See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/337741915

Collective Management of Copyright in Nigeria: Should it Remain Voluntary,

may it Be Mandatory or Extended?

Article · July 2019

CITATIONS READS

0 285

1 author:

Desmond Osaretin Oriakhogba

University of Benin
32 PUBLICATIONS   19 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Intellectual property law View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Desmond Osaretin Oriakhogba on 04 December 2019.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Collective Management of Copyright in Nigeria: Should it Remain Voluntary, may it Be
Mandatory or Extended?

Desmond Osaretin Oriakhogba*

Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (NIALS) Journal of Intellectual Property

(Forthcoming)

Abstract
Informed by the proposal in clause 74 of the draft Copyright Bill, this paper examines the
models of collective management of copyright and related rights that have emerged overtime
from the regulation of collective management organisations in Africa and Europe. Specifically,
the paper discusses the voluntary, mandatory and extended models with the aim of determining
which of the models will be more effective within the context of collective management of
copyright in Nigeria. Among others, the paper discusses the implication of the models on
copyright exclusivity, the right to property and freedom of association of copyright owners and
the no formality rule in international copyright law. To this end, the paper, which is conducted
as a desk research, seeks to resolve the question whether collective management of copyright
in Nigeria should remain voluntary, or be made extended or mandatory. For reasons explained
in the paper, the research concludes that collective management in Nigeria is ripe enough to
migrate to the extended model.

1. Introduction

Historically, collective management emerged from private initiative of copyright owners.1

However, some form of government supervision has emerged over time.2 Nonetheless, there

are arguments against regulation of collective management on the thought that “the legislature

or judiciary is inherently inferior to industry insiders in shaping a proper framework for the

commercialisation of copyright”. Also, that “the spontaneously founded [collective

*
PhD (University of Cape Town), LLM LLB (University of Benin); Lecturer, Law Faculty, University of
Benin, Nigeria; Postdoctoral Researcher, Public Law Department, Law Faculty, University of Cape Town,
South Africa; Queen Elizabeth Scholar and Fellow, Open Africa Innovation Research (Open AIR) Network.
Osaretin.oriakhogba@uniben.edu.
1
The origin of collective management is traceable to the actions of Beaumarchais, which led to the creation of
the General Statutes of Drama in Paris in 1777. This association later metamorphosed to the still existing CS
known as the Society of Dramatic Authors and Composers (SACD derived from the French name: Societe des
auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques). The Society of Writers established in 1838 by Honore de Balzac, Victor
Hugo and Alexandre Dumas followed was next. However, the first full-fledged CS – Society of Authors,
Composers and Publishers of Music (SACEM) – was founded in 1850 in France as a result of the outcome of
the lawsuit instituted by Paul Henrion, Victor Parizot and Ernest Bourget, with the support of their publisher
against a Café-concert in Paris. Generally, see M Ficsor Collective Management of Copyright and Related
Rights (2002); U Uchtenhagen Copyright Collective Management in Music (2011); D Gervais ‘Collective
Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age’ in D Gervais (ed.) Collective Management
of Copyright and Related Rights (2010) 1-28.
2
R Towse and C Handke ‘Regulating copyright collecting societies: current policy in Europe’ (2007) available
at http://www.serci.org/2007/towsehandke.pdf, accessed on 20 July 2019.

1
management] illustrate the ability of the industry to create its own solutions on the basis of

property rights”.3 Even so, the prevailing view is that government regulation of collective

management is not only necessary but also inevitable given the tendency of collective

management organisations (CMOs) to abuse their dominant position in their relationship with

copyright owners and users respectively and the need to check such abuses. The proponents of

regulation also base their argument on the fact that the services rendered by collecting societies

are public in nature. Thus, government regulation is important in the public interest to ensure

efficiency, transparency and accountability.4

Some regulatory frameworks take the form of ‘sector-specific’5 regulation: copyright

law regime or competition law (anti-trust). Some others take the form of dual-sector regulation:

usually regulation under copyright and competition law.6 For countries adopting copyright

sector-specific regulation, the observed trend is that while some make all the provisions relating

to collective management under the general copyright law,7 some others make a few provisions

in the copyright law and empower a political office holder or a supervisory body to make rules

for the regulation. Also, some countries enact a separate law entirely for regulation of collective

management.8 In all these cases, the supervision of collective management is placed under the

powers of a political office holder, a supervisory agency or a judicial or quasi-judicial (special

tribunal) body depending on the relevant national law.9

3
Ibid; RP Merges ‘Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The case of Scientific Research’ in EF Paul, et al
(eds.) Scientific Innovation, Philosophy, and Public Policy (1996) 145-167.
4
Towse and Handke op cit note 2; A Adewopo Nigerian Copyright System: Principles and Perspectives (2012)
88-89.
5
J Drexl Copyright, competition and development (2013) 231.
6
Towse and Handke op cit note 2.
7
For instance, see the Consolidated Act on Copyright, Consolidated Act No.1144, 2014 (Denmark).
8
Germany and Netherlands are examples of countries with a separate law for CMC. See Law on the
Administration of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, 1995 as amended (Germany); Act on the Supervision of
Collective Management Organizations for Copyright and Related Rights, 2003 as amended (Netherlands). See
generally, AB Engelbrekt ‘Toward Network Governance of Collective Management Organisations in Europe:
The Problem of Institutional Diversity’ in G Karnell, et al (eds.) Liber Amicorum Jan Rosen (2016) 61-100.
9
L Guibault and S van Gompel ‘Collective management in the European Union’ in D Gervais op cit note 1 at
135-168.

