G.R. No.

211356, September 29, 2014

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN

Facts:

Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. While the company was already operating a
resort in the area, the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a
three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes
(FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay
West Cove.

Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone”
demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).

In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor on February 1, 2010. On
April 5, 2011, however, a Notice of Assessment was sent to petitioner asking for the settlement of
Boracay West Cove’s unpaid taxes and other liabilities under pain of a recommendation for closure in
view of its continuous commercial operation since 2009 sans the necessary zoning clearance, building
permit, and business and mayor’s permit. In reply, petitioner expressed willingness to settle the
company’s obligations, but the municipal treasurer refused to accept the tendered payment. Meanwhile,
petitioner continued with the construction, expansion, and operation of the resort hotel.

Subsequently, on March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government,
enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan
issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.

EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein
respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove, the most recent of which
was made in February 2014.

Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA. He argued that judicial proceedings should first
be conducted before the respondent mayor could order the demolition of the company’s establishment;
that Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR, which bestowed the company the right to
construct permanent improvements on the area in question; that since the area is a forestland, it is the
DENR—and not the municipality of Malay, or any other local government unit for that matter—that has
primary jurisdiction over the area, and that the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region 6 had
officially issued an opinion regarding the legal issues involved in the present case; that the Ordinance
admits of exceptions; and lastly, that it is the mayor who should be blamed for not issuing the necessary
clearances in the company’s favor.

Issue:
 a. Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is still available to petitioner.

b. Whether or not the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper.

Ruling:

a. Declaratory relief no longer viable

Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find merit in petitioner’s contention that the special
writ of certiorari , and not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As provided under
Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder. x x x (emphasis added)

An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of the rights arising thereunder.  Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or
contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues
arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the
statute, deed or contract to which it refers.  A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for
ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and
supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation
of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.

In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement
and implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible
guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying out the directives in the challenged
EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given
such a situation.

b. Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari

On the propriety of filing a petition for certiorari, Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must establish the concurrence of the following requisites,
namely:

1. The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;

2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

3. There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Guilty of reiteration, the CA immediately dismissed the Petition for Certiorari upon determining that the
first element is wanting—that respondent mayor was allegedly not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions when he issued EO 10.

We are not persuaded.

The CA fell into a trap when it ruled that a mayor, an officer from the executive department, exercises an
executive function whenever he issues an Executive Order. This is tad too presumptive for it is the
nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that
determines whether or not a particular act is a discharge of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The first
requirement for certiorari is satisfied if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may
be their public character.

It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense
in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi-judicial.

To contrast, a party is said to be exercising a judicial function where he has the power to determine what
the law is and what legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, whereas quasi-judicial function is “a term which applies to the
actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”

In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the respondent mayor’s finding that Boracay
West Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel in Malay, Aklan is illegal. Such a finding
of illegality required the respondent mayor’s exercise of quasi-judicial functions, against which the
special writ of certiorari may lie.

Apropos hereto is Our ruling in City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued:

There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing
demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. In determining whether or not a structure is
illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and
opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process.  
In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers.
With the foregoing discussion, the CA erred in ruling that the respondent mayor was merely
exercising his executive functions, for clearly, the first requisite for the special writ has been
satisfied.