ARTICLES 1106-1126 the units were indicated on the sales invoice dated
November 5, 1990. The sales were in fact consummated on
ART. 1106: 2 KINDS OF PRESCRIPTION/DISTINCTION
BETWEEN PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES
PANGASINAN VS. ALMAZORA
All the elements of laches were present. First, Aurora and
her family entrusted to Conrado the owner’s duplicate of the
certificate of title of the subject property in 1945. In their
complaint, Caltex-Philippines even admitted that Conrado’s
family had been staying in the subject property since 1912.
Second, it took five decades, from 1945 to 1996, before
Aurora decided to enforce their right thereon. Third,
Conrado’s heirs who lived all their lives in the disputed
property apparently were not aware that Aurora would one
day come out and claim ownership thereon. Fourth, there
was no question that Conrado’s heirs would be prejudiced in
the event that the suit would be allowed to prosper.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the present case
was not barred by laches and had not prescribed, it must still
fail on its merits. The basis of the action for damages of
Aurora would be the fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation
allegedly committed by Conrado in transferring the title of the
subject property to his name. However, they drastically failed
to prove the fact of fraud with clear and convincing evidence.
What is laches?
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
Rationale behind the principle of laches
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such,
is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon
one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do
so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. The time-
honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be
denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become
"stale," or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of
time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept on his
rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. In other
words, public policy requires, for peace of society, the
discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion; thus
laches is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a
right which has become, under the circumstances,
inequitable or unfair to permit.
Kinds of Prescription in the Civil Code
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil
Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by
the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article
1106. Acquisitive prescription is also known as adverse
possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive
prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the
lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and
Article 1139. 36 Another name for extinctive prescription is
litigation of action.
PHIL-AIR CONDITIONING CENTER VS. RCJ LINES
Both parties admit the existence and validity of the contract
of sale. They recognize that the price quotation dated August
4, 1989, contained the terms and conditions of the sale
contract. They also agree that the price and description of
various dates between March 5, 1990 and August 29, 1990,
as proved by several delivery receipts.
The Court therefore can resolve whether Phil-Air's action to
enforce the contract was timely filed even in the apparent
absence of a formal or notarized deed of sale. More
significantly, Rolando Abadilla, Jr., admitted under oath that
the sale was in writing. Phil-Air filed the complaint with the
RTC on April 1, 1998. The time elapsed from August 4, 1989
(the date of the price quotation, which is the earliest possible
reckoning point), is eight years and eight months, well within
the ten-year prescriptive period. There was simply no delay
(second element of laches) where Phil-Air can be said to
have negligently slept on its rights. Furthermore, there is no
basis for laches as the facts of the present case do not give
rise to an inequitable situation that calls for the application of
equity and the principle of laches.
Distinction between laches and prescription
The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. The court resolves whether the claimant
asserted its claim within a reasonable time and whether its
failure to do so warrants the presumption that it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. The court determines
the claimant's intent to assert its claim based on its past
actions or lack of action. After all, what is invoked in
instances where a party raises laches as a defense is the
equity jurisdiction of the court. Laches is a recourse in equity
and is applied only in the absence, never in contravention, of
statutory law. Thus, laches cannot abate a collection suit
filed within the prescriptive period mandated by the Civil
Code.
On the other hand, if the law gives the period within which to
enforce a claim or file an action in court, the court confirms
whether the claim is asserted or the action is filed in court
within the prescriptive period. The court determines the
claimant's intent to assert its claim by simply measuring the
time elapsed from the proper reckoning point (e.g., the date
of the written contract) to the filing of the action or assertion
of the claim.
In sum, where the law provides the period within which to
assert a claim or file an action in court, the assertion of the
claim or the filing of the action in court at any time within the
prescriptive period is generally deemed reasonable, and
thus, does not call for the application of laches. As we held in
one case, unless reasons of inequitable proportions are
adduced, any imputed delay within the prescriptive period is
not delay in law that would bar relief.
ART. 1112: RENUNCIATION OF PRESCRIPTION
ALREADY OBTAINED
CALTEX-PHILIPPINES VS. AGUIRRE, ET. AL
Caltex-Philippines cannot be permitted to assert their right to
waive the defense of prescription when they had foregone
the same through their own omission. There is no dispute
that the Aguirre's cause of action against Caltex-Philippines
has prescribed under the Civil Code. In fact, the same is
evident on the complaint itself. Aguirre brought their claim
before a Philippine court only on March 6, 2001, more than
13 years after the collision occurred. Article 1139 of the
Civil Code states that actions prescribe by the mere lapse of
time fixed by law. Accordingly, the RTC of Catbalogan
cannot be faulted for the motu proprio dismissal of the
complaint filed before it. It is settled that prescription may be
considered by the courts motu proprio if the facts supporting
the ground are apparent from the pleadings or the evidence
on record.
The RTC of Manila denied the Aguirre's motion for
intervention on the ground of the finality of the order of the
RTC of Catbalogan, there being no appeal or any other legal
remedy perfected in due time by either Caltex-Philippines or
Aguirre. Since the dismissal of the complaint was already
final and executory, the RTC of Manila can no longer
entertain a similar action from the same parties. The bone of
contention is not regarding the Caltex-Philippines' execution
of waivers of the defense of prescription, but the effect of
finality of an order or judgment on both parties. Furthermore,
Caltex-Philippines, as a mere voyage charterer, were
exonerated from third party liability in the M/V Doña Paz
collision. Should this Court allow the reinstatement of the
complaint against Caltex-Philippines, let the trial proceedings
take its course, and decide the same on the merits in favor of
Aguirre, then it would have led to the promulgation of
conflicting decisions.
Legal remedies available to Caltex-Philippines
Caltex-Philippines should have exhausted the other available
legal remedies under the law after the [RTC of Catbalogan]
denied their motion for reconsideration. Under Section 9,
Rule 37 of the [Rules of Court], the remedy against an order
denying a motion for reconsideration is not to appeal the said
order of denial but to appeal from the judgment or final order
of the court. Moreover, the Caltex-Philippines could have
availed of an action for annulment of judgment for the very
purpose of having the final and executory judgment be set
aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. An action
for annulment of judgment is grounded only on two
justifications: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or
denial of due process.
All that herein Caltex-Philippines have to prove was that the
trial court had no jurisdiction; that they were prevented from
having a trial or presenting their case to the trial court by
some act or conduct of Aguirre; or that they have been
denied due process of law. Seasonably, the Caltex-
Philippines could have also interposed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the
said order of dismissal.
ART. 1113: OBJECT OF PRESCRIPTION
REPUBLIC VS. ESPINOSA
All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is
the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by
the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
ART. 1118: POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN
OWNER
