EN BANC
Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and
G.R. No. 135981               September 29, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
It is a hornbook rule that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire
records to review. The Court may pass upon all relevant issues,
including those factual in nature and those that may not have been
brought before the trial court. This is true especially in cases
involving the imposition of the death penalty, in which the accused
must be allowed to avail themselves of all possible avenues for their
defense. Even novel theories such as the "battered woman
syndrome," which is alleged to be equivalent to self-defense, should
be heard, given due consideration and ruled upon on the merits, not
rejected merely on technical or procedural grounds. Criminal
conviction must rest on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Case
For resolution by the Court is an Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by
Appellant Marivic Genosa y Isidro in connection with the automatic
review of the September 25, 1998 "Judgment" 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Ormoc City2 in Criminal Case No. 5016-0. The RTC
found her guilty of parricide aggravated by treachery and sentenced
her to death.
In an Information3 dated November 14, 1996, Provincial Prosecutor I
Rosario D. Beleta charged appellant-movant with parricide allegedly
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the
use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided
herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blown[ ]up & swollen w/ evident post- mortem lividity.
Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of
the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of
the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of
the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of
the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial
hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/
shedding of the epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."
After arraignment and trial, the court a quo  promulgated its
Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the
Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide as provided under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659,
and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance
and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused
with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the
deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine
currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."
The Antecedents
Prior to the filing of her Appeal Brief, appellant submitted an Urgent
Omnibus Motion,4 to bring "to the attention of the x x x Court certain
facts and circumstances which, if found valid, could warrant the
setting aside of [her] conviction and the imposition of the death
penalty."
Appellant alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding
that she had lied about the means she employed in killing her
husband. On the contrary, she had consistently claimed that she had
shot her husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled that the cause of
his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe
intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital
bone," which resulted from her admitted act of "smashing" him with a
pipe. Such conclusion was allegedly unsupported by the evidence on
record, which bore no forensic autopsy report on the body of the
victim.
Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of
repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her
husband, the trial court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory.
She claims that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of
killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense. Furthermore, she
argues that if she "did not lie about how she killed her husband, then
she did not lie about the abuse she suffered at his hands."
She thus prays for the following reliefs:5
"1. The Honorable Court allow an exhumation of the body of
the victim, Ben M. Genosa, and a re-examination of the
cause of death.
2. The Honorable Court submit accused-appellant for
examination by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists of
the Court to determine her state of mind at the time of the
killing of her spouse, Ben M. Genosa.
3. Thereafter, the Honorable Court allow the reports of the
psychologists and psychiatrists to form part of the records of
the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the
alternative, to allow a partial re-opening of the case before a
lower court in Metro Manila to admit the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists."
On August 22, 2000, the solicitor general, on behalf of the State, filed
his Comment,6 which substantially objected to the Motion on the
ground that appellant had not been "deprived of her right to due
process, substantial or procedural."
The Issues
In brief, the issues for our resolution are (1) whether the body of the
victim should be exhumed and reexamined in order to ascertain the
cause of his death, and (2) whether the appellant should be
examined by qualified psychologists or psychiatrists in order to
determine her state of mind at the time of the killing.
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants in part the Motion of appellant. We remand the
case to the RTC for the reception of evidence from qualified
psychologists or psychiatrists whom the parties may present to
establish her state of mind at the time of the killing.
First Issue:  No Need for a Reexamination of Cause of Death
Accused-appellant seeks the exhumation of the victim's body to be
able to determine his exact cause of death, assailing the court a
quo's conclusion that he was "smashed or beaten at the back of his
head" rather than shot, as claimed by appellant.
Considering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her
husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of
shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that
exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of
said acts actually caused the victim's death. There is no need to
exhume the body at this time and conduct an autopsy thereon for the
purpose.
Moreover, the matter of proving the cause of death should have
been made before the trial court. Time and again, we have said that
this Court is not a trier of facts. Neither will it authorize the firsthand
reception of evidence, where the opportunity to offer the same was
available to the party during the trial stage. Consistent with this
principle alone, the prayer sought by appellant for the exhumation of
the victim's body cannot be granted.
Second Issue: The Need to Determine Appellant's State of Mind at
the Time of the Killing
In seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and
psychiatrists to bring into evidence the abuse inflicted upon her;
[and] to determine whether such abuse will support the 'battered
woman syndrome'," the appellant brings to the fore a novel defense
theory. Through Counsel Katrina Legarda, she asks the Court to "re-
evaluate the traditional elements" used in determining self-defense
and to consider the "battered woman syndrome" as a viable plea
within the concept of self-defense.
Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the
woman believes that the violence was her fault; (2) she has an
inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) she
fears for her life and/or her children's lives; and (4) she has an
irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and
omniscient.7 Living in constant danger of harm or death, she knows
that future beatings are almost certain to occur and will escalate over
time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer
makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when
it will seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence
and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb to her
helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem
other than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an
existing or impending lethal aggression and thus would have no
opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a
less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.
Appellant further alleges that the syndrome is already a recognized
form of self-defense in the United States and in Europe. In the US
particularly, it is classified as a post-traumatic stress disorder, rather
than a form of mental illness. 8 It has been held admissible in order to
assess a defendant's perception of the danger posed by the abuser. 9
In view of the foregoing, Appellant Genosa pleads that she be
allowed to present evidence to prove that her relationship with her
spouse-victim had afflicted her with the syndrome. Allegedly, an
expert can explain how her experiences as a battered woman had
affected her perception of danger and her honest belief in its
imminence, and why she had resorted to force against her batterer.
The records of the case already bear some evidence on domestic
violence between appellant and her deceased husband. A defense
witness, Dr. Dino Caing, testified that she had consulted him at least
six (6) times due to injuries related to domestic violence and twenty-
three (23) times for severe hypertension due to emotional
stress.10 Even the victim's brother and mother attested to the
spouses' quarrels every now and then. The court a quo, however,
simplistically ruled that since violence had not immediately preceded
the killing, self-defense could not be appreciated.
Indeed, there is legal and jurisprudential lacuna with respect to the
so-called "battered woman syndrome" as a possible modifying
circumstance that could affect the criminal liability or penalty of the
accused. The discourse of appellant on the subject in her Omnibus
Motion has convinced the Court that the syndrome deserves serious
consideration, especially in the light of its possible effect on her very
life. It could be that very thin line between death and life or even
acquittal. The Court cannot, for mere technical or procedural
objections, deny appellant the opportunity to offer this defense, for
any criminal conviction must be based on proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Accused persons facing the possibility of the
death penalty must be given fair opportunities to proffer all defenses
possible that could save them from capital punishment.
In People v. Parazo,11 after final conviction of appellant therein, this
Court granted his Urgent Omnibus Motion and allowed him to
undergo mental, neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and
evaluation to determine whether he was a deaf-mute. Based on
findings that he really was deaf and mute, yet unaided during the trial
by an expert witness who could professionally understand and
interpret his actions and mutterings, the Court granted him re-
arraignment and retrial. It justified its action on the principle that "only
upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may [the accused] be
consigned to the lethal injection chamber."
More recently in People v. Estrada,12 we likewise nullified the trial
proceedings and remanded the case "to the court a quo for a
conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a
determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further
proceedings." In that case, the defense counsel had moved to
suspend the arraignment of the accused, who could not properly and
intelligently enter a plea because of his mental defect, and to confine
him instead in a psychiatric ward. But the trial court denied the
Motion, after simply propounding questions to the accused and
determining for itself that he could understand and answer them
"intelligently." After trial, he was convicted of murder aggravated by
cruelty and thus sentenced to death.
In nullifying the trial proceedings, this Court noted: 13
"The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of
accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or
psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized
knowledge of determining the state of a person's mental health. To
determine the accused-appellant's competency to stand trial, the
court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the
examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the
latter's history of mental illness."
It was held that in denying appellant an examination by a competent
medical expert, the trial court practically denied him a fair trial prior to
conviction, in violation of his constitutional rights.
Moreover, proof of insanity could have exempted appellant from
criminal liability. If the accused had not performed the act voluntarily,
then he could not have been criminally liable. The Court, through Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno, emphasized:
"The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally
liable for a felony committed by him. Under the classical theory on
which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is
human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an
absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he
commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is
presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom,
intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired."14
In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether
Appellant Genosa had acted freely, intelligently and voluntarily when
she killed her spouse. The Court, however, cannot properly evaluate
her battered-woman-syndrome defense, absent expert testimony on
her mental and emotional state at the time of the killing and the
possible psychological cause and effect of her fatal act. Unlike
in Parazo, we cannot simply refer her for proper psychological or
psychiatric examination and thereafter admit the findings and
evaluation as part of the records of the cases for purposes of
automatic review. The prosecution has likewise the right to a fair trial,
which includes the opportunity to cross-examine the defense
witnesses and to refute the expert opinion given. Thus, consistent
with the principle of due process, a partial reopening of the case is
apropos, so as to allow the defense the opportunity to present expert
evidence consistent with our foregoing disquisition, as well as the
prosecution the opportunity to cross examine and refute the same.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion of Appellant Marivic
Genosa is PARTLY GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to
the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea, within
ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this
Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN
and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135981             January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for
acquittal on a novel theory -- the "battered woman syndrome"
(BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven
facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because
there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected
attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete
or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on
appellant constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke
down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
"psychological paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power,
thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and
10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating
circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to
have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-
spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with
their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to
vindicate her life and her unborn child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances
arising from BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody
on parole, because she has already served the minimum period of
her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch
35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the
Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly
considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y
Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding
treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none
of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused
with the penalty of DEATH.
 "The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of
the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral
damages."2
The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at
Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and
wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the
use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had
provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following
wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-
mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and
tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the
occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of
the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels
on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of
the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe
intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest,
posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."4
With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty
during her arraignment on March 3, 1997. 6 In due course, she was
tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the
prosecution's version of the facts in this wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on
November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived
with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a
time, Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with
them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben
rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang,
Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children,
namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a
cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2)
bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass
Ben's house before reaching his. When they arrived at the
house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to
Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house,
while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the
evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not
see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of
the Genosas' rented house, he heard her say 'I won't
hesitate to kill you' to which Ben replied 'Why kill me when I
am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive.
Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas' rented
house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog,
her close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters
from her house, to look after her pig because she was going
to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked
Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie
Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida
was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant
going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one
carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to
the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50)
meters behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant
and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no
conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want
to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga
told him about the foul odor emanating from his house being
rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out
the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the
inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him,
Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel
saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but
only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it.
Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the
offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless
body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a
blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of
his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent
word to the mother of Ben about his son's misfortune. Later
that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the
dead body as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo
Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at Isabel,
Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the
Genosas' rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1
Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded
to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found
the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a
bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had
his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side
of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where
Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured
three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one
and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop
valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in
disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben,
because of its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of
the house before the postmortem examination was
conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A
municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for
medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been
dead for two to three days and his body was already
decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo
yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide
later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of
Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to
severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture
of the occipital [bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going
home after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that
her husband who was not home yet might have gone
gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño,
appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and
taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They
found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas' house.
Ecel went home despite appellant's request for her to sleep
in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him,
even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him
and instead attended to their children who were doing their
homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben
switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife,
cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching
television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack
her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands
 and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and
screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant
packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave.
Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben
allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the
bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told
her 'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.'
Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a gun
inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he
got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She
however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him
to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed'
Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the
blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her
husband by shooting him. She supposedly 'distorted' the
drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on
the spot, though, but in the bedroom."7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on
November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had
graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was
working, at the time of her husband's death, as a Secretary
to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three
(3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary
school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were
classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of
parents were against their relationship, but Ben was
persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her.
Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner
at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's
parents, together with Ben's brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In
the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'. But
apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often
and their fights would become violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he
could not remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said
that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben
would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on
him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic
holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his
left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but
after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Ben's
forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early
morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid
again and saw blood from Ben's forehead and Marivic
holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after
Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben's forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified
too, saying that Ben and Marivic married in '1986 or 1985
more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as the
marriage went along, Marivic became 'already very
demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth
of Marivic's two sons, there were 'three (3)
misunderstandings.' The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben
with a table knife through his left arm; the second incident
was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the
forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye was also
affected. It was wounded and also the ear' and her husband
went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when
the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang
and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered as 'the bone
cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar
clinic for medical intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on
November 15, 1995 'After we collected our salary, we went
to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed there for
three (3) hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and drank
beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they
bought barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic
was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after
which he went across the road to wait 'for the runner and the
usher of the masiao game because during that time, the
hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for
the ushers and runners so that I can place my bet.' On his
way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the
Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their
house was one 'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his
fighting cocks. Basobas' testimony on the root of the quarrel,
conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying 'I will
never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me
when I am innocent.' Basobas thought they were joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the
road from the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he
and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and
Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben 'before when he
was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that he should
leave her and that Ben would always take her back after she
would leave him 'so many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but
it was a long time that they had been quarreling. He said
Ben 'even had a wound' on the right forehead. He had
known the couple for only one (1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben
became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he
provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin
her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would
often run home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and
seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her
forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would
seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra.
Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon
her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat
her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least
three times a week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely
related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she
received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor]
of the Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he
overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was
shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the
spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben had Marivic in a
choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily
to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that
testified to by Arturo Busabos.8 )
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother
of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor
Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He
peeped through the window of his hut which is located
beside the Genosa house and saw 'the spouses grappling
with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both
hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said
after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter
the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as
he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the
next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the
Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house
was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his
niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14
years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic
confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would
use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house
and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be
pacified 'if somebody would come.' He testified that while
Ben was alive 'he used to gamble and when he became
drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, 'Teody'
because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,'
which means 'let's go and look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia
further testified that Ben 'would box his wife and I would see
bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the
witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a
knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that once he
saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily
testified only that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a
cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of November
15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to
look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several
taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She
accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with
her in the Genosa house 'because she might be battered by
her husband.' When they got to the Genosa house at about
7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that 'her husband was
already there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was
drunk 'because of his staggering walking and I can also
detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and she heard
them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the
same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss
Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had
asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid
every time her husband would come home drunk. At one
time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in
the evening when Ben arrived because the couple 'were very
noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like
a vase.' She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked
the door. When Ben couldn't get in he got a chair and a knife
and 'showed us the knife through the window grill and he
scared us.' She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no
one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she
left Marivic's house on November 15, 1995, the couple were
still quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic
were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic
was his patient 'many times' and had also received treatment
from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989
until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of
physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were
reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital.
The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and
considered him an expert witness.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and
hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate
occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD
Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the
consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of
physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a
psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries were
directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a
psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological
make-up of the patient, 'whether she is capable of
committing a crime or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place
where the Genosas resided, testified that about two (2)
months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00
in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the
Genosa couple who were experiencing 'family troubles'. He
told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear from
her again and assumed 'that they might have settled with
each other or they might have forgiven with each other.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night it was her husband who began the
provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she
would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be
admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was
suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby
was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to
leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would
always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that
the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her
that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent
girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a
gun; she said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels
could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas
lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day,
November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in
Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field
researcher under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell
anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have
a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San
Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she
threw the gun away; that she did not know what happened to
the pipe she used to 'smash him once'; that she was
wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2)
hours after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and
dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had
packed his things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18,
1995 after an investigation was made of the foul odor
emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified
to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense
witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal
Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and
among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all
medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers
and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic
pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and
passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the
Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw 'some
police officer and neighbor around.' She saw Ben Genosa,
covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his
back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the
injury involving the skeletal area of the head' which she
described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her examination,
Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify
as to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed
against Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of
PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and
evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate
husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which
caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997,
21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November
1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6
August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the
day of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a
JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt'
of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an
aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the
ultimate penalty of DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon
automatic review and, under date of 24 January 2000,
Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a
Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a
precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant's Briefs
he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own,
were not conformed to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty.
Tabucanon and permitted the entry of appearance of
undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa
wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice,
coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip,
Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office,
wherein she submitted her 'Brief without counsels' to the
Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4
February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and
stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 19 February
2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the
cause of his death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa
by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally,
to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo  to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter
of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic
pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of
the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings,
Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating
with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the
Honorable Court partly granted Marivic's URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial
court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the 'battered woman syndrome' plea,
within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to
forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together
with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary
evidence, if any, submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared
and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-
Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a
quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra.
Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the
Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical
psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own private clinic
and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a
professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology
Department of the Assumption College; a member of the
faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and
St. Joseph's College; and was the counseling psychologist of
the National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology
from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in
Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a
PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the
Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a
member of the American Psychological Association. She is
the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists
from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic
Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the
Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in
domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the
Davide Commission doing research about Military
Psychology. She has written a book entitled 'Energy Global
Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan
Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has
testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first
case of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on
the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families
involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked
at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and
discovered that 'there are lots of variables that cause all of
this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to
psychiatric disorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a
lot of incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and
emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has a self-
defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they
usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the
violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke
it, that they were the one who precipitated the violence, they
provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and even
sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that usually a
battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from
'broken homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered
woman, 'also has a very low opinion of himself. But then
emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as
being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very
angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for
frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like
gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.' The
batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family
which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to
do anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused
each other so 'there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the
family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a
battered woman does not leave her husband: poverty, self-
blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle
itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the
belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs
for the sake of the children.
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the
violence: some leave the house, or lock themselves in
another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering
'physical violence on both of them.' She said that in a 'normal
marital relationship,' abuses also happen, but these are 'not
consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day
out.' In an 'abnormal marital relationship,' the abuse occurs
day in and day out, is long lasting and 'even would cause
hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of
psychological tests she administered, it was her opinion that
Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because 'inspite
of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times
there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of
humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a
broken person. And at the same time she still has the imprint
of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife
and did not even consider filing for nullity or legal separation
inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that
Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxx   xxx   xxx
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician,
who has since passed away, appeared and testified before
RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of
Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry
and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He
was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years.
Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the
Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his
training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was
called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26)
years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he
obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his
medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was
also a member of the World Association of Military
Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan
Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military
Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous
Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from the
Period 1954 – 1978' which was presented twice in
international congresses. He also authored 'The Mental
Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000', which
was likewise published internationally and locally. He had a
medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a
Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline),
on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the
drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the
functional disorder of the mind and neurology deals with the
ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology,
on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate
degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a
specialist in psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical
Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving
violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes
abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand
cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was
reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic
violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered
Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of
severe domestic violence, where there is physical abuse:
such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and
boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the
woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of
the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very
healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the
disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic
constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, 'it will take
more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic
stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is
incorporated under the 'anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming brutality,
trauma.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she
is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks 'of
nothing but the suffering.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become
neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable
and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and
persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her 'self-world' is
damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background
relates to an individual's illness, such as the deprivation of
the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the
batterer, he normally 'internalizes what is around him within
the environment.' And it becomes his own personality. He is
very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so
macho; he shows his strong façade 'but in it there are doubts
in himself and prone to act without thinking.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the
presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who administered
the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred
(sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just come
up in her mind or in his mind.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic
stress disorder try to defend themselves, and 'primarily with
knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is
available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x
because that abound in the household.' He said a victim
resorts to weapons when she has 'reached the lowest rock
bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her
but to act decisively.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his
office in an interview he conducted for two (2) hours and
seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological
evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his
diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22
January 2001.
xxx   xxx   xxx
"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr.
Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her husband Marivic'c
mental condition was that she was 're-experiencing the
trauma.' He said 'that we are trying to explain scientifically
that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by
Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that point
in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the
trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he interviewed
Marivic 'she was more subdued, she was not super alert
anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the
predicament she is involved.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by
either the private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord
with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of
the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated."9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave
credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the
deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery,
because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was
killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at
the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to
this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion
praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and
the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of
appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine
her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the
inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial
reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts'
testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in
part appellant's Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the
"battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court to
report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to
submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the
examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad
Dayan10 and Alfredo Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic
violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence,
were then presented to and admitted by the lower court before finally
being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case. 12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this
Court's consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously
hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as
to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben
and Marivic Genosa were legally married and that she was
therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to
be by beating with a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding
evidence adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses
that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and
wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben
Genosa was a battered husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony
from the children of Marivic Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's
flight to Manila and her subsequent apologies were indicia of
guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn
child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was
an aggravating circumstance of treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the
traditional elements in determining the existence of self-
defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of
 parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of
death."13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether
appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2)
whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature,
if not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As
consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence
of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome
of the case.14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of
discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that
would reverse or modify the trial court's disposition of the case. In
any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the
trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously
hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-
defense." We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L.
Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and
the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the
documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings
and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the
testimony and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or
even this Court, may not agree with the trial judge's conclusions, we
cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he
failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an
"obviously hasty" manner. The Information had been filed with the
lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at
least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge
about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his
judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with
dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to
condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which
he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his
actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation. 15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben
Genosa and appellant had been legally married, despite the non-
presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,16 this
Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the
offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse,
the best proof of the relationship between the accused and
the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a
marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of
marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is
not objected to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the
brother of appellant's deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben
had been married to Marivic. 17 The defense raised no objection to
these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination,
appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to
Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive
upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that
(1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no
admission was in fact made.19 Other than merely attacking the non-
presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof
that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her
marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct
cause of Ben's death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a
pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its
September 29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the appellant has
admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his
nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head,
the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial,
to determine which of said acts actually caused the victim's death."
Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not
dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating
evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-
beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had
not raised the novel defense of "battered woman syndrome," for
which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-
defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be
discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under
prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the
surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his
personal character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute
vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring
testimony from appellant's children. As correctly elucidated by the
solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the
discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary
to present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court
nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children
as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not
requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the
flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her
brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life
of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial court's
appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final
resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability,
invokes self-defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the
accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove
any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing
evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense
(and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the
burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. 22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the
battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence,
the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of
self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. 23 By
appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the
justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically
abused and controlled over a period of time."24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a
man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do
without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or
women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in
order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a
second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman."25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-
esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female
sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the
tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's actions; and false
hopes that the relationship will improve.26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by
the so-called "cycle of violence,"27 which has three phases: (1) the
tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. 28
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it
could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile
behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a
show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way.
What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in
ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to
prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This
wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her "placatory"
and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to
abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to
placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or
physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of
control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the
persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally.
But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the
batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some
unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control" and leads to
an acute battering incident.29
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems
this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase,
she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence.
Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and
so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes
that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the
terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail.
Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be
rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger
physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is
futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage
and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are
likely to get hurt.30
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute
battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show
a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that
he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for
her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other
hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the
battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the
better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the real person
whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the
emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair,
she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the
chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help,
are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after
she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting
her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she
is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a
battered woman's psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are
indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant
behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of
"tension, violence and forgiveness," each partner may believe that it
is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel
independent, capable of functioning without the other. 31
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense
presented several witnesses. She herself described her heart-
rending experience as follows:
"ATTY. TABUCANON Q During those times that you were the recipient of such
cruelty and abusive behavior by your husband, were you
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa? able to see a doctor?

A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the A Yes, sir.
subsequent year he was cruel to me and a behavior of
habitual drinker. Q Who are these doctors?

Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and
your husband was abusive to you and cruel. In what way Dra. Cerillo.
was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
xxx   xxx   xxx
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me
and sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
sometimes beat me.
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times did this happen?
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Several times already.
A Of course my husband.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we
separate each other. A Yes, sir.

Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving xxx   xxx   xxx
home?
[Court] /to the witness
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A Everytime he got drunk.
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was
convinced and after that I go to him and he said 'sorry'.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction
of injury inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from
that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
 A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month
or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he
will just quarrel me." 32
Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart" 33 on Marivic Genosa at the
Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing
testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents
which are found in the chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with
the dates for the record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows:
Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness of eye. Attending
physician: Dr. Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower
arbital area, pain and contusion (R) breast.
Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2 o to
trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder.
Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple
contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr.
Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein
you were the attending physician, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one
who attended the patient. What do you mean by abrasion
furuncle left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact
with something rough substance if force is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an
inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is
tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is
tenderness pain.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor? Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable
Court, was the patient pregnant?
xxx   xxx   xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of
A Yes, sir. pregnancy was she?

Q What did she tell you? A Eight (8) months pregnant.

A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
cause of these injuries. And she told me that it was done to
her by her husband. A Yes, sir.

Q You mean, Ben Genosa? Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an
examination about her pregnancy or for some other
A Yes, sir. findings?

xxx   xxx   xxx A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which

complicates her pregnancy.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the
accused sometime in the month of November, 1995 when A Yes, sir.
this incident happened?
Q For how many days?
A As per record, yes.
A One day.
Q What was the date?
Q Where?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
xxx   xxx   xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You
said that you were able to examine her personally on
November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache
secondary to hypertension and I think I have a record here,
also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a
consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation,
that the patient had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to
our treatment. She does not response when the medication
was given to her, because tension headache is more or less
stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said
is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination
of the patient is the family history in line of giving the root
cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment
you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure,
Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause
increases in hypertension which is unfortunately does not
response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you
take the blood pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure
was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean
this is dangerous level of blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the
Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple
quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would
run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon
her by Ben.35
Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been
asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter
feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one
occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten
o'clock at night, because the couple "were very noisy … and I heard
something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running into
Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill
atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her
help -- this time to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned
to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again
afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their
house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when
she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at
least three other witnesses saw or heard the couple
quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the
fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process
a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
"ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in
November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office
working then after office hours, I boarded the service bus
and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately
asked my son, where was his father, then my second child
said, 'he was not home yet'. I was worried because that was
payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while
waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I
prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking
for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated
this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence
at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I
requested to sleep with me at that time because I had fears
that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would
again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me,
but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing
will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep
with you?
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father
would not allow her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you
pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that
time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your
husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual
behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly
behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling
at you? What else did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to
quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if
you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him,
looking for him. I was just worried he might be overly drunk
and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do
to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him
because I want to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me
again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore
him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said
to him, 'why did you switch off the light when the children
were there.' At that time I was also attending to my children
who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for
not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and
[got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from
watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting
because they were scared and he was already holding the
bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as
Ben was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled
me and I fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the
bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he
was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were
their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got
angry with me for packing his clothes, then he dragged me
again of the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he
dragged you? How did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her
right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and
then he kept on shouting at me that 'you might as well be
killed so there will be nobody to nag me.'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON: Q Where were the children during that time?

Q Were you actually brought to the drawer? A My children were already asleep.

A Yes, sir. Q You mean they were inside the room?

Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer? A Yes, sir.

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you
open the drawer but he could not open it because he did not please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it
have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a look like?
blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was
going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I
saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about Q Is it a flexible blade?
to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran
to the other room, and on that very moment everything on
my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that A It's a cutter.
very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

COURT INTERPRETER: A Yes, because he once used it to me.

(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely). Q How did he do it?

xxx   xxx   xxx A He wanted to cut my throat.

ATTY. TABUCANON: Q With the same blade?

Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room? A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate
me." 38
A Outside.
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as
Q In what part of the house? an expert witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a
battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions
totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former
A Dining. briefly related the latter's ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
 "Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered xxx   xxx   xxx
wife? Could you in layman's term describe to this Court what
her life was like as said to you? Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the
side of her husband they were fond of battering their wives?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than
ten years, that she was suffering emotional anguish. There A I also heard that from her?
were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to
verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a Q You heard that from her?
very meager income, she was the one who was practically
the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in
a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even A Yes, sir.
womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very
angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives
had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the of her husband that were fond of battering their wives?
reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the
husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband
his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time who are also battering their wives.
very depressed because she was also aware, almost like
living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she
and day out." 39 stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her
and battered [her] several times in that room?
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely
elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting A She told me about that.
evidence as shown below:
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in
1999, where you talked to her about three hours, what was
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was
the most relevant information did you gather?
battered in that room.
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that
Q Several times in that room?
happened. The most important information were escalating
abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem
about being battered, it really happened.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume
that you already knew of the facts of the case or at least you
have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case? Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete
on saying this matter. I think that is the first time that we
have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know
whether I can consider them as substantial.
 A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this
kind happened, it was really a self-defense. I also believe
that there had been provocation and I also believe that she
became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety
reaction because of all the battering that happened and so
she became an abnormal person who had lost she's not
during the time and that is why it happened because of all
the physical battering, emotional battering, all the
psychological abuses that she had experienced from her
husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely
battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as
follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective
personality test, what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that test is to find out
about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the
truth, or is she someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will]
tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective
personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning
she is a person that I can trust. That the data that I'm
gathering from her are the truth."41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo
Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric Report, 42 which was based on his
interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that
during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked
good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until "Ben
started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to]
gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was
often joining his barkada in drinking sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed
toward his family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: "At
first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he
became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of
her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a
painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that
her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for
twelve years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was
battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband
whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in
vain. Further quoting from the Report, "[s]he also sought the advice
and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her
feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant
battering became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x." 43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in
the Court's mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely
abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the
abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining
her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an
ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events
immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly
pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of
battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and
necessary. "How can the mental state of the appellant be
appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask:
Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should
she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner
who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would
expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-
respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for
herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with
the so-called 'battered wife syndrome.'"44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint
should not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person.
What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to
repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay,
comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar
experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common
myths and misconceptions about battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her
research on domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the
United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and
prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the
killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the
cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman
immobilizes the latter's "ability to act decisively in her own interests,
making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of
escape."46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse
often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in
greater danger of dying then."47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the
battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x
x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the
violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that
they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they
provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually
abusive to them."48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered
woman does not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-
blame and guilt arising from the latter's belief that she provoked the
violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all
cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for
her spouse to change.49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful.
He had previously testified in suits involving violent family relations,
having evaluated "probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family
disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such
cases abounded. As a result of his experience with domestic
violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman
Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40)
cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on
the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of
consciousness.50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could
result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or
neurologic anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and severely abused,
battered persons "may believe that they are essentially helpless,
lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute battering
incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of
coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's ability
to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma.
Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can
do will have a predictable positive effect."52
A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the
University of Pennsylvania, found that "even if a person has control
over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more
likely to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than
trying to escape." He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the
individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this
phenomenon as "learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a
situation turn out to be less important than the individual's set of
beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women don't
attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to
outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their
own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does will
alter their terrible circumstances."54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow
responsible for the violent behavior of her partner, she also believes
that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no
escape.55 Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety,
and usually fail to leave the relationship. 56 Unless a shelter is
available, she stays with her husband, not only because she typically
lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she
leaves she would be found and hurt even more.57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific
evidence establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she
had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time, became
afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to
find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. More
specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the
presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of
violence" supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In
relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death
of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase
of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical
characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not
prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had
gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up
prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Ben's
relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to
prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent)
stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third
phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run
away to her mother's or father's house;58 that Ben would seek her
out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that
believing his words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her
and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben
to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional
stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on
him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both
of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual
experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate
the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert
witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully,
albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of
the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of
repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or
spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were
culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual
cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual
experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at
all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying
circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat,
the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the
essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested
specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does
not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive
partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further
that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered
woman at the time of the offense 60 -- she must have actually feared
imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need
to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who
resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one's life; and the
peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following
requisites and effect of self-defense:62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not
incur any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-
defense.63 It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or
an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. 64 In
the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic
herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their
children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his
attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their
children's bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was
a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted
graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life
would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already
suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the
time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery
usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to
await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life
"would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" 65 Still,
impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous
battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must
be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger.66 Considering such circumstances
and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not
warrant self-defense.67 In the absence of such aggression, there can
be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the
victim.68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified
under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any
other modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem
it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that
mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal
in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including
that which has not been raised by the parties.69
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic,
Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November
29, 2000, opined as follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The
repeated battering Marivic experienced with her husband
constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke
down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It
 is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to
sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously.
Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser
husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be
ended by an act of violence on her part." 70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained
that the effect of "repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and]
repetitious maltreatment" as well as the severity and the prolonged
administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress
disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious
battering. Second, the severity of the battering. Third, the
prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged
commission of the battering and the psychological and
constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the
public and social support available to the victim. If nobody is
interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxx   xxx   xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the
qualifications in terms of severity of the postraumatic stress
disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er
this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head,
banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very
severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress
disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a
pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating
the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation
therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for
example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because
the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect
the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic]
degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness,
how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed
or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called
delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering
and the individual will manifest now a severe emotional
instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear
and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be
happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious
maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months.
The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this
six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book
specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical
one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is
abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get
neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder." 72
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert
witness clarified further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered
woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her mental
capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
 Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted
upon appellant resulted in "cumulative provocation which broke down
her psychological resistance and natural self-control," "psychological
paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such
manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the
exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving
her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting
diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
paragraphs 974 and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a
mitigating factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating
circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to
have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held
that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a
result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust
or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason.77 To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not
far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal
equanimity.78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the
unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had
further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards
a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that
she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life
was likewise on that of her fetus. 79 His abusive and violent acts, an
aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her
unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation
overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a
separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According
to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of
self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit
of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a
gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there
was no considerable period of time within which Marivic could have
recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's
testimony80 that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a
victim of "overwhelming brutality [or] trauma" -- the victim relives the
beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being
beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the whole
thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered." She thinks
"of nothing but the suffering." Such reliving which is beyond the
control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been
what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented
her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological
paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the
same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical
nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse
upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving
her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the
violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the
incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their
child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but
likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally
produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against
persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.81 In order to qualify an act as
treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as
indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere
inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation
of evidence.82 Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. 83
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court
imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this
qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of
Ben had been found lying in bed with an "open, depressed, circular"
fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and when
he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to
establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads
us to the events surrounding his death:
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he
dragged you? How did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her
right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and
then he kept on shouting at me that 'you might as well be
killed so there will be nobody to nag me'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to
open the drawer but he could not open it because he did not
have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a
blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was
going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet
and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I
saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about
to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran
to the other room, and on that very moment everything on
my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that
very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
 (The witness at this juncture is crying intensely). A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the
pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the other room.
xxx   xxx   xxx
Q What else happened?
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you
please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like
look like? what happened before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide. raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my
blood pressure.
Q It is a flexible blade?
COURT INTERPRETER:
A It's a cutter.
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and
smashed him, the witness at the same time pointed
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
at the back of her neck or the nape).
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q How did he do it?
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been
through with him, I took pity on myself and I felt I was about
Q With the same blade? to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I
got that gun and I shot him.
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
COURT
xxx   xxx   xxx
/to Atty. Tabucanon
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You shot him?
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84
A Yes, because I smashed him.
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of
Q What happened? treachery. There is no showing of the victim's position relative to
appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is
the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel,
treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to
have anticipated aggression from the assailant.85
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by
the party attacked.86 There is no showing, though, that the present
appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory
act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought
of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment
when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any
convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the
method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor. 87
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to
have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be
lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 88 of
the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances
are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree,
and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended
the commission of the offense.90 Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that
which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum
shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just
and proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum;
to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and
1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the
minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from
detention on parole.91
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman
syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis-
à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized
on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great
effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven
facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored
to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to
understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct
personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has
learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant's
counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning
process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we
can only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts.
We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised
Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense
arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our
main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must
be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the
history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not
all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The
parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) following facts are not disputed.
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending
her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan, municipality
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five
children. From there they went to live in the house of his half-brother,
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the same
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay.
Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody After about a month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in
upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house.
being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his
SO ORDERED. wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and
causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long
thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the
Imbecility/ Insanity
ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking
her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of
Republic of the Philippines the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was
SUPREME COURT found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help
Manila made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and
testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.
EN BANC
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a
G.R. No. L-3246            November 29, 1950 written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted that he killed The
motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that
vs. he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant. suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he
noticed that his had become indifferent to him (defendant).
Luis Contreras for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the
Felix V. Makasiar for appellee. peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E.
At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant
MONTEMAYOR, J.: entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented
the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was
confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would
Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty of parricide and
remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the
prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his
surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash his
clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he
would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by
himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell
was opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison
compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an
imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12
of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory
and we are inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the
very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined
him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish
right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the
meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt
from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the
crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are
copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal
Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and
applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his
Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to
43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this
exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his
own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; 1 that
there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that
there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this
reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time
of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude
imputability.2
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-
muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had
previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments
prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized
by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper
to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to
relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition,
unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement,
assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be
attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a
morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his
wife. From the case of United States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we
quote the following syllabus:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no
further than to indicate that the accused was moved by a
wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other
testimony to the effect that, while in confinement awaiting
trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not
sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The conduct of
the defendant while in confinement appears to have been
due to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the
appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his
marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted
himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an
imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five
children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his
children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a
side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of
jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom
he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so
he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an
imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no
import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification
and was not a mere product of hallucination and aberrations of a
disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to
the following effect. In addition to the observations made by
appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he
and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias
Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his
house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was settled
in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used
to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly
confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be
one of those unfortunate beings, simple, and even feebleminded,
whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking
up the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking
her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours,
shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he
thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly
surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel
the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement
he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no
effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the
government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring
his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared
to find that the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the
commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not
intent or proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance was not
alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in
the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of
the doubt and we therefore declined to find the existence of this
aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the
accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the
mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or
paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely that the
accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his
means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings,"
or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power." To
this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the
same article, — that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The accused
evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any
aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first we thought of the
possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of
the Revised Penal Code for the purpose of imposing the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which
is reclusion perpetua to death. It will be observed however, that
article 64 refers to the application of penalties which contain three
periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three
different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance
with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the
present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is composed
only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of the
same Code refers to the application of indivisible penalties whether it
be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like that
of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is
the one applicable in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the
commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance
and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be
applied. Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in
the case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the
crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the
old Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3
of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said
the following:
 And even though the court should take into consideration the
presence of two mitigating circumstances of a qualifying
nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any
aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the
next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a
ruling of the court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does
not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of
article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code.)
(Decision of September 30, 1879.)
Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict
application of which is inevitable and which, under the law,
must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional
power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal
Code; and.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs,
and hereby order that a proper petition be filed with the
executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if
it be deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative vested
in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that
of the next lower.
Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another
parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of
conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that
notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to
exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties,
namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the
said Code must be applied. The Court further observed:
We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that
malice nor has exhibited such moral turpitude as requires life
imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5
of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite the
attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to
executive clemency after appellant has served an
appreciable amount of confinement.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby
affirm the judgment of the lower court with the modification that the
appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive
imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same
court in the two cases above cited, and believing that the appellant is
entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the
attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the
penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise
apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33211 June 29, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, Accused whose death
sentence is under review.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a
defense the exempting circumstance of insanity.chanrobles
virtual law library
There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon
of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver,
entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling
Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in the area
known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by
saying: "Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon kang
bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her
several times on the head with a hammer until she was
dead.chanrobles virtual law library
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who
was in the bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes,
27, a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that
Puno's eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and
menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.chanrobles
virtual law library
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where
Hilaria had taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he made
the following confession and threat: "Huwag kayong
magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na
umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang
pumatay sa matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno said:
"Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng
pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang
paghihigantihan ko. "
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio
Tugatog, Malabon and then went to the house of his second
cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit,
Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening. How he was
able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not
shown in the record.chanrobles virtual law library
Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had
left, notified the Malabon police of the killing. Corporal
Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay
sprawled on her bed already dead, Her head was bloody.
Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down
the statements of Lina and Hilaria at the police station. They
pointed to Puno as the killer (pp. 15- 17,
Record).chanrobles virtual law library
A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation conducted an autopsy. He certified that the
victim had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow and
contusions on the head caused by a hard instrument, On
opening the skull, the doctor found extensive and
generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death was
intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).chanrobles
virtual law library
Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon
policemen brought him to the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970 (p. 14, Record).
He was charged with murder in the municipal court. He
waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation.chanrobles virtual law library
On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the
Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the
information as aggravating circumstances were evident
premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of
sex.chanrobles virtual law library
Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about
five months after the killing, pretended that he did not
remember having killed Aling Kikay- He believes that there
are persons who are "mangkukulam," "mambabarang" and
"mambubuyog and that when one is victimized by those
persons, his feet might shrink or his hands might swan.
Puno believes that a person harmed by a "mambabarang"
might have a headache or a swelling nose and ears and can
be cured only by a quack doctor (herbolaryo).
Consequently, it is necessary to kill the "mangkukulam" and
"mambabarang".chanrobles virtual law library
Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is
married with two children. He finished third year high
school. His father is a welder. Among his friends are drivers.
(Exh- B).chanrobles virtual law library
Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night
before the murder, Puno's eyes were reddish. He
complained of a headache. The following day while he was
feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble bee was
coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands.
Zenaida did not see any bee.chanrobles virtual law library
Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious
habit of his mother. He wanted to use that cord in tying his
dog. He asked for another rope when Zenaida admonished
him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog to a tree by
looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He
repeatedly boxed the dog.chanrobles virtual law library
Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was
boxing that dog. Aida observed that Puno's eyes were
bloodshot and his countenance had a ferocious
expression.chanrobles virtual law library
Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8,
1970, Ernesto Puno came to their house in Barrio San Jose,
Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood in
that place. He was cuddling a puppy that he called "Diablo".
He called for Teotimo's mother who invited him to eat.
Ernesto did not eat. Instead, he fed the puppy.chanrobles
virtual law library
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an
English song. When Teotimo asked him to change his wet
clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the clothes of
Teotimo's father. When told that Teotimo's father had been
dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at
Teotimo.chanrobles virtual law library
While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then
he emitted a moaning sound until he fell asleep. Ernesto
was awakened the next morning by the noise caused by
persons wading in the flood. Ernesto thought they were his
fellow cursillistas.chanrobles virtual law library
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead
of proving that puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay,
the medical experts testified that Puno acted with
discernment.chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of
the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom Puno was
referred for treatment ten times between September 8,
1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno was an out-
patient who could very well live with society, although he
was afflicted with "schizophrenic reaction"; that Puno knew
what he was doing and that he had psychosis, a slight
destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to Doctor Maravilia
that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and
irritability was his financial problem (7 tsn November 4,
1970). Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on July 4, 1970
was already cured.chanrobles virtual law library
Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital
testified that Puno was first brought to that hospital on July
28, 1962 because his parents complained that he laughed
alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such as kneeling,
praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed
that while Puno was suffering from "schizophrenic reaction",
his symptoms were "not socially incapacitating" and that he
could adjust himself to his environment (4 tsn January 20,
1971). He agreed with Doctor Maravilla's
testimony.chanrobles virtual law library
Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National
Mental Hospital, testified that from his examination of Puno,
he gathered that Puno acted with discernment when he
committed the killing and that Puno could distinguish
between right and wrong (5 tsn January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor
Vicente also concluded that Puno was not suffering from any
delusion and that he was not mentally deficient; otherwise,
he would not have reached third year high school (8-19 tsn
January 1 1, 197 1).chanrobles virtual law library
On December 14, 1970 or three months after the
commission of the offense, Doctors Vicente, Robles and
Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental Hospital
submitted the following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):
Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment
at the Out-Patient Service of the National Mental Hospital
for schizophrenia in 1962 from which he recovered; in 1964
a relapse of the same mental illness when he improved and
in 1966 when his illness remained unimproved.chanrobles
virtual law library
His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital
at the San Lazaro Compound up to July, 1970. He was
relieved of symptoms and did not come back anymore for
medication. On September 8, 1970, according to
information, he was able to kill an old woman. Particulars of
the offense are not given.
MENTAL CONDITION
... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is
fairly clean in person and without undue display of emotion.
He talks to co-patients but becomes evasive when talking
with the doctor and other personnel of the ward. He knows
he is accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS
In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who
previously was suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia, is presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms.
The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and
amnesia of several isolated accounts in his life do not fit the
active pattern of a schizophrenic process. It may be found
in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a markedly,
retarded individual of which he is not.chanrobles virtual law
library
However, persons who recover from an acute episode of
mental illness like schizophrenia may retain some residual
symptoms impairing their judgment but not necessarily
their discernment of right from wrong of the offense
committed.
The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of
the Rules of Court and the order of the trial court dated
November 16, 1970 for the mental examination of Puno in
the National Mental Hospital to determine whether he could
stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed
the killing.chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that
the killing of Francisca Col was wrong and that he would be
punished for it, as shown by the threats which he made to
Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old woman's
companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.chanrobles
virtual law library
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal
maniac who had gone berserk, he would have killed also
Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay
signified that he really disposed of her because he thought
that she was a witch.chanrobles virtual law library
Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he
"meticulously observed the conduct and behavior of the
accused inside the court, most especially when he was
presented on the witness stand" and he was convinced "that
the accused is sane and has full grasp of what was
happening" in his environment.chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to
death and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim an
indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos (Criminal Case No.
509).chanrobles virtual law library
His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence,
contends that the trial court erred in not sustaining the
defense of insanity and in appreciating evident
premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as
aggravating circumstances.chanrobles virtual law library
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from
responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to the
time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547).
Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence
(People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).chanrobles virtual law
library
The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed
Francisca Col because he had chronic schizophrenia since
1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8,
1970, when he liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a
form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment
and freedom of will.chanrobles virtual law library
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means
that the accused must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87 Phil. 658,
660).chanrobles virtual law library
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is
deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment
because there is complete absence of the power to discern,
or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October
17, 1980; People vs. Renegade, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57
SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to
"el trastorno mental transitorio as an exempting
circumstance, see I Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed.,
1974. pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.)
After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light
of the strict rule just stated and the circumstances
surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that
Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and
helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the
psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was not
completely deprived of reason and freedom of
will.chanrobles virtual law library
In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused
was confined in the National Mental Hospital for thirteen
days because he was suffering from schizophrenia of the
paranoid type. His confinement was recommended by
Doctor Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the
accused used to work as a laborer. About one year and two
months later, he killed Doctor Casal because the latter
refused to certify him for re-employment. His plea of
insanity was rejected. He was convicted of
murder.chanrobles virtual law library
In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized
the killing as murder. The qualifying circumstance is abuse
of superiority. In liquidating Francisco Col, Puno, who was
armed with a hammer, took advantage of his superior
natural strength over that of the unarmed septuagenarian
female victim who was unable to offer any resistance and
who could do nothing but exclaim " Diyos ko ".chanrobles
virtual law library
Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which qqqs sex and the weapon used in the act afforded
him, and from which the woman was unable to defend
herself" (People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing
U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil.
757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446).chanrobles
virtual law library
Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be
appreciated because the evidence does not show (a) the
time when the offender determined to commit the crime,
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to
his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act
(People vs. Ablates, L-33304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241,
247).chanrobles virtual law library
The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del
culpable juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de animo."
It is characterized (1) "por la concepcion del delito y la
resolucion de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival meditada y
detenida" and (2) "por la persistencia en la resolucion de
delinquir demostrada por el espacio de tiempo transcurrido
entre dicha resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho
Premeditation should be evident, meaning that it should be
shown by "signos reiterados v externos, no de meras
sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed.,
pp- 582-3).chanrobles virtual law library
Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on
account of her old age should be appreciated as generic
aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not
aggravating because there is no evidence that the accused
deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the
victim or showed manifest disrespect to her womanhood
(People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-
23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 404, People vs,
Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil.
190).chanrobles virtual law library
However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set
by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender to
the authorities and, as contended by counsel de oficio, the
offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic
reaction) which diminished his will-power without however
depriving him of consciousness of his acts. (See People vs.
Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and
People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.)
Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los
acusados de que el matar a un brujo es un bien al publico
puede considerarse como una circunstancia atenuante pues
los que tienen la obsession de que los brujos deben ser
eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que,
atacado de enfermedad morbosa pero consciente aun de lo
que hace, no tiene verdadero imperio de su voluntad"
(People vs. Balneg 79 Phil. 805, 810).chanrobles virtual law
library
It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder
should be imposed (Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised Penal
Code).chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua The indemnity imposed by
the trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines Meanwhile, at noontime of the same day, SPO2 Ramon Villar
SUPREME COURT received a report that a body of a boy between ten (10) to twelve
Manila (12) years of age was found dead at the Bulacao Bridge. The body
was in a sickening state of nudity and physical abuse. The face was
EN BANC covered with a big stone in an apparent attempt to hide the body.
After the routine taking of photographs the body was brought to the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes for a post-mortem examination. 3
 