2
 Section 39 of the Copyright Act10 is an example of a framework where a few provisions

on collective management are made in the main law. Aside laying foundation and key

conditions for the establishment of CMOs in Nigeria, the section empower the Nigerian

Copyright Commission (NCC) to formulate rules for their regulations. Pursuant to this power,

the NCC made the Copyright (CMO) Regulations, 2007 (CMO Regulations). The regulation

of CMOs in Nigeria has formed the focus of a number of literature.11 It suffices now to note

that different models of collective management of copyright has emerged from the diverse

regulatory frameworks developed by different countries over time. The major models are

voluntary collective management, mandatory collective management, extended collective

management. As will become apparent, these models are defined by the scope and extent of

choice copyright owners may exercise in respect of rights administration.12

The goal of this paper is to examine these models of collective management with the

aim of determining which model will be more effective within the context of collective

management of copyright in Nigeria. To this end, the paper will, among others discuss the

implication of the models on copyright exclusivity, the right to property and freedom of

association of copyright owners especially given the level of development of collective

management in Nigeria, and on the no formality rule enacted in the Berne Convention.13 The

10
Cap C28, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
11
For instance, see O Ola ‘Copyright collective administration in Nigeria: regulatory challenges’ (2014) 2(1)
NIALS Journal of Intellectual Property 84-122; O Ola Copyright Collective Administration in Nigeria: Lessons
for Africa (Springer, 2013); JO Odion and DO Oriakhogba ‘Copyright collective management organizations in
Nigeria: Resolving the locus standi conundrum’ (2015) 10(7) JIPLP 518-525; O Olatunji et al, ‘The legality and
significance of the AGF’s directive approving a second musical CMO in Nigeria’ (2018) IIC, available at
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-018-0771-6, accessed 20 July 2019; IA Olubiyi and KI Adams ‘An examination
of the adequacy of the regulation of collecting societies in Nigeria (2017) 5 SAIPLJ 87-112; CI Okorie,
‘Corporate governance of collecting societies in Nigeria: powers of the copyright sector regulator’ (2018) 6
SAIPLJ 24-46.
12
M Ficsor ‘Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights from the Viewpoint of International
Norms and the Acquis Communautaire’ in Gervais op cit note 1 at 29-76; W Liu ‘Models for collective
management of copyright from an international perspective: potential changes for enhancing performance’
(2012) 17 JIPR 46-54.
13
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, as amended 28
September 1979.1161 UNTS 3 (Berne Convention).

3
discussion in this paper is important against the backdrop of the on-going reform of the

copyright regime in Nigeria. As shown in due course, collective management of copyright in

Nigeria currently substantially follows the voluntary model. However, an extended model is

being proposed in clause 74 of the draft Copyright Bill.14 Thus, the paper will resolve the

question whether collective management of copyright in Nigeria should remain voluntary, or

be made extended or mandatory. Conducted as a desk research, the paper will draw on relevant

statutory provisions, case law and literature from Africa (for instance, Kenya), and Europe (for

instance France, Denmark and Hungary) in discussing of the collective management models.

The paper is divided into six parts, the introduction being the first. The second part focuses on

the voluntary model. The third and fourth parts examine the mandatory and extended models

respectively. The fifth part resolves the question posed above, while the sixth part will form

the concluding thoughts.

2. Voluntary collective management

Voluntary collective management is based on the will of the copyright owners as guaranteed

by copyright exclusivity.15 Copyright exclusivity bestows on copyright owners the right to

decide on whether to administer their copyrights individually or whether to administer it

through collective management. It also allows copyright owners to decide the terms and

conditions upon which they want to grant access to their works. Where copyright owners

decide to administer their rights through collective management, they are at will to choose a

full-fledged, partial, or an agency-type collective management.16 Under voluntary collective

14
A copy of the Copyright Bill is available at http://graduatedresponse.org/new/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/DRAFT_COPYRIGHT_BILL_NOVEMBER-_2015.pdf, accessed on 20 July 2019.
The draft Copyright Bill is the product of a reform process kick-started by the Nigerian Copyright Commission
(NCC) in 2012. It was approved by the Federal Executive Council on 21 December 2017 to be forwarded to the
National Assembly for consideration. See B Aroture ‘Nigeria: Federal Executive Council Approves Copyright
Bill’ NLIPW 10 January 2018 available at https://nlipw.com/nigeria-federal-executive-council-approves-
copyright-bill/, accessed 20 July 2019.
15
See generally Ficsor op cit note 12; Liu op cit note 12.
16
For a discussion of types of collective management, see Uchtenhagen op cit note 1.

4
management, CMOs can only administer copyright on the individual mandate of copyright

owners. CMOs cannot legally administer the right of a copyright owner without a valid

mandate from such copyright owner.

As stated above, under the Nigeria copyright regime collective management of

copyright is substantially based on the voluntary model. A combined reading of section 39 of

the Copyright Act and regulation 17(1)(a) and (b) of the CMO Regulations is relevant. Among

others, section 39 allows a CMO to be formed in respect of any one or more class(es) of

copyright owners, and to operate only when approved by the NCC. However, such CMO is

prevented under regulation 17(1)(a) and (b) of the CMO Regulations, from granting licenses,

collecting and/or distributing royalties over works, which they are not authorised to administer.

Taken at face value, section 39 of the Copyright Act appears as the mandatory model

(discussed in 2 below). But, the section does not make it mandatory for copyright owners to

join any approved CMO. Copyright owners still reserve the right to choose whether to

administer their rights themselves or to mandate an approved CMO absolutely or partially to

administer their works on their behalf. In practice, however, the utilisation of blanket licenses

by CMOs in Nigeria make it inevitable for such CMOs to grant licenses and collect and

distribute royalties over works without copyright owners’ mandate.

Blanket licenses “issued to users have been very useful instruments that allow access

to the totality of a [CMOs] repertoire. Users obtaining blanket licenses are not only permitted

to use any work, but they are entitled to do so as many times as they want” within the timeframe

for which the license was issued.17 The blanket license also makes it easy for the management

of the right of every copyright owner within the repertoire of the CMO. CMOs also issue

17
MM Frabboni ‘The Changing Market for Music Licensing: A Redefinition of Collective Interests and
Competitive Dynamics’ in A Flanagan and ML Montagnani (eds.) Intellectual Property Law: Economics and
Social Justice Perspectives (2010) 144-162 at150.

5
licenses – known as transactional, per work or per programme license – covering only

particular work and for specific use.18 However, blanket licenses are more widespread, even in

Nigeria, because they are more effective in solving the transaction cost problem associated

with individual management of copyright.19 Further, blanket licenses “provide users with

certainty from involuntary infringement, and they effectively price each additional

performance of a work at its effective marginal cost (of zero)”.20

Therefore, blanket licenses in the hands of a user may be likened to a fisherman’s

dragnet, which when plunged in a river and pulled out, drags every organism falling within its

grip, including those within the fisherman’s expectation. Similarly, in practical terms, a user

holding a blanket license, is not expected to determine which work falls under the license.