CANLAS VS. REPUBLIC
Canlas’ evidence shows that she complied with the notice
requirements and she was able to substantiate the
allegations in her application. She acquired the property by
inheritance from Honorio and Gregorio S. Apran and she and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in its continuous
possession since 1900. The testimonies of the applicant and
her witnesses proved that the applicant through her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable and
disposable parcel of land of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years.
The applicant has sufficient title proper for registration, and
we render judgment confirming it. There were sufficient
pieces of evidence to show that Canlas and her
predecessors in-interest exercised specific acts of ownership
such as: farming activities; allowing the excavation of land
for “pulang lupa” to make clay pots; paying realty taxes;
declaring the property for tax purposes; employing a
caretaker; causing corrections in entries in public documents
with regard to the land; and demanding unlawful occupants
to vacate the premises.
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree governs the applications for
registration of title to land:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion
under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall
file the application jointly.
Distinction between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529.
 Section 14(1) of P.D 1529
- Registration of title on the basis of possession.
- Registration is extended under the aegis of the
P.D. No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA).
- Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by Republic
Act No. 1472, the 30-year period is in relation to
possession without regard to the Civil Code.
 Section 14(2) of P.D 1529
- Entitles the applicant to the registration of his
property on the basis of prescription.
- Registration is made available both by P.D. No.
1529 and the Civil Code.
- The 30-year period involves extraordinary
prescription under the Civil Code, particularly
Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.
What constitutes possession
Possession involves committing acts of dominion over a
parcel of land in such a way that an owner would perform
over his or her property. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks
to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation
serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of
a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over
it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over
his own property.
The fact that a parcel of land is not declared for tax purposes
regularly, or that realty taxes are not paid on a regular basis,
does not automatically contradict the claim of possession.
Tax declarations serve as additional indicia of ownership. It
is not conclusive as to the fact of possession, occupation, or
ownership.
HEIRS OF YAMBAO VS. HEIRS OF HERMOGENES
The subject property is co-owned by the parties herein,
having inherited the same from Hermogenes. Feliciano's free
patent application indicated that he merely tacked his
possession of the subject property from Hermogenes, his
father, who held the property in peaceful, open, continuous,
and adverse manner in the concept of an owner since 1944.
This is an implicit recognition of the fact that Feliciano merely
co-owns the subject property with the other heirs of
Hermogenes. Indeed, the heirs of Feliciano have not
presented any evidence that would show that Hermogenes
bequeathed the subject property solely to Feliciano.
The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an
open and clear repudiation of any trust. In such a case, an
action to demand partition among co-owners prescribes in
10 years, the point of reference being the date of the
issuance of certificate of title over the property. But this rule
applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is
in actual possession of the property, the right to demand
partition does not prescribe.
Although the subject property was registered solely in
Feliciano's name, they are co-owners of the property and as
such is entitled to the conveyance of their shares. On the
premise that they are co-owners, they can validly seek the
partition of the property in co-ownership and the conveyance
to them of their respective shares. Moreover, when Feliciano
registered the subject property in his name, to the exclusion
of the other heirs of Hermogenes, an implied trust was
created by force of law and he was considered a trustee of
the undivided shares of the other heirs of Hermogenes in the
property. As trustees, the heirs of Feliciano cannot be
permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the registration.
ART. 1119: POSSESSION BY MERE TOLERANCE
ABALOS VS. HEIRS OF TORIO
Jaime Abalos and the Spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar
have not inherited the disputed land because the same was
shown to have already been validly sold to Marcos Torio,
who, thereupon, assigned the same to his son Vicente (heirs
of Torio). A valid sale was amply established and the said
validity subsists because the deed evidencing the same was
duly notarized. The evidence relative to the possession upon
which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear,
complete and conclusive in order to establish the
prescription. Abalos failed to present competent evidence to
prove their alleged good faith in neither possessing the
subject lot nor their adverse claim thereon.
Abalos’ possession of the lot in question was by mere
tolerance of the heirs of Torio and their predecessors in-
interest. Acts of possessory character executed due to
license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for
purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession, to
constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en
concepto de dueño, or, to use the common law equivalent of
the term, that possession should be adverse, if not, such
possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the
running of the period of prescription.
Even if the character of Abalos possession of the subject
property had become adverse, as evidenced by their
declaration of the same for tax purposes under the names of
their predecessors-in-interest, their possession still falls short
of the required period of thirty (30) years in cases of
extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Records show that the
earliest Tax Declaration in the name of Abalos was in 1974.
Reckoned from such date, the thirty-year period was
completed in 2004. However, the heirs of Torio’s complaint
was filed in 1996, effectively interrupting Abalos’ possession
upon service of summons on them. Thus, Abalos’
possession also did not ripen into ownership, because they
failed to meet the required statutory period of extraordinary
prescription.
ART. 1122-1124: NATURAL AND CIVIL INTERRUPTION
PACHECO VS. CA
ISSUE: Whether Rafael Pacheco acquired the property by
acquisitive prescription.
RULING: Yes. It was clearly established that Rafael
Pacheco started occupying the same since 1939 and that his
possession was public, open, peaceful, continuous,
uninterrupted, adverse and in the concept of owner until and
even beyond 1949. After ten years of such possession,
acquisitive prescriptive title was vested in Rafael Pacheco,
pursuant to Article 1134 of the Civil Code. Consequently,
when he mortgaged the land to the PNB, he did so not as a
mere possessor but as an owner by virtue of prescription
under Article 1134 of the Civil code. Article 1121 could no
longer apply to him because the ten-year prescriptive period
had already been completed at the time.
It follows that when Rafael Pacheco sold the land to Ciriaco
Pacheco, the latter acquired the rights of the former as
owner of the property, and not as a mere possessor thereof,
and so did Estrella Razo-Rey and Benvenuto Abitria who
derived their title from Ciriaco Pacheco. Thus, the judgment
sale in favor of Hernandez did not and could not cover the
lands claimed by Pacheco as these lots no longer belonged
to the judgment debtor when they were levied upon and sold.
That sale covered only the lands still under the ownership of
the judgment debtor and did not affect the ownership of the
property titled in the name of Pacheco.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES TANYAG VS. GABRIEL
Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial
summons to the possessor and not by filing of a mere Notice
of Adverse Claim. From 1969 until the filing of this complaint
by the heirs of spouses Tanyag in March 2000, the latter
have been in continuous, public and adverse possession of
the subject land for 31 years. Having possessed the property
for the period and in the character required by law as
sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive prescription, the heirs
of spouses tanyag have indeed acquired ownership over the
subject property. Such right cannot be defeated by Gabriel’s
acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979
and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in their name in
1998.