The autopsy conducted by the PNP Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Jesus

G.R. No. 130210 December 8, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RALPH VELEZ DIAZ alias "JIMBOY," accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FRANCIS BART FULACHE, eleven (11) years old, was found dead
at Bulacao Bridge, Cebu City, on 4 December 1996. Subsequently,
for his death, Ralph Velez Diaz alias "Jimboy" was charged before
the Regional Trial Court 1 of Cebu City with murder in relation to RA
7610.
On 3 December 1996 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening Francis
Bart Fulache and his 10-year old brother Felbart went to Pier 3 to
defecate. They were with 30-year old Ralph Velez Diaz, a friend
Francis Bart knew from the hantakan, a gaming place near their
store. Francis Bart then invited his brother Felbart to go with them to
Pier 4 but the latter was not inclined so he went home.
Francis Bart did not return home that evening. But Felbart was not
alarmed as his brother was used to going around and doing anything
he wanted to without telling him nor asking permission from their
parents. However when Francis Bart still failed to show up in the
afternoon of the next day their parents got worried and started
searching for him. 2
P. Cerna, revealed that the cause of death was "intracranial
hemorrhage, extensive, with skull fracture, traumatic." 4 The
examination also disclosed contusions, abrasions and lacerations all
over the boy's body the most prominent of which was the
comminuted and depressed fracture on his head. There were, quite
notably, multiple lacerations in his rectum. 5
With respect to the injuries in the boy's rectal area, Dr. Cerna opined
that a blunt instrument like a male organ in full erection could have
caused them. He claimed that in an attempt to avoid any violation of
his rectum the boy could have suffered more pain considering his
soft and tender skin and the violation would necessarily result in
hemorrhage which could cause instantaneous death. 6
On 4 December 1996 while the Fulache family continued their
search for Francis Bart a couple by the name of Degamo claimed the
body of the young victim in the belief that it was their missing son
Joseph Johnson Degamo. After two (2) days however, their missing
son came home so the Degamos returned the body to the funeral
parlor. What was good news for the Degamos was bad news for the
Fulaches. The body now back in the funeral home turned out to be
their Francis Bart. Bartolome Fulache, father of the Fulache boys,
identified the corpse after hearing over the radio that the cadaver of
a boy remained unclaimed at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes. 7
On 9 December 1996 at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning a person
acting suspiciously but unknown to the Fulache spouses went to the
wake. There he created a spectacle of himself by reciting poems for
Francis Bart and singing the theme song from the movie "The Lion
King," and giving emphasis to the word "surrender." Bartolome
Fulache reported to the authorities the unusual behavior of their
"uninvited guest." The police immediately went to the Fulache
residence to observe the person. They invited him to their
headquarters for further observation and questioning. He went with
them voluntarily. He was identified later as herein accused-appellant
Ralph Velez Diaz.
Before conducting their investigation the police authorities as well as
a certain Atty. Abellanosa 8 apprised accused-appellant of his
constitutional rights in Cebuano, a language known to accused-
appellant, in the presence of men from the media 9 who themselves
affixed their signatures in the sworn statement of accused-appellant
to attest to the fact that he was duly informed of his rights under the
Constitution. The investigation proceeded where accused-appellant
revealed his sexual perversity by narrating in detail how he
perpetrated the ghastly crime against Francis Bart.
But this extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant was however
declared inadmissible by the trial court on the ground that Atty.
Abellanosa who assisted accused-appellant during the custodial
investigation was not an independent counsel of the accused as
required under the Constitution. 10
The following day, between 11:00 o'clock in the morning and 12:00
noon, a reenactment was made at the scene of the crime. Those
present were accused-appellant Ralph Velez Diaz, Felbart Fulache,
police officers Monilar, Montebon and Tumakay, and people from the
ABS-CBN, Sun Star Daily, Freeman and Superbalita. There
accused-appellant demonstrated, with Felbart as victim, sexually
abused Francis Bart and later killed him. The reenactment was
published in the 11 December 1996 issue of the Sun Star Daily, but
because only an unauthenticated photocopy of the newspaper was
presented in court, it was likewise declared inadmissible in evidence.
But the trial court nevertheless took judicial notice thereof.
On his part, accused-appellant sought to establish the defense of
insanity by presenting Dr. Wilson Tibayan, a government physician
connected with the National Center for Mental Health. The doctor's
testimony however did not help accused-appellant's case because
although he admitted having initially categorized accused-appellant
as insane, the doctor eventually diagnosed accused-appellant to be
afflicted with pedophilia, a mental disorder not synonymous with
insanity. He explained that pedophilia is a sexual disorder wherein
the subject has strong, recurrent and uncontrollable sexual and
physical fantasies about children which he tries to fulfill, especially
when there are no people around. He claimed, however, that despite
his affliction the subject could distinguish right from wrong. In fact, he
maintained that pedophilia could be committed without necessarily
killing the victim although injuries might be inflicted on the victim in
an effort to repel any resistance.
Also worthy of note was Dr. Tibayan's testimony that accused-
appellant had disclosed to him that his pedophilic acts were done in
revenge as he himself as a child was also a victim of sexual abuse.
Finally, Dr. Tibayan declared that accused-appellant's affliction had a
very low prognosis thus making him very dangerous to society.
On 11 April 1997 the court a quo  found accused-appellant Ralph
Velez Diaz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of "murder in relation to
sexual abuse (sodomy) of a child, attended by treachery." He was
sentenced to death and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P250,000.00 as moral damages,
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P40,000.00 as
reimbursement for funeral expenses. 11
The trial court was convinced that notwithstanding the exclusion of
the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant and the absence of
any eyewitness to the crime, there were enough pieces of
circumstantial evidence to support his conviction, to wit: (a) the
testimony of 10-year old Felbart that he saw his brother last alive in
the company of accused-appellant; (b) the physical evidence of
sexual abuse through sodomy committed against the victim; (c) the
exculpatory plea of insanity which only tended to negate liability but
was an admission of guilt; (d) the reenactment of the crime by
accused-appellant the details of which could not have been known to
anybody but himself; and, (e) the fact that accused-appellant
voluntarily confessed to the crime without any evidence of coercion,
duress or intimidation exerted upon him.
The case is now before this Court for automatic review pursuant to
Art. 47, par. 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by RA
7659. Accused-appellant submits that the trial court erred in (a)
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and (b)
imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. It is the contention
of accused-appellant that if he is guilty his guilt would only be for
homicide and not murder as the qualifying circumstances of
treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation are
absent.
The contention is untenable. We agree with the trial court that the
crime committed by accused-appellant was murder even in the
absence of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation
because treachery and abuse of superior strength were present -
either of which qualified the crime to murder.
There is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the
crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make." 12 In the instant case, treachery
characterized the killing of eleven (11)-year old Francis Bart. Well-
settled is the doctrine that the killing of children who by reason of
their tender years cannot be expected to put up a defense is
considered attended with treachery even if the manner of attack is
not precisely shown. 13 Thus, the killing of Francis Bart must be
deemed ipso facto  qualified by treachery by reason of his inherent
defenselessness. 14
Likewise, there is a clear case of abuse of superior strength given
the blatant inequality of strength between the victim and accused-
appellant. 15 However, this cannot be appreciated even as a generic
aggravating circumstance being necessarily absorbed in treachery. 16
Anent the second assigned error, we agree with accused-appellant
that he should not be meted the supreme penalty of death. A careful
scrutiny of the records shows that the Information charged him only
with murder qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength and
evident premeditation. It failed to mention the commission of sexual
abuse or "sodomy" on the victim. The Information designated the
crime as "murder in relation to RA 7610," but as a rule, what controls
is not the designation of the offense but its description in the
complaint or information. 17 The real nature of the criminal charge
cannot be determined from the caption or preamble of the
information or from the mere reference to a particular provision of
law alleged to have been violated because they are conclusions of
law. On the contrary, it is determined by the actual recital of facts in
the complaint or information. The technical name given by the fiscal
appearing in the title of the information does not determine the
character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the
information. 18 Thus, even if there is positive proof of sexual abuse
accused-appellant cannot be convicted therefor as it was not so
alleged in the information.
We cannot share the view of the Solicitor General that the trial court
did not apply the provisions of RA 7610 in imposing the death
penalty but merely made reference to them as sexual abuse, which
was established to have been committed by accused-appellant. He
contends that the sodomy could be considered as an aggravating
circumstance for adding ignominy to the crime as the sexual abuse
certainly augmented the wrong done to the victim thus unduly
increasing his pain.
We do not agree. The trial court was clear in declaring that
"[c]onsidering the aggravating circumstance of alevosia and the
seriousness of the sexual assault on the victim (in itself a heinous
crime), this court after a soul-searching and prayerful consideration
has arrived at a firm resolution to impose the maximum penalty of
death." 19 Moreover, "ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the
moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime." 20 Thus, for ignominy to be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in the instant case, it must be shown that
the sexual assault on Francis Bart was done by accused-appellant to
put the former to shame before killing him. This is clearly not the
case here for accused-appellant's intention was shown to be the
commission of sexual abuse on the victim as an act of revenge for
his similar experience as a child. Surely, the killing was done to
eliminate the only witness to his crime.
We should not be misunderstood for our failure to hold accused-
appellant responsible for committing sexual abuse on his victim
despite strong evidence in support thereof. We have no choice as
our hands are tied by the failure of the public prosecutor to file the
appropriate information for accused-appellant's sexual assault on the
victim.
The defense, invoking the doctrine of  parens patriae, also appeals to
this Court for the psychiatric examination and evaluation of accused-
appellant if indeed he is found to have committed the crime charged.
The defense emphasizes the fact that accused-appellant was
institutionalized twice within a considerable period in the National
Center for Mental Health; consequently, there is no certainty that he
was sane when he committed the crime imputed to him.
We cannot grant the request. When accused-appellant was
committed to the National Center for Mental Health, he was not
diagnosed as insane but was suffering from pedophilia. Thus, there
is no doubt in our mind that he was sane during his two-year
confinement in the center, pedophilia being dissimilar to insanity.
A defendant in a criminal case who interposes the defense of mental
incapacity has the burden of establishing that fact, i.e., he was
insane at the very moment when the crime was committed. 21 He
must prove it by clear and positive evidence. 22 In the instant case,
the defense of insanity as an exempting circumstance was not
established and did not overcome the legal presumption that a
person's acts are of his own free will and intelligence. The settled
rule is that the onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as
a defense, and the defense failed to discharge this burden. Thus, the
conviction of accused-appellant no doubt is in order.
The civil indemnity for the death of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 is upheld in accordance with recent jurisprudence, 23 as
well as the award of actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00
representing funeral expenses. The award of P250,000.00 as moral
damages is excessive warranting its reduction to P100,000.00
considering that the purpose of the award is to compensate the heirs
for injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them. Similarly, the
amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages is reduced to
P25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the 11 April 1997 Decision of the RTC-Br. 15, Cebu
City, is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Ralph Velez Diaz is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua instead of death. He is also ordered to pay the
legal heirs of Francis Bart Fulache the amount of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P40,000.00 as reimbursement for funeral
expenses. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132319 May 12, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is
guided and controlled by his mind. Law is designed for rational
beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right which is
inseparable from reason. Thus, when man's reasoning is so distorted
by disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong, he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we
are asked to resolve whether or not the accused, invoking insanity,
can claim exemption from liability for the crime he committed.
Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with
parricide for killing his wife LILIA MADARANG in an
Information 1 which reads:
That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion,
municipality of Infante, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
evident premeditation and treachery, armed with a
bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab LILIA M.
MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her
stab wound 4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2 inch(es) long and
3/16 of an inch wide, located just below the left
clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es) lateral to the supra-sternal
notch, and plowed along the interpace slightly
coursing upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1
inch in length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep,
located at the right arm at its medial aspect, coursing
upwards and medially towards the apex of the right
axilla which caused her instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M.
Madarang.
Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to
the Rules, the trial court entered a "not guilty" plea for him. At the
initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the accused's counsel
manifested that his client had been observed behaving in an
abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the
accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the questions
propounded by the court. Hence, on the same date, the Court issued
an Order 2 directing the transfer of the accused to the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to
determine his fitness to stand trial.
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he
was suffering from a form of psychosis known as schizophrenia. The
accused was detained at the hospital and was administered
medication for his illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2)
years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the NCMH
and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to
face the charges against him. 3
At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The
accused proceeded to adduce evidence on his claim of insanity at
the time he committed the offense.
As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law
AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter LILIFER MADARANG, the
following facts were established: The accused and Lilia Mirador were
legally married and their union was blessed with seven (7) children.
The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16) years. He was
employed in a United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a
seaman in Germany and stayed there for nine (9) years, or until
1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan,
and started a hardware store business. His venture however failed.
Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting. 4
In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their
children were forced to stay in the house of Avelina Mirador as the
accused could no longer support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then
already heavy with their eight child and was about to give birth. 5
On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia
had a squabble. The accused was jealous of another man and was
accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence
of their children, the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her untimely
demise. 6
AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the
children of the accused shouting and crying inside her house. She
called out to them and asked what was wrong. She received no
reply. Her nephew barged into the house and brought out the
children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing
by Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then
saw the accused emerge from the house holding a bolo. She
scampered for safety. 7
She declared that during the period that the accused and his family
stayed in her house, she did not notice anything peculiar in
accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from
any mental illness. Neither did she know of any reason why the
accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any
argument while they were living with her. 8
The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the
stabbing incident. He could not remember where he was on that
fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only
during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a
picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death. He,
however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that
he did not know whether he suffered from any mental illness and did
not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment. 9
DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center
for Mental Health (NCMH), declared that the accused was committed
to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH
conducted three (3) medical and psychiatric evaluations of the
accused during his confinement therein. Based on the first medical
report, dated August 2, 1994, 10 the accused was found to be
suffering from insanity or psychosis, classified as schizophrenia. Dr.
Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental abnormality
characterized by impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions,
hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care,
insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and
occupational functions. The patient may be incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may
become destructive or have a propensity to attack any one if his
hallucinations were violent. 11 A schizophrenic, however, may have
lucid intervals during which he may be able to distinguish right from
wrong. 12 Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness may
have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was
highly possible that he was already suffering from schizophrenia
prior to his commission of the crime. 1
By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the
accused was still suffering from schizophrenia. After one and a half
years of confinement, the third psychiatric evaluation of the accused,
dated May 27, 1996, 14 showed that his mental condition considerably
improved due to continuous medication. The accused was
recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to
jail to stand trial. 15
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute
the presumption of sanity at the time he committed the offense. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court is of the view
that accused Fernando Madarang is of sound mind
at the time of the commission of the offense and that
he failed to rebut by convincing proof the evidence
on record against him to exempt him from criminal
liablity. And since the death penalty was suspended
or abolished at the time of the commission of the
offense, this Court hereby sentences the accused
FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of
the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED. 16
Hence this appeal.
The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was
completely deprived of intelligence, making his criminal act
involuntary. His unstable state of mind could allegedly be deduced
from the following:
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was
completely unaware of his acts that fateful day and must have
committed the crime without the least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then
afflicted with schizophrenia. He cited the testimony of Dr. Tibayan
that a schizophrenic may go into extremes — he may be violent and
destructive, or very silent and self-focused. The appellant exhibited
his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife and
Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the
sight of him holding a bolo. He did not seem to recognize anybody
and could have turned to anyone and inflicted further injury. He avers
that this is peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a
sane person who just committed a crime would have appeared
remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there
was a high possibility that he was already suffering from insanity
prior to his commission of the crime on September 3, 1993. 17 The
defense posits that his mental illness may have been caused by his
loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started through 16
years of working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually
dependent on his mother-in-law for his family's support and all these
may have been beyond his capacity to handle.
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife
never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day should be
considered. The marked change in his behavior when he
uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on that day and suddenly
turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when
he committed the crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was
scheduled to give birth to their eighth child three (3) days prior to the
killing. Unless overpowered by something beyond his control,
nobody in his right mind would kill his wife who was carrying his
child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse.
We find these arguments without merit.
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity
cannot be punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on
the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally
endowed with the faculties of understanding and free will. The
consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or
culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there
can be no free act of the will. An insane accused is not morally
blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of
criminal law is served by punishing an insane accused because by
reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his
behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the
future. 18
A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In
Anglo-American jurisprudence, the traditional test is the M'Naghten
rule of 1843 which states that "to establish a defense on the ground
of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing
the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule is a
cognitive measure of insanity as the accused is required to know two
things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the act was wrong.
This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether
the word "wrong" referred to moral or legal wrong. The importance of
the distinction was illustrated by Stephen 19 as follows: A kills B
knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but under an
insane delusion that God has commanded him to kill B to obtain the
salvation of the human race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong"
means illegal but it is not a crime if the word "wrong" means morally
wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it referred solely to
intellectual reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It
was pointed out that the accused may know in his mind what he is
doing but may have no grasp of the effect or consequences of his
actions. 20 M'Naghten was condemned as based on an obsolete and
misleading concept of the nature of insanity as insanity does not only
affect the intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality
of the patient, including his will and emotions. It was argued that
reason is only one of the elements of a personality and does not
solely determine man's conduct. 21
Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse"
test which means that "assuming defendant's knowledge of the
nature and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if,
by reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or
lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself
from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the
accused knew that what he was doing was wrong, he would be
acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness kept him from
controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime.
This rule rests on the assumption that there are mental illnesses that
impair volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or
knowledge of what is right and wrong. 22 This test was likewise
criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement is
too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible"
requirement is also restrictive as it requires absolute impairment of
the freedom of the will which cases are very rare; (3) it will not serve
the purpose of criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist
commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it is difficult
to prove whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible
impulse. 2
Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that
"an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or defect." 24 Critics of this test argued that
it gave too much protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution
in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity beyond reasonable
doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was
the result of a mental disease leaves the judge with no choice but to
accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes completely dependent on
the testimonies of experts. 25
Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the
American Law Institute (ALI) in its Model Penal Code Test, which
improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. The new
rule stated that a person is not responsible for his criminal act if, as a
result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law. 26 Still, this test has been criticized for its
use of ambiguous words like "substantial capacity" and "appreciate"
as there would be differences in expert testimonies whether the
accused's degree of awareness was sufficient. 27 Objections were
also made to the exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose
abnormalities are manifested only by repeated criminal conduct.
Critics observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and thus
undeserving of punishment. 28
In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of
the M'Naghten style statutory formulation. It enacted the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made the appreciation test
the law applicable in all federal courts. The test is similar to
M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not
required to prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation
test shifted the burden of proof to the defense, limited the scope of
expert testimony, eliminated the defense of diminished capacity and
provided for commitment of accused found to be insane. 29
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent
criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must
be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e.,
the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 30
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of
the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man
can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by
his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion
testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to
conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own
perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an
expert, such as a psychiatrist. 31 The testimony or proof of the
accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous
with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. 32
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from
schizophrenia when he was committed to the NCMH months after he
killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic
mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between
fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most
common form of psychosis. 3 Symptomatically, schizophrenic
reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior
apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and
immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed.
The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious
states by delusions and hallucinations. In the most disorganized form
of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place and
is associated with serious thought disorder and profound habit
deterioration in which the usual social customs are
disregarded. 34 During the initial stage, the common early symptom is
aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness,
hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and
dreamy and may appear "far away." He does not empathize with the
feelings of others and manifests little concern about the realities of
life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection
and an intolerable lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional
involvement with other people to protect himself from painful
relationships. There is shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional
responsiveness and a loss of spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes
neglectful of personal care and cleanliness. 35 A variety of subjective
experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and
fears precede the earliest behavioral changes and oddities. He
becomes aware of increasing tension and confusion and becomes
distracted in conversation manifested by his inability to maintain a
train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will be noticed
as blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not
speak or respond appropriately to his companions. He may look
fixedly away, or he may appear to stare, as he does not regularly
blink his eyes in his attempt to hold his attention. 36
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he
exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia
immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be
sure, the record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or
bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day.
Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the
appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the
stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals
during which they are capable of distinguishing right from
wrong. 37 Hence the importance of adducing proof to show that the
appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the
offense. Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a
few months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after
the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if
there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or
simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on the
alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. 38
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense
insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at the time he killed his
wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the
appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous
with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the
appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For
one, his claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing
incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with
facility. The fact that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the
sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife does not,
by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his
grip on reality on that occasion. Neither is the appellant's seemingly
non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife
an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental
condition take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that the
appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful
day does not by itself prove the appellant's unstable mental
condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient
reason to kill a pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with
cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest reason.
The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his
business and became totally dependent on his mother-in-law for
support. We find this, however, purely speculative and unsupported
by record. To be sure, there was no showing of any odd or bizarre
behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune and
prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his
mental illness. In fact, the appellant's mother-in-law declared that
during the time that she knew the appellant and while he lived in her
house, she did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the
appellant's behavior that could have suggested that he was suffering
from any mental illness.
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason
thereof. He admits committing the crime but claims that he is not
guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence,
the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be
sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the
issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime. 39 As
the appellant, in the case at bar, failed to establish by convincing
evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are
constrained to affirm his conviction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the
appellant of the crime of parricide is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 199875 : November 21, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the December 17, 2010
Decision1Ï‚rνll of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 28761, which affirmed the April 26, 2004
Decision2Ï‚rνll of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98,
Quezon City (RTC), finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape and Frustrated
Murder.
On July 25, 1997, two separate Informations for Frustrated
Murder and Rape were filed before the RTC, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-72078 and Q-97-72079,
respectively. These informations read:
Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078
The undersigned accuses EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL of the
crime of Frustrated Murder, committed as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 21st day of July, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, with
treachery and with evident premeditation, with abuse of
superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of AAA 3Ï‚rνll by then and there stabbing
her with a kitchen knife, hitting her twice below the chest,
thereby inflicting upon said AAA serious and mortal wounds,
the offender thus performing all the acts of execution which
would produce death, which, however, was not produced by
reason of cause independent of the will of the perpetrator,
that is, the timely medical intervention, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4ςrνll
Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079
The undersigned accuses EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL, of the
crime of Rape, committed as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 21st day of July, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused by means of force and
intimidation, to wit: by then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously undress her and put himself on top of her,
and thereafter have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5ςrνll
Evidence for the Prosecution
During the trial, the prosecution presented three (3)
witnesses; namely: complainant AAA; Dr. Ma. Cristina
Freyra (Dr. Freyra), the chief of the medico-legal division of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; and
Dr. Reynaldo Perez (Dr. Perez) of the East Avenue Medical
Center, AAAs attending physician.
According to AAAs account, on July 21, 1997, at around
3:00 oclock in the afternoon, she was inside her rented
house together with her two (2) children, aged 1 years old
and 9 months old, respectively. She then noticed that
accused Edwin Isla (Isla) was standing by the door of her
kitchen. He asked her what time her landlady would be
arriving and she answered that she had no idea. Thereafter,
she opened the door of the kitchen, hoping that passersby
would see him inside the house. After fifteen (15) minutes,
she was startled when he suddenly poked a knife on her
neck and pulled her inside the bedroom. By this time, she
noticed that she had already closed the window and the
door of the living room. She pleaded and begged for mercy
but to no avail. She was warned not to shout or resist
otherwise she would be stabbed.
Inside the bedroom, she was made to lie down on the floor
because there was no bed. Isla placed himself on top of her
and then he removed her upper clothing. He raised her bra,
exposing her breasts and then kissed them. Eventually, he
made her spread her legs and had carnal knowledge with
her. While he was committing the dastardly act, she noticed
a knife pointed at her. She also informed the trial court that
during the whole ordeal, her children were present and
witnessed everything.
When Isla stood up after raping her, she noticed that the
knife he was holding was already bloodstained. At this
point, she found out that she was stabbed with the knife.
She tried to take hold of the knife while shouting for help.
In response, Isla struck her the second time, this time,
under her lower left breast. She also sustained a wound on
her palm while trying to disarm him. Then the knife fell to
the floor. It was at this moment that she was able to get
hold of it and she threw it outside through a broken window
in the room. Thereafter, Isla scampered out of the house
through the backdoor.
In a little while, a neighbor came knocking at the door and
was able to see AAAs condition. She was taken to the East
Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) for medical attention and
was confined there for five (5) days.
At the hospital, Dr. Freyra conducted an examination on
AAA upon the request of the station commander of the PNP
Lagro Police Station. Based on her findings, AAA sustained
eleven (11) body injuries, two (2) of which were stab
wounds, six (6) incised wounds and two (2) contusions. The
stab wounds required medical attendance of not less than
30 days. An examination of AAAs sexual organ showed
congestions and abrasion in the labia minora and yielded
negative result on the presence of spermatozoa.
AAAs attending physician, Dr. Perez, on the other hand,
testified that she had multiple stab wounds on the left side
of the chest. Her chest x-ray result disclosed an
accumulation of blood in the thorax which required him to
conduct a procedure to drain the blood. He concluded that
the stab wounds were severe and fatal which could have led
to AAAs death had it not been for the timely medical
attendance.
Evidence for the Defense
For the defense, accused Edwin Isla was presented together
with two (2) psychiatric doctors who examined him.
Isla never denied that he raped AAA on July 21, 1997.
Invoking the defense of insanity, he testified that before the
incident, he and AAA had an illicit relationship for about two
months until they broke up. He had to use a knife to be able
to have sexual intercourse with her. It was the first time
that he and AAA had sex. After raping her, he admitted
stabbing AAA twice, first on her left breast and then on her
lower right breast "for reason he cannot
understand."6Ï‚rνll He also punched her several times
when she attempted to grab the knife from him.
As to Islas claim of insanity, Dr. Juan Villacorta (Dr.
Villacorta) and Dr. Mary Gomez (Dr. Gomez) of the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH) were presented as
qualified expert witnesses.
Dr. Villacorta testified that Isla was suffering from a major
depressive disorder with psychotic features; that he
manifested psychosis on account of his hallucinations, poor
impulse control, poor judgment, and low frustration
tolerance; and that he exhibited such behavioral pattern
immediately prior to being jailed. Dr. Villacorta, however,
could not say with definite certainty or not Isla was
suffering from such mental disorder on July 21, 1997 as
there was no examination conducted on Isla on the said
date.7ςrνll
To corroborate Dr. Villacortas findings, Dr. Gomez was
presented. After a thorough interview and psychiatric
testing on Isla, she likewise observed that Isla was suffering
from a major depressive disorder which impaired his mental
faculties. She said that his psychosis could have been
existing prior to or about July 21, 1997 but again, like Dr.
Villacorta, she opined that such finding could not be
conclusive because of lack of information from other
informants during that time.8ςrνll
Ruling of the RTC
On April 26, 2004, the RTC convicted Isla of the crimes of
rape and frustrated murder. It did not give credence to his
defense of insanity because it noted that Isla committed the
crimes charged during a lucid interval. He knew that what
he was doing was unlawful. There was no indication that he
was deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will
when he committed all the acts attending the commission of
the crime. The RTC gave no weight to the assertion of the
defense that, based on the evaluations made by the doctors
from NCMH, Isla was suffering from psychosis since 1992. It
was of the impression that there was nothing in the
testimony of these expert witnesses that Isla was suffering
from psychosis long before the incident. 9Ï‚rνll On this note,
his condition could not be equated with imbecility; hence,
he could not be exempt from criminal liability. Thus, the
RTC ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment in these cases
is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079, the Court finds
accused Edwin Isla y Rosell GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of RAPE as defined and penalized under
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby SENTENCES
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify complainant AAA the amount of Php50,000.00 as
civil indemnity ex delicto, the amount of Php50,000.00 as
moral damages, and to pay the cause of suit.
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078, the Court finds
accused Edwin Isla y Rosell GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby
SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to indemnify complainant the
sum of P10,000.00 for actual damages, and to pay the
cause of suit.
SO ORDERED.10ςrνll
Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, Isla interposed an appeal with the CA. On
December 17, 2010, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed
the RTC decision which found Isla to have acted with
discernment when he committed the crimes.According to
the CA, Isla exactly knew that what he was doing was evil
so much so that he had to employ cunning means, by
discreetly closing the windows and the door of the house
and by resorting to threats and violence, to ensure the
consummation of his dastardly deed. The fact that he
scampered away after AAA was able to take the knife from
him, would only show that he fully understood that he
committed a crime for which he could be held liable.
The CA did not give weight to the expert testimonies given
by the two psychiatric doctors either. Since the mental
examination on Isla was taken four to six years after the
commission of the crimes, the doctors could not say with
definite certainty that he was suffering from psychosis
immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of
the crimes which was very vital for said defense to prosper.
Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.11ςrνll
Hence, the present appeal.
Both the prosecution and the defense opted not to file any
supplemental briefs and manifested that they were adopting
their arguments in their respective briefs filed before the
CA. In his Appellants Brief, the defense presented the
following:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSEDAPPELLANT NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT
HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS INSANE AT THE TIME OF
THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
At the outset, this Court notes that there is no more
question as to whether or not AAA was raped by Isla. The
latter never denied this fact which can be gleaned from his
direct testimony, to wit:
Atty. Erasmo (defense counsel)
Q: So when you left at 4:00, where did you proceed?
A: To my aunt at Balintawak.
Q: How about AAA, what happened to her if you know?
A: she was raped and stabbed, sir.
Q: Who raped and stabbed AAA, if you know?
A: Me, sir.
Q: What time did this happen?
A: 3:00 oclock, sir.
Q: Now, how did you rape AAA?
A: I went inside their house.12ςrνll
(Emphases supplied)
That being so, what is left for this jurisdiction to resolve is
whether or not Islas claim of insanity is creditable so as to
exculpate him of the crimes he admittedly committed.
This Court is not convinced with Islas defense.
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides for one
of the circumstances which will exempt one from criminal
liability which is when the perpetrator of the act was an
imbecile or insane, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval. This circumstance, however, is not easily available
to an accused as a successful defense. Insanity is the
exception rather than the rule in the human condition.
Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that
every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with
clear and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of
confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity
admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or
she is not guilty because of insanity. The testimony or proof
of an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time
immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission
of the offense with which he is charged.13ςrνll
In the case at bench, the defense failed to overcome the
presumption of sanity. The respective testimonies of Dr.
Villacorta and Dr. Gomez of the NCMH, as qualified expert
witnesses, failed to support its claim of insanity. As
observed by the CA, the mental examination on Isla taken
four to six years after the incident happened in July 1997, in
effect, showed that it could not be concluded with certainty
that he was suffering from such psychosis immediately
before or simultaneous to the commission of the crimes.
The expert witnesses themselves opined that their findings
were not conclusive as to whether Isla was insane on that
fateful day of July 21, 1997, as no examination was made
on said day or for lack of information from other informants
during that time.14ςrνll
This Court also agrees with the observation of the RTC as
affirmed by the CA that Isla acted with discernment as can
be deduced from his acts before, during and after the
commission of the crimes with which he was charged. The
RTC wrote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The overt acts committed by the accused are attributed to a
criminal mind, not a lunatic. There is no indication
whatsoever that he was completely deprived of reason or
discernment and freedom of will when he stood for a while
by the door of complainants house, then entered it, toyed
with a disconnected telephone set, and cunningly poked a
knife at complainants neck and dragged her inside the room
where he raped her. The fact that he first discreetly closed
the door and the window before he approached and poked a
knife at complainant, then, as he laid on top of her, ordered
her to undress, kissed her breast, separated apart her legs
with his own legs, and satisfied his lust, all the while holding
a knife with his right hand poked at complainants body, are
calculated means to ensure consummation of his lewd
design. These are by no means the workings of an imbecile,
but by one engulfed by lust.15ςrνll
In the case of People vs. Rafanan, Jr., this Court has held
that the defense of insanity may be accepted as an
exempting circumstance on the test of cognition, which
requires a complete deprivation of intelligence, not only of
the will, in committing the criminal act. Thus, when the
accused in said case, threatened the victim with death in
case she reported her ravishment indicated that he was
aware of the reprehensible moral depravity of that assault
and that he was not deprived of intelligence. 16ςrνll
If Isla had become insane after the commission of the
crime, such fact does not alter the situation and the Courts
ruling is the same. His defense still fails considering that he
was not insane during the commission of the acts charged.
Any problem regarding his present mental condition should
be dealt with administratively.
With respect to the stabbings, it appears that Isla
committed two acts. The first was while he was ravishing
AAA. The Court considers this and the rape as one
continuous act, the stabbing being necessary, as far as he
was concerned, for the successful perpetration of the crime.
When he testified, Isla claimed that he had to use the knife
so he could have sexual intercourse with her.
The second stabbing took place after consummation of the
rape act. According to AAA, after her defilement, she
noticed the knife bloodied and she tried to wrest it from
him. In their struggle, she was stabbed under her lower left
breast but she was able to force Isla to drop the knife. At
this point, Isla was able to escape through the backdoor.
This second stabbing is a separate and distinct offense as it
was not a necessary means to commit the rape. It was
intended to do away with her life. Thus, it has been written,
"Where a girl was raped and then strangled to death, the
crimes are the separate crimes of rape and homicide, not
complex."17Ï‚rνll This was also the ruling in People v.
Dawandawan,18Ï‚rνll where it was
written:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The physical injuries which could have caused the victim's
death were not the result of the rape committed; neither
was the slashing a necessary means for committing the
rape. Independently of the slashing of the victim's neck and
the stabbing, the accused was able to consummate the
rape. The physical injuries were inflicted after the rape and
were not a necessary means to commit the same. Hence,
the crimes committed are the two separate crimes of Rape
and Frustrated Homicide.
The Court, however, finds itself unable to agree that the
second crime committed was frustrated murder. In the
information, it was alleged that the stabbing was committed
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. There is, however, nothing in the records of the
case that would show the presence of the said qualifying
circumstances.
Evidently, there was no treachery. For treachery to exist
"the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which
the offended party might make." It is important in
ascertaining the existence of treachery that it be proven
that the attack was made swiftly, deliberately,
unexpectedly, and without a warning, thus affording the
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the
attack.19Ï‚rνll In the case at bench, Islas attack was not
sudden, swift, deliberate and without warning. He stabbed
AAA during the course of the struggle. Thus, the
prosecution failed to show that the stabbing was so
calculated as not to afford AAA the chance to evade the
attack.
Moreover, the attack was not with evident premeditation.
The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) a previous
decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) overt
act/acts manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision
to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to
allow accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts.
These circumstances were not obtaining in the case at
bench. An examination of the facts would reveal that there
was no sufficient time that elapsed for Isla to decide to
commit the crime and reflect on its consequences.
Moreover, there was no showing that he performed other
overt acts to show that he was determined to commit
murder. The essence of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive
at a calm judgment.20Ï‚rνll When Isla stabbed AAA the
second time, it was more of a reaction to the possibility of
his being disarmed by his victim rather than a well-planned
attack to kill her.
Neither was there an abuse of superior strength. There was
no showing that Isla took advantage of his superior strength
to consummate the crime.
For said reasons, the crime charged should have been
frustrated homicide only. Consequently the penalty should
be changed.
Under Article 249 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for one
found guilty of Homicide is reclusion temporal, whose
duration is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years. Considering that the crime is frustrated,
Article 250 in relation to Article 50 of the RPC provides that
the penalty next lower in degree of the penalty prescribed
by law for the consummated felony should be imposed.
Thus, the penalty should only be prision mayor, the
duration of which is from six (6) years to twelve (12) years.
Considering that there are neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, Article 64 of the RPC provides
that the penalty should be in its medium period which is
eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term should be within the range of prision correccional, the
penalty next lower in degree. Hence, for the crime of
frustrated homicide, Isla should suffer the indeterminate
penalty ranging from four (4) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
With respect to the civil aspect, he should also be made to
pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages
in addition to the civil indemnity ex delicto and moral
damages awarded. Said award is in consonance with
prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein exemplary
damages are awarded in order to set a public example and
to protect hapless individuals from sexual
molestation.21ςrνll
In lieu of the award of P10,000.00 as actual damages, an
award of temperate damages should be given instead. The
Court has consistently held that in order for one to be
entitled to actual damages, the claim must not only be
capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact
and amount of damages but there must be competent proof
of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to SO ORDERED.
claims which are duly supported by receipts.22ςrνll
Age of Criminal Responsibility
In this case, AAA failed to provide receipts to substantiate
her claim. This Court, however, is not unmindful of the fact FIRST DIVISION
that AAA was hospitalized for about five (5) days.
Considering that the expenses she incurred cannot be [G.R. No. 46539. September 27, 1939.]
proved with certainty, an award of temperate damages is
but proper. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
where from the nature of the case, definite proof of v. VALENTIN DOQUEÑA, Defendant-Appellant.
pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is
convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary Primicias, Abad, Mencias & Castillo for Appellant.
loss.23Ï‚rνll An award of P8,000.00 as temperate damages
is, to the Court's mind, just.ςηαοblενιrυαllÎ±Ï Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant
‰lιbrαr Attorney Paredes, jr ., for Appellee.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with ,MODIFICATION the

December 17, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- DECISION
G.R. No. 28761 as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079, finding the accused DIAZ, J.:

Edwin Isla y Rossell guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity ex delicto, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay
the cost of suit.
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078, finding the accused
Edwin Isla y Rossell guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Frustrated Homicide, the Court hereby sentences
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from four (4) years prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of P8,000.00 as
temperate damages; and to pay the cost of suit.
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, for
having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast
with a knife on November 19, 1938, in the municipality of
Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after trying the case, held that
the accused acted with discernment in committing the act
imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the
provisions of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be
sent to the Training School for Boys to remain therein until
he reaches the age of majority. From this order the accused
interposed an appeal alleging that the court erred in holding
that he had acted with discernment and in not having
dismissed the case.

