G.R. No.

100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO
OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into
focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case
No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being
the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA.1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private
respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the
"People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to
stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA.
The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending
resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as
CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the
demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1
August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of
the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's
supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that
violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred,
among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency
Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the
demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein
refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business
entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that
the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of
EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority
whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the
 jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds
clearly specified by law and ordinance.8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion
to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that
they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political
rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the
contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to
by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine
of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental
motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction
over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations
of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper
tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial
body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to
dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with
little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their health,
safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the
children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's
inhumanity to man.
In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated,
however, in our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order,
directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls
were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment
for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of
its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque
Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No.
163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance
respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations
on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention
of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view,
however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariñ o v. Commission on Human Rights,24 the
Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the
first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment,"
but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that
it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts
of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this
controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it,
albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on
human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the
questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants,
representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:
 Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are
the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet
Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of
speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due
process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to
public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights,
such as the right to an education, employment, and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of
his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but
can only be recognized and protected by it.26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of
his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests
that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally
accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent
and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional
Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent
commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the
martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the
sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of
civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of
the human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable
upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then
became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and
were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until
ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition
for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were
strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term licensing.
Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost
independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were
required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof.
Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like
Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following
discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the
importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights have been
determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the
Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent
legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact
and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most
effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very
broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of
an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language
of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair
and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined
in many international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and political
rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and
there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts
and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore,
in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which
perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary
investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the
specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the international
standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and
civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect
we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really
trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights
that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution.
They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights
covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to
state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos
regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of
people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the
sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the
previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1)
protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting;
and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in
order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without
prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the
term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made
without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights,
although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human
right with other human rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I
correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It
is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other convention which may not be
specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of human
rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the
convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before
the period of amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will
fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these in
the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what
human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises.
For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to
whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil
right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights
that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political detention
and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving
disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically
related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of
individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking
his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or
political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was
referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article
therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand
it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil
and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize,
the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
 MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those
that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot
stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will
accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and
oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate — torture, salvaging,
picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons who are allegedly
guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this
Human Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the
little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think
we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this to land,
housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . .
30
 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to
all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of the
government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a
person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its
general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in
the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office,
the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe
cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3)
fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the
tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which
is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of
Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent
danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right
which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact,
extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances
obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and
rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold
any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the
procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt
could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold
relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is
not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking through
Madame Justice Carolina Griñ o-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is
never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution
refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction)
which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ,
for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which
the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the
Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available
only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and
interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the
vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there
lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the
matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot
and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the
matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain
the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR
Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from
precisely doing that.39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the
P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO
ORDONEZ, respondents.
 
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and
General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the
area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation,
formerly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing
Zone Authority (EPZA).
Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted
agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the
intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted
the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of
respondent Loreto Aledia.
Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoñ ez filed in
the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying
for "justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an
investigation of the complaint.
According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission on May 10,
1991 a verified complaint for violation of their human rights. They alleged that on March 20, 1991, at
10:00 o'clock in the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer, accompanied by his
subordinates and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer and a crane to level the area
occupied by the private respondents who tried to stop them by showing a copy of a letter from the Office
of the President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing. However, the letter was
crumpled and thrown to the ground by a member of Damondamon's group who proclaimed that: "The
President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!"
On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the private respondents to cover the happenings in
the area were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from them by members of the Philippine
National Police and some government officials and their civilian followers.
On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and
Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism,
and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appeal before the Commission on May
27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A).
On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again
bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms
at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.
On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating
her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the
contractors, and their subordinates. The order reads as follows:
Considering the sworn statements of the farmers whose farmlands are being bulldozed and
the wanton destruction of their irrigation canals which prevent cultivation at the farmlands
as well as the claim of ownership of the lands by some farmers-complainants, and their
possession and cultivation thereof spanning decades, including the failure of the officials
concerned to comply with the Constitutional provision on the eviction of rural "squatters",
the Commission reiterates its Order of May 17, 1991, and further orders the Secretary of
Public Works and Highways, their Contractors and representatives to refrain and desist
from bulldozing the farmlands of the complainants-farmers who have come to the
 Commission for relief, during the pendency of this investigation and to refrain from further
destruction of the irrigation canals in the area until further orders of the Commission.
This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9 00 a.m. and the Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways or his representative is requested to appear. (p. 20, Rollo;
emphasis supplied)
On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue
injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders.
On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the motion.
On September 11, 1991, the petitioner, through the Government Corporate Counsel, filed in this Court a
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have
no clear, positive right to be protected by an injunction; that the CHR abused its discretion in entertaining
the private respondent's complaint because the issue raised therein had been decided by this Court,
hence, it is barred by prior judgment.
On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, ordering the CHR to cease and
desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders.
In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of this Court's restraining order,
and for an order restraining petitioner EPZA from doing further acts of destruction and harassment. The
CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited
to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others, to:
a. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
b. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
c. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
d. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on
human rights. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 45, Rollo)
On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that he be excused
from filing a Comment for the CHR on the ground that the Comment filed by the latter "fully traversed
and squarely met all the issues raised and discussed in the main Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition"
(p. 83, Rollo).
Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed
violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of?
In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681, December 2, 1991, we
held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that
it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts
of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.
xxx xxx xxx
 Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters
involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and
it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights,
or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no
power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted
actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions,
and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes
despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of
relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are
justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what were the particular acts
done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for
said acts or omissions. (pp. 5 & 8.)
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed
to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were
the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law" (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs.
Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication (Garcia, et
al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et al.. G.R. Nos. 97108-09,
March 4, 1992).
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek
from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the
CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by
the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules
of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no
other purpose
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction dated May
17 and 28, 1991 issued by the respondent Commission on Human Right are here by ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE and the temporary restraining order which this Court issued on September 19, 1991, is hereby
made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Devide, Jr.,
Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Feliciano and Bellosillo, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture &
Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of
Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO,
HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO
ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor
General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by
a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a
court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission
take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is
placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of
trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter
for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially
correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together
with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the
record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them
members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their
plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and
again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass
concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without
disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no
response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their
representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary
of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS
officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more
teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to

support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4

2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5)

days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits,

Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5

3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others,

named respondents, 6
 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for
suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for
suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later
also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the
respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariñ o dated December 17, 1990,
rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by
the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9)
months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariñ o), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit,

Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due

process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9
 Both
petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals,
and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school
teachers too numerous to be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990
to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass
actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No.

90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariñ o requiring his attendance therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariñ o) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the

Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had

been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the

mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12
 The Commission thereafter issued an
13
Order   reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation
and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and
deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariñ o, of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the
Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten
the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all
documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter.
Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
x x x           x x x          x x x
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariñ o sought and was granted leave to file a
motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as
grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over
the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:

a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariñ o in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the

suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the

individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and  inter alia "ruling that it was  prima facie lawful for petitioner

Cariñ o to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17

9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariñ o's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-

affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18
 It held
that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced
without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and
political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost
respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by
the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991
in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of
petitioner Cariñ o, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's
joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and
resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to
try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition
of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with
which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality
and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of
Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on
said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant
by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23

 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its
powers and functions are the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for

preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the

truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically

grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint

of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of

Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of

documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of

its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the

popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study

closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27
 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into
by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry
or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to
find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to
make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the
exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial
or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the

rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30
 And "adjudge" means "to
decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in
a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To

pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved

in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against

the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to

"resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b)

whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this

effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances

complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the

Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33
 and it appears that appeals have
been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself
has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence;

whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth

committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to

the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil

Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to

what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they

anticipated would be adverse to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by

Secretary Cariñ o, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court.

The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariñ o was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that

would be the Civil Service Commission. 35

 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and
the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to
hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ,
concur.