of the political branches of
government and of the people themselves as
the repository of all state power. On the issue
of monopoly, the same is not necessarily
prohibited by the Constitution. The state must
still decide whether public interest demands
that monopolies be "regulated" or prohibited.
Again, this is a matter of policy for the
Legislature to decide. The judiciary can only
intervene when there are violations of the
statutes passed by Congress regulating or
prohibiting monopolies.
138 Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace
Panel, (GR No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008)
Facts:
Subject of this case is the Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-
AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases
bearing the same subject matter were
consolidated by this court.
The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements
entered into by and between the government
and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997,
they signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year,
they signed the General Framework of
Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the
MILF attacked a number of municipalities in
Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took
the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte;
hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out
war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was
when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when
the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao
continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this
negotiation proceeded when the government
of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks
resumed and MILF suspended all its military
actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to
the ceasefire between the parties. After the
death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took
over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its
final form was born.
MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP
and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of
this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement,
organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international
laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN
Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e
compact right entrenchment (law of compact,
treaty and order). The body is divided into
concepts and principles, territory, resources,
and governance.
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the
definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous
peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands.
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These people have the right to self-
governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to
which they have exclusive ownership by virtue
of their prior rights of occupation in the land.
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the
Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with
defined territory and with a system of
government having entered into treaties of
amity and commerce with foreign nations." It
then mentions for the first time the
"Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the
Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the
Bangsamoro.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the
BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present
ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in
the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The
territory is divided into two categories, “A”
which will be subject to plebiscite not later
than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which
will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the
signing of another separate agreement.
Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall
have jurisdiction over the internal waters-
15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory;
they shall also have "territorial waters," which
shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up
to the baselines of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) south east and south west of
mainland Mindanao; and that within these
territorial waters, the BJE and the government
shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources. There
will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial
waters; but no provision on the internal
waters.
Included in the resources is the stipulation that
the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries and shall have the option to establish
trade missions in those countries, as well as
environmental cooperation agreements, but
not to include aggression in the GRP. The
external defense of the BJE is to remain the
duty and obligation of the government. The
BJE shall have participation in international
meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN
and the specialized agencies of the UN. They
are to be entitled to participate in Philippine
official missions and delegations for the
negotiation of border agreements or protocols
for environmental protection and equitable
sharing of incomes and revenues involving the
bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain.
The BJE shall also have the right to explore its
resources and that the sharing between the
Central Government and the BJE of total
production pertaining to natural resources is to
be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall
have the right to cancel or modify concessions
and TLAs.
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD
claims that the relationship between the GRP
and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by
shared authority and responsibility. This
structure of governance shall be further
discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a
stipulation which was highly contested before
the court. The BJE shall also be given the right
to build, develop and maintain its own
institutions, the details of which shall be
discussed in the comprehensive compact as
well.
Issues:
1. WON respondents violate constitutional
and statutory provisions on public consultation
and the right to information when they
negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and
2. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated
the Constitution and the laws
Ruling:
The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law
and the Constitution.
The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of
public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State, which directly affects the lives of the
public at large.
As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to
information guarantees the right of the people
to demand information, and integrated therein
is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom
to give information even if nobody demands.
The policy of public disclosure establishes a
concrete ethical principle for the conduct of
public affairs in a genuinely open democracy,
with the people's right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy. These
provisions are vital to the exercise of the
freedom of expression and essential to hold
public officials at all times accountable to the
people.
Also, it was held that such stipulation in the
Constitution is self-executory with reasonable
safeguards —the effectivity of which need not
await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is
essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free
political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the people's will.
The idea of a feedback mechanism was also
sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights
to information and disclosure. And feedback
means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as
per the contention of the respondents. Clearly,
what the law states is the right of the
petitioners to be consulted in the peace
agenda as corollary to the constitutional right
to information and disclosure. As such,
respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of
discretion for failing to carry out the furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed
and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of
the legal authority, and amounts to a
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary
and despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he
cannot invoke of executive privilege because
he already waived it when he complied with
the Court’s order to the unqualified disclosure
of the official copies of the final draft of the
MOA-AD.
In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right
to be involved in matters related to such peace
talks as enshrined in the State policy. The
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MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership
of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,
which could pervasively and drastically result
to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have
the right to participate fully at all levels on
decisions that would clearly affect their lives,
rights and destinies. The MOA-AD is an
instrument recognizing ancestral domain,
hence it should have observed the free and
prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it
failed to do so. More specially noted by the
court is the excess in authority exercised by
the respondent—since they allowed
delineation and recognition of ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement and
compromise; such power cannot be found in
IPRA or in any law to the effect.
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD,
there can be no question that they cannot be
all accommodated under the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying
them:
On matters of the Constitution.
Association as the type of relationship
governing between the parties. The parties
manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the
term association was adapted from the
international law. In international law,
association happens when two states of equal
power voluntarily establish durable links i.e.
the one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, principal, while
maintaining its international status as state;
free association is a middle ground between
integration and independence. The MOA-AD
contains many provisions that are consistent
with the international definition of association
which fairly would deduced that the agreement
vest into the BJE a status of an associated
state, or at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. The court vehemently
objects because the principle of association is
not recognized under the present Constitution.
On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state.
The concept implies power beyond what the
Constitution can grant to a local government;
even the ARMM do not have such recognition;
and the fact is such concept implies recognition
of the associated entity as a state. There is
nothing in the law that contemplate any state
within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part
of Philippine territory for independence. The
court disagrees with the respondent that the
MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a
state in all but name as it meets the criteria of
a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population,
a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other
states. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs
counter to the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.
On the expansion of the territory of the BJE.
The territory included in the BJE includes those
areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to
become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of
the respondents in the MOA-AD that these
areas need not participate in the plebiscite is
in contrary to the express provision of the
Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he
creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that
only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region." Clearly,
assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of
the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings
of the law since those included in its territory
are areas which voted in its inclusion to the
ARMM and not to the BJE.
On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity.
The respondents contend that the powers
vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be
within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of
the constitution and that a mere passage of a
law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE
powers included in the agreement. The Court
was not persuaded. SC ruled that such
conferment calls for amendment of the
Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not
concur with the Constitution. Take for instance
the treaty making power vested to the BJE in
the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only
the President has the sole organ and is the
country’s sole representative with foreign
nation. Should the BJE be granted with the
authority to negotiate with other states, the
former provision must be amended
consequently. Section 22 must also be
amended—the provision of the law that
promotes national unity and development.
Because clearly, associative arrangement of
the MOA-AD does not epitomize national unity
but rather, of semblance of unity. The
associative ties between the BJE and the
national government, the act of placing a
portion of Philippine territory in a status which,
in international practice, has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not
conducive to national unity.
On matters of domestic statutes.
- Provisions contrary to the organic act of
ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the
definition of Bangsamoro people used in the
MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes
between the Bangsamoro people and the
Tribal peoples that is contrary with the
definition of the MOA-AD which includes all
indigenous people of Mindanao.
- Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also,
the delineation and recognition of the ancestral
domain is a clear departure from the
procedure embodied in the IPRA law which
ironically is the term of reference of the MOA-
AD.
On matters of international law.
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principle of international law as part of the law
of the land. In international law, the right to
self-determination has long been recognized
which states that people can freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development.
There are the internal and external self-
determination—internal, meaning the self-
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pursuit of man and the external which takes
the form of the assertion of the right to
unilateral secession. This principle of self-
determination is viewed with respect accorded
to the territorial integrity of existing states.
External self-determination is only afforded in
exceptional cases when there is an actual block
in the meaningful exercise of the right to
internal self-determination. International law,
as a general rule, subject only to limited and
exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of
disposing national territory is essentially an
attribute of the sovereignty of every state.
On matters relative to indigenous people,
international law states that indigenous
peoples situated within states do not have a
general right to independence or secession
from those states under international law, but
they do have rights amounting to what was
discussed above as the right to internal self-
determination; have the right to autonomy or
self-government in matters relating to their
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and
means for financing their autonomous
functions; have the right to the lands,
territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise
used or acquired.
Clearly, there is nothing in the law that
required the State to guarantee the indigenous
people their own police and security force; but
rather, it shall be the State, through police
officers, that will provide for the protection of
the people. With regards to the autonomy of
the indigenous people, the law does not
obligate States to grant indigenous peoples
the near-independent status of a state; since
it would impair the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independent
states.
On the basis of the suspensive clause.
- It was contented by the respondents that
grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since
the provisions assailed as unconstitutional
shall not take effect until the necessary
changes to the legal framework are effected.
The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive
clause runs contrary to Memorandum of
Instructions from the President stating that
negotiations shall be conducted in accordance
to the territorial integrity of the country—such
was negated by the provision on association
incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this,
the suspensive clause was also held invalid
because of the delegated power to the GRP
Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it
will require new legislation or even
constitutional amendments. The legality of the
suspensive clause hence hinges on the query
whether the President can exercise such power
as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace
Panel. Well settled is the rule that the
President cannot delegate a power that she
herself does not possess. The power of the
President to conduct peace negotiations is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is
rather implied from her powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief
Executive, the President has the general
responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more
specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion
and lawless violence.