On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen
years, nine months and five days old. The incident that
gave rise to the aggression committed by him on the
deceased is narrated in the appealed order as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Between 1 and 2 o’clock in the afternoon of November
19,1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio
Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province of
Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard,
intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos,
hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the accused,
Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard and, upon
overtaking him, slapped him on the nape. Said accused
then turned against the deceased assuming a threatening
attitude, for which reason said deceased struck him on the
mouth with his fist, returning immediately to the place
where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing with
him. The accused, offended by what he considered an abuse
on the part of Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more
robust than he, looked around the yard for a stone with
which to attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding
none, he approached a cousin of his named Romualdo
Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio
Rarang, who had heard what the accused had been asking
his cousin, told the latter not to give the accused his knife
because he might attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused,
however, succeeded in taking possession of the knife which
was in a pocket of his cousin’s pants. Once in possession of
the knife, Valentin Doqueña approached Juan Ragojos and
challenged the latter to give him another blow with his fist,
to which the deceased answered that he did not want to do
so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger than the accused.
Juan Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused,
continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared and in
the act of stopping the ball with his two hands, the accused
stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he
carried."cralaw virtua1aw library
The order also contains the following conclusions and
findings of fact which we are not at liberty to alter, not
being called upon or authorized to do so, in view of the
nature of the appeal before us, by section 138 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by commonwealth Act No.
3:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Taking into account the fact that when the accused
Valentin Doqueña committed the crime in question, he was
a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the
municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was
one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a
company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he
was studying therein he always obtained excellent marks,
this court is convinced that the accused in committing the
crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the
nature and consequences of his act, and so also has this
court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his
behalf during the trial of this case."cralaw virtua1aw library
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the
appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken from
said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to
determine discernment by the means resorted to by the
attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his brief.
He claims that to determine whether or not a minor acted
with discernment, we must take into consideration not only
the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act
committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the
time the crime was committed, the time he might have had
at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the
consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he
could have had at that moment. It is clear that the attorney
for the defense mistakes the discernment referred to in
article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for
premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a
mitigating circumstance, is included among other mitigating
circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The discernment
that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but
over nine who commits an act prohibited by law, is his
mental capacity to understand the difference between right
and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances accorded by the records in each case, the
very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and even during the
trial (U. S. v. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the
trial court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is correct.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to
the appellant. So ordered.
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.
The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.
Manuel Pete NIETO, Defendant and Appellant.
Cr. 14737.
Decided: December 16, 1968
David W. O'Brien, Covina, for defendant and appellant by
appointment of the Court of Appeal. Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen.,
William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Arthur B. Rosenfeld, Deputy
Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
A jury found defendant guilty of three counts of using a minor
(Dennis Van Johnson) to sell heroin (s 11502, Health & Saf.Code)
and one count of possession for sale of heroin (s 11500.5, Health &
Saf.Code) and the alleged prior felony conviction (first degree
burglary) to be true. He appeals from the judgment and order
denying motion for new trial. The appeal from the order is dismissed.
Dennis Van Johnson,1 16 years old, overheard defendant tell Luis
Gonzales he was selling heroin. Two weeks later (January 14, 1967)
Dennis met defendant who gave him ten balloons containing heroin;
he was to sell them to ‘hyps' for $60 each out of which he was to
keep $10 for himself and give $50 to defendant (count II). On
February 17, 1967, near Bixby Slough defendant gave Dennis more
heroin which he sold under the same arrangement (count III). Later
defendant contacted him and they met at the same place on
February 28, 1967, at which time defendant gave him several more
balloons (count I) but before he could sell them all he was arrested
on March 1, 1967; he had sold only two and still had about $100 on
his person. On March 1, 1967, about twenty minutes before he was
arrested, he saw defendant at Bixby Slough; Dennis had placed
several of the unsold balloons in a paper cup on the ground; he had
a gun and a clip, which he had received from a customer in
exchange for a balloon, in a paper bag which he placed about 25
feet away.
On March 1, 1967, Officer Kline and Officer Knowles, trained in
narcotic investigation and a qualified expert on narcotics and
dangerous drugs, were driving past Bixby Slough and noticed two
vehicles, one a white Chevrolet, license ROA 769, and standing next
to them two males, one of whom was defendant, having a
conversation. Knowles parked and watched through binoculars; he
saw one man get into a vehicle and drive away at which time
Martinez (18), Gonzales (15) and Dennis (16) walked toward
defendant who was standing near a metal trash can; they all stood
close together and conversed for several minutes, then defendant
got into the white Chevrolet and drove away. Knowles drove in the
parking area and approached the three boys, saw a brown paper
bag at the base of a tree about 20 feet from where Dennis and
Gonzales were standing, picked up the bag, opened it and found a .
25 caliber chrome plated pistol and clip; he showed the gun and bag
to the boys, then returned to where he found the gun and saw, about
15 to 18 feet away, a Dixie cup full of balloons; recognizing them, he
approached the boys, informed them of what he had found, and
arrested them. Dennis had $123 on his person. An hour later at the
home of defendant's mother, in front of which was parked a white
Chevrolet, license number ROA 769, defendant was arrested.
The quantity of heroin in each balloon would probably sell for $60 on
the street; expert testimony established that the balloons contained
heroin in usable quantities. Several latent fingerprints lifted from one
of the balloons found in the Dixie cup were photographed and
compared with defendant's finger and palm prints (Exh. 6); an expert
positively identified a left thumb print found on the balloon as made
by the same person (defendant) who made the print on Exhibit 6.
Defendant testified that in passing the park he saw Martinez and
talked with him five minutes; he only said hello to Dennis and
Gonzales. He denied giving or selling Dennis narcotics or asking him
to sell them, hearing Dennis, Martinez or Gonzales talk about the
sale of narcotics, having any heroin in his possession for sale and
receiving any money from Dennis.
Based on the following the trial judge, over defendant's repeated
objections,2 allowed Dennis' testimony to be read from the
preliminary transcript (Exh. 3.)
On August 7, 1967, district attorney's investigator Exworthy called
the probation department and talked to a Mr. Brown who advised him
that on May 15, 1967, 3 Dennis was referred to them from the juvenile
court, his grandmother, Minnie Johnson, picked him up and took him
to Ada, Oklahoma, he is on probation for an offense in Pontotoc
County, Oklahoma, and is ‘a wardship of Judge Fred Andrews of the
County Court,’ P.O. Box 336, Ada, Oklahoma; he then called the
police department in Ada for a check on Dennis; on August 8, 1967,
Officer Farmer called and said Dennis was living with Minnie and
attending Irving School; he then telephoned Irving School and spoke
with a Mr. (Dennis Van) Johnson who said that he was the one
involved in the Nieto case, was living with Minnie in Ada, was not
planning to return for a long time and intended to stay there; asked if
he planned to leave Ada and come to Los Angeles, Dennis replied
that he did not; he did not ask Dennis if he had any money or if he
would come to Los Angeles or if there was any reason why he could
not, knows no reason why Dennis could not come for the trial and did
not attempt to talk to him after August 8, 1967. Subpoenas were
issued April 17, June 15 and August 10, 1967, but none were served
on Dennis.
Officer Kline, a defense witness, testified that in April 1967
subpoenas were issued but were not served; when he tried to serve
Dennis in July 1967 for the August 4 trial he learned that Dennis had
gone to Oklahoma but he did not try to contact him.
Appellant claims he is entitled to a reversal because Dennis'
testimony was read from the preliminary transcript in violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by the witnesses against
him as recently interpreted in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct.
1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255; and the jury did not have the opportunity to
look at Dennis and judge by his demeanor on the stand and the
manner in which he testified whether he was worthy of belief.
Whereas under California laws as it existed prior to January 1, 1967,
the testimony of a witness given at a preliminary examination could
be used at defendant's trial upon a mere showing that the witness is
absent from the state (People v. Carswell (1959), 51 Cal.2d 602,
605, 335 P.2d 99), the Evidence Code which became operative on
January 1, 1967, simultaneously with an amendment to Penal Code,
section 686,4 changed that rule. (People v. Woods,a 265 Cal.App.2d
806, 71 Cal.Rptr. 583.) Thus, under section, 1291, Evidence
Code,5 as applied herein,6 Dennis' testimony taken at the preliminary
hearing was admissible if he was ‘unavailable as a witness' and
defendant had the right and opportunity to cross-examine him with
an interest or motive similar to that which he had at the trial
(defendant, represented by competent counsel, had the opportunity
to and did cross-examine Dennis at length at the preliminary
hearing). However, Dennis was ‘unavailable as a witness' if he was
absent from the trial and the court was unable to compel his
attendance by its process or the prosecutor exercised reasonable
diligence but was unable to procure his attendance by the court's
process. (s 240, Evid.Code.)7
For his criminal activities herein a petition was filed against Dennis
on March 13, 1967, and sustained March 21, 1967, by the juvenile
court which referred Dennis to the probation department, released
him to his mother and allowed him to leave California with his
grandmother (Los Angeles County probation file (Exh. 1); Superior
Court file (Exh. 2)). On March 21, 1967, Dennis testified at the
preliminary hearing; then the prosecution knew that he was a
material witness and the probation department knew that he was
leaving the state. Information was filed April 3, 1967, and defendant
pleaded not guilty on April 4, 1967; his trial was set for May 15, 1967.
On April 19, 1967, the probation department received verification by
Judge Fred Andrews, Pontotoc, Oklahoma, that Dennis was living
with Minnie at 418 West 4th Street, Ada, on probation there and a
ward of the court.8 (Probation file (Exh. 1).) On April 17, June 15 and
August 10, 1967, subpoenas were issued for Dennis but not served.
Dennis' petition in juvenile court was dismissed May 12, 1967. On
May 15, 1967, defendant's trial was continued on his own motion to
June 15, and thereafter to July 31, then August 4, 1967. Officer Kline
tried to serve Dennis in July 1967 for the August 4 trial and learned
he was in Ada. No courtroom was available on August 4, 1967, and
trial was continued to August 7, 1967. On August 7, 1967, the district
attorney's office learned that Dennis was in Ada and his address,
and that he was on probation there and a ward of the court. On the
People's motion, the trial was continued to August 8, 1967; on the
same day, after talking to Dennis, the district attorney's investigator
knew that he did not plan to return and intended to stay in Ada; he
did not ask Dennis to come to Los Angeles or thereafter attempt to
talk to him and knows no reason why Dennis could not come here.
On the People's motion the trial was continued to August 28, 1967,
then again to September 5, 1967. A jury was empaneled on
September 6 and the trial commenced September 7, 1967.
It cannot be said that Dennis' absence was brought about ‘by the
procuring or wrongdoing’ of the prosecution for the purpose of
preventing him from ‘attending or testifying’ (s 240(b), Evid.Code) or
that it was guilty of the kind of negligence shown in Motes v. United
States, 178 U.S. 458, 20 S.Ct. 993, 44 L.Ed. 1150 (United States
marshal permitted a witness who had been in custody to escape),
and while prior to January 1, 1967, ‘a showing of due diligence to
keep the witness within the state’ (People v. Carswell, 51 Cal.2d 602,
605—606, 335 P.2d 99, 101; People v. Dozier, 236 Cal.App.2d 94,
105, 45 Cal.Rptr. 770) was not required to render his prior testimony
admissible, it is now apparent under section 240, Evidence Code,
that when a witness is absent because the prosecution was not
active in attempting by subpoena to secure his presence at the trial
in a timely fashion, his testimony given at the preliminary hearing
may not be used. (People v. Harris,b 266 Cal.App.2d 426, —-, 72
Cal.Rptr. 423.) In Harris, ‘Six weeks had thus elapsed after the trial
date was set during which the prosecution made no effort to see that
Mr. Strickland would be available when the trial was held. The
process server reported what he had done to the district attorney's
office and that office, through him or by some other means, found
that Strickland was supposed to be somewhere in Canada. * * *
‘The district attorney's office was not active in attempting to secure
Mr. Strickland's presence at the trial in a timely fashion. If the
prosecution had moved alertly after the setting of the case, it seems
clear that it could have had the witness present at the trial, and it is
for this reason that we feel that his evidence given at the preliminary
examination was not properly introduced at the trial.’ (266
Cal.App.2d at pages —- - —-, c 72 Cal.Rptr. at pages 427, 429.)
Appellant argues that the delay in attempting to serve Dennis is
much longer than the delay in attempting to serve Strickland. The
facts here reveal no negligence in failing to serve Dennis in
California inasmuch as he left immediately after the preliminary
hearing before any trial date was set, but they do reflect a complete
lack of reasonable or any diligence on the part of the prosecution,
during the five months pending trial, to procure Dennis' attendance
as a witness by court process after he returned to Oklahoma. At this
point, it should be noted that the absence referred to in section 240,
Evidence Code, not limited to absence from the state, means
absence from the hearing wherever the witness might be, and that
the ‘reasonable diligence’ the prosecution must exercise relates to
the procurement of the witness' attendance ‘by the court's process.’
Thus, while the fact that one month before trial the district attorney's
investigator talked to Dennis in Oklahoma but made no effort by
request or persuasion to seek his presence at the trial (had Exworthy
simply asked Dennis to come to Los Angeles he might have done
so), and that two months prior to trial, when Officer Kline learned that
Dennis was in Oklahoma, the prosecution made no effort to seek the
cooperation of the probation department and Judge Andrews in
Pontotoc County, Oklahoma, to arrange his return to California for
the purpose of testifying at defendant's trial might be significant
under the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, that ‘a
witness is not ‘unavailable’ * * * unless the prosecutorial authorities
have made a goodfaith effort to obtain his presence at trial' (390 U.S.
at p. 724, 88 S.Ct. at p. 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 260), under section
240 the reasonable diligence to be exercised is required only in
procuring Dennis' attendance at defendant's trial by court process.
Dennis left California before the first trial date was set; from April 4,
1967, to September 7, 1967, five months elapsed during which, in
July, the first and only effort was made to serve Dennis with a
subpoena in Los Angeles at which time Officer Kline learned he was
in Oklahoma; prior to that time, on April 19, 1967, the probation
department knew Dennis' exact address in Oklahoma, and on
August 8, 1967, the district attorney's investigator talked to Dennis.
Whereas cases prior to the effective date of the Evidence Code hold
that ‘The existence of permissive legislation to obtain the presence of
a witness from another state does not force the decision that it is
mandatory upon the prosecution to exercise it. (Citations.)’ (People
v. Washington, 248 Cal.App.2d 470, 475, 57 Cal.Rptr. 487, 491; see
also People v. Carswell, 51 Cal.2d 602, 605, 335 P.2d 99), it is now
established that the provisions of section 240 make resort to the
Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of the Witnesses without the
State in Criminal Cases necessary in efforts to compel a witness to
attend a trial.9 (Pen.Code, ss 1334—1334.6; People v. Casarez,d
263 Cal.App.2d 130, —-, 69 Cal.Rptr. 187; People v. Woods,e 265
Cal.App.2d 712, —- - —-, 71 Cal.Rptr. 583; see also People v.
Ashford,f 265 Cal.App.2d 673, —-, 71 Cal.Rptr. 619, as to use of
depositions in criminal actions.) In Woods, the court said concerning
the Uniform Act: ‘Under these acts a person within the State of
Washington may be compelled to come to California to testify in a
criminal case. * * *
‘Under the law as it existed when the case at bench was tried (July
31, 1967) the fact that Mr. Buckley was in the State of Washington
was not enough to make his former testimony admissible, since he
was in a place from which his presence could be compelled by
process.’ (Pp. —- - —-,g 71 Cal.Rptr. p. 585.) That the Uniform Act is
in force in Oklahoma is evident from the opinion in Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255. While as early as April
19, 1967, the probation department knew Dennis' exact address in
Ada, Oklahoma, in July 1967 Officer Kline in trying to serve Dennis in
California learned that he was in Oklahoma, and on August 7, 1967,
the district attorney's office knew where Dennis lived and went to
school, no effort of any kind was made by anyone to compel Dennis,
in Oklahoma, by court process to attend defendant's trial.
The retroactive application of Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct.
1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 25510 (decided by the United States Supreme
Court on April 23, 1968, more than seven months after defendant's
trial) employed in People v. Casarez,h 263 Cal.App.2d 130, 69
Cal.Rptr. 187; People v. Ashford,i 265 Cal.App.2d 673, 71 Cal.Rptr.
619; People v. Woods,j 265 Cal.App.2d 712, 71 Cal.Rptr. 583; and
People v. Harris,k 266 Cal.App.2d 426, 72 Cal.Rptr. 423 (see also
People v. Johnson, 68 Cal.2d 646, 11 68 Cal.Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111)
and here urged by appellant is unnecessary for while ‘the definition
of ‘unavailable’ under Barber v. Page may not be coterminous with
that in Evidence Code section 240' (People v. Woods,l 265
Cal.App.2d 712, —-, 71 Cal.Rptr. 583, 586), it is apparent from the
record that the prosecution did not show that Dennis was
‘unavailable as a witness' as defined by statute. It is further apparent
from the record that Dennis' testimony was a substantial and
important part of the People's case on counts I, II and III. He was an
accomplice witness and the only one who testified to defendant's
criminal activities as related to him; and in the light of the entire
evidence we are not ‘able to declare a belief that it (the error) was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.) This conclusion
does not affect the judgment as it relates to defendant's conviction of
possession for sale of heroin as alleged in count IV.
Appellant's last contention that the prosecution was guilty of
prejudicial misconduct is without merit. His claim is based on the
prosecutor's cross-examination of him, particularly with reference to
the validity of his marriage to one Connie and Connie's probation.
Even if improper the same was ameliorated by the court's
instructions and admonishment to the jury to disregard any questions
relating to Connie. We presume that the jury abided by the court's
instruction. Moreover, appellant has failed to point out in what shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty
manner such inquiries were prejudicial even if irrelevant. (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the
course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar
For the foregoing reasons the judgment as to counts I, II and III is bone which caused his unfortunate death.
reversed and the cause remanded to the superior court for retrial on
these counts. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal
exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate
Republic of the Philippines occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents
SUPREME COURT appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a
Manila case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless Imprudence.
The information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which
narrated in part:
SECOND DIVISION

. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years

G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
but below 15 years of age and acting with
discernment, did then and there, without taking the
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner, necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid
vs. accident or injuries to persons, willfully, unlawfully
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent. and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a
reckless and imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22
Teresita Dy-Liacco and Roberto Madrid for petitioner. caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt operated
thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness and
imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at
the left side of the body with its pellet, causing
PARAS,  J.: injuries which directly caused his untimely death; . . .
(p. 8, Rollo)
Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the
Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi, On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information
Branch 1, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law which We on the following grounds:
are tasked to resolve. Considering the issues and arguments raised
by petitioner, We impleaded the People of the Philippines as party I
respondents herein in a resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41,
Rollo). THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT
CONSTITUTE OFFENSE.
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:
II
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with
his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS
backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target- AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD
 CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR
JUSTIFICATION.
III
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED
AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9,
Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect
to the first and third grounds relied upon. However, the resolution of
the second ground was deferred until evidence shall have been
presented during trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising
two (2) issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY
COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY
LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a
corollary controversy with respect to the first issue raised is evident,
that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the
position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes 'intent' (p. 96,
Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto,  G.R. No.
11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the allegation of "with
intent to kill . . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment
should be alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15
years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then
the allegation in the information that the accused
acted with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and
feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless
and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an
inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the
information to allege a cause of action or constitute a
legal excuse or exception. (Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of
9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense under Article 265 of
the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and
intent are two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor
General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an
aim; the purpose of the mind, including such
knowledge as is essential to such intent;. . .; the
design resolve, or determination with which a person
acts.' (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means
of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the other two.
On the other hand, We have defined the term discernment, as used
in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena,
68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an
 act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and
wrong . . . (Emphasis supplied) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and
"discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are products
of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the
desired of one's act while the latter relates to the moral significance
that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend
to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his
negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in
negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue,
as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but
below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to
be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to
shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of
his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and
"discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the
enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of
the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the
accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second element
of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without
this power, necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no
crime can exist, and because ... the infant 3 (has) no
intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal
liability. (Emphasis supplied)
lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and
below are not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other
hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are not
absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be without
criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it could
be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and
criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment.
" 4 The preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element
of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as used in
Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People
vs. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that
discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to two
different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a
distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3)
elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action,
and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies.
However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is
necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be
possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which
results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must
discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act.
Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held
liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of
the said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase
"Any person. . ." without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex
non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent"
and "discernment" used under the law, he cites the case of People
vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying
sentence preceding the ruling he now invokes, which reads:
That requirement should be deemed amply met with
the allegation in the information that she. . ."with the
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally
and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a
deep place of the Peñaranda River and as a
consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and
died right then and there.' This allegation clearly
conveys the Idea that she knew what would be the
consequence of her unlawful act of pushing her
victim into deep water and that she knew it to be
wrong. (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words
"intent" and "discernment." What We meant was that the combined
effect of the words used in the information is to express a
knowledge, on the part of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or
rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not validly contend that
since the information now in question alleged "discernment", it in
effect alleged "intent." The former may never embrace the Idea of
the latter; the former expresses the thought of passivity while the
latter signifies activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the
petitioner that the case against him should have first been brought
before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1508, Section 2(3). He submits that, considering his entitlement to a
two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance due to his minority,
P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the penalty imposable is
reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an original arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional medium as prescribed in
Article 365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The jurisdiction of a court
over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under
the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed
(People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314;
Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451). The
same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which
states:
xxx xxx xxx
considering the attendant circumstances affecting
criminal liability. 5
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We
therefore rule that, in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the
penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter
should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect
criminal liability must not be considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has
not been complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As
intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and
categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is
not jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order
effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding FIRST DIVISION

30 day , or a fine exceeding P 200.00; ... (emphasis
supplied) G.R. No. 183563               December 14, 2011

Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
drafted P.D. 1508 has said: vs.
HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA, Accused-Appellant.
The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One
should therefore consider the penalty provided for by DECISION
law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty
actually imposed in particular cases after LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated
February 8, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560, which affirmed
with modification the Decision2 dated September 9, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7, in Criminal
Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the accused-appellant
Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1)
count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of rape against the
private complainant AAA.3
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged 4 with
eight (8) counts of rape in separate informations, the accusatory
portions of which state:
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46
That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX],
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the
offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal knowledge of
the said [AAA], who was then only eight (8) years old, without her
consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.5
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.6
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48
That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.7
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.8
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.9
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.10
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.11
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.12 (Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28,
2000, he entered a plea of not guilty.13 On March 13, 2001, the pre-
trial conference of the cases was conducted and the parties
stipulated on the identity of the accused-appellant in all the cases,
the minority of the victim and the fact that the accused appellant is
the uncle of the victim.14
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed
by the accused and his counsel. The cases were then heard on
consolidated trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the
charges against the accused-appellant. AAA testified that she was
born on November 1, 1987.15 In one afternoon when she was only
eight years old, she stated that the accused-appellant raped her
inside their house. She could not remember, though, the exact
month and date of the incident. The accused-appellant stripped off
her shorts, panties and shirt and went on top of her. He had his
clothes on and only pulled down his zipper. He then pulled out his
organ, put it in her vagina and did the pumping motion. AAA felt pain
but she did not know if his organ penetrated her vagina. When he
pulled out his organ, she did not see any blood. She did so only
when she urinated.16
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July
1999 for five times on different nights. The accused-appellant was
then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house
of AAA’s neighbor. He came to AAA’s house, took off her panty and
went on top of her. She could not see what he was wearing as it was
nighttime. He made her hold his penis then he left. When asked
again how the accused-appellant raped her for five nights in July of
the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty, went on
top of her and pumped. She felt pain as he put his penis into her
vagina. Every time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain. AAA said
that she recognized the accused-appellant as her assailant since it
was a moonlit night and their window was only covered by cloth. He
entered through the kitchen as the door therein was detached. 17
AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice
in August 1999 at nighttime. He kissed her and then he took off his
shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and
in her chest because he was heavy. She did not know if his penis
penetrated her vagina. She related that the accused-appellant was
her uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said that she did
not tell anybody about the rapes because the accused-appellant
threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint
when he proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD. 18
After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its
documentary evidence, consisting of: (1) Exhibit A - the Medico-
Legal Report,19 which contained the results of the medical
examination conducted on AAA by Dr. Rommel Capungcol and Dr.
Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit B - the
Social Case Study Report20 pertaining to AAA’s case, which was
issued by the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office of
the Province of Leyte.
The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:
P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:
- (-) Physical injuries.
OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of rape since 8 year old for so
many times. last act was March 1999.
O: Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia – grossly normal.
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9 o’clock
position
Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.
Internal Exam:
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE 21
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to
the witness stand to deny the informations filed against him and to
refute the testimony of AAA. He testified that when the first incident
of rape allegedly happened in 1995, he was only 13 years old as he
was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he worked in Sagkahan,
Tacloban City as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he
stayed there up to 1996. He stated that he was working in Tacloban
City when the alleged rapes happened in the municipality of XXX.
When he would go home from Tacloban, he would stay at the house
of a certain Fred Antoni. He did not go to the house of AAA as the
latter’s parents were his enemies. He said that he had a quarrel with
AAA’s parents because he did not work with them in the ricefields.
He further recounted that in July 1999, he was also living in Tacloban
City and worked there as a dishwasher at a restaurant. He worked
there from 1998 up to September 1999. The accused-appellant
likewise stated that in August 1999, he was still working at the same
restaurant in Tacloban City. While working there, he did not go home
to XXX as he was busy with work. He denied that he would have
drinking sprees with AAA’s stepfather, BBB, because they were
enemies.22
On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the
mother of AAA was his sister and they were close to each other. He
said that his parents were still alive in 1995 up to October 1999 and
the latter then resided at Calaasan, Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated
that his parents’ house was about two kilometers away from the
house of AAA. While he was working at the restaurant in Tacloban
City, he would visit his parents once every month, mainly on
Sundays.23
The Judgment of the RTC
On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7,
rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and
266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and further amended
by R.A. 8353 (Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty
Law) the Court found accused HENRY ARPON, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of ONE COUNT OF STATUTORY
RAPE and SEVEN COUNTS OF RAPE charged under the
informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty
of DEATH, and to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount
of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos for each count of Rape and
pay moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00)
Pesos and pay the cost.24 (Emphases in the original.)
The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The fact
that AAA was in tears when she testified convinced the trial court of
the truthfulness of her rape charges against the accused-appellant. If
there were inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony, the trial court
deemed the same understandable considering that AAA was pitted
against a learned opposing counsel. The delay in the reporting of the
rape incidents was not also an indication that the charges were
fabricated. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the findings of the
medico-legal officer confirmed that she was indeed raped. The
accused-appellant’s defense of alibi was likewise disregarded by the
trial court, declaring that it was not physically impossible for him to
be present in XXX at any time of the day after working hours while
he was working in Tacloban City. The trial court stated that the
accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA as the person
who sexually abused her and she held no grudge against him. The
trial court imposed the penalty of death as it found that AAA was less
than 18 years old at the time of the commission of the rape incidents
and the accused-appellant was her uncle, a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree. The trial court also appreciated against
the accused-appellant the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
confidence and nighttime.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration 25 of the
RTC Decision, asserting that the trial court failed to consider his
minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in his
direct examination, the accused-appellant claimed that he was born
on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17 years old
when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999,
respectively. In a Resolution26 dated November 6, 2002, the trial
court denied the accused-appellant’s motion, holding that the latter
failed to substantiate with clear and convincing evidence his
allegation of minority.
The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were
docketed as G.R. Nos. 165201-08. 27 The parties then filed their
respective briefs.28 On February 7, 2006, we resolved29 to transfer
the cases to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo.30 The cases were docketed in the appellate court as CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00560.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
decision, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in Criminal Case Nos.
2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53 is AFFIRMED with modification awarding
exemplary damages to [AAA] in the amount of Twenty[-]Five
Thousand (₱25,000.00) Pesos for each count of rape and
clarification that the separate award of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00)
Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to each count of rape.
The death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in
accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.31
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out
by the accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA were not sufficient
to discredit her. The appellate court held that the exact age of AAA
when the incidents of rape occurred no longer mattered, as she was
still a minor at the time. More significant was her "straightforward,
categorical and candid testimony" that she was raped eight times by
the accused-appellant. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the
ruling of the RTC that AAA’s charges of rape conformed with the
physical evidence and the accused-appellant’s uncorroborated
defense of alibi could not stand against the positive identification
made by AAA.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the relationship of the accused-appellant to AAA was both
alleged in the informations and admitted by the accused-appellant.
The appellate court, however, differed in appreciating against the
accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of AAA’s minority.
The lone testimony of AAA on the said circumstance was held to be
an insufficient proof therefor. The aggravating circumstance of
nighttime was also ruled to be inapplicable as it was not shown that
the same was purposely sought by the accused-appellant or that it
facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape. In view of the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of
Appeals awarded exemplary damages in favor of AAA.
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 32 of the above
decision and the same was given due course by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution33 dated May 27, 2008.
On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and
required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they
so desire, within 30 days from notice.34 Thereafter, in a Manifestation
and Motion35 filed on December 24, 2008, the plaintiff-appellee,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed that it be excused
from filing a supplemental brief. On February 3, 2009, the accused-
appellant submitted a Supplemental Brief.36
The Issues
In the accused-appellant’s brief, the following issues were invoked:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.37
The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC
to give weight to the incredible testimony of AAA. He alleges that
AAA could not state with consistency the exact date when she was
first supposedly raped, as well as her age at that time. The accused-
appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the dates of the
other incidents of rape charged, all of which were allegedly described
in a uniform manner. Contrary to the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that the above inconsistencies
cannot merely be discounted as insignificant. He further insists that
the qualifying circumstances of AAA’s minority and her relationship
to the accused-appellant were not duly proven by the prosecution.
The accused-appellant, thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court
resolves to deny the appeal, but with a modification of the penalties
and the amount of indemnities awarded.
To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-
appellant guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7)
counts of qualified rape.
Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first
incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA
was only eight years old. However, the accused-appellant points out
that the prosecution failed to substantiate the said fact as AAA’s
testimony thereon was too inconsistent and incredible to be worthy of
any belief. He explains that AAA initially claimed that she was raped
for the first time when she was eight years old. Nonetheless, during
her testimony regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in July
1999, she said that the accused did the same thing that he did to her
when she was only seven years old. On her redirect examination,
AAA then stated that she was first raped in 1998 when she was
eleven (11) years old.
Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime
of rape by sexual intercourse as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed
– demented.
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
In particular, "Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime
of statutory rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under
twelve (12) years of age or is demented."38
The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act
No. 8353,39 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on
October 22, 1997.40 Prior to this date, the crime of rape was
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, 41 which
provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
In People v. Macafe,42 we explained the concept of statutory rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in this wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it
departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law
punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman
below twelve years old. Hence, force and intimidation are
immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman
and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that
the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of
her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her
presumed incapacity to discern evil from good.43 (Emphasis ours.)
Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned
provisions of law are essentially the same. Thus, whether the first
incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before
the amendment of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in 1998,
after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the prosecution
has the burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the age
of AAA at the time of the commission of the rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, "the date of the
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of
rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman."44 "Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are
irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for
acquittal."45
In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of
AAA and we found no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the
RTC that the accused-appellant indeed committed the first incident
of rape charged. AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as
the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes. With tears in her eyes, she
clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as
follows:
[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened when you
were still 8 years old?
[AAA]
A: There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact month and
date.

As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity Q: Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 years old?
the substance of AAA’s testimony. On this matter, we reiterate our
ruling in People v. Condes46 that:
A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry.
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on
the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial Q: How did he rape you?
court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are
often accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts.
observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying. Her
"furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you?
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an
oath" are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' A: Yes, sir in our house.
honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine
if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh
Q: Who were the persons present then at that time?
conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value
were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to A: My younger brother and I.
observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying
and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent Q: About your mother and step father where were they?
application where said findings are sustained by the [Court of
Appeals].47 A: In the ricefield.
PROS. SABARRE: A: In my vagina.

May we make it of record that the witness is crying. Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel?

COURT: A: Pain.48

Have it on record. The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-
Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol and Dr. Gagala, who found "old,
PROS. SABARRE: healed, incomplete" hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA.
"[W]hen the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical
findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been
Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or
carnal knowledge."49
evening?

Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been
A: In the afternoon.
committed in July 1999, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the
trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. The
xxxx testimony of AAA on the said incidents is as follows:

Q: After your clothes and [panty] were taken off by accused what did Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in July
he do to you next if any? 1999?

A: He went on top of me. A: Five times.

Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked? Q: Was it in the daytime or night time?

A: He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, he only pulled A: Night time.
down the zipper.
Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night?
Q: And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top of you what
did he do next if any?
A: Different nights.
A: He was pumping on me.
Q: Who were present then at that time when he raped you five
times?
Q: Did he pull out his organ?
A: My Kuya and other siblings.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You have companions why were you raped?
Q: And where did he place his organ?
A: Because they were sleeping. Q: You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights how
did he rape you?
Q: How did he rape you on that July night for five times, will you
please narrate to the court? A: (witness did not answer)

A: Because they have been drinking, he came to our house, pulled PROS. SABARRE:
out my panty and went on top of me.
Make it of record that the witness is crying again.
Q: With whom was he drinking?
Q: Why are you crying?
A: With my step father.
A: I am angry and hurt.
Q: Where did they drink?
PROS. SABARRE:
A: In our neighbor.
Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the proceeding
Q: When he took off your shorts and panty what was the accused considering that the witness is psychologically incapable of further
wearing at that time? proceeding.

A: I do not know because I could not see since it was night time. xxxx

Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something? Q: I have asked you how did the accused rape you will you please
narrate the whole incident to this honorable court?
A: No, sir.
A: The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went on top of
Q: What did he do with his penis? me.

A: He made me hold it. Q: What was the same thing you are talking about?

Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it? A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump.

A: He left. Q: When he pump what did you feel?

xxxx A: Pain.

ATTY. SABARRE: COURT:

Why did you feel pain?
A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel
pain.
ATTY. SABARRE;
How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when it was night
time?
A: It was a moonlight night and our window was only covered by
cloth as cover.50
From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of
rape. She made no reference whatsoever to the other four instances
of rape that were likewise supposedly committed in the month of July
1999.
The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly
committed in August 1999. AAA narrated only one incident of rape in
this manner:
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in the
month of August 1999?
A: Two times.
Q: Was it during day time or night time?
A: Nighttime.
Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999?
A: He kissed me.
Q: After kissing you what did he do next?
A: He took off his shirts.
Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?
A: He went on top of me and pump.
Q: When he made a pumping motion on top of you what did you
feel?
A: My vagina was painful and also my chest because he was heavy.
Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?
A: Because he was raping me.
Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina?
A: I do not know.
Q: If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you recognize
him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is he?
A: That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked his
name answered Henry Arpon).51
"It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and
distinct crime that the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the exacting test of
moral certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of
overcoming the appellant's presumption of innocence." 52 Thus,
including the first incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only
able to establish three instances when the accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of her.
The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA
described the incidents of rape in a uniform manner does not
convince this Court. To our mind, AAA’s narration of the sexual
abuses committed by the accused-appellant contained an adequate
recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of rape, i.e., that
he placed his organ in her private part. 53 "Etched in our jurisprudence
is the doctrine that a victim of a savage crime cannot be expected to
mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of every lurid
detail of a frightening experience — a verity born[e] out of human
nature and experience."54
We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellant’s
defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. "Alibi is an inherently
weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable.
To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing
evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the
time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was
committed."55 "[S]ince alibi is a weak defense for being easily
fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the
positive identification by a credible witness that an accused
perpetrated the crime."56
In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the
trial court that:
The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers and
can be negotiated by passenger bus in less than one (1) hour,
hence, it is not impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX] at
any time of the day after working hours while working in Tacloban.
Besides, the accused has his day off every Sunday, which according
to him he spent in [XXX], Leyte.
The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person
who sexually molested her beginning that afternoon of 1995, and
subsequently thereafter in the coming years up to August 1999. She
can not be mistaken on the identity of the accused, because the first
sexual molestation happened during the daytime, besides, she is
familiar with him being her uncle, the brother of her mother. 57
Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-
appellant that AAA may have been prompted to falsely testify against
him (accused-appellant) in view of the latter’s quarrel with AAA’s
parents when he refused to work with them in the rice fields. 58 Aside
from being uncorroborated, we find the same specious and
implausible. "Where the charges against the appellant involve a
heinous offense, a minor disagreement, even if true, does not
amount to a sufficient justification for dragging a young girl's honor to
a merciless public scrutiny that a rape trial brings in its
wake."591avvphi1
As to the accused-appellant’s objection that there was no proof of
the age of the victim, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the
prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA when the
incidents of rape were committed. The testimony of AAA that she
was born on November 1, 1987,60 the voluntary stipulation of the
accused, with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority of the
victim during pre-trial and his testimony regarding his recollection of
the age of the victim,61 his own niece, all militate against accused-
appellant’s theory. In People v. Pruna, 62 the Court established the
guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or
as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party
is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
 Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives
concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony
will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age
of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to
the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him. (Emphases ours.)
Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she
took the witness stand (when she was 14 years old), the victim, as to
her body and facial features, was indeed a minor.63
That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force,
threat or intimidation need no longer be belabored upon. "[I]n rape
committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father,
uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary
that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation." 64
Penalties
On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the crime of rape
with reclusion perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides
that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law-spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
relevantly recites:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship
qualify the three (3) counts of rape committed by the accused-
appellant. "As a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape,
the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the
accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable
doubt."65 In the instant case, the informations alleged that AAA was
less than eighteen (18) years of age when the incidents of rape
occurred and the accused-appellant is her uncle, a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree. The said circumstances
were also admitted by the accused-appellant during the pre-trial
conference of the case and again admitted by him during his
testimony.66
In People v. Pepito,67 the Court explained that "[t]he purpose of
entering into a stipulation or admission of facts is to expedite trial and
to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of proving
facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These admissions during the pre-
trial conference are worthy of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the
admissions made by appellant therein must be given weight."
Consequently, for the first incident of rape, regardless of whether the
same occurred in 1995 or in 1998, the imposition of the death
penalty is warranted. For the second and third counts of rape, the
imposable penalty is also death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the
accused-appellant the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
Although this matter was not among the issues raised before the
Court, we still take cognizance of the same in accordance with the
settled rule that "[i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws open the
entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct
errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed
judgment."68
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344,
otherwise known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,"
provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a child in conflict
with the law,69 viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. — The child in conflict with the law
shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the
rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years of age or older. The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents,
age may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child
and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the
child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People, 70 we clarified that, in the past, the
Court deemed sufficient the testimonial evidence regarding the
minority and age of the accused provided the following conditions
concur, namely: "(1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence
such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar
documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the
presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and
minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without
any objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any
contrary evidence showing that the accused's and/or his relatives'
testimonies are untrue."71
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born
on February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the
first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995. 72 Other than his
testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the date of his
birth. However, the records of this case show neither any objection to
the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary
evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals should have appreciated the accused-appellant’s minority in
ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before
Republic Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, the said law is
still applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. — Persons who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below
the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence,
shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They
shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act
and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be
immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other
applicable law.
People v. Sarcia73 further stressed that "[w]ith more reason, the Act
should apply to [a] case wherein the conviction by the lower court is
still under review."
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20
of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the
minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,74 "i.e., from ‘under nine
years of age’ and ‘above nine years of age and under fifteen’ (who
acted without discernment) - to ‘fifteen years old or under’ and
‘above fifteen but below 18’ (who acted without discernment) in
determining exemption from criminal liability."75
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995, the
testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he
was only 13 years old at that time. In view of the failure of the
prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of
rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as
previously discussed, any doubt therein "should be resolved in favor
of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter." 76 The Court,
thus, exempts the accused-appellant from criminal liability for the first
count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly
liable therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the
year 1999, the accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We
likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted
with discernment. In Madali v. People,77 the Court had the occasion
to reiterate that "[d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a minor to
fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity
may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records
in each case." In this case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted
with discernment was satisfactorily established by the testimony of
AAA, which we had already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified
that she at first did not tell anybody about the sexual assault she
suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant because the latter
told her that he would kill her mother if she did so. That the accused-
appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal his dastardly
acts only proved that he knew full well that what he did was wrong
and that he was aware of the consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and in conformity with our ruling in Sarcia,
when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, "the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining
the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned
with." Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper
penalty imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua
for each count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-
appellant the circumstance of his minority, the latter would have
been entitled to a suspension of sentence for the second and third
counts of rape under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which
reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who
is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need of application.
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be
supplied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.1awphi1
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be
applied in the instant case given that the accused-appellant is now
about 29 years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts
a limit to the application of a suspended sentence, namely, when the
child reaches a maximum age of 21. The said provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If
the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures
imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled,
or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with
the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the
child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for
execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years
of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age
of twenty-one (21) years. (Emphasis ours.)
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic
Act No. 9344 is warranted in the instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps
and Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution,
in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of
Corrections], in coordination with the [Department of Social Welfare
and Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second
and third incidents of rape shall not be affected by the above
disposition and the same shall be enforced in accordance with law
and the pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence.
Civil Liability
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.78 that "[c]ivil
indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to have been committed.
Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of
₱75,000.00 to the rape victim as civil indemnity for each count." We
also explained in Sarcia that "[t]he litmus test x x x in the
determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the
crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the
death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is
reduced to reclusion perpetua."79 The trial court’s award of civil
indemnity of ₱50,000.00 for each count of rape is therefore
increased to ₱75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape
committed in the instant case.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified "without
need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that
the victim has suffered moral injuries [from the experience she
underwent]."80 We also increase the trial court’s award of ₱50,000.00
to ₱75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape herein
established in keeping with the recent case law.81
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ award of exemplary damages.
As held in People v. Llanas, Jr., 82 "[t]he award of exemplary
damages is also proper not only to deter outrageous conduct, but
also in view of the aggravating circumstances of minority and
relationship surrounding the commission of the offense, both of
which were alleged in the information and proved during the trial."
The appellate court’s award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is
raised to ₱30,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape in
keeping with the current jurisprudence on the matter. 83
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision dated February 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) For the first count of rape herein established, the
accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla is hereby
EXEMPTED from criminal liability.
(2) For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-
appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
(3) As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant
is ORDERED to pay AAA for each of the three (3) counts of
rape ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal
interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from
the date of finality of this Decision.
(4) The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin  for
its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN
(SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN
NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO
DELOS REYES, AND CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS,
MINOR, FOR HERSELF AND AS REPRESENTED BY HER
FATHER, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners, v. QUEZON
CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR HERBERT
BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, AS REPRESENTED BY
MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, AND NAVOTAS CITY, AS
REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN REY
TIANGCO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the
constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the local
governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The
petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be
issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph
Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their
respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist
from implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending
resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of
Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to
Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of
minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their
children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to
implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local
governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement
their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations
which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew
ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02,4 dated August
26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga
Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang
sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended
by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6,
2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through
Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the
Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following Day as
'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below
Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor;
and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila
Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No.
SP-2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for
a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from
10:00 P.M. to 5:00A.M., Providing Penalties for
Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other
Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of young
adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just
society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare
of the youth and minors 10 - filed this present petition,
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness
doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process; and (d)
deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing
the youth without substantive due process. 11 In addition,
petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA
9344, as amended by RA 10630.12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew
Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed
standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and
properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators.13 They further argue that the law enforcer's
apprehension depends only on his physical assessment,
and, thus, subjective and based only on the law enforcer's
visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances
contain provisions indicating the activities exempted from
the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of
working students or students with evening class, they
contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range
and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why
minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or
impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours.15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a)
are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not
being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear
no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They argue that
the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will
not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare
of children of the community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance,
particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-
A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew
provision imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment,
reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the
imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express
command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for
curfew violations.21
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State
interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents'
prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural
and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even
if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are
available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest
massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs
(closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular
visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of
protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They
further opine that the government can impose more
reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling
and education seminars informing the parents of the
reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too
harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be
out during curfew hours.22
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is
whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues
raised in this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of the
petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners'
direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of
courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and
standing to warrant judicial review.23
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 24 Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentalitv of the Government.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has
"expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then
was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable
and enforceable."25
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions
for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the
remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined
under the Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith
respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and
the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right,
undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cited above]."28
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc.
v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was
expounded that "[m]eanwhile that no specific procedural
rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded'
constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the
commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for
review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules -
allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions
invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[.]"30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew
Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City,
Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated
legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances
violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions
pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of
parents to rear their children. They also claim that the
Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors,
conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the
imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses. It has
been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an
act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias." 31 In light
of the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made pursuant to any
judicial or quasi-judicial function.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as
remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative and
executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is
whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is
justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse
must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals
[(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation
of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is
tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law
or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of
paramount importance and immediately affects the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort
to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be anactual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In
this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two
(2) requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the
traditional or in the expanded setting — is the presence of
an actual case or controversy." 35 "[A]n actual case or
controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights,
an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."'36 According to recent jurisprudence, in the
Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987
Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely
requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed governmental act."37
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had
a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or
is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of the act complained of."38
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists
an actual justiciable controversy in this case given the
evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on
whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and
parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila
Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on
their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned
from the substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima
facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce
impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The
case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the
Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court
issued the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported
threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely
speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on
the determination of whether those assailing the
governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the
matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must
show that they have a personal and substantial interest
in the case, such that they have sustained or are in
immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as
a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged
governmental act."40 "'[I]nterest' in the question involved
must be material — an interest that is in issue and will be
affected by the official act — as distinguished from being
merely incidental or general."41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation
of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged
breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right
of minors to freely travel within their respective localities;
and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their children.
Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA
9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila
Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa
Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the
issue affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she
was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before
this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew
Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to
Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent
danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances.
On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John
Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and
Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition
that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the
ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of
the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct
injury as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of
whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to
rear their children as they have not shown that they stand
before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be
noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian
Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the
petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental
right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew
Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he
only stands as the representative of his minor child,
Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and,
consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in
court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue,
SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was
authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew
Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the
required personal interest in the controversy. More
particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the
alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on
the alleged violation of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax
the standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners are
concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this
Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of
legal standing, especially when paramount interest is
involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the
official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, the Court may exercise its
sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It
may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show
that they have been personally injured by the operation of a
law or any other government act."46
This is a case of first impression in which the
constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed
under judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to
determine the impact of these issuances on the right of
parents to rear their children and the right of minors to
travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the
State's authority to regulate these rights in the interest of
general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching
significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a
relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the
standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive
aspect of this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of
minors to travel and of parents to rear their children, this
Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the
Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances
are void for not containing sufficient enforcement
parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with
unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim
that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led
to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even
though they were already of legal age. They maintain that
the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew
offenders based only on their physical appearances and,
thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded
that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to
determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere
does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for
proof or identification of the child to show his age.47
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for
vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do
not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew
Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails
to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is
prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly.49The void for vagueness doctrine is
premised on due process considerations, which are
absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined
that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional
uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process
uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty
cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases
where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed
to give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions
as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication.
Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This
perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with
the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there
is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes
that are "void-for-vagueness."50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement
parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper
apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not
assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject
ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to
the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The
mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew
Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left
for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily,
the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the
sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather,
petitioners must show that this perceived danger of
unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision
in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-
guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited.
In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes
due process because agents of the government cannot
reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits and/or
forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,51 it was
ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and
subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and
arbitrary application based on individual impressions and
personal predilections.52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any
ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the
age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the
Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void
for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are
no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew
violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not
explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents
are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in
statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically,
RA 9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child
may be determinedfrom the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents, age may
be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence. (Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew
Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA
9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory
law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by
RA 10630,54minors caught in violation of curfew
ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered
by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that
"[c]onformity with law is one of the essential
requisites for the validity of a municipal
ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances
should be read and implemented in conjunction with related
statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners
Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor
violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond
the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply
presenting any competent proof of identification establishing
their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law
authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual
assessment of the suspect, which - needless to state -
should be done ethically and judiciously under the
circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules,
the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the
erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances
invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances
as void for vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without
substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that
this right includes the right to determine whether minors
will be required to go home at a certain time or will be
allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose
curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the
latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be
compelling.57
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the
State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing
of their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of
children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency
and the development of their moral character are
characterized not only as parental rights, but also as
parental duties. This means that parents are not only given
the privilege of exercising their authority over their children;
they are equally obliged to exercise this authority
conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a
reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that
the youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and
well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is
during childhood that minors are prepared for additional
obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child
for these [obligations] must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and
elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process
of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example
is essential to the growth of young people into mature,
socially responsible citizens."59
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a
substantial measure of authority over one's
children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of
the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional
interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society."62 As in our Constitution, the right and duty of
parents to rear their children is not only described as
"natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier "primary"
connotes the parents' superior right over the State in
the upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the
State's deference to parental control over their children was
explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti),64 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse
governmental action and from their own immaturity by
requiring parental consent to or involvement in important
decisions by minors. But an additional and more
important justification for state deference to parental
control over children is that "the child is not [a] mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it
should be stressed that "when actions concerning the
child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-
being of the child, the [S]tate may act to promote
these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or
to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is
demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
override the parents' qualified right to control the
upbringing of their children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated
to support parents in the exercise of these rights and
duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of,
but rather, complementary to parental supervision.
In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's
role as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz.:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as  parens
patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights
of persons or individual who because of age or
incapacity are in an unfavorable position,  vis-a
vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of
what concerns them, they have the political community to
look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live
up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth
in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This
prerogative of parens patriae  is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right
and duty to aid parents in the moral development of
their children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for
parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was
held that "[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the
child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can
properly conclude that parents and others, teachers
for example, who have the primary responsibility for
children's well-being are entitled to the support of the
laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility."71
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal
restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. As will be later
discussed at greater length, these ordinances further
compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of
juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which
necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents
to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar
vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more
exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements
that operate during the night; their moral well-being is
likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making
detrimental decisions during this time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew
Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) -
accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in
child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered
authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours
when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all
actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew
Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to
allow minors to remain in public places without
parental accompaniment during the curfew hours.73 In
this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all
plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their
minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to
influence or control their minors' activities.74 As such,
the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit
reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up
his or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew
Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time
at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with
better opportunities to take a more active role in their
children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle
(Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city
government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal
curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's
upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire
to protect their children from the perils of the street but are
unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those
children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who
prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on
the streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities observed
in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context.
Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the impact
of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared
unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear their
children.
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew
Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They claim
that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which,
therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny
test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a
compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile
crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are
other less restrictive means for achieving the government's
interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew
Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours.79
Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not
claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or
any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council (Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that
"the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of
a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases,"81viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to
necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order
to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court
confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is
that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant
claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to
depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the
overbroad statute on third parties not courageous
enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an
overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the
speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n
restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims,
the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US
Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment, 83 and
that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was
held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge
succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically
addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on
overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression."'85
In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa,
Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be
raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on
vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how
vagueness relates to violations of due process
rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the
basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of
freedom of expression."87
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an
overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed
curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this
Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations
under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a
fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to
move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within
the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general
concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every person -
includes the power of locomotion 91 and the right of citizens
to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live
and work where they desire or where they can best pursue
the ends of life.92
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to
access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to
education, free expression, assembly, association, and
religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to travel with other
fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of
Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of
religion, speech, assembly, and association require one to
move about, such movement must necessarily be protected
under the First Amendment. Restricting movement in
those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment
Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law
is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has
eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of
travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot
walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is
impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to
the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively
blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the
sidewalks or drive the streets of a community, opportunities
for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of
movement is inextricably involved with freedoms set
forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public
interest justify restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move
from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this
right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads,
the State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this
right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health;
and (2) are provided by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically
the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within
the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the
probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second
requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law,"
our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the
State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA
7610,98 as amended, RA 9775,99 RA 9262,100 RA 9851, 101 RA
9344,102 RA 10364,103 RA 9211,104 RA 8980,105 RA
106 107
9288,  and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,  as amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603,
which explicitly authorizes local government units, through
their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for
children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal
councils may prescribe such curfew hours for children
as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to
enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or
guardians and the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact
curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this
case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In
other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as
required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors'
exercise of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply
solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In
this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess
and enjoy constitutional rights,108but the exercise of
these rights is not co-extensive as those of
adults.109 They are always subject to the authority or
custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or
guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens patriae, the State
regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors'
exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning
the right to vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and
the right to engage in gainful employment. 113 With respect
to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a
clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development before they can travel to a foreign country by
themselves or with a person other than their
parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State has
broader authority over the minors' activities than over
similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's
general interest in the well-being of minors. 116 Thus, the
State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of
rights even though these limitations do not generally apply
to adults.
In Bellotti,117 the US Supreme Court identified three (3)
justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are:first, the peculiar
vulnerability of children; second, their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed and mature
manner; and third, the importance of the parental role
in child rearing:118
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children
generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are
adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs
for 'concern, ...sympathy, and ... paternal attention. x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded
[on] the recognition that, during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.
x x x.
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the
upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth
from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement
in important decisions by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to
the child's chances for the full growth and
maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme
Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets
to minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this
against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad
range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such
action are the crippling effects of child employment, more
especially in public places, and the possible harms arising
from other activities subject to all the diverse
influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt
that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is
within the state's police power, whether against the parent's
claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples
dictate contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people,
in the primary use of highways. But even in such
use streets afford dangers for them not affecting
adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other
things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting
restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights,
provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of
judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a
classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a
classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such
as in classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all
other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in
our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the
strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this
juncture, it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the
same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State
has broader authority over minors than over adults does not
trigger the application of a lower level of
scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US
court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile
curfews implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the
parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is
necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are
no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but
that the analysis of those rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The
Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the
State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the
activities of children than of adults. x x x. Thus, minors'
rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because
the state has a greater range of interests that justify
the infringement of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors
that, when applicable, warrant differential analysis of the
constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x
x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a
lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of
minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather,
the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether
the state has a compelling state interest justifying greater
restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling
interest in regulating minors differently than adults,
we do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is
appropriate to review burdens on minors'
fundamental rights. x x x.
Accordingly, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the
ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors  entails a
consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as
enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens
patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the
compelling State interests justifying the assailed
government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a
suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. 131 Thus, the
government has the burden of proving that the
classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling
State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest or the means chosen is
narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include
constitutionally declared policies. 133This Court has ruled
that children's welfare and the State's mandate to
protect and care for them as  parens
patriae  constitute compelling interests to justify
regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the paramount
interest of the state for which some individual liberties must
give way.135 As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework
shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing
greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The
limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight
this compelling interest of the State to protect and care for
their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that
the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off
of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate -
their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them
against criminal pressure and influences which may even
include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of
the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal
curfews on minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be
neglected of their proper care and guidance, education, and
moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation,
drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-
of-school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children,
and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or
meander in public or private roads, streets or other public
places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose
or justification;
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement
agencies reveal that minor children roaming around,
loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent
personalities involved in various infractions of city
ordinances and national laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety
to regulate the movement of minor children during night
time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from
neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these
minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the
tendency of growing number of youth spending their
nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the
unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident
elements of society are not provided with potent avenues
for furthering their nefarious activities[.]136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards
the information gathered by the City Council to support its
passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may
serve as a guidepost to our own treatment of the present
case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the
entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a
safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to
make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when
left unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that
its curfew would materially assist its first stated interest—
that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City
Council acted on the basis of information from many
sources, including records from Charlottesville's police
department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data
from the United States Department of Justice, national
crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On
the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled
to conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off
the streets late at night will make for a safer
community. The same streets may have a more
volatile and less wholesome character at night than
during the day. Alone on the streets at night children
face a series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping
decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or
aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into
membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them." Those who succumb to these criminal
influences at an early age may persist in their
criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges
subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those
elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home
community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its
curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact
with criminal influences,the City was directly advancing
its first objective of reducing juvenile violence and
crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)
Based on these findings, their city councils found it
necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their
police power under the general welfare clause. 140 In this
light, the Court thus finds that the local governments
have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to
substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare,
especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling
State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of
the Curfew Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test
satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the
restrictions set forth in the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly
tailored or provide the least restrictive means to address
the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement
of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems
from the fundamental premise that citizens should not be
hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise
of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted,
the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent
necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's
compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn
to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they
must be so narrowly drawn.141