Thus, such user uses all works falling in the class of works within the repertoire of the CMO

issuing the license. According to Uchtenhagen, this practice may be justified under the “solid

legal foundation” of “business management without a mandate”, which is “a quasi-contractual

relationship between two persons, one of which relies on the other in case of incapacity”.

Uchtenhagen illustrates this by the example of a neighbour “who alerts the police when he sees

burglars breaking into an apartment during the tenant’s absence”. The author likened the non-

member copyright owner to the absent tenant and the CMO to the neighbour. CMOs intervene

through the blanket licenses in such circumstances to prevent damage to the non-member

copyright owner’s works.21 However, CMOs are obliged to deposit the royalties collected in a

special account for a particular period to be paid to the copyright owners whose rights have

been administered without a mandate. Such payments are to be made after the CMO has

18
Ficsor op cit note 1.
19
Frabboni op cit note 17.
20
A Katz and E Sarid ‘Who killed the radio star? How music blanket licenses distort the production of music
content’ (2017) 19 available at http://serci.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Katz-Sarid.pdf, accessed 20 July
2019 (cited with permission).
21
Uchtenhagen op cit note 1 at 56.

6
deducted the requisite percentage for administrative costs. After such period, the royalties not

claimed is regarded as income for the CMOs’ members.22

Interestingly, some CMOs in Nigeria seemed to have formed the practice of requesting

non-members to join them before such non-members could claim the royalties collected under

blanket licenses.23 This practice is wrong in principle. According to Uchtenhagen, CMOs

cannot make membership compulsory as condition for the payment of such moneys to

deserving non-members. Moreover, the practice of “[b]usiness management without a mandate

has limits: it must no longer be exercised as soon as the [CMO] becomes aware of the fact that

the [copyright owner] opposes the exercise of his rights by third parties”.24

Furthermore, and this is arguable, CMOs may be regarded as having transformed

themselves to statutory or constructive trustees25 in respect of the royalties collected on works

not forming part of their repertoire. A constructive trust “arise by operation of law [It] is

imposed by the court as a result of the conduct of the trustee and therefore arises quite

independently of the intention of any of the parties”.26 While a statutory trust is created by law

expressly or impliedly also without the intention of the parties.27

The point being made is that by NCC’s approval to act for certain category of works

coupled with the use of blanket license, a CMO may be regarded as statutory trustee for the

royalties collected on all works within the class of works in its repertoire. Thus, the royalties

22
For instance, see Copyright (CMO Regulations), regulation 11 and 12.
23
For instance, see J Daniel ‘Royalty: Lagbaja in hot debate with Okoroji’ Information Nigeria 25 April 2014
available at https://www.informationng.com/2014/04/royalty-lagbaja-in-hot-debate-with-okoroji.html, accessed
on 19 July 2019. The contested chairman of the governing board of the Copyright Society of Nigeria was
reported as stating the following, in response to questions raised by Lara George (popular gospel artist about her
royalty: “Lara, when you last came to the COSON office you said you would come back and register but you
never did. You need to come and register so you can enjoy these benefits. There are over N60m which belongs
to some artistes who are yet to be full-members of the body. COSON is a structured body so if you come in it
will be sorted out.”
24
Uchtenhagen op cit note 1 at 56-57.
25
See Shapiro v SARRAL, unreported case no 14698/04 (6 November 2009) 32.
26
AJ Oakley Parker and Mellows: The Modern Law of Trusts 9th ed. (2008) 41.
27
Ibid at 39.

7
collected on the works of non-members through the blanket license cannot be withheld, neither

can the CMO make membership a condition before remitting the royalty to such non-member.

Allowing CMOs to insist on membership before remitting such royalties to non-members

would be undermining the exclusivity of rights vested in copyright owners by the Copyright

Act and consequently run counter to the voluntary foundation upon which collective

management in Nigeria is based.

3. Mandatory collective management

Mandatory collective management is a system whereby copyright owners do not have a right

of choice in the administration of rights. Here, the law insists that rights administration can

only be done through collective management from which copyright owners cannot opt out.28

Mandatory collective management is largely adopted in situations where copyright is reduced

to remuneration rights as a result of statutory or compulsory licenses. However, there are cases

where mandatory collective management is adopted for exclusive rights.29 The legislative

rationale for mandatory collective management is based on the assumption that collective

management system is the only practical means for administration of such rights because of

the nature of their use. Thus, making it mandatory would “help to achieve the economic

efficiencies and practical benefits that justify [collective management] in the first instance,

such as issuing blanket licenses and reducing the costs of negotiations, enforcement actions

and royalty distributions”.30

Mandatory collective management raises some issues, which will be discussed shortly.

For now, it should be noted that France and Hungary are examples of countries that have

28
SV Lewinski ‘Mandatory collective administration of exclusive rights – a case study on its compatibility with
international and EC copyright law’ (2004) 1 UNESCO e.Copyright Bulletin 1-14.
29
Ficsor op cit note 12.
30
LR Helfer ‘Collective Management of Copyrights and Human Rights: An Uneasy Alliance Revisited’ in
Gervais op cit note 1 at 75-104.

8
adopted mandatory collective management for exclusive rights. In France, a legislation in 1995

introduced mandatory collective management for the administration of reprographic

reproduction rights.31 The situation is different in Hungary where the application of mandatory

collective management on exclusive rights is more entrenched. Here, the public performance

rights in published musical and literary works, rights in terrestrial and satellite broadcast,

transmission of cable-originated programmes, and the right of making available of works to

the public are subject to mandatory collective management.32 However, mandatory collective

management in Hungary does not extend to the “right of public performance in literary and

dramatico-musical works on stage”.33

Mandatory collective management is more widely utilised in cases where statutory or

compulsory licenses have been granted for particular uses of certain works.34 In such instances,

the right of copyright owners have been reduced to remuneration rights.35 The remuneration is

either fixed by statute or subject to negotiation or determined by a judicial or quasi-judicial

body. But in every such case, remuneration will only be made through a CMO for distribution

among their members. Such cases include the resale rights for visual artists,36 rental and public

31
Law No. 95-4 of 3 January 1995, Supplementing the Intellectual Property Code and Relating to the Collective
Management of the Reproduction Right by Reprography. See T Koskinen-Olsson and N Lowe Educational
Material on Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (Module 1) (2012).
32
Copyright Act No. LXXVI. of 1999 (Hungary), articles. 25-27.
33
Lewinski op cit note 28.
34
Under a statutory license, users have the liberty to use a work without authorisation, but must pay a statutory
compensation for such uses. In other words, the license as well as the compensation for use of a work is fixed by
statute. In the case of compulsory license, while the license to use a work is fixed by statute, the compensation for
such uses is a subject of negotiation between the user and copyright owner. But where an agreement cannot be
reached in such negotiations, a judicial or quasi-judicial body steps in to fix the amount of compensation – usually
on the application of the parties.
35
DJ Gervais ‘The landscape of collective management schemes’ (2011) 34(4) CJLA 423-449.
36
Copyright Act, section13. See also the German Copyright Act, 1965, section 26.