As such, the President is given the leeway to
explore, in the course of peace negotiations,
solutions that may require changes to the
Constitution for their implementation. At all
event, the president may not, of course,
unilaterally implement the solutions that she
considers viable; but she may not be
prevented from submitting them as
recommendations to Congress, which could
then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant
to the legal procedures for constitutional
amendment and revision.
While the President does not possess
constituent powers - as those powers may be
exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people through initiative
and referendum - she may submit proposals
for constitutional change to Congress in a
manner that does not involve the arrogation of
constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may
be inferred that the President - in the course
of conducting peace negotiations - may validly
consider implementing even those policies that
require changes to the Constitution, but she
may not unilaterally implement them without
the intervention of Congress, or act in any way
as if the assent of that body were assumed as
a certainty. The President’s power is limited
only to the preservation and defense of the
Constitution but not changing the same but
simply recommending proposed amendments
or revisions.
- The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is
not a suspensive condition but is a term
because it is not a question of whether the
necessary changes to the legal framework will
take effect; but, when. Hence, the stipulation
is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes
to the legal framework –which changes would
include constitutional amendments. Simply
put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with
the limits of the President's authority to
propose constitutional amendments, it being a
virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines will
certainly be adjusted to conform to all the
"consensus points" found in the MOA-AD.
Hence, it must be struck down as
unconstitutional.
On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an
international agreement or unilateral
declaration binding on the Philippines under
international law, respondents' act of
guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders
the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not
being a document that can bind the Philippines
under international law notwithstanding,
respondents' almost consummated act of
guaranteeing amendments to the legal
framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute
grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies
not in the fact that they considered, as a
solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a
state within a state, but in their brazen
willingness to guarantee that Congress and the
sovereign Filipino people would give their
imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such
an act would amount to authorizing a
usurpation of the constituent powers vested
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only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention,
or the people themselves through the process
of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.
139 Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines,
659 SCRA 270
FACTS: On August 1, 1989 or two years after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No.
6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces
were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and
Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first
regular elections for the regional officials of the
ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor
later than 90 days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to
further enhance the structure of ARMM under
R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the
regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September
2001.
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by
Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections
to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the
same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA
No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was
not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM
regional elections should have been held
onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected.But
onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,
resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to
coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.With the enactment
into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC
stopped its preparations for the ARMM
elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and
madamus originating from different parties
arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A.
No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the
validity of said laws.
OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering
the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to
continue to perform their functions should
these cases not be decided by the end of their
term onSeptember 30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No.
9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws
amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply
with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and
3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to
become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further
maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the
alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the
people of ARMM, as well as the failure to
adhere to the "elective and representative"
character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM
officials until the officials elected under the
May 2013 regular elections shall have
assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue
that the power of appointment also gave the
President the power of control over the ARMM,
in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of
the Constitution.
ISSUE: Does the 1987 Constitution mandate
the synchronization of elections?
Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution?
HELD: Court dismissed the petition and
affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in
toto. The Court agreed with respondent Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position
that the Constitution mandates
synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5,
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the
1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does
not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the
clear intent towards this objective can be
gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the
extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections.
The objective behind setting a common
termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the
terms of the twelve winning senators with the
least number of votes, is to synchronize the
holding of all future elections whether national
or local to once every three years.This
intention finds full support in the discussions
during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve
synchronization, Congress necessarily has to
reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular
elections (which should have been held in
August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the
fixed schedule of the national and local
elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in
May 2013).
In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court
thus explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of
the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office
of Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the
President and the Vice-President have been
synchronized to end on the same hour, date
and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the
above-mentioned Sections that the term of
synchronization is used synonymously as the
phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office
Tenure on the same day or occasion.This
common termination date will synchronize
future elections to once every three years
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(Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives and the local
officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to
be synchronized with the election for President
and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x xrecords of the
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.
Although called regional elections, the ARMM
elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a "local"
election based on the wording and structure of
the Constitution. Regional elections in the
ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-
governor and regional assembly
representatives fall within the classification of
"local" elections, since they pertain to the
elected officials who will serve within the
limited region of ARMM. From the perspective
of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article Xof the
Constitution entitled "Local
Government."Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15
to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted
to Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No.
10153, acted strictly within its constitutional
mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted
within due constitutional bounds and with
marked reasonableness in light of the
necessary adjustments that synchronization
demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of
a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason
to accord merit to the petitioners claims of
grave abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both
autonomy and the synchronization of national
and local elections are recognized and
established constitutional mandates, with one
being as compelling as the other.If their
compelling force differs at all, the difference is
in their coverage; synchronization operates on
and affects the whole country, while regional
autonomy as the term suggests directly carries
a narrower regional effect although its national
effect cannot be discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is
dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way
arrangements and approaches were adopted
or used in order to adjust to the goal or
objective in sight in a manner that does not do
violence to the Constitution and to reasonably
accepted norms.Under these limitations, the
choice of measures was a question of wisdom
left to congressional discretion.
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No.
10153, for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term as an option that
Congress could have chosen because a
holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. In the case of the terms of local
officials, their term has been fixed clearly and
unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the
fixed term itself and no vagueness that would
allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus,
the term of three years for local officials should
stay at three (3) years as fixed by the
Constitution and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress.
RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend
what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No.
9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only
does is to"appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office."This
power is far different from appointing elective
ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending
on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be
therefore emphasized that the law must be
interpreted as an interim measure to
synchronize elections and must not be
interpreted otherwise.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
140 Santiago vs. COMELEC, 3/19/97
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC
a petition to amend Constitution, to lift term
limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative.
Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and
supervise said people’s initiative the signature-
gathering all over the country. The proposition
is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of
all elective government officials, amending for
the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI,
Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article
8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will
first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least 12% total number of
registered voters in the country, it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication
of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al
moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on
the ground that it is not the initiatory petition
properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed.b.
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems
on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle
on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the
other modes of initiative. This deliberate
omission indicates matter of people’s initiative
was left to some future law.c. COMELEC has no
power to provide rules and regulations for the
exercise of people’s initiative. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.d. People’s initiative is
limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term
limits constitutes a revision.e. Congress nor
any government agency has not yet
appropriated funds for people’s initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
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HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover people’s
initiative on amendments to the Constitution
but, as worded, it does not adequately cover
such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution providing for amendments
to Constitution, is not self-executory. While
the Constitution has recognized or granted the
right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution via PI, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for
whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC,
Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The inclusion of the word “Constitution”
therein was a delayed afterthought. The word
is not relevant to the section which is silent as
to amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other
systems of initiative, the Act does not provide
for the contents of a petition for initiative on
the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the
provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on
the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as
to the latter simply means that the main thrust
of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. The argument that the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
not accepted to be subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum
because it is national in scope. Under Subtitle
II and III, the classification is not based on the
scope of the initiative involved, but on its
nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be
enacted is a national law, or a law which only
Congress can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or
resolution which only legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be
delegated. The recognized exceptions to the
rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the
President; [2] Delegation of emergency
powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the
people at large; [4] Delegation to local
governments; and [5] Delegation to
administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative
body exercising quasi judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority. In every
case of permissible delegation, there must be
a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It
is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate and determinable
– to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Republic Act No.
6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations
on the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative.
It does not have that power under Republic Act
No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of,
or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely
intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist
Delfin’s movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c)
directing or causing the publication of the
unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if
it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon
the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures
of the required number of voters. Without the
required signatures, the petition cannot be
deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC
requires jurisdiction over a petition for
initiative only after its filing. The petition then
is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its
filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en
banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory
petition under RA6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained
or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning
undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere
scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply
to constitutional amendment.
141 Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr. et al. vs. The
Secretary of Justice, GR No. 203335,
February 11, 2014
FACTS: On August 1, 1989 or two years after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No.
6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
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 403 CASE DIGESTS | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE ESTELA ALMA SINGCO | FIRST SEMESTER | 2020-2021
Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces
were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and
Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first
regular elections for the regional officials of the
ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor
later than 90 days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to
further enhance the structure of ARMM under
R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the
regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September
2001.
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by
Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections
to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the
same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA
No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was
not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM
regional elections should have been held
onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected.But
onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,
resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to
coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.With the enactment
into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC
stopped its preparations for the ARMM
elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and
madamus originating from different parties
arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A.
No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the
validity of said laws.
OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering
the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to
continue to perform their functions should
these cases not be decided by the end of their
term onSeptember 30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No.
9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws
amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply
with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and
3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to
become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further
maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the
alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the
people of ARMM, as well as the failure to
adhere to the "elective and representative"
character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM
officials until the officials elected under the
May 2013 regular elections shall have
assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue
that the power of appointment also gave the
President the power of control over the ARMM,
in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of
the Constitution.
ISSUE: Does the 1987 Constitution mandate
the synchronization of elections?
Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution?