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local

governments of Quezon City and Manila presented
statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the
alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as
victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.139
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing
standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still
accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate
activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic. 142 Thus, in
the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly
tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the
minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional
rights.143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance
unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn,
resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to
freely exercise their religion and to free speech.145 It
observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending
alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local
Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at
the various local Protestant Churches. It would likewise
prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch
services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit
grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters
from taking their minor relatives of any age to the above
mentioned services. x x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a
minor could not even attend the city council
meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do)
to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew
ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn
ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was
very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional
muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First
Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and
returning home by a direct route from religious,
school, or voluntary association activities. (Emphases
supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective
provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while
the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from
the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors
accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age,
or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as
buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities
for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school
students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are
required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00
p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more
exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those
working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church
activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office; (d)
those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e)
those running errands under the supervision of their
parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority
over them; (f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and
the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during
these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day,
New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the
barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All
Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday,
and Easter Sunday.147
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not
narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect
the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to
travel at night from school or work. 148 However, even with
those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater
extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the
reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free
exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of
free expression, among others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited,
and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The
Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of
constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance;
nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as
discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or
church activities, it hinders them from engaging in
legitimate non-school or non-church activities in the streets
or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of
association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that
participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other
than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social,
emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such
participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose
the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it
effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional
religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without
accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted
in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the
minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore
effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate
avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend
city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with
their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance
to engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but the
Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in
these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such
proscription does not advance the State's compelling
interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at
night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal
activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered
without any reasonable relation to the State's interest;
hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More
so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also
not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be
completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the
curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of
the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some
provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary
thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite
the presence150 of any separability clause.151
(h)
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the
first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the
minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following
exceptions:
organization/group (recognized by the community) that
supervises the activity or when the minor is going to or
returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop;
and
When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a
student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or
that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following
circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this
ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony,
religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their
school or organization wherein their attendance are required or
otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and
unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their
control as verified by the proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such
as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law
enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity,
or going to or returning home from the same place of employment
activity without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied
by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official
school, religious, recreational, educational, social, communitv or
other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay,
school, or other similar private civic/religious
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of
exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more
narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of
exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of
association by enabling minors to attend both official
and extra-curricular activities not only of their school
or church but also of other legitimate organizations.
The rights to peaceably assemble and of free
expression are also covered by these items given that
the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic
or religious organizations are allowed during the
curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right
to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in
the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at
religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation
to their right to travel, the ordinance allows the minor-
participants to move to and from the places where
these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous
exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only
prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly
contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly
loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where
danger is perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly
authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or
engage in legitimate activities during the night,
notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on
this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an
exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City
Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not
only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the
Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of
this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew
measure with the basic premise that State interference is
not superior but only complementary to parental
supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes,
the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural
but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in
passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the
welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable
of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully
understand the import and consequences of their actions. In
one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil
laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding
or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State,
as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the
risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as
yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its protection.153
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's
inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the
same against the State's compelling interest to promote
juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds
that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is
reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and
hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are
in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance
with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded
from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar
laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall,
passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it
proper - as it was raised- to further discuss the validity of
its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the
parentis or guardian under Section 8 thereof, 154 does not
impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas
Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s
or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community
service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s
of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in
addition to the fine imposed therein. 155Meanwhile, the
Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the
minor based on the age and frequency of violations,
to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or
youth violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished
as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and
below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for
the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's
parent, guardian or person exercising parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under
Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand
and Admonition;
2. For the SECOND
OFFENSE, Reprimand and
Admonition, and a warning about the
legal impostitions in case of a third
and subsequent violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT
OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one
(1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine
of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(Php2,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the Court, PROVIDED,
That the complaint shall be filed by
the Punong Barangay with the office of
the City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments
could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a)
community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine;
and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-
A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses such as
curfew violations, viz.:
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered
an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult
shall not be considered an offense and shall not be
punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances
enacted by local governments concerning juvenile
status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew
violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking
and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but
not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal,
harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal
nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public
urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of
children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for
said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their
residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to
be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate
intervention programs shall be provided for in such
ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at
risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The
ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such
as counseling, attendance in group activities for children,
and for the parents, attendance in parenting education
seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of
regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the
similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or
penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit
is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of
these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew
ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations
thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty" 157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a
wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or
fine";158 "[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a
person who commits a deliberate or negligent
act."159 Punishment, in turn, is defined as "[a] sanction -
such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property,
right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has
violated the law."160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read
to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the
regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A
thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate
intervention programs, such as community-based
programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the same
law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community
service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare
of minors. For one, the community service programs
provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they
promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the
moral and social stigma caused by jail detention. In the
same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and
compliance with the law and legal orders. More importantly,
they give them the opportunity to become productive
members of society and thereby promote their integration
to and solidarity with their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila
is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344
as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and
expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor.
Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly
reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or
oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition
as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or censure";164 while
the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or
friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder,
[counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of
authoritative advice or warning."165 Notably, the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS)
and our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly
declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be
considered a penalty."166
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-
based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties -
as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less
intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be
clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate
the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions
must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to
reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the
City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally
defined as "a severe or formal reproof."167 The Black's Law
Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that
does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice
law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a
"public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered
to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which
he belongs. It is more than just a warning or
admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and
public pronouncement made to denounce the error or
violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the
erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual
including the public against repeating or committing the
same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring
individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp
disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our
jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a
penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand,
undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various
criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear,
categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty
shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of]
juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the
sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on
minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the
Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the
clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of
community service programs and admonition on the minors
are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew
Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny
test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon
City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three
which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve
this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance
provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to
freely exercise their fundamental rights during the
prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to
achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", has also been construed to include parental
permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the
manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of
the local government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared
unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon
City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid
in accordance with this Decision.
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila
Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that
ordinances should always conform with the law, these
provisions must be struck down as invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the
local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of
Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and,
thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301,
Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the
Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and,
thus,VALID in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result. All of the assailed ordinances should
have been struck down for failing to ground themselves on
demonstrated rational bases, for failing to adopt the least
restrictive means to achieve their aims, and for failing to
show narrowly tailored enforcement measures that foreclose
abuse by law enforcers. The doctrine of parens patriae fails
to justify these ordinances. While this doctrine enables state
intervention for the welfare of children, its operation must
not transgress the constitutionally enshrined natural and
primary right of parents to rear their children.
However, the adoption by this Court of the interpretation of
Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance to the
effect that parental permission in any form for any minor is
also an exception will have the effect of narrowly tailoring
the application of that curfew regulation.
The assailed ordinances are not novel. Navotas City
Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-021 was passed on August
26, 1999. City of Manila Ordinance No. 80462 was passed on
October 14, 2002. Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-2301 3 was
passed on July 31, 2014.
The present controversy was spurred by the revitalized,
strict implementation of these curfew ordinances as part of
police operations under the broad umbrella of "'Oplan
Rody." These operations were in fulfillment of President
Rodrigo Duterte's campaign promise for a nationwide
implementation of a curfew for minors.4
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), an
association of youths and minors for "the protection of the
rights and welfare of youths and minors," and its members
Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua,
Ronel Baccutan (Baccutan), Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos
Reyes), and Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Villegas) filed the
present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that
the ordinances are unconstitutional and in violation of
Republic Act No. 9344.5
I The presumption of constitutionality is rooted in the respect
Constitutional challenges against local legislation
Petitioners submit a multi-faceted constitutional challenge
against the assailed ordinances.
They assert that the assailed ordinances should be declared
unconstitutional as the lack of expressed standards for the
identification of minors facilitates arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.6
Petitioners further argue that the assailed ordinances unduly
restrict a minor's liberty, in general, and right to travel, in
particular.7
Likewise, petitioners assert that, without due process, the
assailed ordinances intrude into or deprive parents of their
"natural and primary right"8 to rear their children.
Ordinances are products of "derivative legislative power" 9 in
that legislative power is delegated by the national
legislature to local government units. They are presumed
constitutional and, until judicially declared invalid, retain
their binding effect. In Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates:10
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances
enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption
of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In
short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-
founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain.11
that the judiciary must accord to the legislature. In Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan:12
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its
bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of
the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of
another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is
based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its
coordinate branch — the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation
may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature
is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the
facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining
whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the
fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial
restraint and act with caution and forbearance.13
The same respect is proper for acts made by local legislative
bodies, whose members are equally presumed to have
acted conscientiously and with full awareness of the
constitutional and statutory bounds within which they may
operate. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association v. City of Manila14 explained:
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity . . . The action of the
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality
and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject and necessitates action. The local legislative body,
by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that
the regulations are essential to the well being of the
people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation."15
The presumption of constitutionality may, of course, be
challenged. Challenges, however, shall only be sustained
upon a clear and unequivocal showing of the bases for
invalidating a law. In Smart Communications v. Municipality
of Malvar:16
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation,
there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful,
breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the
sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the
Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law]
based on ... baseless supposition is an affront to the
wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of
the executive which approved it." This presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest
showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by
the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the
discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged
act must be struck down.17
Consistent with the exacting standard for invalidating
ordinances, Hon. Fernando v. St. Scholastica's
College,18 outlined the test for determining the validity of an
ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line
of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.19
The first consideration hearkens to the primacy of the
Constitution, as well as to the basic nature of ordinances as
products of a power that was merely delegated to local
government units. In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio:20
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when
they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws.
The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass
muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of
consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should
be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of
the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must
not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their
derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter.21 (Citations omitted)
II
Appraising due process and equal protection
challenges
At stake here is the basic constitutional guarantee that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws."22 There are two (2)
dimensions to this: first, is an enumeration of objects of
protection—life, liberty and property; second, is an
identification and delimitation of the legitimate mechanism
for their modulation or abnegation—due process and equal
protection. The first dimension lists specific objects whose
bounds are amorphous; the second dimension delineates
action, and therefore, requires precision.
Speaking of life and its protection does not merely entail
ensuring biological subsistence. It is not just a proscription
against killing. Likewise, speaking of liberty and its
protection does not merely involve a lack of physical
restraint. The objects of the constitutional protection of due
process are better understood dynamically and from a
frame of consummate human dignity. They are likewise
better understood integrally, operating in a synergistic
frame that serves to secure a person's integrity.
"Life, liberty and property" is akin to the United Nations'
formulation of "life, liberty, and security of person" 23 and
the American formulation of "life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness."24 As the American Declaration of Independence
postulates, they are "unalienable rights" for which
"[g]overnments are instituted among men" in order that
they may be secured.25 Securing them denotes pursuing
and obtaining them, as much as it denotes preserving them.
The formulation is, thus, an aspirational declaration, not
merely operating on factual givens but enabling the pursuit
of ideals.
"Life," then, is more appropriately understood as the
fullness of human potential: not merely organic,
physiological existence, but consummate self-actualization,
enabled and effected not only by freedom from bodily
restraint but by facilitating an empowering existence.26 "Life
and liberty," placed in the context of a constitutional
aspiration, it then becomes the duty of the government to
facilitate this empowering existence. This is not an
inventively novel understanding but one that has been at
the bedrock of our social and political conceptions. As
Justice George Malcolm, speaking for this Court in 1919,
articulated:
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom
which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently
with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The
right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of
the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for
the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of
authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the
citizen to be free to use his faculties in lawful ways; to live
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that purpose, to
enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty
are the right to contract, the right to choose one's
employment, the right to labor, and the right of
locomotion.27
It is in this sense that the constitutional listing of the
objects of due process protection admits amorphous
bounds. The constitutional protection of life and liberty
encompasses a penumbra of cognate rights that is not fixed
but evolves—expanding liberty—alongside the
contemporaneous reality in which the Constitution
operates. People v. Hernandez28 illustrated how the right to
liberty is multi-faceted and is not limited to its initial
formulation in the due process clause:
[T]he preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation
of our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing
its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of
the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13),
(14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) 29 to
the protection of several aspects of freedom.30
While the extent of the constitutional protection of life and
liberty is dynamic, evolving, and expanding with
contemporaneous realities, the mechanism for preserving
life and liberty is immutable: any intrusion into it must be
with due process of law and must not run afoul of the equal
protection of the laws.
Appraising the validity of government regulation in relation
to the due process and equal protection clauses invokes
three (3) levels of analysis. Proceeding similarly as we do
now with the task of appraising local ordinances, White
Light Corporation v. City of Manila31 discussed:
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on
substantive due process grounds is best tested when
assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the
U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. Footnote
4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the
judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a
discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or
infringement of a "fundamental right". Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny
for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the
political process, and the rational basis standard of review
for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate
scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for
evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy.
Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Craig, after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.
While the test may have first been articulated in equal
protection analysis, it has in the United States since been
applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test
mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if
they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.
Under intermediate review, governmental interest is
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is
on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict
scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality
and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify
the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is
used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications
to equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has
expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental
rights such as suffrage, judicial access and interstate
travel.32 (Citations omitted)
An appraisal of due process and equal protection challenges
against government regulation must admit that the gravity
of interests invoked by the government and the personal
liberties or classification affected are not uniform. Hence,
the three (3) levels of analysis that demand careful
calibration: the rational basis test, intermediate review, and
strict scrutiny. Each level is typified by the dual
considerations of: first, the interest invoked by the
government; and second, the means employed to achieve
that interest.
The rational basis test requires only that there be a
legitimate government interest and that there is a
reasonable connection between it and the means employed
to achieve it.
Intermediate review requires an important government
interest. Here, it would suffice if government is able to
demonstrate substantial connection between its interest and
the means it employs. In accordance with White Light, "the
availability of less restrictive measures [must have
been] considered."33 This demands a conscientious effort at
devising the least restrictive means for attaining its avowed
interest. It is enough that the means employed
is conceptually the least restrictive mechanism that the
government may apply.
Strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are
fundamental freedoms or what is involved are suspect
classifications. It requires that there be a compelling state
interest and that the means employed to effect it are
narrowly-tailored, actually—not only conceptually—being
the least restrictive means for effecting the invoked
interest. Here, it does not suffice that the government
contemplated on the means available to it. Rather, it must
show an active effort at demonstrating the inefficacy of all
possible alternatives. Here, it is required to not only explore
all possible avenues but to even debunk the viability of
alternatives so as to ensure that its chosen course of action
is the sole effective means. To the extent practicable, this
must be supported by sound data gathering mechanisms.
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas34 further explained:
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial
restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative
discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial
of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice
against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak
and watered down view would call for the abdication of this
Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to
the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true
whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a
private person or the government itself or one of its
instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the
actor.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Cases involving strict scrutiny innately favor the
preservation of fundamental rights and the non-
discrimination of protected classes. Thus, in these cases,
the burden falls upon the government to prove that it was
impelled by a compelling state interest and that there is
actually no other less restrictive mechanism for realizing the
interest that it invokes:
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest
and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving
that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to
prove the same.36
III
The present Petition entails fundamental rights and
defines status offenses. Thus, strict scrutiny is
proper.
By definition, a curfew restricts mobility. As effected by the
assailed ordinances, this restriction applies daily at specified
times and is directed at minors, who remain under the
authority of their parents.
Thus, petitioners correctly note that at stake in the present
Petition is the right to travel. Article III, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution provides:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.
While a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, this
right is not absolute. The Constitution itself states that the
right may be "impaired" in consideration of: national
security, public safety, or public health.37 The ponencia
underscores that the avowed purpose of the assailed
ordinances is "the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime."38 The assailed ordinances,
therefore, seem to find justification as a valid exercise of
the State's police power, regulating—as opposed to
completely negating—the right to travel.
Given the overlap of the state's prerogatives with those of
parents, equally at stake is the right that parents hold in the
rearing of their children.
There are several facets of the right to privacy. Ople v.
Torres39 identified the right of persons to be secure "in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects,"40 the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures,41 liberty of abode,42 the
right to form associations,43 and the right against self-
incrimination44 as among these facets.
While not among the rights enumerated under Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, the rights of parents with respect to
the family is no less a fundamental right and an integral
aspect of liberty and privacy. Article II, Section 12
characterizes the right of parents in the rearing of the youth
to be ''natural and primary."45 It adds that it is a right,
which shall "receive the support of the Government."46
Imbong v. Ochoa,47 affirms the natural and primary rights of
parents in the rearing of children as a facet of the right to
privacy:
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to
exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right
of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very
well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the
violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. 48
This Court's 2009 Decision in White Light49 unequivocally
characterized the right to privacy as a fundamental right.
Thus, alleged . statutory intrusion into it warrants strict
scrutiny.50
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance
should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint
imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is
the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury
that would warrant the application of the most deferential
standard - the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we
recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well
the constitutional rights of their patrons - those persons
who would be deprived of availing short time access or
wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
....
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental
rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights,
thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by
Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare.'' .. . In
accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free
to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling;
and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in
the concept of liberty ...
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the
ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City
asserts before this Court that the subject establishments
"have gained notoriety as venue of 'prostitution, adultery
and fornications' in Manila since they provide the necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and
thus became the 'ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-
seekers"'. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene
of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate
sexual behavior among consenting married or consenting
single adults which is constitutionally protected will be
curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our
holding therein retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual
whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect ...
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was
recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded
recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen.51 (Citations omitted)
In determining that the interest invoked by the State was
not sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion of the patrons'
privacy rights, this Court weighed the State's need for the
"promotion of public morality" as against the individual
patrons' "liberty to make the choices in [their] lives," thus:
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality which takes great pains at a nuanced approach to children.
among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the Republic Act No. 9344 meticulously defines a "child at risk"
judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights and a "child in conflict with the law" and distinguishes them
this Court is sworn to protect ... from the generic identification of a "child" as any "person
under the age of eighteen (18) years." 54 These concepts
.... were adopted precisely to prevent a lackadaisical reduction
to a wholesale and indiscriminate concept, consistent with
[T]he continuing progression of the human story has seen the protection that is proper to a vulnerable sector. The
not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but assailed ordinances' broad and sweeping determination of
also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the presence in the streets past defined times as delinquencies
enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is warranting the imposition of sanctions tend to run afoul of
distinguished from non-free societies not with any more the carefully calibrated attitude of Republic Act No. 9344
extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and and the protection that the Constitution mandates. For
immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty these, a strict consideration of the assailed ordinances is
to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by equally proper.
the State.52 (Citation omitted)
IV
Apart from impinging upon fundamental rights, the assailed
ordinances define status offenses. They identify and restrict The apparent factual bases for the
offenders, not purely on the basis of prohibited acts or assailed ordinances are tenuous at best.
omissions, but on the basis of their inherent personal
condition. Altogether and to the restriction of all other To prove the necessity of implementing curfew ordinances,
persons, minors are exclusively classified as potential respondents City of Manila and Quezon City provide
offenders. What is potential is then made real on a passive statistical data on the number of Children in Conflict with
basis, as the commission of an offense relies merely on the Law (CICL).55 Quezon City's data is summarized as
presence in public places at given times and not on the follows:56
doing of a conclusively noxious act.
Year No. of Barangay Barangays No. of Total
The assailed ordinances' adoption and implementation Barangays with without Barangays no. of
concern a prejudicial classification. The assailed ordinances submissions submissions with Zero CICL
are demonstrably incongruent with the Constitution's CICL
unequivocal nurturing attitude towards the youths and
whose mandate is to "promote and protect their physical, 2013 142 102 (January 40 (January Not 2677
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being."53 to June) to June) provided
44 (July to 98 (July to
December) December)
This attitude is reflected in Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, 2014 142 119 (January 23 (January 32 (January 2937
 to June) to June) to June) YEAR NUMBER OF CICL
82 (July to 60 (July to 25 (July to
December) December) December) 2015 845

2015 142 142 0 51 4778 January to June 2016 524

The data submitted, however, is inconclusive to prove that
the city is so overrun by juvenile crime that it may as well
be totally rid of the public presence of children at specified
times. While there is a perceptively raised number of CICLs
in Quezon City, the data fails to specify the rate of these
figures in relation to the total number of minors and, thus,
fails to establish the extent to which CICLs dominate the
city. As to geographical prevalence that may justify a city-
wide prohibition, a substantial number of barangays
reported not having CICLs for the entire year. As to
prevalence that stretches across the relative maturity of all
who may be considered minors (e.g., grade-schoolers as
against adolescents), there was also no data showing the
average age of these CICLs.
The City of Manila's data, on the other hand, is too
conflicting to be authoritative. The data reports of the
Manila Police Department, as summarized in the
ponencia,57 state:
The Department of Social Welfare of Manila submits that for
January to August 2016, there was a total of 480 CICLs as
part of their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign. 59 Of the 480
minors, 210 minors were apprehended for curfew violations,
not for petty crimes.60 Again, the data fails to account for
the percentage of CICLs as against the total number of
minors in Manila.
The ponencia cites Shleifer v. City of Charlottesville,61 a
United States Court of Appeals case, as basis for examining
the validity of curfew ordinances in Metro Manila. Far from
supporting the validity of the assailed
ordinances, Shleifer discounts it. Shleifer relies on
unequivocally demonstrated scientific and empirical data on
the rise of juvenile crime and the emphasis on juvenile
safety during curfew hours in Charlottesville, Virginia. Here,
while local government units adduced data, there does not
appear to have been a well-informed effort as to these
data's processing, interpretation, and correlation with
avowed policy objectives.

YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

With incomplete and inconclusive bases, the concerned local
2014 74 government units' justifications of reducing crime and
sweeping averments of "peace and order" hardly sustain a
2015 30 rational basis for the restriction of minors' movement during
January to June 2016 75 curfew hours. If at all, the assertion that curfew restrictions
ipso facto equate to the reduction of CICLs appears to be a
gratuitous conclusion. It is more sentimental than logical.
The Department of Social Welfare and Development of the Lacking in even a rational basis, it follows that there is no
City of Manila has vastly different numbers. As summarized support for the more arduous requirement of demonstrating
in the ponencia:58 that the assailed ordinances support a compelling state
interest.
V merely "reasonably related." Moreover, equal protection
It has not been demonstrated that the curfews
effected by the assailed ordinances are the least
restrictive means for achieving their avowed
purposes.
The strict scrutiny test not only requires that the challenged
law be narrowly tailored in order to achieve compelling
governmental interests, it also requires that the
mechanisms it adopts are the least burdensome or least
drastic means to achieve its ends:
Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include
the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right to
exercise. First Amendment freedoms such as free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right
to travel, and the right to vote.
Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which either
classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic
or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the
presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that is, such
legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the
government demonstrates otherwise. The government must
show that the statute is supported by a compelling
governmental interest and the means chosen to accomplish
that interest are narrowly tailored. Gerald Gunther explains
as follows:
... The intensive review associated with the new equal
protection imposed two demands a demand not only as to
means but also as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict
scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and
statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility
traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means
had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not
became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the
areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by
"compelling" state interests, not merely the wide spectrum
of "legitimate" state ends.
Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least
burdensome or least drastic means available for achieving
the governmental objective.62 (Citations omitted)
The governmental interests to be protected must not only
be reasonable. They must be compelling. Certainly, the
promotion of public safety is compelling enough to restrict
certain freedoms. It does not, however, suffice to make a
generic, sweeping averment of public safety.
To reiterate, respondents have not shown adequate data to
prove that an imposition of curfew lessens the number of
CICLs. Respondents further fail to provide data on the
frequency of crimes against unattended minors during
curfew hours. Without this data, it cannot be concluded that
the safety of minors is better achieved if they are not
allowed out on the streets during curfew hours.
While the ponencia holds that the Navotas and Manila
Ordinances tend to restrict minors' fundamental rights, it
found that the Quezon City Ordinance is narrowly tailored to
achieve its objectives. The Quezon City Ordinance's
statement of its objectives reads:
WHEREAS ... the children, particularly the minors, appear to
be neglected of their proper care and guidance, education,
and moral development, which led them into exploitation,
drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses;
....
WHEREAS, as a consequence, most of minor children
become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers,
street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay,
roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets
or other public places, whether singly or in groups, without
lawful purpose or justification;
WHEREAS, to keep themselves away from the watch and
supervision of the barangay officials and other authorities,
these misguided minor children preferred to converge or
flock together during the night time until the wee hours of
the morning resorting to drinking on the streets and other
public places, illegal drug use and sometimes drug peddling,
engaging in troubles and other criminal activities which
often resulted to bodily injuries and loss of lives;
WHEREAS, reports of barangay officials and law
enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming
around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the
frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city
ordinances and national laws;
WHEREAS, it is necessary in the interest of public order and
safety to regulate the movement of minor children during
night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from
neglect, abuse, cruelty and exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
WHEREAS, to strengthen and support parental control on
these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on
the tendency of a growing number of the youth spending
their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of
the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the
dissident elements in society are not provided with potent
avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]63
In order to achieve these objectives,64 the ponencia cites
the ordinances' exemptions, which it found to be
"sufficiently safeguard[ing] the minors' constitutional
rights":65
SECTION 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the
following circumstances shall not be covered by the
provisions of this ordinance:
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony,
religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their
school or organization wherein their attendance are required or
otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to
go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified
by the proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such
as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law
enforcers encounter, and similar incidents;
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity,
or going to or returning home from the same place of employment
activity, without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by
an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official
school, religious, recreational, educational, social, community or
other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay,
school or other similar private civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when
the minor is going to or returning home from such activity, without
any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a
student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or
 that he/she is a working student.66
The ponencia states:
[T]he Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits
unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-
being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the
locality at a time where danger is perceivably more
prominent.67
The ponencia unfortunately falls into a hasty generalization.
It generalizes unattended minors out in the streets during
curfew hours as potentially, if not actually, engaging in
criminal activities, merely on the basis that they are not
within the bounds of the stated exemptions. It is evident,
however, that the exemptions are hardly exhaustive.
Consider the dilemma that petitioner Villegas faces when
she goes out at night to buy food from a convenience store
because the rest of her family is already asleep. 68 As a
Quezon City resident, she violates the curfew merely for
wanting to buy food when she gets home from school.
It may be that a minor is out with friends or a minor was
told to make a purchase at a nearby sari-sari store. None of
these is within the context of a "party, graduation
ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular
activities of their school and organization" or part of an
"official school, religious, recreational, educational, social,
community or other similar private activity." Still, these
activities are not criminal or nefarious. To the contrary,
socializing with friends, unsavorily portrayed as mere
loafing or loitering as it may be, contributes to a person's
social and psychological development. Doing one's chores is
within the scope of respecting one's elders.
Imposing a curfew on minors merely on the assumption that
it can keep them safe from crime is not the least restrictive
means to achieve this objective. Petitioners suggest street
lighting programs, installation of CCTVs in street comers,
and visible police patrol.69 Public safety is better achieved by
effective police work, not by clearing streets of children en
masse at night. Crimes can just as well occur in broad
daylight and children can be just as susceptible in such an
environment. Efficient law enforcement, more than
sweeping, generalized measures, ensures that children will
be safe regardless of what time they are out on the streets.
The assailed ordinances' deficiencies only serve to highlight
their most disturbing aspect: the imposition of a curfew only
burdens minors who are living in poverty.
For instance, the Quezon City Ordinance targets minors who
are not traditionally employed as the exemptions require
that the minor be engaged in "an authorized employment
activity." Curfew violators could include minors who scour
garbage at night looking for food to eat or scraps to sell.
The Department of Social Welfare and Development of
Manila reports that for 2016, 2,194 minors were turned
over as part of their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign. 70 The
greater likelihood that most, if not all, curfew violators will
be street children—who have no place to even come home
to—than actual CICLs. So too, those caught violating the
ordinance will most likely have no parent or guardian to
fetch them from barangay halls.
An examination of Manila Police District's data on CICLs
show that for most of the crimes committed, the motive is
poverty, not a drive for nocturnal escapades. 71 Thus, to
lessen the instances of juvenile crime, the government must
first alleviate poverty, not impose a curfew. Poverty
alleviation programs, not curfews, are the least restrictive
means of preventing indigent children from turning to a life
of criminality.
VI
The assailed ordinances give
unbridled discretion to law enforcers.
The assailed ordinances are deficient not only for failing to
provide the least restrictive means for achieving their
avowed ends but also in failing to articulate safeguards and
define limitations that foreclose abuses.
In assailing the lack of expressed standards for identifying
minor, petitioners invoke the void for vagueness doctrine.72
established rule is that "one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed
out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context,
like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder
Law on its face and in its entirety.76

The difference between a facial challenge and an as-applied

The doctrine is explained in People v. Nazario:73
challenge is settled. As explained in Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council:77
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation
as to its application.'' It is repugnant to the Constitution in
is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
very existence may cause others not before the court to
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.74
activities.78 (Citation omitted)
While facial challenges of a statute on the ground of
Thus, to invalidate a law with penal provisions, such as the
vagueness is permitted only in cases involving alleged
assailed ordinances, as-applied parties must assert actual
transgressions against the right to free speech, penal laws
violations of their rights and not prospective violations of
may nevertheless be invalidated for vagueness "as applied."
the rights of third persons. In Imbong v. Ochoa:79
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan:75

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"