9
lending rights,37 private levy rights,38 and the so-called article 12 (Rome Convention) rights.39

Under article 12 of Rome Convention,

“if a phonogram published for commercial purposes, or a reproduction of such phonogram, is

used directly for broadcasting or for any communication to the public, a single equitable
remuneration shall be paid by the user to the performers, or to the producers of the phonograms,
or to both. Domestic law may, in the absence of agreement between these parties, lay down the
conditions as to the sharing of this remuneration.”

Similar provision as the above is contained in section 30A of the Kenyan Copyright Act in

respect of sound recordings and audio-visual works.40 The judicial interpretation of section

30A of the Kenyan Copyright Act is examined shortly. It suffices now to mention that the

Nigerian Copyright Act does not contain the article 12 provision However, it provides for the

resale right of visual artists as follows:

“notwithstanding any assignment or sale of original work, the authors of graphic works, three-
dimensional works and manuscript shall have an inalienable right to share in the proceeds of
any sale of that work or manuscript by public auction or through a dealer whatever the method
used by the latter to carry out the operation”.41

The Copyright Act does not state whether the resale right can only be exercised through CMOs.

It empowers the NCC to make regulations providing for conditions for the exercise of the

right.42 So far, such regulation has not been made. However, mandatory collective management

was recently introduced for levies on materials used for copyright infringement under the

Copyright Act. Section 40 of the Copyright Act imposes levies on materials used or capable of

being used for copyright infringement. That section empowers the Minister to make regulations

determining among others, the levy payable on such materials. The section further provides

that such levies shall be paid to the NCC’s fund for disbursement among approved CMOs.

Specifically, the NCC is obligated to distribute 60% of the levies collected among approved

37
German Copyright Act, section 27.
38
Copyright Act, section 40. See also German Copyright Act sections 54, 54a and 54h. See A Porcin ‘Of guilds
and men: copyright workaround in the cinematographic industry’ (2012) 35(1) HCELJ 1-34.
39
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations (Rome Convention) Oct. 26, 1961.
40
Copyright Act 2001, Chapter 130, Laws of Kenya.
41
Copyright Act, section 13.
42
Ibid.

10
CMOs in Nigeria.43 The CMOs are under a duty to distribute such funds among their members

in accordance with established rules of royalty distribution adopted by the CMO in accordance

with the CMO Regulations.44

The issues raised about the propriety of mandatory collective management relate to its

application on exclusive rights. Scholars seem not to have issues with its application in cases

where exclusive rights have been reduced to mere remuneration rights under a statutory or

compulsory licence. In such cases, it seems unarguable that mandatory collective management

is most suitable for administration of rights since it relates to collection of royalty already and

not the granting of licenses.45 However, mandatory collective management has not received

general acceptance from the user side. In this regard, Katz argues against the mandatory tariff

system practiced in Canada, wherein licensing tariffs are accepted as mandatory on users when

they are fixed by the Copyright Board in individual cases and where the tariffs, although fixed

by CMOs, are certified by the Board under section .... of the Canadian Copyright Act. To Katz,

the mandatory tariff “theory gives rise to numerous practical challenges, conceptual puzzles,

procedural nightmares, and constitutional headaches, each of which should weigh the scales

against it” in favour of the “voluntary license” model.46

The article 12 (Rome Convention) right contained in section 30A of the Kenyan

Copyright Act was challenged in a case before the Kenyan High Court.47 The plaintiffs’ case

is that section 30A of the Kenyan Copyright Act breached their rights to freedom of association

and freedom of property guaranteed under articles 36 and 40 respectively of the Kenyan

43
Copyright (Levies on Materials) Order, 2012 para 4(1)(d).
44
Ibid, para 4(3).
45
See O Bulayenko ‘Permissibility of non-voluntary collective management of copyright under EU law – the
case of the French Law on out-of-commerce books’ (2016) 7(1) JIPIEL 51-68.
46
A Katz ‘Specter: Canadian copyright and the mandatory tariff-part I’ (2015) 27 IPJ 151-211; A Katz
‘Spectre: Canadian copyright and the mandatory tariff-part II’ (2015) 28 IPJ 39-99
47
Xpedia Management Limited v The Attorney General (Xpedia case), Petition No. 317 of 2015; [2016] eKLR
(delivered on 11 May 2016).

11
Constitution since, in effect, it would amount to a compulsion to join the relevant CMO and

take away their right to negotiate directly with users.48 In terms of section 30A,

“If a sound recording is published for commercial purposes or a reproduction of such recording
is used directly for broadcasting or other communication to the public, or is publicly performed,
a single equitable remuneration for the performer and the producer of the sound recording shall
be paid by the user through the respective [CMO], and the remuneration shall be shared equally
between the producer of the sound recording and the performer”.

The Kenyan High Court, per Ngugi J, upheld section 30A of the Kenyan Copyright Act as not

being in breach of the said human rights. The court was of the view that section 30A does not

take away the exclusive right which the Kenyan Copyright Act bestowed on copyright owners.

Neither does it compel copyright owners to join CMOs before they can get their remuneration.

According to the Kenyan High Court, the section is important as it provides better means for

copyright owners to enjoy their copyright, which is protected under article 40 of the Kenyan

Constitution.49

Another Judge of the Kenyan High Court, Chitembwe J, held section 30A of the

Kenyan Copyright Act as unconstitutional in another case with similar issues.50 Chitembwe J

vitiated section 30A on two grounds: (a) that its enactment did not comply with the procedure

laid down under article 118 of the Kenyan Constitution (lack of public participation); (b) that

the section violates copyrights owners right to freedom of association because its application

is capable of forcing them to associate.