HELD: Court dismissed the petition and
affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in
toto. The Court agreed with respondent Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position
that the Constitution mandates
synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5,
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the
1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does
not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the
clear intent towards this objective can be
gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the
extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections.
The objective behind setting a common
termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the
terms of the twelve winning senators with the
least number of votes, is to synchronize the
holding of all future elections whether national
or local to once every three years.This
intention finds full support in the discussions
during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve
synchronization, Congress necessarily has to
reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular
elections (which should have been held in
August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the
fixed schedule of the national and local
elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in
May 2013).
In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court
thus explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of
the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office
of Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the
President and the Vice-President have been
synchronized to end on the same hour, date
and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the
above-mentioned Sections that the term
ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the
phraseholding simultaneouslysince this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office
Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This
common termination date will synchronize
future elections to once every three years
(Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives and the local officials
(under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be
synchronized with the election for President
and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x xrecords of the
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.
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Although called regional elections, the ARMM
elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a "local"
election based on the wording and structure of
the Constitution. Regional elections in the
ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-
governor and regional assembly
representatives fall within the classification of
"local" elections, since they pertain to the
elected officials who will serve within the
limited region of ARMM. From the perspective
of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article Xof the
Constitution entitled "Local
Government."Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15
to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted
to Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No.
10153, acted strictly within its constitutional
mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted
within due constitutional bounds and with
marked reasonableness in light of the
necessary adjustments that synchronization
demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of
a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason
to accord merit to the petitioners claims of
grave abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both
autonomy and the synchronization of national
and local elections are recognized and
established constitutional mandates, with one
being as compelling as the other.If their
compelling force differs at all, the difference is
in their coverage; synchronization operates on
and affects the whole country, while regional
autonomy as the term suggests directly carries
a narrower regional effect although its national
effect cannot be discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is
dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way
arrangements and approaches were adopted
or used in order to adjust to the goal or
objective in sight in a manner that does not do
violence to the Constitution and to reasonably
accepted norms.Under these limitations, the
choice of measures was a question of wisdom
left to congressional discretion.
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No.
10153, for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term as an option that
Congress could have chosen because a
holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. In the case of the terms of local
officials, their term has been fixed clearly and
unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the
fixed term itself and no vagueness that would
allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus,
the term of three years for local officials should
stay at three (3) years as fixed by the
Constitution and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress.
RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend
what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No.
9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only
does is to"appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office."This
power is far different from appointing elective
ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending
on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be
therefore emphasized that the law must be
interpreted as an interim measure to
synchronize elections and must not be
interpreted otherwise.g
These consolidated petitions seek to declare
several provisions of Republic Act (RA) 10175,
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to
and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is
a boon to the need of a current generation for
greater information and facility of
communication. But all is not well with the
system since it could not filter out a number of
persons of ill will who would want to use
cyberspace technology for mischiefs and
crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail
himself of the system to unjustly ruin the
reputation of another or bully the latter by
posting defamatory statements against him
that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up
a user to communication from others, the ill-
motivated can use the cyberspace for
committing theft by hacking into or
surreptitiously accessing his bank account or
credit card or defrauding him through false
representations.
The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for
illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to
pornography guileless children who have
access to the internet.
For these reasons, the government has a
legitimate right to regulate the use of
cyberspace and contain and punish
wrongdoings. The government certainly has
the duty and the right to prevent these
tomfooleries from happening and punish their
perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime
Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted
by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate
certain of their constitutional rights.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues
presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013,
the Court extended the original 120-day
temporary restraining order (TRO) that it
earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining
respondent government agencies from
implementing the cybercrime law until further
orders.
ISSUES:
1. The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1)
fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard
required of laws that interfere with the
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fundamental rights of the people. Is Section
4(a)(1) on Illegal Access unconstitutional?
2. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3)
suffers from overbreadth in that, while is seeks
to discourage data interference, it intrudes into
the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
these guaranteed freedoms.
3. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or
cyber-squatting violates the equal protection
clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it
will cause a user using his real name to suffer
the same fate as those who use aliases or take
the name of another in satire, parody, or any
other literary device.
4. Is Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation
and Coordinating Center (CICC) valid and
constitutional? Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s
power and functions valid and constitutional?
HELD:
1. No. The strict scrutiny standard, an
American constitutional construct, is useful in
determining the constitutionality of laws that
tend to target a class of things or persons.
According to this standard, a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of
a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.
The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that
calls for the application of the strict scrutiny
standard since no fundamental freedom, like
speech, is involved in punishing what is
essentially a condemnable act – accessing the
computer system of another without right. It
is a universally condemnable act.
2. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper
governmental purpose, constitutionally
subject to state regulation, may not be
achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep
its subject broadly, thereby invading the area
of protected speech. Section 4(a)(3) does not
encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply
punishes what essentially is a form of
vandalism, the act of wilfully destroying
without right the things that belong to others,
in this case their computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message. Such
act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms.
Ergo, there is no freedom to destroy other
people’s computer systems and private
documents. All penal laws, like the cybercrime
law, have of course an inherent chilling effect,
an in terrorem effect, or the fear of possible
prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens
who are minded to step beyond the boundaries
of what is proper. But to prevent the State
from legislating criminal laws because they
instil such kind of fear is to render the state
powerless in addressing and penalizing socially
harmful conduct.
3. No, the challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The law is
reasonable in penalizing the act of acquiring
the domain name in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others
who are not ill-motivated of the rightful
opportunity of registering the same. It is the
evil purpose for which one uses the name that
the law condemns.
4. Petitioners mainly contend that Congress
invalidly delegated its power when it gave the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC) the power to formulate a
national cybersecurity plan without any
sufficient standards or parameters for it to
follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue
delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted two tests: the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate, the
only thing he will have to do is to enforce
it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.103
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself
when it directed the CICC to formulate and
implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also,
contrary to the position of the petitioners, the
law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to
follow when it provided a definition of
cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools,
policies, risk management approaches,
actions, training, best practices, assurance
and technologies that can be used to protect
cyber environment and organization and user’s
assets.104 This definition serves as the
parameters within which CICC should work in
formulating the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity
plan is consistent with the policy of the law to
"prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by
facilitating their detection, investigation, and
prosecution at both the domestic and
international levels, and by providing
arrangements for fast and reliable
international cooperation."105 This policy is
clearly adopted in the interest of law and
order, which has been considered as sufficient
standard.106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a)
are likewise valid.
142 Garcia vs, Drilon, GR No. 179267, June 25,
2013
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of
Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition
before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus,
pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and
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economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed
to faithfully comply with the conditions set
forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO
ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO
and extended the same when petitioner failed
to comment on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment as it would be an “axercise
in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO
on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA
9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the
modified TPO for being “an unwanted product
of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the
TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in
his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the
petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing
to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection
clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not
finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law
does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution
143
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA
9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to
Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the
RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority
and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and
if not raised in the trial court, it may not be
considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that
is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; not limited to existing conditions only;
and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favouring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of one’s defense. The grant of the
TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative
of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a
mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention
that by not allowing mediation, the law
violated the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the
court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial
power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable
and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive
power is the power to enforce and administer
the laws. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is an executive,
not a judicial, function. The same holds true
with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies
is consistent with their duty executive
function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied
for lack of merit.
Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No.
178413, March 13, 2008
FACTS:
2 months after the May 14, 2007 national
elections, 11 candidates for senatorial posts
were proclaimed and had taken their oaths
except to the 12thand last post where Pimentel
and Zubiri were the contenders. A new board
of canvassers (Special Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Maguindanao) was created
because Pimentel thru his counsel questioned
some irregularities as to the authenticity and
due execution of Cert. of Canvass. During the
proceedings, they were not allowed to ask
questions and present evidence to prove their
claim. Instead, their questions were noted in
the minutes. Hence, Pimentel a petition for
certiorari and mandamus seeking the court to
issue tro as to enjoin comelec from
canvassing;to annul such proceedings because
it is unconstitutional and illegal proceedings
and; to allow them to raise their objections and
present evidence to prove their claims. All
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petitions were denied. Eventually, Zubiri were
proclaimed, had taken oath and assumed
office. Pimentel protested. Zubiri filed a
motion to dismiss contending that Pimentel
should have filed with Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) for the annulment of his
proclamation.
ISSUES:
1. WON the case of Pimentel is an exception to
the prohibition on pre-proclamation in cases of
Senators
2. WON the comelec has the jurisdiction over
the case
RULING:
1. No. The SC did not recognize the pre-
proclamation case of Pimentel, which could
have prospered if he met the requirement of
law, because SPBOC-Maguindanao is not
Congress nor COMELEC en banc acting as the
NBC, specifically charged by Section 30 of
Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, with the duty to
determine the authenticity and due execution
of the certificates of canvass submitted to it.
In elections for President, Vice-President,
Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the general rule still is that
pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns or
certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As
with other general rules, there are recognized
exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1)
correction of manifest errors; (2) questions
affecting the composition or proceedings of the
board of canvassers; and (3) determination of
the authenticity and due execution of
certificates of canvass as provided in Section
30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369.And, in this case, the
exception applies only to Congress or the
COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not
to local boards of canvassers who must still be
deemed covered by the prohibition on pre-
proclamation controversies.