[T]he doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
embodies the rule that one can challenge the
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is
also known as the prohibition against third-party standing. 80
The ponencia states that petitioners' invocation of the void
for vagueness doctrine is improper. It reasons that
petitioners failed to point out any ambiguous provision in
the assailed ordinances.81 It then proceeds to examine the
provisions of the ordinances, vis-a-vis their alleged defects,
while discussing how these defects may affect minors and
parents who are not parties to this case. In effect, the
ponencia engaged in a facial examination of the assailed
ordinances. This facial examination is an improper exercise
for the assailed ordinances, as they are penal laws that do
not ostensibly involve the right to free speech.
The more appropriate stance would have been to examine
the assailed ordinances, not in isolation, but in the context
of the specific cases pleaded by petitioners. Contrary to the
ponencia's position, the lack of specific provisions in the
assailed ordinances indeed made them vague, so much so
that actual transgressions into petitioner's rights were
made.
The questioned Navotas and City of Manila Ordinances do
not state any guidelines on how law enforcement agencies
may determine if a person apprehended is a minor.
For its part, Section 5(h) of the Quezon City ordinance
provides:
(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of
this Act;82
However, the Section 7 it refers to provides no guidelines
on the identification of age. It merely states that any
member of the community may call the attention of
barangay officials if they see minors during curfew hours:
SECTION 7. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT/PARTICIPATION -
Any person who has personal knowledge of the existence of
any minor during the wee hours as provided under Section
3 hereof, must immediately call the attention of the
barangay.83
The ponencia asserts that Republic Act No. 9344, Section
784 addresses the lacunae as it articulates measures for
determining age. However, none of the assailed ordinances
actually refers law enforcers to extant statutes. Their
actions and prerogatives are not actually limited whether by
the assailed ordinances' express provisions or by implied
invocation. True, Republic Act No. 9344 states its
prescriptions but the assailed ordinances' equivocation by
silence reduces these prescriptions to mere suggestions, at
best, or to mere afterthoughts of a justification, at worst.
Thus, the lack of sufficient guidelines gives law enforcers
"unbridled discretion in carrying out [the assailed
ordinances'] provisions."85 The present Petition illustrates
how this has engendered abusive and even absurd
situations.
Petitioner Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), an 18-year-
old—no longer a minor—student, recalled that when he was
apprehended for violating the curfew, he showed the
barangay tanod his registration card. Despite his
presentation of an official document, the barangay tanod
refused to believe him. Delos Reyes had to resort to
showing the barangay tanod his hairy legs for the tanod to
let him go.86
Petitioner Baccutan likewise alleged that he and his friends
were apprehended by 10 barangay tanods for violating
curfew even though he was already 19 years old at that
time. He alleged that he and his friends were told to
perform 200 squats and if they refused, they would be
framed up for a crime. They were released only when the
aunt of one (1) of his friends arrived.87
These instances illustrate how predicaments engendered by
enforcing the assailed ordinances have not been resolved by
"simply presenting any competent proof of
identification"88 considering that precisely, the assailed
ordinances state no mandate for law enforcers to check
proof of age before apprehension. Clear and explicit
guidelines for implementation are imperative to foreclose
further violations of petitioners' due process rights. In the
interim, the assailed statutes must be invalidated on
account of their vagueness.
VII
The doctrine of parens patriae
does not sustain the assailed ordinances.
The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify the intrusions
into parental prerogatives made by the assailed ordinances.
The State acts as parens patriae in the protection of minors
only when there is a clear showing of neglect, abuse, or
exploitation. It cannot, on its own, decide on how children
are to be reared, supplanting its own wisdom to that of
parents.
The doctrine of parens patriae is of Anglo-American,
common law origin. It was understood to have "emanate[d]
from the right of the Crown to protect those of its subjects
who were unable to protect themselves." 89 It was the King's
"royal prerogative"90 to "take responsibility for those without
capacity to look after themselves."91 At its outset, parens
patriae contemplated situations where vulnerable persons
had no means to support or protect themselves. Given this,
it was the duty of the State, as the ultimate guardian of the
people, to safeguard its citizens' welfare.
The doctrine became entrenched in the United States, even
as it gained independence and developed its own legal
tradition. In Late Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ v.
United States,92 the United States Supreme Court
explained parens patriae as a beneficent state power and
not an arbitrary royal prerogative:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no
affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes
exerted by irresponsible monarch to the great detriment of
the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the
contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often
necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity,
and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot
protect themselves.93 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case, the United States Supreme Court
emphasized that the exercise of parens patriae applies "to
the beneficiaries of charities, who are often incapable of
vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the
sovereign authority."94 It is from this reliance and
expectation of the people that a state stands as "parent of
the nation."95
American colonial rule and the adoption of American legal
traditions that it entailed facilitated our own jurisdiction's
adoption of the doctrine of parens patriae.96 Originally, the
doctrine was understood as "the inherent power and
authority of the state to provide protection of the person
and property of a person non sui juris."97
However, significant developments have smce calibrated
our own understanding and application of the doctrine.
Article II, Section 12 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides:
Section 12.... The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is only the 1987 Constitution which introduced the
qualifier "primary." The present Article II, Section 12's
counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution merely
referred to "[t]he natural right and duty of parents":
Section 4.... The natural right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development
of moral character shall receive the aid and support of the
Government.98
As with the 1973 Constitution, the 1935 Constitution also
merely spoke of"[t]he natural right and duty of parents":
Section 4. . . . The natural right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency should receive the
aid and support of the government.99
The addition of the qualifier "primary" unequivocally attests
to the constitutional intent to afford primacy and
preeminence to parental responsibility. More plainly stated,
the Constitution now recognizes the superiority of parental
prerogative. It follows, then, that state interventions, which
are tantamount to deviations from the preeminent and
superior rights of parents, are permitted only in instances
where the parents themselves have failed or have become
incapable of performing their duties.
Shifts in constitutional temperament contextualize Nery v.
Lorenzo,100 the authority cited by ponencia in explaining the
State's role in the upbringing of children.101 In Nery, this
Court alluded to the State's supreme authority to
exercise parens patriae. Nery was decided in 1972, when
the 1935 Constitution was in operation.102 It stated:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens
patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of
persons or individual[s] who because of age or incapacity
are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties.
Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them,
they have the political community to look after their
welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot
be recreant to such a trust.103
This outmoded temperament is similarly reflected in the
1978 case of Vasco v. Court of Appeals,104 where, without
moderation or qualification, this Court asserted that "the
State is considered the parens patriae of minors.''105
In contrast, Imbong v. Ochoa,106 a cased decided by this
Court in 2014, unequivocally characterized parents' rights
as being "superior" to the state:
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of
moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the
youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it
places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role
shall be "primary, " that is, that the right of parents in
upbringing the youth is superior to that of the
State.107 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the State acts as parens patriae only when parents
cannot fulfill their role, as in cases of neglect, abuse, or
exploitation:
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to
children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide
protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the
State safeguards them from everyone, even their own
parents, to the end that their eventual development as
responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony.108
As it stands, the doctrine of parens patriae is a mere
substitute or supplement to parents' authority over their
children. It operates only when parental authority is
established to be absent or grossly deficient. The wisdom
underlying this doctrine considers the existence of
harm and the subsequent inability of the person to protect
himself or herself. This premise entails the incapacity of
parents and/or legal guardians to protect a child.
To hold otherwise is to afford an overarching and almost
absolute power to the State; to allow the Government to
arbitrarily exercise its parens patriae power might as well
render the superior Constitutional right of parents inutile.
More refined applications of this doctrine reflect this
position. In these instances where the State exercised its
powers over minors on account of parens patriae, it was
only because the children were prejudiced and it
was without subverting the authority of the parents
themselves when they have not acted in manifest offense
against the rights of their children.
Thus, in Bernabe v. Alejo,109parens patriae was exercised in
order to give the minor his day in court. This is a matter
beyond the conventional capacities of parents, and
therefore, it was necessary for the State to intervene in
order to protect the interests of the child.
In People v. Baylon110 and other rape cases,111 this Court
held that a rigorous application of the penal law is in order,
since "[t]he state, as parens patriae, is under the obligation
to minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully."112 In these criminal cases where minor children were
victims, this Court, acting as the representative of the State
exercising its parens patriae power, was firm in imposing
the appropriate penalties for the crimes—no matter how
severe—precisely because it was the only way to mitigate
further harm to minors. Parens patriae is also the reason
why "a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving
rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse,"
as this Court held in People v. Malto.113 Again, these State
actions are well outside the conventional capabilities of the
parents and in no way encroach on the latter's authority.
Such assistive and justified regulation is wanting in this
case.
VIII
In my view, the interpretation that this Court gives to
Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance will
sufficiently narrowly tailor its application so as to save it
from its otherwise apparent breach of fundamental
constitutional principles. Thus, in the ponencia of Justice
Estela Perlas-Bernabe:
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly
authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or
engage in legitimate activities during the night,
notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate MORELAND, J.:
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on
this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder
exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City committed, as alleged in the information, as follows:
Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the
only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the said accused, with the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez,
Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the
this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew forest, with premeditation shot him in the breast with a
measure with the basic premise that State interference is shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said
not superior but only complementary to parental Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried
supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the body of the deceased in a well. The motive is unknown.
the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural The premeditation consists in that the accused had prepared
but primary. his plans to take the deceased to the forest, there to kill him,
so that no one could see it, and to bury him afterwards
secretly in order that the crime should remain unpunished.
Of course, nothing in this decision will preclude a stricter
review in a factual case whose factual ambient will be
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First
different. Accordingly, for these reasons, I concur in the
Instance of the Province of Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen years
result. eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, accessories,
indemnification and costs. The defendant appealed.
Accident
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no
Republic of the Philippines dispute at all as to the important facts. The accused was a
SUPREME COURT landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with
Manila Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and
Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon  or dam on his land. The
EN BANC defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the
intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at work.
G.R. No. L-5418             February 12, 1910 He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short
distance away across a stream to see how the alteration which he
had made in the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, filed on the other side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him
vs. across the stream. On the other side of the stream he met the
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant. deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been living in a small
shack for a month or so during the rice-harvesting season. The
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant. accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee. good place in which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on
the floor in the interior of the shack sick of fever. The deceased, a
young man about 20 years of age, was working at something under
a manga tree a short distance from the shack. Although the accused
directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased
answered the question and pointed out in a general way a portion of
the forest near the edge of which stood the shack. There is some
contradiction between the testimony of the accused and the
Government witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the deceased
testified that the boy and the accused invited each other mutually to
hunt wild chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The
accused, however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to go
hunting with him, neither did the deceased go with him, but that he
remained under the manga tree "trying something." At any rate the
accused went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is
unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that subject he
testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me,
that place where the wild chickens were to be found, I
proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill
some wild chickens we would have something to eat on that
day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens
and I shot him. And after I shot that chicken I heard a human
cry. I picked up the chicken and went near the place where I
heard the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I
went back toward the malecon, where my companions were
working, running back, and when I arrived there I left my
shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where my
companions were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa
to tell him about the occurrence, and to him I told of that
occurence because he is my friend and besides that he was
a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this
he and myself went together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by
gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found in considerable
qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and where the
accident occurred. The defendant within a few minutes after the
accident went out of the woods to the malecon  where he had left his
laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The accused
called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the laborers, to go with him and
they disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that they went a little
way toward the woods and came back. The accused says that they
went to the place where the body of the deceased lay and removed it
to a place in the cogon grass where it would not be easily observed.
It is certain, however, that the body was concealed in the cogon
grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his
fellow laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which to
hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul take
the chicken which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to
the wife of the accused, who testified that she received the chicken
from Yumul and that it had been killed by a gunshot wound. That
evening the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the
body finally. They took it from the cogon grass where it lay concealed
and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from the
place where it had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well,
covering it with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well
for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the
accused dispose of the body because he was afraid of him, although
he admits that the accused in no way threatened or sought to compel
him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of
the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the body. On the
trial, however, he confessed his participation in the death of the
deceased and told the story substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations
between the accused and the deceased had been normal. The
deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the
accused. There was no enmity and no unpleasant relations between
them. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to have
been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The
Government has not attempted to show any. The only possible
reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be
found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt.
That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man
were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions
punished by law.
 Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to
be voluntary unless the contrary shall appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes
some injury by mere accident without liability or intention of
causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a
reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he
shall be entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held
that if life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance
of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing
harm, there is no criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33;
State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State,
2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U.
S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas.,
14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the
part of the accused. Neither is there any question that he was
engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident
occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the
accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the
case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his
concealment and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said
(p.1165):
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the
accused is not required to prove such a defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of
intentional killing, and the burden is upon the State to show
that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the
evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was
accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But
where accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits
the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the
State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error
to instruct the jury that the defendant must show that it was
an accident by a preponderance of the testimony, and
instruction B in the Cross case was properly held to be
erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in
a prosecution for homicide, which must be submitted to the
jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal
intent (or its equivalent) which constitutes an essential
element in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must
be negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the
judgment of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant
acquitted, and his discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio.
So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6897             February 15, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POLICARPIO TAYONGTONG, defendant-appellant.
Jose M. Arroyo for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was convicted of the crime of homicide by
negligence (homicidio por imprudencia temeraria). He appealed,
basing his whole case here upon the proposition that the evidence
does not warrant the conviction.
It appears that on the 19th day of January, 1911, one Severino
Resume was engaged in painting telephones poles located along the
highway between Jaro and Iloilo. On that day he was killed by being
run over by an automobile driven by the defendant. The highway at
the point where Severino met his death was straight, of considerable
width, and in good condition. The telephone pole upon which
Severino was at work at the time of the accident was outside of the
beaten portion of the highway and located about 2 feet into the grass
at the side. Between it and the edge of the road was a pathway used
by people traveling on foot. The machine which caused the death of
the deceased is a large passengers, and having upon each side and
extending about 2 feet out beyond the wheels a rack or other
contrivance for the carrying of parcels, baggage, and freight. It is
used solely for the purpose of carrying passengers back and forth
between Iloilo and Jaro.
The accident happened at about 10 o' clock in the morning. The
automobile was then engaged in making its third trip from Iloilo at
Jaro, and was loaded to its fullest capacity. There were several
people who claim to have witnessed the accident. One of them, the
principal witness for the prosecution, and its only witness who saw
the occurrence, named Pablo Tayson, is alleged to have been
standing within a few feet of the deceased, talking with him, at the
time he was run down. Another person, who was near by at the time
of the accident, was Basilio Severaldo, who was engaged in the
same work as the deceased but, just prior to the passage of the
automobile, had gone away from the locality where the accident
occurred and saw nothing of what happened. Two other persons,
who have been produced as witnesses for the defendant, allege that
they were present and saw the whole occurrence.
Pablo Tayson, who, as we have said, is the only witness for the
prosecution testifying directly to the facts and substantially the only
witness upon whom the prosecution relies for a conviction, testified
that at the time of the accident he and the deceased were located on
the left-hand side of the highway going from Iloilo at Jaro; that he
was standing a few feet from the deceased who was also on the
same side of the highway; that the deceased was standing up
painting the side of the telephone pole toward Jaro; that the
telephone pole was, therefore, between the deceased and Iloilo, the
direction from which the automobile was coming; that the road on
that day was very dusty and the automobile, as he saw it coming
from Iloilo toward him and the deceased, was raising a cloud of dust
which he was drifting to the side of the road upon which he and the
deceased were located. This witness further asserted that he saw
the automobile when it was within about 1,200 feet of the place
where he stood; that it was coming at a rate of speed variously
termed by him "very fast" and "at full speed;" that, on observing the
machine as it approached, he saw that the driver, the accused, was
turning the steering wheel first in one direction and then the other, as
if uncertain what course he was going to pursue; that the machine,
as a consequence, was darting first to one side of the road and then
to the other, thus zigzagging back and forth across the traveled
portion of the highway; that just before reaching the place where
deceased was painting the telephone pole it crossed to the side of
the road opposite to him and then suddenly started back across the
road opposite to him and then suddenly started back across the
road, striking the deceased as he stood painting; that by the impact
the deceased was thrown upon the ground somewhat toward the
front of the machine, which was going so fast that, although the
accused was not within the reach of its wheels, nevertheless, the
"suction," as the witness called it, created by the swift passage of the
machine drew the deceased under its wheels where he was run over
and crushed.
From the testimony of the witness it does not appear that the
deceased moved or stirred in any way until he was hit by the
automobile.
The accused testified, and produced several witnesses to support his
testimony, that at the time of the accident he was driving the
machine, which was loaded to its fullest capacity with passengers
and baggage, at about 10 to 15 miles an hour; that he was driving in
or near the center of the road and pas to either side; that the
machine was under full control and was going steadily and smoothly
without deviating to the right or to the left; that on approaching the
place where the witness Pablo Tayson stood he saw him turn his
back toward the road and place his cap over his face in such a way
as to cover his nose, mouth and eyes, evidently to protect them from
the cloud of dust which was rolling from behind the machine over
toward the side of the road on which he was; that the deceased, as
the machine approached, probably seeing the cloud of dust which it
was raising and which would inevitably drift in his direction, and
observing his companion, Pablo Tayson, under the necessity of
protecting himself from the dust in the manner described, just before
the machine reached a point opposite him, started to cross the road
to the other side, evidently to escape the dust; that he misjudged the
distance and started too late; that in attempting to cross he placed
himself squarely in front of the machine; that his movement was so
sudden and unexpected and, when he reached the road, he was so
close to the machine that it was impossible to stop it in time to avert
the catastrophe; that he did everything that was possible to be done
to avoid the accident; that he put on both brakes as hard as possible
and turned the machine as much as could be done under the
circumstances; that in proof thereof he shows that only the front
wheel of the machine passed over the body of the deceased, it
having been turned by him sufficiently so that the mind wheel missed
him, and that the machine was stopped a very few feet beyond the
point where the accident occurred. The accused testified, and his
evidence in this regard is uncontradicted, that he was thoroughly
qualified as a driver, having served his apprenticeship on this very
road and this very machine before being employed.
The accused denies absolutely that portion of the story told by Pablo
Tayson in which he alleges that the accused was driving at a high
rate of speed; that he was zigzagging from one side of the road to
the other; and that he struck the deceased while he stood painting
the telephone pole.
We are satisfied that the evidence is not sufficient to convict. On the
contrary, we believe that, under all of the facts and circumstances of
the case, the fair preponderance of the evidence indicates that the
deceased met his death in substantially the manner described by the
accused. In the first place, the testimony of Pablo Tayson is affected
by an attack made upon his credibility during the progress of the trial.
It was shown that, on the preliminary investigation had by the justice
of the peace, this witness testified, precisely as the accused asserted
in his evidence, that just as the machine was arriving at a point in the
highway opposite him, he, desiring to avoid the unpleasantness of
the dust, turned his back toward the road and covered his face with
his cap, thereby excluding the dust from his mouth, eyes, and
nostrils. That he so testified on the preliminary investigation,
according to the record thereof, is admitted. In his testimony on the
trial of this case he stated, at first, that he turned his right side to the
road and placed his hand  over the side of his face. leaving his eyes
uncovered, so that he was able to see and did see the deceased at
the time he was run down. Upon cross-examination he changed this
testimony to the extent of saying that he covered the right side of his
face with his cap instead of his hand, maintaining, however, that he
did not cover his eyes and that he was able to see the deceased and
all that transpired. When confronted with the evidence which he gave
on the preliminary examination, he sought to explain the difference
between his two declarations by stating that the testimony before the
justice of the peace, which was reduced to writing and signed by
him, was in a different language from that which he was able to
speak and to speak and that it was not translated so that he knew
what he was signing.
In the second place, the testimony of this witness is unreasonable. It
is improbable that a machine as large as the one in question, going
at the rate of speed described by Pablo Tayson, could zigzag from
one side of the highway to the other in the manner described by the
witness. It is still more improbable that this machine could have
dodged from the right-hand side of the road to the left and, in some
unknown manner, picked the deceased out from behind the
telephone pole, dragged him into the highway and there run over
him. It is not clear how an automobile can run over a man when it is
admitted that he is on the opposite side of a telephone post from the
machine which ruins him down, with only a portion of his body
extending beyond it. Even if the machine had started toward him in
the manner described he would undoubtedly have seen it quickly
enough to have passed around the other side of the post and save
himself from being touched. This is especially evident when we
observe that it is admitted that the deceased stood facing the
automobile all the time and could see it plainly and its every
movement. It is difficult to believe that a machine of the size of the
one in question, driven at the high rate of speed alleged by the
witness, could have turned suddenly, darted toward the ditch, and
struck the deceased while located partly on the opposite side of a
post from the machine without having collided with the post or gone
into the ditch, it being remembered that the post was not more than 6
feet from the ditch.
From the transcription given of the machine it appears, as we have
already seen, that there were certain portions of the body of the
machine extending over and beyond the wheels, which were used as
receptacles for the baggage and bundles of passengers. This
projection, under the theory of the prosecution, would necessarily
have been the portion of the machine to hit the deceased for the
reason that no other part of the machine could have come in contact
with him without the projection referred to striking the telephone pole.
If this projection is that which struck the deceased first, then he
would have been thrown into the ditch away from the machine and
not into the highway under the machine. This is what would
necessarily have happened when we remember that at the time the
deceased was struck the machine was going at full speed toward the
ditch. It was apparently to avoid the contradiction of his previous
testimony inherent in this necessary result that the witness testified
that the force which prevented the deceased from going into the
ditch and drew him under the machine was the "suction" created by
its rapid passage along the highway.
It is undisputed evidence of the case that that portion of the machine
which struck the deceased first was the mudguard over the left
wheel. This fact alone shows the impossibility of the machine having
hit the deceased while standing at the post, as it is admitted that no
part of the automobile collided with the post. If the deceased had
been at the post, as described by Tayson, the guard could not
possibly have struck him without the extended portions described
having struck the post itself.
On the otherhand, the story told by the accused and supported by
some of the passengers who saw the accident is entirely reasonable,
accords with common sense and ordinary experience. It was clearly
told, in a manner frank and straightforward, was free from
contradictions and needs no explanation or excuses.
We have read with detention the opinion upon which the judgment of
conviction is based. In spite of careful study, we are unable to
discover anything therein that alters our views in relation to the
merits. As between the two theories, the one of the prosecution and
the other of the defense, we cannot have, under the evidence and
record, any hesitation in choosing. The evidence presented by the
prosecution itself, and it is upon that evidence alone that the
conviction must stand, every other fact in the record being
conspicuously in exculpation of the accused, shows the deceased
standing upon the east side of a telephone pole facing an automobile
coming toward him from the west, about half of his body extending
beyond the pole toward the highway on his left. On his right was the
highway drainage ditch. The pole was outside of the travelled portion
of the highway so far that a footpath lay between it and said traveled
portion. The automobile was coming toward him at a high rate of
speed, to judge from the evidence of this witness, at least 40 miles
an hour, possibly more. The machine was not proceeding in a
straight line but it was going from one side of the road to the other.
Just before arriving opposite the deceased it darted to the right-hand
side of the road and then, turning, it started toward the left-hand side
directly at the deceased. All of these things the deceased saw, yet
he did not move or attempt to save himself in any way. On the
contrary, he stood still and permitted the machine to strike him upon
his left side. Having collided with him, the machines turned back
toward the center of the highway, carrying the deceased with it,
depositing him within the traveled portion of the highway, where it
ran over him. On the other hand, the evidence of the defendant
shows that he was driving the machine at a moderate rate of speed
within the usually traveled portion of the highway, guiding it in a
substantially straight line and handling it in the usual and ordinary
manner. The machine, one of extraordinary size and capable of
carrying 35 passengers with their baggage and effects, was
incapable of running at the rate of speed described by the
prosecution. Arriving at a point in the highway just in front of the
deceased, the latter, to avoid the cloud of dust which was drifting to
his side of the road, started to cross the road to the other side. He
miscalculated the time and distance and as a result was struck by
the automobile and run over. His action in starting across the road
was so sudden and unexpected and, when he reached the road, he
was so close to the automobile, that it was impossible to stop the
machine in time to save him. The body was picked up within the
traveled portion of the highway.
Which of these two stories is the most reasonable? We have no
hesitation in answering. The story of the prosecution presents so
many things that are unreasonable and incredible and for which
there exists in the record no explanation whatever, and concerning
which no reasonable explanation can give, that it must necessarily
be rejected. Even if, going at such a high rate of speed, the accused
could have driven the automobile from one side of the road to the
other as alleged, what could possibly be his reason for so doing? It
was market day at Jaro; this was his third trip; the machine was
loaded to its utmost capacity, both with passengers and with
baggage; he was doubtedly running according to a schedule and
would have no time to waste in going from one side of the road to the
other; no reason is suggested and one can be supplied why a driver
should handle his machine in the manner described by the only
witness for the prosecution who saw the whole occurrence. Instead
of Kepping to the travelled portion of the highway, which was
admittedly in fine condition, why should the accused go outside of it,
across a foothpath used by pedestrians, and skin alongside of the
telephone poles located on that side? What object could he have had
in thus exposing himself, his passengers, and his machine to the
risks and dangers of plunging into the drainage ditch or driving
against the telephone poles or meeting the other disasters and
dangers which might be encountered outside of the usually traveled
portion of the highway? No explanation of such extraordinary
conduct is given in the record and none can be conceived. He was
not engaged in taking a party of hilarious companions on a "joy" ride,
nor in giving an exhibition of his skill in handling an automobile of
that size and class. It does not appear that he was drunk or foolish.
He was engaged in a business enterprise, employed by a
businessman purposes. What could possibly have been his purpose
when, or arriving at a point in front of the deceased, he turned his
automobile across the road and started squarely toward the
telephone pole and the deceased? That he saw the deceased and
that the deceased saw him is admitted. What spirit or purpose could
have animated him in driving his automobile outside of the highway
directly toward not only a telephone post but the drainage ditch itself
in order to run down an unoffending person? What motive can be
assigned by the prosecution when it asserts that the accused did this
unaccountable thing? What purpose does the prosecution allege the
accused sought to subserve when, by this conduct, he placed the
safety of his passengers and of his machine, as well as of himself, at
stake in thus driving directly toward a place of great danger? Above
all, why did the deceased stand still, instead of stepping around
behind the post, and permit himself to be crushed to death by the
machine which he clearly saw bearing down upon him? These
unreasonable and accountable things must be satisfactorily
explained by the prosecution when it is confronted by the statement
of the accused, supported by a number of disinterested witnesses,
that none of those things ever occurred. We have already pointed
out that, giving the story as told by the prosecution credence, it
would have been little short of an impossibility for the body of the
deceased to have found itself in the travelled portion of the highway
after the accident. He would inevitably have been driven further away
from the highway and toward the ditch by the blow from the machine
going in the direction in which it was alleged by the prosecution to
have been going.
Turning to the story of the event as given by the defendant and his
witnesses, we meet nothing that requires explanation. There can,
therefore, be no hesitation on our part in accepting the truth of the
story told by the defendant.
Although we have held in a recent case (U. S. vs. Reyes, 10 Off.
Gaz., 1045), a criminal action for homicide by imprudencia temeraria,
that contributory negligence on the part of the person killed is no
defense, provided the driver of automobile himself was negligent and
that negligence was the proximate cause of the death, nevertheless,
that doctrine does not in any way inveigh against the proposition
which we here assert that, where death is due to the negligence of
the decedent himself and not to the negligence of the driver of the
automobile, the latter cannot be held for homicide. In this case the
death of the deceased was due entirely to his own negligence. There
is not sufficient reliable proof in the record to establish negligence on
the part of the accused. There being no negligence, he is not
responsible, no matter what the result of the accident may have
been.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the accused acquitted.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29396             November 9, 1928
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRAXEDES AYAYA, defendant-appellant.
G. N. Trinidad for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was tried in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
upon the following information:
That on or about January 15, 1928, in the municipality of
Pagbilao, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, and within
the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, with
the intent to kill her husband Benito dela Cruz, with whom
she was united in lawful marriage, with treachery and by
means of an umbrella, did voluntarily, unlawfully, and
feloniously assault and attack her said husband Benito de la
Cruz, inflicting a mortal wound in the upper left eyelid, as a
result of which said Benito de la Cruz died five (5) days
thereafter. In violation of article 402 of the Penal Code.
It appears from the record that at about 1 o'clock in the morning of
January 16, 1928, Jose Fajardo, the chief of police of Pagbilao,
Tayabas, was informed by a policeman that one Benito de la Cruz
was drunk, wounded, and vomiting in his house in said municipality.
Said chief of police went to the place and found Benito, the
deceased, lying in bed with a wound on his left eyelid, and
unconscious, for he did not answer the questions put to him. When
his wife, the defendant Praxedes Ayaya, was questioned as to the
cause of that wound, she replied that it was due to the fact that she
herself had jabbed her husband with an umbrella. Health officer
Victoriano Litonjua was then called, and upon examining Benito,
found he had a wound on the left upper eyelid which was bleeding:
that his pupils were dilated and, from the odor of his breath and from
his vomiting, it appeared that Benito was drunk. In view of the
wounded man's condition he was later taken to the provincial
hospital of Tayabas, where he died four days after the incident.
Health officer Litonjua and Dr. G. Santos Cuyugan, the director of the
provincial hospital of Tayabas, who treated the wounded man,
expressed different opinions as to the cause of the death of Benito
de la Cruz. Health officer Litonjua believes that the deceased's
cerebral hemorrhage was due to his alcoholic excesses, whereas
Doctor Cuyugan, who performed the autopsy, declared that the
wound was caused by some blunt instrument and that his death was
caused by the cerebral hemorrhage produced by the wound he had
received in the forehead, and that health officer Litonjua's statement
as to said hemorrhage being due to the alcohol is erroneous. The
trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime alleged in the
information, and taking into account that the defendant did not intend
to inflict so grave an injury as she did, and that there had been
provocation on the part of the offended party, sentenced her to
fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with
the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of P500 by way of indemnity, plus the costs of the action.
The defendant appealed from this judgment, and her attorney, in
support of the petition that the judgment appealed from be reversed
and the appellant acquitted with costs de oficio, assigns the following
errors: (1) The trial court erred in holding that the deceased's wound
on the left upper eyelid was caused by the appellant; (2) supposing,
without admitting, that said wound was really caused by the herein
appellant, the lower court erred in concluding that said wound was
the immediate cause of the death of the deceased and consequently,
in convicting the appellant; and (3) the lower court erred in not
acquitting the appellant, at least, for reasonable doubt.
The evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the crime
charged, consists of the following: Exhibit A, which is the sworn
statement filed by the accused with the justice of the peace of
Pagbilao; Exhibit B, which is the umbrella used by the defendant and
with which she jabbed the deceased; Exhibit C, which is the report of
the autopsy of Benito de la Cruz signed by Doctor Cuyugan; and
Exhibit D, which is the death certificate.
In the defendant's sworn statement she states, among other things,
that at about 8 o'clock at night on January 15, 1928, she, with her
husband Benito de la Cruz, and her son Emilio, drank tuba in the
store of one Felicidad Losloso; that afterwards they went to a
cinema; that while returning home and without any warning her
husband, who was drunk, gave her a blow which she dodged; that
then her husband went home, preceding her and her son and when
they arrived at the house they found the door closed; that she and
her son pushed the door and attempted to open it, but her husband,
who was inside, prevented it; that then the door gave way somewhat
and her son Emilio succeeded in putting his head between the
opening of the door and the wall and in order to prevent the door
from crushing him, she pushed it; that Benito then poked his head
out of the opening of the door and when she saw him, she jabbed
him with the umbrella she carried; that she does not know where she
jabbed him although she thinks it was in the body; and that when she
and her son finally succeeded in entering the house, they found that
Benito was already in bed with a wound in the forehead. The
accused herself, in her testimony in her own behalf, substantially
repeated what she had declared before the justice of the peace of
Pagbilao, stating, however, that when the door was opened and her
son put his head between the opening of the door and the wall, in
order to prevent the door from crushing her son's head, she jabbed
her husband with her umbrella with a downward motion, though she
could not tell if she touched him or not. She stated, furthermore, that
she did not know how the wound in her husband's forehead was
caused. This point of the defendant's testimony has not been
contradicted by any evidence to the contrary; rather it has been
corroborated by her son Emilio de la Cruz who also testified at the
trial.
On the other hand, it appears from the testimony of the defendant
and of her son that the husband and wife did not quarrel in the street
while returning home on the night in question, and, moreover, that
during the marriage they lived together in peace with no
disagreements between them, either on or before the date of the
incident. lawphi1.net
In view of the fact that there is no eyewitness of the act herein
prosecuted, with the exception of the defendant and her son Emilio
de la Cruz, we are compelled to accept the declaration of the
defendant that she jabbed her husband with her umbrella in order to
prevent the door from closing and crushing her son's head which
was inserted between said door and the wall of the house. Said
defendant, explaining what took place, says in part: "When the door
was ajar my son went in, and then my husband pushed it and as I
saw that he was about to crush my son's head, I jabbed my husband
with the point of the umbrella, downwards to prevent him from
crushing my son's head." We find nothing improbable in this
statement and if we add to this the absence of any reasonable
motive to prompt said defendant to injure her husband, we are
compelled to conclude that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of
the door in question, she did so to free her son from the imminent
danger of having his head crushed or being strangled; and if she
thus caused her husband's injury, it was by a mere accident, without
any fault or intention to cause it. This being so, we believe that she
incurred no criminal liability in accordance with article 8, No. 8, of the
Penal Code, because, it being a licit act to free her son from the
grave danger threatening him, and the fact of having touched the left
eye of her husband, who was behind the door, with the end of her
umbrella, does not make her criminally liable. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1888.)
Whereof the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the appellant
Praxedes Ayaya must be, as she hereby is, acquitted, with costs de
oficio. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180219               November 23, 2011
VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By petition for review on certiorari, Virgilio Talampas y Matic
(Talampas) seeks the review of the affirmance of his conviction for
homicide (for the killing of the late Ernesto Matic y Masinloc) by the
Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated on August
16, 2007.1
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Biñan, Laguna (RTC) had
rejected his pleas of self-defense and accident and had declared him
guilty of the felony under the judgment rendered on June 22, 2004. 2
Antecedents
The information filed on November 17, 1995, to which Talampas
pleaded not guilty, averred as follows:3
That on or about July 5, 1995, in the Municipality of Biñan, Province
of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused VIRGILIO TALAMPAS, with intent to kill, while
conveniently armed with a short firearm and without any justifiable
cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one Ernesto Matic y Masinloc with the said
firearm, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound at the back of his
body which directly caused his instantaneous death, to the damage
and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The State presented as witnesses Jose Sevillo, Francisco Matic,
Jerico Matic, Dr. Valentin Bernales, and Josephine Matic. The CA
summarized their testimonies thuswise:4
Prosecution witness Jose Sevillo (Jose) who allegedly witnessed the
incident in question, testified that on July 5, 1995 at about 7:00
o’clock in the evening, he together with Eduardo Matic (Eduardo)
and Ernesto Matic (Ernesto) were infront of his house, along the road
in Zona Siete (7), Wawa, Malaban, Biñan, Laguna, repairing his
tricycle when he noticed the appellant who was riding on a bicycle
passed by and stopped. The latter alighted at about three (3) meters
away from him, walked a few steps and brought out a short gun, a
revolver, and poked the same to Eduardo and fired it hitting Eduardo
who took refuge behind Ernesto. The appellant again fired his gun
three (3) times, one shot hitting Ernesto at the right portion of his
back causing him (Ernesto) to fall on the ground with his face down.
Another shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on his back
(patihaya). Thereafter, the appellant ran away, while he (Jose) and
his neighbors brought the victims to the hospital. On June 6, 1995,
Jose executed a Sworn Statement at the Biñan Police Station.
Another witness, Francisco Matic, testified that prior to the death of
his brother Ernesto who was then 44 years old, he (Ernesto) was
driving a tricycle on a boundary system and earned ₱100.00 daily,
although not on a regular basis because sometimes Ernesto played
in a band for ₱100.00 per night.
Jerico Matic, eldest son of Ernesto, alleged that he loves his father
and his death was so painful to him that he could not quantify his
feelings in terms of money. The death of his father was a great loss
to them as they would not be able to pursue their studies and that
nobody would support them financially considering that the money
being sent by their mother in the amount of ₱2,000.00 to ₱2,500.00
every three (3) months, would not be enough.
Dr. Valentin Bernales likewise, testified that he was the one who
conducted the autopsy on the body of Ernesto and found one
gunshot in the body located at the back of the costal area, right side,
sixteen (16) centimeters from the spinal column. This shot was fatal
as it involved the major organs such as the lungs, liver and the spinal
column which caused Ernesto’s death.
The last witness, Josephine Matic, wife of Ernesto, testified that her
husband was laid to rest on July 18, 1995 and that his untimely
death was so painful and that she could not provide her children with
sustenance. She asked for the amount of ₱200,000.00 for her to be
able to send her children to school.
On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He
insisted that his enemy had been Eduardo Matic (Eduardo), not
victim Ernesto Matic (Ernesto); that Eduardo, who was then with
Ernesto at the time of the incident, had had hit him with a monkey
wrench, but he had parried the blow; that he and Eduardo had then
grappled for the monkey wrench; that while they had grappled, he
had notice that Eduardo had held a revolver; that he had thus
struggled with Eduardo for control of the revolver, which had
accidentally fired and hit Ernesto during their struggling with each
other; that the revolver had again fired, hitting Eduardo in the thigh;
that he had then seized the revolver and shot Eduardo in the head;
and that he had then fled the scene when people had started
swarming around.
Ruling of the RTC
On June 22, 2004, the RTC, giving credence to the testimony of
eyewitness Jose Sevilla, found Talampas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide,5 and disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, with one
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
IMPRISONMENT ranging from TEN (10) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) years and EIGHT
(8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is likewise
ordered to pay the heirs of Ernesto Matic y Masinloc the following
sums, to wit:
1. ₱50,000.00 – as and for death indemnity;
2. ₱50,000.00 – as and for moral damages;
3. ₱25,000.00 – as and for actual damages; and
4. ₱30,000.00 – as and for temperate damages.
Furnish Public Prosecutor Nofuente, Atty. Navarroza, the private
complainant and accused with a copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.6
Ruling of the CA
Talampas appealed to the CA, contending that:
 I Ruling
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE
CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE DEATH OF ERNESTO MATIC WAS MERELY
ACCIDENTAL.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ACTED IN DEFENSE
OF HIMSELF WHEN HE GRAPPLED WITH EDUARDO
MATIC.
Still, the CA affirmed the conviction based on the RTC’s factual and
legal conclusions, and ruled that Talampas, having invoked self-
defense, had in effect admitted killing Ernesto and had thereby
assumed the burden of proving the elements of self-defense by
credible, clear and convincing evidence, but had miserably failed to
discharge his burden.7
The CA deleted the award of temperate damages in view of the
awarding of actual damages, pointing out that the two kinds of
damages were mutually exclusive.8
Issue
Hence, Talampas is now before the Court, continuing to insist that
his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that the lower
courts both erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and accidental
death.
The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.
Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in defending
himself.9
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused
and the victim. The established circumstances indicated that such
did not happen here, for it was Talampas who had initiated the attack
only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a
target of Talampas’ attack, he having only happened to be present at
the scene of the attack. In reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had
committed any unlawful aggression against Talampas. Thus,
Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the victim
(Ernesto), thereby rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.
Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by
invoking accident as a defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal
Code,10 the legal provision pertinent to accident, contemplates a
situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal,
exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process
produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least
in the mind of the actor – an accidental result flowing out of a legal
act.11 Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the sway of
our will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, it
lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. 12 In
short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the
wrong done.
The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas
brandished and poked his revolver at Eduardo and fired it, hitting
Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At that
point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the
right portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall face down to the
ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape, causing Eduardo to
fall on his back. Certainly, Talampas’ acts were by no means lawful,
being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and
Ernesto.
And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas’ assault was
Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting and killing of
Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct
consequence of Talampas’ felonious deadly assault against
Eduardo. Talampas’ poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or
mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from
criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es
causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused). 13 Under Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code,14 criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
Nonetheless, the Court finds the indeterminate sentence of 10 years
and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and eight
months, as maximum, legally erroneous.
The penalty for homicide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal.1avvphi1 Under Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,15 the court, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, is mandated to prescribe an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for the offense. With the absence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period, or 14 years, eight months, and one
day to 17 years and four months. This is pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code.16 It is such period that the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be reckoned from. Hence, limiting the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at only 14 years and
eight months contravened the express provision of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, for such penalty was within the minimum period of
reclusion temporal. Accordingly, the Court must add one day to the
maximum term fixed by the lower courts.
The Court finds to be unnecessary the increment of one day as part
of the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence. It may be true
that the increment did not constitute an error, because the minimum
term thus fixed was entirely within the parameters of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Yet, the addition of one day to the 10
years as the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence of
Talampas may occasion a degree of inconvenience when it will be
time for the penal administrators concerned to consider and
determine whether Talampas is already qualified to enjoy the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, in order to
simplify the computation of the minimum penalty of the indeterminate
sentence, the Court deletes the one-day increment from the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
August 16, 2007 finding VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and IMPOSES
the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Irresistable Force
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1352            March 29, 1905
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,
vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance
of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor  as
accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder
perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers Louis A.
Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because,
without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as
accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims
in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As
regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in
the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was
compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not
only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the
only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a
witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when
the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of
the group who killed the Americans, but the he was in a banana
plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he
heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by
Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to
him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to
bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the
act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted,
doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts
which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no
proof that he took any part in any way in the execution of the crime
with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the
contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for the
prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros,
did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was
he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place.
The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an
official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique
Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not
be considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that
Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a
confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the
statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton
Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made
through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that
nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to
have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or
promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4,
Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the
perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of the motives for
the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in
his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that
can not render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of
the judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants,
with the costs de oficio  in both instances. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11439           October 28, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDUARDO
ELICANAL, Defendant-Appellant.
Francisco Villanueva, Sr., and Francisco Villanueva, Jr., for
appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The appellant in this case is one of several persons arrested
and convicted of murder. He was sentenced to death and
this case comes to this court not only en consulta but by
appeal also.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The accused was a member of the crew of the
lorcha Cataluña cruising in the waters of the Philippine
Islands off Iloilo under the captaincy of Juan Nomo. The first
mate was Guillermo Guiloresa. The accused is about 22
years of age, without education or instruction and
somewhat weak physically. The lorcha left the mouth of the
Iloilo river early in the morning of the 11th of December,
1914. She had scarcely cleared the river when Guillermo,
the chief mate, suddenly and without having mentioned the
subject to the accused before, said to him that he was going
to kill the captain because he was very angry with him, and
asked him to assist him. The accused took this statement as
a joke as, according to him, the chief mate was a great
joker; and particularly as he was smiling at the time he
made the statement; and naturally paid no more attention
to it. Neither he nor the other members of the crew held
any resentment against the captain and he had no idea at
that time that he would take part in any acts directed
against him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The following morning while the crew were engaged in their
daily occupation, Guillermo, finding the captain in his cabin,
assaulted him, attempting to seize and hold his hands and,
at the same time, calling to the crew to come forward and
help him. The crew, drawn by the cries, hastened to the
spot where Guillermo was engaged in a hand to hand fight
with the captain. At the request of Guillermo the crew, with
the exception of the accused, seized the captain and tied
him with the rope. After he had been rendered helpless
Guillermo struck him in the back of the neck with an iron
bar an then, delivering the weapon to the accused, ordered
him to come forward and assist in disposing of the captain.
The accused thereupon seized the bar and, while the
captain was still struggling struck him a blow on the head
which caused his
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The sole defense of the accused is that, in killing the
captain, he was acting under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury induced by the threat
of Guillermo, the chief mate, and that he was so absolutely
overwhelmed thereby that, in striking the blow which killed
the captain, he acted without volition of his own and was
reduced to a mere instrument in the hands of the chief
mate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The learned trial court refused to accept this defense
holding that the chief mate did not exercise such influence
over the accused as amounted to an uncontrollable fear or
that deprived him of his volition. We are satisfied from the
evidence that the finding of the trial court was correct. It
was held by the supreme court of Spain in a decision of the
5th of November, 1880, that "a threat, in order to induce
insuperable fear, must promise such grave results, and such
results must be so imminent, that the common run of men
would succumb. The crime threatened must be greater
than, or at least equal to, that which we are compelled to
commit." In a decision of the same court of April 14, 1871,
it was said that "inducement must precede the act induced
and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it the act would not have been performed." That is
substantially the principle which is at the bottom of
subdivision 9 of article 8 of the Penal Code. That article
defines the different circumstances under which a person
will be exempt from criminal liability. Subdivision 9 thereof
covers "any person who acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force." The foundation of these decisions and the
basis of the defense in this case is subdivision 10, which
exempts from liability "any person who acts under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury." chanrobles virtual law library
As we have already intimated, before a force can be
considered to be an irresistible one, it must produce such an
effect upon the individual that, in spite of all resistance, it
reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such, incapable
of committing a crime. It must be such that, in spite of the
resistance of the person on whom it operates, it compels his
members to act and his mind to obey. He must act not only
without will but against will. Such a force can never consist
anything which springs primarily from the man himself; it
must be a force which acts upon him from the outside and
by means of a third person. In order that one may take
advantage of subdivision 10 of article 8 and allege with
success that he acted under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, it must
appear that the threat which caused the uncontrollable fear
related to a crime of such gravity and so imminent that it
might safely be said that the ordinary run of men would
have been governed by it. And the evil threatened must be
greater than, or at least equal to, that which he is
compelled to cause. The legislature by this enactment did
not intend to say that any fear would exempt one from
performing his legal duty. It was intended simply to exempt
from criminal responsibility when the threat promised an
evil as grave, at the very least, as that which the one
threatened was asked to produce. Viada in his
commentaries on this subdivision of article 8 of the Penal
Code gives this illustration:
Certain evil-minded persons seize me and threaten me with
death If I do not set fire to a neighbor's house; if I perform
the act under such threat, as grave as it is imminent, I
would fall within the exemption from criminal responsibility
provided for in this number; but if the same persons
threatened to lay waste my forest if I do not kill my father
my act would not come within the exemption for the reason
that the evil with which I was threatened was much less
than that of killing my father.
The evidence fails to establish that the threat directed to
the accused by the chief mate, if any, was of such a
character as to deprive him of all volition and to make him a
mere instrument without will of his own but one moved
exclusively by him who threatened. Nor does the threat
appear to have been such, or to have been made under
such circumstances, that the accused could reasonably have
expected that he would suffer material injury if he refused
to comply. In other words, the fear was not insuperable.
Indeed, it is doubtful if any threat at all in the true sense
was made; certainly none of such serious nature as would
justify an illegal act on the part of the accused chanrobles
virtual law library
This discussion disposes of the first error assigned by
counsel for the appellant. The second relates to the finding
of the trial court that the crime committed was murder
instead of homicide; and counsel for appellant urge, under
this assignment, that the evidence does not sustain the
finding of any qualifying circumstance which would raise the
crime from the grade of homicide to that of murder. It is
quite true, as counsel argue, that qualifying circumstances
must be as clearly proved and established as the crime
itself; and, unless the evidence in this case shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed with one or
more of the qualifying circumstances required by the Penal
Code to constitute murder, it must be denominated
homicide and not murder. (U. S. vs. Beecham, 15 Phil.
Rep., 272; U. S. vs. Gavarlan, 18 Phil. Rep., 510; U. S. vs.
Aslul, 21 Phil. Rep., 65; U. S. vs. Ibañez, 19 Phil. Rep., 463;
U. S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil. Rep., 170; U. S. vs. Amoroso, 5
Phil. Rep., 466; U. S. vs. Cagara, 5 Phil. Rep.,
277.) chanrobles virtual law library
We agree with counsel that the evidence does not establish
the existence of premeditation as a qualifying circumstance.
In the case of United States vs. Bañagale (24 Phil. Rep.,
69), the court said with respect to the facts which must be
proved to establish premeditation:
The record does not show whether Banagale, upon
extending the invitation to Domingo Posada through
Mariano Ilao, did so for the purpose of killing the former,
inasmuch as there is no proof that he had resolved upon
doing so, through deliberation, meditation, and reflection,
and performed acts revealing his criminal purpose, some
days or even hours prior to carrying out his criminal
determination to kill the unfortunate Posada. Article 10,
circumstance 7, of the Penal Code establishes the requisite
that the criminal should have acted, in the perpetration of
the crime, with deliberate premeditation or that he should
have prepared for its commission by outward acts such as
denote in the agent a persistent criminal purpose and a
meditated resolution to consummate the deed. (U. S. vs.
Nalua and Kadayum, 23 Phil. Rep., 1 ; U. S. vs. Alvarez, 3
Phil. Rep., 24; U. S. vs. Lasada and Lasada, 21 Phil. Rep.,
287; U. S. vs. Catigbac, 4 Phil. Rep., 259; U. S. vs. Angeles,
6 Phil. Rep., 480; U. S. vs. Idica, 3 Phil. Rep., 313; U. S. vs.
Buncad, 25 Phil. Rep., 530.)
In the case at bar it does not appear that there was ever
any consideration of the question of killing the captain of
the launch by the members of the crew, in which this
accused took part. The matter, so far as the evidence goes,
was never mentioned except on the day before the crime
was committed and then in such a way as not to show any
fixed purpose or determination even on the part of the chief
mate and much less on that of the accused. The fact that
he, with the rest of the crew, answered the call of the chief
mate while he was engaged in his endeavor to make way
with the captain is not sufficient by itself, or in connection
with the conversation of the day before, to establish that
sustained reflection and continued persistence which are the
special features of the qualifying circumstance of
premeditation. It does not appear that the accused had
even thought of taking any part in the death of the captain
up to the very moment when the iron bar with which he
dealt the fatal blow was handed him by the chief mate.
Under such circumstances it is error to find the existence of
premeditation as a qualifying circumstance (U. S. vs.
Beecham, 15 Phil. Rep., 272.) chanrobles virtual law library
We cannot agree with counsel fro the appellant that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, or alevosia, has not
been proved. It appears undisputed that, at the time the
accused struck the deceased with the iron bar and thereby
caused his death, the latter was bound hand and foot and
was helpless and defenseless. While it is quite true that
there was no treachery at the beginning of the struggle
terminating in the death of the captain, that is, the initial
attack was open and fair, the struggle being man to man
between the chief mate and the captain, both unarmed, this
does not necessarily dispose of the question of treachery.
This court has held repeatedly that, even though the
beginning of an attack resulting in the death of the
deceased is free from treachery of any sort, nevertheless it
will be found present if, at the time the fatal blow is struck,
the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself.
While the writer of this opinion holds the view that, where
there is not treachery in the attack which results in the
death of the deceased, there can be no treachery which will
qualify the crime as murder notwithstanding the fact that,
at the time the fatal blow was struck, the deceased was
unarmed and defenseless, but, the court having held so
frequently the contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so
well established. Counsel for the appellant, however,
maintain that the doctrine of the court in this regard was
modified in the case of United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime
(19 Phil. Rep., 164). In that case the deceased was walking
with the two accused in single file in a narrow street, the
deceased being between the other two.
When they were about ninety yards from any house and
while in an obscure place on the railroad track, at about
eight o'clock at night, the deceased was knocked down, and
while down was struck two or three blows in the face and
rendered practically unconscious. While in this unconscious
condition, but still groaning, the two defendants, one taking
him by the head and the other by the feet, carried him
across the embankment, which was alongside the railroad
track, and threw him into a small pond of water, face
downward. The defendants then returned to their house.
The deceased remained in that position until the following
day when his body was found there by the policemen,
Hartpence and Solis, who conducted the body to the
morgue where it was later identified as that of Simeon
Flores by Valentin Franco, a friend and neighbor of the
deceased.
The question arose in that case, under the facts just stated,
whether the act of throwing the deceased into the water
while he was still alive but in a perfectly helpless and
defenseless condition constituted alevosia, and made the
crime murder instead of homicide. It will be noted that the
attack was not treacherously made, that is, begun with
treachery. This the court held; and, therefore, if that
element is to be found at all in the case it must be found
from the fact that the decease was thrown into the water
and drowned while he was unconscious and in a helpless
and defenseless condition. Discussing that question the
court said:
But assuming that the deceased would have recovered from
the effects of the four wounds, if he had not been thrown
into the water, yet we still think that the proofs fail to show
that there was present treachery, as the knocking down of
the deceased, striking him while on the ground, and
throwing him into the water were all done in so short a time
and one movement followed the other in such rapid
succession. constitute one and the same attack. In order
that treachery may be considered as a qualifying
circumstance to raise the classification of the crime, or as
an aggravating circumstance to augment the penalty, it
must be shown that the treacherous acts were present at
and preceded the commencement of the attack which
caused the injury complained of. After the commencement
of such an attack and before its termination an accused
person may have employed means or methods which were
of a treacherous character, and yet such means or methods
would not constitute the circumstance of alevosia. One
continuous attack, such as the one which resulted in the
death of the deceased Flores, cannot be broken up into two
or more parts and made to constitute separate, distinct, and
independent attacks so that treachery may be injected
therein and considered as a qualifying or aggravating
circumstance.
While the writer of this opinion is inclined to agree with the
contention of counsel that the doctrine laid down in this
case is quite different from, if not directly opposed to, that
already stated as, theretofore, the unform holding of this
court, nevertheless the majority of the court being of the
opinion that it was not the intention of the court in the case
just cited to reverse the previous decisions of this court and
to set down a new doctrine, the writer accepts that view,
particularly in the face of the almost unbroken line of
decisions on the subject now to be reffered to. In the case
of United States vs. De Leon (1 Phil. Rep., 163), it appeared The third error assigned charged that the court erred in
that the accused entered the house of the deceased, drew refusing to apply article 11 of the Penal Code in favor of the
their bolos and compelled him to follow them. On arriving at accused. We do not agree with this contention. The personal
a place called Bulutong the deceased was bound and in that qualities and characteristics of the accused are matters
condition murdered. It was held that the fact that the particularly cognizable by the trial court; and the application
accused was bound at the time he was killed, although of this section is peculiarly within the discretion of that
there was no treachery at the beginning of the assault court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
resulting in his death, the qualifying circumstance was library
present. The court said:
There being neither aggravating nor extenuating
From the evidence there appears the qualifying circumstances, the judgment appealed from is reversed and
circumstance of treachery. To show this it is only necessary the accused is hereby sentenced to cadena perpetua. No
to mention the fact that the deceased was bound. costs in this instance. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
The head note to that case says: library