While the first ground of Chitembwe J’s judgment may not be faulted, the second

ground seems a little bit removed from the practice of collective management. In this regard,

48
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010.
49
Article 40 of the Kenyan Constitution expressly protects IP as property right and imposes a duty on the
government to “support, promote and protect the intellectual property rights of the people of Kenya”.
50
Mercy Munee Kingoo v Safaricom Ltd [2016] eKLR (Kingoo case). Chitembwe J restated his position in a
recent application where he was called upon to interpret the orders in his 3 November 2016 ruling. See Mercy
Munee Kingoo v Safaricom Ltd (MLD) unreported Const. Petition no 5 of 2016 (14 July 2017).

12
the judgment of Ngugi J is preferable. Ngugi J’s judgment seems to align with the practice of

“business management without a mandate” discussed above. CMOs usually collect royalties

of works forming part of their repertoire, even though the owners of such works may not be

their members. Such practice becomes a legal duty under section 30A of the Kenyan Copyright

Act. Further, the section represents a classic example of collective management as statutory

trust as discussed above. The CMO is a statutory trustee for the royalties collected pursuant to

the section and copyright owners (members and non-members) as beneficiaries. Thus, a

copyright owner may not need to belong to the relevant CMO before getting his remuneration.

The copyright owner needs only show that his work falls within the CMO’s repertoire to obtain

his remuneration under section 30A of the Kenyan Copyright Act. In this sense, it can be said

that the section cannot or does not compel a copyright owner to associate.

On the propriety of the mandatory collective management in respect of exclusive rights,

the issue is twofold: compatibility with international norms and compatibility with the rights

to property and freedom of association of copyright owners. On the first issue, the challenges

are whether mandatory collective management constitutes an exception or limitation to

exclusive right and whether it constitutes a formality for the subsistence of copyright.

Generally, the Berne Convention lays down minimum exclusive rights, which can only be

excepted or limited through provisions that pass the three-step-test.51 Also, the Berne

Convention proscribes the placing of formalities in national legislations for the recognition of

these exclusive rights.52

If mandatory collective management is regarded as an exception or limitation to

copyright, it can only be permissible if it passes the three-step-test. If it were seen as a

formality, it would be regarded as being incompatible with the Berne Convention. However,

51
Berne Convention, article 9.
52
Berne Convention, article 5.

13
the settled position is that mandatory collective management is neither an exception nor a

limitation of copyright; hence the question of compatibility with the three-step-test does not

arise. Also, that mandatory collective management cannot be regarded as a formality for

copyright recognition.53 Further, mandatory collective management does not take away

copyright owners’ exclusive rights. Under the model, exclusive rights are recognised, but the

relevant regulation insists that the right can only be administered through CMOs. The

authorities hold the position that mandatory collective management enhances the exercise of

exclusive rights and qualifies as a condition, which the Berne Convention permits member

states to impose for the exercise of exclusive rights.54

The compatibility of mandatory collective management with rights to freedom to

associate and property ownership appear not to have attracted much academic discussion.55

Nonetheless, such discussion should be done against the backdrop of the interface between

copyright and human rights, for which a good amount of literature has emerged.56 Even so, an

in-depth discussion of the intersection between copyright human right is beyond the scope of

this paper. It suffices to state that some international instruments seem to recognise copyright

as human rights. For instance, in terms of article 27(2) of the United Nations Declaration on

Human Rights (UHDR),57 “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and material

interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”.58

53
Ficsor op cit note 12; M Ficsor ‘Collective management of copyright and related rights at a triple crossroads:
should it remain voluntary or may it be “extended” or made mandatory?’ (2003) available at
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/14935/10657988721Ficsor_Eng.pdf/Ficsor%2BEng.pdf, accessed on
20 July 2019.
54
See Berne Convention, articles. 11bis(2) and 13(1).
55
See D Sinacore-Guinn Collective Administration of Copyrights and Neighboring Rights: International
Practices, Procedures, and Organizations (1993) 289. See also Helfer op cit note 29.
56
See generally, OH Dean ‘The case for recognition of intellectual property in the Bill of Rights’ (1997) 60
JCRL 105-119; P Torremans (ed.) Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of Expression – Intellectual Property
– Privacy (2004); L Tong ‘The Interface between Intellectual-property Rights and Human Rights’ in H Klopper,
et al (eds.) Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2011) 433-473. See also, B Krisjanis ‘Copyright and
free speech: the human right perspective’ (2015) 8(2) BJLP 182-202; OF Afori ‘Human rights and copyright:
the introduction of natural law consideration into American copyright law’ (2004) 14(2) FIPMELJ 497-568.
57
Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
58
See also the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR), article 15.

14
However, according to Helfer, these international instruments “provide only a skeletal outline

of how to develop human rights-compliant rules and policies for governments to promote

creativity [...]. They also leave unanswered the critical question of how those rules and policies

interface with existing [copyright] protection systems.”59 Thus, the onus rests on national

governments to create frameworks connecting copyright protection with relevant human rights

principles. And in discharging such onus, it must be realised that copyright is not human right

per se.60 It may be used as a tool to promote human rights such as freedom of speech and access

to information.61

Copyright is not specifically protected as a human right in Nigeria. Section 44(1) of the

Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria (CFRN), 1999 provides that “[n]o moveable

property or any interest in an immoveable property shall be acquired compulsorily [...] except

in the manner and for the purposes prescribed by a law that, among other things [...] require

the prompt compensation of payment of compensation therefore” (emphasis added). The case

Musical Copyright Society Nigeria (MCSN) v NCC,62 relating to the validity or otherwise of

section 39 of the Copyright Act, is important on the issue of whether copyright may be regarded

as moveable property under section 44 of the CFRN. In that case, the appellant (as applicant)

initiated an action for the enforcement of human rights under the defunct Fundamental Rights

(Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 (FREP Rules). The appellant sought, among others, a

declaration that section 39 is null and void because it seeks to abrogate copyright owners’ rights

to freedom of association and to own property. The FHC, per Sani J, refused the declaration

and held that the section does not abrogate the fundamental rights complained about. In

reaching this conclusion, Sani J took the view that the provision of the CFRN regarding the

59
Helfer op cit note 30.
60
See generally, IPA ‘Copyright and Human Rights – An IPA Special Report’ (2015) available at
http://www.internationalpublishers.org/images/Copyright.pdf, accessed on 20 July 2019.
61
IPA ibid.
62
Unreported Appeal No.: CA/L/575/2009 (21 October 2016).