2. No. As provided in Article VI, Section 17 of
the 1987 Constitution SET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective
members. Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a senator, COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the SET’s
own jurisdiction begins. The word "sole" in
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution
underscores the exclusivity of the electoral
tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests
relating to their respective members. It is
therefore crystal clear that this Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari
and mandamus on matters which may be
threshed out in an election contest. It is the
SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on
the complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does,
a contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now
a member of the Senate.
NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER
144 Abakada Guro Party List vs. Executive
Secretary, September 1, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law
Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act.
Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the
Court issued a TRO enjoining government from
implementing the law in response to a slew of
petitions for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the constitutionality of the new
law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the
common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: “That
the President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added
tax to 12%, after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and one-half percent (1½%)”
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by
authority to the President to increase the VAT
rate is an abdication by Congress of its
exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2),
Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax
levied on the sale or exchange of goods and
services which can’t be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption
delegation since this refers to customs duties,
tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to
the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods.
Petitioners further alleged that delegating to
the President the legislative power to tax is
contrary to republicanism. They insist that
accountability, responsibility and transparency
should dictate the actions of Congress and
they should not pass to the President the
decision to impose taxes. They also argue that
the law also effectively nullified the President’s
power of control, which includes the authority
to set aside and nullify the acts of her
subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by
mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the
President upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by
authority to the Executive to increase the VAT
rate, especially on account of the
recommendatory power granted to the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
The powers which Congress is prohibited from
delegating are those which are strictly, or
inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely
legislative power which can never be delegated
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is the authority to make a complete law-
complete as to the time when it shall take
effect and as to whom it shall be applicable,
and to determine the expediency of its
enactment. It is the nature of the power and
not the liability of its use or the manner of its
exercise which determines the validity of its
delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President
under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to
President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
145
For the delegation to be valid, it must be
complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative
power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increased rate under the
law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1,
2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or
non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual
matters outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the
President. Highlighting the absence of
discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is
used in the common proviso. The use of the
word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its
use in a statute denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President
to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by
Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be
evaded by the President. It is a clear directive
to impose the 12% VAT rate when the
specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance
the authority to ascertain the existence of a
fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the
VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of
the previous year exceeds one and 1½%. If
either of these two instances has occurred, the
Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate,
must submit such information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the
President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not
acting as the alter ego of the President or even
her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of
the legislative department, to determine and
declare the event upon which its expressed will
is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by which legislative
policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities
to gather data and information and has a much
broader perspective to properly evaluate
them. His function is to gather and collate
statistical data and other pertinent information
and verify if any of the two conditions laid out
by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or
unduly delegate power when it describes what
job must be done, who must do it, and what is
the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in
which the legislative process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative
power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible. Congress did not delegate the
power to tax but the mere implementation of
the law.
Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17,
2007
On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or
the Electric Power Industry Act of 2001.
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company
assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA
Law for being an undue delegation of the
power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the
imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all
electricity end users after a period of (1) one
year after the effectively of the EPIRA Law. The
universal charge to be collected would serve as
payment for government debts, missionary
electrification, equalization of taxes and
royalties applied to renewable energy and
imported energy, environmental charge and
for a charge to account for all forms of cross
subsidies for a period not exceeding three
years. The universal charge shall be collected
by the ERC on a monthly basis from all end
users and will then be managed by the PSALM
Corp. through the creation of a special trust
fund.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of
the power to tax on the part of the ERC
HELD:
No, the universal charge as provided for in
section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of the
regulatory power (police power) of the state.
The universal charge under section 34 is
incidental to the regulatory duties of the ERC,
hence the provision assailed is not for
generation of revenue and therefore it cannot
be considered as tax, but an execution of the
states police power thru regulation.
Moreover, the amount collected is not made
certain by the ERC, but by the legislative
parameters provided for in the law (RA 9136)
itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a
rule solely coming from the ERC. The ERC in
this case is only a specialized administrative
agency which is tasked of executing a
subordinate legislation issued by congress;
which before execution must pass both the
completeness test and the sufficiency of
standard test. The court in appreciating
Section 34 of RA 9136 in its entirety finds the
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said law and the assailed portions free from
any constitutional defect and thus deemed
complete and sufficient in form.
146 Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R.
No. 132601 January 19, 1999
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO
staying the execution of petitioner Leo
Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The
public respondent Justice Secretary assailed
the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action
of the SC not only violated the rule on finality
of judgment but also encroached on the power
of the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion
in granting a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite
the fact that the finality of judgment has
already been rendered… that by granting the
TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted
reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The
provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures
after conviction by final judgment. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their
finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative
and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the
simple reason that there is no higher right than
the right to life. For the public respondents
therefore to contend that only the Executive
can protect the right to life of an accused after
his final conviction is to violate the principle of
co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.
147 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166
SCRA 533
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an
accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint
for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines
with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular
No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated
death benefits and burial for the family of
overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity
of the memorandum circular as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that no authority had been
given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization,
the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the
principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and
decided the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation
of powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation
of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is
clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of the
Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration
(POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of
legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry
out the general provisions of the statute. This
is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by “filling in’ the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by
their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department
of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test – the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be
adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative
148 Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte
Cigar, GR No. 166498, June 11, 2009
FACTS:
To implement RA 8240, the BIR issued
Revenue Regulations No. 1-97 which provided
that new brands, or those registered after
January 1, 1997, shall be initially assessed at
their suggested retail prices. Three months
after a new brand is launched in the market, a
survey shall be conducted to determine its
actual net retail price which shall be the basis
in determining its specific tax classification.
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In February 1999, respondents introduced into
the market Astro and Memphis cigarettes and
their variants with suggested net retail prices
below P5.00 per pack and a temporary excise
tax pegged at P1.00 per pack. On May 15,
1999, respondents requested the BIR to
conduct a survey to determine the final tax
classification of said brands of cigarettes.
On February 17, 2003, BIR issued the assailed
Revenue Regulations No. 9-2003, Section 2 of
which amended Revenue Regulations No. 1-
97, by providing for a periodic review every
two years or earlier of the current net retail
prices of new brands of cigars and cigarettes
and their variants to establish and update their
tax classification. Respondents filed a case for
injunction with the trial court assailing the
validity of Revenue Regulations No. 9-2003
and praying for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the implementation of said
regulation insofar as it authorizes the BIR to
update the tax classification of cigarettes
registered after January 1, 1997. The
complaint was later amended to include
Revenue Regulations No. 22-2003
(implementing the revised tax classification).
Respondents asserted that Section 145 of the
NIRC does not give the BIR the power to
reclassify cigarettes introduced into the
market after January 1, 1997, hence, the
reclassification thereof by the BIR constitutes
usurpation of legislative powers.
Petitioners, on the other hand, maintained that
the assailed revenue regulations constitute a
valid exercise of subordinate legislation having
been issued pursuant to the powers of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Secretary of Finance.
ISSUE:
WON there is usurpation of legislative powers
RULING:
The reclassification of Astro and Memphis
pursuant to Revenue Regulations Nos. 9-2003
and 22-2003 constitutes the prohibited
reclassification contemplated in British
American Tobacco v. Camacho. It will be
recalled that these brands were already
classified by the BIR based on their current net
retail prices in 1999 through a market survey.
Consequently, their upward reclassification in
2003 by the BIR through another market
survey is a prohibited reclassification.
In order to implement RA 8240 following its
effectivity on January 1, 1997, the BIR issued
Revenue Regulations No. 1-97, dated
December 13, 1996, which mandates a one-
time classification only. Upon their launch, new
brands shall be initially taxed based on their
suggested net retail price. Thereafter, a survey
shall be conducted within three (3) months to
determine their current net retail prices and,
thus, fix their official tax classifications.
However, the BIR made a turnaround by
issuing Revenue Regulations No. 9-2003,
dated February 17, 2003, which partly
amended Revenue Regulations No. 1-97, by
authorizing the BIR to periodically reclassify
new brands (i.e., every two years or earlier)
based on their current net retail prices.
Thereafter, the BIR issued Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 6-2003, dated March
11, 2003, prescribing the guidelines on the
implementation of Revenue Regulations No. 9-
2003. This was patent error on the part of the
BIR for being contrary to the plain text and
legislative intent of RA 8240.
It is clear that the afore-quoted portions of
Revenue Regulations No. 1-97, as amended by
Section 2 of Revenue Regulations 9-2003, and
Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003
unjustifiably emasculate the operation of
Section 145 of the NIRC because they
authorize the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to update the tax classification of new
brands every two years or earlier subject only
to its issuance of the appropriate Revenue
Regulations, when nowhere in Section 145 is
such authority granted to the Bureau. Unless
expressly granted to the BIR, the power to
reclassify cigarette brands remains a
prerogative of the legislature which
cannot be usurped by the former.
149 Review Center Assos. of the Philippines
vs. Ermita, GR No. 180046, April 2, 2009
FACTS.