The fact that the deceased was bound while killed EN BANC
constitutes the qualificative circumstance of alevosia and
raises the crime to the degree of murder, . . . . [G.R. Nos. L-31481, L-31482 and L-31483. February
28, 1979.]
The same was held in the case of U. S. vs. Ricafor (1 Phil.
Rep., 173); U. S. vs. Santos (1 Phil. Rep., 222); U. S. vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Abelinde (1 Phil. Rep., 568); U. S. vs. Hinto Santos (2 Phil. v. ERNESTO SARIP alias Poor, MANUEL RAOP alias
Rep., 453); U. S. vs. Jamino (3 Phil. Rep., 102); U. S. vs. Onot, CONDALLA SARIP and DONATO (DUMATO)
Abaigar (2 Phil. Rep., 417); U. S. vs. Gloria (3 Phil. Rep., MABPAN, Accused; ERNESTO SARIP and MANUEL
333); U. S. vs. Gabriel (4 Phil. Rep., 165); U. S. vs. Doon RAOP, defendants whose death sentences are under
(4 Phil. Rep., 249) U. S. vs. Colombro (8 Phil. Rep., 391); automatic review.
U. S. vs. Tupas (9 Phil. Rep., 506); U. S. vs. Nalua and
Kadayum (23 Phil. Rep., 1); U. S. vs. Indanan (24 Phil. Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices (counsel de oficio) for
Rep., 203); U. S. vs. Reyes and De la Cruz (11 Phil. Rep., defendants.
225) chanrobles virtual law library
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor Emmanuel G.
For these reasons we are of the opinion that the crime was
Cleto for Appellee.
committed with treachery and that it was properly
denominated murder instead of
SYNOPSIS
homicide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The trial court convicted Ernesto Sarip and Manuel Raop of
robbery with triple homicide and sentenced each of them to
death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P30,000. The judgment of conviction was based on the
testimony of two eyewitnesses, on Sarip’s confession, on his
plea of guilty, and on Raop’s admission. A co-accused who
also made a confession, with exculpatory allegations,
confirmed appellants’ participation. Their de oficio counsel
cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. Sarip did not
present any evidence, nor attempted to prove any
attenuating circumstances in his favor, nor assailed the due
execution and voluntariness of his extrajudicial confession.
Raop reiterated his admission, but averred that he acted
under duress exercised by Sarip.
On automatic review, it is claimed that Sarip did not
understand the full implication of his plea of guilty because
his counsel and the trial court did not explain to him the
consequences thereof; that Raop acted against his will; and
that the crime of robbery and homicide should be treated
separately since appellants did not take part in the killing.
The Supreme Court held that defendant’s Sarip in entering a
plea of guilty merely ratified his extrajudicial confession
which was corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti
and by the testimonies of the other accused; that Raop’s
claim that he acted under duress is untenable because he
too was armed with a gun and he did not prove that he
acted under compulsion of an irresistible force or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal of greatery
injury; and that is conspiracy all the conspirators are
equally liable for the crime committed.
Judgment affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PLEA OF GUILTY. — No serious
consideration can be accorded to the contention that
accused did not understand the full implication and import
of his plea of guilty because his counsel and the trial court
did not explain to him the consequences of his plea, where
it appears that in pleading guilty accused simply ratified his
extrajudicial confession which was corroborated by
indubitable evidence of the corpus delicti and the due
execution and voluntariness of the confession have not been
assailed.
2. ID.; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; MASTERMIND PRIMARILY
LIABLE. — The accused is responsible for the death of the
three victims where he was the mastermind and co-
conspirator; and knowing that he was the one primarily
liable for the robbery with triple homicide, which the trial
court described as "most atrocious and cold-blooded", he
interposed a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and did not
bother to prove any attenuating circumstances.
3. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES VITIATING DURESS. —
Counsel de oficio argues that Raop acted against his will.
That contention is belied by Raop’s admission that he and
Ernesto are close friends and residents of Barrio Kalilangan.
Raop did not prove that he acted under the compulsion of
an irresistible force or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. His
pretension that he was threatened with a gun his friend,
Ernesto, is not credible because he himself (Raop) was
armed with a rifle.
4. ID.; ID.; CONSPIRATORS EQUALLY LIABLE FOR THE
CRIME COMMITTED. — Counsel’s contention, that the crime
of robbery and homicide should be treated separately and
that only Makadatar Tayao (Mabpan), who is at large,
should be held liable for the killings, is likewise bereft of
merit. The evidence proves that Ernesto Sarip and
Makadatar fired at the inmates of the house before the
clothes and the sewing machine were taken by them.
Makadatar hacked Ciriaco Mision before the robbery was
consummated. It is evident that the killings were
perpetrated on the occasion of the robbery. Since
Macadatar Tayao, Ernesto Sarip and Manuel Raop were
conspirators, Raop is equally liable for the assaults
committed by Makadatar and Sarip.
5. ID.; ID.; PENALTY; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES;
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE BY DEATH. — The
guilt of Ernesto Sarip and Raop has been established
beyond reasonable doubt. Abuse of superiority, dwelling and
nocturnity attended the commission of the robbery with
triple homicide. Even if the mitigating circumstance of plea
of guilty is appreciated in Sarip’s favor, the death penalty
should still be imposed upon him (Arts. 63 and 294(1),
Revised Penal Code).
6. ID.; INDEMNITY; AMOUNT OF. — The trial court failed to
include in the indemnity the value of the stolen articles
which it found to be P1,000. The indemnity for three killings
should be raised from P30,000 to P36,000.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Court of First Instance of Bukidnon in its decision
August 22, 1969 convicted Ernesto Sarip and Manuel Raop
(Raup) of robbery with triple homicide and sentenced each
them to death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Ciriaco Mision, Pamposa Mision and Amparo Mision in the
sum of P30,000 (Criminal Case No. 1591). They did not
from that decision. Their deaths sentences are now under
mandatory review (Sec. 9, Rule 122, Rules of Court).
The lower court also convicted Raop of robbery in band
illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Cases Nos. 1609
and 1611, respectively, and sentenced him to imprison
penalties. Raop did not appeal from the two sentences.
Hence, the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 1609 and 1611
were improperly elevated to this Court which has not
acquired any appellate jurisdiction over the two cases. The
offenses changed in the two cases did not arise out of the
same occurrence, and were not committed on the same
occasion, as the robbery with triple homicide.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
Ernesto Sarip pleaded guilty to the charge of robbery in
band in Criminal Case No. 1609 (wherein Raop was his co-
accused). That offense was committed on April 24, 1966. In
the lower court’s partial decision of November 11, 1968,
Ernesto was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two
years, four months and one day of prision correccional to
eight years and one day of prision mayor and to indemnify
Alfredo Mataya in the sum of P180. He did not appeal from
that decision.
In Criminal Case No. 1591, the case now under review, five
persons were involved, namely, Raop, Ernesto Sarip,
Condalla Sarip, Dumato Mabpan (Madpan) and Macadatar
Tayao Mabpan. Macadatar was not arrested. The four were
tried and after trial, Condalla Sarip and Dumato Mabpan
were acquitted in the lower court’s order of July 15, 1969.
The acquittal was based in part on the affidavit of Ernesto
Sarip, dated August 10, 1967, wherein he swore that
Dumato had no participation in the robbery and that he
(Ernesto) and Raop forced Condalla "at the point of a gun"
to take part in the robbery (Exh. 5).
In said Criminal Case No. 1591, Ernesto Sarip was arraigned
on March 29, 1968. He was assisted by his counsel, Manuel
Valdez. At first, he pleaded not guilty. A few minutes later,
Ernesto told his lawyer that he wanted to plead guilty. His
lawyer manifested to the court that Ernesto wanted to
change his plea. The trial judge, addressing Ernesto, asked
him whether it was true that he wanted to plead guilty. He
replied in the affirmative. So, it was made of record that he
had pleaded guilty with the assistance of his lawyer.
The trial court did not then and there pronounce the
judgment of conviction on Ernesto Sarip. It heard the
evidence the prosecution and the defense. Ernesto was
present throughout the trial and was identified by the
prosecution witnesses. He was represented by a counsel de
oficio who cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. He
did not present any evidence.
Maybe, he realized the futility of presenting any defense
because the prosecution offered in evidence his confession
(Exh. J) dated August 1, 1966 which was taken down by a
Constabulary Sergeant and was sworn to before a special
deputy clerk of court who, like the sergeant, was cross-
examined by Ernesto’s counsel when he testified on the
circumstances under which the oath was administered to
Ernesto.
In that confession, Ernesto stated that Datu Damiano
Madpan, the barrio captain of Malipayon (brother of Dumato
Madpan), convinced him and Raop to rob and liquidate a
certain family in Malipayon (referring to, but not naming,
the Mision family) and that Damiano gave him two
American rifles and a paltik to accomplish that diabolical
mission.
Ernesto revealed in his confession that upon arriving at the
place to be robbed, Makadatar Madpan and Dumato Madpan
took the chickens and carabao under the house while he
and Raop stood guard at the stairs and that Makadatar and
Dumato assaulted the occupants of the house and Dumato
took their personal belongings and the sewing machine.
That version does not dovetail in all details with the story
told by the prosecution witnesses. But the decisive fact is
the Ernesto in his confession admitted that he participated
in the robbery and that he was a co-conspirator of Raop
Makadatar.chanrobles law library
It is now feebly contended by Ernesto’s counsel de officio
that Ernesto did not understand the full implication and
import of his plea of guilty because his counsel and the trial
court did not explain to him the consequences of his plea.
No serious consideration can be accorded to that contention
because Ernesto Sarip in pleading guilty simply ratified his
extra-judicial confession which was corroborated by
indubitable evidence of the corpus delicti. The due execution
and voluntariness of that confession have not been assailed.
As already stated, the death sentence was imposed Ernesto
Sarip in the lower court’s decision of August 22, 1969. The
judgment of conviction was based on the testimonies two
eyewitnesses, Ernesto’s confession and plea of guilty, the
confession of Condalla Sarip and Raop’s statement (Exh. G).
The prosecution’s evidence shows that at about eleven
o’clock in the evening of Saturday, April 30, 1966, Ernesto
Sarip, Manuel Raop, Condalla Sarip (Ernersto’s first cousin)
and Makadatar Tayao Madpan (Madpan) were in the vicinity
of the house of the spouses Ciriaco Mision and Pamposa
Mision located at Barrio Malipayon, Pangantucan, Bukidnon.
Ernesto Sarip, Makadatar and Raop had firearms. They
made known their presence by means of gunshots.
Ernesto Sarip and Makadatar, who was wearing a turban
went under the house and took the chickens which they
gave to Raop and Condalla Sarip. The cackling of the
chickens awakened Diosdado Mision, 12, son of Ciriaco, and
Loreto Palanog 26, a farm helper, who were upstairs.
Through the bamboo slats of the floor, they pepped and saw
what the intruders were doing under the house.
The intruders wanted to get also the carabao which was
inside the coral under the house. Makadatar asked Ciriaco in
a loud voice to open the corral but the latter kept silent.
Makadatar, who was armed with a gun and a bolo, and
Ernesto Sarip destroyed the corral, took the carabao and
gave it to Raop and Condalla who brought it to the plowed
field nearby.
Makadatar and Ernesto Sarip (tall and short, respectively)
returned to the house and asked Ciriaco to give them rice
and money but the latter replied that he did not have any.
Angered by Ciriaco’s refusal to comply with their demand,
Makadatar and Ernesto fired several shots directed at the
inmates of the house. Ciriaco, who was lying on the door,
was not hit but his wife, Pamposa, and daughter, Amparo,
were wounded.
Makadatar went up the stairs, cut the string which tied the
door, pushed the shutter, and, on seeing Ciriaco lying on
the floor face down, hacked him to death. Ernesto Sarip,
armed with a rifle, followed Makadatar and went up the
house. Makadatar and Ernesto Sarip took clothes and a
sewing machine. The carabao was later released by the
robbers.
After the intruders had left, two inmates of the house were
found dead. Ciriaco, 37, suffered an incised wound, eleven
three inches, across his back, two stab wounds also in the
back and a lacerated wound on the chin. His wife, Pamposa,
35, sustained an entrance gunshot wound in the right infra-
clavicular region. The bullet penetrated her right lung and
exited on her back. Amparo Mision, a daughter of the said
spouses (who was older than Diosdado), sustained a mortal
wound in the back and died in the hospital.
The participation of Ernesto Sarip and Raop in the robbery
was confirmed by Condalla Sarip, a 22-year old farmer, who
also made a confession, with exculpatory allegations, which
was sworn to before the municipal judge on August 1, 1966.
Condalla declared that in the afternoon of April 30, 1966 he
encountered Ernesto Sarip, Raop and Makadatar in Barrio
Macatol. They were armed. They forced him to join them in
robbing Mision’s house in Barrio Malipayon several
kilometers away. Condalla was Ernesto’s friend.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
The group drank the liquor called "Kulafu" before
proceeding via a trail to Mision’s house. Condalla said that
on arriving near Mision’s house, he was stationed by
Ernesto Sarip near the banana plants where he (Condalla)
received the chickens and carabao taken by Ernesto, Raop
and Makadatar. While Raop guarded Condalla, Ernesto and
Makadatar took clothes and the sewing machine from the
house. Later, they released the carabao because it impeded
their flight from the scene of the crime.
Diosdado Mision testified that before April 30, 1966, he saw
Ernesto Sarip at Barrio Malipayon with Muslim companions.
Loreto Palanog had also seen Sarip in the cockpit prior to
incident. Diosdado and Loreto knew Ernesto before the
robbery was committed.
On the other hand, defendant Raop, 25, in his sworn
statement taken on June 6, 1966 by a Constabulary
corporal and in his testimony, admitted his participation the
robbery but he averred that he acted under dures exercised
by his friend, Ernesto Sarip.
Raop testified that at six o’clock in the morning of April 30,
1966, his friend, Ernesto Sarip, went to his house at Barrio
Kalilangan and requested him to accompany Ernesto to the
house of the latter’s Aunt located at Barrio Lampanosan. At
first Raop refused but when Sarip allegedly threatened him
pointing his rifle at Raop, Raop consented to go with him.
Ernesto gave him a homemade gun called "paliuntod." They
arrived at Lampanosan at four o’clock in the afternoon.
Ernesto then told him that they were going to Barrio
Malipayon. On the way, they met Condalla Sarip.
Ernesto asked Condalla to accompany them to Malipayon.
Condalla refused but Ernesto poked his gun at him and he
agreed to go along with them. At Barrio Kitalo, they met
Makadatar Tayao (Mabpan) who joined of them. The four of
them arrived at Barrio Malipayon at about eleven o’clock in
the evening.
They proceeded to Mision’s house. Ernesto asked Mision to
open the door of his house. Mision refused. Ernesto asked
him to come down. Mision likewise refused because he was
scared. Upon Ernesto’s order, Makadatar took Mision’s
chickens and carabao under the house.
Ernesto allegedly reproached Raop for doing nothing. So,
Raop got hold of the carabao, took it to the place near the
banana plants, and stayed there with Condalla. Raop
allegedly advised Ernesto and Makadatar not to kill any
person inside Mision’s house. Ernesto did not heed Raop’s
advice. After Ernesto and Makadatar entered the house,
Raop and Condalla, who carried the chickens, left the place.
Raop let loose the carabao. In the distance, they heard
gunshots being fired inside Mision’s house. Later, Ernesto
and Makadatar overtook Raop and Condalla. Ernesto
allegedly warned Raop that he would be killed if he squealed
to the authorities.
Counsel de oficio, who filed through his assistant a hardly
legible typewritten brief (a practice which should not be
encouraged), contends that the trial court erred in holding
that Ernesto Sarip was responsible of the deaths of the
three times. That contention cannot be sustained. Ernesto
was mastermind and was a co-conspirator. Knowing that he
was the one primarily liable for the robbery with triple
homicide, which the trial court described as "most atrocious
and cold-blooded", he interposed a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere did not bother to prove any attenuating
circumstances.
With respect to Raop, it is clear that his version of the
robbery with homicide does not exculpate him at all. His
counsel de oficio argues that Raop acted against his well.
That contention is belied by Raop’s admission that he and
Ernesto are close friends (89 tsn July 16, 1959; No. 4, Exh.
J). The two were residents of Barrio Kalilangan. Raop did
not prove, that he acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force or under impulse of an uncontrollable fear
of an equal or greater injury. His pretension that he was
threatened with a gun by his friends, Ernesto, is not credible
because he himself (Raop) was armed with a rifle (Exh. E).
Counsel’s third contention, that the crime of robbery and
homicide should be treated separately and that only
Makadatar Tayao (Mabpan), who is at large, should be held
liable for the killings, is likewise bereft of merit.
The evidence proves that Ernesto Sarip and Makadatar fired
at the inmates of the house before the clothes and the
sewing machine were taken by them. Makadatar hacked
Ciriaco Mision before the robbery was consummated. It is
evident that the killings were perpetrated on the occasion of
the robbery. Since Makadatar, Ernesto Sarip and Raop were
conspirators, Raop is equally liable for the assaults
committed by Makadatar and Ernesto.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library
We are satisfied that the guilt of Ernesto Sarip and Raop has
been established beyond reasonable doubt. Abuse of
superiority, dwelling and nocturnity attended the
commission of the robbery with triple homicide. Even if the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty is appreciated in
Sarip’s favor, the death penalty should still be imposed CONCEPCION JR., J.:
upon him (Arts. 63 and 294[1], Revised Penal Code).
In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of
The trial court failed to include in the indemnity the value of Camarines Sur, accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy
the stolen articles which it found to be P1,000. The Marantal y Londete were charged with tile crime of Robbery with
indemnity for the three killings should be raised from Double Rape, committed as follows:
P30,000 to P36,000.
That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 1591, the death penalty Barangay of Magsaysay, Municipality of Libmanan,
imposed by the trial court on Ernesto Sarip and Manuel Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
Raop (Raup) is affirmed and they are ordered to pay the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
solidarily to the heirs of the Mision spouses the sum of named accused, together with John Doe, Jose Doe,
P1,000 as the value of the articles taken during the robbery Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe, and Ricky
and P36,000 to the heirs of the three victims or P12,000 for Doe, who are still at large, armed with firearms,
each set of heirs. Cost de oficio. conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain and rob,
taking advantage of nighttime to better accomplish
SO ORDERED.
their purpose, did then and there were Ifully
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and use
Republic of the Philippines violence and intimidation upon the person of Elias
SUPREME COURT Monge by tying his two hands and the hands of the
Manila members of his fully and on the occasion hereof,
while they were made lying flat on the floor, the
EN BANC herein accused take, rob and carry away, without the
consent of said Elias Monge, owner thereof, of the
G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984 following properties, to wit:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, One camera with trademark Olympus worth P400.00
vs.
EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL y Two birthstones rings worth 700.00
LONDETE, accused-appellants.
One wedding ring with name MONDING 100.00
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
One pair of earrings heartshape 100.00
Reynaldo Herrera for accused-appellants.
Two pieces of necklace solid worth 400.00