We uphold the heirs of spouses Tanyag’s right as owner only

with respect to Lot consisting of 686 square meters. They
failed to substantiate their claim over Lot 2 by virtue of a
deed of sale from the original declared owner, Agueda
Dinguinbayan. They failed to identify Lot 2 by providing
evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that the same
may be compared with the technical description contained in
OCT No. 1035, which would have shown whether Lot 2
consisting of 147 square meters was erroneously included in
Gabriel’s title.

ART. 1126: RECORDED TITLES AS TO THIRD PERSONS

SUPAPO VS. DE JESUS

Section 47 of PD No. 152 Registered land not subject to

prescriptions:
No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.

In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a

Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the possession
thereof. The right to possess and occupy the land is an
attribute and a logical consequence of ownership. Corollary
to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to
eject any person illegally occupying their property.

Even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title

were aware of the other persons' occupation of the property,
regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful
owners have a right to demand the return of their property at
any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or
merely tolerated, if at all.

Furthermore, even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title

because of a purported sale or transfer of the property, we
still rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens Title if the
defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of sale, a
duly registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer
or sale.

LAUSA VS. QUILATON

None of them could rightfully own Lot No. 557. Lausa’s

cancelled deed of assignment and tax declarations cannot
establish their ownership over Lot No. 557; especially since
the operation of pertinent laws prevented the possibility of
acquisitive prescription. The Quilaton’s TCT No. 571, on the
other hand, had several discrepancies indicating that it was a
fake.