Due to a cheating incident which occurred
during the 2006 nursing board exam wherein
a handwritten copy of the questions and
answers were passed around by examinees of
RA Gapuz Reviewing center during the
examination period then PGMA was prompted
to issue EO 566 which authorized the CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of
all review centers and similar entities in the
Philippines. The IRR was also revised pursuant
to this change. The petitioners come to this
court assailing the validity of the EO and the
revised IRR. The SC held that the EO and the
revised IRR were void. Review centers are not
institutions of higher learning, to include them
in the scope of CHED would be to amend the
law. The president does not have the power to
amend laws nor was it granted by the congress
to amend the law through EO 566
ISSUE:
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional
exercise by the Executive as it usurp the
legislative power.
RULING:
Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO 292 speaks
of other powers vested in the President under
the law. The exercise of the President’s
residual powers under this provision requires
legislation, as the provision clearly states that
the exercise of the President’s other powers
and functions has to be "provided for under
the law." There is no law granting the
President the power to amend the functions of
the CHED. The President may not amend RA
7722 through an Executive Order without a
prior legislation granting her such power.
The President may not amend RA 7722
through an Executive Order without a prior
legislation granting her such power.
As head of the Executive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive. He represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that
all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. He has control
over the executive department, bureaus and
offices. This means that he has the authority
to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office, or
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interfere with the discretion of its officials.
Corollary to the power of control, the President
also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus
and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the
work of applying policies and enforcing orders
as determined by proper governmental
organs. It enables the President to fix a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency
and check the official conduct of his agents. To
this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued
by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the
law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy. Just like AO 308 in Ople v.
Torres, EO 566 in this case is not supported by
any enabling law.
150 SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597,
July 16, 2008
FACTS:
The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) was created by RA 9054. Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054 allows ARMM’s
legislature, the ARMM National Assembly, to
create provinces. Thus it enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act
201) creating the province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of eight municipalities in
the first district of Maguindanao. Comelec and
Didagen Dilanganen (Dilanganen) now
questions the constitutionality of Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
delegating to the ARMM National Assembly the
power to create provinces is constitutional.
(NO)
RULING:
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional. Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, is void for being contrary to Section
5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the
creation of legislative r only Congress can
exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot create a province without a legislative
district because the Constitution mandates
that every province shall have a legislative
district.
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
151 BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
1777271, May 4, 2007
FACTS:
A number of organized groups filed the
necessary manifestations and subsequently
were accredited by the Comelec to participate
in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act
(BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal
Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an
Urgent Petition seeking to disqualify the
nominees of certain party-list organizations.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No.
177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of
the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a
list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was
the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution
07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually
declaring the nominees’ names confidential
and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’
basic disclosure request. According to
COMELEC, there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that
requires the Comelec to disclose the names of
nominees, and that party list elections must
not be personality oriented according to
Chairman Abalos.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by
the Constitution to disclose to the public the
names of said nominees.
RULING:
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well to
government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution
reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like
concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the partylist groups
in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the
party-list groups subject of their respective
petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941
reading: "[T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified
list" is certainly not a justifying card for the
Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To
us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec
under said Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning that it extends only to the
certified list which the same provision requires
to be posted in the polling places on election
day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition
to the absolute is to read into the law
something that is not intended. As it were,
there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941
that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or
even publishing through mediums other than
the "Certified List" the names of the party-list
nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the
limited nondisclosure aspect of the provision
as an absolute bar to public disclosure before
the May 2007 elections. The interpretation
thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last
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sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx
Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose
and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups.
152 Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC,
342 SCRA 244, October 6, 2000;
FACTS:
Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC
resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38
additional party-list representatives to
complete the 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI
of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent,
together with the respondent parties, avers
that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in
the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory,
wherein the twenty (20%) percent
congressional seats for party-list
representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation
for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.
RULING:
Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is
not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for
the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled
that the Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at
least 4 inviolable parameters:
(1) the 20% allocation: the combined number
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
20% of the total membership of the House of
Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold: only
those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of
the total votes cast for the party list system
are qualified to a have a seat in the House; (3)
the three seat limit: each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three
seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional;
and (4) proportional representation: the
additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed ―in proportion
to their total number of votes”.
153 Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC,
March 15, 2006
FACTS:
The petition at bar involves the formula for
computing the additional seats due, if any, for
winners in party-list elections. Comelec issued
Resolution No. 6835,1adopting the simplified
formula of "one additional seat per additional
two percent of the total party-list votes.
"Section 11(b) and Section 12 of R.A. 7941
(Party-List System Act) provide that "the
parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled
to one seat each, provided that those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes xxx.
For failure of the respondent Commission to
resolve the substantive issues raised by
petitioners and to cause there-tabulation of
the party-list votes despite the lapse of time,
petitioners PM and BUTIL filed the instant
petition on August 18, 2004. They seek the
issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent Commission: a) to convene as the
National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List
System; b) to declare them as entitled to one
(1) additional seat each; c) to immediately
proclaim their respective second nominees; d)
to declare other similarly situated party-list
organizations as entitled to one (1) additional
seat each; and e) to immediately proclaim
similarly situated parties' second nominees as
duly elected representatives to the House of
Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent COMELEC EN
BANC, as the National Board of Canvassers for
the Party-List System could be compelled by
the Honorable Court to Mechanically apply the
simplified formula
RULING:
Under the Constitution, this Court has original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.[20] We have
consistently ruled that where the duty of the
respondent Commission is ministerial,
mandamus lies to compel its performance. A
purely ministerial act, as distinguished from a
discretionary act, is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to
or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.
The case at bar is one of mandamus over
which this Court has jurisdiction for it is
respondent Commission's ministerial duty to
apply the formula as decided by this Court
after interpreting the existing law on party-list
representation. It is given that this Court has
the ultimate authority to interpret laws and the
Constitution. Respondent Commission has no
discretion to refuse enforcement of any
decision of this Court under any guise or guile.
In any event, it is the averments in the
complaint, and not the nomenclature given by
the parties, that determine the nature of the
action.[24] Though captioned as a Petition for
Mandamus, the same may be treated as a
petition for certiorari and mandamus
considering that it alleges that the respondent
Commission acted contrary to prevailing
jurisprudence, hence, with grave
abuse of discretion and without
jurisdiction. In previous rulings, we have
treated differently labeled actions as special
civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for
reasons such as "justice, equity and fairplay"
and "novelty of the issue presented and its far-
reaching effects." The petition at bar involves
the rightful representation in the House of
Representatives of the marginalized groups by
the party-list winners and their constitutional
claim merits more than a disposition based on
thin technicality.
154 BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271,
April 21, 2009
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the Comelec, sitting
as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the
party-list elections which was held in May
2007. In proclaiming the winners and
apportioning their seats, the Comelec
considered the following rules: (1) In the lower
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house, 80% shall comprise the seats for

legislative districts, while the remaining 20%
shall come from party-list representatives
(Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); (2)
Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-
List System Act, a party-list which garners at
least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-
list elections shall be entitled to one seat; (3)
If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is
entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant
to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula
from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
Comelec; (4) In no way shall a party be given
more than three seats even if it garners more
than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list
election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a
party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being
used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of
the votes cast in the party-list election, is not
supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2%
rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the
Constitution. BANAT also questioned if the
20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory.
If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would
be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share
of party-lists in the lower house.
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another
party-list candidate, questions the validity of
the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It
also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in
the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
However, we cannot allow the
continued existence of a provision in
the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated
20% party-list representatives from
being filled. The three-seat cap, as a
limitation to the number of seats that
a qualified party-list organization may
occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections.
Seats for party-list representatives
shall thus be allocated in accordance
with the procedure used in Table 3
above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in
Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-
list elections, directly or indirectly.
2. 2% threshold in relation to the
distribution of additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared
unconstitutional. The two percent
threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the
attainment of ―the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of
Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats
for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be
observed:

ISSUES: 1) The parties, organizations,

and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest
1. Whether or not the 20% allocation for
based on the number of votes
party-list representatives is
they garnered during the
mandatory. (NO)
elections.
2. Whether or not the 2% threshold to
2) The parties, organizations,
qualify for a seat is valid. (NO)
and coalitions receiving at
3. Whether or not the Constitution
least two percent (2%) of the
prohibit the major political parties
total votes cast for the party-
from participating in the party-list
list system shall be entitled to
elections?
one guaranteed seat each.
3) Those garnering sufficient
RULINGS:
number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1,
1. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. shall be entitled to additional
7941 mandates the filling-up of the seats in proportion to their
entire 20% allocation of party-list total number of votes until all
representatives found in the the additional seats are
Constitution. The Constitution, in allocated.
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, 4) Each party, organization, or
left the determination of the number coalition shall be entitled to
of the members of the House of not more than three (3)
Representatives to Congress: ―The seats.