15
right to own moveable and immoveable properties does not include the right to own intellectual

property (copyright). In other words, Sani J was of the view that copyright is not property

envisaged under the CFRN.

Sadly, the Court of Appeal did not directly consider the issue of the nature of copyright

as moveable or immoveable property raised by the main appeal. Instead, the appeal was

decided on the Respondent’s notice, which sought confirmation of Sani J’s judgment on the

ground, among others, that the FHC lacked jurisdiction since the case was not originally

initiated through the right procedure. The respondent’s contention is that the main claim of the

appellant at the FHC cannot be validly initiated under the FREP Rules. The Court of Appeal

upheld the respondent’s contention and rightly held that,63 under the defunct FREP Rules, it is

the person whose human rights have been, is being or is likely to be infringed that can approach

the court to enforce such rights. The right cannot be enforced on his/her behalf.

It should be stated that the position of Sani J on the nature of copyright and the right to

own property seems to conflict with established authorities. The Supreme Court of Nigeria has

long ago declared copyright to be an incorporeal property,64 which is a moveable property.

This position was echoed by Asein who regarded copyright as falling within the category of

moveable property known as choses in action because of its intangibility.65 Again, Oyewunmi

regarded copyright as proprietary rights.66 These views find legislative support in section 11 of

the Copyright Act where copyright is regarded as moveable property. The protection afforded

moveable property in the CFRN applies to both tangible and intangible properties. The

Constitution does not differentiate between both. Section 44(1) of the CFRN refers to

“moveable property” without excluding tangible or intangible property from its ambit. Indeed,

the Supreme Court not only recently reaffirmed its position on the nature of copyright as a

63
Ibid at 31.
64
PPC Ltd v Adophy [1977-1989] 2 IPLR 251-298 at 295-295.
65
JO Asein Nigerian Copyright Law and Practice (2012) 7.
66
AO Oyewunmi Nigerian Law of Intellectual Property (2015) 22.

16
property, it confirms it as falling under moveable properties protected under section 44 of the

CFRN.67

The issue still remains, however, whether mandatory collective management in respect

of exclusive right is compatible with the rights to freedom of association and property. Taking

the right to property first: mandatory collective management would only be regarded as

incompatible with the right to property if it were seen as a divestment of the right to property.

The Kenyan High Court in the Xpedia case regarded mandatory collective management as a

condition for the exercise of copyright and not a divestment of copyright. Although that

judgment relates to mandatory collective management in respect of remuneration rights, its

reasoning is nonetheless relevant here. The view that mandatory collective management is a

condition for the exercise of copyright finds support in authoritative scholarly writings on the

subject as pointed out above.

The situation of mandatory collective management for exclusive rights is more critical

when weighed against the right to freedom of association. The view has been expressed that

“in its most extreme incarnation”, mandatory collective management is capable of requiring

copyright owners to affiliate with other copyright owners “with whom they may not wish to

associate”.68 This sentiment is what led the Kenyan High Court in the Kingoo case to declare

mandatory collective management incompatible with the right to freedom of association.

However, the judgment in the Xpedia case is preferable. The judgment took cognisance of the

fact that mandatory collective management is meant to enhance the economic rights of

copyright owners. Further, it is supportable on the basis of the statutory trust argument

advanced above.

However, the goal of mandatory collective management is not only to further the

67
MCSN v Compact Disc Technology Ltd & Ors., unreported SC. 425/2010 (14 December 2018).
68
Helfer op cit note 30.

17
interest of copyright owners. It is also to promote the interest of the public in obtaining easy

access to copyright works for the enhancement of creativity. Collective management is

generally meant to achieve this same goal. The issue then is does collective management need

to be made compulsory before the above goals could be achieved? Although the answer to this

question seems obvious, it is argued that wile mandatory collective management may be

important for effective rights administration, copyright owner should have the liberty to decide

whether to belong or not to be part of the system especially given the possibility of individual

rights management in this digital age.69

4. Extended collective management

Extended collective management developed and is firmly established in the Nordic region.70

Its invention is attributed to the Swedish law professor – Svante Bergström.71 Its emergence is

based on the view that it is the best model for solving the transaction cost problem involved in

rights management.72 Further, views have been expressed that the extended collective

management model is influenced by the trade union practice of collective bargaining the

product of which extends to non-members of the trade unions.73 Although it was first applied

in the field of broadcasting, it has been extended to other areas including reprography –

particularly copying for educational purposes, cable retransmission and other aspects of

collective management.74 Even so, it has found its way into the laws of countries outside that

69
A Adewopo ‘Analysis of copyright in digital music: implications for new media licensing for ringtones under
the Nigerian Copyright Act’ (2017) 8(1) GRBPL 1-23; YW Chin ‘Copyright collective management in the
twenty-first century from a competition law perspective’ in S Frankel and D Gervais eds. The Evolution and
Equilibrium of Copyright in the Digital Age (2015) 269-284; G Mazziotti ‘New licensing models for online
music services in the European Union: from collective to customized management’ (2011) 34(4) CJLA 757-808.
70
T Koskinen-Olsson ‘Collective Management in the Nordic Countries’ in Gervais op cit note 1 at 283-306.
71
T Riis and J Schovsbo ‘Extended collective licenses and the Nordic experience – it’s a hybrid but is it a Volvo
or a lemon?’ (2010) 31(4) CJLA 441, fn 5.
72
See V Verronen ‘Extended collective licence in Finland: a legal instrument for balancing the rights of the
author with the interests of the user’ (2002) 49 JCSU 1143-1160.
73
Engelbrekt op cit note 8 at 82-84.
74
For instance, see generally Denmark Copyright Act, sections 13, 14, 16, 17(4), 24a, 30, 30a, 35, and 50;
Copyright Act No. 404 of 1961 as amended, sections 13, 14 and 25f (Finland); Copyright Act No.73 of 1972 as
amended, article 15a(1) (Iceland); Copyright Act No. 2 of 1961, articles 13, 16a and 36 (Norway); Act on
Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works, Swedish Statute Books, SFS, 1960:729, article 42h (Sweden).

