Republic of the Philippines the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.

He is
SUPREME COURT appealing from that decision with the following assignment of error:
Manila
1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the
EN BANC accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which
does not cover evasion of service of "destierro."
G.R. No. L-1960            November 26, 1948
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, evading a sentence of destierro  is not criminally liable under the
vs. provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the
FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-appellant. said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons
who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of
their liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment"
Carlos Perfecto for appellant.
used in the English text of said article which in part reads as follows:
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor
Manuel Tomacruz for appellee.
Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision
correccional  in its medium and maximum periods shall be
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of reason of final judgment.
Manila with evasion of service of sentence under the following
information:
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the
Revised Penal Code been in the English language, then the theory
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the of the appellant could be uphold. However, it is the Spanish text that
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a is controlling in case of doubt. The Spanish text of article 157 in part
convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four reads thus:
(4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he
should not enter any place within the radius of 100
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado
kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment
con prision correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el
rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal
sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose
case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there
mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said
sentencia firme; . . . .
sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and
commit vagrancy.
We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised
Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the
Contrary to law.
Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is
clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, with libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the
Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting
imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the
sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence
of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila.
This view has been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No.
36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court held, as
quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a
person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his
liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he
enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in that case was ratified by
this Court, though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus,
(45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370) 1, where it was held that one
evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the
prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he
cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall
have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion
of service of sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code
(Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence
of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited
from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same
is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J.,  dissenting:
The legal question raised in this case is whether or not appellant, for
having violated his judgment of destierro rendered by the Municipal
Court of Manila, can be sentenced under article 157 of the Revised
Penal Code which reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision
correccional  in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or
escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry,
by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or
by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall
be prision correccional in its maximum period.
Appellant invokes in his favor the negative opinion of author
Guillermo Guevara (Revised Penal Code, 1946, p. 322). This
negative position is supported by another author, Ambrosio Padilla
(Revised Penal Code annotated, p. 474).
The prosecution invokes the decision of this Court in  People vs. De
Jesus, L-1411,2promulgated April 16, 1948, but said decision has no
application because in said case the legal question involved in the
case at bar was not raised. The Supreme Court did not consider the
question of interpretation of the wording of article 157. Undoubtedly,
there was occasion for considering the question, but the Court
nevertheless failed to do so. This failure to see the question, at the
time, is only an evidence that the tribunal is composed of human
beings for whom infallibility is beyond reach.
The prosecution maintains that appellant's contention, supported by
two authors who have considered the question, although tenable
under the English text of article 157, is not so under the Spanish text,
which is the one controlling because the Revised Penal Code was
originally enacted by the Legislature in Spanish.
There is no quarrel, therefore, that under the above quoted English
text, the appellant is entitled to acquittal. The question now is
whether or not the Spanish text conveys a thing different from that
which can be read in the English text. The Spanish text reads as
follows:
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado
con prision correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el
sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose
mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por
sentencia firme; pero si la evasion o fuga se hubiere llevado
a efecto con escalamiento, fractura de puertas, ventanas,
verjas, paredes, techos o suelos, o empleado ganzuas,
llaves falsas, disfraz, engano, violencia o intimidacion, o
poniendose de acuerdo con otros sentenciados o
dependientes del establecimiento donde a hallare recluido la
pena sera prision correccional en su grado maximo.
The question boils down to the words "fugandose mientras estuviere
sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme," which are
translated into English "by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment." The prosecution
contends that the words "privacion de libertad" in the Spanish text is
not the same as the word "imprisonment" in the English text, and that
while "imprisonment" cannot include destierro, "privacion de libertad"
may include it.
The reason is, however, the result of a partial point of view because
it obliterates the grammatical, logical, ideological function of the
words "fugandose" and "by escaping" in the Spanish and English
texts, respectively. There should not be any question that, whatever
meaning we may want to give to the words "privacion de libertad," it
has to be conditioned by the verb "fugandose," (by escaping).
"Privacion de libertad" cannot be considered independently of
"fugandose."
There seems to be no question that the Spanish "fugandose" is
correctly translated into the English "by escaping." Now, is there any
sense in escaping from destierro or banishment, where there is no
enclosure binding the hypothetical fugitive? "Fugandose" is one of
the forms of the Spanish verb "fugar," to escape. The specific idea of
"evasion" or "escape" is reiterated by the use of said words after the
semi-colon in the Spanish text and after the first period in the English
text. Either the verb "to escape" or the substantive noun "escape"
essentially pre-supposes some kind of imprisonment or confinement,
except figuratively, and Article 157 does not talk in metaphors or
parables.
"To escape" means "to get away, as by flight or other conscious
effort; to break away, get free, or get clear, from or out of detention,
danger, discomfort, or the like; as to escape from prison. To issue
from confinement or enclosure of any sort; as gas escapes from the
mains." (Webster's New International Dictionary.)
"Escape" means "act of escaping, or fact or having escaped; evasion
of or deliverance from injury or any evil; also the means of escape.
The unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits of his custody.
When the prisoner gets out of prison and unlawfully regains his
liberty, it is an actual escape." (Webster's New International
Dictionary.)
"Evasion" means "escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.)
.
The "destierro" imposed on appellant banished him from Manila
alone, and he was free to stay in all the remaining parts of the
country, and to go and stay in any part of the globe outside the
country. With freedom to move all over the world, it is farfetched to
allege that he is in any confinement from which he could escape.
The words "privacion de libertad" have been correctly translated into
the English "imprisonment," which gives the idea exactly conveyed
by "privacion de libertad" in the Spanish text. Undoubtedly, the
drafters of the latter could have had used a more precise Spanish
word, but the literary error cannot be taken as a pretext to give to the
less precise words a broader meaning than is usually given to them.
"Privacion de libertad," literally meaning "deprivation of liberty or
freedom," has always been used by jurist using the Spanish
language to mean "imprisonment." They have never given them the
unbounded philosophical scope that would lead to irretrievable
absurdities.
Under that unlimited scope, no single individual in the more than two
billion inhabitants of the world can be considered free, as the freest
citizen of the freest country is subject to many limitations or
deprivations of liberty. Under the prosecution's theory, should an
accused, sentenced to pay a fine of one peso, evade the payment of
it, because the fine deprives him of liberty to dispose of his one peso,
he will be liable to be punished under article 157 of the Revised
Penal Code to imprisonment of from more that two years to six
years. The iniquity and cruelty of such situation are too glaring and
violent to be entertained for a moment under our constitutional
framework.
There is no gainsaying the proposition that to allow the violation of a
sentence of destierro  without punishment is undesirable, but even
without applying article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, the act of the
appellant cannot remain unpunished, because his violation of the
sentence of destierro may be punished as contempt of court, for
which imprisonment up to six months is provided.
It is deplorable that article 157 should not provide for a situation
presented in this case, but the gap cannot be filled by this Court
without encroaching upon the legislative powers of Congress.
Perhaps it is better that evasions of sentence be punished, as
provided by the old Penal Code, by an increased in the evaded
penalty. This will be more reasonable that the penalties provided by
article 157, which appear to be disproportionate and arbitrary,
because they place on equal footing the evader of a sentence of one
day of imprisonment and a life-termer, one who commits an
insignificant offense and one who perpetrates the most heinous
crime. At any rate, this is a problem for Congress to solve.
The appealed decision should be set aside.
EN BANC
December 5, 2017
G.R. No. 217874
OPHELIA HERNAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolution1 dated February 2, 2015 and Decision 2 dated November
13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division which affirmed, with
modification, the Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 7, Baguio City convicting petitioner of the crime
of malversation of public funds in Criminal Case No. 15722-R.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC), Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein she served as
an accounting clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted to the
position of Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue of which she was
designated as cashier, disbursement and collection officer. 3 As such,
petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and
clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll foes, and special
message fees. The collections she received were deposited at the
bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), Baguio City Branch.4
On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA), conducted a cash examination of the
accounts handled by petitioner as instructed by her superior,
Sherelyn Narag. As a result, Lopez came across deposit slips dated
September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of
₱11,300.00 and ₱81,348.20, rcspectively.5 Upon close scrutiny, she
noticed that said deposit slips did not bear a stamp of receipt by the
LBP nor was it machine validated. Suspicious about what she found,
she and Narag verified all the reports and other documents turned-
over to them by petitioner.6 On the basis of said findings, Narag sent
a letter to the LBP to confirm the remittances made by petitioner.
After adding all the deposits made and upon checking with the
teller's blotter, Nadelline Orallo, the resident auditor of LBP, found
that no deposits were made by petitioner for the account of DOTC on
September 19, 1996 for the amount of ₱11,300.00 and November
29, 1996 for the amount of ₱81,340.20.7
Thereafter, the LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez,
instructed the bank's teller, Catalina Ngaosi, to conduct their own
independent inquiry. It was discovered that on September 19, 1996,
the only deposit in favor of the DOTC was that made by its Ifugao
office in the Lagawe branch of the LBP.8 This prompted Lopez to
write to petitioner informing her that the two (2) aforesaid remittances
were not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found that
petitioner duly accounted for the ₱81,348.20 remittance but not for
the ₱11,300.00. Dissatisfied with petitioner's explanation as to the
whereabouts of the said remittance, Narag reported the matter to the
COA Regional Director who, in turn wrote to the LBP for
confirmation. The LBP then denied receiving any ₱11,300.00 deposit
on September 19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the
DOTC.9 Thus, the COA demanded that she pay the said amount.
Petitioner, however, refused. Consequently, the COA filed a
complaint for malversation of public funds against petitioner with the
Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon which, after due investigation,
recommended her indictment for the loss of
₱11,300.00.10 Accordingly, petitioner was charged before the RTC of
Baguio City in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about September 16, 1996, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer, being then the Disbursing Officer of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, Baguio City, and as such an
accountable officer, entrusted with and responsible for the amount of
₱1 1,300.00 which accused received and collected for the DOTC,
and intended for deposit under the account of DOTC with the Land
Bank of the Philippines-Baguio City, by reason of her position, while
in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her
position, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully
misappropriate or consent, or through abandonment or negligence,
permit other persons to take such amount of ₱11,300.00 to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
Upon arraignment on July 31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
two (2) COA auditors, namely, Maria Lopez and Sherelyn Narag as
well as three (3) LBP employees, namely, Rebecca Sanchez,
Catalina Ngaosi, and Nadelline Orallo. 12 In response, the defense
presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized
as follows:
On September 19, 1996, petitioner and her supervisor, Cecilia
Paraiso, went to the LBP Baguio branch and personally deposited
the exact amount of ₱11,300.00 with accomplished deposit slips in
six (6) copies.13 Since there were many clients who came ahead of
her, she decided to go with her usual arrangement of leaving the
money with the teller and telling her that she would just come back to
retrieve the deposit slip. Thus, she handed the money to Teller No.
2, whom she identified as Catalina Ngaosi. Upon her return at
around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, she retrieved four (4) copies of the
deposit slip from Ngaosi. She noticed that the same had no
acknowledgment mark on it. Being contented with the initials of the
teller on the deposit slips, she returned to her office and kept them in
her vault. It was only during the cash count conducted by auditor
Lopez when she found out that the said amount was not remitted to
the account of the LBP. When demand was made on her to return
the amount, she requested that she be allowed to pay only after
investigation of a complaint of Estafa that she would file with the
National Bureau of Investigation against some personnel of the bank,
particularly Catalina Ngaosi.14 The complaint, however, was
eventually dismissed.15
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered convicting accused Ophelia Hernan of Malversation and
hereby sentences her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, to suffer imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day
of prision mayor medium period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months
and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum period to reclusion
temporal maximum period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
₱11,300.00.
Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification.
Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to
the government the amount of ₱11,300.00 plus legal interest thereon
at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the date of the
filing of the Information up to the time the same is actually paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.16
Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon
motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on the finding that it
has no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
petitioner occupying a position lower than Salary Grade
27.17 Petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Leticia Gutierrez Hayes-Allen,
then appealed the case to the Sandiganbayan. In a Decision dated
November 13, 2009, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's
judgment of conviction but modified the penalty imposed, the
dispositive opinion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modifications that the indeterminate
penalty to be imposed on the accused should be from 6 years and 1
day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21
days of prision mayor as maximum, together with the accessory
penalties under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that
interest of only 6% shall be imposed on the amount of ₱11,300.00 to
be restored by the accused.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 21,
2009 alleging that during the trial before the RTC, her counsel was
unable to elicit many facts which would show her innocence. Said
counsel principally failed to present certain witnesses and
documents that would supposedly acquit her from the crime charged.
The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the motion in a Resolution
dated August 31, 2010 on the ground that evidence not formally
offered before the court below cannot be considered on appeal. 19
On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration became final and executory and was recorded in
the Book of Entries of Judgments.20 On July 26, 2013, petitioner's
new counsel, Atty. Meshack Macwes, filed an Urgent Motion to
Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the
Execution.21 In a Resolution22 dated December 4, 2013, however, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion and directed the execution of the
judgment of conviction. It noted the absence of the following
requisites for the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be
before finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by
the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued
only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or
further evidence should be terminated within thirty (30) days from the
issuance of the order.23
Unfazed, petitioner filed on January 9, 2014 a Petition for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of
the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment praying for a
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan' s recent Resolution, that the
case be reopened for further reception of evidence, and the recall of
the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013. 24 In a Resolution dated
February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the petition for lack of
merit. According to the said court, the motion is clearly a third motion
for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of
Court. Also, the grounds raised therein were merely a rehash of
those raised in the two previous motions. The claims that the
accused could not contact her counsel on whom she merely relied
on for appropriate remedies to be filed on her behalf, and that she
has additional evidence to present, were already thoroughly
discussed in the August 31, 2010 and December 4, 2013
Resolutions. Moreover, the cases relied upon by petitioner are not on
point.25
On May 14, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the
following arguments:
I.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
MOTION TO REOPEN WAS FILED OUT OF TIME CONSIDERING
TI-IE EXTRAORDINARY AND EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE CASE.
II.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
INTENDED TO BE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER SHOULD HER
MOTTON FOR REOPENING BE GRANTED, WAS PASSED UPON
BY THE TRIAL COURT.
III.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PRONOUNCING THAT THE
MOTION TO REOPEN AND THE PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONER ARE CONSIDERED
AS THE SECOND AND THIRD MOTIONS TO THE DENIAL OF
THE DECISION.
Petitioner posits that her counsel, Atty. Hayes-Allen, never received
the August 31, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying her
Motion for Reconsideration. This is because notice thereof was
erroneously sent to said counsel's previous office at Poblacion, La
Trinidad, Benguet, despite the fact that it was specifically indicated in
the Motion for Reconsideration that the new office is at the Public
Attorney's Office of Tayug, Pangasinan, following her counsel's
appointment as public attorney. Thus, since her counsel was not
properly notified of the subject resolution, the entry of judgment is
premature.26 In support of her assertion, she cites Our ruling
in People v. Chavez,27 wherein We held that an entry of judgment
without receipt of the resolution is premature.
Petitioner also claims that during trial, she could not obtain the
necessary evidence for her defense due to the fact that the odds
were against her. Because of this, she asks the Court to relax the
strict application of the rules and consider remanding the case to the
lower court for further reception of evidence. 28 In particular, petitioner
seeks the reception of an affidavit of a certain John L. Ziganay, an
accountant at the Depaiiment of Science and
Technology (DOST), who previously worked at the DOTC and COA,
as well as two (2) deposit slips. According to petitioner, these pieces
of evidence would show that the ₱11,300.00 deposited at the
Lagawe branch of the LBP was actually the deposit made by
petitioner and not by a certain Lanie Cabacungan, as the prosecution
suggests. This is because the ₱11,300.00 deposit made by
Cabacungan consists of two (2) different amounts, which, if proper
accounting procedure is followed, shall be recorded in the bank
statement as two (2) separate amounts and not their total sum of
₱11,300.00.29 Thus, the Sandiganbayan's denial of petitioner's
motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical
since the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a
miscarriage.
Finally, petitioner denies the Sandiganbayan's ruling that her motion
to reopen and petition for reconsideration are considered as a
second and third motion for reconsideration, and are thus, prohibited
pleadings. This is because the additional evidence she seeks to
introduce were not available during the trial of her case.
The petition is devoid of merit.
At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent
Office of the Special Prosecutor, petitioner's resort to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an improper
remedy. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies
available, a party aggrieved by a cou1i order, resolution or decision
must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or
decision he intends to assail. 30 It bears stressing that the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.31 If the Order or Resolution sought to be
assailed is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved
party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.32 Petitioner, in the instant
case, seeks to assail the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated
December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 wherein said court denied
her motion to reopen the malversation case against her. Said
resolutions are clearly final orders that dispose the proceedings
completely. The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is,
therefore, improper.
Even if We assume the propriety of petitioner's chosen action, the
Court still cannot grant the reliefs she prays for, specifically: (1) the
reversal of the Sandiganbayan's December 4, 2013 and February 2,
2015 Resolutions denying her motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration; (2) the reopening of the case for further reception of
evidence; and (3) the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26,
2013.33
First of all, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that since her
counsel was not properly notified of the August 31, 2010 Resolution
as notice thereof was erroneously sent to her old office address, the
entry of judgment is premature. As the Court sees it, petitioner has
no one but herself to blame. Time and again, the Court has held that
in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a
change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court
upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel
on record.34 It is the duty of the party and his counsel to device a
system for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty
of the counsel to inform the court officially of a change in his
address.35 If counsel moves to another address without informing the
court of that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will
not stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be expected to
take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved or
to ascertain on its own whether or not the counsel of record has
been changed and who the new counsel could possibly be or where
he probably resides or holds office.36
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to inform the
court of the change in her office address from Poblacion, La
Trinidad, Benguet, to the Public Attorney's Office in Tayug,
Pangasinan. The fact that said new address was indicated in
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration does not suffice as "proper
and adequate notice" to the court. As previously stated, courts
cannot be expected to take notice of every single time the counsel of
a party changes address. Besides, it must be noted that petitioner
even expressly admitted having received the subject resolution
"sometime in September or October 2010." 37 Easily, she could have
informed her counsel of the same. As respondent posits, it is not as if
petitioner had no knowledge of the whereabouts of her counsel
considering that at the time of the filing of her Motion for
Reconsideration, said counsel was already with the PA0. 38 Moreover,
the Court cannot permit petitioner's reliance on the Chavez case
because there, petitioner did not receive the resolution of the Court
of Appeals through no fault or negligence on his paii. 39 Here,
however, petitioner's non-receipt of the subject resolution was mainly
attributable not only to her counsel's negligence but hers, as well.
Thus, the Court deems it necessary to remind litigants, who are
represented by counsel, that they should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.
They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel for what
is at stake is their interest in the case. It is, therefore, their
responsibility to check the status of their case from time to time. 40
To recall, petitioner, on December 21, 2009, filed her Motion for
Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the Sandiganbayan's
November 13, 2009 Decision which affirmed the RTC's ruling
convicting her of the crime of malversation. In a Resolution dated
August 31, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. Said resolution became final in the absence of any
pleading filed thereafter, and hence, was recorded in the Book of
Entries of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Subsequently, on July 12,
2013, petitioner, through her new counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to
Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the
Execution, which was denied through the Sandiganbayan's
Resolution dated December 4, 2013.41 Undeterred, petitioner filed
her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of
Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of
Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was likewise denied in the
Sandiganbayan's February 2, 2015 Resolution.
It seems, therefore, that petitioner waited almost an entire three (3)
year period from the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration to act
upon the malversation case against her through the filing of her
urgent motion to reopen. In fact, her filing of said motion may very
well be prompted only by her realization that the case has finally
concluded by reason of the entry of judgment. Stated otherwise, the
Court is under the impression that had she not heard of the recording
of the August 31, 2010 Resolution in the Book of Entries of
Judgments on June 26, 2013, petitioner would not even have
inquired about the status of her case. As respondent puts it, the
urgent motion to reopen appears to have been filed as a substitute
for the lost remedy of an appeal via a petition for review
on certiorari before the Court.42 On this inexcusable negligence
alone, the Court finds sufficient basis to deny the instant petition.
Second of all, petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of
her motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical
since the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a
miscarriage has no legal nor factual leg to stand on. Section 24, Rule
119 and existing jurisprudence provide for the following requirements
for the reopening a case: (l) the reopening must be before the finality
of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on
his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a
hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage
of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further
evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of
the order.43
But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite
that the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of
conviction already cripples the motion.1âwphi1 The records of the
case clearly reveal that the August 3l, 2010 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had
already become final and executory and, in fact, was already
recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013.
Moreover, petitioner's supposed predicament about her former
counsel failing to present witnesses and documents should have
been advanced before the trial court.44 It is the trial court, and neither
the Sandiganbayan nor the Court, which receives evidence and rules
over exhibits formally offered.45 Thus, it was, indeed, too late in the
day to advance additional allegations for petitioner had all the
opportunity to do so in the lower court. An appellate court will
generally not disturb the trial court's assessment of factual matters
except only when it clearly overlooked certain facts or where the
evidence fails to substantiate the lower court's findings or when the
disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. 46
Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the
Sandiganbayan acted in a capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner
when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen especially in view of the
fact that the rulings it seeks to refute are legally sound and
appropriately based on the evidences presented by the parties. On
this score, the elements of malversation of public funds under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a
public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or
property were public funds or prope1iy for which he was
accountable; and (4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them. This article establishes a presumption
that when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public
funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds to personal uses.47
As duly found by the trial court, and affinned by the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner's defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia
Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject ₱11,300.00 deposit
to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the
money went failed to overcome the presumption of law. For one,
Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For
another, when questioned about the subject deposit, not only did
petitioner fail to make the same readily available, she also could not
satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of
malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof
that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did
not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made,
and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so.48
Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who
misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable
for malversation. The Comi quotes, with approval, the trial court's
ruling, viz.:
Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the
amount of ₱11,300.00 and the corresponding deposit slip with
the Bank Teller Ngaosi and she came back to retrieve the
deposit slip later, is to be believed and then it came out that the
said ₱11,300.00 was not credited to the account of DOTC with
the Land Bank and was in fact missing, still accused Hernan
should be convicted of malversation because in this latter
situation she permits through her inexcusable negligence
another person to take the money. And this is still malversation
under Article 217.49
Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its
Decision, thus:
Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina
Ngaosi who misappropriated the amount and should therefore be
held liable, as the accused would want to poltray, the Court doubts
the tenability of that position. As consistently ruled by jurisprudence,
a public officer may be held liable for malversation even if he does
not use public property or funds under his custody for his personal
benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another person, or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking. The
accused, by her negligence, simply created the opportunity for
the misappropriation. Even her justification that her deposits
which were not machine-validated were nonetheless
acknowledged by the bank cannot fortify her defense. On the
contrary, it all the more emphasizes her propensity for
negligence each time that she accepted deposit slips which
were not machinevalidated, her only proof of receipt of her
deposits. 50
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's
finding that petitioner's motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration are practically second and third motions for
reconsideration from its Decision dated November 13, 2009. Under
the rules, the motions are already prohibited pleadings under Section
5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court due to the fact that the grounds
raised in the petition for reconsideration are merely a rehash of those
raised in the two (2) previous motions filed before it. These grounds
were already thoroughly discussed by the Sandiganbayan in its
subject resolutions. Hence, as duly noted by the Sandiganbayan, in
the law of pleading, courts are called upon to pierce the form and go
into the substance, not to be misled by a false or wrong name given
to a pleading because the title thereof is not controlling and the court
should be guided by its averments.51 Thus, the fact that the pleadings
filed by petitioner are entitled Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case
with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay Execution and Petition
for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in
lieu of the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment does not exempt
them from the application of the rules on prohibited pleadings.
Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is
grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound
practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts
and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some
definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are
the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
which render its execution unjust and inequitable. 52 None of the
exceptions is present in this case.
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment
becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the
winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the
judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory
schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts,
time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that
this Court should write finis to this litigation.53
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still
necessary to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of
Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further
reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order
to modify the penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that
a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or
law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.54 When, however, circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable, the Court may sit en bane and give due regard to such
exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of
immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c), 55 Rule II of the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides that cases
raising novel questions of law are acted upon by the Court en
bane. To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10951 entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property
and Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed
Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No.
3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal Code" as
Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the
crime charged herein is an example of such exceptional
circumstance. Section 40 of said Act provides:
SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act.
No. 1060, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise
be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of pnswn correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation docs not exceed Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000.00).
xxxx
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the
penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the
amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a
novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused,
petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet
the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the
passage of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner's
sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive
effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the
accused,56 she may even apply for probation, 57 as long as she does
not possess any ground for disqualification, 58 in view of recent
legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707 entitled An Act Amending
Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation
Law of 1976," As Amended. allowing an accused to apply for
probation in the event that she is sentenced to serve a maximum
term of imprisonment of not more than six (6) years when a judgment
of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or
reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a
probationable penalty.59
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may
suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the
Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry
of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which
imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since
the amount involved herein is ₱11,300.00, which does not exceed
₱40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison
term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6)
years. The Court, however, takes note of the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated by the
Sandiganbayan in favor of petitioner.60 Hence, taking into
consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the
presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance, the range of the penalty
that must be imposed as the maximum term should be prision
correccional medium to prision correccional maximum in its minimum
period, or from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to
three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days, in accordance
with Article 6461 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the range of the minimum term that should be imposed upon
petitioners is anywhere within the period of arresto mayor, maximum
to prision correccional minimum with a range of four (4) months and
one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Accordingly,
petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6)
months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum.
On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private
counsels, and such other officers of the law are hereby advised to
similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by
reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case.
Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where
the imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified
theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief,
malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is
dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof,
have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration
the presence of existing circumstances attending its commission. For
as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall
find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the
time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service
of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable
instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting
him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already
begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already
accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case,
moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and expediency, further
directs the appropriate filing of an action before the Court that seeks
the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a
similar purpose.
Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage
of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and
favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the
reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which
is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable
penalties to be imposed.
Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and
Correctional Institution for Women are hereby ordered to determine if
there are accused serving final sentences similarly situated as the
accused in this particular case and if there are, to coordinate and
communicate with the Public Attorney's Office and the latter, to
represent and file the necessary pleading before this Court in behalf
of these convicted accused in light of this Court's pronouncement; (2)
For those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive
imprisonment, either the cases against them are non-bailable or
cannot put up the bail in view of the penalties imposable under the
old law, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the
necessary pleading before the proper courts, whether undergoing
trial in the RTC or undergoing appeal in the appellate courts and
apply for bail, for their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where
the accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment pending trial or THIRD DIVISION
appeal, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the
necessary pleading if the accused have already served the minimum G.R. No. 164815               September 3, 2009
sentence of the crime charged against them based on the penalties
imposable under the new law, R.A. No. 10951, for their immediate SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner,
release in accordance with A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC or the Guidelines vs.
For Decongesting Holding Jails By Enforcing The Rights Of Accused COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
Persons To Bail And To Speedy Trial; 62 and (4) Lastly, all courts, PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
including appellate courts, are hereby ordered to give priority to
those cases covered by R.A. No. 10951 to avoid any prolonged
imprisonment. RESOLUTION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition NACHURA, J.:

is DENIED. The Resolution dated February 2, 2015 and Decision
dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum term, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and
twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum term.
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.)
Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our February 22, 2008
Decision2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3 be set aside and a new one
be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for dissemination to the First and Second Level
courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of the appellate courts, the
Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public
Attorney's Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the
National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women, and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information, guidance, and
appropriate action.
Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the
Philippines, and the House of Representatives, be furnished copies
of this Decision for their information.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused without any authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her
possession and under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with
five (5) live ammo.

SO ORDERED. without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by

the proper authorities.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Manila
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty." 5 Trial on the merits
ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police
Officer (SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal
Investigation Division of the Central Police District Command; and
Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the Firearms and
Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch
Order from the desk officer directing him and three (3) other
policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge Ignacio
Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with ransom. 6
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on
Valeroso checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.
Eventually, the team members proceeded to the Integrated National
Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where
they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his team
approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed him of his
constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a Charter
Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces of live
ammunition, tucked in his waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon
verification in the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame,
Deriquito presented a certification8 that the subject firearm was not
issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain Raul
Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol),
and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the
boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay
New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4) heavily armed
men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him out
of the room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him near
the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside, searched and
ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the
room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!" 11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for
his arrest. However, the raiding team was not armed with a search
warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum
Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993 covering the subject firearm and its
ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno. 14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon
City, convicted Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The gun subject of
the case was further ordered confiscated in favor of the
government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed 16 the RTC decision
but the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to
four (4) years and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed 17 in full the CA decision. Valeroso
filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was denied with
finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal 20 imploring
this Court to once more take a contemplative reflection and
deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure.21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to
timely file its Comment on Valeroso’s Motion for Reconsideration, it
instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. 22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now
recommends Valeroso’s acquittal. After a second look at the
evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the
witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes that
Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the
OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by
the police officers in violation of Valeroso’s constitutional right
against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded from
the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject
firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be
convicted of the crime, since he was able to establish his authority to
possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his
superiors.
After considering anew Valeroso’s arguments through his Letter-
Appeal, together with the OSG’s position recommending his
acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately
reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration. While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a
general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of
the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave
whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby. 24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or
excepting a particular case from the operation of the rules. In De
Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzman’s
motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus Motion,
which was actually a second motion for reconsideration. Eventually,
we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to the
Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner’s
evidence. In that case, we said that if we would not compassionately
bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner would surely
experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime
which he might not have committed after all. 26 Also in Astorga v.
People,27 on a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our
earlier decision, re-examined the records of the case, then finally
acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the
ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc
Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to
suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve
respondent’s second motion for reconsideration after the motion was
heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination of the merits of the
case, we granted the second motion for reconsideration and set
aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the
re-examination of the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier
made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are conceived
and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of
justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not
the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case
from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where
Valeroso was arrested, is different from the version of the defense.
The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP
Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to
board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting
officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm and
ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was
arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the
warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the
police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a
cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of
the joint appeal for acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that
we must give more credence to the version of the defense.
Valeroso’s appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure alleged to have been
violated by the arresting police officers; and if so, would render the
confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence against
him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a
general rule, the procurement of a warrant is required before a law
enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers, or
effects of any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental
right of an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Constitution succinctly declares in Article III, Section 3(2), that
"any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are
the well-recognized instances where searches and seizures are
allowed even without a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a)
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations. 33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
reasonableness laid down above, is the warrantless search and concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. 42
seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of
We answer in the negative. arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso
was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They
to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the
are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of
reads: Disuanco.43 The other police officers remained inside the room and
ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject firearm
and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant. From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that
the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any
resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is
control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the
not without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri, 35 People v. Cubcubin,
room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to
Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the
Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area
parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an incident
within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to
to a lawful arrest.
take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used
against him.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the
latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of him,
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 38
the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. 46
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless
the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only
search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting
on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within
officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
the latter’s reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one
destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should
arrested or within the area of his immediate control. 40 The phrase
not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. 47 In the
"within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within
case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
be said to have been within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the
evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an
incident to a lawful arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the
"plain view doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt.
The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course
of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of
Valeroso’s children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant
of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers
had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence
that they would inadvertently discover may be used against
Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not just
accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they
actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the
evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in
evidence against him.1avvphi1
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which
the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power
to search and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare,
still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing
the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the
law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. 53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional
right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the
performance of official functions.54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If
people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings,
democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless.
This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of
the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental
law way above the articles on governmental power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot
stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict him. 56 All told,
the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
measured by the required moral certainty for conviction. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome
the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it
would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of
the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he
did not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the
other issues raised by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non
against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of the 3. ID.; ID.; FEEBLEMINDEDNESS AND ACT IN A FIT OF
government.58 JEALOUSY AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. —
Feeblemindedness of the accused warrants the finding i his
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either
Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised
SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal Penal Code and the fact that the accused evidently killed his
possession of firearm and ammunition. wife in a fit of jealousy, he is, likewise entitled to the
mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article
SO ORDERED. — that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
EN BANC
4. ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — The penalty applicable for parricide
[G.R. No. L-3246. November 29, 1950.] under article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed
only two indivisible penalties, to wit, reclusion perpetua to
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, death. Altho the commission of the act is attended by some
v. ABELARDO FORMIGONES, Defendant-Appellant. mitigating circumstance without any aggravating
circumstance to offset them, article 63 of the said code is
Luis Contreras, for Appellant. the one applicable and must be applied.

Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor
Felix V. Makasiar, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; IMBECILITY AS EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCES; REQUISITES. — In order that a person
could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt
from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of
reason of discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — A man who could feel the pangs of
jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of killing
his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in
the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor,
5. id.; id.; attention OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE INVITED TO
THE CASE. — When the court believes that the appellant is
entitled to a lighter penalty the case should be brought to
the attention of the Chief Executive who, i his discretion
may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion
perpetua to the death or otherwise apply executive
clemency in the manner he sees fit.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty of
parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P2,000, and to pay the costs. The following facts are not
disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo
Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan,
municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia
Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to live
in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the
barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to
find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a
month’s stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the
afternoon, Julia Agricola was sitting at the head of the stairs
of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or
provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the
house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade
penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage
resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent
Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately
followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his
arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the
living room and then lay down beside her. In this position
he was found by the people who came in response to the
shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene
Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of
her mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo
signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted
that he killed his wife. The motive was admittedly that of
jealousy because according to his statement he used to
have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw
her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he
suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations
because he noticed that his wife had become indifferent to
him (defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the
justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty,
as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court
of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty,
but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of
two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was
confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather
strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that
sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked
in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he
would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that
he would refuse to take a bath and wash his clothes until
forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he
would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone
by himself without being asked; and that once when the
door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from inside
into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to
regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant
is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability
under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court
rejected this same theory and we are inclined to agree with
the lower court. According to the very witness of the
defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was
his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could
distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile
within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom
of the will at the time of committing the crime. The
provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied
from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal
Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are
pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo
Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,
4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this
exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused
be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his
own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; 46
that there be a complete absence of the power to discern,
or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at
the time of the commission of the act should absolutely
deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because
mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude
imputability. 49
"The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-
muteness cannot be equalled to imbecility or insanity.
"The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had
previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments
prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized
by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is
improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in
order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his
mental. condition, unless his insanity and absence of will
are proved."cralaw virtua1aw library
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his
confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate
insanity, it may be attributed either to his being
feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition
produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the
case of United States v. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote the
following syllabus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no
further than to indicate that the accused was moved by a
wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other
testimony to the effect that, while in confinement awaiting
trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not
sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The conduct
of the defendant while in confinement appears to have been
due to a morbid mental condition produced by
remorse."cralaw virtua1aw library
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that
the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence,
during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done
anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant
an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and
dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and
supported his family and even maintained in school his
children of school age, with the fruits of his work.
Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who
could feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent measures
to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being
unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was
vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an
imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of
little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of
justification and was not a mere product of hallucination and
aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a
lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In addition
to the observations made by appellant in his written
statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his wife first
went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias
Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and
his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo
was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said
house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have
aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of
Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems
to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple and even
feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully
developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife after
she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs,
laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours,
shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one
though he thought that she had betrayed him. Although he
did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no
effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and
arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted
that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to
deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the
government all the trouble and expense of catching him,
and insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not
prepared to find that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems
that the prosecution was not intent on proving it. At least
said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the
complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in the
Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the
benefit of the doubt and we therefore decline to find the
existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other
hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants
the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance
provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article
13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely, that the accused is
"suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his
means of action, defense or communication with his fellow
beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of
his will power." To this we may add the mitigating
circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, — that of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to
have produced passion or obfuscation. The accused
evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without
any aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first we
thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of
article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the
purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which is reclusion
perpetua to death. It will be observed however, that article
64 refers to the application of penalties which contain three
periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed
of three different penalties, each one of which forms a
period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and
77, which is not true in the present case where the penalty
applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible
penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of the same Code
refers to the application of indivisible penalties whether it be
a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like
that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that
article 63 is the one applicable in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the
commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a similar legal
provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States v.
Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide, in
applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal
Code) which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3
of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice
Arellano said the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"And even though this court should take into consideration
the presence of two mitigating circumstances of a qualifying
nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any
aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the
next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a
ruling of the court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned
does not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule
5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code).
(Decision of September 30, 1879.)
"Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict
application of which is inevitable and which, under the law,
must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional
power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal
Code; and.
"Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with
costs, and hereby order that a proper petition be filed with
the executive branch of the Government in order that the
latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of the
prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce
the penalty to that of the next lower."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Then, in the case of People v. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604),
another parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming the
judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion
perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous
mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the
penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties,
namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article
63 of the said Code must be applied. The Court further
observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that
malice nor has exhibited such moral turpitude as requires
life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of
article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite
the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view
to executive clemency after appellant has served an
appreciable amount of confinement."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and
we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court with the
modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half
of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone.
Appellant will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this
same court in the two cases above cited, and believing that
the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should
be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in
his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower
to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive
clemency in the manner he sees fit.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141066             February 17, 2005
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the
Decision,1 dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case
Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
were filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 -
7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually
helping with one another, knowing fully well that they did not have
sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated
July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE
PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (₱9,075.55), payable to
Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they
did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the
amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to
Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned
checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank
for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the
account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank,
Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22.2
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
7069 and 7070 are similarly worded, except for the allegations
concerning the number, date and amount of each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July
22, 1990 in the amount of ₱12,730.00;3
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July
22, 1990 in the amount of ₱8,496.55.4
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on
June 26, 1991, the two accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes
charged.5
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo
Oculam. He testified that: in 1989, spouses Adronico 6 and
Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in his pawnshop
business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol;7 sometime in May 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained a ₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed
by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post
dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; 8 sometime in the last
week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of ₱12,730.00,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July
26, 1990 issued by Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of ₱8,496.55,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990
issued by Adronico;10 the three checks bounced upon presentment
for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT"; 11 when the Ladonga spouses
failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a
criminal complaint against them.12
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced
because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed,
the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to
guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not
encash the checks when they mature; 13 and, that petitioner is not a
signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance
thereof.14
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the
Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P.
Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding
accused Adronico Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal
cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and
accordingly, sentences them to imprisonment and fine, as follows:
 1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of
one (1) year for each of them, and a fine in the amount of
₱9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No.
284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for
each of them to one (1) year and a fine of ₱12, 730.00,
equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of
one year for each of them and a fine of ₱8,496.55 equivalent
to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and
solidarily pay and reimburse the complainant, Mr. Alfredo
Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00 representing actual
expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant cases;
₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount of ₱30,302.10
which is the total value of the three (3) subject checks which
bounced; but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.15
Adronico applied for probation which was granted. 16 On the other
hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing
that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with
her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P.
Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. 17
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
petitioner.18 It held that the provisions of the penal code were made
applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of this Court in
People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs. Bruhez.21 It noted
that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its
provisions shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter
provide the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P.
Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle of
conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg.
22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue
or sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is
not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in every
act and knows the part which everyone performed. The Court of
Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator
could be held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of
Appeals denied the same in a Resolution dated November 16,
1999.22
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT
THE DRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS
THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND
UNDER THE LATTER’S ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD
LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE
FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN
VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING
THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. –
Offenses which are or in the future may be punished under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall
be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION
OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE
SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO
SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.23
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the
drawing and issuance of the three checks subject of the three
criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She
contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the
principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations
of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of
conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and include
situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such as
penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the
drawing or issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and
echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that some provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the
second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It
submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding
the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. –
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall
be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that
offenses which in the future are made punishable under special laws
are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes
the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two
clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that
they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special
penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically
punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory
construction that special legal provisions prevail over general
ones.24 Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be
considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated
altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The
main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that
the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter
should specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs.
Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S. vs. Bruhez27 rests on a firm basis.
These cases involved the suppletory application of principles under
the then Penal Code to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned
with the application of Article 22 28 of the Code to violations of Act No.
3030, the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect of
penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the
application of Article 1729 of the same Penal Code, with reference to
the participation of principals in the commission of the crime of
misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No.
1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 4530 of the same Code, with
reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in violation of
Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application
of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary
provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by
their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People,31 the Court applied
suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article
3932 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case
is analogous to the application of the provision on principals under
Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert
to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all
the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of
each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.33
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set
aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a co-principal
by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity.34 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or
may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving
them to execute or implement the criminal plan.35
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner
performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As
testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo
Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico,
signed the check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068. 36 With respect
to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the
details of petitioner’s participation. He did not specify the nature of
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a
direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator,
or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the
only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that
she was present when the first check was issued. However, this
inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal
design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive
and conclusive evidence.37 Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does
not in itself amount to conspiracy. 38 Even knowledge, acquiescence
in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a
party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.39
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent
vintage, People vs. Mandao:40
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly
or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability
under specific circumstances; as such, it must be established as
clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be
positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient and
simplistic device by which the accused may be ensnared and kept
within the penal fold.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of
conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must always be founded on
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. The Court ruled thus
in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence
against accused-appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged the
latter’s criminal liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to
us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be
predicated on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and
not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The proof
against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defense could be laid the responsibility for the
offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In
criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines
the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence
for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the
prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof
required in all criminal cases. (Citations omitted)41
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner
with moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof
required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of
the petitioner’s innocence must be upheld and she must be
acquitted.1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068,
7069 and 7070 convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga
is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on
November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or about October
22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four
tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-
buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when
subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for
marijuana.1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2,
1989, after his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained, 2 he
pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial
conference,3 after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly
concluded.
I
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later
identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a
certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt.
Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics
Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed
of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing
marked money from Bustamante, the team, together with their
informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with
the police authorities and barangay officers thereof. When they
reached the place, the confidential informer pointed out appellant to
Lopez who consequently approached appellant and asked him if he
had marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez
offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning
shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and
Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as
payment. Lopez then scratched his head as a due
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around
ten to fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on them.
Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team,
arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the team to the
3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he
was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the
investigator.4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the
deal that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also
averred that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took
the marked money from appellant.5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part
of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of the
other members, that is, around two hundred meters away from his
companions. He did not actually see the sale that transpired between
Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant
after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who conducted the
custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of
his rights to remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant,
however, orally waived his right to counsel.6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of
Property Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting
therein the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in
his possession. Pejoro likewise informed the court below that,
originally, what he placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana
leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and
Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put "two", instead of
"one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to the correction since
they were the ones who were personally and directly involved in the
purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant. 7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined
appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's apprehension, and
the results were practically normal except for his relatively high blood
pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury on
the person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant
to the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara
discovered that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which causes
him to experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In
the afternoon, appellant came back with the same complaint but,
except for the gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition remained
normal.8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the
attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at around 4:30
p.m., he was watching television with the members of his family in
their house when three persons, whom he had never met before
suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just
inquire about something from him at their detachment, appellant
boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were going to Camp
Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different route.
While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to
alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally
reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when
he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt.
Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints
on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the
P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-
peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why
he vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands
of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but
claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure the
maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he
proceeded to the house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San
Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m.
There, he consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied
by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at
Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for three days. 9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that
appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after
undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise
confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even
before the latter's arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident
physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she
treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her
examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant's
peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external
injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the
trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a
fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in
favor of the Government.12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned
judgment of the lower court, contending in his assignment of errors
that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2)
not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated)
inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory
and evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold only two tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were
merely confiscated subsequently from his possession, 14 the latter not
being in any way connected with the sale, the information alleges
that he sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves.15 In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this
appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea bags  allegedly
committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate and
distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags  which
separate offense is not charged herein.16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be
clearly and unmistakably established.17 To sell means to give,
whether for money or any other material consideration. 18 It must,
therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold
and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez,
who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso
bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced
by both parties, we are morally certain that appellant was caught
in  flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that
appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana
dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to
how the sale took place and his testimony was amply corroborated
by his teammates. As between the straightforward, positive and
corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative
testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater
weight and is more entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through
the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake,
harassment, extortion and abuse. 19 Nonetheless, such causes for
judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar.
Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard
way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected. 20 No ill motive was or could be
attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to
have regularly performed their official duty.21 Such lack of dubious
motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and
uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed, 22 erected
as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant
was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a
delimited chance for him to controvert the charge, he does not operations.28 This omission has been satisfactorily explained by Pfc.
appear to have plausibly done so. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:

When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Q: Is it the standard operating
Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National procedure of your unit that in
Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn conducting such operation you do
Salangad, a forensic chemist therein,23 confirmed in her Technical not anymore provide a powder (sic)
Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags on the object so as to determine the
confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of thumbmark or identity of the
3.8 grams of marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had persons taking hold of the object?
been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.25
A: We were not able to put powder
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies on these denominations because
and improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. we are lacking that kind of material
Foremost, according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated in our office since that item can be
the marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro purchased only in Manila and only
asserted that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the few are producing that, sir.
marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same. 26 x x x           x x x          x x x

Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who
confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since such is not an
element of the offense with which appellant is charged. What is
unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the
possession of appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the
prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana
from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor
matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the
prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses'
honesty.27 Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of language
since Pejoro obviously meant that he did not take part in
the  physical  taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he
participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the
investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills
allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-printing
purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust
Q: Is it not a fact that your office is
within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory,
CIS, as well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to
those offices but we cannot make a
request for that powder because
they, themselves, are using that in
their own work, sir.29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark
the money bills used for entrapment purposes can under no mode of
rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution because the
Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions." 30 The dusting of said bills with
phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for
identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by other
species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor
any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the
lack of pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover,
he was not reported to or booked in the custody of
any barangay official or police authorities.31 These are absurd
disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or
seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or
any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures. On
the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant
in  flagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also
under the obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest
report prepared by the police in connection with his apprehension.
Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report32 states, inter alia, that
"suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected
marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation of another two tea bags
of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these remarks was
affixed appellant's signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the
seized property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant
wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from
him.33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits
inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to these
documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of
the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a
person under custodial investigation for the commission of an
offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was
assisted by counsel.34 Although appellant manifested during the
custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver
was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel, 35 hence
whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted
from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in
evidence.36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and
can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits,
appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament since
his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been
sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction37 which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug
from the seller.38 In the present case, and in light of the preceding
discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any peradventure
of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell
marijuana to a total stranger.39 We take this opportunity to once
again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a
small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may
be committed at any time and in any place. 40 It is not contrary to
human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger, 41 for
what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and
seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and
delivery of the marijuana leaves. 42 While there may be instances
where such sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the
diverse circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the
incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that occasion,
we can safely say that those exceptional particulars are not present
in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and
mental torture by the arresting officers which caused him to escape
from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under custody. 43 This he
asserts to support his explanation as to how his signatures on the
documents earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force and
coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for
evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances.44 The evidence on record is bereft of any
support for appellant's allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one
for the prosecution45 and the other for the defense,46 testified on the
absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions
or contusions on the person of appellant. What is evident is that the xxx xxx xxx
cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had
been suffering even before his arrest. 47 His own brother even Sec. 4. Sale, Administration,
corroborated that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of Delivery, Distribution and
bleeding peptic ulcer.48 Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.
— The penalty of reclusion
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp perpetua to death and a fine ranging
Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to from five hundred thousand pesos
his brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and to ten million pesos shall be
during his detention there.49 Significantly, he also did not even report imposed upon any person who,
the matter to the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the unless authorized by law, shall sell,
alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to do so 50 and with the administer, deliver, give away to
legal services of counsel being available to him. Such omissions another, distribute, dispatch in
funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure transit or transport any prohibited
fabrication. drug, or shall act as a broker in any
of such transactions.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his
allegations that his arrest was baseless and premeditated for the x x x           x x x          x x x
NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him at all
costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest was only the Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No.
culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society and it 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs
was providential that it came about after he was caught in the very Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion could
have concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial Sec. 20. Application of Penalties,
court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31, Proceeds or Instrument of the
1993,52 which supervenience necessarily affects the original Crime. — The penalties for offenses
disposition of this case and entails additional questions of law which under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of
we shall now resolve. Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act shall
II be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the quantities:
adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the 5. 750 grams or more of
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended indian hemp or marijuana
to read as follows:
 x x x           x x x          x x x
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is
less than the foregoing quantities,
the penalty shall range from  prision
correccional  to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale
of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams
and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those
tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the patently favorable
provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the
lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit
originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190
to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, 53 it has long been settled that by
force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article
22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes
punished by special laws.54 The execution in said article would not
apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency
refers to convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of
serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa
or  falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659
could neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present
case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present
stage, can
sua sponte  apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the
penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been
resolved in the cited case of People vs.  Moran, et al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the
Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws
in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of
a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts
of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such
duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has
applied for it, just as would also all provisions
relating to the prescription of the crime and the
penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced
penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become
final and executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder,
then practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations would
warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial
authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus.56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable
penalties appears to have been committed in the drafting of the
aforesaid law; thereby calling for and necessitating judicial
reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425,
as now further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell,
administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the
amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is
involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range
from  prision correccional  to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on
the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition,
that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less
than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the
marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been
committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs
provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions
in order to give effect to the whole law, 57 we hereby hold that the
penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is
less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range
from  prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion
perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in
criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a manner
favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only
3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable range of penalties under
the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law
provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range "depending
upon the quantity"  of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in
said second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three
distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional, prision
mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the Code
provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them
being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as
the maximum period.58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex
penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second
paragraph of Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above
quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity  of
the drug subject of the criminal transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of
exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid
component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable
penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the
modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since
each component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be
imposed separately as determined by the quantity of the drug
involved, then the modifying circumstances can be used to fix the
proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter be
explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the
context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are
compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs
enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three, with the
resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively
the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three
aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the
marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed
shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams,  prision mayor;
and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a
conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death.60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the
case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional  is consequently
indicated but, again, another preliminary and cognate issue has first
to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6
years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as
provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article
76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in determining the
penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty
of prision correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating,
aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability should
be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in
imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on
mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal
Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines
as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor
was because the special laws involved provided their own specific
penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties
were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal
Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws
concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum
periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the
aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to
determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in
Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the
provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees
could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since
the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in
the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The
suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as
provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is
a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law
against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is
defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty
therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its
technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation
and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code.
When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More
on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty
under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period
thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being
no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental
changes in the penalties imposed for offenses under special laws
would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice
in the United States but differently from the penalties provided in our
Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one
specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations, such
as imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without
division into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the
special law contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the
Indeterminate Sentence Law61 were passed during the American
regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law
would direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished under the
Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided therein.
Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act No. 303 62 penalizing
non-payment of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed
therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee
or laborer as required by section one of this Act,
shall prima facie be considered a fraud committed
by such employer against his employee or laborer by
means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned
in article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four,
sub-paragraph two (a) of the Revised Penal Code
and shall be punished in the same manner as
therein provided.63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined
therein were specifically punished by the penalties as technically
named and understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are
exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where
the penalties ranged from arresto mayor  to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where
the penalties run from arresto mayor  to  prision mayor; and
Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving
firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor,
reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for
not less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and
4 months, when committed without violence or intimidation of
persons or force upon things; not less than 17 years and 4 months
and not more than 30 years, when committed with violence against
or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and life
imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the
special law are different from and are without reference or relation to
those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory
effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or
by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to
said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the
legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example,
Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years
and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the
duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical
term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for
carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by
the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to
those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore,
cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws
of the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the
correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as
other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such
provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under
the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos.
1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the
penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the
Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the
related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the
corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of any
express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold
otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of
an integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied
legislation, which could never have been the intendment of
Congress.
In People vs.  Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law
(Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the prosecution that
Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not apply
to said special law. We said therein that —
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D.
533 is a special law entirely distinct from and
unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the
nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of
the classification and duration of penalties as
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not
for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special
laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be
deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal
Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large
cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to
applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of
the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the same
Code should, likewise, be applicable, . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on
penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in
this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more
recent pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be
"supplementary" to special laws, this Court held that
where the special law expressly grants to the court
discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the
offense, there is no room for the application of the
provisions of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by
P.D. No. 1623, contains no explicit grant of
discretion to the Court in the application of the
penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the
court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code concerning the application of
penalties  which distill the "deep legal thought and
 centuries of experience in the administration of
criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.)66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous
Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the
incorporation and prescription therein of the technical penalties
defined in and constituting integral parts of the three scales of
penalties in the Code, 67 with much more reason should the
provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of all
attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty.
Likewise, the different kinds or classifications of penalties and the
rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on
Republic Act No. 6425, except if they would result in absurdities as
will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is
involved in the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we
have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances
should be considered and applied only if they affect the periods and
the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and
consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance
with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of
penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and
the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under
paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the
penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of
privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and
68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more.
These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in
toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated
second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid
anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the
legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law
prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the
four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by
analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime
consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the
penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many
penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule
were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one
degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro  and arresto mayor.
There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two
degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since
only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may
be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding
penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should
such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or
lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three
component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall
each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the
lowest penalty should in any event be  prision correccional  in order
not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio
fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to
be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than
fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect
law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly
addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law
is applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since
drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any
act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the
penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua  or death,
provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will
exceed one year of imprisonment. 68 The more important aspect,
however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate
sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that
"if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same." We hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably
refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed
was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal
Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be
said that the "offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on
indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was
necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties
under said laws which were not included or contemplated in the
scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no
minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies
therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws
hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to
the first and last examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of
Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but an application and
is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio.69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised
Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical
signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining
the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to
arrive at  prision correccional  and Article 64 of the Code to impose
the same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for
in a special law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised
Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply
the first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing
a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed  under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but
also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera
haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-
deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal
appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in
Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of
offenses  punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we have
held that what is considered is the penalty actually imposed and not
the penalty imposable under the law,70 and that reclusion perpetua is
likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life
imprisonment".
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore,
is that under the concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation,
which have been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court;
of historical interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the
law and related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural
interpretation, considering the interrelation of the penalties in the
Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of
penalties, it follows that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence
in this case shall be the  penalty next lower to that prescribed for the
offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming ambiguity in
Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with
laws, which is the best mode of interpretation.71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of
compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the
accused.72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at which, and
not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may
merely be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his
confinement.73 It does not constitute the totality of the penalty since
thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence
under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the
convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release
on parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or
his reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has
served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant
should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the
range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision
correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed through the
application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For,
with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6
months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of  prision
correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve only
one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the
judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of
conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant
Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION
that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the
minimum, to six (6) years of  prision correccional, as the maximum
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35748         December 14, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA, defendants-
appellants.
Teofilo Mendoza for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicting them
upon the information of the crime of arson as follows: The former as
principal by direct participation, sentenced to fourteen years, eight
months, and one day of cadena temporal, in accordance with
paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and the latter as accomplice,
sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor; and both are
further sentenced to the accessories of the law, and to pay each of
the persons whose houses were destroyed by the fire, jointly and
severally, the amount set forth in the information, with costs.
Counsel appointed by the court to defend the accused-
appellants de oficio, after delivering his argument, prayed for the
affirmance of the judgment with reference to the appellant Martin
Atienza, and makes the following assignments of error with reference
to Romana Silvestre, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in convincing Romana Silvestre as
accomplice of the crime charged in the information.
2. Finally, the court erred in not acquitting said defendant
from the information upon the ground of insufficient
evidence, or at the least, of reasonable doubt.
The following facts were proved at the hearing beyond a reasonable
doubt:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage,
cohabited with her codefendant Martin Atienza from the month of
March, 1930, in the barrio of Masocol, municipality of Paombong,
Province of Bulacan. On May 16, 1930, the complaining husband,
Domingo Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace for that
municipality, a sworn complaint for adultery, supported by affidavits
of Gerardo Cabigao and Castor de la Cruz (Exhibit B). On the same
date, May 16, 1930, the said accused were arrested on a warrant
issued by said justice of the peace. On the 20th of the month, they
were released on bail, each giving a personal bond of P6,000.
Pending the preliminary investigation of the case, the two defendants
begged the municipal president of Paombong, Francisco Suerte
Felipe, to speak to the complaint, Domingo Joaquin, urging him to
withdraw the complaint, the two accused binding themselves to
discontinue cohabitation, and promising not to live again in the barrio
of Masocol; Martin Atienza voluntarily signed the promise (Exhibit A).
The municipal president transmitted the defendants' petition to the
complaining husband, lending it his support. Domingo Joaquin
acceded to it, and on May 20, 1930, filed a motion for the dismissal
of his complaint. In consideration of this petition, the justice of the
peace of Paombong dismissed the adultery case commenced
against the accused, and cancelled the bonds given by them, with
the costs against the complainant.
The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to live in that of
Santo Niño, in the same municipality of Paombong.
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her
son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo
Niño, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves, followed
him home to the village of Masocol, and remained there. The
accused, Martin Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said
Romana Silvestre, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas de
la Cruz. On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz
and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together with the
appellants herein after supper, Martin Atienza told said couple to
take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire
to it. Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set
fire to the house, he answered that that was the only way he could
be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had
instigated the charge of adultery against him and his codefendant,
Romana Silvestre. As Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a
pistol, no one dared say anything to him, not even Romana Silvestre,
who was about a meter away from her codefendant. Alarmed at what
Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to
communicate with the barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to
what they had just heard Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly
gone a hundred arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!"
Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran back to it; but
seeing that the fire had assumed considerable proportions, Antonia
took refuge in the schoolhouse with her 1 year old babe in her arms,
while Nicolas went to the home of his parents-in-law, took up the
furniture he had deposited there, and carried it to the schoolhouse.
The fire destroyed about forty-eight houses. Tomas Santiago coming
from the barrio artesian well, and Tomas Gonzalez, teacher at the
barrio school of Masocol, and Felipe Clemente, an old man 61 years
of age, coming from their homes, to the house on fire, saw Martin
Atienza going away from the house where the fire started, and
Romana Silvestre leaving it.lawphil.net
As stated in the beginning, counsel appointed by this court to defend
the accused-appellant de oficio, prays for the affirmance of the
judgment appealed from with reference to defendant Martin Atienza.
The facts related heretofore, proved beyond a reasonable doubt at
the hearing, justify this petition of the de oficio counsel, and establish
beyond a reasonable doubt said defendant's guilt of arson as
charged, as principal by direct participation.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only
evidence of record against her are: That, being married, she lived
adulterously with her codefendant Martin Atienza, a married man;
that both were denounced for adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Romana
Silvestre's second husband; that in view of the petition of the
accused, who promised to discontinue their life together, and to
leave the barrio of Masocol, and through the good offices of the
municipal president of Paombong, the complaining husband asked
for the dismissal of the complaint; that in pursuance of their promise,
both of the accused went to lived in the barrio of Santo Niño, in the
same municipality; that under pretext for some nipa leaves from her
son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, who had gone to the
barrio of Santo Niño, Romana Silvestre followed him to his house in
the barrio of Masocol on November 23, 1930, and remained there;
that her codefendant, Martin Atienza followed her, and stayed with
his coaccused in the same house; that on the night of November 25,
1930, at about 8 o'clock, while all were gathered together at home
after supper, Martin Atienza expressed his intention of burning the
house as the only means of taking his revenge on the Masocol
resident, who had instigated Domingo Joaquin to file the complaint
for adultery against them, which compelled them to leave the barrio
of Masocol; that Romana Silvestre listened to her codefendant's
threat without raising a protest, and did not give the alarm when the
latter set fire to the house. Upon the strength of these facts, the court
below found her guilty of arson as accomplice.
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article
13, defines an accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part
in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to
commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates
in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana
Silvestre in the crime of arson committed by her codefendant Martin
Atienza? Is it her silence when he told the spouses, Nicolas de la
Cruz and Antonia de la Cruz, to take away their furniture because he
was going to set fire to their house as the only means of revenging
himself on the barrio residents, her passive presence when Martin
Atienza set fire to the house, where there is no evidence of
conspiracy or cooperation, and her failure to give the alarm when the
house was already on fire?
The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of
cooperation, whether moral, through advice, encouragement, or
agreement, or material, through external acts. In the case of the
accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral
or material cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the
crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are
simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not
appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the
crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a
subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
The trial court found the accused-appellant Martin Atienza guilty of
arson, defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, of the
Penal Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be imposed
upon:
x x x           x x x          x x x
2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited house or
any building in which people are accustomed to meet
together, without knowing whether or not such building or
house was occupied at the time, or any freight train in
motion, if the damage caused in such cases shall exceed six
thousand two hundred and fifty  pesetas.
While the defendant indeed knew that besides himself and his
codefendant, Romana Silvestre, there was nobody in De la Cruz's
house at the moment of setting fire to it, he cannot be convicted
merely arson less serious than what the trial court sentenced him for,
inasmuch as that house was the means of destroying the others, and
he did not know whether these were occupied at the time or not. If
the greater seriousness of setting fire to an inhabited house, when
the incendiary does not know whether there are people in it at the
time, depends upon the danger to which the inmates are exposed,
not less serious is the arson committed by setting fire to inhabited
houses by means of another inhabited house which the firebrand
knew to be empty at the moment of committing the act, if he did not
know whether there were people or not in the others, inasmuch as
the same danger exists.
With the evidence produced at the trial, the accused-appellant Martin
Atienza might have been convicted of the crime of arson in the most
serious degree provided for in article 549 of the Penal Code, if the
information had alleged that at the time of setting fire to the house,
the defendant knew that the other houses were occupied, taking into
account that barrio residents are accustomed to retire at the tolling of
the bell for the souls in purgatory, i.e., at 8 o'clock at night.
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so the deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000,
hold, that: (1) Mere passive presence at the scene of another's rendered by the Court of First Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case
crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of No. 686, of all the accused the namely, Nemesio Talingdan,
agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required Magellan Tobias, Augusta Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa
by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of Domogma, the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who,
the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept because no certificate nor any other proof of their marriage could be
silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a barrio, without presented by the prosecution, could not be charged with parricide.
knowing whether there are people in them or not, sets fire to one
known to be vacant at the time, which results in destroying the rest, Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June
commits the crime of arson, defined and penalized in article 550, 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children,
paragraph 2, Penal Code. arrived together in their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some
100 meters distant from the municipal building of the place. For
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as sometime, however, their relationship had been strained and beset
follows: It is affirmed with reference to the accused-appellant Martin with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of
Atienza, and reversed with reference to the accused-appellant times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two
Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted with (2) different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited
one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered. Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during
those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old
Republic of the Philippines daughter living with them, go down the house and leave them.
SUPREME COURT Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was
Manila going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel
between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should
she get pregnant, the child would not be his. About a month or so
EN BANC
before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did
not come back for a period of more than three (3) weeks, and
G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978 Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen
together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time; then on
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Thursday night, just two (2) days before he was gunned down,
vs. Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped
NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO Teresa several times; the latter went down the house and sought the
BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES and TERESA DOMOGMA, accused- help of the police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to
appellants. the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but
Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the
time and was armed, so the latter left the place, but not without
warning Bernardo that someday he would kin him. Between 10:00
PER CURIAM: and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter,
Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother,
Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence
Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by
of life imprisonment, with indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of
Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as
she approached them, she heard one of them say "Could he elude a
bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of
her daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that
we will kill him".
Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June
24, 1967, while the same 12-year old daughter of Bernardo was
cooking food for supper in the kitchen of their house, she saw her
mother go down the house through the stairs and go to the yard
where she again met with the other appellants. As they were barely
3-4 meters from the place where the child was in the "batalan", she
heard them conversing in subdued tones, although she could not
discern what they were saying. She was able to recognize all of them
through the light coming from the lamp in the kitchen through the
open "batalan" and she knows them well for they are all residents of
Sobosob and she used to see them almost everytime. She noted
that the appellants had long guns at the time. Their meeting did not
last long, after about two (2) minutes Teresa came up the house and
proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went under an
avocado tree nearby. As supper was then ready, the child caged her
parents to eat, Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the kitchen
did not heed his daughter's call to supper but continued working on a
plow, while Teresa also excused herself by saying she would first put
her small baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon
as she was through she again called her parents to eat. This time,
she informed her father about the presence of persons downstairs,
but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He proceeded to the
kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door. Corazon stayed
nearby watching him. At that moment, he was suddenly fired upon
from below the stairs of the "batalan". The four accused then climbed
the stairs of the "batalan" carrying their long guns and seeing that
Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again.
Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time, but
when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying "You
call for help and I will kill you", so she kept silent. The assailants then
fled from the scene, going towards the east.
The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazon's male teacher
who lived nearby. Teresa came out of her "silid" later; she pulled
Corazon aside and questioned her, and when Corazon informed her
that she recognized the killers of her father to be her co-appellants
herein, she warned her not to reveal the matter to anyone,
threatening to kill her if she ever did so. Still later on, other persons
arrived and helped fix and dress the lifeless body of the victim,
Bernardo, autopsy on which was performed in his own house by the
Municipal Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36
hours after death; burial took place on the same day. The victim's
brother who came from Manila arrived one day after the burial
followed by their mother who came from La Paz, Abra where she
resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the Identities of the
killers of her father because she was afraid of her own mother, was
somehow able to reveal the circumstances surrounding his killing to
these immediate relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she
thereafter executed on August 5, 1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing
of the information for murder against the herein five (5) appellants.
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense:
Teresa prior to her marriage with Bernardo, was a resident of the
town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister in Manila and two (2)
brothers in America who love her dearly, that is why said brothers of
hers had been continuously and regularly sending her monthly
$100.00 in checks, starting from the time she was still single up to
the time of her husband's violent death on June 24, 1967, and
thereafter. After their marriage, they moved to and resided in her
husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with them three (3)
carabaos and two (2) horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling
a parcel of land in said place, separate and distinct from the parcel of
land worked on by Bernardo's parents and their other children. She
and Bernardo lived in their own house which was about 4-5 meters
away from the house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo
dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband never maltreated her;
although sometimes she had to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels
with his own mother who wanted that Bernardo's earnings be given
to her, (the mother) which Bernardo never did, and at those times,
Bernardo would admonish Teresa "You leave me alone". Her in-laws
also hated her because her mother-in-law could not get the earnings
of Bernardo for the support of her other son, Juanito, in his
schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her because she did not
give him any of the carpentry tools which her brothers in America
were sending over to her. She never left their conjugal home for any
long period of time as charged by her mother-in-law, and if she ever
did leave the house to go to other places they were only during those
times when she had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar checks with
the PNB branch there, and even on said trips, she was sometimes
accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had to go alone and leaves
Sallapadan in the morning, she rode in a weapons carrier along with
merchants going to Bangued in the morning and always rode back
with them to Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day because
the weapons carrier is owned by a resident of Sallapadan who waits
for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter
became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of the
carabaos and horses they brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got
lost, she and Bernardo would go and report the matter to the Mayor
who would then refer the matter to his policemen, one of whom is
Talingdan, so that they may help locate the lost animals; Teresa
knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors, the latter's home
being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But illicit
relationship had never existed between them.
Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of
their house cooking their food for supper. Two of the children,
Corazon and Judit, were with her. Her husband, Bernardo, was then
in the adjoining room making a plow. He had to make the plow at
that time of the night because at daytime he worked as a carpenter
in the convent. As soon as the food was ready, she and the children
moved over to the adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for
supper, and he then proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the
two children were about to follow him to the kitchen when suddenly
they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive gun shots coming
from near their "batalan". They were all so terrified that they
immediately cried for help, albeit she did not know yet at that precise
time that her husband was shot, as she and the children were still in
the other room on their way to the kitchen, about three (3) meters
away from Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her husband crying in
pain, and as soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her
arms. She did not see the killers of her husband, as the night was
then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo was in her arms when
the first group of people who responded to their cry for help arrived.
Among them were the chief of police, some members of the
municipal council and appellant Tobias who even advised Teresa not
to carry the lifeless body of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was
then six (6) months pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an
investigation of the surroundings and he found some empty shells
and foot prints on the ground some meters away from the "batalan".
He also found some bullet holes on the southern walls of said
"batalan" and on the nothern wallings of the kitchen. Later, Teresa
requested some persons to relay the information about the death of
her husband to her relatives in Manabo, Abra, and they in turn
passed on the news to Bernardo's mother and her family in La Paz,
Abra, where they were then residing, as they have left their house in
Sallapadan about two (2) months previous after they lost the land
they used to till there in a case with the natives called Tingians. Two
(2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and after
Bernardo's remains was autopsied and he was buried under their
house, they conducted an investigation, but she did not give them
any information relative to the Identity of the persons who shot her
husband because she did not really see them. Her mother-in-law and
a brother-in-law, Juanita Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the
town of La Paz, Abra, and the latter from Manila, and after the usual
nine (9) days mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking
Teresa's children under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her
mother-in-law and her brother-in-law have axes to grind against her
and they have her daughter, Corazon, under their custody, they had
forced the said child to testify against her. She further declared that
her late husband, Bernardo, had enemies during his lifetime, as he
had quarrels with some people over the land they work on.
Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that:
Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing of Bernardo
on June 24, 1967; being a policeman of the place at the time, he was
one of the two (2) policemen who escorted and acted as bodyguard
of the Mayor, when the latter attended the cursillo in Bangued, all of
them leaving Sallapadan on June 22 and returning thereto four (4)
days later on June 26, hence, he could not have anything to do with
the said killing. On the other hand, Tobias claimed to be in the house
of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan on the date of said killing, but
he was one of the persons who was called upon by the chief of
police of the place to accompany him in answer to the call for help of
the wife of the victim. The other two appellants Bides and Berras
also alleged that they were in the same house of Mrs. Bayongan on
that date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs. Bayongan and had
been staying in her house for a long time. They were sleeping when
the chief of police came that evening and asked Tobias, who was
then municipal secretary, to accompany him to the place of the
shooting. They did not join them, but continued sleeping. They never
left the said house of Mrs. Bayongan, which is about 250-300 meters
away from the place of the killing, that evening of June 24, 1967.
After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of the
prosecution and defense, We have no doubt in Our mind that in that
fatal evening of June 24, 1967, appellants Nemesio Talingdan,
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides, all armed with
long firearms and acting inconspiracy with each other gunned down
Bernardo as the latter was sitting by the supper table in their house
at Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen committing
the offense by the witness Corazon. She was the one who prepared
the food and was watching her father nearby. They were all known to
her, for they were all residents of Sobosob and she used to see them
often before that night. Although only Talingdan and Tobias
continued firing at her father after they had climbed the stairs of the
"batalan", it was Bides who threatened her that he would kill her if
she called for help. Berras did not fire any shot then. But even before
the four appellants went up the "batalan", they already fired shots
from downstairs.
We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two nights before, or
on Thursday, June 22, 1967, the deceased Bernardo and appellant
Teresa had a violent quarrel during which he slapped her several
times. She went to seek the help of the police, and it was appellant
Talingdan, a policeman of their town, who went to the vicinity of their
house and challenged her father to come down, but the latter refused
because the former was a policeman and was armed. And so,
Talingdan left after shouting to her father that "If I will find you
someday, I will kill you."
We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration regarding the
amorous relationship between her mother and appellant Talingdan,
as already related earlier above. So also her testimony that in the
morning following the quarrel between her father and her mother and
the threat made by Talingdan to the former, between 10:00 and
11:00 o'clock, she saw all the herein four male accused-appellants
meeting with her mother in a small hut some 300 or 400 meters
away from their house, near where she was then washing clothes,
and that on said occasion she overheard one of them ask "Could
(sic) he elude a bullet?", We have our doubts, however, as to
whether or not her mother did say to her in shoving her away upon
seeing her approach, "You tell your father we will kill him." If it were
true that there was really such a message, it is to be wondered why
she never relayed the same to her father, specially when she again
saw the said appellants on the very night in question shortly before
the shooting talking together in subdued tones with her mother and
holding long arms. Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a warning
could have been done in such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above
and which We have carefully reviewed that appellants Nemesio
Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides are
guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as charged, and that they
committed the said offense in conspiracy with each other, with
evident premeditation and in the dwelling of the offended party. In
other words, two aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the offense, namely, evident premeditation and that it
was committed in the dwelling of the victim. No mitigating
circumstance has been proven.
Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon
suffered from vital contradictions and inconsistencies and badges of
falsehood because of patently unnatural circumstances alleged by
her. We do not agree. As the Solicitor General has well pointed out,
the fact that the witness varied on cross-examination the exact time
of some of the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it
was before or after Bernardo had began eating when he was shot;
(2) whether it was before or after seeing her mother's meeting with
her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June 23, 1967, that she
went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or not the accused were
already upstairs or still downstairs when they first fired their guns,
cannot alter the veracity of her having seen appellants in the act of
mercilessly and cold-bloodedly shooting her father to death.
Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently
unnatural in the circumstances related by her. We agree with the
following rebuttal of the Solicitor General:
Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack
against the credibility of Corazon Bagabag by
pointing out five supposed unnatural declarations in
her testimony; First, she said that her father,
appeared unconcerned when she informed him of
the presence of people downstairs. But as correctly
observed by the prosecuting fiscal the witness does
not know then "the mentality of her father" (p. 62,
t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968). Second, Corazon
also declared that the accused conversed that
Saturday night preceding the day the crime charged
was committed in a lighted place although there was
a place which was unlighted in the same premises.
But this only proves that the accused were too
engrossed in their conversation, unmindful of
whether the place where they were talking was
lighted or not, and unmindful even of the risk of
recognition. Third, witness declared that Pedro Bides
and Augusto Berras did not fire their guns. Even if
these accused did withhold their fire, however, since
they were privies to the same criminal design, would
this alter their culpability? Should the witness
Corazon Bagabag be discredited for merely stating
an observation on her part which is not inherently
unnatural? Fourth, Corazon also declared that only
three bullets from the guns of the four male accused
found their mark on the body of her father. But would
this not merely prove that not all the accused were
good shots? And fifth, the witness declared that her
father was still able to talk after he was shot yet Dr.
Jose Dalisan declared that his death was
instantaneous It is respectfully submitted, however,
that the doctor's opinion could yield to the positive
testimony of Corazon Bagabag in this regard without
in the least affecting the findings of said doctor as
regards the cause of the death of the deceased. As
thus viewed, there are no evident badges of
falsehood in the whole breadth and length of
Corazon Bagabag's testimony. (Pp. 9-10, People's
Brief.)
Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the
killing of her father, if it were not basically true, is hardly conceivable,
considering she was hardly thirteen (13) years old when she
testified, an age when according to Moore, a child , is, as a rule, but
little influenced by the suggestion of others" because "he has already
got some principles, lying is distasteful to him, because he thinks it is
mean, he is no stranger to the sentiment of self- respect, and he
never loses an opportunity of being right in what he affirms." (II
Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent explanation has been
offered why she would attribute the assault on her father to three
other men, aside from Talingdan whom she knew had relations with
her mother, were she merely making-up her account of how he was
shot, no motive for her to do so having been shown.
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was
taught to her by her uncle, His Honor pointed out that said
"testimony, both direct and cross, would show that she was constant,
firm and steady in her answers to questions directed to her." We
have Ourselves read said testimony and We are convinced of the
sincerity and truthfulness of the witness. We cannot, therefore, share
appellants' apprehension in their Seventh Assignment of Error that
the grave imputation of a mother's infidelity and her suggested
participation in the killing of her husband, would if consistently
impressed in the mind of their child, constitute a vicious poison
enough to make the child, right or wrong, a willing instrument in any
scheme to get even with her wicked mother. We feel Corazon was
too young to he affected by the infidelity of her mother in the manner
the defense suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her whole
testimony that it could not have been a fabrication. On the whole, it is
too consistent for a child of thirteen years to be able to substantially
maintain throughout her stay on the witness stand without any fatal
flaw, in the face of severe and long cross-interrogations, if she had
not actually witnessed the event she had described. We reject the
possibility of her having been "brainwashed or coached" to testify as
she did.
The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do
not merit serious consideration. Anent these alleged errors, suffice it
to say that the following refutations of the Solicitor General are well
taken:
Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly
failed to consider the testimony of Dr. Dalisan that
the distance between the assailants and the
deceased could have been 4 to 5 meters when the
shots were fired. But the appellants overlook the
testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the first
shot was fired, the gunman was about 3-½ meters
from her father (p. 60, t.s.n., hearing of March 29,
1968), which disproves the theory of the defense
that the killers fired from a stonepile under
an avocado tree some 4 to 5 meters away from the
deceased's house. Appellants also insist that the
Court a quo ignored the testimonies of defense
witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall and Chief of Police
Rafael Berras on their having found bullet marks on
the southern walling of the house of the deceased,
as well as empty cal. 30 carbine shells under the
aforementioned avocado tree. The trial court,
however, made the following apt observations on the
testimony of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall:
This witness stated that we went to the house of the
deceased to investigate the crime after the
deceased had already been buried; that he
investigated the widow as well as the surroundings
of the house where the deceased was shot. He
found empty shells of carbine under the avocado
tree. He stated that the 'batalan' of the house of the
deceased has a siding of about 1-½ meters high and
that he saw bullet holes on the top portion of the wall
directly pointing to the open door of the 'batalan' of
the house of the deceased. When the court asked
the witness what could have been the position of the
assailant in shooting the deceased, he stated that
the assailant might have been standing. The
assailant could not have made a bullet hole on the
top portion of the sidings of the 'batalan' because the
'batalan' is only 1-½ meters high, and further, when
asked as to the level of the ground in relation to the
top sidings of the 'batalan,' he answered that it is in
the same level with the ground. If this is true, it is
impossible for the assailant to make a bullet hole at
the top portion sidings of the 'batalan,' hence, the
testimony of this witness who is a PC corporal is of
no consequence and without merit. The court is
puzzled to find a PC corporal testifying for the
defense in this case, which case was filed by
another PC sergeant belonging to the same unit and
assigned in the same province of Abra (pp. 324-
325, rec.).
As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity
of the shooting, suffice it to state that no testimony
has been presented, expert or otherwise, linking said
shells to the bullets that were fired during the
shooting incident. Surmises in this respect surely
would not overcome the positive testimony of
Corazon Bagabag that the accused shot her father
as they came up the 'batalan' of their house. (Pp. 11-
12, People's Brief.)
At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not
at the scene of the crime when it happened. This defense of alibi
was duly considered by the trial court, but it was properly brushed
aside as untenable. In their brief, no mention thereof is made, which
goes to show that in the mind of the defense itself,. it cannot be
successfully maintained and they do not, therefore, insist on it.
Nonetheless, it would do well for this Court to specifically affirm the
apt pertinent ratiocination of His Honor in reference thereto thus:
This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion
of the court, can not stand firmly in the face of a
positive and unwavering testimony of the
prosecution witness who pointed out to the accused
as the authors of the crime. This is so because, first,
according to the three accused — Bides, Tobias and
Berras — they were sleeping at 8:00 o'clock that
night in the house of Mrs. Bayongan which is only
250 meters away from the scene of the crime.
Granting, for the sake of argument, but without
admitting, that they were already sleeping at 8:00
o'clock in the house of Mrs. Bayongan, Corazon
Bagabag clearly stated that her father was gunned
down at sunset which is approximately between 6:00
and 6:30 in the evening, hence, the accused Tobias,
Berras and Bides could have committed the crime
and went home to sleep in the house of Mrs.
Bayongan after the commission of the crime.
According to Pedro Bides, the house of Mrs.
Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house
of the victim. Second, the three accused have failed
miserably to present the testimony of Mrs.
Bayongan, the owner of the house where they slept
that night to corroborate or bolster their defense of
alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the
accused, also in his defense of alibi, stated that on
June 22, 1967, he accompanied Mayor Gregorio
Banawa of Sallapadan to Bangued, together with
policeman Cresencio Martinez for the purpose of
attending a cursillo in Bangued They started in
Sallapadan in the early morning of June 22, 1967
and arrived in Bangued the same day. According to
him, he went to accompany the mayor to the cursillo
house near the Bangued Cathedral and after
conducting the mayor to the cursillo house, he went
to board in the house of the cousin of Mayor Banawa
near the Filoil Station at Bangued, Abra. From that
time, he never saw the mayor until after they went
home to Sallapadan on June 26th.
This kind of alibi could not gain much weight
because he could have returned anytime on the
evening of June 22 or anytime before the
commission of the offense to Sallapadan and
commit the crime on the 24th at sunset, then
returned to Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and
bring him back to Sallapadan on the 26th.
The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor
who was alleged to have been accompanied by
witness-accused is still living and very much alive.
As a matter of fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still
the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra, and also policeman
Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who
accompanied the mayor to Bangued, is also still
living and still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were
not the mayor and the policeman presented to
corroborate or deny the testimony of Nemesio
Talingdan?
Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia
Abra, and a member of the Cursillo Movement, was
presented as rebuttal witness for the prosecution.
On the witness stand, he stated that he belongs to
Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued, Abra, and
said cursillo was held on October 20 to 23, 1966, at
the St. Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan Abra,
and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a matter of fact,
Mayor Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the
cursillo held on October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be
seen in his 'Guide Book' where the signature of
Gregorio Banawa appears because they both
attended Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued.
(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies
partly, if not in full, the testimony of accused
Nemesio Talingdan. (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of
Appellants' Brief.)
Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as
to whom the Solicitor General has submitted a recommendation of
acquittal, We find that she is not as wholly innocent in law as she
appears to the Counsel of the People. It is contended that there is no
evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her
husband because there is no showing of 'actual cooperation" on her
part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his death.
If at all, what is apparent, it is claimed, is "mere cognizance,
acquiescence or approval" thereof on her part, which it is argued is
less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator
per People vs. Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We do not see it exactly that
way.
True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is
not beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason, sue cannot have the
same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in
the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear that she helped
directly in the planning and preparation thereof, albeit We are
convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object.
(U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown
that she masterminded it either by herself alone or together with her
co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be plain
surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really includible. After all, she
had been having her own unworthy ways with him for quite a long
time, seemingly without any need of his complete elimination. Why
go to so much trouble for something she was already enjoying, and
not even very surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark Bernardo had
occasion to make to Teresa one time was "If you become pregnant,
the one in your womb is not my child." The worst he did to her for all
her faults was just to slap her.
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability.
There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very
least an accessory to the offense committed by her co-accused. She
was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out
after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to
recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon Identified
appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits,
Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew
to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to
anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the
peace officers who repaired to their house to investigate what
happened, instead of helping them with the information given to her
by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other
words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was
more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants'
conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was
killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These
subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the
escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an
accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants
was murder qualified by treachery. It being obvious that appellants
deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and without warning assault
their victim, taking advantage of their number and arms, it is manifest
that they employed treachery to insure success in attaining their
malevolent objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants
acted with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill
Bernardo Thursday night, then he met with his co-accused to work
out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday evening just
before the actual shooting. In other words, they had motive
Talingdan's taking up the cudgels for his paramour, Teresa and
enough time to meditate, and desist, if they were not resolved to
proceed with their objective. Finally, they committed the offense in
the dwelling of the offended party.
In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being
murder, qualified by treachery, and attended by the generic
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and that the
offense was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the
Court has no alternative under the law but to impose upon them the
capital penalty. However, as to appellant Teresa, she is hereby
found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.
WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias,
Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two
aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to
offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to be
executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years
of prision correccional  as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor  as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all
other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs
against appellants.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 165842 November 29, 2005]
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
26877, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P.
Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on
November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P.
MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does
not know the existence of the first marriage of said
EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975,
Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr.
Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a
municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in
January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two
days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a
Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39.
Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her.
Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a
motel where, despite Tina's resistance, Eduardo succeeded
in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on
several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo
even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina's
parents, and was assured by them that their son was still
single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first
week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996
before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the
RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared in their
marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years of their
married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to
build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City.
However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself
scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year.
Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from
Eduardo, he would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001,
Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse,
he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made
inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila
where she learned that Eduardo had been previously
married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage
contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when
she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when
they exchanged their own vows.8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in
1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer
(GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He
informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña,
but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital
relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed
that she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned
her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was
"single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He
did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry
his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide
unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975
and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three
months and never saw her again. He insisted that he
married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer
valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than
20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002
finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six
(6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private
complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by
way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that
Eduardo's belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved
because of his first wife's 20-year absence, even if true, did
not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling
of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled
that even if the private complainant had known that
Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still
be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he
was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he
married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time
that he married the private complainant, he was of the
honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He
insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable
for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying
the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited
that the trial court should have taken into account Article
390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the
appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v.
Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that
Eduardo's defense of good faith and reliance on the Court's
ruling in United States v. Enriquez 13 were misplaced; what is
applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended
Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court
in Republic v. Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as
provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for
a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even
assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties
thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the
nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for
resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private
complainant's knowledge of the first marriage would not
afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the
State and not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the
penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and
sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with
modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of
the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove
all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of
the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply.
Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant,
there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña's
presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate
court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v.
Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to support its
ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision
promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to
reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.17
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari , insisting that:
I Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER'S FIRST WIFE
CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE
390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR
UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF
PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS
IN FACT AND IN LAW.18
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove
the second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married
Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years
since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was
presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that,
under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code,
one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not
he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all
purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph
refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect
to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the
absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the
satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse's reasonable belief
that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to
prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975
and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or
whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the
by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390
of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that
he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences
provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein
on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere
under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there
must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule
on presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that
contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the
requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement
for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the
CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO" before
he married her, and even knew that he was already
married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave
her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an
illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their
house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the
decision of the CA affirming the petitioner's conviction is in
accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on
record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this
Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and
penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. 'The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish
Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse
legÃtimamente disuelto el anterior, será castigado con la
pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve
and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by
law.20 The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the
Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of
the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which
provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a
number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed
death like annulment of marriage should be a
justification for bigamy."21
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution
is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally
married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage
without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage.22 It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it
not for the subsistence of the first marriage.23 Viada avers
that a third element of the crime is that the second
marriage must be entered into with fraudulent
intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element
of a felony by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of
the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1)
the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully
dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It
does not matter whether the first marriage is void or
voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until
lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. 25 As
the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family Code of
the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of
the same view as Viada and declared that there are three
(3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a
new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the
felony of the act.28 He explained that:
'This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is
undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all
codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal
Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime.
There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and
this must be supported by very strong evidence, and if this
be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a
crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in
the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is
dead, because of the many years that have elapsed since he
has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his
endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime
of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is
one of the essential elements of the crime.29
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner
is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there
is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.
Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony
by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do not appear
in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is
included in the word "voluntary."31
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of
an overt act without legal excuse or justification from which
another suffers injury.32 When the act or omission defined
by law as a felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have
been intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law
that every man intends the natural or probable consequence
of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary,
and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable
doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.34
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there
must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the
petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the
marriage is presumed to subsist. 36 The prosecution also
proved that the petitioner married the private complainant
in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil
intent when he married the private complainant. As a
general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is
a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However,
ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that
when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of
the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard
from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should
have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court
declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required
by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also
constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and
would negate criminal intent on his part when he married
the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could
not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner,
however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on
the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The
requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the
absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as
protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and
convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on
mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit
of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social
institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good
morals and the interest of society require that the marital
relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its
severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes
specified by law.37 The laws regulating civil marriages are
necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort
or general welfare of the community and the parties can
waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A
civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging
stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the
welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil
marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On
marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other
and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and
death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the
parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious
that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the
first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for under the
law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration
by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a
subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death
of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they
wish to be true," is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a
second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the
parties believed the other to be dead would make the
existence of the marital relation determinable, not by
certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic
ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated
as so dissolved as to permit second marriages. 40 Thus,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the
dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the
personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts
easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance,41 namely, a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioner's sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code
as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide'
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If
he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or
an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of
for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war,
and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been
absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or not
the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without
any necessity of judicial declaration. 42 However, Article 41 of
the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.43
With the effectivity of the Family Code, 44 the period of seven
years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil
Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before
the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he
or she must institute summary proceedings for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this
Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.:
(a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have
been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in
Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance;
(b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the
old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute
a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages
as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the
Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioner's contention that the
requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is
designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a
valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one
charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to
harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings
of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on
Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v.
Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the
law only requires that the former spouse had been absent
for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her
former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a
judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he or she had been unheard from in seven years,
being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final;
and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made
in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she
had not been heard from in seven years cannot become
final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary
period within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to
contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its
valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and
meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition
for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse may even be made in collusion with the other
spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court
declared that the words "proper proceedings" in Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized
by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which
refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a
deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the
Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that,
under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are
authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person
after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its
rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that
"the provision of Article 349 or "before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous
and should be considered as not written. He opined that
such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has
not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has
not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court
proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He
maintains that the supposition is not true. 53 A second
marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not
present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of
the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of
dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with
such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not
constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not
illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to
bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand,
was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code,
the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of
bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed
the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to
conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in
a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only
after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death
of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted
of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence
that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead.57 Such judgment is proof of the good
faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent
marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged
with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be
convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy:
'Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code providing that the present spouse must first ask
for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse
in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries
again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides
that for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a
second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding
as provided in the Code for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
latter's reappearance. This provision is intended to protect
the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy
under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the
judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively
dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a
second marriage is already established.58
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now
Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now
clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death
is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary
proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will
not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it
necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment
declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of
authority is that the clause "before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead x x x" should be
disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil
Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a
summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive
death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some
cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead,
there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death,
which could then be made only in the proceedings for the
settlement of his estate.60 Before such declaration, it was
held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous
even if done in good faith. 61 Justice Regalado opined that
there were contrary views because of the ruling
in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil
Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by
Article 41 of the Family Code, "which requires a summary
hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry."
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a
declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under
Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial
court and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of
the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral
damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided
in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of
them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed
to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of
moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the
petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to
adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private
complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to
prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy
is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral
damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled
that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v.
Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se
debió indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Código
Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños
morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violación,
adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en
esta enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por
consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquà los daños
de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are
based on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise,
avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v.
Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission. 65 An award for moral
damages requires the confluence of the following
conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission
factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained
by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.66
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended
party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219,
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous
cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or
abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and
sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this
article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should
be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has
suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or
omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been
any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article
221967 and analogous cases (which refer to those cases
bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some
others or resembling, in other respects, as in form,
proportion, relation, etc.)68
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be
ordered to pay moral damages to the private
complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is
liable to the private complainant for moral damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code.
According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." This provision contains what is commonly referred to
as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise
of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
The standards are the following: act with justice; give
everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The
elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or
duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another.69
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own
sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.70 If the provision does not provide a remedy for
its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20
or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20
provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the
latter for the same." On the other hand, Article 21 provides
that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages." The latter provision is adopted to remedy "the
countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims
of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove
for specifically in the statutes." Whether or not the principle
of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other
applicable provisions of law depends upon the
circumstances of each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private
complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her
that he was single. He even brought his parents to the
house of the private complainant where he and his parents
made the same assurance - that he was single. Thus, the
private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who
even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single.
She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her
duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her
lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner
heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no
inkling that he was already married to another
before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioner's chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud
consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series
of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being
a lawful husband to the private complainant, who changed
her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost
the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she
could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and
humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was
not her lawful husband.72
The Court rules that the petitioner's collective acts of fraud
and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the
private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice
and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any
physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral
damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that,
absent physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation,
and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is
simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper &
James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize
that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent,
recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and
proximate consequences though they consist of shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super,
579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at
p. 38. Here the defendant's conduct was not merely
negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was
bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish
for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff
became entitled not only to compensatory but also to
punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co.,
supra; Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra.
CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts," 70
Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because
of the defendant's bigamous marriage to her and the
attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and
"ashamed to go out" but "couldn't sleep" but "couldn't eat,"
had terrific headaches" and "lost quite a lot of weight." No
just basis appears for judicial interference with the jury's
reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the
first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249,
117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.74 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner's acts are
against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution, good morals and the interest
and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of
the petitioner's perfidy, she is not barred from claiming
moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public
policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held
in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation
of another to do an act which, in consequence of such
misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor action was induced solely by the defendant's
immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of
right of action against the person so inducing him for action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such
damages sustained by him in consequence of his having considerations
done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In distinguish this case from cases in which the court has
Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract
Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and
defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the
whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass.
remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76
that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or
innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the
be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to
for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was be just and reasonable.
said to be in her being led by the promise to give the
fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v.
Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, SO ORDERED.
343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Republic of the Philippines
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base SUPREME COURT
her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by Manila
herself but upon the defendant's misrepresentation. The
criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part, SECOND DIVISION
were but one of the incidental results of the defendant's
fraud for which damages may be assessed.  