House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two
In computing the additional seats, the
hundred and fifty members, unless
guaranteed seats shall no longer be
otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20%
included because they have already
allocation of party-list representatives
been allocated, at one seat each, to
is merely a ceiling; party-list
every two-percenter. Thus, the
representatives cannot be more than
remaining available seats for
20% of the members of the House of
allocation as ―additional seats‖ are
Representatives.
the maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
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disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for
a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold
unconstitutional, we do not limit our
allocation of additional seats in Table
3 below to the two-percenters. The
percentage of votes garnered by each
party-list candidate is arrived at by
dividing the number of votes garnered
by each party by 15,950,900, the total
number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First,
the percentage is multiplied by the
remaining available seats, 38, which
is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-
percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds
to a party‘s share in the remaining
available seats. Second, we assign
one party-list seat to each of the
parties next in rank until all available
seats are completely distributed. We
distributed all of the remaining 38
seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-
seat cap to determine the number of
seats each qualified party-list
candidate is entitled.
3. The Constitutional Commission
adopted a multi-party system that
allowed all political parties to
participate in the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No.
7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers
of the Constitution clearly intended
the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. In fact,
the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any
permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the
party-list system to the sectoral
groups. In defining a “party” that
participates in party-list elections as
either “a political party or a sectoral
party, “R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties
will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution,
the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This
Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties
from the party- list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the
law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the
deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political
parties are allowed to establish, or
form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political
purposes. There should not be a
problem if, for example, the Liberal
Party participates in the party-list
election through the Kabataang
Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major
political parties can thus organize, or
affiliate with, their chosen sector or
sectors. To further illustrate, the
Nacionalista Party can establish a
fisherfolk wing to participate in the
party-list election, and this fisherfolk
wing can field its fisherfolk nominees.
Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino
(KAMPI) can do the same for the
urban poor.
155 ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC, GR
No. 203646, April 2, 2013
The Comelec disqualified petitioners from
participating in the May 2013 party-list
elections either by the denial of their new
petitions for registration or by cancellation of
their existing registrations.
Is the Comelec correct?
No. In determining who may participate in the
party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere
to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate
in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and
regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in
party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-
list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may
either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are "marginalized and underrepresented"
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-
defined political constituencies" include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the
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"marginalized and underrepresented"
must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or
that represent those who lack "well-
defined political constituencies," either
must belong to their respective sectors, or
must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of
national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
5. National, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
6.
156 Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793,
April 7, 2010
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment
introduced by RA 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of 250,000 for the
creation of a legislative district. The petitioners
claim that the reconfiguration of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less
than 250,000 or only 176,383. They anchor on
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 5(3). Each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
Petition is denied. There is no specific provision
in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a
legislative district. The 2nd sentence of Sec.
5(3) draws a plain and clear distinction
between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province
to a district on the other. For while a province
is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city
must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. Sec.
5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
While Section 5(3) requires a city to have a
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled
to a representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another 250,000 to
be entitled to an additional district (Mariano v.
Comelec). There is no reason why the Mariano
case, which involves the creation of an
additional district within a city, should not be
applied to additional districts in provinces.
Indeed, if an additional legislative district
created within a city is not required to
represent a population of at least 250,000 in
order to be valid, neither should such be
needed for an additional district in a province,
considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its population.
157 Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No.
188078, January 25, 2010
RA 9591 was passed creating a legislative
district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan.
According to petitioners, the law violates the
minimum population requirement under the
Constitution for the creation of a legislative
district in a city.
Petitioners are correct. RA 9591 is
unconstitutional for being violative of Section
5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution. It requires that for a city to
have a legislative district, the city must have a
population of at least 250,000.
Sec. 5(3). Each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
A city that has attained a population of
250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only
in the "immediately following election." In
short, a city must first attain the 250,000
population, and thereafter, in the immediately
following election, such city shall have a
district representative. There is no showing in
the present case that the City of Malolos has
attained or will attain a population of 250,000,
whether actual or projected, before the 10 May
2010 elections.
Clearly, there is no official record that the
population of the City of Malolos will be at least
250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10
May 2010 elections, the immediately following
election after the supposed attainment of such
population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not
qualified to have a legislative district of its own
under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution.
158 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR
No. 190582, April 8, 2010
Petitioner is an organization composed of men
and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). Comelec refused to
accredit petitioner as a party-list organization
for allegedly advocating immoral doctrines.
The Comelec erred. Governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality." Thus, it was grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for
the Comelec to utilize the Bible and the Koran
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to justify the exclusion of petitioner.
Government must act for secular purposes and
in ways that have primarily secular effects.
The Comelec posits that the majority of the
Philippine population considers homosexual
conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this
constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the
petitioner. However, the Philippine electorate
has expressed no such belief. No law exists to
criminalize homosexual behavior or
expressions or parties about homosexual
behavior. The Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,
therefore, these "generally accepted public
morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.
In refusing petitioner’s accreditation, there
should have been a finding by the Comelec
that the group's members have committed or
are committing immoral acts. Mere allegation
of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability. Moral disapproval,
without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals
from participation in the party-list system.
Comelec’s blanket justifications give rise to the
inevitable conclusion that it targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not
because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting
that implicates our equal protection clause.
LEGISLATIVE PERKS
159 PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689
Jalosjos is confined at the national penitentiary
while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts
is pending appeal.
Can he be allowed to fully discharge the duties
of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense?
No. Election to the position of Congressman is
not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply
to all those belonging to the same class.
Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee
meetings for five (5) days or more in a week
will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant's status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.
The performance of legitimate and even
essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in
prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of
the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.
The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not
to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its
members.
Moreover, the members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if
the reason for the absence is a legitimate one.
The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of
more than six months is not merely authorized
by law, it has constitutional foundations.
160 Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008
A group of more than 300 heavily armed
soldiers led by junior officers of the AFP
stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and
key national officials. Petitioner Trillanes was
charged, along with his comrades, with coup
d'etat. Close to four years later, petitioner won
a seat in the Senate.
Petitioner points out that former Rep. Jalosjos
(in People v. Jalosjos) was already convicted,
albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when
he filed a motion similar to petitioner's
Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a
mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he
continues to enjoy civil and political rights
since the presumption of innocence is still in
his favor.
Can petitioner be allowed to attend senate
sessions?
No. Election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as
the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.
It is impractical to draw a line between
convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for
the purpose of maintaining jail
security; and while pre-trial detainees do not
forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement, the fact of their detention makes
their rights more limited than those of the
public.
All prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence cannot
practice their profession nor engage
in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This
is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention (People v. Maceda). These inherent
limitations, however, must be taken into
account only to the extent that confinement
restrains the power of locomotion or actual
physical movement. It bears noting that in
Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one
month after Maceda, the Court recognized that
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the accused could somehow accomplish
legislative results.
161 Trillanes vs. Marigomen, G.R. No. 179817,
March 14, 2018
Petitioner, as senator, is conducting an
investigation, in aid of legislation, for the
alleged overpricing of the Makati City Hall
Parking Building. Petitioner, during media
interviews at the Senate, particularly during
gaps and breaks in the plenary hearings as
well as committee hearings, expressed his
opinion that based on his office's review of the
documents, private respondent appears to be
a "front" or "nominee" or is acting as a
"dummy" of the actual and beneficial owner of
the estate, VP Binay. Thus, private respondent
filed a Complaint for Damages against
petitioner for the latter's alleged defamatory
statements before the media, specifically his
repeated accusations that private respondent
is a mere "dummy" of VP Binay.
Are petitioner's statements in media interview
covered by the parliamentary "speech or
debate" privilege?
No. Petitioner's remarks fall outside the
privilege of speech or debate under Section 11,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
statements were clearly not part of any speech
delivered in the Senate or any of its
committees. They were also not spoken in the
course of any debate in said fora. It cannot
likewise be successfully contended that they
were made in the official discharge or
performance of petitioner's duties as a
Senator, as the remarks were not part of or
integral to the legislative process.
Parliamentary non-accountability cannot be
invoked when the lawmaker's speech or
utterance is made outside sessions, hearings
or debates in Congress, extraneous to the "due
functioning of the legislative process." To
participate in or respond to media interviews
is not an official function of any lawmaker; it is
not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a
component of the process of enacting laws.
Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to
discharge his duties and legislate without
having to communicate with the press. A
lawmaker's participation in media interviews is
not a legislative act, but is "political in nature,"
outside the ambit of the immunity conferred
under the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987
Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's stance,
therefore, he cannot invoke parliamentary
immunity to cause the dismissal of private
respondent's Complaint. The privilege arises
not because the statement is made by a
lawmaker, but because it is uttered in
furtherance of legislation.
162 Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15,
2009
Petitioners seek to declare the forfeiture of the
Senate seat of Sen. Gordon, by contending
that respondent’s acceptance of the
chairmanship of the Phil. National Red Cross
(PNRC) Board of Governors, he has ceased to
be a member of the Senate, as provided under
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution,
which reads:
Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during
his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the
term for which he was elected.
Is the PNRC a government office or a GOCC for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the Constitution?
No. The PNRC is a privately owned, privately
funded, and privately run charitable
organization. The PNRC is not a GOCC.