18
region and it is proposed in clause 74(10) of the draft Copyright Bill, examined in the next

part.75 It is already been adopted for online licensing of copyright in books and scientific

journals, especially out-of-commerce publications in other countries.76

Under extended collective management, a CMO representing a substantial number of

copyright owners of a category of rights is allowed by law to conclude licensing agreements

that bind copyright owners of the same category of rights being administered by, but who are

non-members of, the CMO. Such non-members include foreign rights holders and deceased

rights holders whose successors-in-title have not been determined. However, the non-members

have a right to opt out of the extended collective management by giving relevant notice to the

CMO as required by law.

Extended collective management resembles a hybrid of the voluntary collective

management and mandatory collective management. It combines elements of exclusivity of

rights and mandatory licenses. CMOs derive substantial membership on the basis of mandates

entered into by copyright owners. The substantial membership of the CMO enables it to enter

into licensing agreements with users that extends to non-members of the same rights category.

In exercise of their exclusivity, the non-members have a right to opt out of the extended

collective management.77 The opt out option distinguishes extended from mandatory collective

management.

The relevant law determines the substantiality of membership that enables the operation

75
The extended collective management model is now a feature of French and UK copyright laws and it is also
being considered China. See Bulayenko op cit note 45; D Mendis and V Stobo ‘Extended collective licensing in
the UK – one year on: a review of the law and a look ahead to the future (2016) 4(38) EIPR 208-220; Y Jiang
‘The changing tides of collective licensing in China’ (2013) 21 (3) MSILR; J Wang ‘Should China adopt
extended licensing system to facilitate collective copyright administration: preliminary thoughts’ available at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228172715_Should_China_Adopt_an_Extended_Licensing_System_t
o_Facilitate_Collective_Copyright_Administration_Preliminary_Thought, accessed on 20 July 2019.
76
Bulayenko op cit note 45.
77
Riis and Schovsbo op cit note 71. See also, T Riis and J Schovsbo ‘Extended collective licenses in action’
(2012) 43(8) IIC 930-950.

19
of extended collective management. This usually manifests in the conditions for approving a

CMO to operate by the relevant authority. The law will usually indicate the number of

copyright owners that a CMO is required to have before it can be approved by the relevant

authority. Substantiality can also be determined by indirect representation. Riis and Schovsbo

describes this using “the example of Copydan which is the dominant [extended collective

management] organisation in Denmark. The Copydan [...] consists of an umbrella organisation

[...] and five “affiliated” societies”.78

Gervais noted that extended collective management is an interesting model for

countries where rights holders are well organised and informed. It is also well suited for

countries where much of the copyright works come from foreign countries. Extended collective

management provides a legal solution to this situation, as the agreements struck between users

and rights holders will include all non-excluded domestic and foreign rights holders. By

accelerating the acquisition of rights, extended collective management also increases the

efficiency and promptness of royalty collection. The monies redistributed to rights holders are

thereby increased.79

Extended collective management is widely held as being compatible with the Berne

Convention and other international copyright treaties as considered under the discussion of

mandatory collective management in (3) above.80 It is also regarded as compatible with the

rights to property and freedom of association because of its opt-out feature.81 However, the

major challenge with extended collective management is the fate of foreign copyright owners

under the model. Riis and Schovsbo have copiously identified the issues. According to the

78
Riis and Schovsbo ‘Extended collective licensing in action’ ibid at 936.
79
D Gervais ‘Application of an Extended Collective Licensing Regime in Canada: Principles and Issues Related
to Implementation’ (2003) available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920391, accessed
on 20 July 2019.
80
Ficsor op cit note 12; Riis and Schovsbo op cit note 71.
81
Bulayenko op cit note 45; Riis and Schovsbo ibid.

20
authors,

“it may be very difficult for foreign right holders to find out that their works are being used under
[extended collective management] and consequently they cannot claim remuneration (or opt
out of the [extended collective management] for that matter). [...] Secondly, a closer
examination of the [CMOs’] allocation practices reveal that in various situations foreign right
holders do not receive any remuneration for the use of their work under [extended collective
management]. Remuneration is distributed to foreign organisations only if the organisation that
administers the [extended collective management] has entered into a so-called [reciprocal]
agreement with the foreign organisation and that is the case for only a limited number of foreign
organisations. Furthermore, it is a well-established feature of [collective management] that a
certain percentage, often 10 [%], of the collected royalties are withheld and used for collective
purposes (typically cultural and social purpose) to the benefit of the members of the organisation
and that practice is carried on in the context of [extended collective management]. In principle,
the practice of withholding a share of the royalties for collective purposes contravenes the rule
on national treatment in the Berne Convention insofar as foreign right holders do not benefit from
the collective purposes”.82

The spread of extended collective management beyond the Nordic region, as well as its

adaptability to collective management in the digital sphere, underscores its usefulness.

Moreover, in view of the widespread nature of reciprocal agreements among CMOs globally,

it is doubtful whether the issues highlighted by Riis and Schovsbo are of any practical

relevance. The point being made is that with the widespread usage of reciprocal agreements,

foreign copyright owners in countries without extended collective management will easily

benefit from the model in other countries.

In Nigeria, extended collective management is currently not provided under the

Copyright Act. However, it is arguable that the practice of “business management without a

mandate” discussed in (2) above has elements of the extended collective management model.