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
enter into the marriage relation have been maintained in
other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 vs.
Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias  "Beloy," and ENRIQUE
Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-appellants.
L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not
prevent recovery where the circumstances are such that the The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal
Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-
appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the
information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the
Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple
robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-
57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom
allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being
then private individuals, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL
SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the
purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in such amount
as may be awarded to her under the provisions of
the Civil Code.1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned, 2 appellants went to trial which
ultimately resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26,
1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a
highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this
disposition in the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE
AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with
extortion committed on a highway and, in
accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced
to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly
and severally the offended private victim Ma.
Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as
actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate
damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a
quo erred (1) in convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532
since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in
applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the
charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and
cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily
included in the offense charged.4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the
following counter-statement of facts in the People's brief 5 which
adopted the established findings of the court a quo, documenting the
same with page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and
which we note are without any substantial divergence in the version
proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom
allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by the two
accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a
bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called
Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her
own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988,
the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then
away in Davao purportedly on account of local
election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs.
Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to
Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell
a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place
(Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in
Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz
of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After
the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta
Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp.
9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back
side of the front seat and went onto where Ma.
Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun
at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his
nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get
money from you." She said she has money inside
her bag and they may get it just so they will let her
go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken
(Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted
P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them
that but would they drop her at her gas station in
Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car
went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma.
Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's
gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread
(sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA
and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North
superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called,
asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for
P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3
checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand
and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to
swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila.
Later, he changed his mind and turned the car again
towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her,
jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side
of the superhighway and, after some vehicles
ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish
vendors van. Her dress had blood because,
according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the
ground and was injured when she jumped out of the
car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the
matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was
arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00
check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp.
10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said
narrative of complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno,
he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant
to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove
away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he
claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running
across the highway.7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car
to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay
or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided
their loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case,
appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was
in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers. 9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this
opinion, three theories have been advanced as to what crime was
committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission
of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as
charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that
in the determination of the crime for which the accused should be
held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of
variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the
modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and
specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable
aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion
thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be
relevant or essential to determine the specific nature of the crime as,
for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance of
rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the
accused had his own personal motives for committing the murder
independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which
case rebellion and murder would constitute separate
offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in
authority who was not then in the actual performance of his official
duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the
attack was by reason of the previous performance of official duties
by the person in authority, the crime would be direct assault;
otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants
had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the
wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money
from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much
is admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric
qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already
stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for
funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam
(sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well and I
know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I
told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and
that I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they
refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge
that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule
of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party
of her liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of her freedom of action
was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States
vs.  Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been
held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by
the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the
primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders
liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in
relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty
does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or
deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is clearly
demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant
Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento
handed (sic) the bag containing the
P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where
were you already when the checks
was (sic) being handed to you?
 A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit
when she signed the checks.
Q If your intention was just to
robbed (sic) her, why is it that you
still did not allow her to stay at Sto.
Domingo, after all you already
received the money and the
checks?
A Because we had an agreement
with her that when she signed the
checks we will take her to her house
at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her
back to her house at Valle Verde
when she is (sic) already given you
the checks?
A Because while we were on the
way back I (sic) came to my mind
that if we reach Balintawak or some
other place along the way we might
be apprehended by the police. So
when we reached Santa Rita exit I
told her "Mam (sic) we will already
stop and allow you to get out of the
car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as
equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy
of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom,
in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or
demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that
when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from
her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case
can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of
kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by
the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was
summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that
the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code,
we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same
constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by
Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is
also clear from the allegation in the information that
the victim was carried away and extorted for more
money. The accused admitted that the robbery was
carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North
Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the
way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more
money that she had with her at the time for which
reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out
three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion
that the crimes committed is that punishable under
P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery
Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the
highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty
is reclusion perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to
the repealing clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a
modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly
Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary
submission consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct
interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No.
532 on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which
matter we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement has as
yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential
Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of
Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that
the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery"
invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with
brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in
line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal
law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are
synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo)
in order to put our discussion thereon in the proper context and
perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as
highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers.
Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the
American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for
robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery
was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the
Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery
are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of
continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent
the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the
offense consists in the formation of a band by more
than three armed persons for the purpose indicated
in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute
a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to
show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or
members of the band actually committed robbery or
kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by
violent means. The crime is proven when the
organization and purpose of the band are shown to
be such as are contemplated by art 306. On the
other hand, if robbery is committed by a band,
whose members were not primarily organized for the
purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc.,
the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery.
Simply because robbery was committed by a band
of more than three armed persons, it would not
follow that it was committed by a band of brigands.
In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the
band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a
robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate
highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the
crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four
armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives
announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction
and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no
indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule
on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the
time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be
construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is
the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway
robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the
preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies
reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts
of depredation upon the persons and properties of
innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel
from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation
and stunting the economic and social progress of
the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations
constitute  . . . highway robbery/brigandage which
 are among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless
elements be discouraged from perpetrating such
acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on
the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all
obstacles to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people. (Emphasis
supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a
particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim
could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single
act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and
social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of the
people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway
robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree.
This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to
Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein
when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability
for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require
that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers;
and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if
they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree.
But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under
the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are
directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims,
but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway
and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept
of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in
the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the
Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to
the fact that the crime of robbery committed by appellants should be
covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was
committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed
regarding the absence of the requisite elements which thereby
necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and
intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt
a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed
on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule
of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not
be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have
perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers
merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its
meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in
favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a
highway would be the determinant for the application of Presidential
Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if
not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law.
While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning,
we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court
falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is,
to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either
stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by
the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the
location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily
put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus
rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter
of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being
herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively
set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No.
532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact
that the robbery in the present case was committed inside a car
which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a
highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the
decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision
precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have
amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and
committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway
robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is
simple robbery defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph
5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional  in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown
by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and
community of purpose. In the determination of their respective
liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be
appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence
shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating
circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation
having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be
imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the
Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction
of appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an information
charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense
which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense
with which they are charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient
that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal
property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall
be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus
lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is
charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and
appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information
filed against appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the
complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least
by necessary implication, clearly convey that the taking of
complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom)
was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot
be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does
not include but could negate the presence of any of the elements of
robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET
ASIDE and another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-
appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of
robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to
Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of
them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended
party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as
actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142773             January 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias "BONG"
(At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD DELIM
alias "BONG", accused-appellants.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision, 1 dated January
14, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City,
finding accused appellants Marlon Delim, Leon Delim and Ronald
Delim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The court
also ordered accused-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, the
heirs of the victim the sums of P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel
alias "Bong" and Robert, all surnamed Delim, were indicted for
murder under an Information dated May 4, 1999 which reads:
"That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy.
Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto
Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premedidation (sic), conspiring with one another, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold,
hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct
Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim
stayed in the house guarded and prevented the wife and son
of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with
abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto
Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659."2
Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon and Ronald, all
surnamed Delim, were apprehended. Accused Robert and Manuel
remain at-large.
At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with the assistance
of their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
At the trial, the prosecution established the following relevant
facts3 —
Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles
of Leon Delim and Ronald Delim. Modesto Manalo Bantas, the
victim, was an Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname Delim
after he was "adopted" by the father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert.
However, Modesto's wife, Rita, an illiterate, and their 16-year old
son, Randy, continued using Manalo Bantas as their surname.
Modesto, Rita and Randy considered Marlon, Robert, Ronald,
Manuel and Leon as their relatives. Manuel and Leon were the
neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to visit
Modesto and his family. Modesto and his family and the Delim kins
resided in Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan.
On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita
and Randy were preparing to have their supper in their home.
Joining them were Modesto and Rita's two young grandchildren,
aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about to eat their dinner when
Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into the house and
closed the door. Each of the three intruders was armed with a short
handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald
simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was
placed in the mouth of Modesto. 4 Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded
Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of
Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the
intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also
armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of
Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon
and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the
following day, January 24, 1999.
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of
his uncle, Darwin Niño, at Sitio Labayog, informed the latter of the
incident the night before and sought his help for the retrieval of
Modesto. Randy was advised to report the matter to the police
authorities. However, Randy opted to first look for his father. He and
his other relatives scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail.
They proceeded to Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, around 200 meters
away from Modesto's house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him
there. On January 25, 1999, Randy and his relatives returned to the
housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to locate Modesto but
again failed to find him there. On January 26, 1999, Randy reported
the incident to the police authorities.
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the
company of his relatives, Nida Pucal, Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias
and Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan and this time they found Modesto under thick bushes in
a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and
in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white
worms swarmed over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his
relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the
incident and to seek assistance.
When informed of the discovery of Modesto's cadaver, the local chief
of police and SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito and other policemen rushed to
the scene and saw the cadaver under the thick bushes. Pictures
were taken of the cadaver.5 Rita and Randy divulged to the police
investigators the names and addresses of Marlon, Ronald, Robert,
Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death
of Modesto. Rita and Randy were at a loss why the five malefactors
seized Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their respective
sworn statements to the police investigators. 6 Police authorities
proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but
failed to find them in their respective houses. The police officers
scoured the mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog and Labayog
to no avail.
The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who
prepared her autopsy report, which reads:
"SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
 Body  both upper extremities are flexed
 both lower extremities are flexed
 (+) body decomposition
 (+) worms coming out from injuries
 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right
 20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right
 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE) his mother, his brothers and sisters were in their house at Asan
 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto — occipital area (POEx)
 2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek
 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left
 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd left arm
 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm
 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm
 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound medial aspect D/3rd, left arm
 #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed would, medial aspect, M
forearm
 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3rd, left forearm
 10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum
 penis inflamed
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
 no significant internal findings
CAUSE OF DEATH:
 GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD."7
The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm
were defensive wounds. The police investigators were able to
confirm that Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel had no
licenses for their firearms.8
Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in
Baguio City show that Marlon had pending cases for robbery in the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 16193-R,
and for robbery in band in Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802
pending with the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 9
To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed
denial and alibi.10
Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children,
Norte, Sison, Pangasinan about two kilometers away from Modesto's
house.
He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23,
1999 and of abducting and killing him. He theorized that Rita and
Randy falsely implicated him upon the coaching of Melchor Javier
who allegedly had a quarrel with him concerning politics.
Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the
house of his sister, Hermelita Estabillo at No. 55-B, Salet, Laoag
City, Ilocos Norte where he had been living since 1997 after leaving
Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan. Since then, he had been working for
Sally Asuncion at a hollow-block factory in that city where he was a
stay-in worker.
Sally Asuncion corroborated Leon's alibi. She testified that Leon
Delim never went home to his hometown in Pangasinan during his
employment. His sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred that on
January 23, 1999, his brother was at her house to give her his
laundry. She claimed that the distance between Laoag City and Bila,
Sison, Pangasinan can be traversed in six hours by bus. Leon
presented a Barangay Certificate to prove that he was a resident of
Laoag City from January 1998 up to February 1999.11
Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from
December 26, 1998 up to January 29, 1999. During his stay there,
he lived with his sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his return to Manila on
January 29, 1999, he immediately proceeded to Baguio to visit his
cousin. Marlon denied setting foot in Bila, Sison, Pangasinan after
his sojourn in Dumaguete City.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty
of murder. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond
reasonable doubt is hereby rendered against Ronald Delim,
Marlon Delim and Leon Delim (for) the commission of
Aggravated Murder, an offense defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
7659 and the Court sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim
and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be
implemented in the manner as provided for by law; the Court
likewise orders the accused, jointly and solidarily, to
indemnify the heirs of Modesto Delim the sum of P75,000.00
as moral damages, plus the amount of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the
entire records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court,
and to prepare the mittimus fifteen (15) days from date of
promulgation.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology,
Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City is hereby ordered to
transmit the persons of Marlon, Ronald and Leon, all
surnamed Delim to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City,
fifteen days from receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED."12
The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance
and of taking advantage of superior strength, nighttime and use of
unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the crime. Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in their appeal
brief, assail the decision alleging that:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT
AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' DEFENSE OF
ALIBI."13
Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the
matter of whether the crime charged in the Information is murder or
kidnapping. During the deliberation, some distinguished members of
the Court opined that under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and
Leon are charged with kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code and not with murder in its aggravated form in light of the
allegation therein that the accused "willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of
cloth, brought out and abduct(ed) Modesto Delim (while) Leon Delim
and Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and) guarded and prevented
the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter." They
submit that the foregoing allegation constitutes the act of deprivation
of liberty of the victim, the gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. They
contend that the fact that the Information went further to charge
accused with the killing of the victim should be of no moment, the
real nature of the criminal charge being determined not from the
caption or the preamble of the Information nor from the specification
of the law alleged to have been violated — these being conclusions
of law — but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. They further submit that since the prosecution failed to
prove motive on the part of Marlon, Ronald and Leon to kill Modesto,
they are not criminally liable for the death of the victim but only for
kidnapping the victim.
It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an
information, the material inculpatory facts recited therein describing
the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are
controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is
determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be
alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade
ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al.,14 that for
kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual
specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his
liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely
an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended
by the malefactor. This Court further held:
"x x x Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and
consistently reiterated thereafter, it has been held that the
detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the
accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the
primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the
offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses
they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental
deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute
kidnapping or serious illegal detention."15
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim,
the incidental deprivation of the victim's liberty does not constitute
the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing,
and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the
victim.16 The crime committed would either be homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as
disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is
determinative of what crime the accused is charged with — that of
murder or kidnapping.
Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the
concept of specific intent as an essential element of specific intent
crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which
exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired
certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result
to follow his act or failure to act. 17 Specific intent involves a state of
the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the
prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and
proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific
intent.18 Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of
the accused as established by the evidence on record. 19
Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is
referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a
particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a
crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a
general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense
charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive
does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged
such as murder.20 The history of crimes shows that murders are
generally committed from motives comparatively trivial. 21 Crime is
rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In
kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her
liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be
convicted for kidnapping.22 In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is
ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a
loved one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the
specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the house of
Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him
with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the
malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their
primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific
allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors
was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him
was merely incidental to kidnapping.23 Irrefragably then, the crime
charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.
The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the
prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove
that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.
In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt. The prosecution must rely
on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the accused. The proof against the accused must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment.24
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove
the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal act
and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the
act.25 Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the
objective; second, the subjective element of crimes. 26 In homicide (by
dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a)
the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was
produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and
was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that
defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death. 27 To prove the
felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible
evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately
killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such
evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by
the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the
time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies
because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond
reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or
presumptive evidence.28
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of
proof of corpus delicti. Modesto sustained five (5) gunshot wounds.
He also sustained seven (7) stab wounds, 29 defensive in nature. The
use by the malefactors of deadly weapons, more specifically
handguns and knives, in the killing of the victim as well as the nature,
number and location of the wounds sustained by said victim are
evidence of the intent by the malefactors to kill the victim with all the
consequences flowing therefrom.30 As the State Supreme Court of
Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:31
"This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the
ordinary and natural consequences of his own acts, is
applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act
deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and
not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that
every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears.
Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if
the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves
show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is
presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by
 the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it 1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald barged into the
was otherwise." house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun. Marlon poked his
gun on Modesto while Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They then seized
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors Modesto and herded him out of his house:
of the killing of Modesto. It relied on circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellants of "FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then at that time in
murder. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts your house?
and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common experience. 32 What was A         We were eating, sir.
once a rule of account respectability is now entombed in Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that Q         You said we, who were your companions eating then
circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or at that time?
presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of
conviction if the following requisites concur:
A         My father, my mother and the two children and
myself, sir.
"x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived have been
established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances Q         While taking your supper that time, do you recall if
is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable there was anything unusual that happened at that time?
doubt."33
A         When we were about to start to eat three armed men
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which entered our house.
constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof
of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without Q         Do you know these three armed men who entered
exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt your house?
of accused for the offense charged. 34 For circumstantial evidence to
be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be A         Yes, sir.
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the Q         Who are they, name them one by one?
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. 35 If the prosecution adduced the
A         Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.
requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the
accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution. Q         Are these three persons inside the courtroom now?

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum A         Two of them, sir.
of circumstantial evidence to prove that accused-appellants, in
confabulation with their co-accused, conspired to kill and did kill Q         Who are these two who are inside the courtroom?
Modesto:
A         Marlon and Ronald, sir.
Q         Will you please stand up and point to them?
A         (Witness is pointing to a person seated on the bench
inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked
answered Marlon Delim. Likewise, witness is pointing unto a
person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who,
when his name was asked he answered Ronald Delim).
Q         You said that these two armed persons entered your
house, what kind of arm were they carrying at that time?
A         Short handgun, sir.
Q         When these three armed persons whom you have
mentioned, armed with short firearms, what did they do then
when they entered your house?
A         They took my father, sir.
Q         Who took your father?
A         Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim, sir.
Q         When these three persons took your father, what did
you do then?
A         None, sir.
COURT: How did they get your father?
A         They poked a gun and brought him outside the
house, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun?
A         Marlon Delim, sir.
Q         Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the person who
poked a gun?
A         (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim, one of the
accused).
Q         After bringing your father out from your house, what
transpired next?
A         Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, 'Stay in your
house,' and guarded us.
COURT: You said your father was taken out, who?
A         Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three persons bring
your father?
A         I do not know where they brought my father, sir.
COURT: Was your father taken inside your house or
outside?
A         Inside our house, sir.
Q         You said that Marlon poked a gun at your father, is
that correct?
A         Yes, sir.
Q         What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon was
poking his gun to your father?
 A         Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled my
father out, sir."36
Randy's account of the incident was corroborated by his mother,
Rita, who testified:
"PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during the last hearing
that on January 23, 1999 at around 6:30 in the evening while
preparing for your supper three (3) armed men entered
inside your house, who were these three (3) men who
entered your house?
A         I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record that the witness
is taking her time to answer, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that Marlon Delim,
Robert Delim and Bongbong entered your house, are these
three (3) persons who entered your house in Court now?
A         They are here except the other one, sir.
Q         Will you please step down and point to the persons
who entered your house?
A         Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert Delim is
not in Court and Bongbong is Ronald Delim.
Q         After these three (3) armed men entered your house,
what happened then?
A         My husband was brought out, sir.
Q         What is the name of your husband?
A         Modesto Delim, sir."37
2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged into their house,
Leon, armed with a handgun, acted as a lookout when he stood
guard by the door of the house of Modesto and remained thereat
until 7:00 a.m. of the next day:
"FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was pulled out from
your house by these three persons, what did you and your
mother do while these three persons were taking out of your
house?
A         We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon
Delim guarded us.
COURT: Where, in your house?
A         Yes, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that your father was
pulled out by these three persons Marlon, Robert and Ronal
(sic), where were Leon and Manuel then?
A         They were at the door, sir.
COURT: Why do you know that they were guarding you?
A         Because they were at the door, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance that time
when these two persons were guarding you, these Leon and
Manuel?
A         They were armed, sir.
Q         What do you mean by armed?
A         They have gun, sir.
 Q         What kind of firearm? COURT: Where?

A         Short firearm, sir. A         At the housing project at Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan,

sir.
Q         By the way, where are these Leon and Manuel now,
if you know? FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at that time
when you were able to look for your father on January 27,
A         Leon is here, sir. 1999 at 3:00 o'clock P.M.?

Q         About Manuel? A         Yes, sir.

A         None, sir. Q         Who?

Q         Will you please stand up and point at Leon, Mr. A         My Aunt, sir.
Witness?
Q         What is the name of your Aunt?
A         (Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench
inside the courtroom, who when his name was asked, A         Nida Pucal, sir.
answered, Leon Delim)."38
Q         Who else?
3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave the house as
Ronald and Marlon left the house with Modesto in tow. Rita and A         Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, sir.
Randy were detained in their house up to 7:00 a.m. of January 24,
1999 to prevent them from seeking help from their relatives and COURT: When you found your father, what was his
police authorities. condition?

4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999, at about 3:00 A         He was dead, sir.
p.m., the cadaver of Modesto was found under the thick bushes in a
grassy area in the housing project located about 200 meters away
from the house of Modesto. The cadaver exuded bad odor and was COURT: Go ahead.
already in the state of decomposition:
FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was already dead, what
"Q         So what did you do then on January 27, where did was his appearance then when you saw him dead?
you look for your father?
A         He has bad odor, sir, in the state of decompsition
A         The same place and at 3:00 o'clock P.M., we were (sic)."39
able to find my father.
The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de Guzman who
testified that the cadaver of Modesto was in a state of
decomposition, with tiny white worms crawling from his wounds, and
that his penis and scrotum were inflamed. The victim sustained five
gunshot wounds and defensive wounds on the left arm and forearm:
"PROS. TOMBOC:
Q         Will you please tell the Honorable Court your
findings, Doctora?
WITNESS:
A         First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver, this is the
position of the body, both upper extremities are flexed and
both lower extremities are flexed (Nakakukot).
Q         How many days had already elapsed when you
autopsied the cadaver of the victim, Doctora?
A         Four (4) days upon the recovery of the body, sir.
Q         And what was your findings Doctora?
A         The body was already under the state of
decomposition, sir, with foul odor and there were so many
worms coming out from the injuries, there were tiny white
worms, sir.
Q         What else did you observe Doctora?
A         Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the relative to refer
it to the NBI sir. Actually the victim was an igorot (sic) and
they have tradition that they will bury immediately. Whether
they like it or not I should do it, sir.
Q         What else Doctora?
A         And the penis was inflammed (sic), the scrotum was
also inflammed (sic), sir.
And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10 ml. GSW pre-
auricular area, right; there was also 20 ml x 20 ml. GSW,
mandibular area, right; I cannot also determine the exit.
Q         So there were two (2) gunshot wounds (GSW)
Doctora?
A         Yes sir.
And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right;
there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose,
directed upward (POE); and there was also 30 x 40 ml.
GSW, mid parieto-occipital area (POEx).
Q         How many all in all are the gunshot wound?
A         Five (5) sir.
And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated wound,
right cheek; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area,
left; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd,
left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound lateral aspect
D/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial
aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound,
medial aspect D/3rd, left arm; and #3; 1 x 1 cm. in
line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect,
M/3rd, left forearm.
Q         How many stabbed wound are there Doctora?
A         There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.
Q         Those stabbed wounds were defensive wounds,
Doctora?
 A         Yes sir."40 A         Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects were their
neighbors, Marlon Delim and his brothers, sir.
The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny white worms
swarming and feasting on it and the distention of his scrotum and Q         What are the names of the brothers?
penis are evidence that the cadaver was in the stage of putrefaction
and that the victim had been dead for a period ranging from three to A         Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot remember the
six days.41 Admittedly, there are variant factors determinative of the others, sir.
exact death of the victim. An equally persuasive authority states:
Q         By reason of that information were you able to
"Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes Occurring in Tropical Region:
apprehend any of them for investigation?
Time Since Death Condition of the Body
A         No, sir.
48 hours Ova of flies seen. Trunk bloated. Face discolored and swollen.
Blisters present. Moving maggots seen
Q         Why?
72 hours Whole body grossly swollen and disfigured. Hair and nails
loose. Tissues soft and discolored."42
A         Because when we were dispatched by the Chief of
Police no Delim brothers could be found, they all left the
The lapse of two or three to four days from the seizure of the victim place, sir.
in the evening of January 23, 1999 to the discovery of his cadaver
which was already in the state of putrefaction in the afternoon of Q         In what place did you look for the brothers Delim?
January 27, 1999, about 200 meters away from his house, is
consistent with and confirmatory of the contention of the prosecution
A         Within the vicinity, sir.
that the victim was killed precisely by the very malefactors who
seized him on January 23, 1999.
Q         In what place?
5. When police authorities went to the residences of all the
malefactors, the latter had flown the coop and were nowhere to be A         Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime was
found: committed in Brgy. Bila and the place where the cadaver
was found in Paldit, sir.
"COURT: In connection with this case, you investigated the
wife and son of Modesto Delim? Q         Where did you look for the Delim brothers?

A         Yes, sir. A         Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir.

Q         In the course of the investigation did you come to Q         Wherelse (sic)?

know who were the suspects?
A         Labayog, Sison, sir.
 Q         Wherelse?
A         In mountainous part of Immalog, part of Tuba
Benguet, sir.
Q         What was the result?
A         Negative result, sir."43
6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while Marlon and
Ronald used to go to the house of Modesto and Rita:
"COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to
you prior to that day, January 23, 1999?
A         Yes, sir, I know them.
Q         Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to January
23, 1999?
A         They are my neighbors, sir.
Q         How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do you
know them before January 23, 1999?
A         I know them, sir.
Q         Why do you know them?
A         They used to go to our house, sir.
Q         I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert, Manuel and
Leon are all Delims and your husband's name is Modesto
Delim are they related with each other?
A         Yes, sir."44
The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and Leon from their
houses in Barangay Bila, Sison is strong circumstantial evidence of
their guilt for the death of Modesto. Although flight after the
commission of an offense does not create a legal presumption of
guilt, nevertheless, the same is admissible in evidence against them
and if not satisfactorily explained in a manner consistent with their
innocence, will tend to show that they, in fact, killed Modesto. 45
It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the
malefactors to abduct and kill Modesto. Indeed, Randy and Rita
testified that they were not aware of any misunderstanding or grudge
between Modesto on the one hand and Marlon, Ronald and Leon
and their co-accused on the other before the incident, or any
motivation on the part of the three malefactors to cause harm to
Modesto. Nonetheless, it cannot thereby be concluded that a person
or persons other than Marlon, Ronald and Leon were criminally
responsible for the death of the victim. It is a matter of judicial notice
that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for
no reason at all.46 In this case, the inscrutable facts are that Marlon
and Ronald, each of whom was armed with a handgun, forcibly took
Modesto from his house at the gunpoint, hog-tied, put a piece of
cloth in his mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left the house
with Modesto in tow, Rita heard three gunshots or so and the
cadaver of Modesto was found concealed under the bushes and
already in a state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27,
1999. Modesto sustained several gunshot wounds and died because
of a gunshot wound on the head. The criminal acts and the
connection of Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts having been
proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the act itself
furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration there was some
causes or influences moving the mind. 47 The remarkable tapestry
intricately woven by the prosecution should not be trashed simply
because the malefactors had no motive to kill Modesto.
Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the burden of
evidence shifted on Marlon, Ronald and Leon to rebut the same and
explain what happened to the victim after taking him from his house
in the evening of January 23, 1999. They may have freed the victim
shortly after taking him, or the victim may have been able to escape
and that thereafter a person or some other persons may have killed
him. However, Marlon, Ronald and Leon failed to give any
explanation. Instead, they merely denied having seized and killed the
victim and interposed alibi as their defense.
Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto because the evidence
on record shows that he conspired with accused-appellants Marlon
and Ronald and accused Robert and Manuel in killing the victim.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a
felony and decide to commit it. 48 Conspiracy must be proven with the
same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is not presumed. It may
be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
Conspiracy is deducible from the acts of the malefactors before,
during and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of
a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment. 49 To
establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to the
existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. 50 It is sufficient
if, at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused had the
same purpose and were united in its execution. If conspiracy is
established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. It matters not
who among the accused actually shot and killed the victim. 51 This is
based on the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the
prosecution of the common plan:
"x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the
scope of his authority, are considered and treated as the
acts and declarations of his principal. 'What is so done by an
agent, is done by the principal, through him, as his mere
instrument.' Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania D. &
M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). 'If the
conspiracy be proved to have existed, or rather if evidence
be given to the jury of its existence, the acts of one in
furtherance of the common design are the acts of all; and
whatever one does in furtherance of the common design, he
does as the agent of the co-conspirators.' R. v. O'Connell, 5
St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710."52
In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one
breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm and the law says
that the acts, words and declaration of each, while in the pursuit of
the common design, are the acts, words and declarations of all. 53
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the
house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun. Marlon and Ronald
barged into said house while Leon stood guard by the door thereof.
After Marlon and Ronald had left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by
the door and warned Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon
stood guard by the door of the house until 7:00 a.m. of January 24,
1999 when he left the house. The overt acts of all the malefactors
were so synchronized and executed with precision evincing a
preconceived plan or design of all the malefactors to achieve a
common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto. Irrefragably, the
tasks assigned to Leon in the commission of the crime were — (a) to
act as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy remain in their
house to prevent them from seeking assistance from police
authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto
shall have been a fait accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and
Ronald.54 Patently, Leon, a lookout for the group, is guilty of the
killing of Modesto.55 Leon may not have been at the situs
criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon and Ronald
nevertheless he is a principal by direct participation. 56 If part of a
crime has been committed in one place and part in another, each
person concerned in the commission of either part is liable as
principal. No matter how wide may be the separation of the
conspirators, if they are all engaged in a common plan for the
execution of a felony and all take their part in furtherance of the
common design, all are liable as principals. Actual presence is not
necessary if there is a direct connection between the actor and the
crime.57
Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the testimonies of Randy
and Rita alleging that the same were marred by inconsistencies.
1. Randy initially stated that he did not know where the
assailants brought his father. Later however, Randy claimed
that the malefactors proceeded to the direction of Paldit,
Sison, Pangasinan;
 2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon and Ronald
as those who barged into their house. She later changed her
testimony and declared that it was Robert, together with
Marlon and Ronald who barged into the house;
3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood outside the
house guarding them. Later, she testified that after the three
men brought out the victim, the two other accused entered
the house and guarded them there;
4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her husband the
next day, or on January 25, 1999, and she was
accompanied by her son Randy. However, Randy testified
that he was alone when he looked for his father from
January 24 to 26, 1999.58
We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon. Case law has it that
the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective
testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof and its conclusions culled from its findings are accorded by
the appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of
its unique advantage of observing at close range the demeanor,
deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they give their
testimonies before the court.
In the present case, the trial court gave credence and full probative
weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution.
Moreover, there is no evidence on record that Randy and Rita were
moved by any improper or ill motive in testifying against the
malefactors and the other accused; hence, their testimonies must be
given full credit and probative weight.59 The inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Rita and Randy do not render them incredible or their
testimonies barren of probative weight. It must be borne in mind that
human memory is not as unerring as a photograph and a person's
sense of observation is impaired by many factors including the
shocking effect of a crime. A truth-telling witness is not always
expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that
the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing of
statements dilute neither the witnesses' credibility nor the veracity of
his testimony.60 Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the
same side with respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do
not impair the weight of their united testimony to the prominent
facts.61 Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they
erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 62
Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be construed in its
entirety and not in truncated terms and the true meaning of answers
to isolated questions propounded to a witness is to be ascertained by
due consideration of all the questions propounded to the witness and
his answers thereto.63
Randy's testimony that he did know where the malefactors brought
his father is not inconsistent with his testimony that Ronald and
Marlon brought his father towards the direction of Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan. Randy may not have known the destination of accused-
appellants but he saw the direction to which they went. While it may
be true that when asked to identify the three who barged into their
house, Rita pointed to Leon as one of them, however, Rita had been
consistent throughout her testimony that those who barged into their
house were Ronald and Marlon. Leon's counsel never cross-
examined Rita and impeached her testimony on her identification of
Leon as one of those who barged into their house to give her an
opportunity to explain her perceived inconsistency conformably with
Rule 132, Section 13, of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
"Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he
has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, the statements must be related to him,
with the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made
such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness
before any question is put to him concerning them."64
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent statements made by Rita
is insufficient for the desired impeachment of her. 65 As to whether
Rita and Randy were together in looking for Modesto or Leon merely
stood guard by the door of the house or entered the house are
inconsequential. The fact is that Leon stood guard throughout the
night to prevent Rita and Randy from seeking assistance for the
seizure and killing of Modesto.
This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that the respective
testimonies of Randy and Rita bear the earmarks of truth and
sincerity. Despite intense and grueling cross-examination, they
responded with consistency upon material details that could only
come from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events which
unfolded before their eyes. The Court thus finds no cogent reason to
disregard the findings of the trial court regarding their credibility.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court committed a
reversible error in not giving credence and probative weight to their
evidence to prove their defense of alibi. They aver that their
collective evidence to prove their defense is strong.
We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of
the weakest of defenses in criminal prosecution because the same is
easy to concoct between relatives, friends and even those not
related to the offender.66 It is hard for the prosecution to disprove. For
alibi to merit approbation by the trial court and this Court, Marlon,
Ronald and Leon are burdened to prove with clear and convincing
evidence that they were in a place other than the situs criminis at the
time of the commission of the crime; that it was physically impossible
for them to have committed the said crime. 67 They failed to discharge
their burden. Moreover, Rita and Randy positively and
spontaneously identified Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the culprits.
The house of Ronald, where he claimed he was when the crime was
committed, was only two kilometers away from the house of Modesto
and can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed to adduce any
documentary evidence to prove his employment by Sally Asuncion.
The barefaced fact that he was a resident of Laoag City does not
constitute proof that he was in Laoag City on the day of the
commission of the crime. With respect to Marlon, he failed to adduce
evidence aside from his self-serving testimony that he resided in, left
Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on January 29, 1999.
The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of murder with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of Modesto. The
trial court likewise appreciated nighttime and abuse of superior
strength and the use of unlicensed firearms as separate aggravating
circumstances. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that
indeed treachery was attendant in the killing of Modesto. Hence,
Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder defined in and
penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty
only of homicide defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior
strength must be alleged and proved clearly and conclusively as the
crime itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are
utterly insufficient and cannot produce the effect of qualifying the
crime.68 As this Court held: "No matter how truthful these
suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot
produce the effect of aggravating the condition of
defendant."69 Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
following elements: (a) the employment of means of execution which
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously
adopted.70 Although the victim may have been defenseless at the
time he was seized but there is no evidence as to the particulars of
how he was assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be appreciated
against the accused.71 In this case, the victim was defenseless when
seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to
present any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was
defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked and
killed. It cannot be presumed that although he was defenseless when
he was seized the victim was in the same situation when he was
attacked, shot and stabbed by the malefactors. To take advantage of
superior strength means to purposely use force that is out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked.72 What is primordial, this Court held in People v. Rogelio
Francisco73 is that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the crime. It is necessary
to show that the malefactors cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage from their superiority in strength.74 In this case, the
prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald
deliberately took advantage of their numerical superiority when
Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the malefactors
outnumbered Modesto and were armed while Modesto was not does
not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical
superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and
stabbed.75
In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only
of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its full period.
Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of
unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial, there is no allegation
in the Information that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to
possess the firearm. Lack of license to possess a firearm is an
essential element of the crime of violation of PD 1866 as amended
by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating circumstance
in the felony of homicide or murder. 76 Neither can dwelling, although
proven, aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not
alleged in the Information as required by Rule 110, Section 8, of the
Revised Rules of Court.77 Although this rule took effect on December
1, 2000, after the commission of the offense in this case,
nonetheless it had been given retroactive effect considering that the
rule is favorable to the accused.78
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of
homicide, Marlon, Ronald and Leon should be meted an
indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which shall be taken from the
entirety of prision mayor, ranging from 6 years and one day to 12
years and the maximum period of which shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8
months and one day to 17 years and 4 months.
Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the heirs of the
victim should be modified. The sum of P75,000.00 awarded as moral
damages should be reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.79 The amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages is in order. 80 In addition, civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 should be awarded without need of proof, likewise in
consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.81
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Marlon
Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide defined in and penalized
by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime, each of accused-
appellants is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum period as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. Accused-
appellants are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the
heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and
the amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., joins the dissenting opinion of J. Vitug.
Gutierrez, J., joins Justice Vitug in his dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J.:
Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which relates to a
series of facts other than the fact in issue which, by experience, are
found to be so associated with such fact that, in relation of cause and
effect, they lead to a veritable conclusion. There should, for
circumstantial evidence to warrant a criminal conviction, be a) more
than one circumstance; b) proof of the facts from which the inference
is derived; and c) a clear showing that the combination of all the
circumstances can aptly support a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.1 The use of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases,
prompted by sheer necessity, has long been an accepted, practice
but with one important caveat — it must be used with utmost care
and, when its exacting standards are not met, it is correctly ignored.
On 04 May 1999, the following Information was filed against Marlon,
Leon, Manuel, Robert and Ronald, all surnamed Delim; viz:
"That on or about January 23, 1999 in the evening at Brgy.
Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with
short firearms barged in and entered the house of Modesto
Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation, conspiring with one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hog-tie,
gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto
Delim, (while) accused Leon and Manuel Delim stayed in the
house (and) guarded and prevented the wife and son of
Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse
of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim,
to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
"Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659."2
The evidence would show that Modesto Delim was forcibly abducted
from his residence by appellants, all armed, on the night of 23
January 1999. But to say that the same group was also responsible
for his death, days later, or that his violent end was the consequence
of the abduction, and nothing more, would be to unduly put to risk
our standard of moral certainty required for all convictions.
It was approximately six-thirty on the evening of 23 January 1999.
Three armed men suddenly barged into the house of Modesto Delim
in Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan. Modesto, who was then about to
take his supper with his wife Rita Manalo Bantas, his teen-age son
Randy Manalo Bantas, and his two grandchildren, was suddenly
seized by the intruders. Randy identified the malefactors to be their
neighbors — Marlon, Robert, and Ronald, all surnamed Delim.
Without any word, the trio went straight for Modesto. Randy saw
Marlon poke a gun at his father while Ronald and Robert held back
his arms and brought him outside the house. Two more armed
cohorts, namely, Manuel and Leon, both also surnamed Delim, stood
guard by the door. No words were uttered to interrupt the heavy
silence except when one of the two men told the stunned family
members to stay where they were. All through the night, both Manuel
and Leon Delim kept watch outside the door and only left at around
seven o'clock in the morning of the next day.
Soon after Manuel Delim and Leon Delim had left, Randy
immediately sought the help of his Uncle Darwin Niño who forthwith
told him to bring the matter to the authorities. But it was only two
days later that, in the company of his Uncle Melchor, Randy finally
reported the incident to the police. In the meantime, the distressed
son scoured the vicinity of Paldit, Pangasinan, to look for his father.
He was nowhere to be found. Days passed. Then, one day, he
stumbled upon the decomposing body of his father at a thick grassy
portion of a housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, some 200
meters from their house. Dr. Ma. Fe Lagmay de Guzman, who
conducted the autopsy, found the corpse riddled with five fatal
gunshot wounds, seven stab wounds and several "defensive"
wounds.
The victim's surviving spouse Rita Manalo Bantas and son Randy
Manalo Bantas could not understand why anyone would want
Modesto killed. The family was completely unaware of any possible
motive for the nabbing and killing of Modesto Delim or of any bad
blood between Modesto and the five indictees.
On 14 January 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City,
Branch 46, rejecting the defense of alibi, convicted Ronald, Marlon,
and Leon for murder; it held:
 "WHEREFORE, judgment of conviction beyond reasonable "A         Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.
doubt is hereby rendered against Ronald Delim, Marlon
Delim and Leon Delim (for) the commission of Aggravated "Q         Are these three persons inside the courtroom now?
Murder, an offense defined and penalized under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 and "A         Two of them, sir.
the Court sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon
Delim to suffer the penalty of death, to be implemented in
the manner as provided for by law; the Court likewise "Q         Who are these two who are inside the courtroom?
ordered the accused, jointly and solidarily, to indemnify the
heirs of Modesto Delim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral "A         Marlon and Ronald, sir.
damages, plus the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages."3 xxx           xxx           xxx

In assailing the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt by the "Q         You said that these two armed persons entered your
court a quo, appellants stress on what they claim to be house; what kind of arms were they carrying at that time?
inconsistencies in the testimony of Randy Manalo Bantas and that of
Rita Manalo Bantas. I agree with my colleagues that the trial court "A         Short handguns, sir.
has not erred in regarding the so-called inconsistencies as being
minor and trivial that hardly can affect the credibility of the witnesses.
"Q         When these three armed persons whom you have
The narration given by Randy Manalo Bantas and Rita Manalo
mentioned, armed with short firearms, what did they do
Bantas at the witness stand, identifying each of the appellants and
when they entered your house?
detailing their individual participation in the incident, could not have
been more spontaneous and straightforward; thus —
"A         They took my father, sir.
Testimony of Randy Manalo Bantas
"Q         Who took your father?
"Q         While taking your supper that time, do you recall if
there was anything unusual that happened at that time? "A         Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim, sir.