The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded,
voluntary, humanitarian organization. The
Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the
Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as
a voluntary organization. Thus, the PNRC must
not only be, but must also be seen to be,
autonomous, neutral and independent in order
to conduct its activities in accordance with the
Fundamental Principles. It is imperative that
the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and
independent in relation to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy,
neutrality, and independence, the PNRC
cannot be owned or controlled by the
government. Indeed, the Philippine
government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC
does not have government assets and does not
receive any appropriation from the Philippine
Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by
contributions from private individuals and
private entities obtained through solicitation
campaigns organized by its Board of
Governors.
The government does not control the PNRC.
Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only six
of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of
Governors are appointed by the President of
the Philippines.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President appoints all officials
and employees in the Executive branch whose
appointments are vested in the President by
the Constitution or by law. The President also
appoints those whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law. Under this Section
16, the law may also authorize the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards to appoint officers lower in rank than
such heads of departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.
The President does not appoint the Chairman
of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any
department, agency, commission or board
appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Executive branch since his appointment does
not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is
not an official or employee of the Judiciary or
Legislature. This leads us to the obvious
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conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an
official or employee of the Philippine
Government. Not being a government official
or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such,
does not hold a government office or
employment. Under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President exercises
control over all government offices in the
Executive branch. If an office is legally not
under the control of the President, then such
office is not part of the Executive branch.
However, RA 95 or the PNRC Charter (enacted
on March 1947) is unconstitutional as it
violates the proscription under the 1935
Constitution against the creation of private
corporations by special law, to wit:
Art. XIV, Sec. 7. The Congress shall not,
except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by
the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.
The elements of government ownership and
control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus,
although the PNRC is created by a special
charter, it cannot be considered a
government-owned or controlled corporation
in the absence of the essential elements of
ownership and control by the government. In
creating the PNRC as a corporate entity,
Congress was in fact creating a private
corporation. However, the constitutional
prohibition against the creation of private
corporations by special charters provides no
exception even for non-profit or charitable
corporations. Consequently, the PNRC
Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a
private corporation and grants it corporate
powers, is void for being unconstitutional.
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352,
163 January 18, 2011
This is a resolution on the Motion for
Clarification and/or for Reconsideration by
respondent on the decision earlier rendered by
the Court on 2009. Respondent raises the
following grounds: (1) as the issue of
constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 95
was not raised by the parties, the Court went
beyond the case in deciding such issue; and
(2) as the Court decided that Petitioners did
not have standing to file the instant Petition,
the pronouncement of the Court on the validity
of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter.
As correctly pointed out in respondent's
Motion, the issue of constitutionality of R.A.
No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was
not among the issues defined in the body of
the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota
of the case. A court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such
question is raised by the parties.
This Court should not have declared void
certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by
P.D. Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter.
Instead, the Court should have exercised
judicial restraint on this matter, especially
since there was some other ground upon which
the Court could have based its judgment.
Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most
adversely affected by this declaration of
unconstitutionality, which was not even
originally a party to this case, was being
compelled, as a consequence of the Decision,
to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under
the Corporation Code, after more than sixty
(60) years of existence in this country.
The purpose of the constitutional provision
prohibiting Congress from creating private
corporations was to prevent the granting of
special privileges to certain individuals,
families, or groups, which were denied to other
groups. Based on the above discussion, it can
be seen that the PNRC Charter does not come
within the spirit of this constitutional provision,
as it does not grant special privileges to a
particular individual, family, or group, but
creates an entity that strives to serve the
common good.
Furthermore, a strict and mechanical
interpretation of Article XII, Section 16 of the
1987 Constitution will hinder the State in
adopting measures that will serve the public
good or national interest. It should be noted
that a special law, R.A. No. 9520, the
Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, and not
the general corporation code, vests corporate
power and capacities upon cooperatives which
are private corporations, in order to implement
the State's avowed policy.
Based on the above, the sui generis status of
the PNRC is now sufficiently established.
Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of the government, nor a
GOCC or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly
explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so
much so that respondent, under the Decision,
was correctly allowed to hold his position as
Chairman thereof concurrently while he served
as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso
facto imply that the PNRC is a "private
corporation" within the contemplation of the
provision of the Constitution, that must be
organized under the Corporation Code.
164 Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)
Principle: The term majority simply means
the greater number or more than half. Who
shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of
the Senate. (Note: splitting of term between
Senate President Drilon and another Senator).
When the Constitution provides that the
Senate President shall be elected by the
majority it does not delineate who comprises
the majority or the minority. The defeated
senator (s) in the election for the Senate
presidency are not necessarily the minority.
FACTS: During the first regular session of the
eleventh Congress, Sen. Fernan was declared
the duly elected President of the Senate. The
following were likewise elected: Senator Ople
as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M.
Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with
the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly
the only other member of the minority, he was
assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the "majority,"
while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
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During the discussion on who should constitute
the Senate "minority," Sen. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven
(7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen
Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
No consensus on the matter was arrived at.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed
the body chat he was in receipt of a letter
signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
senators, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue
thereof, the Senate President formally
recognized Senator Guingona as the
minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and
Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main
that Senator Guingona had been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader, a position that,
according to them, rightfully belonged to
Senator Tatad.
ISSUE: In recognizing Respondent Guingona
as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate
or its officials, particularly Senate President
Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
HELD: No. The interpretation proposed by
petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate
or even from practices of the Upper House. The
term “majority,” when referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply
means the number greater than half or
more than half of any total. In effect, while
the Constitution mandates that the President
of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the
members thereof, it does not provide that
the members who will not vote for him
shall ipso facto constitute the minority,
who could thereby elect the minority leader.
No law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit in the manner
of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter
says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each
House shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary.” The method of
choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the said
constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate
itself, not by the Court.
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS
165 Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268
Principle: Courts cannot inquire into the
allegations that in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules in
the absence of showing that there was
violation of a constitutional provision or private
rights. Parliamentary rules are mere
procedures which may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.
FACTS: A petition was filed challenging the
validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the NIRC. Petitioners, who are
members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of
the House which petitioners claim are
constitutionally-mandated so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of
Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House.
During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made
an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack
of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair
declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano
moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called
out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: “There being none, approved.”
At the same time the Chair was saying this,
Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr.
Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority
Leader’s motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then
already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law
by President Ramos.
ISSUE: WON RA 8240 is null and void because
it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House
HELD: NO. Rules of each House of
Congress are hardly permanent in
character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have
no concern with their observance. They may
be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to them does not have
the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members has agreed
to a particular measure. But this is subject
to qualification. Where the construction to be
given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.
In this case, no rights of private individuals are
involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose
to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of
internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is
not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
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questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of
quorum had already been defeated, as the roll
call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying
the business of the House.
166 Baguilat vs. Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757,
July 25, 2017
FACTS: Petitioner Baguilat filed a petition for
mandamus praying that respondents Alvarez
et. al be compelled to recognize: Rep. Baguilat
as the Minority Leader of the 17th Congress of
the House of Representatives and petitioners
as the legitimate members of the Minority.
Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing
tradition" of the House – where the candidate
who garnered the second second-highest
number of votes for Speakership automatically
becomes the Minority Leader. However,
despite numerous follow-ups from
respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never
recognized as such.
Representative Abayon manifested before the
Plenary that on those who did not vote for
Speaker Alvarez convened and elected Rep.
Suarez as the Minority Leader. Thereafter,
Majority Leader Fariñas moved for the
recognition of Rep. Suarez as the Minority
Leader.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may be
compelled via a writ of mandamus to recognize
Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the
House of Representatives and petitioners as
the only legitimate members of the House
Minority.
HELD: NO. The petition is without merit.
Under Section 16 of Article VI, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall be elected
by a majority vote of its entire membership.
Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have
officers other than the Speaker, and that
the method and manner as to how these
officers are chosen is something within
its sole control. In the case of Defensor-
Santiago v. Guingona, which involved a
dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader
during the 11th Congress (1998-2001), the
Supreme Court observed that "while the
Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing x x x (a Speaker of the House of
Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on
the manner of selecting the other officers [of
the Lower House). All that the Charter says is
that each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.' [As such],
the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise
of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by
the House of Representatives itself, not by the
Court."
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution vests in the House of
Representatives the sole authority to,
inter alia, "determine the rules of its
proceedings." These "legislative rules,
unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In
fact, they 'are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.' Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are of no concern
to the courts, for said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body at will,
upon the concurrence of a majority of the
House of Representatives." Hence, as a
general rule, “this Court has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of
Constitutional principles that it is bound to
protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents
the Court from prying into the internal
workings of the House of Representatives."
DISCIPLINING MEMBERS
167 Osmeña vs Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144
Principle: The House of Representatives is the
judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior.
The courts will not assume jurisdiction in any
case which will amount to an interference by
the judicial department with the legislature.
FACTS: Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr.,
herein petitioner, delivered his privilege
speech before the House making serious
imputations of bribery against the President of
the Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution
was issued authorizing the creation of special
House Committee to investigate the truth of
the charges made against the President, to
summon petitioner to substantiate his
charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so,
to require petitioner to show cause why he
should not be punished by the House.
Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking
for the annulment of said resolution on the
ground that it infringes his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in the House. Meanwhile, the Special
Committee continued with its proceeding, and
after giving petitioner a chance to defend
himself, found the latter guilty of seriously
disorderly behavior. A House resolution was
issued and petitioner was suspended from
office for 15 months.
Thereafter, respondents filed their answer
challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to
entertain the petition, and defended the power
of Congress to discipline its members with
suspension.
ISSUE: Whether the House Resolution
violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted
parliamentary immunity for speeches
HELD: NO. Section 15, Article VI of our
Constitution provides that “for any speech or
debate” in Congress, the Senators or Members
of the House of Representative “shall not be
questioned in any other place.” Our
Constitution enshrines parliamentary
immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. t guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear
of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does
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not protect him from responsibility before
the legislative body itself whenever his
words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches
attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be
discipline, We believe, however, that the
House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it,
but also because the matter depends mainly
on factual circumstances of which the House
knows best but which cannot be depicted in
black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts.
168 People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo G.
Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress
who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness
on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed this motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate
of sovereign will." He states that the
sovereign electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-
elected by his constituents, he has the duty to
perform the functions of a Congressman. He
calls this a covenant with his constituents
made possible by the intervention of the State.
He adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from
pending criminal cases. Jalosjos also invoked
the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo
v. Santos.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant should be
allowed to discharge mandate as member of
the House of Representatives
HELD: NO! Doctrine of condonation does not
apply to criminal cases. The Aguinaldo case
involves the administrative removal of a public
officer for acts done prior to his present term
of office. It does not apply to imprisonment
arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive
suspension is not removal, confinement
pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or,
otherwise, disqualified.
His election as congressman did not thereby
amount to a condonation of his offense;
neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of
his case, to be free from confinement and to
be allowed to attend sessions of congress, for
the people elected him with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action and
movement. They did so with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To allow accused-appellant
to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings will virtually make him a
free man.
It was never the intention of the framers of the
constitution to shield a member of congress
from the consequences of his wrongdoings. A
member of Congress could only invoke the
immunity from arrests for relatively minor
offenses, punishable at most by correctional
penalties.
169 Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
89989
FACTS: Atty. Paredes, provincial attorney of
Agusan del Sur was granted land through free
patent. Later, a former Mayor of Agusan filed
a criminal complaint charging Atty. Paredes
with having violated Section 3 (a) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)
because he allegedly used his office as
Provincial Attorney to influence, persuade, and
induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the
District Land Office in Agusan del Sur, to
favorable indorse his free patent application.
In the meantime, Paredes was elected
Governor of Agusan del Sur and the free
patent was reverted back to public domain.
Information was filed and warrant of arrest
was issued against Paredes. He refused to post
bail “in protest against the injustice to him as
Governor”. A petition for habeas corpus was
filed by the wife of Paredes, alleging that the
warrant of her husband’s arrest was void
because the PI was void and that the crime
charged in the information against him had
already prescribed.
ISSUE: WON the arrest was void because the
PI was conducted without notice to the
accused
HELD: No, it was not void. The absence of PI
does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the
case nor impair the validity of the Information
or otherwise render it defective. The remedy is
to demand that PI be conducted before
entering his plea, and the court should
suspend trial and order the fiscal to conduct
PI. Habeas corpus would not lie after the
Warrant of Commitment was issued by the
Court on the basis of the Information filed
against the accused. A writ of habeas corpus
will not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in custody of an
officer under a process issued by the court
which has jurisdiction to do so.
NOTE: There is no Constitutional Law related
topic discussed in this case. But Judge Cinco
notes: Suspension imposed by Congress
to a colleague is distinct from suspension
spoken in Section 13 of RA 3019 which is
not a penalty but a preliminary preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that
the latter is not being imposed for
misbehavior as a member of Congress.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
170 Vera vs. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543
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Principle: The members of the Senate
validly suspended the oath-taking of the 3
senators elect. This does not fall within
the powers of the electoral tribunal. The
latter has jurisdiction only over electoral
contests in which contestant seeks not only to
oust the intruder, but also have himself
inducted into office.
FACTS: The Commission on Elections
submitted last May 1946 to the President and
the Congress a report regarding the national
elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason
of certain specified acts of terrorism and
violence in certain provinces, namely
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac,
the voting in said region did not reflect the
accurate feedback of the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a
pendatum resolution was approved
referring to the report ordering that the
three senators, namely: Jose O. Vera,
Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had
been included among the 16 candidates for
senator receiving the highest number of votes
and as proclaimed by the Commissions on
Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated,
as members of the chamber, pending the
termination of the protest filed against
their election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an
action against their colleagues who instituted
the resolution, praying for its annulment and
allowing them to occupy their seats and to
exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents
assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
ISSUE: Whether administration of oath and
the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and
Jose Romero should be deferred pending
hearing and decision on the protests lodged
against their elections.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court refused to
intervene, under the concept of separation of
powers, holding that the case was not a
“contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent
right of the legislature to determine who
shall be admitted to its membership.
Following the powers assigned by the
Constitution, the question raised was
political in nature and therefore not under
the juridical review of the courts.
The members of the Senate validly suspended
the oath-taking of the 3 senators elect. This
does not fall within the powers of the electoral
tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over
electoral contests in which contestant seeks
not only to oust the intruder, but also have
himself inducted into office.
171 LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs.
Nograles; Paras vs. Nograles & Villando
vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32 April
1, 2009
Principle: Once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
the election contests relating to his election,
returns and qualifications, ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. The
proclamation of a winning candidate divests
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters
pending before it at the time of the
proclamation.
FACTS: At the core of these contentious
consolidated petitions are: (1) the Joint
Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying
Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong)
from running as a congressional candidate
for the First District of Negros Oriental; (2) the
COMELEC En Banc Resolution affirming her
disqualification; and (3) the COMELEC En
Banc Resolution resolving that all
pending incidents relating to her
qualifications should now be determined
by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET)
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st
District of Negros Oriental. Two petitions for
her disqualification were filed by Napoleon
Camero and Renald Vilando on the grounds of
her lacking of citizenship which would
invalidate her candidacy. COMELEC
consolidated such complaints but the cases
remained pending when the elections were
conducted. Limkaichong thereafter emerged
as the victor from opponent Paras. Paras filed
to COMELEC for the suspension of
Limkaichong’s proclamation as winner.
Thereafter, COMELEC En Banc issued
Resolution 8062 not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with
pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the
hearing and resolution of the involved cases.
LIMKAICHONG filed a motion for
reconsideration and to lift the suspension.
Later, PBOC proclaimed her as First District
Representative. Numerous cases followed suit
reaching the Supreme Court in a petition for
certiorari.The Court granted it and
dismissed all petitions, including Biraogo’s
petition.
ISSUE: Upon proclamation, would it have
been the HRET and not COMELEC whom have
had the jurisdiction over the disqualification
case?
HELD: Yes. It should be the HRET’s
jurisdiction. The court has invariable held that
once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
172 Vilando v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
Nos. 192147 & 192149, [August 23,
2011], 671 PHIL 524-540)
FACTS: Limkaichong ran as a representative in
the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Because of
this, her opponent, Paras and some other
concerned citizens filed disqualification cases
against Limkaichong. They alleged that
Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of
the Philippines because when she was born,
her father was still a Chinese and that her
mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue
of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father.
During the pendency of the case against
Limkaichong before the COMELEC, election
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day came and votes were cast. Results came would operate as a collateral attack on the
in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. citizenship of the father which is not
permissible. (Aug. 23, 2011).
COMELEC after due hearing declared
Limkaichong as disqualified. On the following Accordingly, after the proclamation of the
days however, notwithstanding their winning candidates in the congressional
proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the elections, the remedy of those who may assail
COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing one’s eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or
Limkaichong as the winner of the recently disqualification is to file before the HRET a
conducted elections. This is in compliance with petition for an election protest, or a petition for
Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy- quo warranto, within the period provided by
guidelines of not suspending the proclamation the HRET Rules.
of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases which shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the hearing
and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a
petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong
assailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she
is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the
HRET which has the jurisdiction over the
matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC
agreed with Limkaichong.

ISSUE: WON the proclamation done by

COMELEC is valid – YES
WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction
over the case – YES

HELD:
(1) YES. The proclamation of Limkaichong was
valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the
COMELEC En Banc her motion for
reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the
incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration effectively suspended the
execution of the COMELEC’s Joint Resolution.
Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment to the
valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the
winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure

(2) YES. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction

after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has
invariably held that once a winning candidate
has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then
that the proclamation of a winning candidate
divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his
qualification should now present his case in a
proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and
decide a case involving a Member of the House
of Representatives with respect to the latter’s
election, returns and qualifications. The use of
the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral
Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests
relating to its members

Lifted from J5’s notes: Clearly under law and

jurisprudence, it is the State thru its
representatives designated by statute, that
may question the illegally or invalidly procured
certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. HRET no matter
how complete and exclusive, does not carry
with it authority to delve into the legality of the
judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of
disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise
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