By implication, aspects of extended collective management forms part of the practice of CMOs

in Nigeria. The relevant aspects of extended collective management include the management

of rights of non-members of a CMO; management of works of un-known authors or orphan

works; and the right of non-members to insist on payment of the royalties collected by the

82
Riis and Schovsbo ibid.

21
CMOs or to sue the users for infringement.

Moreover, regulation 11 of the CMO Regulations could be interpreted to mean an

implied sanctioning of extended collective management. Under regulation 11, every CMO

“shall establish a Holding account which shall be used to hold any share of the distributable

amount, which cannot be allocated or distributed for reasons including [that] the qualified

person entitled is not currently a member” of the CMO. It appears the drafters of this provision

envisaged the practical possibility of CMOs managing rights of non-members without

authorisation. Thus, the provision was inserted to safeguard moneys collected as royalties from

such unauthorised management. However, there seems to be some inconsistency in this regard

under the CMO Regulations. As pointed out in (2) above, regulation 17(1)(a) and (b) prohibits

collective management without copyright owners’ mandate. Regulation 17 is generally termed

“unethical practices”. Commission of any of the acts listed under regulation 17 will attract

relevant sanctions under the CMO Regulations and the Copyright Act. But a combined reading

of regulation 11 and 17(1)(a) and (b) may lead one to the conclusion that the prohibition in

regulation 17(1)(a) and (b) would be sanctioned only where royalties collected without a

mandate are not treated as required under regulation 11. This interpretation appears more in

tune with the practice of CMOs under the much talked about “business management without a

mandate”. Even so, should collective management in Nigeria remain voluntary, may it be

mandatory or extended?

5. Choosing from the voluntary, mandatory and extended model

The voluntary model of collective management, which is expressly supported by the extant

Copyright Act, was found to be based on copyright owners’ exclusive rights. It does not

undermine this right neither does it raise concerns on copyright owners’ rights to property and

freedom of association, nor implicate the no formality rule. However, it was found that the

22
principle of “business management without a mandate” hinged on the wide spread use of

blanket licenses by CMOs in Nigeria has the effect of making collective management

mandatory in practice in Nigeria, even though this is not expressly mandated by the Copyright

Act.

The implication of mandatory collective management on copyright exclusivity, the

non-formality rule, and the rights to own property and freedom of association depends on

whether it relates to remuneration rights or exclusive rights. As argued above, the mandatory

model can enhance the effectiveness of royalty collection and distribution especially in cases

where copyright has been reduced to mere remuneration rights. However, the model seems

problematic when it is applied to exclusive rights. While it cannot be said to offend the no

formality rule or the three-step tests under international copyright law, there is discord in the

case law and academic literature on the implication of the mandatory model on human right,

especially the right to freedom of association. Also, the mandatory model raises concern about

the liberty of copyright owners to exercise their exclusive right to personally administer their

rights through the use of digital platforms.

That being said, extended collective management is found to be a hybrid of the

voluntary and mandatory model. It is found to be very useful in systems where the copyright

owners are well informed and organised, and in countries where a good mount of the works

under collective management are owned by foreigners, especially given the wide-spread

execution of reciprocal agreements among foreign CMOs. It has also been found very useful

to manage rights in orphan-works, works of unknown owners, and for rights administration in

this digital era. The opt-out option expressly provided for under extended collective

management makes it unique compared to the mandatory model. The opt-out option also

insulates the extended model from negatively impacting the right to property, freedom of

association, the no formality rule, the three-step test and copyright exclusivity. As discussed in

23
(4) above, it seems to align with the combined reading of section 39 of the Copyright Act, and

regulations 11 and 17 of the CMO regulation, and the established practical usage of blanket

licences by CMOs in Nigeria. This, and the need to expressly provide for the extended model,

may have informed the proposal in clause 74(10) of the draft Copyright Bill.

Generally, clause 74 of the draft Copyright Bill rehashed the provisions of section 39(1)

to (9) of the Copyright Act. It then seeks to introduce a new subsection (10) as follows:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act or any other law, a CMO may issue licences
permitting the use of works of owners of copyright who are not members of the CMO:
Provided that:
(a) such works are of the same category as works for which it is approved to issue licences;
(b) the owners of copyright in such works are not otherwise represented by any other
CMO;
(c) the owners of copyright in such works have not specifically opted out of collective
management of their rights and
(d) the CMO does not discriminate against such owners in terms of the tariffs for the use
of their works and the royalties paid to such owners.”

The proposed subsection 74(10) is hinged on the presumption that the CMO concerned must

have been approved by the NCC to represent a substantial number of copyright owners of the

class of works forming the repertoire of the CMO.83 Also, the CMOs are duty bound to remit

royalties collected to the non-members without discrimination. As such, the CMO cannot make

payment of such royalty conditioned on such copyright owners becoming its members.

Moreover, the non-members can opt-out of the extended collective management scheme in

exercise of their right to freedom of association. But is collective management in Nigeria ripe

for the extended model, should it remain voluntary or be made mandatory?

The answer to the above question should be in the positive for a number of reasons.

First, copyright owners in Nigeria seems to be well organised. There are several rights owners’

organisations, such as the Performing Musicians Association of Nigeria (PMAN), established

to further the interests of their members. Indeed, the membership of some CMOs, such as the

83
See clause 74(1) and (2) Copyright Bill.

24
 Reprographic Rights Organisation of Nigeria (REPRONIG) is structured around such

copyright owners’ organisations.84 Second, it is common knowledge that CMOs in Nigeria are

already entering into reciprocal agreement with the relevant sister foreign CMO. Third, as

already now over-flogged, the practice of collective management in Nigeria currently is such

that the extended model is already accommodated, safe for the express provision of the opt-out

option for copyright owners.

6. Conclusion

As stated in (1) above, this paper set out to resolve the question whether collective management

of copyright in Nigeria should remain voluntary, or whether it should be made mandatory or

extended. To answer the question, the paper has so focused on examining the models of

collective management and their implication on copyright exclusivity, the no formality rule

and three-step test in international copyright law, and copyright owners’ rights of freedom of

association and to own property. Gleaned from the foregoing discussion, the inescapable

conclusion reached in this paper is that Nigeria is ripe enough to expressly adopt the extended

collective management model as proposed in clause 74(10) of the Copyright Bill.

84
Authors and publishers forming REPRONIG’s membership are represented by the following: (a) Association
of Nigerian Authors (ANA); (b) Association of Non Fiction Authors of Nigeria (ANFAAN); (c) National
Association of Translators and Interpreters (NATI); (d) Photographers Association of Nigeria (PAN); (e)
Society of Nigerian Artists (SNA); (f) Newspapers Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN); and (g)
Nigerian Publishers Association (NPA). See REPRONIG ‘About us’ available at http://repronig.ng/about-
repronig/, accessed on 20 July 2019; Baker & McKenzie Collecting Societies Handbook (2014) available at
http://www.collectingsocietieshb.com/CollectingSocieties/CSConvertToPDF?societyfk=246&mod=GenInfo,
accessed on 290 July 2019.

25

View publication stats