"A         When we were about to start to eat, three armed "Q         When these three persons took your father, what did
men entered our house. you do then?

"Q         Do you know these three armed men who entered "A         None, sir.
your house?
"COURT:
"A         Yes, sir.
How did they get your father?
"Q         Who were they, name them one by one.
"A         They poked a gun and brought him outside the "A         Yes, sir.
house, sir.
"Q         What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon was
"FISCAL TOMBOC: poking his gun at your father?

Who poked a gun? "A         Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled my
father out, sir.
"A         Marlon Delim, sir.
"FISCAL TOMBOC:
"xxx           xxx           xxx
When your father was pulled out from your house by
"Q         After bringing your father out from your house, what these three persons, what did you and your mother
transpired next? do while these three persons were taking your father
out of your house?
"A         Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, 'Stay in your
house,' and guarded us. "A         We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon
Delim guarded us.
"COURT:
"xxx           xxx           xxx
You said your father was taken out, who?
"FISCAL TOMBOC:
"A         Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.
What was their appearance that time when these
two persons were guarding you, these Leon and
"FISCAL TOMBOC:
Manuel?
Where did these three persons bring your father?
"A         They were armed, sir.
"A         I do not know where they brought my father, sir.
"Q         What do you mean by armed?
"COURT:
"A         They have [a] gun, sir.
Was your father taken inside your house or outside?
"Q         What kind of firearm?
"A         Inside our house, sir.
"A         Short firearm, sir.
"Q         You said that Marlon poked a gun at your father, is
"xxx           xxx           xxx
that correct?
"FISCAL TOMBOC:
You said that you were guarded by Leon and
Manuel, how long did these two persons guard you
in your house?
"A         Up to the morning, sir.
"Q         You know what time?
"A         Yes, sir, [seven o'clock].
"xxx           xxx           xxx
"Q         When [seven o'clock] arrived, you said that they
guarded you up to [seven o'clock], what did these two, Leon
and Manuel, do then?
"A         They left, sir.
"Q         Do you know where they went?
4
"A         No, sir."
Testimony of Rita Manalo Bantas
"PROSECUTOR TOMBOC
You said during the last hearing that on January 23,
1999 at around 6:30 in the evening while preparing
for your supper three (3) armed men entered inside
your house, who were these three (3) men who
entered your house?
"A         I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir.
"xxx           xxx           xxx
"PROSECUTOR TOMBOC
You said that Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and
Bongbong entered your house, are these three (3)
persons who entered your house in Court now?
"A         They are here except the other one, sir.
"Q         Will you please step down and point to the persons
who entered your house?
"A         Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert Delim is
not in Court and Bongbong is Ronald Delim.
"Q         After these three (3) armed men entered your
house, what happened then?
"A         My husband was brought out, sir.
"xxx           xxx           xxx
"PROSECUTOR TOMBOC
Who brought your husband out of your house on
January 23, 1999 at 6:30 in the evening?
"A         Marion Delim, Bongbong and Robert Delim, sir.
"Q         Then after Marlon Delim, Bongbong and Robert
Delim brought your husband out what transpired next?
"A         The two (2) stayed at the door of our house to guard
us, sir.
"Q         Who were these two (2) persons who guarded you?
"A         Leon and Manuel, sir.
 "xxx           xxx           xxx
"COURT
You said the two (2) Leon and Manuel stayed at the
door guarding you, is that correct?`
"A         Yes, sir.
"Q         What made you say that you are guarded by them?
"A         Because they have guns with them, sir.
"PROSECUTOR TOMBOC
Do you know what kind of firearm were they
holding?
"A         I don't know, sir.
"Q         But you can describe whether long or short firearm?
"A         Short firearms, sir.
"Q         What did you do then when these two (2) armed
persons guarded you in your house?
"A         We did not do anything because we were afraid, sir.
"COURT
These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to
you prior to that day, January 23, 1999?
"A         Yes, sir, I know them.
"Q         Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to January
23, 1999?
"A         They are my neighbors, sir.
"Q         How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do you
know them before January 23, 1999?
"A         I know them, sir.
"Q         Why do you know them?
"A         They used to go to our house, sir.
"xxx           xxx           xxx
"Q         You said that Leon and Manuel Delim guarded the
door of your house, how long did they stay there?
"A         The whole night up to [seven] o'clock the following
morning when they left the house, sir.
"Q         You said they left, do you know where they
proceeded?
"A         I don't know where they [went], sir.
"Q         How about you, what did you do then when the two
persons left your house?
"A         I stayed at home because I [was] afraid, sir.
"COURT
When the 3 persons brought your husband out did
Modesto Delim go with them voluntarily?
 "A         No, sir.
"Q         Why do you say [that] he did not go voluntarily?
"A         Because they held his hand and brought him
outside, sir.
"PROSECUTOR TOMBOC
You said they held the hand of your husband, will
you please demonstrate how he was brought
outside?
"A         They held the 2 hands placed at the back and they
brought outside my husband, sir.
"Q         Who among the 3 men held the hands of your
husband?
"A         Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, Sir.
"COURT
Did your husband resist when they held the hand?
"A         He did not resist, Sir."5
Between the positive identification made by the eyewitnesses and
the bare denial of appellants, there is scarcely any serious doubt but
that decisive weight must be given to the positive testimony of Randy
Manalo Bantas and Rita Manalo Bantas. 6 The defense of alibi, being
one that can easily be fabricated, is inherently weak and cannot be
expected to withstand the positive identification made by credible
witnesses.
Randy Manalo Bantas, who was in the house when the five intruders
entered their abode and took his father away, could not have been
mistaken in identifying the malefactors who not only were neighbors
but also had family ties with them as well. According to Randy and
Rita Manalo Bantas, it was appellant Leon Delim, together with
Manuel Delim (at large), who stood guard at their house after the
others, appellant Marlon Delim, Robert Delim (at large) and appellant
Ronald Delim, took Modesto away on the early evening of 23
January 1999. Leon and Manuel stayed well into the night and left
only at seven o'clock in the morning of the next day. The certificate of
residency issued by the barangay captain of Salet, Laoag City, only
confirmed that Leon Delim was a co-resident of the barangay but it
did not establish with any degree of certainty that Leon Delim had
not left Laoag City on the day of the incident. Appellant Ronald
Delim, in his case, said that he was home at Asan Norte with his
family when the abduction and the brutal slaying of Modesto Delim
occurred. Ronald himself confirmed, however, that Asan Norte was a
mere ten-minute bicycle ride from the victim's house at Paldit,
Pangasinan. Alibi, to be believed, must invariably place the accused
at such location as to render it physically impossible for him to be at
the place of the crime and, let alone, to commit the same. The claim,
upon the other hand, of appellant Marlon Delim that he was at
Dumaguete City during the fateful day of 23 to 24 January 1999
remained to be just a bare assertion; it was not corroborated even by
his sister in Dumaguete whom, he said, he worked for.
The evidence would indeed point out that Marlon, Ronald and Robert
seized Modesto Delim from his house while Leon and Manuel stood
guard and stayed at the door of the victim's house. Randy Manalo
Bantas and Rita Manalo Bantas, however, could only testify on the
participation of each of the malefactors in the abduction of Modesto
Delim but not on what might have happened to him thereafter. In
arriving at its verdict convicting appellants for "aggravated murder,"
the trial court considered the act of the accused of forcibly taking
Modesto Delim from his house as being likewise enough to
substantiate the killing by them of the victim. The conclusion could
rightly be assailed. The accounts of Randy and his mother Rita
would indicate that the forcible taking of Modesto was carried out in
absolute silence, with not one of the five intruders uttering any word
which could give a clue on the reason for the abduction and, more
particularly, whether the same was carried out for the purpose of
killing Modesto. The two witnesses were unaware of any existing
grudge between the malefactors and the victim that could have
prompted them to violently snuff out the life of the latter. While the
motive of an accused in a criminal case might generally be
immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive could be
important and consequential when the evidence on the commission
of the crime would be short of moral certainty.7
In sustaining the conclusion of the trial court that the
five accused also snuffed out the life of Modesto Delim,
the ponencia relied on circumstantial evidence testified to by Randy
Bantas. He recounted that, on the early evening of 23 January 1999,
Marlon and Ronald barged into the house of Modesto, each armed
with a handgun. Marlon poked his gun on Modesto while Ronald
hog-tied Modesto. They then seized Modesto and herded him out of
the house. Leon, armed with a handgun, acted as a lookout by
standing guard by the door of the house of Modesto until seven
o'clock in the morning of the next day. Rita and Randy were ordered
by Leon not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left the house
with Modesto in tow. On the afternoon of 27 January 1999, the
cadaver of Modesto was found under the thick bushes in a grassy
area in the housing project located about 200 meters away from the
house of Modesto, exuding bad odor and in a state of
decomposition.
The above recitals all point to only one established fact, i.e., that the
accused forcibly took Modesto Delim from his residence to an
unknown destination on the night of 23 January 1999, would be
scanty to support a conclusion that the five, aside from abducting the
victim, likewise killed him. There was an unexplained gap in what
ought to have been a continuous chain of events. The body bore
several defensive wounds, which could give rise to the not too
unlikely scenario that Modesto might have ultimately been released
by his abductors sometime before he was killed.
Recognizing that circumstantial evidence is as strong as the weakest
link, this Court is bound not to ignore all other possibilities. 8 It would
seem to me that what has instead . been shown and established
beyond reasonable doubt is the guilt of appellants for the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the whereabouts of the
victim — the immediate consequence of the abduction — for "more
than three days" from the time of his abduction not having been
accounted for. The allegation in the Information that the accused
"willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d),
gag(ged), with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct(ed) Modesto
Delim (while) Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house
(and) guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim
from helping the latter," constitutes the act of deprivation of liberty
and the gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
provides:
"Article 267 Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any
private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:
"1 If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than
three days.
"2 If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
"3 If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill
him shall have been made.
"4 If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
except when the accused is any of the parents, a female or a
public officer.
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances abovementioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
"When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed."
The fact that the Information went further to charge the accused with
the killing of the victim should be of no moment, the real nature of the
criminal charge being determined not from the caption or the
preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the law
alleged to have been violated — these being conclusions of law —
but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.  9
In meting upon appellants the supreme penalty of death, the trial
court has appreciated five aggravating circumstances of treachery,
abuse of superior strength, nighttime, dwelling, and use of
unlicensed firearms. The Information specifies treachery, abuse of
superior strength and evident premeditation as being the aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime. Treachery and
superior strength, however, only pertain to crimes against persons.
The crime of kidnapping, falling as it does within the classification of
crimes against liberty, is aggravated neither by treachery nor
superior strength. The aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation can be appreciated when it is shown that the culprits
have previously reflected on the crime, or that they have prepared
appropriate means to execute it, coolly taking into account its
consequences. The evidence is deficient in this respect. The
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling and use of
unlicensed firearms, not having been alleged in the Information,
cannot be considered. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
rendered effective on 01 December 2000, 10 requires aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be specified in the
complaint or information.
The crime of kidnapping is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
that can be appreciated, the punishment that should be imposed is
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua than the penalty of death.11
Now, on the civil aspect of the case. The law places abundant
protective shields in order to ensure that no man shall be made to
account for a crime he might not have committed or be adjudged
guilty and meted a punishment without him having first been afforded
a full opportunity to defend his cause. Thus, a conviction is
pronounced only upon proof beyond reasonable doubt, preceded by
an arraignment where he pleads on the basis of a complaint or
information that specifies the gravamen of the offense and the
circumstances that are said to aggravate it and then the trial where
evidence is adduced by the parties. For purposes of the civil liability,
as well as its extent, civil law principles, however, are applied, and
damages might be accorded to the aggrieved party upon a mere
preponderance of evidence. There is, I believe, enough justification,
albeit inadequate for purposes of a criminal conviction, to hold
appellants responsible and civilly liable for the death of Modesto
Delim whose body was found riddled with bullets a few days after
being forcibly abducted by appellants.
Consonantly, appellants should be held liable, jointly and severally,
for civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of the victim, moral
damages in an equal amount for the mental anguish suffered by his
heirs and P25,000.00 exemplary damages because of the
attendance of aggravating circumstances that were established
albeit not allowed to be considered in meting out the sentence for the
crime. Thus, in People vs. Catubig,12 the Court has said:
"The term 'aggravating circumstances' used by the Civil
Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of
an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the private
victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional
damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift
to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended
for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make
little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be
of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
 liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of Republic of the Philippines
the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or SUPREME COURT
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of Manila
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article
2230 of the Civil Code. EN BANC

"Relevantly, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, made G.R. No. L-47722             July 27, 1943
effective on 01 December 2000, requires aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
the complaint or information. vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-
"xxx           xxx           xxx appellants.

"A court would thus be precluded from considering in its Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
judgment the attendance of 'qualifying or aggravating Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
circumstances' if the complaint or information is bereft of any Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for
allegation on the presence of such circumstances. appellee.

"The retroactive application of procedural rules, MORAN, J.:

nevertheless, cannot adversely affect the rights of the private
offended party that have become vested prior to the
effectivity of said rules. Thus, in the case at bar, although
relationship has not been alleged in the information, the
offense having been committed, however, prior to the
effectivity of the new rules, the civil liability already incurred
by appellant remains unaffected thereby."
WHEREFORE, I vote for the modification of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, of Urdaneta City by instead holding
appellants Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, defined and penalized by Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, and imposing on each of them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, as well as by ordering said appellants to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Modesto Delim the amounts of P50,000.00
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 moral damages and P25,000.00
exemplary damages, with costs de officio.
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the
accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of
Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary,
respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of
homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to
an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two
years and two months of  prison correccional and to indemnify jointly
and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000.
Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod,
Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor:
"Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas
with bailarina  and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive."
Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked
that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and
privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon
order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial
Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted
telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas.
They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to
follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction
was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the
Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he
knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose
morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector,
the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the
constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and
failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party.
The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with
defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the
route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was
supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis
approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana
stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the
place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with
her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own
room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour.
Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and
an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they
were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .
45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her
paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots
came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the
entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot
and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a
peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's
paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired
to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased.
Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir."
The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and
upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds
inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's
body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by
the evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea.
Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy.
According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis
arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room
was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping
in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon
opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas,
stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and
as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him.
Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and
shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the
curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas
stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas,
while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he
had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis,
entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was
then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he
fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies
are certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a
natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because
they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at
Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an
attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand,
Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to
sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta
testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the
latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot
Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these
contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate
himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but
their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate
substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled
that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when
he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is
confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual
recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the
latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a
noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter
was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the
trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand,
we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her
testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two
appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony
will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but
that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even
misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the
witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence.
Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in
disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was
sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and
Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively,
believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made
previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question
is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for
the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants
acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their
official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they
incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower
court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that,
under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by
appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to
be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake
of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil.,
488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only
when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the
Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was
awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice,
"who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was
a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter
the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by
a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he
was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and
fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A
common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man
who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a
friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his
money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief
that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was
loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the
hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent
mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because
the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry,
and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and
such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants,
unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances
whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time
and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was
unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim
was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at
sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance
or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such
force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender,
overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima,
46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or
in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous
means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par.
13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus:
"No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an
arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par.
2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability
if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J.,
p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo
Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from
justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts
alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his
arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered,
as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down,
although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by
storm" without regard to his right to life which he has by such
notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of
official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does
something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack.
Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact
of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands
of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for
redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify
precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the
precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and
there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such
character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation —
not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a
premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence,
the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
(People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se
celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado
en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion,
debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que
no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta
gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal
Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with
the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232;
People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is
wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot
be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil.,
605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is
murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is,
however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the
incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the
Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person
incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in
order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that
the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the
first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance
of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them
committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance
of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or
alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But
through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no
chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing
the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any
resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to
his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are
hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to
pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally
an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988
ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant,
vs.
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch 113, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by
the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, against
respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City,
for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very least,
to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal
Case No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi
Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense charged, i.e., smuggling
of foreign currency out of the country.
Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge
filed an Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting his "commendable
record as a fearless prosecutor" since his appointment as Assistant
City Fiscal of Manila on December 4, 1962, until his appointment
eventually as RTC Judge on February 18, 1983; that at in the
reorganization of the judiciary after the February 26, 1986 revolution,
he was reappointed to his present position; that his length of service
as prosecutor and judge is "tangible proof that would negate the
allegations of the petitioner" (should be complainant), whereas the
latter did not last long in the service for reasons only known to him;
that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated by
respondent on September 29, 1986, but the complaint against him
was filed only on August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-
will of the complainant to subject respondent to harassment,
humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision, of which he submits
a copy (Annex A) as part of his Answer, is based on "fundamental
principles and the foundation of rights and justice" and that if there
are mistakes or errors in the questioned decision, they are
committed in good faith. Accordingly, respondent prays for the
dismissal of the petition (should be complaint).
The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is
guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in
rendering the decision in question. A judge can not be held to
account or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively, for an
erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.
The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal
involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs guard
at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle
foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the
country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by a customs guard and two
PAFSECOM officers on July 9, 1986, while on board Flight PR 300
of the Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the time of his
apprehension, he was found carrying with him foreign currency and
foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$
355,349.57, in various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese
Yen, Swiss Franc, Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder,
French Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound, Malaysian Dollar,
Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar and Hongkong Dollar, without any
authority as provided by law. At the time the accused was
apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations which
he was supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in
previous trips, namely, CB Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated
May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00 and Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and
CB Currency Declaration No. 06346, dated June 29, 1986 for
Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay
City for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960, as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the
City of Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to take out
 of the Philippines through the Manila International Contrary to Law.
Airport the following foreign currencies in cash and
in checks: The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P,
was subsequently raffled to Branch 113, presided by herein
respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.
Japanese Yen Y 32,800,000.00

Swiss Franc SW. FR 6,9000.00 Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as
follows:
Australian Dollar A$ 17,425.00
Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange;
Singapore Dollar S$ 9,945.00 exceptions. — No person shall take out or transmit
or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange
Deutsche Marck DM 18,595.00 in any form, out of the Philippines directly, through
other persons, through the mails or through
Canadian Dollar CS 13,330.00 international carriers except when specifically
authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under
Hongkong Dollar HK$ 15,630.00
existing international agreements or Central Bank
HFL Guilder HFL 430.00 regulations.

French Franc F/6,860.00 Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or
send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in
US Dollar US$ 73,950.00 amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign
exchange brought in by them. For purposes of
English Pound 5,318.00 establishing the amount of foreign exchange brought
in or out of the Philippines, tourists and non-resident
Malaysian Dollar M$. 14,760.00 temporary visitors bringing with them more than
US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
(in checks)   currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the
form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of
Australian Dollar A$ 7,750.00 entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
British Pound 700.00
The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883, which
US Dollar US$ 17,630.00 reads as follows:

Canadian Dollar C$ 990.00 Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange .—

That any person who shall engage in the trading or
purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of
without authority from the Central existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central
Bank. Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of
 foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion temporal, (minimum of 12 years and I
day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less
than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman
from Kowloon, Hongkong, engaged in the garment business, in
which he had invested 4 to 5 million Hongkong Dollars; that he had
come to the Philippines 9 to 1 0 times, although the only dates he
could remember were April 2, 1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and
July 8, 1986; that the reason for his coming to the Philippines was to
invest in business in the Philippines and also to play in the casino;
that he had a group of business associates who decided to invest in
business with him, namely: Wakita Noboyuki, Kobayashi Nabuo, Lee
Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had their own
businesses in Japan and Hongkong; that when he came to the
Philippines on April 2,1986, he brought US$50,000.00 and
8,500,000.00 Japanese Yen which he tried to declare but the Central
Bank representative refused to accept his declaration, until he could
get a confirmation as to the source of the money, for which reason
he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a telex was sent to him on
April 3,1986 (Exh. 4). He also brought in with him US$39,000.00 and
4,000,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on May 4,1986 which
he declared (Exh. 1). Again, he declared 8,600,000.00 Japanese
Yen when he arrived on June 28, 1986 (Exh. 2). He also testified that
his business associates, as per their agreement to invest in some
business with him in the Philippines, started putting their money for
this purpose in a common fund, hence, every time anyone of them
came to the Philippines, they would declare the money they were
bringing in, and all declarations were handed to and kept by him;
these currency declarations were presented at the trial as exhibits for
the defense. When asked by the court why he did not present all of
these declarations when he was apprehended at the airport, his
answer was that he was not asked to present the declaration papers
of his associates, and besides, he does not understand English and
he was not told to do so. He also testified on cross-examination that
the reason he was going back to Hongkong bringing with him all the
money intended to be invested in the Philippines was because of the
fear of his group that the "revolution" taking place in Manila might
become widespread. It was because of this fear that he was urged
by his associates to come to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the
money out of the Philippines.
The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated:
The factual issue for this Court to determine is
whether or not the accused wilfully violated Section
6 of Circular No. 960. The fact that the accused had
in his possession the foreign currencies when he
was about to depart from the Philippines did not by
that act alone make him liable for Violation of
Section 6.
What is imperative is the purpose for which the act
of bringing foreign currencies out of the country was
done the very intention. It is that which qualifies the
act as criminal or not. There must be that clear
intention to violate and benefit from the act done.
Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is
shown by overt acts of a person.
The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which, according
to him, tended to show that the accused had no wilfull intention to
violate the law. According to the respondent in his decision:
... this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation
of the defense that the currencies confiscated and/or
seized from the accused belong to him and his
business associates abovenamed. And from the
unwavering and unequivocal testimonies of Mr.
Templo and all of currencies in question came from
abroad and not from the local source which is what
is being prohibited by the government. Yes, simply
reading the provisions of said circular will, readily
show that the currency declaration is required for the
purpose of establishing the amount of currency
being brought by tourist or temporary non-resident
visitors into the country. The currency declarations,
therefore, is already (sic) intended to serve as a
 guideline for the Customs authorities to determine
the amounts actually brought in by them to
correspond to the amounts that could be allowed to
be taken out. Indeed, this Court is amazed and really
has its misgivings in the manner currency
declarations were made as testified to by the Central
Bank employees. Why the Bureau of Customs
representative never took part in all these
declarations testified to by no less than five (5)
Central Bank employees? Seemingly, these
employees are the favorites of these travellers. It is
the hope of this Court that the authorities must do
something to remedy the evident flaw in the system
for effective implementation of the questioned
Central Bank Circular No. 960.
But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not
be able to pin criminal responsibility on the accused.
This is due to its steadfast adherence and devotion
to the rule of law-a factor in restoring the almost lost
faith and erosion of confidence of the people in the
administration of justice. Courts of Justice are
guided only by the rule of evidence.
The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross
ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the accused for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must
establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.
The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate
intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special
laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the
respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go
scot free. The accused at the time of his apprehension at the Manila
International Airport had in his possession the amount of
US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange
instruments (380 pieces), without any specific authority from the
Central Bank as required by law. At the time of his apprehension, he
was able to exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in his
possession. These were old declarations made by him on the
occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines.
Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a
case for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the respondent
nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused based on his defense
that the foreign currency he was bringing out of the country at the
time he was apprehended by the customs authorities were brought
into the Philippines by him and his alleged business associates on
several previous occasions when they came to the Philippines,
supposedly to be used for the purpose of investing in some
unspecified or undetermined business ventures; that this money was
kept in the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines to
take the money out as he and his alleged business associates were
afraid that the "attempted revolution" which occurred on July 6,1986
might spread. Such fantastic tale, although totally irrelevant to the
matter of the criminal liability of the accused under the information,
was swallowed by the respondent-judge "hook, line and sinker." It
did not matter to the respondent that the foreign currency and foreign
currency instruments found in the possession of the accused when
he was apprehended at the airport-380 pieces in all-and the amounts
of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency
declarations presented by the accused at the trial. It did not matter to
the respondent that the accused by his own story admitted, in effect,
that he was a carrier" of foreign currency for other people. The
respondent closed his eyes to the fact that the very substantial
amounts of foreign exchange found in the possession of the accused
at the time of his apprehension consisted of personal checks of other
people, as well as cash in various currency denominations (12 kinds
of currency in all), which clearly belied the claim of the accused that
they were part of the funds which he and his supposed associates
had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of
investing in some business ventures. The respondent ignored the
fact that most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the
defense at the trial were declarations belonging to other people
which could not be utilized by the accused to justify his having the
foreign exchange in his possession. Although contrary to ordinary
human experience and behavior, the respondent judge chose to give
credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged
business associates had brought in from time to time and
accumulated and kept in the Philippines foreign exchange (of very
substantial amounts in cash and checks in various foreign currency
denominations) for the purpose of investing in business even before
they knew and had come to an agreement as to the specific
business venture in which they were going to invest. These and
other circumstances which make the story concocted by the accused
so palpably unbelievable as to render the findings of the respondent
judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the accused,
thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision "in
good faith." His actuations in this case amount to grave misconduct
prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice.
He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his
decision the release to the accused of at least the amount of
US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent, under Central Bank
Circular No. 960. This, in spite of the fact that forfeiture proceedings
had already been instituted by the Bureau of Customs over the
currency listed in the information, which according to the respondent
should be respected since the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive
jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture of the property
involved in the alleged infringements of the aforesaid Central Bank
Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify
the release of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge
again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
There is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as
authority for the trial court to release the said amount of U.S.
Currency to the accused. According to the above-cited CB Circular,
tourists may take out or send out from the Philippines foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign
exchange brought in by them; for the purpose of establishing such
amount, tourists or non-resident temporary visitors bringing with
them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of entries
upon arrival in the Philippines. In other words, CB Circular No. 960
merely provides that for the purpose of establishing the amount of
foreign currency brought in or out of the Philippines, a tourist upon
arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange he is bringing in at
the time of his arrival, if the same exceeds the amount of
US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies. There is
nothing in said circular that would justify returning to him the amount
of at least US$3,000.00, if he is caught attempting to bring out
foreign exchange in excess of said amount without specific authority
from the Central Bank.
Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court
Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his
integrity and efficiency, and consistent with the responsibility of this
Court for the just and proper administration of justice and for the
attainment of the objective of maintaining the people's faith in the
judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby
ordered that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the service.
All leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be
entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in
any branch of government service, including government-owned
and/or controlled agencies or corporations.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157171             March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 245471that affirmed the conviction of
petitioner by the Regional Trial Court 2of Alaminos City, Pangasinan,
Branch 54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646. 3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran
in the 1995 senatorial elections, an information dated March 30,
1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging
Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca
de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The
information reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing
period during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of
Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R.
Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray,
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan,
tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then
and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by
senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine
hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total
number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the
Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos.
008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to
one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in
the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and
Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of
five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
4
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the
accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was
convicted as follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court
pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime
defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the
votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP
Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a violation of Election
Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6)
YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower
which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is
not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer
disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her
right of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the
Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of
Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further
orders from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
modification the RTC Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is
hereby affirmed with modification, increasing the minimum penalty
imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal assigning the following as errors of the appellate
court:
I
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE
RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE
BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF
COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON
WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT
HAVE ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER
WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT
PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF
PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER
WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF
1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN
THE DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL
WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is
erroneous, based on speculations, surmises and conjectures,
instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her
part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a
defense in the violation of an election law, which falls under the class
of mala prohibita.
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No.
6646, classified under mala in se  or mala prohibita? Could good faith
and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the
Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently
immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a
special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established
with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the
criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only
because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole
issue is whether the law has been violated. 9Criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public
policy.10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and
election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of
canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board
who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the
correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For
otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and
fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be
counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and
miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent
of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However,
intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received
by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and
intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who
executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall
appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before
the Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of Alaminos,
Pangasinan was conducted as follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of
Alaminos were tallied, the results thereof were sealed and
forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for
canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each
precinct was then recorded in the Statement of Votes with
appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures
appearing in the results from the precincts and accused
Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board, entering the
number in the Statements of Votes as read by the appellant.
Six Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes
received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for
each precincts were entered by accused Viray in the
Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the
accused Palisoc and de Vera with the use of electrical
adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the
corresponding machine tapes were handed to appellant who
reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the
precincts listed in each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray
[then] records the subtotal in the proper column in the
Statement of Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray,
tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera added all the
subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on
which the grand total was reflected was handed to appellant
who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure
read by appellant in the column for grand total in the
Statement of Votes.14
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the
Statement of Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the number of
votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in
SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the
addition of the subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received
by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423. 15The
grand total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than
the number of votes private complainant actually received. This error
is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156
signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero.16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the
one who announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently
entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the
board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who
prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our
mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an
intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC. 18
Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board
of Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC
reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of
6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
petitioner’s concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic
entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and
fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the
concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant
to the dictates of the law.19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes
received by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not
added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of
liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere
decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is
already punishable under the said provision.20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual
conclusions of the appellate court. The Court has consistently held
that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of
Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court on the matter coincide.21
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be
exercised by the members of the board of canvassers in canvassing
the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for
senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes
prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election
documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.22
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998. 23
As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received
by private complainant of 6,921 votes and statement of his actual
votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy
may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However,
a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes and
Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain
on record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the
mere transfer of totals from one document to another.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner’s conviction but
increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead
of six months is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y
MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y
BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged
with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an
information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of
the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and
assisting one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their superior
strength, and with the decided purpose to kill,
poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of
Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the
whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused his
subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
 That the crime was committed with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and superior
strength, and the means employed was to weaken
the defense; that the wrong done in the commission
of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing
another wrong, that is the burning of the body of
Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding both
accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the
accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y
Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are
pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals by direct participation of the crime of
murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and
appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance
in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term
ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua  together with the
accessories of the law for both of them. The accused
are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P13,940.00 plus moral
damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be
deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present
appeal and assigned the following errors committed by the court a
quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE
STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN
ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS
ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING
THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE
PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL
TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING
CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY
OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE
MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE
(Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused
Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at
times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town
fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were
different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was
sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend
Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they
were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking
nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased
dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the
accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the
engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the
former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in
the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set
Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the
burning body of the deceased. Some people around also poured
sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to
extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer
Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the Rosario Police
Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who
were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around
spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment.
In the meantime, the police officers brought Gabion, the two accused
and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for
interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written
statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was
released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon
by the accused-appellants for the reversal of the decision of the
court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-
appellants gave their written statements to the police. The accused
Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of
gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was
water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The
accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he
saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who
set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not
impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of
the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated
their written statements alleging that they were extracted by force.
They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting
authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to
lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-
appellants were mentioned and discussed in the decision of the
court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis
for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court
categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is
still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing testimony
which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and
unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the
testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that
despite the fact that there were other persons investigated by the
police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial
of the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of
these persons raises the presumption that their testimonies would be
adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the
commission of the crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-
17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one
Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the
respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on
fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court.
They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed.
Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative,
their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that
evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This
presumption does not apply to the suppression of merely
corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||
anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for
the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness A. I put down the comics which I am
Gabion alleging that not only was the latter requested by the mother reading and I saw what they were
of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his doing.
absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was
reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human Q. According to you also before
behavior and experience. Bayani was poured with gasoline
and lighted and burned later you
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the had a talk with Pugay, is that
deceased who asked him to testify and state the truth about the correct?
incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she
never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time A. When he was pouring gasoline
when the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay on Bayani Miranda I was trying to
admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other prevent him from doing so.
accused Samson testified that they had no previous
misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to Q. We want to clarify. According to
testify falsely against them. you a while ago you had a talk with
Pugay and as a matter of fact, you
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect told him not to pour gasoline. That is
that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on the deceased and then Samson what I want to know from you, if that
set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's is true?
testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour
gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; A. Yes, sir.
and that it was only when the victim's body was on fire that he
noticed a commotion.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled
with a stick on his ass, do you mean
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion to say you come to know that Pugay
stated: will pour gasoline unto him?

Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on
cross-examination that you were
reading comics when you saw
Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani
Miranda and lighted by Samson.
How could you possibly see that
incident while you were reading
comics?
A. I do not know that would be that
incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the
first place not to pour gasoline
before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling
Bayani with a stick on his ass you
tried according to you to ask him not
to and then later you said you asked
not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell
you he was going to pour gasoline
on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how
did you come to know he was going
to pour gasoline that is why you
prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a
container of gasoline. I thought it
was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was
tickling Bayani with a stick on his
ass, he later got hold of a can of
gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of
gasoline, was that the time you told
him not to pour gasoline when he
merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on
the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told
Pugay not to pour gasoline he was
already in the process of pouring
gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp.
32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was
reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading when the group
of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw
Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris
wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the
gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not
to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on
fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was
previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention
between the two accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the
deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the
scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused
Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased.
Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual
and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act
committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs.
Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of
the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from under the engine of
the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body
of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline.
The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped
his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to
exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his
companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We
agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil.
468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
 A man must use common sense and exercise due
reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment. He is
responsible for such results as anyone might foresee
and for acts which no one would have performed
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his
own person, rights and property, all those of his
fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner
of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an
indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the
Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder,
is proper considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire
knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized
by treachery as the victim was left completely helpless to defend and
protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not
agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused
Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the incident.
On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was
merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance
of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit
employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that
the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a
flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of
setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of
doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely
intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however,
does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of
the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical
injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If
his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the
instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the
aforesaid code provides,  inter alia, that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any
qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the
crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his
favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact
from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion
testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when
they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-
17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an
indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the
amount spent by Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and
interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to
P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid
amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-
indicated. Costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172716               November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling
finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising
from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage
to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two
cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC),
in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner
sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005,
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on
petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his
arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration
but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce
sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s
loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No.
2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of
standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order
to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of
S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A.
No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from
the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for
absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a
special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of
a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition
in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his
constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No.
82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367
for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal
Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences
of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s
decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in
S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s
attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g.
homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the
charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries
from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to
property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the
Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the
public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private
respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner
forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether
petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to
maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded
by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him
in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from
custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in relation to Section 1,
Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing
this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in
Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to
review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the
Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s
reliance on People v. Esparas9  undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s
ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused
who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even
though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory
review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an
exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance
at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of
standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of
Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 11 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely
renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to
cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within
30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to
surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to
produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-
appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that
of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no
explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding" 12 at
the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,
petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in
S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment
(the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion
remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" 13 protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with
the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in
Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question
whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367
involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed;
if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit
an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be
imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,
shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article
sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or
lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next
lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of
the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in
which case the defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in
those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to
the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-
groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses
of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified
penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6
and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties
(paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and
"simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses
penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal
act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set
them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13
Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple,
are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under
the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the
middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this
field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it x x x" 17 on three points of analysis: (1)
the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional
crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct
offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that
"reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes
that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence:
murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of
felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would
be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty
prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty
for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art.
365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor
maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would
constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the
latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according
to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set
in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. 18 (Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes
is to state that their commission results in damage, either to person
or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without
jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for
Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible
with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our
present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated, 21 stands on
solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement
in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself
x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x," 23 has long been
abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955
nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon
rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that
quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in
post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal
confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules
defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown
shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the
Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch
of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-
offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging
one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-
offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same
reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was
based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single
quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other
crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting
with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for
"damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case
against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the
same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was
brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal
of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga 26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en
banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero 27 (promulgated in 1959,
unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas 28 (promulgated in
1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v.
Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.),
People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc,
per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan 31 (promulgated in 1968 by the
Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of
Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova,
J.), and People v. City Court of Manila 33 (promulgated in 1983 by the
First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the
second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional
protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was
best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in
barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the
accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court
explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious
result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split
into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely
extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this
unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El
Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 36 decided by the pre-war colonial
Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an
accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising
from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the
second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the
post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it.
At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in
Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an
accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite
his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the
second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on
Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this
Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on
November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22
SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B.
L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious
result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split
into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the
Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the
appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled
Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of
his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact
which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his
MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo)
admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s
plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision
dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding
petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double
jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and
physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow
where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not
death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a
result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same
mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts
erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v.
Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved
in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations
with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and
"Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence."
Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal
of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court
initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial
court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz
and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2,
1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of
double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case
cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the
aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of,
two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the
peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to
property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by
the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another
for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both
of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After
trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in
Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to
quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending
that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of
Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was
denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the
case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by
one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga
had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After
such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance
two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property
through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the
Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga
who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the
Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga
in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his
subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30,
1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City
with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless
manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had
pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of
the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless
imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50.
Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal
by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we
there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first
offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the
Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property
thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First
Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the
second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence
which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the
facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient
to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime
is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the
contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s
contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted
the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to
press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the
same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have
been previously cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to
reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or
clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing
the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the
acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries,
thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the
Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall
squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order
of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General,
however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain
considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or
disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are
analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no
practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is
nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court
has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical
case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30,
1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which
the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts
to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural
rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under
the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing
single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies 46);
and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the
accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the
maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act
defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus,
Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48
works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes
falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when
proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and
their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction
can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models –
that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime
damages to persons and property with varying penalties
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be
prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the
single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences
(excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried
separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single
charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-
crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties
under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings
(none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article
48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony,
in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand,
resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the
charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting
acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first
level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under
Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365
which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the
"complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because
there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue
of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a
light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act
penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a
single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively
alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in
Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in
relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only
damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if
there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty
for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the
physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x
x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty
scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable.
Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the
other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by
breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present
framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon
and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a
quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-
13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require
single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number
and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365,
and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted
under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double
jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of
government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep
inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to
the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually
impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2)
an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This
is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s
argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly
because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the
other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined
with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows
only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of
People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the
lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is
not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which
the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by
the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of
First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because
the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for
the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and
severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that Republic of the Philippines
scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use. SUPREME COURT
Manila
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed
from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the EN BANC
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged G.R. No. L-1477             January 18, 1950
and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
level court.55 vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365
charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor
the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime
effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious PER CURIAM, J.:
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can
re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the
formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the information, and is
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased
lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling. Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the
costs.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders
dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the
of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal charges contained in the information.
Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First
of double jeopardy. Instance of Manila presided over by the honorable Buenaventura
Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial
SO ORDERED. and before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused moved
that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court,
notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the
accused to questions propounded to him in order to test the
soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental
derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital,
there to be examined by medical experts who should report their
findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report of
the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the
National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said
report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at
pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since
admission. There was not a single moment during his whole
24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated
above. The veracity of this motivation was determined in the
Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful
was checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis
proved not only reveal any conflict or complex that may
explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or
symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to
be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong,
fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is
equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct
and conversation relative thereto, the motives, temptations
and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an
individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction
and once arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of
consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act
at Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen
is his commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only
in the present instance, but sometime when an employee in
la Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout
Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar
makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran
after a policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked
to a fight several times. He even challenged Congressman
Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was
running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his apparently
outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a
weakness of censorship especially in relation to
rationalization about the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that
Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a
personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed,
Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without
psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and
notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was
asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court
ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired,
for the offenses he committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by
counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General and their respective
memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the
prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused
the filing of the present criminal case against this accused. Those
facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus,
although not affirmed with any particular political group, has voted for
the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946.
Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of
President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the
President of the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he
became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to
redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the
presidential election campaign; and his disappointment was
aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of
looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned
for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he
determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of
assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on
the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the
Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big
crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and
surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in
government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose
and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his
thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained by the
Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American
citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of
his purpose, but having lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he
thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an American
soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for
two bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the chances of
killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacañan, or following
his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to
Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to
speak, but having encountered many difficulties, he decided to carry
out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on
the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez
whom he requested to prepare for him a document (Exhibit B), in
accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding
afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club
on the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of
its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the
contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from
its original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I
conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by myself
alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this
act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until I reached
my conclusion. It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare.
And had I expected to lives to spare, I would not have
hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle
which was the welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned
the loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there are
millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their
hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a
man to be blamed for all this: he had deceived the people,
he had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice
them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of
our future generations. For these reasons he should not
continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as
compared with the welfare of eighteen million souls. And
why should I not give up my life too if only the good of those
eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did
and I am willing to bear up the consequences of my act. I t
 matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will
show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of
patriotism in my performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at
the request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only at
about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason
said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for
that meeting at Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand
grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts.
He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot
located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his
evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and,
from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the
President when the latter had just closed his speech, was being
congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the
platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking,
hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked it
away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open
space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the
least harm; and, covering the President with his body, shouted to the
crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the
ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were
standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd
dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the grenade
had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the
following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the
fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about
two hours after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia,
who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was
standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the
explosion, ran away towards a barber shop located near the platform
at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of the
object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost
succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got
loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but
some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the
author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In the meantime,
while the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police
Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles
volunteered the information that the person with whom Angel Garcia
was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was
acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen
each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio
Guillen was, within two hours after the occurrence, found in his home
at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters
and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled
towards the platform the object which exploded and whom Garcia
tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted
his responsibility, although at the same time he tried to justify his
action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to
his captors the place where he had hidden his so called last will
quoted above and marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by
him and subsequently signed at the police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where
he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and,
in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which contained
his answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of
the Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit
E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it
tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness
stand during the trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several
errors are assigned allegedly committed by the trial court,
namely:  first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of
Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the
complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in
applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in
determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused";
and  fourth, "in considering the concurrence of the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in
the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen
statements made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of
doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him
two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to
assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing
one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President
Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons
who were around his main and intended victim from being killed or at
least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb
employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions
propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our
conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his
purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any
difference to him if there were some people around the President
when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who
surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the President, in
view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President being
loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other word,
although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding
the President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also in order to
attain his main purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that
the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in
regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical
injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and
Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the
corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum
total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed
for the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to
article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing
him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara,
55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be
qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor
intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention
exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has produced even
though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an
evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the
Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with
the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.)
Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of
the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain:
 Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el
estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este
a darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos
disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora,
hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la
detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la
calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el estanquero;
supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al
estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y
la de c de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal
de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al
procesado a catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a
un año de prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de
que la muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato
y no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es
evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se
propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de
imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio declararsele
responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este
apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes
producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo,
debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el
grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del
Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente
que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del
Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este
apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo
declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872.
(Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article
49 that is applicable. The case before us is clearly governed by the
first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing
highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused
committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon
Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which
President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at,
supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was
not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from
the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put
up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same
case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation
may not be properly taken into the account when the person whom
the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who
became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill
President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the
intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony
by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on
the four other persons already named as merely attempted and not
frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is
abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of article 148 of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among
others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact
his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main purpose
of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral
campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the
Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in
view of the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the
commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that
effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder
committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand
grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating
circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said
aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the
most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The
penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the
extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and circumstances
hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative
but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death
sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the
Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on
such working day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the
date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
 