Two pieces of mosquito net 110.00

 Three pieces of blankets color orange and spotted
200.00
Three men pants and also one cut of cloth 235.50
One beach towel, with decoration 35.00
One aluminum Reynold kettle 30.00
One One caserola 15.00
Two pieces of pillow case 12.00
Two cans of rice 70.00
One flashlight Eveready two batteries 30.00
TOTAL P10,619.50
all in the total amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P10,619.50), Philippine Currency, to
the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in
the aforementioned amount. That on the occasion
thereof, the abovenamed accused with lewd design,
and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual intercourse with Monica Monge, a
virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina Monge, all
against their will. 1
Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and
Jimmy Marantal y Londete entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
charged.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment adverse to the
accused, the dispositive portion of which read:
ACCORDINGLY, we find the guilt of the accused
Eustaquio Loreno has been established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby find him
GUILTY of Robbery with Double Rape, penalized by
Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
There being present aggravating circumstances in
the commission of the offense, Eustaquio Loreno is
hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the
maximum penalty provided by law.
Likewise, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused
Jimmy Marantal has been established beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby finds him GUILTY of
the crime of ROBBERY penalized under Par. 5 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Jimmy
Marantal is sentenced to indeterminate penalty
ranging from TWO (2) YEARS and ELEVEN (11)
DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, in
view of the aggravating circumstances present.
Said accused Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal
shall indemnify jointly and severally Elias Monge in
the sum of P10,619.50 without subsidiary
imprisonment, In addition, Eustaquio Loreno shall
indemnify Monica Monge and Cristina Monge in the
sum of P10,000.00 each or a total of P20,000.00 as
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment.
The accused herein shall pay one-half of the costs
each. 2
The facts of the case as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief,
areas follows:
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain
Elias Monge was at his house located at barrio
Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his
two young daughters, namely: Monica Monge,
single, then 14 years old, and Cristina Monge,
married, then 22 years old, were preparing to attend
the dance to be held in the barrio proper that
evening. But they had to wait for a while because his
wife, Beata Monge, was still changing the diaper of
baby Rachel Baybayon, four-month old daughter of
Cristina Monge. The other occupants present in the
house that evening were his sons, Mario, then 11
years old, and Nilo, then 13 years old, and their farm
helper, also staying with them, by the name of
Francisco Fable. Cristina was then vacationing at
her parents' house. Her husband, Raymundo
Baybayon, was in Manila (pp. 2-5, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979
AM: pp, 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM: pp. 2-4, tsn, Oct.
19, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 2-
3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he
was at the balcony of said house, Francisco Fable
saw at first four men with flashlights approaching.
When they came near, he heard one of them call
Elias Monge saving that there was a letter from the
chief hepe). Fable called Elias Monge who was in
the sala, informing him that there was a letter from
the chief. Two of the visitors, one wearing red
clothes and the other in dark sweater. came up the
house. When Elias Monge went out to the balcony
the man in dark sweater handed to him the letter.
Because it was dark to read it, Elias Monge invited
the man in dark sweater to come inside the sala.
The other man in red clothes posted himself near the
post of the balcony (pp. 4-5, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM:
pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp. 4-9, tsn, Oct. 22,
1979 AMOUNT pp. 4-7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp.
4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
When be and the man in dark sweater were inside
the sala Elias Monge asked his daughter, Monica to
fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias
Monge and Monica read the following: "Kami mga
NPA", which caused Monica to run to her mother,
seized with fear, informing her what she came to
know about camme visitors. Cristina Morgagor came
attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo but she
was held back by the man in dark sweater who then
announced to all those inside not to make any
scandal. kitchen Elias Monge turned to look at him
the man in dark sweater poked his gun at him, and
ordered all those inside the on the floor (pp. 13-14,
tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 Pvl p. 7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp.
4 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 4, 13, 16, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 PM)
In the meantime outside at the balcony the man in
red clothe asked Fable for a glass of water arid the
latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of later,
but Mario did not obey and instead went to the sala
Hence, fabie himself outside inside the house to the
the glass of water. But, as he went inside the sala,
he noticed the man in red clothes following him. As
Fabie reached the door to the sala, the man in red
clothes poked his gun on Fabie's back and pointed a
sharp instrument on his neck and then he wish
pushed to go inside the sala. Once inside the sala,
which Aras lighted, Fable saw and recognized the
man in red clothes these to Estaquio loreno. Also
Elias Monge and his two daughters, Monica and
Cristina, saw and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as
he entered the sala as one of the companions of the
man in dark sweater. All tile occupants of the house
were ordered by the man in dark sweater and
Loreno to remain lying flat on their stomachs on the
floor (pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 10-12, tsn,
Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 1-8, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp.
21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5, 17-18, tsn, Oct.
29, 1979 PM p. 5, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed
loreno to tie all their victims on the floor. Loreno tied
them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the
baby's hammock (duyan) and got the ropes with
which he and Loreno used to reinforce in tying the
victim's hands together behind their backs.
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed
Loreno to go downstairs and drive the barking dog
away. Loreno held Fable and brought him
downstairs to drive the barking dog away (pp, 8-9,
tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM).
On reaching the corner of the house below the
flashlight used by Loreno happened to focus on the
person of Jimmy Marantal. Fable immediately
recognized Jimmy Marantal as one of the visitors
who remained on the ground as lookouts. Jimmy
Marantal beamed his flashlight on the face of Fable,
and seeing the latter, he kicked him (Fabie) on the
right side of his rib which caused him to fall on the
ground. Marantal kicked Fable who managed to roll
on his side and was hit on his left thigh. After a
while, Loreno lifted Fable bodily from the ground,
and brought am back upstairs (pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 19,
1979 AM pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
After Loreno and Fable returned to the sala, the man
in dark sweater got hold of Monica Monge and
dragged her up to a room located above the
balcony. She tried to resist but she was then still
tied, Inside the room, Monica was asked to reveal
the whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She
said there was none. He ransacked the room but
found none. The man in dark sweater then seized
Monica and forcibly removed her pants. Monica
resisted and shouted at her parents for help. He
boxed and slapped her. Despite her struggle, he was
able to remove her panty and then made her he on
the floor near the bed. After undressing himself, he
forcibly went on top of her. She kept on struggling
and shouting for help, but he succeeded in inserting
his organ into her vagina. She felt pain. He
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She
could not do anything to stop him from
consummating his lust as she was still tied. When he
was through with her, she noticed blood in her
private part (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn,
Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 5, 14, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM
pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Below in the sala, Monica Monge's parents and
others heard her shouts for help and the struggle
she put up inside the room. Hearing her shouts for
help, Loreno menacingly pointed his gun at them,
telling them not to rise if they wanted to live, Then
Loreno brought Beata Monge first to the masters
room and then to the teacher's room. During these
two occasions, he forced Beata Monge to open the
aparador and the trunk respectively, with her keys,
and he got their contents, which he brought to the
sala, holding on to Beata Monge who remained tied.
All the things he got from the two rooms were
poured on the floor of the sala (pp. 7, 9, tsn, Oct. 19,
1979 AM pp. 10-1 1, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 7-13,
tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM
pp. 17-19, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the
sala, dragging along Monica Monge whose hair was
dishevelled and was crying, and he made her joined
the others on the floor of the sala. He reached for a
can of pineapple j nice from the aparador and the
sala and drank its contents. Not long thereafter, he
turned his attention to Cristina Monge, and he
dragged her to the room which was then rented by
school teacher Miss Olitoquit (who was then in Naga
City). Inside the room, the man in dark sweater
forced his lewd designs on her but she resisted and
struggled although her hands were still tied behind
her back. He boxed her, hitting her on her right eye
which caused her to lose consciousness. He then
proceeded to satisfy his lust on her. When she
regained consciousness, the man in dark sweater
returned her shorts. She then realized that he had
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (p.
6, 17-19, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 19,
1979 AM pp. 11-12, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 6, 14-
15, 18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge
were still inside the teacher's room, a third man
entered the sala, and he told Loreno to cover their
victims on the floor with a mat. Loreno found instead
a piece of lawanit with which they covered their
victims. The third man proceeded to the kitchen, and
when he returned to the sala, he was bringing along
some rice. Then, a fourth man entered the sala and
he asked from Elias Monge for a cigarette. Elias
Monge stood up and told him to get it from his
pocket as he was still tied. Reacting to Monge's
reply, the fourth man boxed him, hitting him on his
breast and solar plexus which caused him to fall on
the floor. Then Loreno asked Elias Monge to
accompany him to the house of a nearby neighbor.
On reaching the balcony, Elias Monge protested and
refused to accompany Loreno who then held Elias
Monge by the neck, pointing his gun at him. Beata
Monge protested, telling her husband not to go
along. loreno desisted from his plan to go to the
nearby neighbor's house, Elias Monge did not
recognize the Identities of both the third and fourth
men (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16-17,
25-26, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 12-13, tsn, Oct. 22,
1979 AM pp. 7, 14-15, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina
Monge was earlier brought by the man in dark
sweater, and he found her still lying on the floor.
Loreno embraced her trying to kiss her and touch
her private parts. One of the malefactors on the
ground called those upstairs to hurry because a man
was approaching. Loreno then released Cristina
Monge and told her to return to the sala to
breastfeed her daughter who was continuously
crying. Thereafter, the malefactors went down from
the house one by one, bringing along all the things
they robbed from their victims. The man in dark
sweater returned to the sala and touched the thighs
of Cristina Monge, who was already wearing her
shorts, and he told them not to tell anybody what
happened to them, otherwise he will kill them. And
then all the malefactors left the place (pp. 15-16, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16, 18, 19-20, tsn, Oct. 29,
1979 PM).
Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito
who was On the ground near the fence of the house
calling him, asking if he was going to the dancehall
Elias Monge replied from upstairs that he was not
feeling well, and Agapito left. EUSTAQUIO Monge
was able to untie himself, and then he also untied
the others. Fable then revealed to him that earlier
when he had gone down with Loreno, he (Fabie)
saw and recognized Jimmy Marantal as among
those left on the ground as lookout for the group that
had just robbed them. Cristina and Monica Monge
also told their father that they were abused by the
man in dark sweater when they were brought inside
the rooms. For the rest of the night, they remained
on guard and could hardly sleep (pp. 15-16, 17, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 10-11, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM
p. 7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they
were robbed of their following personal properties:
jewelry valued at Pl,000.00' two mosquito nets,
P70.00; three bets, P200.00; one caldero of rice,
P30.00; one reversible jacket, P40.00; three
chickens, P30.00; one camera, P400.00; one beach
towel, P35.00; cash in the amount of P6,500,00; and
several others, all in the total of P10,305.00, more or
less (pp. 4-6, 8, 14-17, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979; pp. 16-17,
tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM).
Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno
because the latter's daughter married a member of
the youth organization in the barrio when he (Fabie)
was its president. Elias Monge had already known
Loreno whose occupation was catching wild pigs,
and the latter used to place bobby traps in his
(Monge's) place to catch pigs, during which
occasions Loreno usually slept in his house, Monica
Monge and Cristina Monge also had already known
Loreno because his daughter married a neighbor
near their house. Monica often saw Loreno traverse
the playground of the Magsaysay Elementary School
where he was studying. Fable had also known
Jimmy Marantal because the latter often attended
dances held by the barrio youth organization, and he
(Marantal) even married one of its members, He had
engaged Marantal in conversations many times p. 3,
tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM
pp. 2-3, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 7-8, tsn,
Oct. 18-1979 AM pp. 2-3, 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979
PM pp. 2, 8-10, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Despite the revelation of her daughters to him that
they were sexually abused that fateful evening, Elias
Monge forced himself to report the following day,
Sunday the robbery-rape incident at the PC
detachment in Sipocot, but there was no one to talk
there. So he proceeded to the PC headquarters at
Camp Tara, bringing along the ropes and rattan
which were used by the malefactors in tying him and
his family during the robbery-rape incident. He was
given a written recommendation from the PC to the
hospital with instructions to have himself and his
daughter Monica be physically examined. Cristina
Monge was informed that there was no need for her
to submit for physical examination because she was
already married. (pp. 18-19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p.
18; tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM p. 8, tsn., Oct. 29, 1979
PM).
Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the
investigation section of the 243rd PC Company,
stationed at Tara, Camarines Sur, investigated on
January 10, 1978 the robbery-rape incident. He was
informed by Barangay Captain Elias Monge that his
house was robbed and his two daughters were
raped by the robbers in the evening of January 7,
1978 in their house and that he (Monge) was able to
Identify two of the robbers, mentioning their names
as Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal of Barrio
Calabnigan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. After Sgt.
del Socorro and his team made an ocular inspection
of the place on that same day, they proceeded to
barrio Calabnigan where they picked up Eustaquio
Loreno and Jimmy Marantal and brought them to the
PC camp. At the PC camp on January 17, 1978, the
two suspects were duly Identified upon confrontation
as two of the robbers by the above-mentioned barrio
captain, his daughters Monica and Cristina Monge,
and their helper Fable. During the investigation, the
two suspects refused to give their written
statements. Thus, Sgt. del Socorro was able to
secure the written statements of Elias Monge,
Francisco Fable, Monica Monge, and Cristina
Monge about the robbery-rape incident. Upon being
Identified both said suspects told their victims ff they
could just talk and settle the matter, but Elias Monge
replied that what they did that evening was an
oppression (kaapihan) against him and his family,
The two suspects retorted that it was up to him (pp.
19-21, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 18-20, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 PM pp. 1-5, 6, 8- 12, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 AM).
Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the
Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital at Naga City,
examined Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-
Ray examination's result was negative. But the
doctor found him to have sustained an external
injury which he classified as "resolving hematoma,
right cestal region" a close wound, already spread
 out but and the process of healing, located on the
right side of the middle portion of the thorax. He
gave Elias Monge a prescription for anti-infection to
stop the bleeding as there was still slight bleeding
and to subside the swelling. Afterwards he gave the
corresponding medical certificate to Elias Monge
(Exhibit "A"; pp. 22-26, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM p. 19,
tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the
same provincial hospital examined Monica Monge
on January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any
fresh wound on her body, but examining her hymen,
she found fresh and incomplete lacerations of said
hymen at 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock locations and,
inserting her index finger inside her patient's sex
orifice, lt easily admitted her forefinger. She had the
patient's vagina smeared for spermatozoa but none
was found after laboratory examination The doctor
observed that the lacerations did not reach the base
of the hymen but the edges of the lacerated portions
were still reddish and slightly swollen. The doctor
opined that the lacerations could have been caused
by the forcible penetration of a male's penis into the
patient's vagina. The doctor further expeled that the
laceration of the hymen heals after five days. She
also expeled that male spermatozoa stays inside the
female vagina at the most for 72 hours. She stated
that, admitting there was orgasm during the forcible
sexual intercourse, any sperm must have already
disappeared when she examined Monica Monge on
January 10, 1978 which was already beyond 72
hours since she was raped in the evening of January
7, 1978 (pp. 26-28, 31, 33-34, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979
AM; Exhibit "B"). 3
Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they
acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They
admitted that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of
January 7, 1978, 4 but they were only forced by a man wearing black
sweater and his five companions who claimed to be members of the
New People's Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat
that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would be killed.
We, however, find the contention untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like
one who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not
act with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a
mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of Appellee's Brief. death or serious bodily harm if the
act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The
compulsion must be of Such a character as to leave no opportunity
to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 5
A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as
summarized in their joint brief (pp. 3-10), showed that they admitted
their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and
rape against Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further
established were facts inconsistent with appellant's claim of having
acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, to wit:
1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a
short firearm when he and the man in dark sweater
went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the
house, Loreno pointed the gun to the victims which
enabled the malefactors to ransack the house (p. 38,
tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 PM
2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark
sweater reached the balcony, Loreno positioned
himself next to the post in the balcony, while the
man in dark sweater delivered the letter to Elias
Monge. Loreno admitted that, without prior
instructions, he immediately positioned himself near
 the post of the balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an act which
showed his voluntary participation in the criminal
acts.
3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with
rattan and thereafter, with ropes of the hammock.
Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who
furnished the rattan which he got from inside the
house (pp. 14-15, tsn, Id.).
4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting
for help from inside the room where she was earlier
dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno's
immediate reaction was to point his gun to the
victims who were then lying on the floor, telling them
not to rise if they wanted to live (p. 38, tsn.,  Id.).
The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio
Loreno brought Beata Monge to the master's room and the teacher's
room where he made her open the trunk and the "aparador"  with her
keys and got the contents which he brought and poured on the floor
of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and
assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in dark
sweater consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the teacher's
room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on the floor, Loreno
embraced her and tried to kiss and touch her private parts.
When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fable went downstairs to
drive the barking dog away, the flashlight of Loreno happened to be
focused on the face of Jimmy Marantal who in turn beamed his
flashlight on the approaching Fable. Upon seeing Fable, Jimmy
Marantal kicked the former twice causing him (Fabie) to fall to the
ground. Marantal's reaction towards Fable was due to the fact that
Fable had recognized him and the blows which he gave to Fable
who was still tied at the moment was to serve as a warning to Fable
not to report his presence and participation in the robbery-rape
incident to the authorities.
Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below,
must have heard the shouts of Monica Monge for help and must
have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his
two companions who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or
guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his companions effective means and
encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There
was no showing that Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of protest or did
an act to prevent the commission of the crimes.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy
of the appellants. The foregoing acts, though separately performed
from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their
community of interest and concert of criminal design with their
unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy without the
need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself. 6 Conspiracy may be
inferred and proven by the acts of the accused themselves and when
said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and community
of interest, which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to
establish the existence of conspiracy, 7 and the degree of actual
participation petition by each of the conspirators is
immaterial. 8 Conspiracy having been establish, all the conspirators
are liable as co-penpals regardless of the extent and character of
their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is
the act of all. 9
The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was combat muted
on January 7, 1978, by more than three persons, all armed, 10 in
conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating
circumstances of band, nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D.
767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by death. But, for
lack of the required number of votes, the accused should suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, AFFIRMED, with the modification that the accused cused
JIMMY MARANTAL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. With costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Uncontrollable fear
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1481            February 17, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
LIBERATO EXALTACION, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Alberto Barretto for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the
court of that province an information charging Liberato Exaltacion
and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in that they,
subsequently to the 4th day of November, 1901, willfully and illegally
bound themselves to take part in a rebellion against the Government
of the United States in these Islands, swearing allegiance to the
Katipunan Society, the purpose of which was to overthrow the said
Government by force of arms, this against the statute in the case
made and provided.
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor
of Bulacan, testified under oath that the two defendants were
arrested in the month of March, 1903, the police some days before
having captured a number of documents in the encampment of one
Contreras, as so-called general of bandits, situated at a place called
Langca, of the town of Meycauayan, among which documents
appeared the papers now on pages 2 and 3 of the record, signed by
the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who recognized the said
documents when they were exhibited to them; that the said
defendants stated to the witness that they had signed the said
documents under compulsion; that the purpose of the Katipunan
Society was to obtain the independence of the Philippines; that this
statement was made in the house of the parish priest of Meycauayan
in the presence of Exequiel Casas and Fernando Nieto. The latter,
upon their examination as witnesses, testified to the same facts,
stating that the defendants told Governor Tecson that they had
signed the said documents under fear of death at the hands of the
thieves by whom they had been captured. The witness Casas, the
municipal president of Meycauayan, testified that he held office as
such in place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was
kidnapped in the month of October, 1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the
second July 17, 1902, were written in Tagalog, and contain an oath
taken in the name of God, and a covenant on the part of the
subscribers to carry out the superior orders of the Katipunan, and
never disobey them until their death in the defense of the mother
country. The two accused, under oath, testified to having signed the
said documents and alleged that they did so under compulsion and
force while they were held as captives by the thieves; that the
defendant Tanchinco was captured in the fields one day when he
was going to work on his farm by three armed men, unknown to him,
who asked him if he was an agent or friend of President Testa, and
upon his replying in the negative they compelled him in view of his
denial to sign a document, now on page 3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact
that he was captured at a place called Kaibiga in the township of
Novaliches, and that on the day following his release, having been
unable to pay the $300 which was demanded of him, he reported to
the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant Liberato Exaltacion
under oath testified that he was captured near Meycauayan by five
persons, unknown, dressed as policemen and armed with guns or
revolvers; that these men bound him and took him into the forest and
there compelled him by threats of death to sign the documents now
on page 2 of the record; that thereupon they allowed him to go upon
promise to return. This defendant testified that Antero Villano and
Tomas Rivera saw him while on the road in the hands of the thieves.
Both the accused testified that as soon as they were released they
presented themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the judgment entered herein will be furnished him for his information and
presence of witnesses, and subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, guidance. So ordered.
a lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him the fact that they had
been captured. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Manila
Ferrer, and Hipolito de Leon — of whom the last two were present
when Tanchinco appeared before Senor Testa, the president of EN BANC
Meycauayan, and reported to him what had happened to him — all
testified to the same fact and corroborated the statements of the G.R. No. L-13025           December 29, 1959
accused with respect to their capture and their subsequent report to
President Testa and to the witness Morales.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents TEODULO ROGSDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
above referred to, signed by the accused, is not sufficient to prove
the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition upon them of the
penalty inflicted by the judgment of the court below. Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for
appellee.
Alfredo G. Fernando for appellant Teodoro Rogado.
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were Angel C. Facundo for the appellants.
kidnapped by brigands who belonged to the Contreras band, and
that they signed the said documents under compulsion and while in
captivity, relieve them from all criminal liability from the crime of
rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct of the defendants
in presenting themselves first to the local president of Meycauayan
and subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of the Bulacan BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Government Volunteers, as soon as they were released by the
bandits is corroborative of their testimony, and is the best On September 25, 1956, Teodulo Togado, alias Commander Sulit,
demonstration of their innocence. This conclusion is not overcome Isaac Orenia, alias Commander Lawin, Domingo Golfo, alias Eser,
by the trifling discrepancy between the testimony of the witness Cresencio Arsenal, alias Sako, Pedro Merin, alias Abling, Francisco
Yusay and that of the defendant Tanchinco nor the fact the Racoma, alias Maneng, Pio Mercurio, alias Abling, Francisco
Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he was captured Racoma, alias Rolando, Nemesio Arsolacia, alias Noli, and Conrado
or that on which he appeared before President Testa. Devesa, alias Donato, were charged with murder before the Court of
First Instance of Laguna for killing of one Salvador Areza. They all
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act pleaded not guilty.
No. 292 not having been established at the trial beyond a reasonable
doubt, we are of the opinion that the judgment below must be During the trial and after several witnesses for the prosecution have
reversed and the defendants acquitted with the costs de oficio. The testified, Francisco Racoma and Conrado Devesa were excluded
judge below will be informed of this decision and a copy of the from the information upon motion of the fiscal to be utilized as
government witnesses. Later, upon motion also of the fiscal, the
charge was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence with respect to
accused Nemesio Arsolacia, Maximo Cerebo and Pedro Merin. Then
counsel for the remaining accused filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the killing of the deceased was accomplished by them in
furtherance of the huk movement, but the motion was denied.
Upon resumption of the trial, counsel for Teodulo Rogado and Pio
Mercurio moved for separate trial on the ground that their defense is
incompatible with the defense of their co-accused, which motion was
granted by the trial court. And when both parties have submitted the
case for decision, the trial court found the accused Rogado, Orenia,
Golfeo and Arsenal guilty as principals of the crime charged and
sentenced them to suffer the supreme penalty of death, while it
found Pio Mercurio guilty merely as accomplice and sentenced him
to the penalty of from 8 years and 21 days of prision mayor  as
minimum to 14 years 19 months and 21 days of reclusion
temporal as maximum, with the corresponding accessory penalties
provided for by law. Each of the four principals was also ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000.00 and the
accomplice in the amount of P2,000.00, and all to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.
Pio Mercurio having failed to file his brief, this case is before this
Court only for the review of the decision rendered against the
accused Rogado, Orenia, Golfeo and Arsenal which imposes upon
them the penalty of death.
On July 12, 1956, Salvador Areza, a farmer residing in Lilio, Laguna,
left his house carrying with him a bolo on lots scabbard to gather
firewood in his farm in barrio Bubukal. When he failed to return home
that day, his wife Lydia Nudal went out to search for him. She was
accompanied by some armed men, the mayor, and a sanitary health
officer, and after a brief search, they found the decapitated body of
her husband in an uninhabited place in Bubukal about half kilometer
away from the road. The gruesome find revealed that Areza's head
was totally severed from his body with his hands tied together. The
health officer, Dr. Dominador L. Gomez, found the body to be in state
of decomposition, which led him to conclude that the deceased must
have died three to five days prior to his discovery. Areza's bolo and
his scabbard were also found near his body.
It appears that on July 12, 1956, Teodulo Rogado, alias Commander
Sulit, Isaac Orenia, alias Commander Lawin, Domingo
Golfeo, alias Eser Cresencio Arsenal, alias Sako, Pedro
Merin, alias Nestor, Maximo Cerebo, alias Maneng, Pio
Mercurio, alias Abling, Nemesio Arsolacia, alias Noli, Francisco
Racoma, alias Rolando, and Conrado Devesa, alias Donato, were on
their way from barrio Sta. Lucia, Nagcarlan, to the municipality of
Lilio, Laguna. They lost their way, and as they were looking for
someone from whom they should get information as to their
whereabouts they met Salvador Areza whom Racoma and Deveza
approached. Upon their inquiry, Areza informed them that they were
in barrio Bubukal, municipality of Lilio; that there was an army camp
stationed nearby; and that the soldiers occasionally go on patrol to
the barrios.
The information was reported to commander Sulit (Rogado) who in
turn ordered that Areza be brought to him. After talking with him,
Rogado asked Areza to lead the way for them, but Areza refused
saying that he had much work to do, and besides he had a carabao
with him. after a brief talk with Orenia, alias Commander Lawin,
rogado told Racoma that they were taking along Areza and that if he
should refuse, he should be tied, which instruction Racoma relayed
to his two companions, Merin and arsenal, telling them to be
prepared in case Areza would give them a fight. Thereupon, Racoma
approached Areza and asked if he could barrow from him his bolo.
Areza obliged. When Areza refused to go with them, Pio Mercurio
dragged him along, and as he refused, Golfeo struck him with the
butt of his gun.
After walking a short distance, Mercurio tied Areza's hands behind
him. Areza protested telling Mercurio that he had not done anything
wrong, whereupon Golfeo gave him a fist blow on his stomach. After
walking some distance, a command to stop was heard and so they
stopped. Racoma then approached Rogado and told him that they
should release Areza at night but rogado told him that Areza should
be killed and when Racoma returned to the group he found that
Areza was being assaulted by Orenia and Golfeo. At this moment,
Racoma heard Rogado saying, in the vernacular, "Kill him now so we
can proceed." Areza was then taken to a secluded place quite far
from the road, which was thick forest about 20 or 30 meters away
from the group, and there Golfeo ordered Areza to lie down. With
Areza's bolo and ignoring the plea for mercy of their victim, Golfeo
gave him a blow on the neck as he lay face down and with his hands
still tied behind. With the same bolo, Arsenal also gave the victim
another blow on the neck which completely severed the head from
the body.
On September 20, 1956, Pedro Merin, a member of the group who
surrendered to the authorities, made a sworn statement before the
Justice of the Peace of Nagcarlan, Laguna, stating therein that
Salvador Areza was killed by Ezer and Sako upon order of
Commander Sulit. Domingo Golfeo also made a sworn statement
before the justice of the Peace of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting his
participation in the killing of Areza upon order of Commander Sulit.
On September 21, 1956, Cresencio Arsenal also made a written
statement before the Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting that he
was one of those who killed Areza. Both Domingo Golfeo and
Cresencio Arsenal, while admitting their participation in the killing of
the deceased, claimed in exculpation that they acted under the
pressure of an irresistible force in that they merely obeyed the order
of their Commander, Rogado alias Commander Sulit, who would
have killed them if they disobeyed his order. The other appellants
merely contended that the killing was done in furtherance of the huk
rebellion.lawphi1.net
Their is no doubt that the unfortunate victim met his death in the
hands of the accused who decided to take his life because of his
stubborn refusal to obey their command that he lead their way to the
place they wanted to go in order that they may not be exposed and
caught by the agents of the law who were stationed in a nearby
municipality. The only question to be determined is whether the
defense they have set up is sufficient to exonerate them from liability.
As regard accused Domingo Golfeo, The evidence is clear that it
was he who first struck Areza with the butt of his gun hitting him on
the side of his body, then gave him a fist blow on his stomach, and
after he had been taken to a secluded place, it was he who ordered
Areza to lie down in the fashion adopted by the Kempetai during the
gloomy days of Japanese occupation and in that position gave him a
blow on the back of the neck which almost severed his head from the
body. His participation in the killing of Areza cannot therefore be
doubted. His only defense is that he did so in obedience to the order
of his commander, and because he acted under the influence of
uncontrollable fear, he should be exempt from criminal responsibility.
The defense of Golfeo is clearly untenable not only because of the
well-settled rule that obedience to an order of a superior will only
justify an act which otherwise would be criminal when the order is for
a lawful purpose, but also because the circumstances under which
Golfeo participated in the torture and liquidation of Areza cannot in
any way justify his claim that he acted under an uncontrollable fear of
being punished by his superiors if he disobeyed their order. In the
first place, at the time of the killing, Golfeo was armed with automatic
carbine such that he could have protected himself from any
retaliation on the part of his superiors if they should threaten to
punish him if he disobeyed their order to kill Areza. In the second
place, the evidence shows that Areza was brought to a secluded
place quite far from that where his superiors were at the time and in
such a predicament, he and companion Arsenal could have escaped
with Areza to void the ire of their superiors. The fact that he carried
out their order although his superiors were at some distance from
him and that without pity and compunction he struck his victim in a
Kempetai fashion show that he acted on the matter not involuntarily
or under the pressure of fear of force, as he claims, but out of his
own free will and with the desire to collaborate with the criminal
design of his superiors. In the circumstances, we find that the trial
court did not err in finding him responsible for the death of Areza as
co-principal by direct participation.
The same situation obtained with regard to Cresencio Arsenal. It
appears that he was one of those ordered by Rogado to kill Areza
and in obedience to such order he had a direct participation in the
killing. It was he and Golfeo who brought Areza to a secluded place
and once there he helped Golfeo in killing him with the same bolo
which was taken from the victim himself. Thus, it appears that after
Golfeo had given the first blow on the back of the neck of Areza as
he lay face down on the ground, Arsenal took the bolo himself and
gave the fatal blow which completely severed the head of Areza from
his body. There is therefore no doubt that Arsenal directly
cooperated with Golfeo in carrying out the concerted plan of killing
Areza because of the hostile attitude he adopted in denying them the
help they demanded from him. Since Arsenal to those existing in the
case of Golfeo, his claim of obedience and fear of retaliation if he
disobeyed his superiors' order cannot also be entertained.
The other defense of appellants refers to their theory that they killed
Areza not for personal motive but in furtherance of the huk rebellion
and so, if any liability they have, it is only for rebellion and for murder
as they are charged. And having already been prosecuted and
convicted of the crime of rebellion in Criminal Case No. SP-137 of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna, their prosecution in the instant
case would constitute double jeopardy.
to begin with, it should be stated that while this Court ruled in People
vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil., 515, 52 Off. Gaz., No. 11, p. 5506, that
there is no complex crime of rebellion with murder because the latter
offense is absorbed by the former, however, a distinction was made
in the case of People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90, 53, Off. Gaz., No.
1, p. 68, where we held that if the killing is inspired by personal
motive such killing is not absorbed by the rebellion but may be the
subject of separate prosecution. In the second place, we find that the
acts with which appellants now charged do not appear included in
the information for rebellion in Criminal Case No. SP-137, for in the
case they were merely accused of having risen and taken up arms
against the Philippine constabulary, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
police forces and other military detachments of the government,
without specifying the particular acts committed against private
persons or civilians which may be said to have been undertaken in
furtherance of the huk rebellion. It is not, therefore, correct to say, as
appellants now claim, that the act in question is already included or
absorbed in the rebellion charge filed against them in said criminal
case.
On the other hand, the pretense that the killing of Areza by
appellants was done in furtherance of the huk rebellion is
preposterous considering the fact that Areza was a mere farmer who
had no connection whatsoever with any law-enforcement agency of
the government. The pertinent question that arises is: Why was he
taken killed and brutally beheaded by appellant?
The answer is well given in the following interesting observation of
the trial court:
According to the testimony of the prosecution witness,
Francisco Racoma, Salvador Areza was maltreated, tied and
killed because the latter refused to lead and guide the group
of Rogado to the road when he was asked by the latter to do
so, Rogado's men were lost in the mountains of Lilio and
they needed somebody to help them find the way out of the
place. They came upon Areza working in his farm. Rogado
asked him to lead the way and Areza refused saying that he
had much work to do and he could not leave his carabao.
Angered and irked by such stubborn refusal, Rogado after
conferring with his co-defendant Orenia gave the order to
take Areza along and to kill him. The killing of Areza was
done solely to satisfy the anger of the leader, rogado, who
being used to the blind obedience of his men could not
tolerate the refusal of Areza to carry out his wishes and
desires. The rebellious movement of the group had nothing
to gain by Atienza's death. On the contrary, Rogado and his
group needed Areza alive in order that they could utilize him
as their guide while they were in the mountains of Lilio.
There is no question that they could have easily at the point
of their thompsons, carbines and garands, forced Areza to
lead the way. But they did not do so, because at that time
Rogado was not so much interested in finding the path to the
road; what concerned him most was to teach a lesson and a
hard one at that, to Salvador Areza for having the timerity of
saying "no" to his wish and request. Surely, to kill a person
under those circumstances is obviously outside of the
political intent of the Hukbalahap movement. The huks rise
up in arms because they mistakenly believe that by doing so
they can have desired changes in the political, social, and
economic life of this country. But to accomplish such a
purpose, the death of innocent civilians like Salvador Areza
is unquestionably unnecessary. When the killing is done
solely for the purpose of answering the lust to kill or of
satisfying angered feelings, thwarted desires of leaders and
followers of the Hukbalahap movement, such a killing must
receive its due punishment at the hands of our courts which
 are called upon to do justice not only to the living but just as
well to the dead.
An attempt was made by appellants to show that Areza was killed
because he threatened to inform the Army of their presence in the
neighborhood where he met them. Such attempt, however, is
ridiculous, for Areza, being then alone and confronted with a group of
armed men, could not have hurled such a threat without catering
immediate death. As the trial court aptly observed: "This Court
cannot believe that Areza would have been such a fool to tell that
band of armed Huks that he would give them away to the Army. It is
reasonable to presume that any sane person would have seen the
danger of making such statement under the circumstances, for that
would have been sure death."
The trial court found that the crime was committed with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery, aggravated by abuse of superior
strength and the fact that it happened in an uninhabited place, for
which reason it imposed upon appellants to supreme penalty of
death. While some members of the Court agree to the existence of
the above aggravating circumstances, others however doubt if they
could be entertained in the case of appellants who, as members of
the Hukbalahap organization, rightly or wrongly, were of the belief
that they were justified in doing what they had done because Areza
committed something inimical to the purposes of their organization.
At any rate, the requisite number of votes for the application of the
supreme penalty not having been obtained, the only alternative is to
impose upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
With this modification, we affirm the decision appealed from all other
respects, with costs against appellants.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178771               June 8, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO and FERNANDO
CALAGUAS FERNANDEZ a.k.a. LANDO CALAGUAS,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556, affirming the trial court's judgment
finding appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando) and
Alberto Cabillo Anticamara (Al) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 4498-R and of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case No. 4481-
R.
Lando, Al, Dick Tañedo (Dick), Roberto Tañedo (Bet), Marvin Lim
(Marvin), Necitas Ordeñiza-Tañedo (Cita), and Fred Doe are
charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal
Detention in two separate Informations, which read:
For Murder (Criminal Case No. 4498-R)
That on or about the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia,
Brgy. San Bartolome, Municipality of Rosales, Province of
Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then armed with a hand gun,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior
strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
Sulpacio Abad, driver of the Estrellas, hog tied (sic) him, brought
(sic) to a secluded place, shoot and bury in a shallow grave, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.
For Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention (Criminal Case No. 4481-R)
That on or about the 7th day of May 2002, more or less 3:00 o'clock
in the early morning, at the Estrella Compound, Brgy. Carmen East,
Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who
are private persons, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, armed with firearms, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Sulpacio Abad and AAA, 2 both
employees of the Estrellas, thereby depriving them of their liberty, all
against their will for a period of twenty-seven (27) days.
That in the course of the kidnapping, Sulpacio Abad was killed and
buried in Brgy. Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan and AAA was raped
for several times by her abductors.
Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to RA
7659.
When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all
pleaded not guilty, while Dick, Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe remained
at-large. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
As summarized in the People's brief, the facts as established by the
evidence of the prosecution are as follows:
About 3 o'clock in the early morning of May 7, 2002, househelper
AAA and driver Abad Sulpacio were sleeping in their employers'
house located in Barangay Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Their employers, Conrado Estrella and his wife, were out of the
house at that time (TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 4-7). Momentarily,
AAA was jolted from sleep when she heard voices saying, "We will
kill her, kill her now" and another voice saying, "Not yet!" Hiding
under her blanket, AAA later heard someone saying, "We only need
money, we only need money." Thereafter, she heard someone
talking in Ilocano which she could not understand. Then she heard
somebody say, "Cebuana yan, Cebuana yan, kararating lang galing
Cebu." AAA heard the persons conversing which she estimated
about four to five meters away (TSN, ibid., pp. 11-12).
Thereafter, AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house,
who she later identified as accused Dick Tañedo, Marvin Lim, Bert
Tañedo, a certain Fred and appellants Alberto Anticamara alias "Al
Camara," and Fernando Fernandez alias "Lando Calaguas." One of
the intruders approached her and told her not to move (TSN, ibid., p.
8).
Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she
attempted to run but to her surprise, someone wearing a bonnet was
watching her. Someone, whom she later recognized as Dick Tañedo,
tapped her shoulder. AAA asked Tañedo, "Why Kuya?" Tañedo
replied, "Somebody will die." After a brief commotion, appellant alias
"Lando Calaguas" asked the group saying, "What shall we do now?"
They then decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led her
outside the house. Outside, AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and
blindfolded, seated inside a vehicle (TSN, April 26, 2004, pp. 6-10).
The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by
their employers. AAA saw Cita Tañedo there. The group brought
Abad outside the vehicle and led him away (TSN, December 2,
2002, pp. 13-18; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 5-8).
Later, alias "Fred" returned telling the group, "Make the decision
now, Abad has already four bullets in his body, and the one left is for
this girl." When Cita Tañedo made a motion of cutting her neck,
appellant alias "Lando Calaguas" and "Fred" boarded the vehicle
taking along with them AAA. They later proceeded towards San
Miguel Tarlac, where Lando Calaguas resided. They stayed in
Lando's house where they kept AAA from May 7 to May 9, 2002
(TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 18-22; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 7-
9).
On May 9, 2002, appellant Lando Calaguas told AAA that Fred and
Bert Tañedo would kill her. Lando then brought AAA to a hotel in
Tarlac, telling AAA that he would leave her there as soon as Fred
and Bert Tañedo leave the place. However, once inside the hotel
room, appellant Lando Calaguas sexually molested AAA. Lando told
AAA to follow what he wanted, threatening her that he would turn her
over to Fred and Bert Tañedo. After Lando raped AAA, he brought
her back to his house. Later, Fred, Bert Tañedo and Lando Calaguas
transferred AAA to Riles, Tarlac (TSN, ibid., pp. 9-13).
AAA was brought to the residence of Fred's niece, a certain Minda,
where Fred kept AAA as his wife. At nighttime, Fred would
repeatedly ravish AAA, threatening her that he would give her back
to appellant Lando Calaguas who, AAA knew, killed Abad Sulpacio.
She was afraid Lando might also kill her (TSN, ibid., pp. 14-16).
On May 22, 2002, Fred brought AAA to Carnaga (should be
Kananga), Leyte, together with his wife Marsha and their children.
AAA stayed in the house of Marsha's brother Sito, where she was
made as a house helper (TSN, ibid., p. 17).
On June 4, 2002, AAA escaped from the house of Sito. She
proceeded to Isabel, Leyte and sought the help of her friend Susana
Ilagan. After hearing AAA's plight, Susana called AAA's brother in
Cebu, who later fetched AAA in Isabel, Leyte and brought her to
Mandaue City. When they arrived in Mandaue City, they immediately
reported the incident to the police authorities. On June 23, 2002,
AAA executed a Sworn Statement (Exh. "D," TSN, ibid., pp. 18-20).
Meanwhile, Dr. Ronald Bandonil, Medico-Legal Officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), conducted an autopsy on the
cadaver of Sulpacio Abad. Dr. Bandonil prepared Autopsy Report
No. N-T2-23-P (Exh. "A") which contains the following findings, to
wit:
x Remains placed in a sealed metal coffin, wrapped in two (2) layers
of black, plastic garbage bags, and covered in (sic) a red-stripped
cotton blanker. A thick layer of lime embeds the whole torso.
x Remains in a far advanced state of decomposition, with the head
completely devoid of soft tissue. A cloth is wrapped around the
eyesockets and tied to the back of the skull. The skull does not show
any signs of dents, chips nor fractures. The other recognizable body
part is the chest area which retained a few soft tissues and skin, but
generally far advanced in decomposition. The whole gamut of
internal organs have undergone liquefaction necrosis and have been
turned into grayish-black pultaceous masses. Worn on top of the
remaining chest is a sando shirt with observable holes at the left
side, both front and back. A large hole is seen at the area of the left
nipple, with traces of burning at its edges and inward in direction. A
tied cloth is also observable at the remnants of the left wrist.
x At the upper chest, which is the most recognizable, remaining and
intact part of the torso, a hole, 1.0 cm. x 2.0 cms., with signs of
burning, edges inverted, is seen at the left anterior axillary line just
below the left nipple. Another hole is seen 1.5 cms. x 2.5 cms. in
diameter, edged averted (sic) at the right chest, along the right
anterior axillary line, 5.0 cms. below the right nipple. A 3rd hole,
almost unrecognizable is seen at the left groin area.
x The other parts of the cadaver are too far advanced in
decomposition to have remarkable findings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUNSHOT WOUNDS, TRUNK3
In his defense, Lando denied having committed the crimes charged
and interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the
incident on May 7, 2002, he was in Barangay Maligaya, San Miguel,
Tarlac, with his family. He denied ever going to the Estrella farm in
Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his
companions if any person or vehicle would approach the house of
the Estrellas. He said that he was forced to follow what was ordered
of him and did not report the matter to the police because he was
threatened to be killed, including the members of his family who were
in Cebu.
On August 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales,
Pangasinan, Branch 53, rendered its Decision, 4 the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
A. Accused Nicetas "Cita" Tañedo is hereby
acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of
evidence;
B. Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas
Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al
Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principal, of the crime of Murder qualified
by treachery, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the
presence of aggravating circumstance of pre-
meditation, with no mitigating circumstance to offset
the same, the penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed
upon the two (2) accused Fernando Calaguas
Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto
Anticamara (Al Camara). They are also ordered
jointly and severally [to] pay the heirs of the victim
Abad Sulpacio the following:
1) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as
moral damages;
2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) as indemnity for the death of
the victim;
3) Fifty-Seven Thousand One Hundred
Twenty-Two Pesos and Thirty Centavos
(₱57,122.30) as actual damages; and
4) The cost of suit.
II. Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping/Serious Illegal
Detention:
A) Accused Nicetas "Cita" Tañedo is hereby
acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of
evidence;
B) Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas
Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al
Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principal, of the crime of
Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention of the victim
AAA as charged, defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. 7659. Considering that the victim AAA was
raped during her detention, the maximum penalty of
DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two accused,
Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando Calaguas)
and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). The two
accused are also ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the victim AAA the amount of:
1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00) as moral damages;
2) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as
exemplary damages; and
3) Cost of suit.
As to the rest of the accused who are still at-large, let this case be
set to the archives until they are apprehended.
SO ORDERED.5
In light of the Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo, 6 the records of the
cases were forwarded by the RTC to the CA for its review. The CA
rendered a Decision dated December 15, 2006, affirming the
decision of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 4498-R and 4481-R.
However, in view of the abolition of the death penalty pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, which was approved on June 24,
2006, the appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
On January 9, 2007, Lando, through the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), appealed the Decision of the CA to this Court. Lando had
assigned the following errors in his appeal initially passed upon by
the CA, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ALLEGED
PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE
LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
FOR THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION, AGGRAVATED BY RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT
THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS NOT DULY PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING SCANT
CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN THAT
OF THE PROSECUTION
V crimes charged.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A
VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On January 9, 2007, Al, through the PAO, appealed the Decision of
the CA to this Court. Al had assigned the following errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE
CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE
ACCUSED THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH FOR THE
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION WITH RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT HE HAD
NO PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF [TWO] SEXUAL
ABUSES AGAINST THE VICTIM.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN
SPITE OF THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH
HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE SAME.8
In capsule, the main issue is whether the appellants are guilty of the
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
Circumstantial Evidence
The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in
the killing of Sulpacio in the early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio
Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the
prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish
with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the
crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common experience .
9
 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.10 A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. 11
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution, when analyzed and taken together, lead to the
inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the
death of Sulpacio. The Court quotes with approval the lower court's
enumeration of those circumstantial evidence:
The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:
1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while
she and the victim Abad Sulpacio were sleeping inside the
house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales,
Pangasinan several persons entered to rob the place;
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused
Lando Calaguas and Dick Tañedo, and heard the latter
uttering "somebody will die";
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the
Revo where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was
blindfolded and with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick
Tañedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Tañedo,
Alberto Anticamara and Fred;
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by
the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan;
6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he
was dragged out from the vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin
and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick
Tañedo stayed with her in the vehicle;
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard
him uttered (sic): "Make a decision now. Abad has already
four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl." 12
In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that
AAA heard Fred utter "Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang
masagasaan, sagasaan." (Our agreement is that whoever comes
our way should be eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V.
Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his
participation as lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando,
Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from
the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also
pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia,
Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains
of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body,
prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that
several holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim
and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim's death was
the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of cloth
was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of
the skull, and another cloth was also found tied at the remnants of
the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of
Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the
appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied
and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was
repeatedly shot and buried.
Conspiracy
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and
decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when
taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal
design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of
a chain of circumstances.13 To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take
part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may
appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole
collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once
conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 14
In the present case, prior to the commission of the crime, the group
met at the landing field in Carmen, Pangasinan and discussed their
plan to rob the house of the Estrellas with the agreement that
whoever comes their way will be eliminated. 15 Appellant Al served as
a lookout by posting himself across the house of the Estrellas with
the task of reporting any movements outside. Fred then climbed the
old unserviceable gate of the Estrella compound and then opened
the small door and the rest of the group entered the house of the
Estrellas through that opening.16 After almost an hour inside the
house, they left on board a vehicle with AAA and Sulpacio. AAA and
Sulpacio were brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome,
Rosales, Pangasinan. In that place, Sulpacio was killed and AAA
was brought to another place and deprived of her liberty. These
circumstances establish a community of criminal design between the
malefactors in committing the crime. Clearly, the group conspired to
rob the house of the Estrellas and kill any person who comes their
way. The killing of Sulpacio was part of their conspiracy. Further,
Dick's act of arming himself with a gun constitutes direct evidence of
a deliberate plan to kill should the need arise.
Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he
was only forced to participate in the commission of the crime
because he and his family were threatened to be killed. Al's defense
fails to impress us. Under Article 1217 of the Revised Penal Code, a
person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the
compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person
does not act with freedom. 18 To avail of this exempting circumstance,
the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable
fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of
an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. 19 For
such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must
be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. 20
There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's
insistence that he was under duress from his co-accused while
participating in the crime that would suffice to exempt him from
incurring criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was tasked to
act as a lookout and directed to station himself across the house of
the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. 21 of the
following day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the landing
field. Thus, while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since
he was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear.
However, he opted to stay across the house of the Estrellas for
almost six (6) hours,22 and thereafter returned to the landing field
where the group was waiting for his report. Subsequently, the group
proceeded to the Estrellas’ house. When the group entered the
house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his
companions. Later, when the group left the house aboard a vehicle,
Al rode with them in going to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome,
Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and
AAA.23 Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he
wished to, but he never did. Neither did he request for assistance
from the authorities or any person passing by the house of the
Estrellas during the period he was stationed there. Clearly, Al did not
make any effort to perform an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the
commission thereof that would exempt himself from criminal
liability.24 Therefore, it is obvious that he willingly agreed to be a part
of the conspiracy.
Alibi and Denial
Appellant Lando denied having committed the crime charged and
interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the
incident he was in his house at Tarlac, together with his family. On
the other hand, the appellants were positively identified by AAA, as
two (2) of the six (6) malefactors who forcibly took her and Sulpacio
from the Estrella house in the early morning of May 7, 2002. Both the
trial court and the CA found the testimony of AAA credible. The Court
gives great weight to the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of a
witness because it had the opportunity to observe the facial
expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying;
thus, making it in a better position to determine whether a witness is
lying or telling the truth.251avvphi1
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on
one hand, and the bare denial of the appellant, on the other, the
former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger
than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth
of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion
and always received with caution, not only because they are
inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily
fabricated and concocted.26 Denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any
ill-motive to testify against the appellants.27
As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant
Lando that he was in Tarlac at the time of the incident, the defense
was unable to show that it was physically impossible for Lando to be
at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper,
the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime.Physical impossibility refers to
the distance between the place where the appellant was when the
crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as
the facility of access between the two places. 28 Where there is the
least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the
defense of alibi must fail.29 During the trial of the case, Lando
testified that the distance between his house in Brgy. Maligaya, San
Miguel, Tarlac to the town of Rosales, Pangasinan is only around
forty (40) kilometers. Such distance can be traversed in less than 30
minutes using a private car and when the travel is
continuous.30 Thus, it was not physically impossible for the appellant
Lando to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. In
addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and
renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible
and categorical.31
Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances
In convicting the appellants, the courts a quo appreciated treachery
in qualifying the killing to murder and evident premeditation in
imposing the penalty of death. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from
the defense that the offended party might make. 32 Two conditions
must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of
means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of
execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.33
In the case at bar, it was proven that when AAA boarded the vehicle,
she saw Sulpacio tied and blindfolded. Later, when they reached the
fishpond, Sulpacio, still tied and blindfolded, was led out of the
vehicle by the group. When the remains of Sulpacio was thereafter
found by the authorities, the autopsy report indicated that a piece of
cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the
back of the skull and another cloth was also found tied at the left
wrist of the victim. There is no question therefore, that the victim's
body, when found, still had his hands tied and blindfolded. This
situation of the victim when found shows without doubt that he was
killed while tied and blindfolded; hence, the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of treachery was present in the commission of the
crime. In People v. Osianas,34 the Court held that:
x x x In the case at bar, the means used by the accused-appellants
to insure the execution of the killing of the victims, so as to afford the
victims no opportunity to defend themselves, was the act of tying the
hands of the victims. Teresita saw the accused-appellants hog-tie
the victims and take them away with them. Later that night, Dionisio
Palmero saw the victims, still hog-tied, walking with the accused-
appellants. The following day, the victims were found dead, still hog-
tied. Thus, no matter how the stab and hack wounds had been
inflicted on the victims in the case at bar, we are sure beyond a
reasonable doubt that Jose, Ronilo and Reymundo Cuizon had no
opportunity to defend themselves because the accused-appellants
had earlier tied their hands. The fact that there were twelve persons
who took and killed the Cuizons further assured the attainment of
accused-appellants' plans without risk to themselves.35
The aggravating circumstance of superior strength cannot be
separately appreciated because it is absorbed by treachery. 36
The circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof showing:
(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2)
an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.37 The essence of premeditation is that the
execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 38 From the time the group
met at the landing field at around 6:30 p.m. of May 6, 2002, and
discussed the possibility of killing anyone who stands on their way,
up to the time they took Sulpacio away from the Estrellas’ house and
eventually killed him thereafter at around past 3:00 a.m., more than
eight hours had elapsed – sufficient for the appellants to reflect on
the consequences of their actions and desist from carrying out their
evil scheme, if they wished to. Instead, appellants evidently clung to
their determination and went ahead with their nefarious plan.
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention.
The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape, defined in and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The
elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code 39 are: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping
must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d)
the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer.40
The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by
the prosecution. Appellants Lando and Al, both private individuals,
forcibly took AAA, a female, away from the house of the Estrellas
and held her captive against her will. Thereafter, appellant Lando
brought AAA to his house in San Miguel Tarlac, whereby she was
deprived of her liberty for almost one month. It is settled that the
crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in
any manner of his liberty.41 For there to be kidnapping, it is enough
that the victim is restrained from going home. 42 Its essence is the
actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable
proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation.43 Although AAA was not confined in an enclosure, she
was restrained and deprived of her liberty, because every time
appellant Lando and his wife went out of the house, they brought
AAA with them. The foregoing only shows that AAA was constantly
guarded by appellant Lando and his family.
The crime of rape was also established by the prosecution. Appellant
Lando succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the
use of threat and intimidation. AAA testified that on May 9, 2002,
appellant Lando brought her to a hotel to hide her from Fred and
Bert, who intended to kill her. Appellant Lando told her to follow his
orders, otherwise, he will give her to Fred and Bert. While in the
hotel, appellant Lando raped her.44 Clearly, for fear of being delivered
to Fred and Bert and of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give
in to appellant Lando's lustful assault. In rape cases, the credibility of
the victim's testimony is almost always the single most important
factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the sole
basis for the accused's conviction. 45 This is so because owing to the
nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence that can be
given regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended party. 46
The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that if the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People v.
Larrañaga,47 this provision gives rise to a special complex crime.
Thus, We hold that appellant Lando is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape in Criminal Case No. 4481-R.
However, the Court does not agree with the CA and trial court's
judgment finding appellant Al liable for Rape in Criminal Case No.
4481-R. In People v. Suyu,48 We ruled that once conspiracy is
established between several accused in the commission of the crime
of robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape committed
by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of
them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from
committing rape.49 Also, in People v. Canturia,50 the Court held that:
x x x For while the evidence does convincingly show a conspiracy
among the accused, it also as convincingly suggests that the
agreement was to commit robbery only; and there is no evidence
that the other members of the band of robbers were aware of
Canturia's lustful intent and his consummation thereof so that they
could have attempted to prevent the same. x x x
The foregoing principle is applicable in the present case because the
crime of robbery with rape is a special complex crime defined in and
penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
and the crime of kidnapping with rape in this case is likewise a
special complex crime as held in the case of People v.
Larrañaga.51 There is no evidence to prove that appellant Al was
aware of the subsequent events that transpired after the killing of
Sulpacio and the kidnapping of AAA. Appellant Al could not have
prevented appellant Lando from raping AAA, because at the time of
rape, he was no longer associated with appellant Lando. AAA even
testified that only Fred and appellant Lando brought her to
Tarlac,52 and she never saw appellant Al again after May 7, 2002, the
day she was held captive. She only saw appellant Al once more
during the trial of the case.53 Thus, appellant Al cannot be held liable
for the subsequent rape of AAA.
The Penalties
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the attendant circumstance of
treachery qualified the killing to murder. The penalty for murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
was alleged and proven, the imposable penalty upon the appellants
is death, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code.54 In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No.
9346,55 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of
death is reduced to reclusion perpetua, 56 without eligibility for
parole.57
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, the penalty for the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape is death.
In view of R.A. No. 9346, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion
perpetua,58 without eligibility for parole.59 Accordingly, the imposable
penalty for appellant Lando is reclusion perpetua.
As to appellant Al, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the
commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be imposed is
reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63 60 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The Damages
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the award of civil indemnity is
mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime.61 In People v.
Quiachon,62 even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed
because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty
attended the commission of the offense. As explained in People v.
Salome,63 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by law for a
heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous.
Accordingly, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00
is proper.
Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder,
without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim.64 However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous
crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to
reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the award of moral
damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00. 65
The award of exemplary damages is in order, because of the
presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation in the commission of the crime. 66 The Court awards
the amount of ₱30,000.00, as exemplary damages, in line with
current jurisprudence on the matter.67
Actual damages is also warranted. Modesta Abad, the spouse of
victim Sulpacio, incurred expenses in the amount of ₱57,122.30,
which was duly supported by receipts.68lawphil
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line
with prevailing jurisprudence that civil indemnification is mandatory
upon the finding of rape. 69 Applying prevailing jurisprudence, AAA is
entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity.70
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article
2219 of the Civil Code,71 without the necessity of additional pleadings
or proof other than the fact of rape. 72 Moral damages is granted in
recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious
crime of rape.73 Such award is separate and distinct from the civil
indemnity.74 However, the amount of ₱100,000.00 awarded as moral
damages is reduced to ₱75,000.00, in line with current
jurisprudence.75
The award of exemplary damages to AAA in the amount of ₱50,000
is hereby reduced to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with recent
jurisprudence.76
As to appellant Al. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the
accused is individual and not collective. 77 Since appellant Al is liable
only for the crime of serious illegal detention, he is jointly and
severally liable only to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. For serious illegal detention, the award of civil indemnity
is in the amount of ₱50,000.00, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 78
Along that line, appellant Al's liability for moral damages is limited
only to the amount of ₱50,000.00. 79 Pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal
detention. This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious
anxiety and fright when she was detained for almost one (1) month. 80
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00556 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, appellants Fernando
Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando" and Alberto Cabillo
Anticamara alias "Al" are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole,
and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Sulpacio Abad
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
₱57,122.30 as actual damages.
 (b) In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, appellant Fernando
Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando" is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with rape and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of
parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Appellant
Alberto Cabillo Anticamara alias "Al" is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is also directed to pay,
jointly and severally, with appellant Fernando Calaguas
Fernandez alias "Lando," the victim AAA the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages.
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the
crime of "illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness
for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625
pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there
can be no doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the
exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make arrest of
the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful
detention. As we understand the evidence, the alleged offense with
which the complaining witness in this case was charged was
committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who
must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for
the making of arrest without warrant, under the doctrine laid down in
the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).