G.R. No. 123485 August 31, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling," ARTEMIO TIMOTEO
BERONGA, TEODULO ALEGARBES and EUFEMIO CABANERO,
accused, ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling" and ARTEMIO
TIMOTEO BERONGA, accused-appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Factual findings of trial courts which are affirmed by the Court of
Appeals are, as a general rule, binding and conclusive upon the
Supreme Court. Alibi, on the other hand, cannot prevail over positive
identification by credible witnesses. Furthermore, alleged violations
of constitutional rights during custodial investigation are relevant only
when the conviction of the accused by the trial court is based on the
evidence obtained during such investigation.
The Case
These are the principles relied upon by the Court in resolving this
appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 Decision 2 dated September
28, 1995, convicting Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga of
murder and frustrated murder. The convictions arose from a shooting
incident on June 1, 1985 in Talisay, Cebu, which resulted in the
killing of two persons and the wounding of three others, who were all
riding in two vehicles which were allegedly ambushed by appellants.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Second Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Juanito M. Gabiana Sr. filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, 3 five amended
Informations charging four "John Does," who were later identified as
Rolusape Sabalones, Artemio Timoteo Beronga, Teodulo Alegarbes
and Eufemio Cabanero, with two counts of murder and three counts
of frustrated murder. The Informations are quoted hereunder.
1) Crim Case No. CBU-9257 for murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985, at 11:45 o'clock
in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
 another, armed with high-powered firearms, with
intent to kill and treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot GLENN TIEMPO, who was riding [i]n a
jeep and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting
upon the latter several gunshot wounds, thereby
causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
2) Criminal Case No. 9258 for murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in
the evening, more or less at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with
intent to kill and treachery, did [then] and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot ALFREDO NARDO, who was riding on a
jeep and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting
upon the latter several gunshot wounds, thereby
causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
3) Crim Case No. CBU-9259 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in
the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with
intent to kill and treachery, did and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
REY BOLO who was riding in a car and who gave
no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the
following injuries to wit:
laceration, mouth due to gunshot wound, gunshot
wound (L) shoulder penetrating (L) chest; gunshot
wound (R) hand (palm); open fracture (L) clavicle (L)
scapula; contusion (L) lung;
thereby performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of [m]urder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical
attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
4) Criminal Case No. 9260 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in
the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with
intent to kill and treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot ROGELIO PRESORES, who was riding in
a car and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting
upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:
gunshot wound, thru and thru right chest
 thereby performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of [m]urder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical
attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
5) Criminal Case No. 9261 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in
the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with
intent to kill and treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot NELSON TIEMPO, who was riding in a
car and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting
upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:
Gunshot wound neck penetrating wound perforating
trachea (cricoid) thereby performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of [m]urder
as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator,  i.e. the timely medical
attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Of the four indictees in the five Informations, Teodulo Alegarbes and
Artemio Timoteo Beronga were the first to be arraigned. Upon the
arrest of the two, the Informations were amended by the public
prosecutor, with the conformity of the defense counsel, by
substituting the names of the two accused for the "John Does"
appearing in the original Informations. When arraigned, said
accused, assisted by their respective lawyers, pleaded not guilty to
the five Informations.
Alegarbes died in the course of trial; thus, the cases against him
were dismissed. Accused Cabanero remained at large. Sabalones,
on the other hand, was eventually arrested. Subsequently, he
jumped bail but was recaptured in 1988 and thereafter pleaded not
guilty during his arraignment.
The cases against Sabalones and Beronga were jointly tried.
Thereafter, the lower court found them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above-set forth, the Court
finds accused ROLUSAPE SABALONES and
(ARTEMIO) TIMOTEO BERONGA, [g]uilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principals:
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, defined
and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer
the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years, [e]ight (8)
months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to
[s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months and [o]ne
(1) day, of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of deceased, Glenn Tiempo, the
sum of P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, defined
and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer
the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years, [e]ight (8)
months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to
[s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months and [o]ne
(1) day, of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to
 indemnify the heirs of deceased, Alfredo Nardo, the
sum of P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED
MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of
[e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
[f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8) months
of [re]clusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify
the victim, Rey Bolo, the sum of P20,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED
MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of
[e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
[f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight months
of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify
the victim, Rogelio Presores, the sum of P20,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261, for FRUSTRATED
MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of
[e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
[f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8) months
of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify
the victim, Nelson Tiempo, the sum of P20,000.00;
and
To pay the costs in all instances. The period of their
preventive imprisonment shall be credited to each
accused in full.
SO ORDERED. 4
Appellants filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Thereafter, the CA affirmed their conviction but sentenced them
to reclusion perpetua for the murders they were found guilty of.
Accordingly, the appellate court, without entering judgment, certified
the case to the Supreme Court in accordance with Section 13, Rule
124 of the Rules of Court. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court
convicting accused-appellants Rolusa[p]e Sabalones
and Artemio Timoteo Beronga for murder in Crim.
Cases Nos. CBU-9257 and CBU-9258, and
[f]rustrated [m]urder in Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9259,
CBU-9260, and CBU-9261 is hereby AFFIRMED;
however, the penalties in the [f]rustrated [m]urder
and [m]urder cases are hereby MODIFIED, such that
both accused-appellants are each sentenced to
imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of [p]rision
[m]ayor medium as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of [r]eclusion
[t]emporal medium as maximum in each of the three
[f]rustrated [m]urder cases (Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-
9259, CBU-9260 and CBU-9261); and are each
sentenced to [r]eclusion [p]erpetua in each of the
two [m]urder cases (Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9257
and CBU-9258). The indemnity to the victim in each
[f]rustrated [m]urder case shall remain. In conformity
with Rule 124, Section 13 of the Rules of Court,
however, this Court refrains from entering judgment,
and hereby certifies the case and orders that the
entire record hereof be elevated to the Supreme
Court for review. 5
After the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court, we
required appellants to file supplemental briefs. Appellants failed to
comply within the prescribed period and were deemed to have
waived their right to do so. 6 Thus, in resolving this case, this Court
will address primarily the arguments raised by the appellants in their
Brief before the Court of Appeals, which assailed the RTC Decision.
The Facts
 Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general 7 quoted the following factual findings of the trial
court:
Edwin Santos, a resident of Mambaling, Cebu City
stated that on June 1, 1985 at 6:00 o'clock in the
evening, he was at the residence of Inday Presores,
sister of Rogelio Presores, located at Rizal Ave.,
Cebu City to attend a wedding. He stayed until 9:00
o'clock in the evening and proceeded to the house of
Maj. Tiempo at Basak, Mambaling, Cebu City where
a small gathering was also taking place. (pp. 3-6,
tsn, April 7, 1987)
Arriving thereat, he saw Nelson and Glenn Tiempo
as well as Rogelio Presores, Rogelio Oliveros,
Junior Villoria, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo. (p.
7, ibid.)
At about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Stephen Lim,
who was also at the party, called their group and
requested them to push his car. When the engine
started, the former asked them to drive his car
home. (pp. 7-11, ibid.)
Together with Nelson Tiempo, who was at the
wheel, Rogelio Presores, Rogelio Oliveros and
Junior Villoria, they drove to the residence of
Stephen Lim at Mansueto Compound, Bulacao,
Talisay, Cebu. (p. 12, ibid.)
Glenn Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo also
went with them riding in an owner-type jeep, driven
by the latter, in order to bring back the group [as]
soon as the car of Mr. Lim was parked in his home.
(p. 21, ibid.)
The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the jeep 3
to 4 meters ahead of the car. When they arrived at
the gate of the house of Stephen Lim, they were met
with a sudden burst of gunfire. He looked at the
direction where the gunfire came, and saw [the]
persons [who] fired at the jeep. He identified
accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Rolusape Sabalones
and Timoteo Beronga as the persons who fired at
the vehicle. Except for Teodulo Alegarbes, who was
naked from [the] waist up, the gunmen wore clothes.
(pp. 21-23; 13-16; 33, ibid.)
After firing at the jeep, the assailants shot the ear
they were riding[,] hitting Nelson Tiempo on the
throat and Rogelio Presores on the breast. Despite
the injury he sustained, Nelson Tiempo was able to
maneuver the car back to their residence. (pp. 17-
19,  ibid.)
He immediately informed Maj. Tiempo about the
incident and the lat[t]er brought the victims to the
Cebu Doctor's Hospital. (p. 20, ibid.)
Rogelio Presores corroborated in substance the
testimony of Edwin Santos, being one of those who
were in the car driven by Nelson Tiempo to the
residence of Stephen Lim. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Aug. 14,
1987)
He further testified that when the jeep driven by
Alfredo Nardo with Rey Bolo and Glenn Tiempo as
passengers arrived at the front gate of Lim's
residence and while their car was 3 meters from the
rear end of the jeep, there was a volley of gunfire.
He glanced at the direction of the gunfire and saw
the jeep being fired at by four persons, who were
standing behind a concrete wall, 42 inches in height,
and armed with long firearms. Thenceforth, he saw
Alfredo Nardo, Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo f[a]ll to
the ground. (pp. 6-7, ibid.)
He recognized accused, Rolusape Sabalones, as
one of those who fired at the jeep. He also identified
in Court accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Timoteo
Beronga and another person, whom he recognized
only through his facial appearance. (pp. 7-8, ibid.)
When the shots were directed [at] their car[,] they
were able to bend their heads low. When the firing
stopped, he directed Nelson Tiempo to back out
from the place. As the latter was maneuvering the
car, the shooting continued and he was hit in the
breast while Nelson Tiempo, in the neck, and the
windshield of the vehicle was shattered. (p. 10, ibid.)
Arriving at the house of Maj. Tiempo, they were
brought to Cebu Doctor's Hospital. He and Nelson
Tiempo were operated on. He had incurred hospital
expenses in the sum of P5,412.69, (Exh. "I", "K").
(pp. 11-12, ibid.)
Ladislao Diola, Jr., [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the PC
Crime Laboratory, Regional Unit 7 stationed at
Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City remembered
having performed a post-mortem examination on the
dead body of Glenn Tiempo on June 2, 1985 at the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Cebu City. (p. 7, tsn,
Nov. 11, 1987)
He issued the necessary Death Certificate, (Exh.
"D") and Necropsy Report, (Exh. "F") and indicated
therein that the victim's cause of death was "[c]ardio
respiratory arrest due to [s]hock and [h]emorrhage
[s]econdary to [g]unshot wounds to the trunk." (p.
8, ibid.)
The victim sustained gunshot wounds in the right
chest and left lumbar area. (pp. 10-11, ibid.)
He explained that in gunshot wound no. 1, the
wound entrance[,] which [was] characterized by
invaginated edges and contusion collar[,] was
located in the right chest and the bullet went up to
the left clavicle hitting a bone which incompletely
fractured it causing the navigation of the bullet to the
left and to the anterior side of the body. He
recovered a slug, (Exh. "G") below the muscles of
the left clavicle. (p. 21, ibid.)
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the assailant
could have been [o]n the right side of the victim or in
front of the victim but [o]n a lower level than the
latter.
In both gunshot wounds, he did not find any powder
burns which would indicate that the muzzle of the
gun was beyond a distance of 12 inches from the
target. (p. 15, ibid.)
At the time he conducted the autopsy, he noted that
rigor mortis in its early stage had already set in
which denote[s] that death had occurred 5 to 6 hours
earlier. (pp. 34-5, ibid.)
Maj. Juan Tiempo, father of the victims, Glenn and
Nelson Tiempo, testified that when he learned about
the incident in question, he immediately summoned
military soldiers and together they proceeded to the
scene. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 12, 1988)
Arriving thereat, he saw the lifeless body of his son,
Glenn. He immediately carried him in his arms and
rushed him to the hospital but the victim was
pronounced Dead on Arrival. (pp. 6-7, ibid.)
They buried his son, who was then barely 14 years
old, at Cebu Memorial Park and had incurred funeral
expenses (Exhs. "K", "L", "O"). (pp. 7-8,  ibid.)
His other son, Nelson, then 21 years old and a
graduate of [m]edical [t]echology, was admitted at
the Cebu Doctor's Hospital for gunshot wound in the
neck. The latter survived but could hardly talk as a
result of the injuries he sustained. He had incurred
medical and hospitalization expenses in the sum of
P21,594.22, (Exh. "H"), (pp. 8-10, ibid.)
He had also incurred expenses in connection with
the hospitalization of the injured victims, Rogelio
Presores and Rey Bolo in the amount[s] of
P5,412.69, (exh. "I") and P9,431.10, (Exh. "J"),
respectively. (p. 11, ibid.)
He further stated that he [was] familiar the accused,
Roling Sabalones, because the latter had a criminal
record in their office in connection with the
kidnapping of a certain Zabate and Macaraya. (p.
16, ibid.)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the
PC/INP, Cebu Metrodiscom, had conducted an
autopsy on the dead body of Alfredo Nardo, who
sustained two (2) gunshot wounds in the lower lip
and left intraclavicular region, upon the request of
the [c]hief of the Homicide Section of Cebu
Metrodiscom. He issued the victim's Necropsy
Report, (Exh. "F:") and Death Certificate, (Exh. "G").
(pp. 5-8, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 29,
1988)
He stated that the wound of entrance in gunshot
wound no. 1 was located in the lower lip, more or
less[,] on the left side making an exit in the left
mandibular region. (pp. 9-11, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp.
6-8, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
In gunshot wound no. 2, the wound of entrance was
in the left intraclavicular region exiting at the back as
reflected in the sketch, (Exh. "F-2"). This wound was
fatal and [could] almost cause an instantaneous
death considering that the bullet penetrated the
thoracic cavity, lacerating the lungs and perforating
the heart before making an exit. (pp. 11-13, tsn, Dec.
4, 1987; pp. 13-15, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
He found no tattooing around the wound of entrance
in both gunshot wounds. (pp. 8-9, tsn, Nov. 29,
1988)
He prepared and issued th[e] Necropsy Report,
(Exh. "F") and Death Certificate, (Exh. "G") of
Alfredo Nardo who was identified to him by the
latter's daughter, Anita Nardo. (pp. 26-27, ibid.)
Rey Bolo, one of the victims, testified that when the
jeep he was riding [in] together with Glenn Tiempo
and Alfredo Nardo, reached the gate of the
residence of Stephen Lim, they were suddenly fired
upon. (pp. 5-8, tsn, March 6, 1989)
He was hit in the right palm and left cheek. He
jumped out of the vehicle and ran towards the car
which was behind them but he was again shot at [,]
[and hit] in the left scapular region. He was still able
to reach the road despite the injuries he sustained
and tried to ask help from the people who were in
the vicinity but nobody dared to help him, [they]
simply disappeared from the scene, instead: (pp. 8-
9, ibid.)
He took a passenger jeepney to the city and had
himself treated at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital, and
incurred medical expenses in the sum of P9,000.00.
(p. 9, ibid.)
He was issued a Medical Certificate, (Exh. "N") by
his attending physician.
Dr. Miguel Mancao, a [p]hysician-[s]urgeon, recalled
having attended [to] the victims, Nelson Tiempo, Rey
Bolo and Rogelio Presores at the Cebu Doctor's
Hospital on June 2, 1985. (pp. 7-8, 11, 14, tsn, May
30, 1989)
Nelson Tiempo sustained gunshot wound[s] in the
neck and in the right chest but the bullet did not
penetrate the chest cavity but only the left axilla. He
was not able to recover any slugs because the same
disintegrated while the other was thru and thru. The
wound could have proved fatal but the victim
miraculously survived. As a consequence of the
injury he sustained, Nelson Tiempo permanently lost
his voice because his trachea was shattered. His
only chance of recovery is by coaching and speech
therapy. He issued his Medical Certificate. (Exh.
"O"). (pp. 8-11, ibid.)
With regard to the patient, Rey Bolo, the latter
suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the left shoulder
penetrating the chest and fracturing the 2nd, 3rd,
and 4th ribs in the process, in the right hand
fracturing the proximal right thumb and in the mouth
lacerating its soft tissues, per Medical Certificate,
(Exh. "N") which he issued. (pp. 11-16, ibid.)
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the gunman
could have been in front of the victim, when gunshot
would no. 1 was inflicted. (p. 30, ibid.)
With respect to the patient, Rogelio Presores, the
latter suffered [a] gunshot wound in the chest with
the wound of entrance in the right anterior chest
exiting at the back which was slightly lower than the
wound of entrance. He issued the victim's Medical
Certificate, (Exh. "M"). (pp. 34-35, ibid.)
Based on the location of the wound, the gunman
could have been in front of the victim but [o]n a
slightly higher elevation than the latter. (pp. 35-
36, ibid.) 8
Version of the Defense
Appellants interposed denial and alibi. Their version of the facts is
summarized by the trial court9 thus:
. . . Timoteo Beronga, a cristo or bet caller in the
cockpit, testified that in the afternoon of June 1,
1985, he was in the Talisay Sports Complex located
at Tabunok, Talisay, Cebu to attend a cock-derby.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he was fetched
by his wife and they left taking a taxicab going to
their residence in Lapulapu City. After passing by the
market place, they took a tricycle and arrived home
at 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
After taking his supper with his family, he went home
to sleep at 10:30 in the evening. The following
morning, after preparing breakfast, he went back to
sleep until 11:00 in the morning.
On February 24, 1987, while he was playing
mahjong at the corner of R.R. Landon and D.
Jakosalem Sts., Cebu City, complainant, Maj. Juan
Tiempo with some companions, arrived and after
knowing that he [was] "Timmy," [which was] his
nickname, the former immediately held him by the
neck.
He ran away but the latter chased him and kicked
the door of the house where he hid. He was able to
escape through the back door and took refuge in
Mandaue at the residence of Nito Seno, a driver of
Gen. Emilio Narcissi. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 4-17,
October 19, 1989)
On February 27, 1987, upon the advi[c]e of his
friend, they approached Gen. Narcissi and informed
him of the incident. The latter brought him to the
Provincial Command Headquarters in Lahug, Cebu
City to confront Maj. Juan Tiempo.
After several days, he was brought by Maj. Tiempo
to the PC Headquarter[s] in Jones Ave., Cebu City
where he was  provided with a lawyer to defend him
but he was instructed that he should assent to
whatever his lawyer would ask of him.
He was introduced to Atty. Marcelo Guinto, his
lawyer, who made him sign an Affidavit, (Exh. "U")
the contents of which, co[u]ched in the dialect, were
read to him.
He also testified that before he was detained at the
CPDRC, complainant brought him inside the shop of
a certain Den Ong, where he was again mauled after
he denied having any knowledge of the whereabouts
of Roling Sabalones and the carbine.
At the instance of Col. Medija, he was physically
examined at the Southern Islands Hospital, Cebu
City and was issued a [M]edical Certificate. (Tsn-
Formentera, pp. 3-36, Jan. 18, 1990).
Justiniano Cuizon, [a]ccount [o]fficer of the Visayan
Electric Company (VECO) South Extension Office,
who is in charge of the billing, disconnection and
reconnection of electric current, testified that based
on the entries in their logbook, (Exh. "3") made by
their checker, Remigio Villaver, the electrical supply
at the Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay,
Cebu, particularly the Mansueto Homeowners
covered by Account No. 465-293000-0, (Exh. "4-B")
was disconnected on January 10, 1985, (Exh. "3-A")
for non-payment of electric bills from March 1984 to
January 1985 and was reconnected only on June
17, 1985 (Exh. "4", "4-A"). (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 22-27,
Jan. 31, 1990).
Remigio Villaver, a checker of VECO, whose area of
responsibility cover[ed] the towns of Talisay and San
Fernando, Cebu had kept the record of
disconnection of electrical supply of Mansueto
Subdivision in Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu and the same
showed that on January 10, 1985, (Exh. "3-A"), a
service order was issued by their office to the
Mansueto Homeowners for the permanent
disconnection of their electric lights due to non-
payment of their electric bills from March 1984 until
January 1985. The actual disconnection took place
on December 29, 1984.
Witness Fredo Canete made efforts to corroborate
their testimony. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 3-5, Apr. 20,
1990).
Vicente Cabanero, a resident of Mansueto
Compound in Talisay, Cebu since 1957 until the
present, remembered that on June 1, 1985, between
10:00 o'clock and 11:00 o'clock in the evening, he
heard a burst of gunfire about 15 to 20 armslength
[sic] from his residence.
He did not bother to verify because he was scared
since the whole place was in total darkness. (Tsn-
Abangan, pp. 18-23, Feb. 22, 1990).
Marilyn Boc, another witness for the accused, stated
that on the date and time of the incident in question,
while she was at the wake of Junior Sabalones,
younger brother of Roling Sabalones, who died on
May 26, 1985, a sudden burst of gunfire occurred
more or less 60 meters away.
Frightened, she went inside a room to hide and saw
accused, Roling Sabalones, sound asleep.
She came to know accused, Timoteo Beronga, only
during one of the hearings of this case and during
the entire period that the body of the late Junior
Sabalones [lay] in state at his residence, she never
saw said accused.
She was requested to testify in this case by Thelma
Beronga, wife of Timoteo Beronga. (Tsn-Abangan,
pp. 9-13, February 28, 1990).
Dr. Daniel Medina, while then the [r]esident
[p]hysician of Southern Islands Hospital, Cebu City
had treated the patient, Timoteo Beronga on March
18, 1987.
Upon examination, he found out that the patient
sustained linear abrasion, linear laceration and
hematoma in the different parts of the body. Except
for the linear laceration which he believed to have
been inflicted two or three days prior to [the] date of
examination, all the other injuries were already
healed indicating that the same were inflicted 10 to
12 days earlier.
He issued the corresponding Medical Certificate
(Exh. "2") to the patient. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 9-13,
May 21, 1990).
Atty. Jesus Pono, counsel for accused Beronga,
mounted the witness stand and averred that he
[was] a resident of Mansueto Compound, Bulacao,
Talisay, Cebu. As shown in the pictures, (Exhs. "3",
"4" & "5" with submarkings) his house is enclosed by
a concrete fence about 5 feet 6 inches tall. It is
situated 6 meters from the residence of accused,
Roling Sabalones, which was then being rented by
Stephen Lim. Outside the fence [are] shrubs and at
the left side is a lamp post provided with 200 watts
fluorescent bulb.
On June 1, 1985 at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, he saw Roling Sabalones, whom he
personally [knew] because they used to be
neighbors in Talisay, Cebu, at the wake of his
brother, Federico Sabalones, Jr. or Junior
Sabalones, as mentioned repeatedly hereabout.
They even had a talk and he noticed accused to be
physically indisposed being gravely affected by the
loss of his only brother, who met a violent death in
the hands of an unknown hitman on May 26,1985.
He went home after he saw accused [lie] down on a
bamboo bench to rest.
At about 12:00 o'clock midnight, he was awakened
by a rapid burst of gunfire which emanated near his
house. He did not attempt to go down or look
outside. He [was] in no position to tell whether or not
the street light was lighted.
When he verified the following morning, he noticed
bloodstains on the ground as well as inside the jeep
which was parked 2 to 3 meters from his fence and
50 to 70 meters from the house where Junior
Sabalones [lay] in state. He observed that the jeep
was riddled with bullets and its windshield shattered.
(Tsn-Abangan, pp. 3-16, June 6, 1990).
He admitted that he used to be a counsel of
accused, Roling Sabalones, in several cases,
among which involved the death of a certain Garces
and Macaraya, which cases were however,
dismissed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Cebu. (Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 2-3, June 13, 1990).
Doroteo Ejares, a relative of accused, testified that
when he attended the wake of Junior Sabalones on
June 1, 1985 at 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he saw
accused lying on a bamboo bench in the yard of the
house of the deceased.
At past 10:00 o'clock in the evening, accused
excused himself as he was not feeling well and
entered a room to rest while he remained by the
door and slept.
At almost 12:00 o'clock midnight, he was awakened
by a burst of gunfire which took place more or less
20 meters away and saw the people scamper[ing]
for safety. He hid inside the room where accused
was sleeping and peeped thru the door. Not long
after, Marilyn Boc entered and in a low voice talked
about the incident.
They decided to wake up the accused to inform him
of what was happening, but the latter merely opened
his eyes and realizing that accused was too weak,
they allowed him to go back to sleep.
When he went home at past 5:00 o'clock in the
morning of June 2, 1985, he saw a jeep outside of
the compound. He did not bother to investigate or
inquire about the incident as he was in a hurry to go
home and prepare for the burial of Junior Sabalones.
He was requested to testify in this case by his aunt
and mother of accused Rolusape Sabalones. (Tsn-
Tumarao, pp. 10-15, June 13, 1990).
Russo Sabalones, uncle of accused, Sabalones,
averred that the latter was once, one of his
undercover agents while he was then the [c]hief of
the Intelligence Service of the PC from 1966 until
1968.
As part of their intelligence tradition, an undercover
agent is not allowed to carry his real name. In the
case of his nephew and accused, Rolusape
Sabalones, the latter chose the name "Paciano
Laput" which name was recorded in their code of
names.
When he retired in 1968, the accused ceased to be
an agent and . . . likewise ceased to have the
authority to use the name Paciano Laput. (Tsn-
Abangan, p. 12, July 23, 1990).
Alfonso Allere, a distant relative of the accused,
remembered having received a call from Roling
Sabalones, one morning after the burial of the
latter's brother, asking for his advise because of the
threats [to] his life which he received thru telephone
from the group of Nabing Velez and the group of the
military.
After he had advised accused to lie low, he had not
heard of him, since then.
Godofredo Mainegro of the Public Assistance and
Complaint Action Office of the Regional Unified
Command 7, received a complaint from one On the following morning, she was again awakened
Inocencia Sabalones on March 13, 1986. by the persistent shouts and pushing of the gate.
When she verified, the man who introduced himself
He recorded the complaint in their Complaint Sheet, to her as Maj. Tiempo, ordered her to open the gate.
(Exh. "6") and let complainant affix her signature. Once opened, the men of Maj. Tiempo entered the
house and proceeded to search for Roling
Sabalones, whom Maj. Tiempo suspected to have
After the document was subscribed and sworn to
killed his son and shot another to near death. When
before him, (Exh. "6-C"), he indorsed it to their
she demanded for a search warrant, she was only
[c]ommanding [o]fficer, Apolinario Castano. (Tsn-
shown a piece of paper but was not given the
Formentera, pp. 3-10, July 24, 1990).
chance to read its contents.
Ret. Col. Apolinario Castano, recalled that while he
Racquel Sabalones, wife of accused, Rolusape
was then with the Regional Unified Command 7, his
Sabalones, maintained that on June 1, 1985 at 1.00
niece, Racquel Sabalones together with her
o'clock in the afternoon, she was at the wake of her
husband Roling Sabalones, came to him for advi[c]e
brother-in-law, Junior Sabalones, at his residence in
because the latter was afraid of his life brought
Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu.
about by the rampant killings of which his brother
and the son of Maj. Tiempo were victims.
At 11:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day,
together with her 3 daughters as well as Marlyn
Considering that accused's problem matter, they
Sabarita, Rose Lapasaran and Gloria Mondejar, left
approached Gen. Ecarma, the then [c]ommander of
the place in order to sleep in an unoccupied
the PC/INP, Recom 7, and the latter referred them to
apartment situated 30 meters away from the house
his [c]hief of [s]taff, Col. Roger Denia, who informed
where her deceased, brother-in-law, Junior, was
them that there was no case filed against the
lying in state, as shown in the Sketch, (Exh. "7" and
accused. Nevertheless, the latter was advised to be
submarkings) prepared by her. They brought with
careful and consult a lawyer.
them a flashlight because the whole place was in
total darkness.
Inocencia Sabalones, mother of accused, Roling
Sabalones, narrated that on March 12, 1986 at past
As they were about to enter the gate leading to her
10:00 o'clock in the evening, she was roused from
apartment she noticed a sedan car coming towards
sleep by a shout of a man demanding for Roling
them. She waited for the car to come nearer as she
Sabalones.
thought that the same belong[ed] to her friend, but
the vehicle instead stopped at the corner of the road,
Upon hearing the name of her son, she immediately (Exh. "7-F") and then proceeded to the end portion
stood up and peeped through the door of her store of Mansueto Compound, (Exh. "7-G"). As it moved
and saw men in fatigue uniforms carrying long slowly towards the highway, she rushed inside the
firearms. Thenceforth, these men boarded a vehicle apartment.
and left.
Few minutes later, she heard a burst of gunfire
outside their gate. She immediately gathered her
children and instructed Marlyn Sabarita to use the
phone situated at the third door apartment and call
the police.
After the lull of gunfire, she went to the terrace and
saw people in civilian and in fatigue uniforms with
firearms, gathered around the place. One of these
men even asked her about the whereabouts of her
husband, whom she left sleeping in the house of the
deceased.
At 8:30 in the morning of June 2, 1985, during the
burial of Junior Sabalones, they were informed by
Pedro Cabanero that Roling Sabalones was a
suspect for the death of Nabing Velez and the son of
Maj. Tiempo.
She believed that the reason why her husband was
implicated in the killing of Nabing Velez was
because of the slapping incident involving her father-
in-law, Federico Sabalones, Sr. and Nabing Velez
which took place prior to the death of Junior
Sabalones.
After the funeral, she began to receive mysterious
calls at their residence in Sikatuna St., Cebu City
where they began staying since 1978. She also
noticed cars with tinted windows strangely parked in
front of their residence.
Frightened and cowed, they decided to seek the
advice of Col. Apolinario Castano, who after relating
to him their fears, advised her husband to lie low and
to consult a lawyer.
To allay their apprehension, accused, Roling
Sabalones, left Cebu City for Iligan, Manila and other
cities to avoid those who were after him. When she
learned about the threat made by Maj. Tiempo on
her husband, she forewarned the latter not to return
to Cebu.
Marlyn Sabarita, an illegitimate daughter of
Rolusape Sabalones, stated that in the night in
question, she was at the wake of Junior Sabalones
and saw her Papa Roling, the herein accused, lying
on the lawn of the house of the deceased.
She was already in the apartment with her Mama
Racquel when she heard a burst of gunfire. Upon
instructions of the latter, she went out to call the
police thru the phone located [in] the third apartment
occupied by a certain Jet. (Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 3-15,
Oct. 15, 1990).
Edward Gutang, [a]sst. lay-out [e]ditor and [a]sst.
[s]ports [e]ditor of Sun-Star Daily, while then a
military and police reporter had covered the shooting
incident which took place on June 1, 1985 at the
Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu.
At past 1:00 o'clock dawn, together with their
newspaper photographer, Almario Bitang, they went
to the crime scene boarding the vehicle of the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes. Arriving thereat, they
decided not to proceed inside the compound
because of fear. The place was then incomplete
darkness.
Upon being informed that the victims were brought
to Cebu City Medical Center, they rushed to the
place and met Maj. Tiempo hugging the dead body
of his 14-year old son. His photographer took a
picture of that pathetic scene. (Exh. "8-B").
Samson Sabalones, a retired [a]mbassador and
uncle of Rolusape Sabalones, posted a bail bond for
his nephew with Eastern Insurance Company, when
a warrant for his arrest was issued by the Municipal
Court, on March 12, 1986 because he was bothered
by the fact that the latter was being unreasonably
hunted by several groups. He even advised the
accused to appear in [c]ourt to clarify the nature of
the case filed against him.
Virgincita Pajigal, a resident of Butuan City, met
accused, Rolusape Sabalones, who introduced
himself to her as "Paciano Laput" nicknamed, Ondo,
in a massage clinic where she was working.
For less than a year, they lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage because
according to her the accused was married but
separated from his wife, whose name was never
mentioned to her. For such a short span of time
being together, her love for the accused developed
to the extent that whatever happen[ed] to him, she
[would] always be there to defend him.
With the help of Maj. delos Santos, who advised her
to always stay close [to] the accused, she was able
to board the same vessel. She saw the latter clad in
green T-shirt, (Exh. "14") and pants, handcuffed and
guarded.
Reaching Cebu City, they took a taxicab and as the
vehicle went around the city, she was instructed by
Maj. Tiempo to place the towel, (Exh. "15") which
she found inside her bag, on the head of the
accused. They stopped at the Reclamation Area and
Maj. Tiempo pulled them out of the vehicle but she
held on tightly to Ondo, ripping his shirt. This pulling
incident happened for several times but complainant
failed to let them out of the vehicle.
The accused was finally brought to the Provincial
Jail while she stayed in the residence of the
accused. She returned to Butuan after a week. (Tsn-
Formentera, pp. 5-33, Jan. 22, 1991).
Accused, Rolusape Sabalones, alias "Roling", in his
defense, with ancillary incidental narrations, testified,
that on June 1, 1985 at 6:00 o'clock in the evening,
he was at the wake of his only brother, Junior
Sabalones, who was killed on May 26, 1985.
He had no idea as to who was responsible for the
killing of his brother inasmuch as the latter had
plenty of enemies. He also did not exert effort to look
into the case and to place it under police authority
since he had lost faith in the capabilities of the
police. The matter was however reported by his
uncle, Ambassador Sabalones, to the authorities.
He stayed at the wake until 10:00 o'clock in the
evening because he was not feeling well. He retired
in a small room adjacent to the sala of the house of
the deceased. Not long after, he felt somebody
waking him up but he merely opened his eyes and
went back to sleep as he was really exhausted.
At 6:30 the following morning, he was roused by his
wife so he could prepare for the burial. He came to
know about the burst of gunfire which took place the
previous night upon the information of his wife. He
did not take the news seriously as he was busy
preparing for the burial of his deceased brother, Jun.
The funeral started at past 8:00 o'clock in the
morning and he noticed the presence of Maj. Eddie
Ricardo and his men, who were sent by Col.
Castano purposely to provide the burial with military
security, upon the request of his wife.
He had a conversation with Maj. Ricardo who
inquired about the shooting incident which resulted
in the death of the son of Maj. Tiempo and others in
his company. Also in the course of their
conversation, he came to know that Nabing Velez
was killed earlier on that same night in Labangon,
Cebu [C]ity.
On the same occasion, Pedro Cabanero also
notified him that he was a suspect in the killing of
Nabing Velez, a radio commentator of ferocious
character, who was engaged in a protection racket
with several under his control.
He remembered that a month prior to the death of
Nabing Velez, his father, Federico Sabalones, Sr.
and the deceased while matching their fighting cocks
at the Talisay Sports Complex, had an altercation
and the latter slapped his paralytic father and
challenged him to ask one of his sons to avenge
what he had done to him. He came to know about
the incident only after a week.
He did not deny the fact that he was hurt by the
actuation of the deceased for humiliating his father
but it did not occur to him to file a case or take any
action against the deceased because he was too
busy with his business and with his work as a bet
caller in the cockpit.
He advised his father to stay in Bohol to avoid
further trouble because he knew that the latter would
frequent the cockpit[,] being a cockfight aficionado.
Likewise, during the burial, he was informed by a PC
soldier, Roger Capuyan, that he was also a suspect
in the killing of the son of Maj. Tiempo and even
advised him to leave the place.
On the following days after the burial, his wife
started to notice cars suspiciously parked in front of
their house and [she] also received mysterious calls.
Together with his wife, they decided to see Col.
Apolinario Castaño to seek his advise. The latter
verified from the Cebu Metrodiscom and learned that
there was no case filed against him.
In the evening of June 6, 1985, he left for Iligan and
after a month, he transferred to Ozamis and ten to
Pagadian. He likewise went to Manila especially
when he learned that his uncle, Samson Sabalones,
had arrived from abroad. The latter posted a bond
for his temporary liberty immediately after being
informed that a case was filed against him, before
the Municipal Court of Talisay.
Despite . . . the bond put up his uncle, he did not
return to Cebu City because it came to his
knowledge that Maj. Tiempo inquired from the
bonding company as to his address.
He also stayed in Marikina in the house of his friend
and during his stay in the said place, he registered
as a voter and was issue a Voter's Affidavit, (Exh.
"19"; Exh. "R" for the prosecution) which bore the
name "Paciano Mendoza Laput" which [was] his
baptismal name. He explained that the name[s]
Mendoza and Laput [were] the middle name and
surname, respectively of his mother. The name
"Rolusape" was given to him by his father and the
same [was] not his registered name because during
the old days, priests would not allow parents to
name their children with names not found in the
Almanac; thus, Paciano [was] his chosen name and
the same appeared in his Baptismal Certificate,
(Exh. "20") issued by the Parish of the Blessed
Trinity of Talibon, Bohol. In his Birth Certificate, it
[was] the name "Rolusape" which appeared based
upon the data supplied by his father.
He had used the name Paciano during the time
when he [was] still a secret agent under his uncle,
Gen. Russo Sabalones, when the latter was still the
[c]hief of the C-2 in 1966 until 1967 and as such, he
was issued a firearm. He likewise used said name at
the time he was employed at the Governor's Office
in Agusan and when he registered in the Civil
Service Commission to conceal his identity to protect
himself from those who were after him.
From Marikina he proceeded to Davao and then to
Butuan City where he was made to campaign for the
candidacy of Gov. Eddie Rama. When the latter won
in the election, he was given a job at the Provincial
Capitol and later became an agent of the PC in
Butuan using the name, "Paciano Laput."
During his stay in Butuan, he met Virgie Pajigal, a
manicurist who became his live-in partner.
On October 23, 1988 while he was at the Octagon
Cockpit in Butuan with Sgt. Tambok, he was
arrested by Capt. Ochate and was brought to the PC
Headquarter[s] in Libertad, Butuan City and was
detained. Among the papers confiscated from him
was his Identification Card No. 028-88, (Exh. "21")
issued by the PC Command bearing the name
Paciano Laput.
On October 26, 1988 he was taken from the City Jail
by Capt. Ochate and some soldiers, one of whom
was Maj. Tiempo whom he met for the first time.
On their way to Nasipit to board a vessel bound for
Cebu City, Maj. Tiempo made him lie flat on his belly
and stepped on his back and handcuffed him. He
cried in pain because of his sprained shoulder. A
certain soldier also took his watch and ring.
Arriving in Cebu at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he
and Virgie Pajigal, who followed him in the boat,
were made to board a taxicab. Maj. Tiempo alighted
in certain place and talked to a certain guy.
Thereafter, they were brought to the Reclamation
Area and were forced to go down from the vehicle
but Virgie Pajigal held him tightly. They were again
pulled out of the taxi but they resisted.
From the Capitol Building, they proceeded to
CPDRC and on their way thereto, Maj. Tiempo sat
beside him inside the taxi and boxed him on the right
cheek below the ear and pulled his cuffed hands
apart.
At the Provincial Jail, he was physically examined by
its resident physician, Dr. Dionisio Sadaya, and was
also fingerprinted and photographed, (Exh. "21"). He
was issued a Medical Certificate, (Exh. "22").
He further stated that he [was] acquainted with his
co-accused Timoteo Beronga, known to him as
"Timmy" being also a bet caller in the cockpit. (Tsn-
Formentera, pp. 5-23, Feb. 26, 1991; Tsn-Abangan,
pp. 3-33, Feb. 27, 1991; Tsn-Abangan, pp. 4-18,
Apr. 10, 1991).
As surrebuttal witness, accused Rolusape
Sabalones denied that he bribed a certain soldier
because at the time he was arrested, his wallet as
well as his wristwatch and ring worth P2,000.00
each were confiscated and his hands tied behind his
back.
He also denied the allegation of Maj. Tiempo that he
offered the latter the amount of P1,000,000.00 to
 drop the case against him, the truth being that while
they were on board a vessel bound for Cebu City,
Maj. Tiempo compelled him to tell [who] the real
killers of his son [were] because he knew that he
(Rolusape Sabalones) was not responsible. The
former also inquired from him as to the whereabouts
of the carbine.
He also rebutted complainant's testimony that upon
their arrival here in Cebu City and while on board a
taxicab, he directed the former [to] first go around
the city to locate a certain Romeo Cabañero, whom
he did not know personally. 10
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Giving full credence to the evidence of the prosecution, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision convicting appellants of
two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated murder. Like the
trial court, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery and
rejected appellants' defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the penalties imposed by
the trial court were erroneous. Hence, for each count of murder, it
sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua. For each count of
frustrated murder, it imposed the following penalty: ten years (10)
of prision mayor (medium), as minimum, to seventeen years (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal (medium), as
maximum. Sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals awarded
indemnity of P20,000 to each of the victims of frustrated murder.
However, it was silent on the indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the
trial court to the heirs of each of the two deceased.
Having imposed reclusion perpetua on the appellants, the Court of
Appeals, as earlier noted, refrained from entering judgment and
certified the case to the Supreme Court for review, in conformity with
Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this appeal before this Court. 11
The Issues
In his Brief, 12 Appellant Sabalones raised the following errors
allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
The court a quo erred in finding that accused
Sabalones and his friends left the house where his
brother Sabalones Junior was lying in state and
"went to their grisly destination amidst the dark and
positioned themselves in defense of his turf against
the invasion of a revengeful gang of the supporters
of Nabing Velez.
II
The court a quo erred in finding that accused
Sabalones and his two co-accused were identified
as among the four gunmen who fired at the victims.
III
The court a quo erred in overlooking or disregarding
physical evidence that would have contradicted the
testimony of prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos
and Rogelio Presores that the gunmen were
shooting at them from a standing position.
IV
The court a quo erred in holding that the instant case
is "one of aberratio ictus", which is not a defense,
and that the "defense of alibi" interposed by the
accused may not be considered.
V
 The court a quo erred in not finding that the
evidence of the prosecution has not overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused.
VI
The court a quo erred in not acquitting the accused
on ground of reasonable doubt.
In a Manifestation dated December 20, 1995, Appellant Beronga,
through counsel, adopted as his own the Brief of Sabalones. 13
The foregoing assignment of errors shall be reformulated by the
Court into these three issues or topics: (1) credibility of the witnesses
and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2) defense of denial
and alibi, and (3) characterization of the crimes committed and the
penalty therefor.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence
Well-entrenched is the tenet that this Court will not interfere with the
trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, absent any
indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked some
material facts or gravely abused its discretion, 14 especially where, as
in this case, such assessment is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
"As this Court has reiterated often enough, the matter of assigning
values to declarations at the witness stand is best and most
competently performed or carried out by a trial judge who, unlike
appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the
accused's behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the
trial." 15 Giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, the trial court concluded:
Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, this Court, given
the evidence, finds that there is more realism in the
conclusion based on a keener and realistic appraisal
of events, circumstances and evidentiary facts on
record, that the gun slaying and violent deaths of
Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and the near fatal
injuries of Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio
Presores, resulted from the felonious and wanton
acts of the herein accused for mistaking said victims
for the persons [who were] objects of their wrath. 16
We stress that "factual findings of the lower courts, the trial court and
the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule, binding and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court." 17 We find nothing in the instant case to
justify a reversal or modification of the findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that appellants committed two counts of murder
and three counts of frustrated murder.
Edwin Santos, a survivor of the assault, positively pointed to and
identified the appellants as the authors of the crime. His categorical
and straightforward testimony is quoted hereunder: 18
COURT:
Q You stated there was a gun fired.
What happened next?
WITNESS:
A There was a rapid fire in
succession.
Q When you heard this rapid firing,
what did you do?
A I tried to look from where the firing
came from.
Q After that, what did you find?
A I saw persons firing towards us.
Q Where were these persons
situated when they were firing
towards you?
A Near the foot of the electric post
and close to the cemented wall.
Q This electric post, was that lighted
at that moment?
A Yes, sir, it was lighted.
Q How far were these persons
firing, to the place where you were?
A From here to there (The witness
indicating the distance by pointing to
a place inside the courtroom,
indicating a distance of about 6 to 7
meters, making the witness stand as
the point of reference).
Q Were you able to know how many
persons fired towards you?
A I only saw 3 to 4 persons.
Q How long did these persons fire
the guns at you?
A Until we went home. The persons
were still firing, until we went home.
Q You stated that you saw these
persons who were firing at you. Do
you know these persons?
A I can identify [them] when I [see]
them.
Q Try to look around this courtroom,
if these persons you saw who were
firing at you are present in the
courtroom[.]
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you point to these persons?
A Yes, sir.
Q Point at them.
COURT INTERPRETER:
The Court directed the witness to go
down from the witness stand and
[point] at them, Beronga and
Alegarbes.
FISCAL GABIANA:
I would like to make it of record that
on the bench of prisoner, only the
two accused were seated.
COURT:
 Make it of record that only two
prisoners were present.
Q Now, Mr. Santos, aside from
these two accused you identified as
among those who fired [at] you on
that evening, were there other
persons that you saw on that
particular occasion who fired at
you?
A Yes, sir, there were[;] if I can see
them, I can identify them.
Corroborating the foregoing, Rogelio Presores, another survivor, also
pointed to Timoteo Beronga, Teodulo Alegarbes and Roling
Sabalones as the perpetrators of the crime. His testimony proceeded
in this manner: 19
Q When you arrived at the
residence of Stephen Lim, can you
remember of any unusual incident
that took place?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A When the jeep arrived, the car
was following.
Q What happened next?
A When the jeep was near the gate,
the car was following.
Q The car was following the jeep, at
what distance?
A 3 to 4 meters.
Q While the car was following the
jeep at that distance of 3 to 4
meters, what happened?
A All of a sudden, we heard the
burst of gunfire.
Q From what direction was the
gunfire?
A Through the direction of the jeep.
Q After hearing the gunfire, what
happened?
A We looked at the jeep.
Q What did you see?
A We saw Alfredo Nardo and Glenn
Tiempo and Rey Bolo f[a]ll to the
ground. There were only 3.
Q Who was driving the jeep at that
time?
A Alfredo Nardo.
Q What happened after that?
A So, I looked, whence the burst of
gunfire came from.
Q What did you see from that
gunfire?
A I saw 4 persons standing at the Q If Roling Sabalones is inside the
back of the fence. courtroom, can you recognize
Roling Sabalones?
Q What were those 4 persons doing
when they were standing at the A Yes, sir, he is around.
back of the fence?
Q Can you point to Roling
A They were bringing long firearms. Sabalones?

Q Did you recognize these persons? A Yes, he is there (The witness

pointing to the person who
A I can clearly recognize one and answered the name of Roling
the 3 persons[.] I can identify them, Sabalones).
if I can see them again.
Q I would like [you] again to please
Q If you are shown these persons, look around and see, if those
can you recognize them? Can you persons whom you know through
name these persons? their faces, if they are here around?

A No, sir. Only their facial A The two of them (The witness
appearance. pointing to the 2 persons, who,
when asked, answered that his
name [was] Teofilo Beronga and the
Q What about the 3 persons?
other [was] Alegarbes).
A That's why the 3 persons, I do not
Indeed, we have carefully waded through the voluminous records of
know them. I can recognize only
this case and the testimonies of all the fifty-nine witnesses, and we
their facial appearance.
find that the prosecution has presented the required quantum of
proof to establish that appellants are indeed guilty as charged.
Q What about one person? Appellants' arguments, as we shall now discuss, fail to rebut this
conclusion.
A Yes, sir.
Positive Identification
Q What is the name of the person?
Appellants allege that the two witnesses could not have properly
A Roling Sabalones. identified the appellants because, after the first burst of shooting,
they both crouched down, such that they could not have seen the
faces of their assailants. This contention does not persuade. Both
eyewitnesses testified that the firing was not continuous; thus, during
a lull in the firing, they raised their heads and managed a peek at the
perpetrators. Edwin Santos testified as follows:
Atty. Albino, counsel for accused
Beronga:
Q You mean to say that when you
bent you heard the successive
shots, [and] you again raised your
head. Is that correct?
A There, were times that the shots
were not in succession and
continuous and that was the time I
raised my head again. 20
Like Santos, Rogelio Presores also stooped down when the firing
started, but he raised his head during a break in the gunfire:
Atty. Albino:
Q So, what did you do when you
first heard that one shot?
A So, after the first shot, we looked
towards the direction we were facing
and when we heard the second
shot, that was the time we stooped
down. 21
He further testified:
Atty. Acido: [Counsel for Appellant
Sabalones]
Q And you said you stooped down
inside the car when you heard the
first firing to the jeep. Is that what
you want the Court to understand[?]
Presores:
A Yes, sir.
Q So, you never saw who fired the
successive shots to the car as you
said you stooped down inside the
car?
A The bursts of gunfire stopped for
a while and that was the time I
reared of [sic] my head.
Q And that was the first time you
saw them?
A Yes, sir. 22
The records clearly show that two vehicles proceeded to the house
of Stephen Lim on that fateful day. The first was the jeep where
Alfredo Nardo, Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo were riding. About three
to four meters behind was the second car carrying Nelson Tiempo,
Guillermo Viloria, Rogelio Oliveros and the two prosecution
witnesses — Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores. 23 As stated
earlier, said witnesses attested to the fact that after the first volley of
shots directed at the jeep, they both looked at the direction where the
shots were coming from, and they saw their friends in the jeep falling
to the ground, as well as the faces of the perpetrators. 24 It was only
then that a rapid succession of gunshots were directed at them, upon
which they started crouching to avoid being hit.
Hence, they were able to see and identify the appellants, having had
a good look at them after the initial burst of shots. We stress that the
normal reaction of a person is to direct his sights towards the source
of a startling shout or occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar, 25 "the
most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence is to strive to
see the looks and faces of their assailants and to observe the
manner in which the crime is committed.
In bolstering their claim that it was impossible for the witnesses to
have identified them, appellants further aver that the crime scene
was dark, there being no light in the lampposts at the time. To prove
that the service wire to the street lamps at the Mansueto Compound
was disconnected as early as December 1984 and reconnected only
on June 27, 1985, they presented the testimonies of Vicente
Cabanero, 26 Remigio Villaver, 27 Fredo Canete 28 and Edward
Gutang. 29 The trial court, however, did not lend weight to said
testimonies, preferring to believe the statement of other prosecution
witnesses that the place was lighted during that time.
The Court of Appeals sustained said findings by citing the
testimonies of defense witnesses. Fredo Canete of the Visayan
Electric Company (VECO), for instance, admitted that it was so easy
to connect and disconnect the lights. He testified thus:
Atty. Kintanar:
Q Now, as a cutter, what
instruments do you usually use in
cutting the electrical connection of a
certain place?
Canete:
A Pliers and screw driver.
Q Does it need . . . very
sophisticated instruments to
disconnect the lights?
A No, these are the only instruments
we use.
Q Ordinary pliers and ordinary
screw driver?
A Yes, sir.
Q And does [one] need to be an
expert in electronic [sic] in order to
conduct the disconnection?
A No, sir.
Q In other words, Mr. Canete, any
ordinary electrician can cut it?
A That is if they are connected with
the Visayan Electric Company.
Q What I mean is that, can the
cutting be done by any ordinary
electrician?
A Yes, sir. 30
Said witness even admitted that he could not recall if he did in fact
cut the electrical connection of the Mansueto Compound. 31 The
Court of Appeals further noted that "none of the above witnesses
were at the crime scene at or about the exact time that the ambush
occurred. Thus, none was in a position to state with absolute
certainty that there was allegedly no light to illuminate the gunmen
when they rained bullets on the victims. 32
Even assuming arguendo that the lampposts were not functioning at
the time, the headlights of the jeep and the car were more than
sufficient to illuminate the crime scene. 33 The Court has previously
held that the light from the stars or the moon, an oven, or a wick
lamp or  gasera can give ample illumination to enable a person to
identify or recognize another. 34 In the same vein, the headlights of a
car or a jeep are sufficient to enable eyewitnesses to identify
appellants at the distance of 4 to 10 meters.
Extrajudicial Statement
of Beronga
Appellants insist that Beronga's extrajudicial statement was obtained
through violence and intimidation. Citing the  res inter alios acta rule,
they also argue that the said statement is inadmissible against
Sabalones. Specifically, they challenge the trial court's reliance on
the following portions of Beronga's statement:
Q After Roling knew that Na[b]ing
Velez was killed, have you observed
[if] Roling and his companions
prepared themselves for any
eventuality?
A It did not take long after we knew
that Na[b]ing was killed, somebody
called up by telephone looking for
Roling, and this was answered by
Roling but we did not know what
they were conversing about and
then Roling went back to the house
of Junior after answering the phone.
And after more than two hours, we
heard the sound of engines of
vehicles arriving, and then Meo, the
man who was told by Roling to
guard, shouted saying: "They are
already here[;]" after that, Roling
came out carrying a carbine
accompanied by Tsupe, and not
long after we heard gunshots and
because of that we ran towards the
house where the wake was. But
before the gun-shots, I heard
Pedring Sabalones father of Roling
saying: "You clarify, [t]hat you watch
out for mistake[n] in identity," and
after that shout, gunshots followed.
[sic] Then after the gun-shots Roling
went back inside still carrying the
carbine and shouted: "GATHER
THE EMPTY SHELLS AND MEO[,]
YOU BRING A FLASHLIGHT," and
then I was called by Meo to help him
gather the empty shells of the
carbine and also our third
companion to gather the empty
shells.
These arguments have no merit. In the first place, it is well to stress
that appellants were convicted based primarily on the positive
identification of the two survivors, Edwin Santos and Rogelio
Presores, and not only on the extrajudicial statement, which merely
corroborates the eyewitness testimonies. Thus, said arguments have
no relevance to this case. As the Court held in People vs.
Tidula: 35 "Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis of their conviction."
In any case, we sustain the trial court's holding, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, that the extrajudicial statement of Beronga was
executed in compliance with the constitutional
requirements. 36 "Extrajudicial confessions, especially those which
are adverse to the declarant's interests are presumed voluntary, and
in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that the declarant's
consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession
shall be upheld." 37
The exhaustive testimony of Sgt. Miasco, who undertook the
investigation, shows that the appellant was apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. 38 Said witness also stated
that Beronga was assisted by Atty. Marcelo Guinto during the
custodial investigation. 39 In fact, Atty. Guinto also took the witness
stand and confirmed that Appellant Beronga was informed of his sitting with Roling Sabalones, what
rights, and that the investigation was proper, legal and not were they doing?
objectionable. Indeed, other than appellants' bare allegations, there
was no showing that Beronga's statement was obtained by force or A They were gathered in one table
duress. 40 and they were conversing with each
other.
Equally unavailing is appellants' reliance on the res inter alios
acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which x x x           x x x          x x x
provides:
Q On that same date, time and
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the place, at about 10:00 [i]n the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evening, can you remember if there
evidence against the co-conspirator after the was unusual incident that took
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act place?
or declaration.
A I heard over the radio at the
Appellants assert that the admission referred to in the above Sabalones Family that a certain
provision is considered to be against a co-conspirator only when it is Nabing Velez was shot.
given during the existence of the conspiracy. They argue that
Beronga's statement was made after the termination of the Q That [a] certain Nabing Velez was
conspiracy; thus, it should not be admitted and used against shot? What else . . . transpired?
Sabalones.
A I observed that their reactions
The well-settled rule is that the extrajudicial confession of an were so queer, — as if they were
accused is binding only upon himself and is nor admissible as running.
evidence against his co-accused, it being mere hearsay evidence as
far as the other accused are concerned. 41 But this rule admits of
exception. It does not apply when the confession, as in this case, is x x x           x x x          x x x
used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of
participation of the co-accused in the killing of the victims 42 or when Q In that evening of June 1, 1985,
the confession of the co-accused is corroborated by other when you went there at the house of
evidence. 43 Jun Sabalones, have you seen an
armalite?
Beronga's extrajudicial statement is, in fact, corroborated by the
testimony of Prosecution Witness Jennifer Binghoy. Pertinent A Yes, sir.
portions of said testimony are reproduced hereunder:
Q Where aid you see this armalite?
Q While you were at the wake of
Jun Sabalones and the group were
 A At the table where they were
conversing.
Q How many armalites or guns [did
you see] that evening in that place?
A Two (2).
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q This armalite that you saw, —
how far was this in relation to the
groups of Sabalones?
A There (The witness indicating a
distance of about 4 to 5 meters).
ATTY. KINTANAR:
Q When you looked . . . through the
window and saw there were two
vehicles and there were bursts of
gunfire, what happened after that?
A I did not proceed to look . . .
through the window because I
stooped down.
Q When you stooped down, what
happened?
A After the burst of gunfire, I again
opened the window.
Q And when again you opened the
window, what happened?
A I saw two persons going towards
the jeep.
Q What transpired next after [you
saw] those 2 persons?
A When they arrived there, they
nodded their head[s].
Q After that, what happened?
A So, they went back to the
direction where they came from,
going to the house of Sabalones.
Q While they were going to the
direction of the house of Sabalones,
what transpired?
A I saw 5 to 6 persons coming from
the highway and looking to the jeep,
and before they reached the jeep,
somebody shouted that "it's ours".
Q Who shouted?
A The voice was very familiar to me.
Q Whose voice?
A The voice of Roling Sabalones.
Q What else have you noticed
during the commotion [when] wives
were advising their husbands to go
home?
A They were really in chaos. 44
A careful reading of her testimony buttresses the finding of the trial and hid themselves, albeit in vain, when the firing began. After the
court that Rolusape Sabalones and his friends were gathered at one first volley, they crouched and tried to take cover from the hail of
table, conversing in whispers with each other, that there were two bullets. It would have been unnatural for them to remain upright and
rifles on top of the table, and that they became panicky after hearing still in their seat. Hence, it is not difficult to imagine that the
of the death of Nabing Velez on the radio. Hence, the observation of trajectories of the bullet wounds varied as the victims shifted their
the trial court that "they went to their grisly destination amidst the positions. We agree with the following explanation of the Court of
dark and positioned themselves in defense of his turf against the Appeals:
invasion of a revengeful gang of supporters of the recently slain
Nabing Velez." 45 The locations of the entry wounds can readily be
explained, . . . Glenn Tiempo, after looking in the
Alleged Inconsistencies direction of the explosion, turned his body around;
and since the ambushers were between the jeep
Appellants also allege that the prosecution account had and the car, he received a bullet in his right chest
inconsistencies relating to the number of shots heard, the interval (wound no. 1) which traveled to the left. As to wound
between gunshots and the victims' positions when they were killed. No. 2, it can be explained by the spot where Major
These, however, are minor and inconsequential flaws which Tiempo found his fallen son.
strengthen, rather than impair, the credibility of said eyewitnesses.
Such harmless errors are indicative of truth, not falsehood, and do Atty. Kintanar:
not cast serious doubt on the veracity and reliability of complainant's
testimony. 46 Q: Upon being informed by these
occupants who were ambushed and
Appellants further claim that the relative positions of the gunmen, as [you] were able to return the car,
testified to by the eyewitnesses, were incompatible with the wounds what did you do?
sustained by the victims. They cite the testimony of Dr. Ladislao
Diola, who conducted the autopsy on Glenn Tiempo. He declared Major Tiempo:
that the victim must necessarily be on a higher level than the
assailant, in the light of the path of the bullet from the entrance A: I immediately got soldiers and we
wound to where the slug was extracted. This finding, according to immediately proceeded to the area
appellant, negates the prosecution's account that the appellants or to the place where my fallen son
were standing side by side behind a wall when they fired at the was located and when we
victims. If standing, appellants must have been on a level higher than reached . . . the place, I saw my
that of the occupants of the vehicles; if beside each other, they could fallen son [in] a kneeling position
not have inflicted wounds which were supposed to have come from where both knees [were] touching
opposite angles. the ground and the toes also and
the forehead was touching towards
We are not persuaded. The defense presumes that the victims were the ground. (TSN, Feb. 12, 1988, p.
sitting still when they were fired upon, and that they froze in the 6)
same position during and after the shooting. This has no testimonial
foundation. On the contrary, it was shown that the victims ducked
 In such position the second bullet necessarily
traveled upwards in relation to the body, and thus
the entry wound should be lower than the exit
wound. There is no showing that both wounds were
inflicted at the same time. 47
In any event, the witnesses saw that the appellants were the gunmen
who were standing side by side firing at them. They could have been
in a different position and in another hiding place when they first
fired, but this is not important. They were present at the crime scene,
and they were shooting their rifles at the victims.
Aberratio Ictus
Appellants likewise accuse the trial court of engaging in "conjecture"
in ruling that there was aberratio ictus in this case. This allegation
does not advance the cause of the appellants. It must be stressed
that the trial court relied on the concept of aberratio
ictus to explain why the appellants staged the ambush, not
to prove that appellants did in fact commit the crimes. Even
assuming that the trial court did err in explaining the motive of the
appellants, this does not detract from its findings, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and sustained by this Court in the discussion
above, that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
In any event, the trial court was not engaging in conjecture in so
ruling. The conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on the
extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of
Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of evidence sufficiently show that
appellants believed that they were suspected of having killed the
recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to
retaliate against them. Hence, upon the arrival of the victims'
vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the avenging men of
Nabing Velez, appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they
were mistaken does not diminish their culpability. The Court has held
that "mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as
when the accused zeroes in on his intended
victim." 48
Be that as it may, the observation of the solicitor general on this point
is well-taken. The case is better characterized as error personae or
mistake in the identity of the victims, rather than aberratio ictus which
means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting
the other due to imprecision in the blow.
Second Issue:
Denial and Alibi
Appellants decry the lower courts' disregard of their defense of alibi.
We disagree. As constantly enunciated by this Court, the established
doctrine requires the accused to prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but that it was
physically impossible for him at the time to have been present at
the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. 49 This the appellants
miserably failed to do.
Appellant Beronga testified that, at the time of the incident, he was in
his residence in Lapulapu City, which was not shown to be so remote
and inaccessible that it precluded his presence in Mansueto
Subdivision. The alibi of Sabalones is even more unworthy of belief;
he sought to establish that he was a mere 20-25 meters away from
the scene of the crime. He was allegedly in the house of his brother
who was lying in state, which was so near the ambush site that some
of the defense witnesses even testified that they were terrified by the
gunfire. Clearly, appellants failed to establish the requisites of alibi.
Furthermore, the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive
identification of the appellants. 50 As aptly held by this Court
in People v. Nescio: 51
Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is
only a short distance from the scene of the crime.
The defense of alibi is further offset by the positive
identification made by the prosecution witnesses.
Alibi, to reiterate a well-settled doctrine, is accepted
 only upon the clearest proof that the accused-
appellant was not or could not have been at the
crime scene when it was committed.
Flight
Appellants further object to the finding that Sabalones, after the
incident, "made himself scarce from the place of commission. He left
for Manila, thence Mindanao on the supposition that he want[ed] to
escape from the wrath of Maj. Tiempo and his men for the death of
Glenn Tiempo and the near fatal shooting of the other son or from
the supporters of Nabing Velez. . . . On his supposedly borrowed
freedom, he jumped bail and hid himself deeper into Mindanao,
under a cloak of an assumed name. Why, did his conscience bother
him for comfort?" 52
Appellants rationalized that Sabalones was forced to jump bail in
order to escape two groups, who were allegedly out to get him, one
of Nabing Velez and the other of Major Tiempo. Their ratiocination is
futile. It is well-established that "the flight of an accused is competent
evidence to indicate his guilt, and flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn." 53 It
must be stressed, nonetheless, that appellants were not convicted
based on legal inference alone but on the overwhelming evidence
presented against them.
Third Issue:
Crime and Punishment
We agree with the appellate court that accused-appellants are guilty
of murder for the deaths of Glenn Tiempo end Alfredo Nardo. The
allegation of treachery as charged in the Information was duly proven
by the prosecution. "Treachery is committed when two conditions
concur, namely, that the means, methods, and forms of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate; and that such means, methods and forms of execution
were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without
danger to his person." 54 These requisites were evidently present
when the accused, swiftly and unexpectedly, fired at the victims who
were inside their vehicles and were in no position and without any
means to defend themselves.
The appellate court also correctly convicted them of frustrated
murder for the injuries sustained by Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and
Rogelio Presores. As evidenced by the medical certificates and the
testimony of Dr. Miguel Mancao who attended to the victims, Nelson
Tiempo sustained a neck wound which completely shattered his
trachea and rendered him voiceless, as well as a wound on the right
chest which penetrated his axilla but not his chest cavity. 55 Rey Bolo
sustained three injuries which affected his clavicle, ribs and
lungs. 56 Rogelio Presores, on the other hand, sustained an injury to
his lungs from a bullet wound which entered his right chest and
exited through his back. 57
The wounds sustained by these survivors would have caused their
death had it not been for the timely medical intervention. Hence, we
sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that appellants are guilty of
three counts of frustrated murder.
We also uphold the Court of Appeals' modification of the penalty for
murder, but not its computation of the sentence for frustrated murder.
For each of the two counts of murder, the trial court imposed the
penalty of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal (medium), as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal (maximum), as maximum. This is incorrect. Under Article
248 of the Ravised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal, in its maximum period, to death. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the appellate court correctly
imposed  reclusion perpetua for murder.
The Court of Appeals, however, erred in computing the penalty for
each of the three counts of frustrated murder. It sentenced
appellants to imprisonment of ten years of prision mayor (medium)
as minimum to seventeen years and four months of reclusion
temporal  (medium) as maximum. It modified the trial court's
computation of eight (8) years of prision mayor (minimum), as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal (minimum) as maximum.
Under Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a
frustrated felony is the "next lower in degree than that prescribed by
law for the consummated felony . . . ." The imposable penalty for
frustrated murder, therefore, is prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its medium period. 58 Because there are no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance as the Court of Appeals itself
held, 59 the penalty prescribed by law should be imposed in its
medium period. With the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty for frustrated murder should be 8 years of  prision
mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum.
Although the Court of Appeals was silent on this point, the trial court
correctly ordered the payment of P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs
of each of the two murdered victims. In light of current jurisprudence,
this amount is awarded without need of proof other than the fact of
the victim's death. 60 The trial court and the CA, however, erred in
awarding indemnity of P20,000 each to Nelson Tiempo, Rogelio
Presores and Rey Bolo. There is no basis, statutory or
jurisprudential, for the award of a fixed amount to victims of
frustrated murder. Hence, they are entitled only to the amounts of
actual expenses duly proven during the trial.
Thus, Nelson Tiempo, who was treated for a gunshot wound on the
neck which shattered his trachea, should be awarded indemnity of
P21,594.22 for his medical expenses. This is evidenced by a
statement of account from Cebu Doctor's Hospital. 61
Rogelio Presores, who was likewise treated for gunshot wound in the
same hospital, presented a statement of account amounting to
P5,412.69 for his hospitalization. 62 Hence, he is likewise entitled to
indemnity in the said amount.
Rey Bolo, on the other hand, incurred an expense of P9,431.10 for
the treatment of his gunshot wounds, as evidenced by a statement of
account from the same hospital. 63 This amount should be awarded
to him as indemnity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED. However, the penalties are hereby MODIFIED as
follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, the accused-
appellants are each hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua  and to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased, Glenn
Tiempo, in the sum of P50,000;
2) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, the accused-
appellants are each hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased, Alfredo
Nardo, in the sum of P50,000;
3) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the
accused-appellants are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and
8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to
jointly and severally pay the victim, Rey Bolo, in the sum of
P9,431.10 as actual damages;
4) In Crim Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the
accused-appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8
years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly
and severally indemnify the victim, Rogelio Presores, in the sum of
P5,412.69 for actual damages;
5) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261 for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the
accused-appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8
years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly
and severally indemnify the victim, Nelson Tiempo, in the sum of
P21,594.22 as actual damages.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Interior and AVANCEÑA, C.J. :
Local Government and the Secretary of Justice so that Accused
Eufemio Cabanero may be brought to justice.
The judgment appealed from finds the appellant Gines
Costs against appellants. Alburquerque guilty of the crime of homicide committed on
the person of Manuel Osma and sentences him to eight
SO ORDERED. years an one day of prision mayor, and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with the costs.
SECOND DIVISION
The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of
[G.R. No. 38773. December 19, 1933.] age and father of nine living children, has been suffering
from partial paralysis form some time, walks dragging one
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff- leg and has lost control of the movement of his right arm.
Appellee, v. GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y He has been unable to work since he suffered the stroke of
SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant. paralysis. One of his daughters named Maria and another,
are married, while still another one is a nun. With the
Gibbs & McDonough and Roman Ozaeta for Appellant. exception of the other married daughter and the nun, all of
them, including the appellant, live with Maria upon whom
Solicitor-General Hilado for Appellee. they depend for support.

SYLLABUS
1. HOMICIDE; SELF-DEFENSE NOT PROVEN. — According to
the facts stated in the decision, the appellant herein did not
act in legitimate self- defense inasmuch as he provoked and
commenced the aggression by drawing his penknife.
2. ID.; ARTICLE 49, REVISED PENAL CODE. — Article 49 of
the Revised Penal Code is a reproduction of article 64 of the
old Code and has been interpreted as applicable only in
cases where the crime committed befalls a different person
(decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 20,
1897, and June 20 1899), which is not the case herein.
Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar
became acquainted and had intimate relations later with the
deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It
was then that the appellant became acquainted with the
deceased who frequently visited Pilar in his house. The
relations between Pilar and the deceased culminated in
Pilar’s giving birth to a child. The appellant did not know
that his daughter’s relations with the deceased had gone to
such extremes, that he had to be deceived with the
information that she had gone to her godfather’s house in
Singalong, when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese
Hospital for delivery. The appellant learned the truth only
when Pilar returned home with her child.

Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident,

DECISION since which time he had appeared sad and worried not only
because of the dishonor it brought upon his family but also
because the child meant an added burden to Maria upon
whom they all depended for support. For some time the
appellant wrote letters, that at times were hostile and
threatening and at other times entreating the deceased to
legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying her, or at least,
to support her and his child. Although the deceased agreed
to give the child a monthly allowance by way of support, he
never complied with his promise.
The appellant was in such a mood when he presented
himself one day at the office where the deceased worked
and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma.
They both went downstairs. What happened later, nobody
witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that occasion
the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of
the deceased, causing his death.
After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court
infers from the testimony of the appellant that he proposed
to said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon
hearing that the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his
penknife. Upon seeing the appellant’s attitude, the deceased
tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said appellant
stabbed him on the face with the said penknife. Due to his
lack of control of the movement of his arm, the weapon
landed on the base of the neck of the deceased.
The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to
cause so grave an injury as the death of the deceased. We
find that this conclusion is supported b y the evidence. In
his testimony the appellant emphatically affirmed that he
only wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a
permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that
would compel him to remain in the hospital for a week or
two but never intended to kill him, because then it would
frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or, at least,
support his daughter. The appellant had stated this
intention in some of his letters to the deceased by way of a
threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the benefit of
his daughter. That the act of the appellant is stabbing the
deceased resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his
neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore mentioned
that appellant did not have control of his right arm on
account of paralysis and the blow, although intended for the
face, landed at the base of the neck.
Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention
to cause so grave an injury as the death of the deceased as
well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself
to the authorities, and acted under the influence of passion
and obfuscation, should be taken into consideration in favor
of the Appellant.
Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the
appellant’s contention that he acted in legitimate self-
defense inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the
aggression by whipping out and brandishing his penknife.
The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of
the Revised Penal Code, which refers to cases where the
crime committed is different from that intended by the
accused, should be applied herein. This article is a
reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and has been
interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime
committed befalls a different person (decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain of October 20, 1897, and June 28,
1899), which is not the case herein.
The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide
defined and penalized in article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the concurrence
therein of three mitigating circumstances without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree,
that is, prision mayor, should be imposed.
Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year of prision correccional to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, affirming the
judgment appealed from in all other respects, with the
costs. So ordered.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-10126. October 22, 1957.]
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the
minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and
ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural
guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE
BATACLAN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARIANO
MEDINA, Defendant-Appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R.
Francisco, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Fortunato Jose, for Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; CARRIER’S LIABILITY; WORDS AND
PHRASES; PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED. — "The proximate
legal cause is that the acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion., all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might be probably result therefrom."cralaw
virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; OVERTURNING OF BUS; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
DEATH. — When a vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the
tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of
the men with the lighted torch was in response to the call
for help, made not only by the passengers, but most
probably by the driver and the conductor themselves, and
that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as
they did from a rural area where the lanterns and flashlights
were not available, they had to use a torch the most handy
and available; and what was more natural, that said
rescuers should innocently approached the overtuned
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them. Held: That the proximate cause of the death of
B was overturning of the vehicle thru the negligence of
defendant and his agent.
3. ID.; ID.; CARRIER’S NEGLIGENCE; BURNING OF THE
BUS. — The burning of the bus wherein some of the
passengers were trapped can also be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through the driver and conductor
who were on the road walking back and forth. They should
and must have known that in the position in which the
overtuned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked
from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around
the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,
especially over a large area, can be smelt and detected
even from a distance, Held: That the failure of the driver
and the conductor to have cautioned or taken steps to warn
the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus,
constitute negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier
under the provisions of the Civil Code, particularly, Article
1733, 1759 and 1763 thereof.

DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952, bus No. 30
of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner,
defendant Mariano Medina, under a certificate of public
convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to
Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon.
There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver
and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan,
seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara,
seated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger
apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses
just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated
on the left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia
Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At
about 2 :00 o’clock that same morning, while the bus was
running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the
front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell
into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned
turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus
the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled
out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver,
named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman
behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of
the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had
clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from
inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan
and Lara, who said that they could not get out of the bus.
There, is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not
the passengers already free from the wreck, including the
driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or
extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the
vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the
houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about
ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of
bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approached the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire
started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including
the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that
as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape
from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading
over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground
under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by
one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four doomed
passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified, specially that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his
death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in
behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to
recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount
of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite
awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs, plus P600 as attorney’s
fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried
by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the
fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision
to the Court of Appeals, but the latter court endorsed the
appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in
the complaint.
Our New Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of
a common carrier to its passengers and their goods. For
purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent
codal provisions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos.
5, 6, and 7 while the extraordinary diligence for the safety
of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and
1756."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
1733 and 1755."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts
of the former’s employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon
proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented
or stopped the act or omission."cralaw virtua1aw library
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach
of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina
Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely
to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial
court that there was negligence on the part of the
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is
evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus
was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and
as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the
witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point
where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the
bus overturned after zig-zagging, there was a distance of
about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must
have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but
because of the velocity at which the bus must have been
running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150
meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the
defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what
degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the
proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the
bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were
unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started,
Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries,
perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries
suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of
proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in
their brief. It is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . .’that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.’ And more comprehensively, ‘the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result
therefrom."cralaw virtua1aw library
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns,
and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical
injuries, if through some event, unexpected and
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle
sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one
might still contend that the proximate cause of his death
was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in
the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in
the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the
bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not
only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of
the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch
was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had
to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the
coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside
help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part
be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its
driver and its conductor. According to the witnesses, the
driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and
forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have
known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank
and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from
the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large
area, can be smelt and detected even from a distance, and
yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to
have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to
bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on
the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above- reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733,
1759 and 1763.
As regards the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled,
considering the earning capacity of the deceased, as well as
the other elements entering into a damage award, we are
satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000)
PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to
include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also
believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees, and
assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs’ attorneys
not only in the trial court, but also in the course of the
appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by
them, the attorney’s fees may well be fixed at EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800) PESOS. The award made by the trial court
of ONE HUNDRED (P100) PESOS for the loss of the
merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is
adequate and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not
shock us. According to the evidence, one of the passengers
who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was attorney’s fees, respectively, the decision appealed from is
hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited by hereby affirmed, with costs.
the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his
visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus
inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus THIRD DIVISION
changed immediately because they were already old, and
that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to [G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990.]
change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his
instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO, EDMUNDO ASIS y
precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he ILIGAN and JUAN MACANDOG (at large), Defendants,
changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO and EDMUNDO ASIS y
as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his ILIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.
speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would
not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently,
resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical Cesar R. Canonizado, for Defendants-Appellants.
injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of
their goods, and yet the criminal case against him, on
motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally DECISION
dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on
whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint,
either failed to appear or were reluctant to testify. But the FERNAN, J.:
record of the case before us shows that several witnesses,
passengers in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified
in court to the effect that the said driver was negligent. In In this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando Iligan and
the public interest, the prosecution of said erring driver Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the decision of the then
should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II 1
for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public convicting them of the crime of murder and sentencing
utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite. indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the
amounts of P30,000 for the latter’s death and P256,960
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the representing the victim’s unrealized income.
damages awarded by the trial court are increased from ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS to SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) On October 21, 1980, the following information for murder
PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT was filed against Fernando Iligan, Edmundo Asis and Juan
HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for Macandog:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico
II, barangay Sto. Domingo, municipality of Vinzons,
province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named
accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with
treachery and evident premeditation, one of the accused
Fernando Iligan armed with a bolo (sinampalok) and with
deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, gang up and in a sudden
unexpected manner, hacked Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., on
his face, thus causing fatal injuries on the latter’s face which
resulted to (sic) the death of said Esmeraldo Quiñones.
the two to accompany him to his house so that he could
change to his working clothes and report for work as a bus
conductor. 4
While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiñones,
Jr., the three accused suddenly emerged on the roadside
and without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiñones, Jr.
with his bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing him to
fall down. 5 Horrified, Felix Lukban and Zaldy Asis fled to a
distance of 200 meters, but returned walking after they
heard shouts of people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard
someone shout "May nadale na." 6

"CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library On the spot where Quiñones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and
Felix Lukban saw him already dead with his head busted. 7
Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he remains at They helped the brother of Quiñones, Jr. in carrying him to
large. At their arraignment on January 12, 1981 Fernando their house. 8
Iligan and Edmundo Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, the prosecution presented the That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiñones, Jr.
following version of the commission of the was autopsied at the Funeraria Belmonte in Labo,
crime.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library Camarines Norte by the municipal health officer, Dr.
Marcelito E. Abas. The postmortem examination report
At around 2:00 o’clock in the morning of August 4, 1980, which is found at the back of the death certificate reveals
Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. and his companions, Zaldy Asis that Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., who was 21 years old when
and Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto. he died, sustained the following
Domingo, Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a barrio injuries:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a certain Almadrones,
they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew, "1. Shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to
Edmundo Asis, and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed multiple fracture of the entire half of the frontal left,
("winahi") them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to box temporal, parietal and occipital bone of the head, with
him. 2 Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the accused massive maceration of the brain tissue.
that they had no desire to fight. 3 Fernando Iligan, upon
seeing his nephew fall, drew from his back a bolo and "2. Other findings — Incised wound at the right eyebrow,
hacked Zaldy Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran medial aspect measuring about 4 cms. in length, 0.5 cm. in
pursued by the three accused. They ran for about half an width and 0.5 cm. in depth, abrasion on the left shoulder
hour, passing by the house of Quiñones, Jr. They stopped and right side of the neck." 9
running only upon seeing that they were no longer being
chased. After resting for a short while, Quiñones, Jr. invited The death certificate also indicates that Quiñones, Jr. died
of "shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to a
vehicular accident."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They
alleged that they were in their respective houses at the time
the crime was committed.chanrobles law library
Accused Fernando Iligan testified that at around midnight of
August 4, 1980, he left his house to fetch his visitors at the
dance hall. 10 Along the way, he met his nephew, Edmundo
Asis, whom he presumed was drunk. He invited his nephew
to accompany him to the dance hall. However, they were
not able to reach their destination because Edmundo was
boxed by somebody whom he (Edmundo) sideswiped. 11
Instead, Fernando Iligan brought his nephew home. 12 On
their way, they were overtaken by Juliano Mendoza whom
Fernando Iligan invited to his house to help him cook. 13
After bringing his nephew home, Fernando Iligan and
Juliano Mendoza proceeded to Iligan’s house and arrived
there between 1:30 and 2:00 o’clock in the morning of the
same day. 14
Edmundo Asis corroborated Iligan’s testimony. He testified
that while they were walking in front of the Almadrones
ricemill, he sideswiped someone whom he did not recognize
because there were several persons around. He said,
"Sorry, pare" but the person to whom he addressed his
apology boxed him on his left face. He fell down and Iligan
helped him. Later, Iligan accompanied him to his home in
Lico II. 15 After Iligan and Juliano Mendoza had left his
house, he slept and woke up at 7:00 o’clock the following
morning. 16
The defense made capital of the testimony of prosecution
witness Dr. Abas to the effect that Quiñones, Jr. died
because of a vehicular accident. In ruling out said theory,
however, the lower court, in its decision of May 7, 1986,
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The accused, to augment their alibi, have pointed to this
Court that the Certificate of Death have shown that the
victim’s death was caused by a vehicular accident. To this,
notwithstanding, the Court cannot give credit for some
reasons. First, the fact of the alleged vehicular accident has
not been fully established. Second, Esmeraldo Quiñones,
Sr., (the) father of the victim, testified that Dr. Abas told
him that if his son was hacked by a bolo on the face and
then run over the entire head by a vehicle’s tire, then that
hacking on the face could not be visibly seen on the head
(t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13, 1981) Third, Exhibit ‘2’ (the
photograph of the victim taken immediately after his body
had been brought home) is a hard evidence. It will attestly
(sic) show that the entire head was not crushed by any
vehicle. On the contrary, it shows that only half of the face
and head, was damaged with the wound starting on a sharp
edge horizontally. There are contusions and abrasions on
the upper left shoulder and on the neck while the body
downwards has none of it, while on the right forehead there
is another wound caused by a sharp instrument. Therefore,
it is simple, that if the victim was run over by a vehicle, the
other half portion of his head and downward part of his
body must have been likewise seriously damaged, which
there are none." 17
The lower court also found that Iligan’s group conspired to
kill anyone or all members of the group of the victim to
vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It
appreciated the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery and accordingly convicted
Iligan and Edmundo Asis of the crime of murder and
imposed on them the aforementioned penalty.
Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal professing
innocence of the crime for which they were convicted. For
the second time, they attributed Quiñones, Jr.’s death to a
vehicular accident.

No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that Quiñones, Jr.
was run over by a vehicle. The defense relies on the
testimony of Dr. Abas, a prosecution witness, who swore
that the multiple fracture on the head of Quiñones, Jr. was
caused by a vehicular accident 18 which opinion was earlier
put in writing by the same witness in the postmortem
examination. Dr. Abas justified his conclusion by what he
considered as tire marks on the victim’s left shoulder and
the right side of his neck. 19 He also testified that the
incised wound located at the victim’s right eyebrow could
have been caused by a sharp bolo but it was so superficial
that it could not have caused the victim’s death. 20
Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point to the
veracity of the actual occurrence of the vehicular mishap.
One such evidence is the testimony of prosecution witness
Zaldy Asis that when he helped bring home the body of
Quiñones, Jr., he told the victim’s father, Esmeraldo
Quiñones, Sr. that "before Esmeraldo Quiñones (Jr.) was
run over by a vehicle, he was hacked by Fernando Iligan."
21 When asked why he mentioned an automobile, Zaldy
Asis said that he did not notice any vehicle around but he
mentioned it "because his (Quiñones, Jr.) head was busted."
22 It is therefore not farfetched to conclude that Zaldy Asis
had actual knowledge of said accident but for
understandable reasons he declined to declare it in court.
Defense witness Marciano Mago, the barangay captain of
Sto. Domingo, also testified that when he went to the scene
of the crime, he saw bits of the brain of the victim scattered
across the road where he also saw tire marks. 23
For its part, the prosecution, through the victim’s father,
presented evidence to the effect that Iligan authored the
maceration of half of the victim’s head. Quiñones, Sr.
testified that from their house, which was about five meters
away from the road, he saw Fernando Iligan holding a
"sinampalok" as he, together with Edmundo Asis and Juan
Macandog, chased someone. During the second time that he
saw the three accused, he heard Iligan say, "Dali, ayos na
yan." 24 Hence, the lower court concluded that the victim’s
head was "chopped" resulting in the splattering of his brain
all over the place. 25 It should be emphasized, however,
that the testimony came from a biased witness and it was
uncorroborated.
While the factual findings of the trial court are generally
given due respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a
criminal case throws it open for a complete review of all
errors, by commission or omission, as may be imputable to
the trial court. 26 In this instance, the lower court erred in
finding that the maceration of one half of the head of the
victim was also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record
point to a different conclusion. We are convinced beyond
peradventure that indeed, after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen
from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run
over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any
way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of
Quiñones, Jr.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability
shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que
es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is
the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), 27
the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an
intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural
and logical consequence of the felony committed by the
offender. 28 We hold that these requisites are present in
this case.
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the
head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as
superficial by the physician who autopsied Quiñones is
beside the point. What is material is that by the instrument
used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of the
wound, the assault was meant not only to immobilize the
victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital
and delicate part of the body: the head. 29
The hacking incident happened on the national highway 30
where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such
vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis,
running scared and having barely negotiated the distance of
around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiñones, Jr.,
weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the
cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s
hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might not have been the
direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s
death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom." 31 In other words, the sequence
of events from Iligan’s assault on him to the time Quiñones,
Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short
span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events.
Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape
liability.chanrobles law library
We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi
cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan because he was
positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by
the prosecution witnesses. 32
But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its
findings on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by
the lower court in view of the suddenness of the attack on
the group of Quiñones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack,
however, does not by itself show treachery. 33 There must
be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously
adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for
the person attacked to defend himself. 34 In this case, the
hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing
of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the
deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the
appellants. The group of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed
on guard for any subsequent attacks against them. 35
The requisites necessary to appreciate evident
premeditation have likewise not been met in this case.
Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a)
the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had
clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c)
the lapse of sufficient length of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. 36
Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held
liable only for homicide. Again, contrary to the lower court’s
finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been
established to hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan’s co-
conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active part in
the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr.,
which led to his running over by a vehicle and consequent
death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was
carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits
credibility being uncorroborated and coming from an
undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of
Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have known of the former’s
criminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or
approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the
act with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. 37 Such being the case, his mere presence at
the scene of the crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a
co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by
Iligan. 38 Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.

There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty

imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249
and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within the range of
prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal medium
as maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the
award of P256,960 for the victim’s unrealized income and
therefore, the same is disallowed.cralawnad

WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby

convicted of the crime of homicide for which he is imposed
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium
as maximum and he shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo
Quiñones, Jr. in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000). Appellant Edmundo Asis is hereby acquitted of
the crime charged against him. Costs against appellant
Iligan.

SO ORDERED.