SO ORDERED. The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be

reversed, unless the evidence discloses that having made the arrest,
Prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause the defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged,
cause the complaining witness to be detained for a period of three
Republic of the Philippines days without having him brought before the proper judicial authority
SUPREME COURT for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested.
Manila But so far as we can gather from the extremely meagre record in this
case the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice of the
peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True, three days
EN BANC
were expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively proven at the
trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace
G.R. No. L-6082            March 18, 1911 nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of
the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses,
vs. moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant. forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining
municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion
C.W. Ney for appellant. being due to the fact that the written complaint, which was intrusted
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee. to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It
does not appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same
CARSON, J.: municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must
assume that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by
local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as
appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the
journey by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and
sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man,
and that he was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable
inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but
there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that his
defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the
prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties;
and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises.
The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense
for which the arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that
there was no judicial officer in the remote community where the
incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the
early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his auxiliary, we are
not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point
that in a particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful
violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least
expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the
justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince
all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order were
supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the
defendant must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the
offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances de
oficio. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 45186           September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the corresponding accessory
penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from
said sentence alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged
admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had thrown away her
newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable
doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with
costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin
Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket
about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a
call of nature because it was there that the people of the place used
to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge
from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front
and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to
support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was
very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her
house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before
Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened to her, the
appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to
be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar
called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later
requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which
had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about
five brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a path
adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments
before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the
body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby
which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant
answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of
said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division
of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and
found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house
and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his
opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the
appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after
giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose
of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she
had theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his
but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous
relations. To give force to his conclusions, he testified that the
appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he
went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit
to Dr. Nepomuceno whose testimony was not corroborated but, on
the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for the
prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated later, they were of
the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the appellant
was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree
with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may be
guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of
the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the
death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing
how the child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that
the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the
hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed
through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be
committed wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a
voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where
said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person
who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full
enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts,
in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing
her child's death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the
thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause
to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a
former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol,
took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol
— she considers him her husband as he considers her his wife —
began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that the
appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning,
affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child
carried by the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he
and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The
appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy
to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses
Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from
the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house after
the appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength to
remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in
fact she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will
clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's
affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the
appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and
that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever.
This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long
illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth,
coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being then
only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth
and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such
event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere
laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is uneducated
and could supplant with what she had read or learned from books
what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the
reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did
not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness,
which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute
the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code),
to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as
not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by
going into the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature,
notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was
perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving
birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not
because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not
be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from
liability any person who so acts and behaves under such
circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and
considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware of her
involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take
her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes
entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged
errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it
appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the
fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby
acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and convicted,
with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection
with this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J.,  concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the
ground that she is exempt from criminal liability but because she has
committed no criminal act or omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the
accused Josefina Bandian had spent a year of marital life with her
lover Luis Kirol by whom she was begotten with a child for the first
time. Her said lover knew that she was pregnant and both were
waiting for the arrival of the happy day when the fruit of their love
should be born. Since she became pregnant she continuously had
fever, was weak and dizzy. On January 31, at about 7 o'clock in the
morning, she went down from her house and entered a thicket about
four or five brazas away, where the residents of said place
responded to the call of nature. After some minutes the accused
emerged from the thicket staggering and apparently unable to
support herself. Her neighbor Valentin Aguilar, who saw her enter
the thicket and emerged therefrom, ran to help her, supported her
and aided her in going up to her house and to bed. Asked by Aguilar
what happened to her, she merely answered that she was very
dizzy. Thinking that he alone was unable to attend to her, Valentin
Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, and requested
him to take bamboo leaves to stop the appellant's hemorrhage.
Adriano had scarcely gone about five brazas, when he saw the body
of a newborn child near the path adjoining the thicket where the
accused had been a few moments before. Upon being informed of
the discovery, Valentin Aguilar told Adriano Comcom to bring the
child into the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether or not the
child shown to her was hers, the appellant answered in the
affirmative. After an autopsy had been made of the body, it was
found that the child was born alive.
Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal
medicine among young primiparæ who, by reason of their ignorance
of the symptoms of parturition and of the process of expulsion of
fetus, are not aware that they are giving birth when they are
responding to an urgent call of nature (Dr. A. Lacassagne, Precis de
Medicine Legale, pages, 799-781; Annales de Medicine Legale,
December 1926, page 530; Vibert, Manual de Medicina Legal y
Toxicologia, vol. I, pages 512-514). There is no doubt that the
accused, in her feverish, weak and dizzy condition when she went
into the thicket to defecate and being a primipara with no experience
in childbirth, was not aware that upon defecating she was also
expelling the child she was carrying in her womb. Believing that she
did nothing more to respond to an urgent call of nature which brought
her there, she returned home staggering for lack of strength to
support herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she was
leaving a newborn child behind her, and she only knew that she had
given birth when she was shown the already dead child with wounds
on the body produced by the bites of pigs.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions
punishable by law are felonies, which may be committed not only by
means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa); there being
deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent, and fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and
that the child had been exposed to the rough weather and to the
cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she deceitfully committed
the crime of infanticide or that of abandonment of a minor, because
according to the above-cited legal provision there is deceit when the
act punishable by law is performed with deliberate intent. Suffering
from fever and from dizziness, the appellant under the circumstances
was not aware that she had given birth and, consequently, she could
not have deliberately intended to leave her child, of whose existence
she was ignorant, to perish at the mercy of the elements and of the
animals. Neither can it be held that she faultily committed it because,
as already stated, not knowing for lack of experience in childbirth that
in defecating — a perfectly lawful physiological act, being natural —
she might expel the child she carried in her womb, she cannot be
considered imprudent, a psychological defect of a person who fails to
use his reasoning power to foresee the pernicious consequences of
his willful act. Having had no knowledge of the fact of her delivery,
the accused could not think that by leaving the child in the thicket, it
would die as a consequence of the rough weather or of the cruelty of
animals. Neither can she be considered negligent because
negligence is the omission to do what the law or morals obliges one
to do, which implies knowledge of the thing which is the subject
matter of the compliance with the obligation. Inasmuch as the
accused was not aware of her delivery, her mind cannot contemplate
complying with her legal and moral duty to protect the life of her
child. Neither can it be held that the appellant lacked foresight
because, having been absolutely ignorant of her delivery, she could
not foresee that by abandoning her child in a thicket it would die.
Neither can it be held that her act was the result of lack of skill
because she did not know that to defecate in a state of pregnancy
might precipitate her delivery, and as defecation is a natural
physiological function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.
We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which reads: "Any person who,
while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it," because although
the lawful act of satisfying a natural physiological necessity
accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery itself was not an
injury, but the exposure of the child at the mercy of the elements and
of the animals which cased its death. As the child was born alive, if
the accused had been aware of her delivery and she had deliberately
abandoned the child, her accidental delivery would not exempt her
from criminal liability because then the death of said child no longer
would have been accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh
exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
consisting in the failure to perform an act required by law, when
prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, because this
exempting circumstance implies knowledge of the precept of the law
to be complied with but is prevented by some lawful or insuperable
cause, that is by some motive which has lawfully, morally or
physically prevented one to do what the law commands. In the
present case, what the law requires of the accused-appellant, with
respect to the child, is that she care for, protect and not abandon it.
Had she been aware of her delivery and of the existence of the child,
neither her debility nor her dizziness resulting from the fever which
consumed her, being in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and
her illness not being of such gravity as to prevent her from asking for
help, would constitute the lawful or insuperable impediment required
by law. Having been ignorant of her delivery and of the existence of
the child, to her there was subjectively no cause for the law to testified that the first time he ever saw the accused was in the
impose a duty for her to comply with. international Saloon in Jolo in the month of April, 1909; that at the
time, while two or three men were sitting together in the said salon,
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death he heard the accused say that he on some occasions like to smoke
thereof resulting from its exposure to the rough weather and to the opium; that a few hours after leaving the saloon he asked the
cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed to the accused, because accused if he smoked opium, and the accused answered "yes," that
she had neither deceitfully nor faultily committed any act or omission he smoked sometimes; that he knew then that it was his duty to
punishable by law with regard to the child. watch the accused, that he then asked the accused what
opportunities he had for smoking opium, and the accused replied,
"good opportunities;" he then said to the accused, "I wish to smoke
Instigation and Entrapment
opium." On the invitation of the accused he looked him up that night
and was told that he (the accused) was not able to prepare a room
Republic of the Philippines for smoking, as the Chinamen were afraid, and asked the witness to
SUPREME COURT see him the following night; that he saw him the following night, and
Manila accused again said that he could not find a suitable place; that they
made another agreement to meet and at that time they went together
EN BANC to a certain house in the barrio of Tulay, where a certain Chinaman
(this Chinaman was charged in criminal case No. 292 in said court)
G.R. No. L-5728            August 11, 1910 had prepared the opium and pipe for smoking; that the accused gave
the Chinaman P2, and he (the witness) gave him P1 in payment for
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, the preparation of the pipe which was prepared for smoking he took
vs. the pipe and the pan containing the opium and went directly to the
JAMES O. PHELPS (alias PHILIPS), defendant-appellant. justice of the peace and swore out a warrant for the arrest of the
accused and the said Chinaman.
P. J. Moore and W. H. Bishop, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee. The defendant, J. O. Phelps, a man 30 years of age, testified that
Smith, who was then going under the name of Lockwood, came to
his house one night in Jolo and said that he was accustomed to
TRENT, J.: smoking opium and asked him (the accused) if he knew of any
Chinaman in the town who could assist him in obtaining opium to
The defendant, James O. Phelps, was charged in the Court of First smoke; that he answered Smith that he did not; that Smith then
Instance of Jolo, Moro Province, with having violated the provisions asked him if the Chinaman (the one charged in criminal case No.
of Act No. 1761. He was tried, found guilty as charged, and 292), who was the accused's servant, could look for someone to
sentenced to one month's imprisonment and to pay a fine of P250, furnish him (Smith) with a pipe until he became acquainted in town;
Philippine currency, and in case of insolvency to suffer the that on the following night the witness Smith came again to his
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of P2.50 a day, house, and after being there about twenty minutes became very
and to pay the costs. He appealed. nervous, saying that it was necessary for him to have some opium;
that he told him (Smith) to go to the hospital, and received the reply
The prosecution presented but one witness in this case, Homer G. that he (Smith) was working for the quartermaster and was looking
Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This witness for a position as clerk, and that they probably would not give him this
position if they learned that he was an opium smoker that he again
asked to have the Chinaman assist him, and he (the accused)
believing that he (Smith) was acting in good faith and was really sick,
told the Chinaman to do so; that by agreement and the witness
Smith went to the house of the Chinaman in Tulay, where the
Chinaman prepared the pipe and gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving
the Chinaman P2, and that he (Smith) then left, without the accused
noticing whether he smoked or not, and that he (the accused) was
arrested about forty minutes later, and that he called for the doctor to
examine him about one and half hours after he left the Chinaman's
house.
The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused on every
material point, stating that he, after repeated demands made by
Smith, did prepare some opium in a pipe and give it to Smith.
The chief of police of Jolo, a sergeant in the United States Cavalry,
who arrested the accused and the Chinaman, testified that when he
made these arrests the Chinaman and the accused did not have an
opportunity to talk together before they went to the justice of the
peace where the preliminary investigation was held.
Doctor De Kraft, of the United States Army, was called by the
accused himself and made an examination of the accused about an
hour and a half or two hours after he left the Chinaman's house. The
doctor testified that the accused was strong, robust man, and a man
presenting no appearance of an opium smoker. On being asked by
the court whether or not he could state positively if the accused had
used any opium on that day, the witness answered, "I as sure that he
did not use any opium on that day."
The court below in its decision said:
I agree with him (the doctor) that the accused does not
appear to be a person who uses daily a large amount of
opium. The accused is a strong, robust man, in good
physical condition, and from a casual examination of his
person no one would accuse him of being a habitual user of
opium.
The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold or had in
his possession any opium, neither does it contend that he had in his
possession any of the prohibited paraphernalia used in smoking this
drug. He is only charged with having smoked opium this one time in
the house of the Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely
upon the testimony of the witness Smith, who was an employee of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that capacity in
Jolo.
On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to hide his
true mission. He assumed the name of Lockwood for the same
purpose, engaged in gambling, and admits having visited the house
of the appellant three times for the purpose of making arrangements
for himself and the accused to smoke opium. He urged the accused
to have the Chinaman make arrangements so they both could
smoke. He went to the house of the Chinaman with the accused and
paid the said Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1 for the
preparation of the opium. If he had, by these means, induced the
appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession either opium or
any of the prohibited paraphernalia, his testimony would be more
reasonable, since the mere possession of the drug or any of the
prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law within itself.
But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused had in his
possession any of these things. According to the statements made
by the witness Smith, he not only suggested the commission of this
crime, but he (Smith) also states that he desired to commit the same
offense and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the
commission of the prohibited act. Such conduct on the part of a man
who is employed by the Government for the purpose of taking such
steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the offense and
which would tend to the elevation and improvement of the defendant,
as a would-be criminal, rather than further his debasement, should
be rebuked rather than encouraged by the courts; and when such
acts as those committed by the witness Smith are placed beside the
positive testimony of the defendant, corroborated by the Chinaman
and the doctor, the testimony of such witness sinks into
insignificance and certainly does not deserve credit. When an
employee of the Government, as in this case, and according to his
own testimony, encourages or induces persons to commit a crime in
order to prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible. We
desire to be understood that we base our conclusions as to the
conduct of the witness Smith and the incredibility of his testimony on
his own acts according to his own testimony.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the appellant is
not guilty of this crime. The judgment of the lower court is reversed
and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 34917           September 7, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants.
Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuaño, H. Alo and
Manuel G. Briones for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu convicting them of the illegal
importation of opium, and sentencing them each to four years'
imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty,
and to pay the proportional costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following
alleged errors as committed by the court below in its judgment to wit:
The lower court erred:
1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the
Insular Collector of Customs to exhibit in court the record of
the administrative investigation against Joaquin Natividad,
collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising
customs secret service agent of Cebu, both of whom have
since been dismissed from service.
2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium
consignments have passed thru the customhouse without
the knowledge of the customs secret service."
3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan
Samson in denouncing the accused was actuated by a
desire to protect himself and to injure ex-collector Joaquin
Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly instrumental in
the dismissal of Samson from the service.
4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed
chief customs secret service agent of Cebu, is above
reproach and utterly irreconcilable with the corrupt motives
attributed to him by the accused.
5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to
remain in the court room while other prosecution witnesses
were testifying, despite the previous order of the court
excluding the Government witnesses from the court room,
and in refusing to allow the defense to inquire from Insular
Collector of Customs Aldanese regarding the official conduct
of Juan Samson as supervising customs secret service
agent of Cebu.
6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.
7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the
defendant Uy Se Tieng to order the opium from Hongkong.
8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct
transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and the
appellant Uy Se Tieng.
 9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of
the conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant
Lua Chu.
10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua
Chu guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, and in
sentencing each to suffer four years' imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the presumption
of innocence which has not been overcome, despite the
unlawful inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the
evidence presented by the prosecution, emanating from a
spirit of revenge and from a contaminated, polluted source.
The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable
doubt at the trial:
About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy
Se Tieng wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a
shipment of opium.
About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret
service of Cebu, Juan Samson, had returned from a vacation in
Europe, he called upon the then collector of customs for the Port of
Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and the latter, after a short
conversation, asked him how much his trip had cost him. When the
chief of the secret service told him he had spent P2,500, the said
collector of customs took from a drawer in his table, the amount of
P300, in paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for you,
and a shipment will arrive shortly, and you will soon be able to
recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money, left,
and put it into the safe in his office to be kept until he delivered it to
the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week later, Natividad called
Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred to consisted
of opium, that it was not about to arrive, and that the owner would go
to Samson's house to see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to
Samson's house and told him he had come by order of Natividad to
talk to him about the opium. The said accused informed Samson that
the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that he had agreed
to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that the opium had been
in Hongkong since the beginning of October awaiting a ship that
would go direct to Cebu.
At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam
Tai loaded on the steamship Kolambugan, which the Naviera
Filipina — a shipping company in Cebu had had built in Hongkong,
38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H." About the
same date Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already
been put on board the steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed
between them that Samson would receive P2,000, Natividad P2,000,
and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain
employees in the customhouse.
Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson.
Towards the end of November, Natividad informed the latter that
the Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong on account of certain
engine trouble, and remained there until December 7th. In view of
this, the shipper several times attempted to unload the shipment, but
he was told each time by the captain, who needed the cargo for
ballast, that the ship was about to sail, and the 30 cases remained
on board.
The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14,
1929. While he was examining the manifests, Samson detailed one
of his men to watch the ship. After conferring with Natividad, the
latter instructed him to do everything possible to have the cargo
unloaded, and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the
morning of November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy Se
Tieng already had the papers ready to withdraw the cases marked
"U.L.H." from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad it would
be better for Uy Se Tieng to go to his house to have a talk with him.
Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that night and was told that he
must pay over the P6,000 before taking the opium out of the
customhouse. Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading and on
leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and we see whether we can take
the money to you tomorrow." The following day Samson informed
Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary, of all that had taken place,
and the said colonel instructed the provincial commander, Captain
Buenconsejo, to discuss the capture of the opium owners with
Samson. Buenconsejo and Samson agreed to meet at the latter's
house that same night. That afternoon Samson went to the office of
the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the fiscal, and asked for a
stenographer to take down the conversation he would have with Uy
Se Tieng that night in the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As the
fiscal did not have a good stenographer available, Samson got one
Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias, on the
recommendation of the court stenographer. On the evening of
December 17, 1929, as agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant
Fernando; and the stenographer went to Samson's house and
concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which
hung from the window overlooking the entrance to the house on the
ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived, Samson
asked him if he had brought the money. He replied that he had not,
saying that the owner of the opium, who was Lua Chu, was afraid of
him. Samson then hold him to tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that
he might come to Samson's house. After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng
a back door entrance into the garden, he asked him where the opium
was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the cases numbered
11 to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at
about 10 o'clock that night accompanied by his codefendant Lua
Chu, who said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a
man from Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy were also
owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the
opium, and the latter answered that Uy Se Tieng would take charge
of that. On being asked if he had brought the P6,000, Lua Chu
answered, no, but promised to deliver it when the opium was in Uy
Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation, which was taken
down in shorthand, Samson took the accused Lua Chu aside and
asked him: "I say, old fellow, why didn't you tell me about this before
bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered: "Impossible, sir; you
were not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by
Samson how he had come to bring in the opium, Lua Chu answered:
"I was in a cockpit one Sunday when the collector called me aside
and said there was good business, because opium brought a good
price, and he needed money." All this conversation was overheard
by Captain Buenconsejo. It was then agreed that Uy Se Tieng should
take the papers with him at 10 o'clock next morning. At the appointed
hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as
Uy Se Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy
Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and
arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned papers, which
consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B and B-1), and in invoice written
in Chinese characters, and relating to the articles described in
Exhibit B. After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to the
Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Captain
Buenconsejo and Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and
arrest him. In the pocket of a coat hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu
said belonged to him, they found five letters written in Chinese
characters relating to the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain
Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to the Constabulary
headquarters, and then went to the customhouse to examine the
cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11 to 18, they
found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The
value of the opium confiscated amounted to P50,000.
In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo
approached Lua Chu and asked him to tell the truth as to who was
the owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows: "Captain, it is
useless to ask me any questions, for I am not going to answer to
them. The only thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this
contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to bring it in here without
the knowledge of those — " pointing towards the customhouse.
The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had
obtained a loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to order
the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from P2 to P3 a tin
there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20, and that he could make
a good deal of money by bringing in a shipment of that drug; that
Samson told Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that there would be no
danger, because he and the collector of customs would protect him;
that Uy Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who told him he had no
objection, if Samson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his
correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after he had
ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the name of
Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng
then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent cancelling the order, but
the latter answered that the opium had already been loaded and the
captain of the Kolambugan refused to let him unload it; that when the
opium arrived, Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000;
that as Uy Se Tieng did not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu
on the night of December 14th, and proposed that he participate; that
at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se Tieng's proposition,
but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the opium had passed the
customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of
December 17th, because Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium
without first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu personally
promised to pay him that amount.
The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the
trial court in its judgment. Some refer to the refusal of the trial judge
to permit the presentation of certain documentary evidence, and to
the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness for the
Government, from the court room during the hearing; others refer to
the admission of the alleged statements of the accused taken in
shorthand; and the others to the sufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a
reasonable doubt.
With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative
proceedings against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of
Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent
of Cebu, who were dismissed from the service, the trial court did not
err in not permitting it, for, whatever the result of those proceedings,
they cannot serve to impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not
one of the means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to that end.
With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan
Samson, the principal witness of the Government, from the court
room during the hearing, it is within the power of said judge to do so
or not, and it does not appear that he has abused his discretion (16
Corpus Juris, 842).
Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the
transcript of stenographic notes of the defendants' statements, since
they contain admissions made by themselves, and the person who
took them in shorthand attested at the trial that they were faithfully
taken down. Besides the contents are corroborated by unimpeached
witnesses who heard the statements.
As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts
alleged in the information, we find that the testimony given by the
witnesses for the prosecution should be believed, because the
officers of the Constabulary and the chief of the customs secret
service, who gave it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the
defendants do not deny their participation in the illegal importation of
the opium, though the accused Lua Chu pretends that he was only a
guarantor to secure the payment of the gratuity which the former
collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad, had asked of him for Juan
Samson and certain customs employees. This assertion, however, is
contradicted by his own statement made to Juan Samson and
overheard by Captain Buenconsejo, that he was one of the owners
of the opium that had been unlawfully imported.
But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by
Juan Samson to import the opium in question. Juan Samson denies
this, and his conduct in connection with the introduction of the
prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears him out. A public official
who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does
not take the steps necessary to seize the instruments of the crime
and to arrest the offender, before having obtained the profit he had in
mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the
introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the accused
had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving
only its introduction into the country through the Cebu customhouse
to be managed, and he did not do so to help them carry their plan to
a successful issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the imported
drug and the arrest of the smugglers.
The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation
to commit crime, as laid down by the courts of the United States, are
summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been
said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the
purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored,
and while instigation, as distinguished from mere
entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes
been held to prevent the act from being criminal or
punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the
 perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its commission were order the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.
done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose
the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from,
were present and apparently assisting in its commission. the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
Especially is this true in that class of cases where the ordered.
offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the
solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Republic of the Philippines
Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if SUPREME COURT
the offense was committed by him free from the influence or Manila
the instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an
owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is no defense
to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original THIRD DIVISION
design was formed independently of such agent; and where
a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies  
the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorized by
them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the G.R. No. 82590 July 26, 1990
larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it
is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired vs.
informer; but there are cases holding the contrary. ESTANISLAO YUTUC y TELLIS, accused-appellant.

As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
herein defendants-appellants to import the opium in question, as the
latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the
Estelito P. Mendoza for accused-appellant.
collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad — who had promised them
that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise
so far as the customhouse was concerned — not to gain the P2,000
intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the better to
assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the BIDIN, J.:
surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or
against the public good which should prevent the Government from This is an appeal interposed by accused-appellant Estanislao Yutuc
prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where y Tellis from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLVII,
an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute San Fernando, Pampanga * in Criminal Case No. 3707 entitled
him, but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal. "People of the Philippines vs. Estanislao Yutuc y Tellis", the decretal
portion of which reads:
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the
chief of the customs secret service pretended to agree a plan for WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the
smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged, for violation of Section 4, Article 11,
 Republic Act No. 6425, (As Amended by P.D No.
1675 which took effect on Feb. 17, 1980) the Court
hereby sentences him to serve the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) plus costs.
The penalty imposed by the law is very stiff, but it
must be followed and obeyed as it is so written. The
law does not make any distinction whether the sale,
administration, delivery, distribution and
transportation of the prohibited drug is in large scale
or in a small quantity. Whether the amount of the
prohibited stuff sold, administered, delivered,
distributed or transported is big or small, the penalty
is the same because the ultimate pernicious effects
thereof on the victims are the same.
This decision must now serve as a deterrence to
those who are still engaged or are attempting to
indulge themselves in such nef(a)arious activities in
violation of the Dangerous Drug Law, for if they
persist and caught in the act, or sufficient evidence
exists to that effect, the full force of the law will take
its course against them as it did in the case at bar.
SO ORDERED.
The accused was arrested by Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
soldiers on December 2, 1986 at 4:00 p.m. at Barangay Tinajero,
Bacolor, Pampanga, allegedly for selling dried marijuana leaves in
the amount of FIFTY PESOS (P50.00) to one of them Sgt. Juanito
de la Cruz.
At the time of his arrest, the accused was 17 years old. He was
detained at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga until January 9,
1987 when he was transferred to the National Penitentiary at
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila where he is presently detained.
Although arrested on December 2, 1986 and detained from that date,
it was not until January 9, 1987 or more than one month after his
arrest and detention that the following information was filed:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal and Special
Counsel accuses ESTANISLAO YUTUC y TELLIS of
the crime of Violation of Section 4, Article II of RA
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Acts of 1972, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of December, 1986, at
about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in barangay
Tinajero, municipality of Bacolor, province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ESTANISLAO YUTUC y TELLIS, not having been
lawfully authorized, permitted and/or licensed, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, administer and give away one (1) transparent
cellophane bag of dried marijuana leaves, which
when subjected to test, disclosed a positive
indication of the presence of tetro hydro canabinol
(TNC) found in marijuana, a prohibited drug.
All contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, the accused, with the assistance of counsel de
oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY.
At the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Sgt.
Juanita de la Cruz, Sgt. Eufronio N. Sapad, Jr., both of the Narcotics
Command at Camp Olivas, Pampanga and Marlene Salangad,
Forensic Chemist.
Sgt. Juanito de la Cruz, a soldier of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines assigned to the Narcotics Command at San Fernando
Pampanga, as intelligence operative, testified that at about 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1986, a Buy Bust Operation
team was organized by Operation Officer Capt. Honorio Tomas in
view of an informant's (identity undisclosed) report of an on-going
drug trafficking in Barrio Tinajero, Bacolor, Pampanga. Sgt. Juanito
de la Cruz, member of the Philippine Army, Narcotics Command,
was to act as poseur-buyer and was given marked money in the total
sum of P50.00 consisting of two (2) P20.00 and one (1) P10.00 bills
(Exhibits "I" to "I-2", "J" to "J-2" and "K" to "K-2").i•t•c-aüsl  Upon
arrival at the scene of the incident at 3:00 o'clock p.m., the civilian
informer introduced De la Cruz to the accused as a friend of said
informer. De la Cruz offered to buy P50.00 worth of marijuana from
the accused. Accused went to a corner at the back of a house and
came back bringing with him the marijuana dried leaves contained in
one (1) plastic bag measuring one-half foot in length and four (4)
inches in width and which approximately weighed eighteen (18)
grams (Exhibit "G"). The accused gave De la Cruz the marijuana and
the latter in turn proffered the P50.00 marked bills. De la Cruz wiped
his face with a handkerchief as a pre-arranged signal to his
companions to arrest the accused, which they did. Accused's
companion who was with him all the time was able to scamper and
ran away but accused himself was brought to the Police Station at
Bacolor, Pampanga where the arresting team had him blottered and
searched. They found the marked money in accused's possession
(TSN, pp. 32-59, May 19, 1987; pp. 104-107, September 16, 1987).
The apprehending officers brought the accused to Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga where they took accused's fingerprints and
prepared a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhibits "D" to "D-4",
TSN, pp. 59-65, May 19, 1987).
Sgt. Eufronio Sapad, Jr. who apprehended the accused corroborated
Sgt. de la Cruz' statements to the effect that he saw the accused
deliver the marijuana and De la Cruz gave the P50.00 marked bills.
At Camp Olivas, the accused underwent custodial investigation
without having been informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent, to counsel and to be informed of such rights and was made to
sign a Receipt of Property Confiscated/Seized (Exhibits "A" to "A-3")
consisting of the 18 grams marijuana dried leaves and the P50.00
marked bills, a Waiver of Detention under Art. 125, RPC (Exhibits "B"
to "B-1"). The arresting officers executed a joint affidavit in
connection with the apprehension of the accused (Exhibits "C" to "C-
2", TSN, pp. 2-21, March 10, 1987; pp. 92-96, June 10, 1987; pp.
165-168, 171-177, December 9, 1987). Capt. Marlene Salangad,
Forensic Chemist of the Philippine Constabulary confirmed that the
specimen indicated in Exhibit "A" weighs approximately thirteen (13)
grams of marijuana dried leaves contained in a cellophane pack
(Exhibit "G") and which was wrapped with a piece of bond paper
(Exhibit "F"). Upon physical, chemical and confirmatory tests taken,
the specimen proved to be positive for marijuana, a prohibited drug
(Technical Report No. UB-510A-86, Exhibits "H" to "H-1", TSN, pp.
72-86, June 10, 1987).
On the other hand, the defense presented the accused Estanislao
Yutuc as its lone witness, who testified that he is 18 years of age
having been born on May 7, 1969, single, is a helper of his mother
and a resident of Tinajero, Bacolor, Pampanga since birth. On that
fateful day of December 2, 1986 at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at the road near their house at Tinajero, Bacolor,
Pampanga about to pay P230.00 for the rice which his mother
purchased at the store located near their house. The money given to
him by his mother to pay the rice consisted of two (2) P50.00 bills;
five (5) P20.00 bills; and three P10.00 bills. Prior to the intended
payment, a person approached him and inquired about a person
whose name he forgot. He denied any knowledge of said person.
Another person arrived and they exchanged signals to each other.
Then PC soldiers came. The first person who inquired ran away and
the soldiers handcuffed him. C2C Oscar Imperial manacled him. He
asked Imperial the reason for shackling him but the officer refused to
say anything. His aunt came, held him in the arms and asked the PC
soldiers why they put handcuffs on the accused and brought him with
them. The PC soldiers did not answer her questions but simply drew
their guns. He felt frightened and his aunt released him from her
hold. He was made to board a car and sat in the middle of two (2)
persons. The PC soldiers were in civilian clothes and inside the car,
he was beaten and boxed several times all over his body by said
soldiers. He was brought to the Municipal Building of Bacolor,
Pampanga and was subjected to interrogation concerning the sale of
marijuana and his personal circumstances. He denied having
anything to do with a marijuana. Later, he was brought to Camp
Olivas but while they were on the way, apprehending officers
Villaruz, Sapad, Imperial, De la Cruz and Baking hit him and boxed
him several times. While being maltreated, they asked him the name
of the person who ran away and again he denied knowledge of said
person. They boxed him for giving such response. At the NARCOM DECEMBER 2, 1986, PARTICULARLY EXHIBIT A-2
Office, Camp Olivas, Imperial, De la Cruz and Sapad kicked him and WHICH READS "WITH MY CONFORMITY,
he was thrown by the impact of the assault. He was made to sign ESTANISLAO YUTUC Y TELLIS (OWNER OF
exhibits "A", "B" and "D" under threats to kill him if he would not sign CONFTD ITEMS)";
them. Because he could not read the documents presented to him,
he asked the soldiers to read the documents to him, and they replied 2. EXHIBITS B, AND B-1-WAIVER OF DETENTION
that he was just a "nobody' to make such a request. Fearful of his UNDER ART. 125, RPC" DATED DECEMBER 3,
life, he gave in and involuntarily signed said papers without having 1986, PARTICULARLY EXHIBIT B-1 WHICH
been informed of the contents thereof and without the assistance of PURPORTS TO BE THE SIGNATURE OF THE
counsel in violation of his constitutional rights. He was detained at ACCUSED;
Camp Olivas for one (1) month and seven (7) days. Fifteen (15) days
after his detention, his mother filed a petition for habeas corpus 3. EXHIBIT D-BOOKING SHEET AND ARREST
(Exhibit "1") but the same was dismissed upon filing of the REPORT PARTICULARLY EXHIBIT D-1 SHOWING
Information against him on January 9, 1987 (Exhibit "2"). PURPORTEDLY THE SIGNATURE OF THE
ACCUSED AND EXHIBIT D-4 THE ALLEGED
He denied having been engaged in selling marijuana, neither did he FINGERPRINT MARKS OF THE ACCUSED;
smoke marijuana before. He recognizes the money marked as
Exhibits "I", "J" and "K" as part of the P230.00 his mother gave him. 4. EXHIBIT F-THE ALLEGED BOND PAPER USED
At the time the money were taken from him, no markings appeared IN WRAPPING PLASTIC BAG ALLEGEDLY
thereon. He saw the PC officers placed dots on the money CONTAINING MARIJUANA LEAVES, MORE
thereafter. Prior to the incident, he did not know these PC soldiers PARTICULARLY, THE SIGNATURE OF THE
and that he had no quarrel with them earlier, nor with their relatives ACCUSED; AND
(TSN, pp. 196-247, December 10, 1987).
5. EXHIBITS I, I-1, J, J-1, J-2, K, AND K-1-THE
As heretofore mentioned, accused Estanislao Yutuc was convicted ALLEGED MARKED MONEY, MORE
of the crime charged. PARTICULARLY, EXHIBITS I-2, J-2, AND K-2
WHICH PURPORTEDLY ARE SIGNATURES OF
Hence, the instant appeal. A appellant poses the following assigned THE ACCUSED.
errors:
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE THE ACCUSED SOLD DRIED MARIJUANA
FOLLOWING EXHIBITS, AS EVIDENCE OF LEAVES FOR P50.00 (FIFTY PESOS) TO SGT.
INCRIMINATING ADMISSIONS, OF THE JUANITO DE LA CRUZ OF THE NARCOTICS
ACCUSED; COMMAND.

1. EXHIBITS A, A-1, A-2, AND A-3-RECEIPTS OF THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

PROPERTY CONFISCATED/SEIZED DATED
 ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED SOLD DRIED
MARIJUANA LEAVES TO SGT. JUANITO DE LA
CRUZ, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT HE DID SO ONLY UPON
INDUCEMENT (NOT ENTRAPMENT) OF NARCOM
SOLDIERS.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4,
ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 (AS
AMENDED BY P.D. NO. 1675) AND IN
SENTENCING HIM TO SERVE THE PENALTY OF
LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00).
Well-entrenched is the rule that trial courts' findings of facts carry
great weight for these courts have the privilege of examining the
demeanor of the witnesses while on the witness stand, and
therefore, can discern if these witnesses are telling the truth or not.
The exception lies when (1) the conclusion is a finding based entirely
on speculations; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) the court,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same are contrary to the admission of both the appellant and
appellee. (People v. Taruc, 157 SCRA 182 [1988]).i•t•c-aüsl
In its findings of guilt against the accused, the trial court gave more
weight and credence to the evidence of the prosecution, both
testimonial and documentary.
It laid stress on the credibility of the testimonies of the members of
the "Buy Bust Operation Team" organized with the duty to enforce
the law. As such, they were supposed to be parts and parcels of the
law enforcement agencies of the government which enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, and
added that there being no evil or improper motive in the minds of all
the members of the apprehending team or any of them to make a
false imputation against the accused, the credibility of their
declarations is farther strengthened (Rollo, pp. 44-45).
However, a meticulous scrutiny of the records discloses that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not only fraught with
inconsistencies and contradictions but the actions of the police
officers in question indisputably show a callous disregard of the
Constitution and of the law which would amount to a mockery of
justice to impress on their actions the presumption of regularity and
on their testimonies with honesty and good faith.
In an unrebutted testimony, the accused established that he was
boxed and maltreated particularly when asked the name of the
person who ran away. At the NARCOM Office, Camp Olivas,
Imperial, De la Cruz and Sapad kicked him until he was thrown by
the force and impact of the punishment. He was threatened and
intimidated into signing incriminatory admissions. He was illegally
detained from December 2, 1986 to January 9, 1987. On December
17, 1986, the accused's mother filed a petition for Habeas Corpus
thereby practically forcing the filing of the information in the instant
case on January 9, 1987 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga. In view of the filing of said information, the Petition for
Habeas Corpus became moot and academic and was dismissed by
the Regional Trial Court on that ground but not before it has noted
that the detention of the accused by the NARCOM agents was
"without any legal basis." (Rollo, pp. 75-76).
Undeniably, the prosecution witnesses Sets. De la Cruz and Sapad,
committed a criminal act, a plain violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, if not plain arbitrary detention (Article 124 of
the same Code). In fact, Sgt. Sapad admitted in open court that he
was aware that the detention of the accused was in violation of the
Revised Penal Code (Hearing, December 9, 1987; TSN, pp. 7, 8,
9).i•t•c-aüsl
Under the circumstances, there is merit in defense counsel's
contention that these prosecution witnesses who are sworn to
protect the citizenry, yet have knowingly violated the Constitution and courtroom when asked, answered
the law, hardly deserve to be given any credence at all. Otherwise by the name of Estanislao Yutuc.
stated, there can be no conviction on the basis of their testimonies
(Rollo, p. 88). FISCAL LISING: What I mean, you
stated a person or informant went to
Verily, the presumption that official duty has been regularly your office to report that there is a
performed cannot, by itself, prevail against the constitutional person . . . I am clarifying Your
presumption of innocence accorded an accused person. (People v. Honor.
Ale, 145 SCRA 51 [Oct. 14, 1986]; People v. Fernando, 145 SCRA
151 [Oct. 24, 1986]; People v. Flores, G.R. No. 65647 [Aug. 30, ATTY. BENOZA: There was already
1988]; People v. Carido, G.R. No. 32242 [Nov. 18, 1988]). an answer. The alleged informer
was already pinpointed, Your Honor.
Even more categorically, the Court stated that the common modus
operandi  of narcotic agents of utilizing poseur-buyers does not FISCAL LISING: I am asking . . . He
always commend itself as the most reliable way to go after violators misunderstands me.
of the Dangerous Drugs Act as it is susceptible to mistake as well as
to harrassment, extortion and abuse. (People v. Fernando, supra). ATTY. BENOZA: I just want to make
it of record that the informer
Still further, full faith and credence cannot be accorded to the pinpointed to by the witness is the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses particularly those of the two very accused Estanislao Yutuc.
arresting officers, as they are replete with contradictions and tainted (TSN, pp. 4-6, March 10, 1987).
with inccuracies.
Sgt. De la Cruz who acted as poseur-buyer simply declared that the
Sgt. Eufronio Sapad, Jr., himself the aresting officer, was so report came from a civilian informant (TSN, pp. 36-37, May 19,
confused that even on direct examination, he could not even 1987). The identity of the informer was not revealed. For no apparent
distinguish the accused from the informer. He testified thus: reason, he was not presented as a witness, although there appears
to be no point in concealing his identity for as Sgt. de la Cruz
FISCAL LISTING: Can you possibly testified, the informer was with him when he arrested the accused
identify this informer who reported to and introduced him to the latter (Hearing, May 19, 1987; TSN, pp.
your office that there was a person 17, 18, 19); giving rise to another disputable presumption that
in Tinajero, Bacolor, Pampanga? evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced (Rule
131, Sec. 5(e); People v. Ale, 145 SCRA 50 [1986]).i•t•c-aüsl
A: Yes, sir.
As to the number of suspected drug pushers per verbal report from
Q: Who is he? the alleged informant, Sgt. de la Cruz was not even certain. At first,
he said there was one and then he said there were two. He declared
as follows:
CLERK OF COURT: Witness
pointing to a person inside the
Question: What was the purpose of
that civilian informant who went to
your office on December 2, 1986?
Answer: He told us that there was
one person who was selling
marijuana, sir. (TSN, pp. 36-37, May
19, 1987).
Question: Did you hear what was
reported by the alleged civilian
informant to Col. Roberto Kalinisan?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: What did you hear about?
Answer: The civilian informant went
to our office and reported to Col.
Roberto Kalinisan that there are two
persons in the name of Estanislao
Yutuc and Arnel Garcia  who are
involved in selling marijuana in
Barrio Tinajero, Bacolor, Pampanga,
sir.
Question: Did I get you right that
you stated that there was only one
alleged person informed by the
civilian informant who was involved
in selling marijuana?
Answer: I cannot recall, sir, but I
know there are two. (TSN, pp. 113-
115, September 16, 1987, emphasis
supplied).
Even as to the time he acquired knowledge of the name of the
accused, Sgt. de la Cruz contradicted himself as follows:
Q: How about the accused Yutuc?
From whom did you hear his name
for the first time?
A: When we already investigated
him sir. (TSN, p. 159, September
30, 1987) (emphasis supplied)
ATTY. BENOZA: Did I get you right
that it was only in the investigation
when you came to know the name
of the accused?
A: When the informant reported to
us. I already knew his name, sir.
Q: So you want to change your re-
direct testimony that you came to
know the name of the accused
during the investigation?
A: Yes, sir, I had to answer. (TSN,
p. 160, Ibid., emphasis supplied).
As to whom the verbal report of the informant was directed, both
NARCOM agents' statements are at war with each other despite their
presence at the time the report was received, since Sgt. Sapad
swears that the informant reported the matter of drug trafficking to
his officemates  (TSN, p. 7, March 10, 1987) while Sgt. de la Cruz
stated that it was to Operations Officer Captain Honorio Tomas to
whom the information was relayed (TSN, p. 38, May 19, 1987) then
amended it to Commanding Officer Col. Roberto Kalinisan (TSN, pp.
111-112, September 16, 1987, (emphasis supplied).
Even the physical evidence is suspect since Sgt. Sapad who was
supposed to be the seizing officer affirmed that the marked money
were returned to him and he had them xeroxed but when asked who
returned the same, he replied that the money was on file (TSN, p.
18, March 10, 1987).
And again as to who placed the dots on the marked money, the
answers of the two soldiers did not jibe. Sgt. Sapad said that all of
them placed the dots on the marked bills (TSN, p. 94, June 10,
1987) while Sgt. de la Cruz stated that Operations Officer Capt.
Tomas placed them (TSN, pp. 118-119, September 16, 1987).i•t•c-
aüsl
Sgt. Sapad testified that the plastic bag delivered to Sgt. de la Cruz
contained five fingers, dried marijuana leaves weighing
approximately 18 grams  (TSN, pp. 10-12, March 10, 1987; Exhibits
"A" to "A-3", "E" to "E-2"). In contrast, the Laboratory Examination
Report, confirmed by the testimony of Marlene Salangad, Forensic
Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, who examined the contents,
shows that they consisted exclusively of marijuana fruiting tops
weighing thirteen (13) grams. This discrepancy finds no explanation
in the record.
In contrast, the testimony of the accused is direct, consistent and
devoid of any prevarication. Contrary to the claim of the prosecution
that the defense limited itself to bare denial, the accused clearly
explained that he was arrested when about to pay for the rice as
mother has bought. The marked money allegedly used to pay him
was part of the two hundred thirty pesos (P230.00) his mother gave
him to pay for the rice. His testimony remained unshaken despite
rigid cross examination.
The accused maintained that he does not sell nor smoke marijuana
(Decision, Trial Court, p. 16). His statement is confirmed by the fact
that he has no criminal record unlike in the case of People v. Boholst
(152 SCRA 271 [1987]) whose doctrine is sought by the Solicitor
General to be applied to this case, where the accused was
previously convicted of frustrated murder, robbery, hold-up and
violation of R.A. 6425 as drug pusher.
As to documentary evidence, there is merit in the claim that the trial
court erred in admitting the exhibits in question which were taken
from the accused in patent disregard of the latter's constitutional
rights.
As earlier narrated, after he was arrested and on the way to Camp
Olivas, he was beaten, boxed, pushed and kicked. At the NARCOM
Office, without being informed of his right to silence and of his right
not to incriminate himself, he was threatened and/or intimidated to
sign several documents now marked Exhibits "A", "B", "D," "F", "I" "J"
and "K" (Hearing December 10, 1987; TSN, pp. 24, 25, 26, 29, 30).
Because he could not read and understand the documents
presented to him, he requested that the said documents be read to
him but his request was rudely denied. He was a "nobody" the
soldiers said (Ibid.; TSN, p. 27).
Afraid and thoroughly intimidated, the accused signed the
documents identified as follows:
(1) Exhibit "A" — purporting to be a "Receipt of
Property Confiscated/Seized" from him by the
soldiers;
(2) Exhibit "B" — "Waiver of Detention under Article
125, R.P.C.";
(3) Exhibit "D" — "Booking Sheet and Arrest Report"
to which the accused implicitly admits that he was
arrested for selling marijuana leaves;
(4) Exhibit "F" — through which the accused
acknowledges that the plastic bag containing
marijuana leaves taken from him;
(5) Exhibits "1", "I-1", "J", "J-1", "J-2", "K", "K-1" and
"K-2" — which the accused apparently admits that
the two twenty-peso bills and one ten-peso bill
allegedly with markings, were paid to him by the
Narcom. (Rollo, pp. 74-75
The narration of the above circumstances by the accused was not
only unrebutted by the prosecution but was admitted by Sgt. Sapad
on cross examination as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Question: While he was detained,
that was the time you asked him to
sign Exhibit "A", is that correct?
Answer: Before he was detained,
we have him signed the Exhibit "A",
sir.
Question: Is it not you said that you
immediately proceeded to Camp
Olivas to bring the accused in that
place; are you now saying that
before you went to Olivas, you went
to another place and asked the
accused to sign somewhere else?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: That means that
immediately upon being
apprehended, that was the time that
you asked him to sign that
document Exhibit "A"?
Answer: We have him signed the
document in the office, sir.
Question: At Camp Olivas where he
was detained?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: In the office?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: When you asked him to
sign this, again, you just asked him
to sign this without informing him of
anything, is that correct?
Answer: Except for the things I said
a while ago, we told him that before
signing, he can have the services of
a counsel.
Question: That is all you told the
accused, Mr. Sapad?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: Are you sure of that?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: You did not tell him before
signing that this document may be
used against him in a criminal
prosecution like this very serious
crime as charged in the very
information?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: Likewise, you did not
inform him that he has the right to
refuse signing the document?
Answer: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Question: I am showing you again
Exhibit "D", which you asked the
accused to sign, a booking sheet
and arrest report. Before you asked
the accused to sign, again, I am
asking you a very important
question, Mr. Sapad — it was only
the right to counsel that you
informed Mr. Yutuc and noting else
before you asked him to sign?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: And again, this was
signed in the presence of several
officers who are armed with guns, is
that correct?
Answer: Some were armed, sir.
Question: But this was signed in
Camp Olivas when he was
detained?
Answer: Before we have him
signed, he was not yet detained, sir.
Question: Now, let us clarify this. Do
you mean to say that when you
brought him to the office you don't
consider it detention yet?
Answer: Not yet, sir.
Question: And the act of
investigation, that is not detention
yet, according to you?
Answer: Not yet, sir.
Question: You are referring to
detention as the placing behind
bars.
Answer: Yes, sir.
COURT:
Question: But he was under your
custody?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: And it was a custodial
investigation that you had?
Answer: Yes, sir.
(Hearing, December 9, 1987; TSN, pp. 10-12, Record, pp. 171-173;
TSN, pp. 13-16; Record, pp. 174-176).
These documents were signed by the accused during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel. He was not informed
of his constitutional right to silence and obviously under threats of
violence and intimidation upon his person. He might have been
informed of his right to counsel but not that he may be provided with
one if he cannot afford the services of counsel. More than that, if it
can be assumed that he waived said right, the waiver was not in
writing and not in the presence of counsel. In any event, this Court
ruled that the written instruments are declaration against interest and
tacit admission of the crime charged, since mere unexplained
possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. These
documentary evidence is in the same category as extra-judicial Question: Without you having been
confessions outlawed by the Constitution (People v. Turla, G.R. No. a buyer or your companion having
70270, November 11, 1988). been a buyer, you would agree with
me that there would not have been
There is, therefore, no question that the admissions of the accused a charge against the accused, is
were taken without strict observance of Section 20, Article IV of the that correct?
Constitution which provides in no uncertain terms that "Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible Answer: Yes, sir.
in evidence."
Question: In other words,
Thus, this court has ruled that the rights guaranteed during a you induced practically the suspect
custodial investigation are not supposed to be merely communicated into commission of an offense, is
to the suspect especially if he is unlettered, but must be that correct?
painstakingly explained to him so he can understand their nature and
significance. Moreover, manhandling of any sort will vitiate any Answer: Yes, sir.
extrajudicial confession that may be extracted from him and render it
inadmissible in evidence against him (People v. Opida, 142 SCRA Question: Mr. Witness, you have
296 [1986]). been in investigation for so long. I
am asking you a very important
The evidence as to whether or not Yutuc participated in the sale of question, which may redound to the
marijuana is not enough to convict him beyond reasonable doubt. future of this poor boy: — you do not
But assuming he did sell, there remains the issue of whether he know the difference between the
was induced to sell or was merely entrapped into looking for instigation and entrapment, as an
marijuana to sell. investigator, is that correct?

Sgt. Juanita de la Cruz narrated that he approached the accused Answer: No, sir.
who was with one Arnel Garcia and told him "iiscore ako ng
marijuana," meaning, he will buy marijuana. The accused then Question: As a matter of fact, that
allegedly went inside a street at the back of a house and came back was not even a subject of your
bringing along with him the marijuana for which he (Sgt. de la Cruz) seminar or any other training before
paid the marked P50.00 (Hearing, September 16, 1987, TSN, pp. 32 you undergo raiding like this?
to 41).
Answer: I do no know that, sir.
On the other hand, Sgt. Sapad on cross examination admitted that
because of the verbal report of the informant, he already had a pre-
conceived notion, a pre-judgment that there really was illegal sale of Question: In short, you instigated
drugs in Tinajero and that accused was selling marijuana. He the commission of the crime?
admitted further that he and his companion practically induced the
suspect into the commission of the offense. He testified as follows: Answer: Yes, sir.
 (Hearing, December 9, 1987, TSN, pp. 18 to 20,
Emphasis supplied)
On all fours with the case at bar is the case of People v. Lapatha, et
al. (G.R. Nos. 63074-75, November 9, 1988), where the Court ruled
that instigation and not entrapment prevailed. Under similar
circumstances, the accused in said case was not looking for buyers
at the time when the poseur-buyer asked for the drug and practically
induced the former to commit the crime.
In the same case, the Court distinguished instigation from
entrapment as follows:
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for
the purpose of trapping and capturing the law
breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On
the other hand, in instigation, the instigator
practically induces the would be defendant into the
commission of the offense, and himself becomes a
co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution
and conviction, while in instigation, the defendant
would have to be acquitted.
In another case, this Court ruled further that entrapment must be
distinguished from inducement or instigation wherein the criminal
intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the accused is lured
into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute
him, In entrapment, the crime had already been committed, while in
instigation, it was not and could not have been committed were it not
for the instigation of the peace officer (People vs. Gatongo G.R. No.
78698, December 29, 1988).
In the case at bar, the accused denied having sold marijuana to the
Narcotics Command agents nor had he been engaged at any time in
sale of marijuana. His statement is confirmed by the fact that he has
no police or criminal record. Nevertheless, assuming that he did sell
the drug as alleged by the prosecution, it would appear that when
Sgt. Juanito de la Cruz approached the accused, the latter was not
looking for buyers of marijuana nor was he in possession of any
marijuana. It was Sgt. de la Cruz who proposed to buy marijuana
from the accused after having been introduced to the latter as a user.
Thereafter, the accused is alleged to have entered an alley at the
back of a house and later returned with the marijuana for which Sgt.
de la Cruz paid the accused P50. Without the proposal and
instigation of Sgt. de la Cruz, the alleged sale of marijuana would not
have transpired.
It is quite clear that Sgt. de la Cruz suggested the commission of the
crime by offering the accused P50 for the purchase of the prohibited
drug which was not even in the possession of the accused.
Otherwise stated, Sgt. de la Cruz instigated the accused to look for
marijuana which he (Sgt. de la Cruz) would buy or pay for P50.
When an employee of the government, as in this case, encourages
or induces persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them,
such conduct is most reprehensible (U.S. vs. Phelps, 16 Phil. 440, as
cited in People v. Lapatha [supra]). Clearly, there was instigation in
the case at bar and the defendant is entitled to acquittal.
In any event therefore, the issue as to whether or not the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses could be believed, is immaterial as
against the fact that instigation transpired in the case at bar and not
entrapment, in which case the accused would have to be acquitted.
Finally, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two
or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support conviction (People vs. Taruc, pp. 186-
187, supra).
The scales of justice must hang equal and in fact, should even be
tipped in favor of the accused because of the constitutional
presumption of innocence (People vs. Opida, 142 SCRA 303 [1986]).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and accused Estanislao Yutuc y Tellis is ACQUITTED on
grounds of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.